

**UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE**

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**Izboljševanje regionalne varnosti z doktrino Izgradnja
zmogljivosti partnerja (IZP) v Zahodnem Balkanu**

**Enhancing Regional Security Through Building Partner Capacity
in the Western Balkans**

Magistrsko delo

Ljubljana, 2016

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ABSTRACT

Enhancing Regional Security Through Building Partner Capacity in the Western Balkans

Since 2006, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) has emerged as a preferred approach by the United States to project and strengthen stability and security. Due to the uncertain nature of future conflicts and the rising costs involved with resolving conflicts, BPC is an attractive approach because its low costs enable its application to more countries. BPC can be used to build numerous facets of a Partner Nation's capacity to provide security, from building the capacity of special operations forces to building the capacity of defense institutions to manage their resources. Yet the historical record indicates that BPC is more effective with some Partners over others and is more effective at achieving certain strategic objectives than others. The security and stability of the Western Balkans is essential to the security of NATO and the stability of the EU – two entities the United States perceives as vital to its own security. America's application of BPC in the Western Balkans, particularly with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, represents the United States' commitment to the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, but the question is whether or not the U.S. is doing BPC well? The goal of the Thesis is to evaluate U.S. BPC in Serbia and Bosnia and determine how it could be better utilized to build security in those countries and perhaps the wider Western Balkan region.

Key Words: Regional Security, Building Partner Capacity, BPC, United States of America, Western Balkans

POVZETEK

Izboljševanje regionalne varnosti z doktrino Izgradnja zmogljivosti partnerja (IZP) v Zahodnem Balkanu

Vse od leta 2006, ko je bila implementirana doktrina Izgradnja zmogljivosti partnerja (IZP) s strani Združenih držav Amerike, je ta postala najbolj zaželeno na področju stabilizacije in krepitve miru v regijah. Zaradi velike negotovosti na področju bodočih varnostnih izzivov ter naraščanju stroškov, ki jih namenjajo ZDA v reševanje konfliktov, je prav IZP doktrina bodočnosti. IZP je doktrina s ciljem podpore in krepitve najbolj bistvenim komponentam nacionalno-varnostnega sistema držav partneric. Kljub temu pa je ob implementaciji doktrine IZP postalo jasno, da ta ne zagotavlja povsem enakih uspehov v različnih državah partnericah. Varnost in stabilnost Zahodnega Balkana sta bistveni vrednoti tako za Severnoatlantsko zavezništvo kot tudi EU, ki pa ju tudi ZDA dojemajo kot bistvena partnerja pri zagotavljanju lastne varnosti. ZDA z uporabo doktrine IZP v regiji Zahodnega Balkana koordinira te napore z omenjenima regionalnima organizacijama, kljub temu pa ostaja vprašanje, kako uspešna je pri tem in kakšni do varnostni rezultati? Cilj magistrskega dela je vrednotiti napore in uspehe doktrine IZP v dveh študijah primerov: Republiki Srbiji ter Bosni in Hercegovini na eni strani ter iskanju potencialov izboljšave tako pri implementaciji IZP v izbranih primerih kot tudi v regiji, na drugi.

Ključne besede: regionalna varnost, doktrina Izgradnja zmogljivosti partnerja (IZP), ZDA, Zahodni Balkan

ABBREVIATIONS

A5	The Adriatic Charter
ANDSF	Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces
BBA15	Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
C4	Command, Control, Coordination and Communication
CCP	Country Cooperation Plan
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DoJ	U.S. Department of Justice
DoS	U.S. Department of State
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EU	European Union
FFRDC	Federally Funded Research and Development Center
GAO	U.S. Government Accountability Office
GI	Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index
HDI	Human Development Index
IS	Islamic State
LOA	Line of Activity
NDAA	National Defense Authorization and Appropriations Act
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODC	U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation
PN	Partner Nation
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RF	Russian Federation
RSC	Regional Security Complex
SECDEF	United States Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	United States Secretary of State
TI	Transparency International
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
WGI	World Governance Indicators Index

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Introduction

Several issues dominate the contemporary security conversation, including the situation in Ukraine, Russia's resurgence, Iran's nuclear program, the Islamic State (IS), China's territorial claims in the South China Sea and North Korea, to name a few. Ten years ago not many strategists foresaw that Russia would attempt to destabilize parts of Ukraine using a combination of overt and covert actions in conjunction with state and non-state resources (a concept which has since been termed "hybrid" warfare) and in the process annex Crimea. Additionally, not many predicted that Islamic extremists would take over large swaths of northern Iraq and eastern Syria to proclaim a new Islamic caliphate. Moreover, not many policymakers and scholars predicted the enormous waves of migration these conflicts precipitated. The conflicts in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq illustrate a fundamental concept of contemporary security: that successfully predicting the location and nature of future conflict is virtually impossible. In light of this, U.S. policymakers face a dilemma: how to best utilize American military power to prevent conflict, if it can, and respond to conflict when it must?

America's record of successfully predicting conflicts is poor. In a 2011 speech at the United States Military Academy, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates discussed the future of warfare and America's ability to prepare for it:

When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. *We have never once gotten it right*, from Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more – we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged (R. M. Gates 2011, 1).

The implication for policymakers is that because the nature and location of future conflicts cannot be known with certainty, America's military must be trained and equipped to deliver the full range of military capabilities (from humanitarian relief to nuclear war) anywhere.

The cost of maintaining the readiness of the United States military to deliver this capability is enormous. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA15) set the Department of Defense's (DoD) budget for fiscal year 2016 at \$522 billion and also set the Department's budget for fiscal year 2017 at \$525 billion (Pellerin 2015). Despite the fiscal relief BBA15 brings to the DoD, the Department could still face between \$800 billion and \$900 billion in cuts over ten years from the Budget Control Act of 2011 if a deal in the U.S. Congress is not reached to prevent sequester-level cuts in FY 2018. In light of the fiscal uncertainty facing the DoD, which limits its ability to invest in capabilities and capacities to confront an uncertain future filled with unknown challenges, it is forced to prioritize between confronting emerging threats and investing in

capabilities to meet future threats. Consequently, DoD has sought innovative, and less costly, solutions to meet its security objectives.

This paper defines BPC as the provision of training and equipment by one or more governments to improve the security capacity of Partner Nations which share common security interests in a manner that is endogenous, transformative and sustainable.

One of those solutions comes in the form of Building Partner Capacity (BPC). This paper defines BPC as the provision of training and equipment by one or more governments to improve the security capacity of Partner Nations which share common security interests in a manner that is endogenous, transformative and sustainable. Over the last fifteen years successive U.S. administrations have increasingly prioritized efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces, especially

in weak and failing states. According to McInnis and Lucas (2015), proponents argue that enhancing the capacity of foreign allies and partners to deliver security advances U.S. national security objectives. As a result, the Department of Defense has invested billions of dollars in BPC. Within the DoD, BPC encompasses a broad set of missions and authorities which are intended to improve the ability of other nations to achieve the security goals they share with the United States and thus contribute to U.S. national security objectives. (McInnis and Lucas 2015, 6)¹ BPC was a vitally important in the 2003-2011 Iraq campaign and is a core component of the ongoing campaigns in Afghanistan to counter Al Qaeda and the Taliban and in Iraq and Syria to counter the Islamic State (IS). Recent events, however, have raised doubts about the effectiveness of BPC in advancing U.S. security interests. The inability of DoD-led efforts to produce more than a few anti-Assad, anti-IS forces in Syria and the collapse of U.S.-trained Iraqi forces under attack by IS in 2014 indicate there are limitations to what BPC can achieve.

This paper examines the BPC efforts of the United States in two countries of the Western Balkans – Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It argues that BPC, as a security policy, has the

¹ In a sense, BPC can be perceived as a blend of so-called hard and soft power. According to Nye (2004) soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye 2004, 256). Hard power, on the other hand, “grows out of a country’s military and economic might” (Ibid.). The U.S. does not coerce other countries to accept BPC, though it does provide incentives (through funding) to build new capacities. Rather, the U.S. applies BPC in coordination with the Partner Country. Because BPC aims to build security capacity, it can be perceived as a tool to grow the hard power of another country. But because BPC seeks to transform mindsets and cultures as part of a sustainable long-term reform process, it must attract Partner Nations and induce them to adopt new policies, procedures, etc. Thus, while the results of BPC (increased security capacity) can be viewed as hard power, its application, especially through exposure to fundamental tenants of U.S. and NATO militaries like transparency, rule of law and democratic control of the military, is designed to showcase U.S. and NATO culture and values, which are examples of soft-power.

potential to significantly contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building in the region and, consequently, represents a paradigmatic evolution of the theory of conflict prevention. Given the Western Balkans' unique socio-political challenges and its potential impact as a flashpoint for NATO and the European Union, it is beneficial to assess whether or not America's BPC activities in the region incorporate the lessons-learned and practices that most strongly correlate with BPC effectiveness. In a sense, the Western Balkans represent a proving ground for BPC as the next evolution of conflict prevention and peace-building. Given America's current fiscal constraints and the strain regional states face as a result of immigration, there is a pressing need to ensure stability does not deteriorate. If successful, the implications for building stability and security in other conflict-riddled regions, from Central America to Africa, are significant.

1 Methodology

1.1 Terminology

BPC first emerged as U.S. defense policy with the term *Building Partnership Capacity*, which originated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (Rumsfeld 2006, 2). Its meaning expanded and evolved over time as it became increasingly incorporated in U.S. strategic security documents. BPC is prolific in the 2006 QDR, which describes BPC as building the capacity of foreign states' security forces and institutions to deliver security. The 2006 QDR lays out the reasoning behind BPC and identifies three distinct ways in which BPC contributes to American security objectives. First, it assures and bolsters the American military's access to valuable geography. BPC builds relationships of trust between the U.S. and its partners. These relationships are essential to maintain U.S. military access to the venues it needs for operations - ports, airports, airspace, waterways, etc. This enables American forces to go where they must to confront threats. Second, BPC shifts the burden of providing security around the world from the American military to other states by building the capacity of foreign security forces. This frees American military resources and personnel to invest in other strategic priorities such as cutting edge military technologies and high readiness levels. Finally, through BPC, the United States enables foreign governments to better provide security and opportunity for their own citizens and thereby eliminates lawless regions in which violent extremist organizations (VEOs) can take refuge and flourish.² These three security dividends of BPC – enabling greater access for U.S.

² It must be noted that enhanced security capacity by itself does not necessarily address the so called root causes of discontent and conflict. As a result, the 2006 QDR calls for “the establishment of effective representative civil

forces; spreading the costs of global security among more nations; and denying VEOs refuge by eliminating safe-havens afforded by fragile, failing and failed states – represent the benefits of BPC as a broad security strategy.

BPC is not without risks though. First, there is a problem of accountability. Once new security capacity is built, there is no guarantee that a PN will not use its newly built security capacity for purposes that run counter to U.S. security interests, such as, for example, violently repressing public dissent using new tactics or equipment. Since the 1990s, the U.S. Congress has sought to mitigate the chance that U.S. military assistance contributes to human rights violations. First sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy in the late 1990s, the "Leahy laws" (sometimes referred to as the "Leahy amendments") prohibit providing assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act to any foreign security force unit where there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights (McInnis and Lucas 2015). Another safeguard is the prohibition on the use of DoD funds to support any training program (as defined by DoD) involving members of a unit of a foreign security or police force if the unit had committed a gross violation of human rights (Ibid.). Despite these protections, there still exists the possibility that PN's may use what they learn or receive through BPC in a manner that violates human rights or is contrary to U.S. interests.

In addition to the problem of accountability, there is the problem of dependence. There exists the possibility that BPC will expand PN dependence on the U.S. for the provision of equipment, training or funds. This runs counter to the very nature of BPC, which is to *decrease* others' dependence on the U.S. to provide security. Though the U.S. attempts to structure BPC to ensure new PN capacities are domestically sustainable, even after the withdraw of U.S. assistance, there is no guarantee that new capacities will be sustained. A PN could jeopardize its new capacity in many ways, either by mismanaging funds or failing to maintain new equipment, for example. Finally, there exists the risk that BPC will be perceived by a PN or its citizens as an attempt by the U.S. to *create* dependence, especially with respect to the provision of equipment. Advocating the usage by PNs of American military equipment ensures a certain degree of interoperability, but also furthers the interests of America's military industrial base. The U.S. must take care to ensure BPC is not perceived as some form of *imperialism*, otherwise it may foment anti-U.S. sentiment.

societies around the world [because] the allure of freedom is the best long-term counter to the ideology of the extremists" (Rumsfeld 2006, 22)

Table 1.1 – The Evolution of conceptions of BPC through U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review Reports

QDR year	Distinguishing trait of BPC
2006	BPC should help the U.S. maintain a long-term, low-visibility presence in parts of the world where U.S. forces do not traditionally operate
2006	BPC should focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations
2010	BPC should deal with threats that emanate from state weakness rather than state strength
2010	BPC authorities apply in situations without a neat divide between defense, diplomacy and development
2010	Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations are an increasingly critical component of BPC
2014	BPC includes improving partners’ peacekeeping and counterterrorism capabilities and applies especially in fragile states


Source: McInnis and Lucas (2015)

Nevertheless, despite the risks of BPC, it is logical as a security strategy if one accepts, as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued, that the contemporary security environment is one where “the most likely and lethal threats will likely emanate from fractured or failing states, rather than aggressor states” (R. Gates 2010, 1). Initially, BPC began as a concept that was linked with DoD’s activities to increase the capabilities of international partners who were known as failed, failing or fragile states. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the QDR reports between 2006 and the current 2014 version present an evolving conceptualization of BPC. As a result, BPC has become a preferred means by which the United States pursues its national security objectives (McInnis and Lucas 2015, 6). Table 1.1 (above) depicts this evolution.

The 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) seems to broaden BPC’s scope by linking it to both counterterrorism, which is generally conducted in fragile states, and building alliances and coalitions, which is normally conducted with more durable states and U.S. allies. By preserving alliances, expanding partnerships, maintaining a global stabilizing presence and conducting training, exercises, security cooperation activities and military-to-military engagement, argues the NMS, the U.S. increases the capabilities and capacity of partners, “thereby enhancing our

[America’s and its partners’] collective ability to deter aggression and defeat extremists” (JCS 2015, 9). In short, the term BPC has evolved significantly in U.S. strategic security documents over the last ten years. BPC has evolved from a post-9/11 counterterrorism approach applied narrowly to fragile states to a primary means through which the U.S. seeks to accomplish national security objectives in cooperation with its allies and partners.

Figure 1.1 – Varying Conceptions of BPC



According to the CRS, Congress perceives BPC as the narrow set of programs it specifically legislates and DoD seems to perceive it as any security capacity building activity aimed at a partner and also as a security strategy in its own right. Source: McInnis & Lucas (2015, 13)

In contrast to DoD’s understanding of BPC as an approach to achieving security, which includes a wide range of potential missions, Congress, according to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), views BPC in a much narrower sense. According to CRS, Congress tends to perceive BPC as the set of specific programs managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).³ The DSCA manages twelve programs categorized as either *Security Cooperation* or

³ An example of this is the U.S. Army’s recent strategy of regionally aligning its combat forces. The Army defines regionally aligned forces as, “The Army defines Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) as: 1) those units assigned or allocated to combatant commands, and 2) those service-retained, combatant command-aligned forces prepared by the Army for regional missions” (Cantwell, Warren and Orwat 2015, 5). Regionally aligned forces means that the Army’s combat units will focus their training (how they fight, how they partner with foreign forces, how they understand the region’s cultures and history) to deploy to the Pacific region instead of the European region, for

Security Assistance activities, which are a subset of Security Cooperation. According to the DSCA, Security Cooperation “comprises all activities undertaken by the DoD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives” (DSCA 2016, 1.1). Security Cooperation and Security Assistance programs are distinguished by the statutes by which they are authorized and funded. Security Cooperation program authorizations and appropriations are provided to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) primarily under the National Defense Authorization and Appropriations Act (NDAA). They are sometimes required to be exercised in coordination with the Secretary of State (SECSTATE). Security Assistance programs include programs through which the U.S. provides “defense articles, military education and training, and other defense related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease in furtherance of national policies and objectives” (DSCA 2016, 1.1.2.2). All Security Assistance programs are subject to the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State.


Figure 1.1 (above) is taken from a CRS study and it nicely depicts how understandings of BPC differ between Congress and DoD (McInnis and Lucas 2015). According to the CRS (2015), Congress tends to view BPC as a narrow set of programs is depicted by the orange circle in the middle. The white circle depicts DoD’s security cooperation activities that are led by DSCA, including security, security sector and BPC activities; the white circle depicts how congress tends to view DoD’s role in security cooperation and assistance. However, as America’s strategic security documents (QDR, NMS, etc.) indicate, the DoD views Security Cooperation, and by extension BPC, as much broader than those programs managed by DSCA. The green circle depicts just some of a vast array of programs and activities designed to support the overarching rationale of BPC, such as military-to-military exchanges and intelligence sharing (Ibid.). The final element is the grey shaded oval in the background. This represents DoD’s use of BPC as a strategic rationale in its own right. As the diagram suggests, the term BPC is used to represent a variety of different U.S. programs and activities.

The process for formulating BPC strategies between the DoD and DoS is fairly straightforward and is depicted in Figure 1.2. The most significant characteristic of this process is the joint

example. The expectation of this regional alignment is that the Army’s forces will possess a greater understanding of their potential operational environment and thus be more effective war-fighters and peace-builders. In the role of peacebuilders, this regional alignment may yield more effective BPC. But the Army’s regionally aligned forces concept is not termed a “BPC” program in the way, for example, that the DSCA classifies its 1206 Global Train & Equip program. This is the difference between conceptions of BPC as a broad security approach or as a set of specific programs.

formulation and joint concurrence that, according to Perry et. al (2013), “put State and DoD on equal footing to determine the best application of limited resources and/or to design capacity building projects together to meet the most pressing needs” (Perry 2013, 19). This process ensures that DoD BPC activities are designed to complement overarching U.S. foreign policy goals. More information on how.

Figure 1.2 – DoD & DoS Interagency Process for BPC



Source: Perry (2013)

BPC is not solely the purview of the U.S. government. Other state governments and multinational organizations, such as NATO for example, conduct BPC.⁴ Recently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) recognized the concept of BPC as an essential component of collective defense.⁵ In the 2014 Wales Declaration, NATO heads of state launched the

⁴ How other governments, especially NATO Allies, such as France and the United Kingdom, bilaterally conduct BPC with their own Partner Nations is a promising area of research that may yield valuable experiential lessons for the United States. As one staff officer from the U.S. European Command Joint Staff lamented to the author, in regards to BPC, the U.S. knows only how to make other militaries resemble the U.S. military. This research area, however, is beyond the scope of this work.

⁵ BPC is, in essence, undertaken by two or more governments by mutual agreement. Article 52 of the UN Charter states, “nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” (United Nations 1946, Art. 52). BPC is, at a minimum, a bilateral arrangement that relates to

Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative to, “reinforce our commitment to partner nations and to help the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces, as part of the Alliance’s overall contribution to international security and stability and conflict prevention” (NATO 2014, 89). This formal initiative builds on NATO’s extensive experience supporting, advising and assisting nations with defense and related security capacity building. In response to requests from nations for support, this Initiative was extended to Georgia, Jordan and the Republic of Moldova in 2014 and Iraq in 2015. *Defense and Related Capacity Building*, the term NATO uses for its capacity building activities, is becoming a central task of the alliance. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2016, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg highlighted the critical task of helping partners build their defense capacity. “We project stability,” noted Mr. Stoltenberg, “not always with forces, but with training and helping to defend” (NATO 2016, 2). Consequently, while the terminology used may differ slightly (DoD’s *Building Partner Capacity* versus NATO’s *Defense and Related Security Capacity Building*), the concepts are the same – building the capacity of partner states to provide security.

NATO’s recent venture into the realm of BPC poses some questions that must be sorted out. For example, which Ally will provide which BPC activity? How will the costs of BPC be allocated within the Alliance? How will activities be coordinated to ensure maximum interoperability and minimum waste during BPC? NATO must take steps to ensure that a minimum level of interoperability between its forces and the forces of Partner Nations exists as a foundation for BPC, but at the same time prevent interoperability issues from limiting NATO’s intent to conduct BPC with as many states as desire it.

As previously mentioned, this paper defines BPC as the provision of training and equipment by one or more governments to improve the security capacity of Partner Nations which share common security interests in a manner that is endogenous, transformative and sustainable. The goal of the work is to evaluate whether or not U.S. Department of Defense BPC activities in the Western Balkans incorporate best practices from research on capacity development and building security capacity. This paper analyzes DoD BPC programs and activities in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It presents a foundational conception of BPC as security strategy, as understood by DoD, in order to provide an analytical “starting point” from which its analysis

the maintenance of international peace and security and, as a result, does not require explicit authorization by the UN Security Council.

proceeds. DoD strategies in the target countries to improve their security are evaluated. Results indicate that BPC, depending on the strategic objective towards which it is oriented (e.g. building interpersonal and institutional linkages and alliance building), is applicable to the Western Balkans. Furthermore, results suggest that current U.S. BPC activities could be adjusted to offer not only a greater probability of effectiveness within PN security sectors, but also potentially enable spillover benefits to other sectors within Partner Nations.

1.2 Research Methods

Analyzing United States’ BPC activities presents two methodological challenges. First, no official comprehensive evaluative framework or benchmark exists uniformly across the U.S. Government let alone the Department of Defense. The United States Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS) and Department of Justice (DoJ) alongside the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) all play a role in building the capacity of partner nations, though with different developmental goals in different sectors (see Figure 1.3).⁶

Figure 1.3 – Sectors of Development for U.S. Government Agencies

U.S. Government Stakeholder	Development Sector
DoD	Defense and Security
USAID	Economy and Governance
US Department of Homeland Security	Customs and Border Protection
Department of Justice	Rule of Law, Legal, & Penal systems

Note: This is a very general depiction of the specific sectors on which specific U.S. Government agencies focus their development activities. There can be, at times, considerable overlap when Partner Nation agencies do not directly correlate with U.S. agencies. An example of this is a foreign national constabulary force, such as Italy’s Carabinieri.

⁶ The Department of Defense is, generally speaking, the lead organization for *executing* BPC, whereas the Department of State has statutory authority to *oversee* BPC, depending on the program involved. The Department of Justice is involved with developing Partner Nation civilian justice systems, including laws, courts and jails, for example. The U.S. Agency for International Development is the lead U.S. organization for developing Partner Nation economies and governance institutions. The Department of Homeland Security has responsibility for development customs and border protection development. While the concept of security itself can be understood to encompass much more than the military dimension, this paper limits its analysis of BPC to military and Ministry/Department of Defense activities.

Each agency is responsible for creating, resourcing, managing and evaluating its own reform initiatives. These can be executed jointly between agencies, wholly by an agency itself, or outsourced by one agency to another or to a third party. As a result of this complexity, the agencies themselves maintain internal evaluative frameworks, which can vary from one initiative to the next. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted that more often than not BPC initiatives do not contain adequate evaluative metrics and that developing good metrics is difficult.⁷ Second, a number of American BPC efforts in the Western Balkans are classified or sensitive in nature.⁸ Due to the inaccessibility of data on every BPC activity, the observations made and conclusions reached herein are, unavoidably, incomplete to some extent.

In terms of source material, this Master's thesis draws on three primary categories of sources. First, official government and organizational sources including from the United States Government, the Governments of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO, and the United Nations, to name a few, are analyzed. Second, scholarly and academic sources are reviewed in order to distill the most salient points of the growing, albeit small, body of research on BPC. Finally, the thesis presents an analysis of first-hand information and material obtained through personal interviews with U.S. military personnel from U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and the Chiefs of U.S. Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The research and analysis based on these sources is presented through three analytical perspectives. The first is that of the individual state. This level of analysis seeks to portray the perspective of the United States on BPC. The second level of analysis is the regional level. This level of analysis represents the perspectives of a regional security organization (NATO) whose purview includes the Western Balkans.⁹ Finally, the global level of analysis presents the perspectives of the United Nations, World Bank and other globally oriented organizations who

⁷ A 2013 report from the United States Government Accountability Office noted that as of 2010, the DoD and DoS had conducted little monitoring and evaluation of the Section 1206 (a global train and equip program) security assistance program. Of 149 approved proposals, for example, for Section 1206 projects for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, "only 32 percent (48 proposals) defined measures of effectiveness or anticipated outcomes" (St. Laurent 2013, 15)

⁸ No classified or sensitive information on what the U.S. is doing where, with whom and for what purpose in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is contained in this work.

⁹ The EU is another regional organization that conducts capacity development activities in the Western Balkans. The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), for example, has worked to build the rule of law in Kosovo since April 2009 (EULEX Kosovo 2016). Because the EU is not an organization primarily focused on security, however, its capacity building activities are not evaluated here.

work to build capacity in a more general sense. The purpose of these three levels of analysis is to cast as wide a net as possible in the search for fundamental guidelines, lessons-learned and correlates of effectiveness that pertain to BPC.

1.3 Research Questions

As noted previously, DoD seems to perceive BPC as a broad approach that advances U.S. security objectives. How did the DoD arrive at this conception of BPC? How does its perception of the current security context impact its understanding of BPC and, moreover, is this perception in line with the perceptions of other security institutions (i.e., NATO), other branches of the U.S. government (Congress) and current scholarly opinions? These are just some of the research focus points that comprise the first research question (RQ1): *What is BPC and why is it important?*

As noted in Section 1.2., it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of BPC programs because the DoD does not maintain a department-wide system or process to evaluate the effectiveness of its BPC programs. Nor is information about them tracked with the granular level of detail necessary to enable deep analysis. Moreover, for DoD itself to be the sole adjudicator of whether or not its BPC programs are effective presents, to some degree, a conflict of interest – the DoD has skin in the game, so to speak. As a result, this Master’s Thesis draws from the research of organizations outside the DoD (though some do receive funding from DoD) in order to identify what works when conducting BPC.¹⁰ It seeks to identify those environmental conditions, programmatic activities and strategic objectives that correlate to effectiveness in BPC. Essentially, it attempts to distill vital lessons-learned about BPC from DoD, NATO and other capacity building organizations. This leads to the second research question (RQ2): *What elements of BPC most strongly correlate to its effectiveness?*

Having identified BPC’s correlates of effectiveness, the Thesis turns to its target region of analysis, which is the countries of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reason for focusing

¹⁰ The RAND Corporation, for example, is a non-profit policy research institution. It operates three Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) to assist the U.S. Government with scientific research, analysis and development. Working in the public interest, FFRDCs operate as long-term strategic partners with their sponsoring government agencies. The three FFRDCs are: the RAND Arroyo Center, which is sponsored by the U.S. Army; RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), sponsored by the U.S. Air Force; and the RAND National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), sponsored by a number of federal defense organizations. Because RAND operates these three FFRDCs, it states, “we do not accept funds (i.e., project sponsorship or philanthropic support) from firms or segments of firms whose primary business is that of supplying equipment, materiel, or services to the U.S. Department of Defense.” More information on RAND can be found here: <http://www.rand.org/about/faq.html>

on these two countries within the Western Balkans region is derived from Barry Buzan's theory of the Regional Security Complex. A Regional Security Complex (RSC), according to Buzan, "is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another" (Buzan 1991, Chap 5). The principal factor defining a complex, writes Buzan, "is usually a high level of threat/fear which is felt *mutually* among two or more major states" (Buzan 1991, Chap 5). The security rhetoric states use toward each other, their military deployments and postures and the record of their conflicts are all indicators of the presence of a RSC. Using this criteria – inseparable national security concerns and patterns of amity/enmity - it is reasonable to perceive Serbia and Bosnia as a special security complex within the Western Balkans. One cannot consider the security situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina without also considering that of Serbia, and vice versa. This leads to the third research question (RQ3): *In consideration of the BPC correlates of effectiveness, are the current environments in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina conducive to BPC?*

This paper argues that BPC can be better utilized to maximize the likelihood of its effectiveness in Serbia and Bosnia. This implies that current U.S. BPC activities in these states do not reflect at least some of the BPC correlates of effectiveness to the maximum extent possible. One correlate of BPC effectiveness, for example, is whether or not the strategic interests of the partner nation align with those of the United States. Serbia aspires to join the European Union. The U.S. government supports Serbia's EU aspirations. Much work needs to be done, including in the sectors of governance and the rule of law. U.S. BPC has the potential to assist Serbia in this sector, especially with respect to its defense institutions such as the Serbian Ministry of Defense. In terms of strategic security interests, though, Serbia's position on Kosovo places it at odds with the U.S. government. Do U.S. BPC programs and activities in Serbia take into account this apparent divergence in strategic security interests? This leads to the fourth and final research question (RQ4): *In consideration of BPC's correlates of effectiveness and the current environment in Serbia and Bosnia, can United States BPC activities be adjusted to increase the likelihood of their effectiveness and thereby better enhance security?*

2 Theoretical Aspects of BPC

Building partner capacity describes not only DoD activities designed to build the capacity of partner nations to provide security but also the overarching theory that doing so helps to achieve the strategic security objectives of the United States. By helping other states better provide their own security, so the rationale goes, they are better able to govern their own territory, are more stable and become net providers of security to their immediate region. That BPC has permeated DoD activities so thoroughly indicates the Department and the U.S. government deeply believe building the capacity of partners is the new security paradigm. This is predicated on the broader theory of conflict prevention because increased levels of security and stability are assumed to prevent conflict. The question remains: What is BPC, what does it mean to other security stakeholders and, more importantly, why is it important? Consequently, an exploration of the theoretical aspects of BPC is required.

In order to gain a more complete understanding of the theoretical aspects of BPC, it is necessary to first understand the current security context. Security, writes Grizold, is the opposite of insecurity or threat, of which there are many sources including nature, society and relations among societies (Grizold, et al. 2012, 15). The international community has often responded to crises and threats to international peace in a reactive manner. Theorists and policymakers today generally agree that preventing violent conflicts is preferable to responding after the outbreak of violence. Grizold defines conflict prevention as “a range of policy actions and instruments designed to (i) either prevent a foreseen, perhaps imminent, *initial* outbreak of violence, *or* (ii) to prevent the recurrence of violence after it has been halted, *or* (iii) to prevent its further escalation after it has been contained” (Grizold et. al., 2012, p. 33). The new security context is characterized by the growing acceptance of conflict prevention and conflict transformation among security stakeholders.

One of the most important contemporary works that brought the concept of conflict prevention onto the center stage of international diplomacy was the publishing of UN Secretary General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (1992). In *An Agenda for Peace*, the UNSG introduced the term preventive diplomacy, which he defined as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, par 20). The purpose of preventive diplomacy is to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt

conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, notes Boutros-Ghali, “they can strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples” (Ibid., par. 21). Peace-building entails activities in all societal sectors, including rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war. Ultimately, wrote the UNSG, the aim of the UN must be to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression (Ibid., par. 15). Consequently, the new security context is one in which conflict prevention continues to appeal to policymakers who seek creative and less coercive ways of addressing conflict. Over the past ten years, BPC appears to have emerged as a preferred approach through which the United States seeks to prevent conflict by building its partners’ capacity to provide security.

Capacity building efforts by the United Nations, NATO, the United States Government and others to address the root causes of conflict and also to improve the foundations of peace, which Boutros-Ghali mentioned above, reflect the importance of conflict prevention in the post-Cold War era. Of particular interest to this paper is the capacity development programs undertaken by NATO and the U.S. government in the defense and security sector. It is generally acknowledged that helping a partner government identify potential causes of conflict, transparently address those causes and do so in a manner that is domestically sustainable and perceived as legitimate by its citizens is far better than imposing reform. In light of this, a great surge of interest in capacity development characterizes the contemporary security dialogue. The UN, NATO and the United States all recognize the importance of developing nations’ ability to successfully address problems on their own. Thus, in terms of improving the foundation of international peace and security, capacity development is vitally important.

What exactly is so-called capacity development? How is it different from other forms of aid? To answer these questions, we look to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Drawing from decades of experience in the development field, across myriad sectors, in numerous countries, UNDP possesses an incredibly informed perspective on building capacity. Capacity development, notes UNDP, is most successful from the ground up and from the inside out. It starts from the principle that people are best empowered to realize their full potential when the means of development are sustainable. Sustainability stems from action that it is home-grown, which means it is generated and managed collectively by those who stand to benefit (UNDP 2009). An essential ingredient in the UNDP capacity development approach is the idea

of transformation and the need for it to be generated and sustained over time from within. If some activity or effort does not lead to change that is generated, guided and sustained by those whom it is meant to benefit, then it cannot be said to have enhanced capacity, even if it has served a valid *development* purpose. Consequently, capacity development from the perspective of the UNDP is more a matter of changing mindsets and attitudes than about performing tasks; it is about *transforming institutional culture*, which in turn provides momentum for sustained efforts to improve and reform institutions.

The UNDP conclusion that capacity development is about transformation is the result of decades of real-world experience. Early attempts to meet the needs of developing countries entailed the delivery of development aid in the form of grants and loans (Ibid, p. 8). This practice resulted in a greater emphasis on investment and reporting than on results. Recipient countries grew increasingly dependent on foreign aid and when the aid stopped, so too did development projects. The practice of providing development aid gave way to providing technical assistance to developing countries (Ibid.). Technical assistance took the form of foreign experts who came to manage their own projects. This practice resulted in development projects that were disconnected from local goals or priorities and led to dependence on foreign experts. Moreover, technical expertise was not always transferred to the recipient country. The practice of providing technical assistance then gave way to the practice of developed countries partnering with developing ones to facilitate technical *cooperation* (Ibid). While local expertise was enhanced and projects were somewhat more oriented toward local priorities and goals, the development process was externally driven and opportunities to develop local institutions and capacities were missed.

As a result of these experiences, the present UNDP approach to capacity development is focused on empowering and strengthening endogenous (local) capabilities. This approach maximizes the utilization of local resources. It favors sustainable change through deep, lasting transformations of institutions and their policies and values '*best fit*' over '*best practice*,' acknowledging that one size does not fit all (Ibid). Thus, the best capacity development is endogenous and transforms mindsets – these two factors ensure that the process of development is sustained over the long-term, which means a greater probability of success.

The UN has played a large role in building the capacity of the civilian side of the security sector (i.e. civilian police, legal and penal systems) and also a role, though more limited, in security

sector reform through its peacekeeping forces.^{11 12} But primary responsibility for training and providing forces to support UN operations falls on individual nations. This Thesis limits its analysis to BPC that is conducted by national militaries and international defense organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO's 2014 Wales Summit reaffirmed the importance of capacity building to the Alliance's security. The Wales Summit launched NATO's Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative to, "reinforce our commitment to partner nations and to help the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces, as part of the Alliance's overall contribution to international security and stability and conflict prevention" (NATO, 2014, par 89). The Wales Summit also created the position of Deputy Secretary General as Special Coordinator for Defense Capacity Building and called for the establishment of a military hub in the NATO Command Structure to "help ensure a timely, coherent and effective NATO response, taking into account efforts by partners and individual allies, on a voluntary basis (Ibid.)." Thus, the Wales summit further underscored the importance of BPC to international security.¹³

From these developments, I make several observations about NATO's perspective on BPC. First, BPC is vitally important to the security of the Alliance. By building the defense capacity of its partners, NATO believes it will be better able to project stability, and according to Secretary General Stoltenberg, at low cost. Stability is important in its own right, but this also means that Allies can shift their limited defense resources to other areas such as readiness and

¹¹ For over 50 years, the UN has worked to develop nations' law and justice systems, which are critical to security. For example, the United Nations has deployed police officers for service in peace operations since 1960 (Congo). UN Police Forces (UNPOL) are constituted within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Beginning in the 1990s, advisory, mentoring and training functions were integrated into traditional police activities of monitoring, observing and reporting. In 2016, over 15,000 UN Police officers have been authorized for deployment in 17 UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding and political operations globally (UN Police 2016). These are valuable and, generally speaking, essential contributions to building a state's overall level of security, but because they are not focused on the development of a nation's military or defense ministry, they are not analyzed here.

¹² More than 40 UN Peacekeeping Training Institutions (PKTIs) are operated by the UN and individual nations around the world (UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub 2016). Examples include the Bundeswehr UN Training Center in Germany and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana. Peacekeepers can play a role in so-called peacebuilding through the mandate of Security Sector Reform (UN Peacebuilding Support Office 2016). In this instance, peacekeepers actually conduct BPC because they attempt to build the capacity of nations to provide security. How the UN trains peacekeepers varies greatly from institution to institution and is beyond the scope of this thesis. But it does represent a promising area for further research.

¹³ The U.S. uses the term "Building Partner Capacity" and NATO uses the term "Defense and Related Security Capacity Building" and "Defense Capacity Building" to mean essentially the same thing. For clarity, this paper uses the term BPC in reference to U.S. DoD *and* NATO activities that build security capacity. Recall, that BPC is defined as those actions conducted by one or more governments, through the provision of training and equipment, to improve the security capacity of Partner Nations which share common security interests in a manner that is endogenous, transformative and sustainable.

research and development. This is especially important given the present fiscally-constrained environment. Second, duplicative and redundant lines of activity/effort are prolific in the realm of BPC, so much so that NATO seeks to appoint a special coordinator at the Deputy Secretary General level to sort it out. Third, in recognition that instability can emerge from anywhere and that NATO's responsibility to preserve stability and thus provide security is global in nature, it welcomes requests to build defense capacity from partners and *non-partners* alike. These three observations - that stability *can* be projected at low cost through BPC; that efforts by Allies and other organizations' BPC activities *require* coordination; and that NATO is prepared to work with nearly any state, partners and *non-partners* alike, on a demand-driven basis – underscore NATO's understanding of BPC as an approach to provide security.


On the surface, NATO's understanding of BPC appears to align with the UNDP's approach to capacity development. According to Silverman (2014), NATO carefully considers how additional capacity building support could be offered to non-Partners. This support should be, “upon request, on a case-by-case basis, within available resources, complimentary with other international organizations and open to contributions from Allies and Partners” (Silverman, 2014, par. 2). In other words, before NATO embarks on any BPC effort, a state must request it. This implies that at least a minimum level of political support exists in the recipient country for change and for NATO-supported BPC. Thus, a political commitment to BPC in the recipient nation appears to be a prerequisite. Silverman acknowledges that in addition to expertise, capacity building programs are complex, require knowledge of the country and region, patience and a *long-term commitment* (emphasis added), which includes the occasional or enduring presence of NATO personnel on the ground and frequent travel, as well as careful follow-up and assessment (Ibid.). As a result, NATO appears to understand that BPC is a long-term, sometimes decades long, commitment of manpower and resources. From a programmatic perspective, NATO appears to share the perspective of the UNDP. Silverman writes, for example, that capacity building objectives, “should be clear, should focus on sustainment and be based on solutions that have local buy-in” (Silverman, 2014, par. 5). Consequently, NATO's approach to BPC appears to be in line with UNDP's approach to capacity development – both recognize that the process must be locally sustainable and long-term in nature.

We turn now to the United States' conception of BPC. The most recent iteration of U.S. national security strategy documents underscores the value it places on BPC and its role in preventing conflicts. The 2015 *National Security Strategy of the United States* (NSS) recognizes the threat

posed by the nexus of weak governance and widespread grievance, which allows extremism to take root, violent non-state actors to rise up and conflict to overtake state structures. To meet these challenges, notes the NSS, the United States will, “continue to work with partners and through multilateral organizations to address the root causes of conflict before they erupt and to contain and resolve them when they do” (Obama 2015, 10). Consequently, the U.S. perceives its own security as inextricably linked with the security of other nations.

One of the ways the U.S. seeks to address the root causes of conflicts before they erupt is to support democratic reform. The United States, notes the NSS, “will concentrate attention and resources to help countries consolidate their gains and move toward more democratic and representative systems of governance...supporting countries that are moving in the right direction” (Obama 2015, 20). Because the Western Balkans is moving in the right direction, the United States “will steadfastly support the aspirations of countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration,” (Obama 2015, 25).

Figure 2.1 – U.S. National Security Interests & National Military Objectives



Source: Dempsey (2015)

The United States' 2015 *National Military Strategy* (NMS) articulates the DoD's contributions to advancing the national security of the United States. The DoD is committed to achieving three National Military Objectives: (1) deter, deny and defeat state adversaries; (2) disrupt, degrade and defeat violent extremist organizations; and (3) strengthen the United States' global network of allies and partners (Dempsey 2015, 5). This network in particular represents a unique strategic asset of the United States. The DoD asserts that the capacity of this network to provide security and stability directly contributes to American security. Thus, notes the NMS, strengthening partners is fundamental to the security of the United States because it builds strategic depth for America's military.¹⁴

The NMS is also built on the strategic guidance set forth in the DoD's 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR). The QDR notes that while most European countries today are producers of security, continued instability in the Balkans and on the European periphery will continue to pose a security challenge (Hagel 2014, 6). In this regard, the 2014 QDR echoes previous QDRs by seeking to build the capacity of U.S. partners and thus enable them to bear a greater share of providing security. Moreover, the QDR notes that DoD is developing "strategically complementary approaches to deepen cooperation with close allies and partners, including more collaboratively planning our roles and missions and investments in future capabilities" (Hagel 2014, 24). Given the DoD's present fiscally constrained environment, this collaborative approach seems prudent and, in a manner that echoes NATO's pledge to build defense and related security capacity, seeks to enhance security and stability at low cost.

BPC has emerged as a new security paradigm rooted in the theory of conflict prevention and asserts that international security and stability can be achieved by building the security capacity of partners. Capacity building in general it must be as endogenous (local) as possible and focus on transforming minds and mindsets. This combination leads to sustainability over the long-term, which leads to success. NATO and the United States government have accepted the theoretical underpinnings of BPC as a strategy to build security and stability and thus contribute to conflict prevention. They recognize BPC as vitally important to security and stability. Figure 2.2 summarizes BPC from the perspectives of the UNDP, NATO and the United States.

¹⁴ According to the 2015 NSS, the U.S. military strengthens regional stability by conducting activities that support mutual security interests, develop partner capabilities for self-defense and prepare for multinational operations. The NMS states, "strengthening partners is fundamental to our security, building strategic depth for our national defense" (Dempsey 2015, 12). In other words, if the U.S. can call on its partners to perform roles that its own forces would otherwise perform, U.S. forces would be freed to perform other roles – this is the meaning of the term "strategic depth."

Figure 2.2 – UNDP, NATO and U.S.A. Perspectives on Capacity Development & BPC

ACTORS	PERSPECTIVES ON BPC
<p>United Nations Development Programme</p>	<p>Best capacity development programs are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Endogenous • Transforms Mindsets & Institutional Culture • Sustainable
<p>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</p>	<p>BPC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enables projection of stability at low cost • Requires careful coordination among partners • Should be available, upon request & on case-by-case basis, to any state
<p>United States of America</p>	<p>BPC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Helps to eliminate VEO safe-havens • Strengthens global network of allies & partners • Enables others states to share security costs

3 Identifying the BPC Correlates of Effectiveness

3.1 Designing BPC Programs for Effectiveness

What works and does not work when conducting BPC? What environmental conditions, programmatic designs and fundamental principles most strongly correlate to BPC’s effectiveness? What lessons can be taken from history with regard to BPC? These are just some of the questions that must be answered to ensure BPC is properly applied and likely to be effective. Recent research expanded the body of knowledge about BPC. The research can be classified into two primary groups: dealing with the programmatic aspects of BPC (how it is structured and executed) and dealing with the strategic goals towards which it is directed (what it is meant to accomplish). Analyzing this research enables the extraction of criteria essential to assessing United States BPC efforts in Serbia and Bosnia.

In 2013, the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit policy research institution, published a study for the Office of the Secretary of Defense that examined what works best when conducting BPC and under what circumstances. The primary purpose of the study was to determine which approaches to BPC are likely to be more or less effective under different circumstances based on U.S. historical BPC efforts. To do so, RAND compared the results of U.S. BPC activities for 29 selected partner nations (PNs) since the end of the Cold War – in effect, over 20 years of data for each country case. The results of the RAND study are illuminating and provide a baseline set of

criteria against which BPC efforts can be assessed to determine the likelihood (not certainty) of their effectiveness.

RAND's research revealed three broad findings. First, matching is important. According to RAND, "BPC is most effective when U.S. objectives align with PN objectives and when BPC efforts align with the PN's baseline capabilities and absorptive capacity" (Paul, et al. 2013, 87). Second, context is important. Certain characteristics or features of PNs make BPC more likely to be effective. Five characteristics specifically are associated with greater effectiveness of BPC these are: (1) the PN invests its own funds to support or sustain capacity; (2) the PN has sufficient absorptive capacity (that is to say, it has the ability to absorb new materiel, training and so on); (3) the PN has high governance indicators; (4) the PN has a strong economy; and (5) the PN shares security interests with the United States (Ibid.).¹⁵ Finally, independent of context, there are several factors wholly under the control of the U.S. that correlate strongly with BPC effectiveness. These include investing more in BPC (either financially or in terms of manpower), consistency in both funding and implementation of BPC, matching BPC efforts with PN objectives (and not solely U.S. objectives) and including a sustainment component in BPC initiatives.


Figure 3.1 depicts the interplay between Partner and Provider characteristics, the Context of the Partner and the Provider's BPC processes. The blue circles represent those factors that a provider can influence and the yellow circles represent the factors a Partner can influence. The more closely these 4 circles can be aligned (or overlapped as the diagram indicates), the greater the likelihood of BPC effectiveness.

RAND offers four recommendations for BPC effectiveness. First, where possible, provider nations should choose partners that have or can adopt the attributes that correlate with effective BPC. This would be partners that: (a) are willing to invest their own funds to sustain capacity; (b) have sufficient absorptive capacity; (c) have high governance indicators; (d) have strong and healthy economies; and (e) whose strategic interests align with U.S. interests in the region. Second, regardless of the partner or context, choose BPC objectives and activities that correspond with what the partner wants or needs and what it is capable of absorbing. Third, consider sustainment in capabilities in BPC planning – whether it involves building a separate

¹⁵ A fact of foreign policy is that sometimes the U.S. is forced to work together with less than optimal partners. As a result, the five preceding contextual correlates of BPC effectiveness should not be interpreted as absolute prerequisites when considering which countries the U.S. should choose as partners.

funding or logistics stream or expanding existing programs, effective BPC requires sustainment (Paul, et al. 2013, 91). Finally, build ministerial capacity and otherwise develop absorptive capacity.

Figure 3.1 – Correlates of Effective BPC



The Process and Provider circles represent those aspects of BPC that a Provider Nation can influence. The Partner and Context circles represent what a Partner Nation can influence. The more these factors can be brought into alignment (depicted in the figure by overlapping circles), the higher the probability of effective BPC. RAND found that, “if BPC is consistently funded and delivered, supported and sustained, well matched to partner capabilities and interests, and shared with a partner that supports the effort and is healthy economically and in terms of governance, prospects for (Paul, et al. 2013, 89)

3.2 Military and Ministerial Capacity

Democratic control of the armed forces and the transparent management and operation of those forces are central elements of NATO and Ally militaries. NATO believes that efficient and effective state institutions under democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and essential for international security cooperation.¹⁶ In 2004, NATO launched the

¹⁶ In 2004, NATO launched the Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB). Democratic control of defense activities and transparency within defense organizations, especially with regard to personnel, procurement and financial programs, are central to PAP-DIB. For more information on PAP-DIB, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_21014.htm?selectedLocale=en

Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB). The PAP-DIB, according to NATO, “aims to reinforce efforts by Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EACP) Partners to initiate and carry forward reform and restructuring of defense institutions to meet their needs and the commitments undertaken in the context of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document and EACP Basic Document” (NATO 2004, 1). The objectives of PAP-DIB include: (1) the development of effective arrangements for the democratic control of defense activities; (2) the development of effective and transparent procedures to assess security risks; (3) the development of effective and transparent procedures to determine national defense requirements; (4) manage defense ministries; (5) personnel structures; (6) conduct financial planning and defense spending; and (7) ensure effective international cooperation and good neighborly relations. Serbia and Bosnia, as EACP Partner countries, are committed to implementing PAP-DIB and, as a result, U.S. BPC should include activities to promote reforms in accordance with PAP-DIB objectives.

PAP-DIB is designed to enhance democratic control of armed forces and also the effective and transparent *management* of those forces.¹⁷ The management of armed forces in Western governments is typically the responsibility of a defense ministry, whereas the operational employment of armed forces is the responsibility of a general staff. BPC can be categorized along this managerial-operational distinction: BPC can be used to build a Partner’s military capacity (i.e. the operational and logistical components of a military) or their ministerial capacity (i.e. the ability of a civilian led institution, usually a ministry, to manage the defense organization). BPC activities that deal with military capacity could, for example, seek to provide training and equipment to a Partner’s special operations forces whereas BPC activities that deal with ministerial capacity could focus on a ministry’s human resources or procurement programs. Ministerial capacity is a *foundational enabler* of military capacity in this way.

RAND defines ministerial capacity as the capability of a partner’s ministry of defense or ministry of interior to plan for and manage its military and security forces (Paul, et al. 2013, 20). RAND found that ministerial capacity can be improved even when PN absorptive capacity is generally low. Furthermore, ministerial capacity, by itself, can improve a partner’s absorptive capacity even when baseline absorptive capacity is low. Building ministerial capacity, in effect, enables capacity building in other areas and as a result should be central to future BPC efforts.

¹⁷ Assessing risks, developing strategy, effectively managing and allocating resources including personnel and money – these are managerial functions common to all organizations.

There is an added benefit to building ministerial capacity that pertains to an issue every government and society must confront – fighting corruption. Corruption in a state’s defense sector is especially harmful to its stability and welfare. It erodes public trust in the armed forces and, in some cases the entire government. A lack of public trust in the armed forces and government may encourage citizens to seek alternative sources of protection, including patronage networks, organized crime and even insurgencies. Furthermore, defense and security are expensive areas of the national budget and are funded sometimes at the expense of funding more productive sectors, such as healthcare, infrastructure and education. Corruption in the defense sector also undermines the capability of the armed forces, which imperils their ability to defend the state and its people, and contribute to international stability vis-à-vis peacekeeping operations. Corruption in the defense sector has been shown to contribute to corruption in other sectors. The combination of complexity, large sums of money and justifiable secrecy make defense a key means by which grand corruption can still occur. This maintains the networks of corrupt intermediaries, accountants and lawyers necessary for corruption, according to Transparency International (Magahy, Scott and Pyman 2009). The effects of corruption in defense may spill over into the rest of government and undermine efforts to improve public institutions. This makes corruption in the defense sector all the more deleterious to a society’s wellbeing.

Not only does corruption threaten military effectiveness, it also jeopardizes the effectiveness of BPC itself. It can reduce the chances of BPC success and also lead to a complete subversion of its intent. Transparency International (TI), an advocacy group, highlights that “corruption threatens defense capacity building just as much as it threatens stabilization operations and without comprehensive planning, oversight and safeguards, military assistance can have unintended consequences” (Pyman, Bock and MacLachlan 2015, 5). Officials estimate, for example, that 70% of the \$5.4 billion of U.S. military aid to Pakistan since 2002 has been either diverted to non-agreed military goals, put to non-military uses or simply vanished (Walsh 2008). TI’s study of U.S. military aid to Mali leading up to 2011 notes that the U.S. Departments of State and Defense did not take into account the risks corruption posed to the effectiveness of assistance. U.S. training programs focused instead on operational and tactical training and did not include a substantial institution-building component. A dearth of institutional capacity in conjunction with the absence of ‘esprit de corps,’ cohesion and long-term vision prevented the Malian Army from absorbing U.S. assistance and translating it into success on the battlefield (Pyman, Bock and MacLachlan 2015). In light of the apparent shortcomings of U.S. military aid

to Pakistan and Mali to achieve its intended objectives due to corruption and a lack of institutional focus, TI recommends that early and comprehensive risk assessments of corruption threats to the effectiveness of assistance should form an integral part of all defense capacity building programs. Additionally, recommends TI, training courses should incorporate sustained engagement with integrity and defense management issues, rather than focus overwhelmingly on operational and tactical issues.

Thus, we know that ministerial capacity, as defined by RAND, is foundational to and an enabler of other forms of military capacity. Additionally, as EACP Partner states, Serbia and Bosnia are committed not only to creating effective and transparent arrangements for the democratic control of their armed forces, but also to creating effective and transparent procedures for the *management* of their armed forces. Transparency within defense institutions is intrinsically beneficial to societies because it builds institutional resilience against corruption, which is known to be exceptionally detrimental to society. As a result, activities to build ministerial capacity should be included in U.S. BPC activities in Serbia and Bosnia.

3.3 Employing BPC for Effectiveness

RAND's study reveals a great deal about those characteristics of Providers and Partners that correlate to success in BPC. It also demonstrates that the proper alignment, funding and sustainment of BPC programs correlates to effectiveness. These correlates of effectiveness, which relate to BPC programs, do not reveal very much about the effectiveness of BPC in accomplishing certain strategic goals. For example, how successful has BPC been historically when it was used to end a conflict, or enable a partner country to prevent the recurrence of conflict? Does the history of BPC indicate it can be used successfully to manage regional challenges? These are just some questions about the strategic objectives of BPC. The Congressional Research Service's (CRS) 2015 study *What is Building Partner Capacity? Issues for Congress* breaks new ground in that it sought to understand whether, at a strategic (versus programmatic) level, BPC has been an effective way to achieve strategic goals (McInnis and Lucas 2015, 20). The results of the CRS study provide a set of analytic criteria (strategic objectives) that complement the results of the RAND study, which offers programmatic criteria.

In order to evaluate BPC effectiveness in achieving its intended objectives, CRS developed a list of strategic rationales (objectives) that the U.S. sought to accomplish through its BPC activities. These are: (1) victory in war or war termination; (2) managing regional security

challenges; (3) indirectly supporting a party to a conflict; (4) conflict mitigation; (5) building institutional and interpersonal linkages; (6) enhancing coalition participation; and (7) alliance building (McInnis and Lucas 2015, 16). CRS then selected 20 case studies since the second World War, organized by these seven strategic rationales, to determine whether a given BPC effort had its intended strategic effect. Put another way, CRS sought to determine whether BPC achieved what it was meant to achieve. Admittedly, the CRS study was not intended to be exhaustive, neither in case selection nor the cases themselves. Rather, it was “intended to help identify broader trends in the historical record” (Ibid.). Many BPC programs undoubtedly meet their programmatic-level criteria for success. Whether that success translates into helping the United States accomplish its intended strategic-level objectives is unclear. The critical take away from the CRS study is a baseline understanding of BPC and the strategic objectives it has, historically speaking, been most likely to achieve. With this knowledge, we can further assess the likelihood that BPC efforts in the Western Balkans will be effective.

McInnis and Lucas (2015) begin by noting that in many instances in the past, the U.S. built or expanded partner militaries with the goal of curtailing its involvement in wars (McInnis and Lucas 2015, 17). In those instances, in which American forces were engaged in a conflict, but with limited interests, the U.S. dedicated significant resources to training and equipping host-nation forces. The logic for this rationale is that enabling a host-nation to meet its own security needs creates conditions that allow the withdraw of U.S. forces (Ibid.). As many senior U.S. officials argued during the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, local forces and governments must ultimately be responsible for maintaining security after military coalition members depart (McInnis and Lucas 2015, 18). Since World War II, the U.S. has pursued this rationale with BPC in three notable cases: Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. CRS found that:

Despite significant investments of money, time, and personnel, U.S. efforts to build partners’ capacity as a means to enable withdrawal from wars in which it was directly engaged did not prove successful in two—possibly three—out of three cases. In all three examples, the host nation forces that were to assume responsibility for waging a military campaign, in order to allow a U.S. departure from the theater, initially demonstrated some proficiency. Yet in both Vietnam and Iraq, those forces proved unable to secure their respective countries in the long term; in Afghanistan, the Obama Administration has chosen to retain almost 10,000 U.S. troops due to concerns about the ANDSF’s ability to fend off Taliban incursions (Ibid., p. 25).

While each of these cases experienced execution challenges, a number of scholars and practitioners have asked if strategic issues themselves were the root cause of these BPC challenges. Can U.S. and PN strategic interests ever be sufficiently aligned to enable a durable security transition? The historical record indicates this is unlikely and that BPC utilized to build

sufficient partner military capacity to end a war or enable a U.S. withdraw is unlikely to succeed.

The second strategic objective of BPC is its use for managing regional security challenges. The logic behind this objective is that building the security capabilities of states may prevent or degrade the ability of VEOs and other hostile forces to launch attacks against the interests of the U.S. or its allies (McInnis and Lucas 2015, 26). As such, these programs are designed to strengthen partners' ability to manage their own security responsibilities. In order to assess the effectiveness of this strategic rationale, the CRS examined the effectiveness of four cases: (1) U.S. support to the African Union and African Union Mission in Somalia (2005-Present); (2) U.S. assistance to Mali (2002-2015); (3) U.S. support to the Former Warsaw Pact (1994-Present); and (4) U.S. security assistance to Pakistan (2002-Present). Based on the four cases selected, CRS concluded that BPC to manage regional security challenges appears problematic. In the most successful case – U.S. support to the former Warsaw Pact – some argue that even though many of these recipient countries have joined NATO, they fail to invest in the defense capabilities necessary to effectively manage security challenges in the European periphery without U.S. assistance. In the other cases, concludes CRS, “U.S. investments to build local security forces have not necessarily translated into partners’ increased capability – or willingness – to manage regional security challenges in a manner that advances U.S. national security interests” (McInnis and Lucas 2015, 34). Thus, the historical success of BPC for managing regional security challenges is, at best, mixed.

The third strategic objective is using BPC to indirectly strengthen a party to an internal conflict. Over the course of its history, the United States has often supported its allies and partners as they wage their own internal conflicts. In these instances, notes CRS, military support and aid are provided to one belligerent over another with the belief that doing so will enable the American-favored party to win the conflict and create an advantageous post-war situation for the U.S. (McInnis and Lucas 2015) This assistance can range from providing weapons and money to special operations forces. CRS examined three examples of this application of BPC: (1) U.S. and the Philippines (1947-1953); (2) U.S. intervention in the Soviet-Afghan War (1980-1988); and (3) U.S. assistance to Columbia (2000-Present). Based on the cases selected, CRS concluded “it appears BPC can be used effectively to support partners as they wage their own internal conflicts” (McInnis and Lucas 2015, 34). In all three cases, CRS found that U.S. military and security sector assistance helped U.S. partners win a given conflict (Ibid.). In the cases of the

Philippines and Columbia, assistance helped promote longer-term stability and strengthened their bilateral relations with the United States. The case of Afghanistan, however, presents an important caveat – unless BPC efforts are managed carefully, in the short, medium and long term, both politically and militarily, they can have longer-term effects that might be counterproductive to U.S. interests.

The fourth strategic objective of BPC is its use to mitigate conflicts. Specifically, BPC has been used to prevent the re-emergence of a pre-existing conflict. As the reasoning goes, strengthening a relatively weak party to a conflict can help create a balance of power among the other parties to the conflict (Ibid.). This makes it more difficult for the parties concerned to renew violence. CRS examined two cases of this application of BPC: (1) to mitigate conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2002); and (2) to prevent the re-emergence of conflict between Egypt and Israel. Using these examples, CRS found that BPC to mitigate and prevent the re-emergence of conflict may largely depend on factors outside U.S. control and in particular, other parties involved in those conflicts need to play a constructive role (McInnis and Lucas 2015). In Bosnia, for example, which was arguably a successful BPC case, success depended on Bosnian Serbs remaining out of further conflict for the training of Federation forces to work. Consequently, the use of BPC to mitigate conflicts or prevent the re-emergence of pre-existing conflict is problematic.

The fifth strategic application of BPC, according to McInnis and Lucas (2015), is its use to facilitate participation in military coalitions. Since World War II, the majority of U.S. military campaigns have been waged with the assistance of partners. As recent campaigns demonstrate (Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya), the ability to draw upon a broad array of capabilities to perform coalition operations can alleviate the burden borne by U.S. forces. A broad and diverse array of coalition partners can also help build international political legitimacy. But many nations who signal interest in participating are unable to do so without significant external support in the form of training, equipping and logistics. By compensating for a partner's military shortfalls, the U.S. can simultaneously improve its partner's immediate operational abilities and the coalition's overall military capabilities. An added side benefit of this is the potential for increased interoperability between the Partner's armed forces and U.S. armed forces. Thus, this strategic rationale asserts, building the military capability of partners enables them to participate in coalition operations and improves the United States' ability to achieve its strategic objectives. CRS analyzed three cases that demonstrate using BPC in this manner: (1) Vietnam and the

Many Flags Initiative; (2) Coalition participation in Operation IRAQI FREESOM; and (3) Coalition participation in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM/International Security Assistance Force. CRS concluded that BPC's ability to generate participation in U.S.-led military coalitions appears relatively effective, but it noted that coalition participation does not necessarily translate into increased military effectiveness or an equal apportionment of risk (McInnis and Lucas 2015, 44). Consequently, while BPC used in this way may help reach political goals (e.g. expanding an international military coalition) it remains less clear that doing so helps achieve the coalition's military goals.

The sixth strategic objective towards which BPC has been applied is to build institutional and interpersonal linkages. The reason for this is twofold: first, recent operations highlight the enduring requirement for U.S. military personnel to operate in unfamiliar cultural contexts and understand the local human terrain of their environment. Second, experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the complexities of coalition warfare at all levels – strategic, operational and tactical. Building institutional and interpersonal linkages with partners around the globe help U.S. forces understand local and regional dynamics and also bolsters interoperability. In order to evaluate this rationale for BPC, CRS examined one of DoD's regional centers (the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies) and the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). The purpose of the DoD's regional centers is to utilize unique academic forums to build strong, sustainable international networks of security leaders.¹⁸ IMET is intended to be a low-cost program to provide training in DoD schools to predominantly military students from allied and friendly nations (Ibid., 47). Through its regional centers and IMET, the U.S. seeks to influence students who may rise to positions of prominence in foreign governments, expose foreign students to a professional military in a democratic society and professionalize foreign armed forces. CRS found that the programs surveyed suggest BPC is effective to build institutional and interpersonal linkages. Indeed, some participants in these programs have gone on to assume key positions within their country's national security hierarchy. This may have provided the U.S. with more avenues of interaction (and potentially influence) than would otherwise have existed. It should be noted, however, that increased


¹⁸ There are five DoD Regional Centers, which utilize academic forums to build international networks of security leaders. These are: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies; the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies; the Africa Center for Strategic Studies; and the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. For more information on the DoD Regional Centers, see: <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/dod-regional-centers>

interaction does not necessarily create strategic alignment between the U.S. and nations that participate in these programs.

The seventh and final strategic objective for BPC is to build enduring alliances. This rationale differs from the fifth rationale (building military coalitions) because it relates to creating stable, likeminded partners over the *long term*. The U.S. engages with the security institutions of other governments to increase the number of partners with comparable political and military objectives, whom it may then call upon to collectively manage security challenges. This engagement may also, in theory, spillover to enable cooperation on a variety of other non-military issues. To assess the effectiveness of BPC in this manner, CRS analyzed three cases: (1) BPC in Greece to support NATO (1947-1952); (2) BPC in Korea to support the United Nations (1948-1950); and (3) BPC to build Alliances in the Former Warsaw Pact (1992-2010). CRS found that BPC is effective at building alliances (McInnis and Lucas 2015). These cases in particular also suggest that geopolitics influences the success of these BPC activities. The presence of a common threat may have provided incentives for developing unified approaches to accomplishing military and political goals. Furthermore, BPC to support alliance building in the absence of an overwhelming threat, as the example of building former Warsaw Pact nations into stable NATO allies suggests, is also possible.

In summary, successive U.S. administrations have argued that BPC is a key strategy for building stability in fragile states. BPC has become, in essence, a strategic cornerstone of the U.S. approach to dealing with a wide variety of conflicts and security challenges. The historical record shows BPC is more effective at achieving some strategic objectives than others, which is depicted above in Figure 3.2 (below). BPC is most effective at enhancing military coalition participation, building institution and personal linkages and building alliances. U.S. BPC in Serbia and Bosnia should pursue these objectives. It is less effective at terminating wars, managing regional security issues, supporting a party to a conflict and mitigating conflicts.

Figure 3.2 –BPC Effectiveness at Achieving Strategic Objectives



Source: McInnis & Lucas (2015, 3)

4 Assessment of Serbia and Bosnia as BPC Partner Nations

As the U.S. National Security Strategy states, the U.S. will steadfastly support the aspirations of countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe toward Euro-Atlantic integration (Obama 2015, 25). Bosnia and Serbia each desire to join the EU. Bosnia also wants to join NATO but Serbia does not. This reality has implications for U.S. BPC. On the one hand, as this section will demonstrate, Serbia and Bosnia are not so-called ideal partners if measured against RAND’s correlates for BPC effectiveness. On the other hand, BPC has been effective in the strategic objectives of building institution and personal linkages and at building alliances, as demonstrated by CRS. Because the region has the potential for instability, it is important that the U.S. and especially the EU know the human terrain of Serbia and Bosnia. That is to say, it is logical that BPC be used to promote institution and personal linkages. Additionally, because Serbia and Bosnia desire EU accession and a closer relationship with NATO (in Bosnia’s case, membership in the alliance itself), BPC should be used in an alliance building manner, similar to the support that was provided to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. The question then is how conducive are the environments of Serbia and Bosnia to effective BPC?

This section assesses whether or not the environments in Serbia and Bosnia are conducive to effective BPC. As research from RAND and CRS indicate, regardless of how well BPC is programmed or the specific strategic objective towards which it is directed, context matters. Recall from Section 4.1 (above) that RAND notes certain characteristics of PNs make BPC more

likely to be effective. These are: (1) the PN invests its own funds to support or sustain capacity; (2) the PN has sufficient absorptive capacity; (3) the PN has high governance indicators; (4) the PN has a strong economy; and (5) the PN shares security interests with the United States. These characteristics are assessed as contextual correlates of BPC effectiveness in-turn below.

According to U.S. European Command's (EUCOM) Policy, Strategy, Partnering and Capabilities Division, a division of EUCOM's Joint Staff, Serbia and Bosnia do not contribute funds to support or sustain capacity *initially*.¹⁹ They are, however, expected to sustain capacity *after* it has been created. That means that U.S. BPC efforts to build, for example, the capacity of Serbia and Bosnia to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which includes the provision of training, equipment and funding associated with building this capacity, are provided solely by the United States for a period of three to five years, generally. U.S. assistance, over time, is designed to be gradually reduced and then eliminated so that Partner nations are incentivized to endogenously sustain their new capacity. According to Department of Defense policy, the U.S. is obligated to present a total package approach for the provision of defense equipment and services.²⁰ The total package approach addresses sustainment support, recognizing that BPC programs are time-limited by their appropriations (DSCA 2016). Sustainment support may require spare parts, additional training and possibly contractor logistics support and while the U.S. may be the sole source provider of training and equipment, in the long run, its partners are required to pay for them. As a result, the total package approach ensures that Partner Nations who receive U.S. BPC assistance are aware of the total costs associated with sustaining new capacity and invest their own funds to support or sustain the capacity eventually.

RAND's second contextual correlate of BPC effectiveness is whether the PN has sufficient absorptive capacity. It is difficult to assess the absorptive capacity of Serbia and Bosnia.²¹ What is more important in this analysis is the simple notion of whether or not DoD executes BPC that does not exceed a PN's absorptive capacity. That is, in a manner the PN can absorb and eventually sustain on its own. Suppose, for example, that a PN faces challenges with its border

¹⁹ Interview with the Chief of EUCOM's Southeastern Europe Branch, EUCOM J5/8

²⁰ Section C15.2.4.5 of the Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual explains the Total Package Approach in more detail

²¹ Official assessments of these states' military capacity are sensitive politically and from a security standpoint and are not publically available. Furthermore, DoD does not specifically assess an individual country's absorptive capacity, per se. While it routinely conducts capability and capacity assessments together with PNs based on threats the PNs are likely to encounter, it does not assign an absorptive capacity rating, for example, with which one could say that Serbia's absorptive capacity is good and Bosnia's is poor.


security and identifies a need for a small all-terrain vehicle to facilitate border patrols. Any number of vehicles available from international suppliers may satisfy this need. The U.S. is obligated, by law, to advocate filling this need with U.S. products, such as a HUMVEE. This benefits America's defense industry and also ensures interoperable equipment is fielded between the U.S. and PNs. If the provision of HUMVEEs to the PN, or the funds to purchase them, does not also take into consideration the PN's endogenous ability to maintain and sustain them over time, this would exceed the PN's absorptive capacity.

Ensuring that PNs understand and consider the lifecycle costs associated with fielding new equipment is one way the U.S. helps to guarantee BPC does not exceed the absorptive capacity of its partners. According to EUCOM J5/8, the U.S. goes to great lengths to emphasize long-term considerations, such as life-cycle costs, with its PNs.²² Another way the U.S. incorporates PN absorptive capacity is through Country Cooperation Plans (CCPs). CCPs are bilateral agreements between U.S. Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and PNs. They list developmental objectives for a PN's military and the programs DoD will use to help the PN reach those objectives. CCPs are significant because they are bilaterally agreed to with the PN and are implemented with the coordination of the U.S. Embassy. This ensures PNs have input to BPC, that DoD does not unintentionally work against the goals of other U.S. government agencies, and that DoD's efforts support broader U.S. strategy. Thus, through CCPs DoD builds partner capacity in a way that does not exceed PN absorptive capacity.

The third contextual correlate of BPC effectiveness is whether the PN has high governance indicators. According to RAND, the higher the PN's World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI) Index percentile rank, the greater the probability of effective BPC (Paul, et al. 2013, 71). The WGI report on six broad dimensions of governance for 215 countries over the period 1996-2014. These dimensions are: Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of law; and Control of Corruption.

²² According to EUCOM, CCPs typically cover a three to five-year timeframe. They rely on the advice and consent of the PN in order to be implemented, that is to say, they do not provide the U.S. with a "blank check," so to speak, to come into a PN and dictate the terms of its assistance.

Figure 4.1 – Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Index. Source: (World Bank 2014)




Source: World Bank (2014)

Figure 4.1 presents WGI data for Serbia and Bosnia for 2009 and 2014 (the most recent data available). In nearly every indicator, these PNs score at the middle percentile or lower. The average 2014 WGI percentile rank of Serbia is 54.4 whereas the average percentile rank for Bosnia is 45.6 (World Bank 2014). Generally speaking, this means that half of the countries tracked in the WGI score better and half score worse than Serbia and Bosnia. This indicates these PNs do not have the *high* governance indicators of an ideal partner for BPC. It should be noted, though, that in nearly every indicator, each countries’ percentile score improved over time. This would seem to justify U.S. support for these countries (as the 2015 NSS implies) because they are moving in the right direction with regard to their democratic reforms.²³ Nevertheless, the information from this chart indicates the probability of executing BPC effectively with these three PNs is somewhat diminished.


²³ According to the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy, the U.S. will concentrate attention and resources to help countries consolidate their gains and move toward more democratic and representative systems of governance. America’s focus in this effort is to, “support countries that are moving in the right direction” by creating incentives for positive reform and disincentives for backsliding (Obama 2015, 20)

Figure 4.2 – Serbia HDI over time



From the question of governance, we turn now to economics. The strength of a PN's economy correlates positively with effective BPC. Specifically, RAND found that the health of a country's economy as indicated by its average UN Human Development Index (HDI) positively correlated to effective BPC (Paul, et al. 2013, 41). The HDI is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. Serbia's HDI value for 2014 is 0.771 – which, according to the UN, puts the country in the high human development category and ranks it 66 out of 188 countries surveyed. Furthermore, Serbia's 2014 HDI of 0.771 is above the average of 0.744 for countries in the high human development group and above the average of 0.748 for countries in Europe and Central Asia (UNDP 2015, 2). Figure 4.2 depicts changes in Serbia's HDI over time. Based on this criteria, Serbia's economy appears reasonably strong.

Figure 4.3 – Bosnia HDI over time



Bosnia's economy, on the other hand, appears slightly less strong than Serbia's. Bosnia's HDI value for 2014 is 0.733 – which, like Serbia, puts it in the high human development category and ranks it at 85 out of 188 countries (UNDP 2015, 2). Unlike Serbia, however, Bosnia's HDI is below the average of 0.744 for countries in the high human development group and below the average of 0.748 for countries in Europe and Central Asia. Figure 4.3 depicts changes in Bosnia's HDI over time. Given RAND's criteria, it appears that Serbia's economy is stronger than Bosnia's and as result may offer a higher probability of effective BPC. In absolute terms, because both Serbia and Bosnia rank as countries with high human development, the effectiveness of BPC can reasonably be expected to be effective, all else being equal.²⁴

The fifth and final contextual correlate for BPC effectiveness is whether or not the PN shares security interests with the United States. The U.S. supports Serbia's and Bosnia's goals to join

²⁴ There are four broad categories of countries in the Human Development Index: Very High Human Development, High Human Development, Moderate Human Development and Low Human Development (UNDP 2015).

Euro-Atlantic institutions, principally the EU and NATO.²⁵ The 2015 U.S. NSS makes specific reference to supporting the aspirations of countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration. This contributes to the strength of Europe, which the U.S. perceives as an indispensable partner for resolving global security challenges, promoting prosperity and upholding international norms. Thus, the strategic-level interests of the U.S. and these countries generally align. There are, however, some divergences of security interests, especially with respect to Serbia. Serbia's strategic security documents, including its National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, for example, identify the independence of Kosovo as "the biggest threat to the national interests of the Republic of Serbia" (Serbian Ministry of Defense 2009, 7). Additionally, they note that the diplomatic recognition of Kosovo by countries in the region has a "negative impact on the strengthening of measures of trust and cooperation, and slows down the process of stabilizing the security situation in the region" (Ibid., p. 6). These two documents, the Serbian NSS and NDS, communicate a strategic position (the illegality of Kosovo's independence) that is at odds with the U.S. position, which recognizes Kosovo as an independent state. In recent years, through EU-mediated negotiations, Serbia and Kosovo have made progress on normalizing their relations, but until Serbia accepts Kosovo's independence or the U.S. reverses its policy toward Kosovo, the two countries will remain at odds on this issue.

Another issue on which Serbian and U.S. interests diverge is the Russian Federation (RF). Since the RF invasion of Eastern Ukraine and subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014, the U.S. has led the international community's sanctions efforts against it. Though it is in negotiations to become an EU member state, Serbia has not aligned its policies on Russia with current European Council decisions, namely the decision to impose economic sanctions. Speaking in Moscow in February, the Serbian Ambassador to Russia stressed that Serbia will never join the EU's sanctions against Russia (Sputnik 2016). Additionally, high-level contacts between Serbia and Russia have continued since the EU imposed sanctions. Russia's President visited Serbia in October 2014 and Serbia's President attended the celebration of Victory Day in Moscow in May 2015. Further such contacts are planned for 2016. It appears that Serbian and American security interests diverge to some degree. The implication is that BPC with Serbia may be somewhat less effective as a result of this strategic divergence.

²⁵ Unlike other Western Balkan nations, Serbia does not aspire to join NATO. The country is, however, deepening its political dialogue and cooperation with NATO on issues of common interest, such as democratic, institutional and defense reform. In January 2015, Serbia agreed to deepen cooperation with NATO through an Individual Partnership Action Plan (NATO 2015)

In summary, research from RAND reveals that BPC is more likely to be effective when certain contextual factors are met. BPC arrangements between the U.S. and Serbia and Bosnia are structured to ensure that both Serbia and Bosnia are fully aware of the costs associated with new capacities and are prepared to fully fund them, eventually. Additionally, BPC in each country is executed through a Country Cooperation Plan (CCP) that is tailored to ensure enhanced capacity is absorbed and sustained. The CCP enables the PN and BPC provider (the United States) to identify where capacity should be built and in what manner. These two criteria – investment and absorptive capacity – are positive. On the other hand, Serbia’s and Bosnia’s governance indicators are not high and their economies are not strong. Rather, they rank around the middle percentile globally in terms of WGI indicators and slightly above (in Serbia’s case) and below (in Bosnia’s case) the average HDI for Europe and Central Asia. Finally, the security interests of Serbia, Bosnia and the U.S. mostly align. Serbia and Bosnia desire EU and NATO membership (except Serbia), which the U.S. supports. But Serbia’s continued engagement with Russia places it at odds with the security interests of the EU and the United States. Moreover, Serbia perceives Kosovo’s independence as a threat and enlists Russia’s aid to prevent Kosovo’s accession to the UN. This is fundamentally at odds with American policy towards Kosovo. Taken altogether, the contextual criteria for effective BPC in Serbia and Bosnia is mixed, which suggests limited potential for effectiveness. These results are depicted below in Figure 4.4. The next task is to identify specifically where and how BPC is most likely to be effective in light of these results.

Figure 4.4 – Correlates of BPC Effectiveness in Serbia and Bosnia

Correlates of BPC Effectiveness	Serbia	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Partner invests own funds to support or sustain capacity	Through Total Package Approach, PN invests funds incrementally to endogenously support or sustain capacity	Through Total Package Approach, PN invests funds incrementally to endogenously support or sustain capacity
PN has sufficient absorptive capacity	Bilateral creation and oversight of CCP	Bilateral creation and oversight of CCP
PN has high governance indicators (WGI Index percentile rank)	54.4 (2014)	45.6 (2014)
PN has strong economy (HDI)*	0.771 (2014)	0.733 (2014)
PN shares security interests with the United States	EU Accession NATO Partnership	EU Accession NATO Accession

The 5 correlates of BPC effectiveness come from RAND. Measured against these correlates, the environments of both Serbia and Bosnia appear mostly conducive to effective BPC. Both Serbia and Bosnia contribute to BPC sustainment and receive BPC that does not exceed their absorptive capacity. Neither Serbia nor Bosnia’s governance indicators can be categorized as high, per se, because their average WGI Index percentile rank is around 50. In terms of strong economic performance, measured by HDI, Serbia has a higher HDI than the average for countries in Europe and Central Asia (0.744), but Bosnia’s HDI is lower than the average. Finally, both Serbia and Bosnia desire EU membership, but where Bosnia also desires NATO membership, Serbia desires only a NATO partnership and maintains fairly robust relations with the Russian Federation.

5 U.S. BPC in Serbia and Bosnia

As the previous section demonstrated, the suitability of the environments in Serbia and Bosnia for effective BPC is mixed. Despite this, there are opportunities for effective BPC. Building the capacity of these states to better meet the security needs of their citizens and also contribute to regional security bolsters the security of the EU and NATO. In the face of contemporary threats, including mass immigration and terrorism, neither the U.S. nor the EU can afford to witness the destabilization of the Western Balkans. The question this section seeks to answer is in light of the challenges Serbia and Bosnia face and the less-than-optimal BPC environment they provide, how is current U.S. BPC implemented and how *could* it be implemented to maximize its likelihood of effectiveness and thus contribute to security and stability in the countries in the region.

Analysis of America's current CCPs with Serbia and Bosnia reveals a multi-faceted BPC strategy. The Lines of Activity (LOAs) contained in the CCPs fall into three categories: those that build ministerial capacity (termed Defense Reform in the CCPs); those that build the operational capacity and NATO interoperability of conventional military forces (the forces that fight and those who support the fighters); and those that build the capacity of dual-use forces (those forces that can serve a military purpose and also a civilian purpose, such as the development of civil engineering and medical personnel). Several LOAs in each CCP are specifically designed to build the capacity of Serbia and Bosnia to constructively engage with other states in the region through regional fora such as, for example, the Adriatic Charter.²⁶ Additionally, LOAs support the capacity of Serbia and Bosnia to contribute to regional initiatives that involve multi-use forces, such as the Balkan Medical Task Force (BMTF – more information on this below). Moreover, each CCP builds ministerial capacity through LOAs that seek defense reform., which is vital to increased partnership with (and in Bosnia's case, membership in) NATO.

The U.S.-Serbia CCP contains twenty-three lines of activity (LOAs). Of these, eight LOAs seek to develop ministerial capacity (termed defense reform) and the remainder seek to develop

²⁶ The Adriatic Charter (A5) was signed in Tirana, Albania on May 2, 2003. The Charter was proposed jointly by the Presidents of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to then-President Bush at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002. The purpose of the Charter was to strengthen its members' individual and cooperative efforts to intensify domestic reforms that enhance security, prosperity, regional stability and ultimately lead to NATO membership. In 2008, the A5 was expanded to include Bosnia and Montenegro. The current Charter member states are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and the United States. Kosovo and Serbia have the status of observer states (U.S. Department of State 2011, 1).

operational capacity. Defense reform LOAs include activities intended to build the capacity of Serbia's Ministry of Defense to effectively and transparently manage finances and human resources, develop offices that are responsible for assessing and enforcing the compliance of Serbian Armed Forces with its established directives and policies (i.e. an Inspector General) and also its compliance with international treaties and obligations (through the office of a Staff Judge Advocate). Other defense reform LOAs aim to build the interoperability of Serbia's national defense organizations with NATO, ensure democratic control of the armed forces through civilian oversight, build its capacity to develop national and military security strategies and also build its capacity to enhance the professionalization of its military forces. Recall from Section 4.2. that Serbia, as an EAPC Partner country has pledged itself to the objectives laid out by the Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building. All of the eight LOAs contained in the CCP, which focus on defense reform, align with the objectives of PAP-DIB. As a result, it appears that U.S. BPC with Serbia seeks to build its capacity to implement PAP-DIB and thus satisfy some of its obligations as a NATO Partner country.

Of the fifteen remaining LOAs in the U.S.-Serbia CCP, seven build the so-called operational capacity of combat forces and eight build the operational capacity of forces that could be designated as multi-use forces (i.e. medical forces, engineering and construction forces, etc.). LOAs that focus on Serbia's combat forces, for example, build Serbia's capacity to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to build the interoperability of its command, control, communication and coordination (commonly abbreviated as C4) functions with NATO and to build the capacity of its cyber security organizations. The remaining *operationally focused* LOAs deal with building Serbia's multi-use forces. Prominent among these are LOAs designed to build Serbia's capacity to respond to natural disasters, partner with its neighbors to support regional initiatives and to field NATO-interoperable military medical forces.

One LOA in particular builds the capacity of Serbia to participate in the Balkan Medical Task Force (BMTF). The BMTF is an initiative launched by Norway and the United States that seeks to build a multinational medical unit from the military medical forces of 6 Western Balkan countries that would provide NATO Role 2 medical functions to U.S., NATO and UN missions within and beyond the Balkan region.²⁷ In the words of General Phillip Breedlove, Commander

²⁷ Presently, only 5 Western Balkan states have signed the BMTF International Agreement. These are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Slovenia. The process of signing the International Agreement by Serbia is ongoing (BMTF 2016). NATO Role 2 medical facilities, in general, are prepared to provide

of U.S. European Command, the BMTF initiative is one example of U.S.- supported cooperative endeavors that provide an area of common interest, building confidence and good relations between former warring factions to reduce the likelihood of renewed fighting in the Western Balkan region (Breedlove 2015, 7). As an example of BPC, U.S. development of Serbia's capacity to contribute to the BMTF, a military unit that increases NATO interoperability and also could be called on to provide medical services to civilians in an emergency, is a great success.

Like the U.S.-Serbia CCP, the U.S.-Bosnia CCP builds Bosnia's ministerial capacity and the operational capacity of its conventional military forces and multi-use forces. The CCP contains 18 LOAs. Four are focused on defense reform. These build the capacity of Bosnia to effectively and transparently manage its financial and personnel resources, to ensure the compliance of its forces with international treaties and obligations (through a Staff Judge Advocate), to create strategic security documents and develop institutional arrangements that allow for the effective and transparent democratic control of Bosnia's armed forces. These LOAs help Bosnia fulfill its PAP-DIB obligations as an EAPC country. There are nine LOAs that build the operational capacity of Bosnia's conventional military forces. These range in focus from building Bosnia's capacity to counter weapons of mass destruction to improving its C4 interoperability with NATO. The remaining five LOAs build the capacity of multi-use forces, including support for Bosnia's involvement with the BMTF. Thus, U.S. BPC in Bosnia and Serbia as indicated by the CCPs, appears to build ministerial capacity and the operational capacity of the conventional and multi-use military forces of both countries. Each CCP seeks to build the interoperability of Serbia's and Bosnia's military forces with NATO and also to assist Serbia and Bosnia with fulfilling their obligations under the PAP-DIB as EAPC Countries.

There are, however, still underutilized opportunities for BPC with Serbia and Bosnia. In light of the pernicious effects of corruption in the defense sector (shown in Section 4), it makes sense for U.S. BPC education and training efforts to focus on building ministerial capacity to fight corruption, especially in Serbia and Bosnia, where the perception of corruption is widespread according to Transparency International (TI) an advocacy group. According to TI's 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Serbia ranks 71st out of 168 countries with a corruption perceptions index score of 40 (the lower the score, the more corrupt a government is perceived

evacuation from Role 1 facilities, conduct triage and resuscitation, treatment and holding of patients until they can be returned to duty or evacuated and emergency dental treatment (NATO, 1997, ch. 16).

to be).²⁸ Progress in fighting corruption has stagnated, according to Transparency International's office in Serbia, which notes that even basic strategic documents for curbing corruption, such as Serbia's 2013 National Anticorruption Strategy and Action Plan, are not implemented consistently (Transparentnost Srbija 2015). The situation in Bosnia is no better. Bosnia ranks 76th out of 168 countries in the 2015 CPI with a score of 38. TI's Bosnia chapter notes that the fight against corruption has stalled overall and declined significantly in regard to employment within the Civil Service at the Federation level. This is due largely to recent amendments to the Law on Civil Service of the Federation, which introduced additional politicization and jeopardizes the independence and impartiality of the civil service (Transparency International Bosna in Hercegovina 2016). Responsibility for supporting these countries in the fight against corruption is the purview of a vast array of international actors, including states, IGOs and NGOs.²⁹ Addressing corruption in Serbian and Bosnian society is beyond the mandate of the U.S. DoD, but countering corruption in their security institutions should be central to U.S. BPC efforts. Evidence suggests this is not the case.

BPC could be better utilized to build the anti-corruption capacity of Serbia's and Bosnia's Ministries of Defense. Transparency International's Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI) measures levels of corruption risk in national defense establishments. It scores each country from A (the best) to F (the worst) using a 77 question-based assessment of five risk areas: political risk, financial risk, personnel risk, operations risk and procurement risk. Serbia and Bosnia each rank in Band C, indicating there is moderate risk for corruption in their defense sectors (TI-DSP 2015). Serbia, notes the 2015 GI, has made significant progress in adopting legal changes aimed at reducing corruption risks in the areas of procurement, personnel and oversight. In the area of personnel-related risks, however, standards have slipped rather than improved due to the relaxation of prohibition on military officers' involvement in commercial activities (TI-DSP 2015). Additionally, according to the GI, Operations risks scored low given Serbia's lack of a comprehensive and detailed military doctrine addressing corruption issues for

²⁸ The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country's public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index, drawing on corruption-related data from expert and business surveys carried out by a variety of independent and reputable institutions. The Corruption Perceptions Index score ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) (Transparency International 2015).

²⁹ The UN, EU and OSCE are just some of the many organizations playing a role in assisting Serbia tackle corruption. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime, for example, published a report in 2011 (co-financed by the European Commission) entitled "Corruption in Serbia: Bribery as Experienced by the Population." The report is a thorough exploration of corruption throughout Serbian society and found, for instance, that "Serbian citizens rank corruption as the most important problem facing their country after unemployment and poverty/low standard of living" (UNODC 2011, 3).

peace and conflict. Corruption risks in Bosnia's Ministry of Defense manifest themselves in other areas. For example, GI assesses the lowest risk is in the area of personnel but financial risk remains high due to the lack of sufficient detail regarding Bosnia's sources of defense income and defense spending. The MoD's Internal Audit Unit has yet to become fully operational and it has failed to implement the recommendations of the Audit Office of the Institution of BiH (an independent external audit body). These contribute to the risk of corruption in the areas of finance and procurement (TI-DSP 2015). As a result, both Serbia and Bosnia's Ministries of Defense have made limited progress in institutionalizing anti-corruption measures. The need to implement anti-corruption measures as part of developing their overall ministerial capacity, is made all the more urgent given the prevalence of perceived widespread corruption in their societies and the tendency of the effects of corruption in the defense sector to spill over to other sectors.

To date, U.S. BPC in the form of personnel exchanges and training programs for PN military personnel (such as IMET) have not made anti-corruption training a priority. The U.S. government publishes data on the training it provides to foreign militaries in its annual *Foreign Military Training Joint Report to Congress*. In fiscal year 2014-2015, the U.S. funded the training of 121 members of Serbia's military and Ministry of Defense in various defense related courses (U.S. DoS 2014, 228). Of those 121 members, only four members attended a training course that was specifically focused on countering corruption and four more members took part in a training course in which countering corruption was a significant component of the training curriculum – that is, only 6% of the members trained received specific anti-corruption training (Ibid). The amount of U.S.-funded anti-corruption training attended by members of Bosnia's Armed Forces and Ministry of Defense is no better. Of the 131 members trained, none took part in a program that primarily focused on fighting corruption and only eight took part in a program that features anti-corruption as a significant portion of its curriculum – again, 6% (U.S. DoS 2014, 205). This data does not support the view that anti-corruption training comprises a significant portion of overall U.S. training provided through BPC. Any number of factors could contribute to the dearth of anti-corruption training. First and foremost, PNs may not believe they need anti-corruption training. Sending personnel to attend anti-corruption training could be perceived as an admission that corruption is present in their MoDs and thus be politically contentious. Second, the military operational requirements of PNs could make attending such training unfeasible if, for example, those selected to attend training had domestic obligations that precluded their attendance. Third, training courses could have been cancelled or their timelines

changed at the last minute, which would have prevented PN attendance. In any event, regardless of what was originally intended, it appears that too few members of Serbia and Bosnia's military and security institutions *received* anti-corruption training through U.S. BPC.

Thus, while U.S. CCPs for Serbia and Bosnia reveal that building ministerial capacity is a significant portion of U.S. BPC efforts in those countries, the same cannot be said for anti-corruption measures. None of the LOAs or their associated sub-tasks focus on institutionalizing anti-corruption measures. Both CCPs do contain LOAs intended to build the capacity of each MoDs' Inspector General capacity (an office typically tasked with ensuring compliance with laws, policies and directions), which has the potential to reduce their institutional vulnerability to corruption. This is commendable but in general, the CCPs do not contain LOAs intended to develop a corruption-conscious mindset within each countries' MoD or to institutionalize anti-corruption measures, such as the development of a Ministry-wide anti-corruption policy or mandatory annual anti-corruption training for every civilian and military employee.

What accounts for the absence of anti-corruption BPC within U.S. CCPs? The CCPs are quite broad in their scope and it could be the case that building anti-corruption capacity is addressed in some other bilateral agreement. Additionally, it could be assumed that building institutional anti-corruption measures goes without saying, so to speak, and does not bear repeating in the CCPs, though this is unlikely. Furthermore, it could be that neither the Bosnian nor Serbian governments desire assistance with anti-corruption efforts, which is why they are omitted from their CCPs. In any event, the body of evidence indicates that scant few members of Serbia's and Bosnia's MoDs and military forces received training that was specifically focused on combatting corruption and that was facilitated by the U.S. government.³⁰ Moreover, reducing the vulnerability of each countries' MoD to corruption does not feature prominently in U.S. BPC efforts. In consideration of the deleterious effects corruption in the defense sector can have on other sectors of government and society in general, this is an area in which the U.S. could improve its efforts to build partner capacity.

³⁰ The 2014/15 Foreign Military Training Joint Report to Congress (discussed above) itemized U.S. training delivered to Bosnian and Serbian military and MoD personnel. Hardly any training focused on anti-corruption. The current Wales Initiative Fund disbursements indicate, again, that there is underinvestment in anti-corruption training. Only .8% of WIF funds allocated for Bosnia and 1.5% of funds allocated for Serbia funded training that incorporated anti-corruption measures.

6 Evaluation of Research Results

6.1 Research Question 1: *What is BPC and why is it important?*

Policymakers today generally accept that conflict prevention is preferable to responding to conflict after the outbreak of violence, yet the security landscape is dotted with intractable legacy conflicts (India and Pakistan vis-à-vis Kashmir, Israel and Hamas vis-à-vis Gaza, Armenia and Azerbaijan vis-à-vis Nagorna-Karabakh, etc.) and more recent conflicts (Eastern Ukraine, Syria's civil war, and the rise of IS). It is reasonable to assume that the international community judges the costs involved in their resolution as prohibitively high, either in economic, political or military terms.

In this security context, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) has emerged as a new approach to preventing conflicts at relatively low costs. This thesis defines BPC as the provision of training and equipment by one or more governments to improve the security capacity of Partner Nations which share common security interests in a manner that is endogenous, transformative and sustainable. BPC represents a departure from previous conflict prevention strategies because it focuses on enabling recipient nations to more effectively and responsibly provide their own security. For NATO, BPC is important because it enables the Alliance to project stability at low cost. For the United States, BPC is important because it strengthens America's network of partners and allies. This assures access to potential conflict locations and provides strategic depth. Strategic depth means that BPC enables others to share the costs of global security and stability and therefore allows U.S. forces to do the missions that only U.S. forces can do.

6.2 Research Question 2: *What elements of BPC most strongly correlate to its effectiveness?*

BPC is about developing the capacity of others. Capacity development in general, according to the UN Development Programme, must be endogenous in nature (locally resourced and managed) and focused on transformation (the transformation of mindsets and institutional cultures). Capacity building activities that are both endogenous and transformative are most likely to be sustained over the long-term, which positively correlates to effectiveness and success. Because BPC is an extension of capacity development to the military sector, it must also be endogenous in nature and focused on transformation. This is the foundation of successful BPC.

Research from the RAND Corporation reveals BPC's correlates of effectiveness, upon which it makes four recommendations for effective BPC. First, where possible, provider nations should choose partners that have or can adopt the attributes that correlate with effective BPC. This would be partners that: (a) are willing to invest their own funds to sustain capacity; (b) have sufficient absorptive capacity; (c) have high governance indicators; (d) have strong and healthy economies; and (e) whose strategic interests align with U.S. interests in the region. Second, regardless of the partner or context, choose BPC objectives and activities that correspond with what the partner wants or needs and what it is capable of absorbing. Third, consider sustainment in capabilities in BPC planning – whether it involves building a separate funding or logistics stream or expanding existing programs, effective BPC requires sustainment (Paul, et al. 2013, 91). Finally, build ministerial capacity and otherwise develop absorptive capacity.

The benefits of building so-called ministerial capacity cannot be overstated. Benefits to the defense sector include the more effective and transparent management of defense institutions, which, through the proper development of military personnel and management of military resources, enables greater military effectiveness. In this way, building ministerial capacity, as shown by RAND, also builds absorptive capacity. Additionally, because corruption in the defense sector has been shown, according to Transparency International, to have widespread negative spill-over effects on other sectors, anti-corruption activities should be central to BPC.

These recommendations from RAND about effective BPC, combined with the fundamentals of capacity development from the UNDP, constitute the BPC correlates of effectiveness. The historical record shows, as indicated by research from the Congressional Research Service, that BPC is more effective at achieving certain strategic objectives than others. BPC is most effective at enhancing military coalition participation, building institution and personal linkages and building alliances. Serbia and Bosnia each desire membership in the EU. Bosnia desires NATO membership and Serbia seems to desire a closer relationship with NATO too. The United States views both the EU and NATO as vital allies to address global conflicts. As a result, it is fitting that the U.S. uses BPC to achieve the objective of building alliances (i.e. NATO and the EU) in regard to Serbia and Bosnia.

6.3 Research Question 3: *In consideration of the BPC correlates of effectiveness, are the current environments in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina conducive to BPC?*

To answer this question, the paper applied RAND's correlates of effectiveness to the current environments of Serbia and Bosnia. Recall from Section 4.1 that five characteristics of Partner Nations (PNs) are associated with greater BPC effectiveness. These are: (1) the PN invests its own funds to support or sustain capacity; (2) the PN has sufficient absorptive capacity (that is to say, it has the ability to absorb new materiel, training and so on); (3) the PN has high governance indicators; (4) the PN has a strong economy; and (5) the PN shares security interests with the United States (Ibid.).

According to U.S. European Command's (EUCOM) Policy, Strategy, Partnering and Capabilities Division (J5/8), a division of EUCOM's Joint Staff, Serbia and Bosnia do not contribute funds to support or sustain capacity *initially*. They are, however, expected to sustain capacity *after* it has been created. U.S. sustainment activities are intentionally designed, with the full awareness of the PN, to be gradually phased-out and eliminated in order to incentivize the PN to make necessary steps to sustain the new capacity on its own. So, while the PN may not contribute funds to support or sustain capacity initially, it must do so *eventually*. U.S. BPC is matched to PN absorptive capacity. Through Country Cooperation Plans, which are bilateral agreements between the U.S. and a PN on BPC, the U.S. strives to ensure its BPC activities are not only matched to PN absorptive capacity but are also directed towards mutually agreed-upon BPC objectives.

In order to assess whether or not Serbia and Bosnia have high governance indicators and strong economies (RAND's third and fourth correlate of effectiveness, respectively), this paper applied RAND's research criteria to Serbia and Bosnia. Analysis of Serbia and Bosnia's percentile rankings on the World Bank's World Governance Indicators (WGI) Index reveals that neither country has high governance indicators. The average 2014 WGI percentile rank of Serbia is 54.4 whereas the average percentile rank for Bosnia is 45.6. Analysis of Serbia and Bosnia's scores on the UN Human Development Index (HDI) reveals economic performance (Serbia – 0.771, Bosnia – 0.733) that is slightly above and slightly below, respectively, the average for Europe and Central Asia (0.748) and the average for countries with high human development (0.744). As a result of these findings, it appears that neither country has *high* governance indicators

(though they are not *low*, per se) and that their respective economies perform close to the European average in terms of HDI.³¹

The fifth and final correlate of BPC effectiveness is whether or not the PN shares security interests with the United States, or more generally, with the nation conducting BPC. The United States supports Bosnia's and Serbia's desires for Euro-Atlantic integration, which it perceives as in line with American security interests in the region. Where security interests diverge is with respect to Serbia's stance towards the Russian Federation and its position on Kosovo. Serbia adamantly refuses to join EU sanctions against Russia and continues to maintain high level government contacts. This is against the position of the European Council. Additionally, it views Kosovo's independence as illegal and its quick diplomatic recognition by regional neighbors as contributing to regional instability.

Measured against the BPC correlates of effectiveness, neither Serbia nor Bosnia are ideal partner nations. The implication for BPC is that the U.S. must carefully manage its BPC activities with both countries.

6.4 Research Question 4: *In consideration of BPC's correlates of effectiveness and the current environment in Serbia and Bosnia, can United States BPC activities be adjusted to increase the likelihood of their effectiveness and thereby better enhance security?*

Neither Serbia nor Bosnia are ideal PNs for BPC. Moreover, Serbia's security interests diverge somewhat from American security interests. As a result, U.S. BPC proceeds incrementally and focuses on three broad development areas: First, because both Serbia and Bosnia desire a closer relationship with NATO, BPC focuses on building Serbian and Bosnian military interoperability with NATO. Second, because both Serbia and Bosnia are committed to the objectives outlined by the NATO Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building, BPC is designed to build Serbian and Bosnian ministerial capacity. Finally, in order to facilitate greater regional cooperation and guard against trans-national threats (including natural disasters, terrorism, narcotics, etc.) BPC focuses on building so-called dual-use capacities (which includes military civil engineering, construction and medical forces, for example). In consideration of the BPC correlates of effectiveness and the suitability of Serbia and Bosnia as Partner Nations, U.S. BPC

³¹ In its report, RAND fails to clarify what the term *strong economy* precisely means. This is an unfortunate drawback of the research as it limits the degree to which we may assess whether or not Serbia or Bosnia's economic performance is *strong*.

in Serbia and Bosnia, appears well-balanced in terms of development focus areas and strategic objective of assisting both nations in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration.

U.S. BPC activities do, however, miss a capacity building opportunity that can have far-reaching effects across both Partner Nation societies. That opportunity is institutionalizing anti-corruption. Research from Transparency International categorizes Serbia and Bosnia's defense ministries as both being moderately vulnerable to corruption. When considered in tandem with the perception of Serbian and Bosnian citizens that corruption in both societies is widespread, the need to build anti-corruption capacity in the defense sector becomes pressing. The implication for U.S. BPC is that current strategies should be adjusted to give anti-corruption a more prominent and central role.

Current U.S. BPC plans attempt to institutionalize anti-corruption measures in both Serbia and Bosnia's MODs by developing the responsibilities and authorities of Inspectors General and also Staff Judge Advocates. This is important, but more should be done to develop corruption awareness and anti-corruption capacity at lower levels throughout each ministry. Annual, mandatory anti-corruption training, facilitated at first by NATO and later with local resources is one way this could be accomplished. Another way is by facilitating more Serbian and Bosnian military and civilian personnel to attend anti-corruption training through the IMET program. If, through BPC, the U.S. builds the anti-corruption capacity of its Partner Nations, ministerial capacity is likely to benefit, which in turn raises absorptive capacity and enhances military operational capacity

7 Conclusion

This paper examined the BPC efforts of the United States in two countries of the Western Balkans – Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It argued that BPC, as a security policy, has the potential to significantly contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building in the region and, consequently, represents a paradigmatic evolution of the theory of conflict prevention. It assessed whether or not America's BPC activities and strategy for Serbia and Bosnia incorporate the lessons-learned and practices that most strongly correlate with BPC effectiveness. The answer to this question is "yes." But there is the potential to make U.S. BPC activities in Serbia and Bosnia more effective. United States BPC in Serbia and Bosnia could be restructured to more effectively build both nations' anti-corruption capacity. Such activities should be, at their

most basic level, endogenous and focus on transforming mindsets. This means that U.S. BPC activities should foster awareness of the vulnerability to corruption within the defense ministries of Serbia and Bosnia and instill an anti-corruption culture. Lessons-learned from regional partners may have particular relevance to Bosnia and Serbia's Euro-Atlantic integration process. The degree to which BPC, and specifically its use to build anti-corruption capacity in PNs, enabled the accession of other countries in the Western Balkans to NATO is an area of future study that may reveal significant lessons for BPC in Serbia and Bosnia.

Due to the unpredictable nature of conflict and the high costs associated with responding to conflict after the outbreak of violence, BPC is likely to grow as the preferred approach of NATO and the United States to project stability and build security. Great care must be taken in selecting Partner Nations to receive BPC and in the management of BPC in the short, medium and long-term to guard against unintended consequences. Furthermore, as more and more individual states adopt BPC as an approach to build security, the need to coordinate BPC between providers will also grow. Providers of BPC, especially NATO Allies, must collaborate and coordinate their BPC activities to ensure they do not work at cross purposes. Furthermore, the Alliance will need to determine each member's fair share of support in terms of manpower, material and funds in an equitable manner. The U.S. share of this support is likely to outweigh that of other Allies, but NATO should take great care to leverage its members' areas of expertise.

The Western Balkans represent a proving ground for BPC as the next evolution of conflict prevention and peace-building. Some countries in the region have experienced some success with integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Other countries have been less successful, which increases the vulnerability of themselves and the wider European region to transnational threats including mass migration flows and terrorism. If BPC can be employed to enhance the effectiveness of military forces and also contribute to the effectiveness of governance institutions, its positive impact on society will grow. If successful, the implications for building stability and security in other conflict-riddled regions, from central America to Africa, are significant.

8 Povzetek Magistrske Naloge v Slovenskem Jeziku

Oboroženi konflikti v Ukrajini, Siriji in Iraku izkazujejo nekatere karakteristike sodobne (ne)varnosti: uspešno predvideti tako lokacijo kot tudi naravo konflikta je v sodobni varnostni arhitekturi praktično popolnoma nemogoče. Neposredna posledica za oborožene sile ZDA je visoka stopnja pripravljenosti, ki morajo biti sposobne izvajati vse naloge povezane z zagotavljanjem stabilnosti in varnosti v globalnem prostoru. Vendar pa so politični odločevalci v ZDA soočeni s pričakovanji po dodatnem zniževanju razpoložljivih sredstev za obrambo, kar predstavlja omejitve tudi pri obsegu izvajanja nalog ameriških oboroženih sil. Doktrina Izgradnja zmogljivosti partnerja (IZP), ki jo vključujemo med aktivnosti preprečevanja konfliktov ter izgradnja in poglobljanje varnosti v regiji, predstavlja vse bolj uporabljan pristop na področju zagotavljanja varnosti ZDA v zadnjem obdobju. Cilj magistrske naloge je tako poiskati odgovore na naslednja štiri raziskovalna vprašanja: (1) Kaj je pravzaprav doktrina IZP in zakaj je vse bolj pomembna; (2) Kateri parametri doktrine IZP so pomembni za njeno uspešno izvajanje; (3) Ali trenutne varnostne in politične razmere v Srbiji in BiH omogočajo izvedbo doktrine IZP; (4) Kako naj se ameriški pristop pri izvajanju doktrine IZP vsebinsko nadgradi?

Doktrina IZP zavzema pomembno mesto na področju preprečevanja konfliktov. Magistrska naloga definira doktrino IZP kot področje neposredne pomoči pri usposabljanju, izobraževanju ter zagotavljanju opreme na obrambnem področju s ciljem izboljšanja stabilnosti in varnosti partnerske države, ki ima podobne varnostne interese v regiji in so utemeljeni na transparentnosti, vzdržnosti, racionalnosti in nacionalni utemeljenosti. Vse večja razširjenost doktrine IZP tako v ZDA, kot tudi NATO je posledica v prepričanju uspešnosti reševanja in preprečevanja konfliktov kar vodi v stabilizacijo in večjo varnost v regiji in širše. Kljub vsemu pa ostane še kar nekaj vprašanj predvsem v relaciji do partnerskih držav in predvsem ali in kako so cilji doseženi.

Izkušnje Razvojnega programa OZN izkazujejo, da je dolgoročni uspeh tesno povezan s ciljno in lokalizirano implementacijo. Takšen pristop pa vključuje nujno transformacijo v načinu razmišljanja in nujnem upoštevanju institucionalne kulture. Raziskave korporacije RAND izkazujejo, da je doktrina IZP najbolj uspešna v tistih državah partnericah, ki delijo varnostne prioritete ZDA, imajo visoko stopnjo vodenja in vladanja, stabilno gospodarstvo, so pripravljene investirati lastne vire v izvajanje doktrine IZP in imajo zadostno sposobnost absorbiranja novih taktik, tehnik, procesov in opreme. Končno, tudi raziskovalni center ameriškega Kongresa izkazuje, da je doktrina IZP učinkovita zlasti, kadar je nadgrajena z medosebnim in

medinstitucionalnim povezovanjem ter tvorjenju zavezništev. V primeru Srbije in BiH, kjer gre hkrati za proces približevanja omenjenih držav evropskim, kot tudi severnoatlantskim asociacijam, je doktrina IZP lahko možnost, čeprav obe državi nista idealna partnerja. Zlasti v primeru Srbije, kjer gre celo za kompetitivne varnostne interese med ZDA in Rusko federacijo.

Kljub temu ameriška implementacija doktrine IZP omogoča doseganje treh temeljnih ciljev: (1) povečuje se interoperabilnost oboroženih sil nacionalnih držav s standardi NATO; (2) izgradnja in povečevanje transparentnosti delovanja obrambnih ministrstev v raziskovanih državah; (3) podpora večjemu regionalnemu sodelovanju in odpornosti obrambnega sistema varnostnim izzivom z izgradnjo sposobnosti dvojne rabe obrambnih virov. Ameriško izvajanje doktrine IZP bilo še prav posebno uspešno pri vzpostavitvi Balkanske nujne pomoči (Balkan Medical Task Force). Ta iniciativa je primer krepitve medsebojnih interesov, izgradnja zaupanja in dobrih odnosov med nekdanjimi sprtimi in vojskovajočimi stranmi, kar pomembno zmanjšuje možnost obnove konflikta na območju Zahodnega Balkana (Breedlove, 2015: 7).

Vendar pa uspeh ameriškega izvajanja doktrine IZP še ne uspeva implementirati dolgoročnih pozitivnih ukrepov na področju boja proti korupciji v obeh izbranih državah raziskave. Transparency International (TI) dokazuje povezavo med korupcijo v obrambnih sistemih in zniževanjem kvalitete življenja posamezne družbe ter večjo izpostavljenostjo do različnih oblik družbene destabilizacije. TI izkazuje veliko razširjenost korupcije v družbi, ki jo zaznavajo med srbsko javnostjo. Hkrati je dokazano (TI), da so tako srbski kot bosanski ministri za obrambo sorazmerno ranljivi ali dovzetni za korupcijo. Sicer doktrina IZP ni izključno usmerjena v boj proti korupciji v obeh državah, pa bi verjetno morala biti bistveno bolj. Prav tako obstajajo še nekatere možnosti za še učinkovitejše izvajanje v bodoče prav s poudarkom na delovanju obrambnih ministrstvih.

Ob koncu, je mogoče pričakovati še več primerov izvajanja doktrine IZP tudi v bodoče. Izkušnje s področja implementacije doktrine IZP do sedaj, bi bilo smiselno še bolj poglobljeno in sistematično proučevati ter s tem omogočiti nadgradnjo IZP v bodoče. Predvsem pa bi se izkazalo, da je doktrino IZP potrebno bolj prilagajati vsakemu primeru posebej, upoštevaje čim več specifik držav partneric. Prihajajoča plima dvigne vse čolne, pravi pregovor. Vprašanje pa je kako, v kakšni meri in kdaj bo plima izvajanja doktrine IZP dvignila raven dolgoročne varnosti tako narodov kot regij.

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