

**UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE**

Srdan Šušnica

**Pop-mitološko označevanje 'naših' ulic
Študija primera Banje Luke, Bosna in Hercegovina**

**Pop-mythological urine marking of 'our' streets
Case study of Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Magistrsko delo

Ljubljana, 2015

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Every word of this text is propelled by unpleasantness of absence and oblivion and thus devoted for those who are no longer here.

Every thought is here only because of those who remained had showed me how to use my eyes and thoughts, to resist and live along.

... to my beloved Una & ever inspiring Maja

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Resume

Pop-mythological urine marking of 'our' streets - Case study of Banja Luka, BiH

Research analyzes discursive meanings of ethno-religious street graffiti, and consummation and reception of their texts and contextual messages in Banja Luka, once a military, and nowadays a political center of „RS” („Republic of Srpska”). Ethno-religious graffiti are inflammable form of street art whose narrative contain prevailing national and religious features, themes and myths of new-Serbian pop-nationalistic meta-narratives of 1990's. In today's post-war and post-genocidal context of „RS” they are true ethno-fascistic hate speeches, but also a form of street postproduction of dominant official memory narratives, identitarian practices and ethno-exclusivism of the Serbian ethno-political elite in BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Belgrade. By emphasizing ethnic and religious differences, new-Serbian ethno-exclusivism and racial or religion elitism, by glorifying war crimes and war successes or by hating „others”, these graffiti aggressively produce visibility of „our stories”, in such a powerful way that they produce discursive invisibility, auto-censorship and oblivion of „others”. Text is giving a contextual interpretation of socio-political meanings of pop-nationalistic graffiti, by reading them in the light of civil war and aggression and in the light of media new speech and politics of remembrance „RS” elite. It does that by questioning the nature, characteristics and intensity of the connections between the production and consummation of graffiti on one and messages of ethno-political elite on the other side. Text suggests existence of still fresh populist and ethno-fascistic legitimizations of war and aggression, ethnic cleansings, glorifications of „RS” and post-war divisions of BiH as legitimate war-gains of Bosnian Serbs. Walking down streets of today's Banja Luka, one can read graffiti such as „Srpska to Serbs!”, or „Who plays for Bosnia is Serb no more!”. Further down the streets one can notice street names such as *Cara Lazara* or *Vojvode Uroša Drenovića* or community names such as *Lazarevo* or *Obilićevo*. Furthermore, one will discover great number of fresh erected monuments, such as those of *Ban Tisa Milosavljević* or *Stefan Nemanja*. One and the only visible ethno-religious identifications present in official narratives are new-Serbian memory narratives so close to the well know Belgrade's spiritual myth of Serbian-hood. All non-Serbian and thus unsuitable official symbols, all undesirable cultural monuments are changed or blown away in intense and violent political wave of new-Serbian ethno-fascism on Banja Luka and BiH. Research describes and analyzes these violent changes which had constituted cultural oblivion as a norm of existence in „RS”. Pop-nationalistic graffiti not only reaffirm official narratives and oblivion, but also project expectations of the future for the young generations of Bosnian Serbs. Future in which there will be no others. Discursive meanings of street names such as *Vahida Maglajlić* or *Ferhatpaša*, don't pass the filter of selected memory frame, so they are expelled from the chain of desirable explanations, and therefore not allowed to be placed in the mnemonic relation with an average reader. Soon, absence is normal, and the normality of absence would become a norm of social and political order. Untold sadness of unspeakable magnitude! Why?

Key words: street art, graffiti, pop-nationalism, hate speech, ethnic cleansing, ethno-fascism, street names, memory narratives, cultural memory, Banja Luka, Republic of Srpska (RS), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

Pop-mitološko označevanje 'naših' ulic - Študija primera Banje Luke, BiH

Namen raziskovanja je analiza simbolike in pomenov uličnih etnoreligijskih grafitov, parol in nalepk na eni ter konzumacije (branja, recepcije) njihovih tekstualnih in podtekstualnih sporočil na drugi strani, pri čemer se tekst omeji na področje Banja Luke, nekoč vojno-strateškega, danes pa političnega centra Republiki Srbske (RS). Etnoreligijski grafiti so eksplozivna oblika street arta, katerega narativni in vizualni kodi vsebujejo dominantna nacionalna in religijska obeležja, tematike in mite, v konkretnem primeru srbskega etničnega korpusa, in kateri v povojnem kontekstu skozi poudarjanje etnoreligijskih razlik, povečevanje zločinov in vojnih uspehov, žalitve in nestrpnost do drugačnega z lahkoto postanejo sovražni govor. Z njimi se tako agresivno proizvaja vidnost »našega«, da na ravni diskurza proizvaja nevidnost in povzroča avtocenzuro drugega in drugačnega. Besedilo podaja kontekstualno interpretacijo pomena in družbeno-političnega diskurza grafitov v luči državljanske vojne in agresije v Bosni in Hercegovini (BiH) in delovanja političnih elit RS. To počne skozi preizpraševanje narave, značilnosti, intenzivnosti in kvalitete povezav med produkcijo in konzumacijo etnofašističnega sovražnega govora v grafitih na eni in sporočilih etnopolitične elite RS v javnem, regulativnem in medijskem prostoru na drugi strani. S poudarjanjem njihove močne povezanosti in interaktivnosti, besedilo kaže na še vedno svežo politično namero populistične legitimacije državljanske vojne, vojnih zločinov in etničnega čiščenja, hkrati pa tudi glorifikacije RS in delitve BiH kot legitimnih vojnih pridobitev Srbov v BiH. Ekstremna vidnost in intenzivnost povezave med ulico in politiko daje pobudo za pozabo multietnične preteklosti – ponuja »narodno in duhovno legitimnost« za obstoj RS v natančno določenem mestu in za njegovo pripadanje natanko srbskemu etničnemu korpusu. Ponuja navidezno kulturno-politično in vojno-emancipatorno „kontinuiteto“ in „normalnost“ RS in odgrinja pravi namen prelivanja krvi, skozi katerega je le-ta nastala. V dosledni maniri Ecovega „Ur Fašizma“.

Ključne besede: street art, grafiti, pop-nacionalizem, sovražni govor, etnično čiščenje, etnofašizem, naziv ulic, memorijskih narativov, kulturni spomin, Banja Luka, Republika Srbska (RS), Bosna in Hercegovina (BiH).

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Introduction

In this work I want to give one wider review of discursive meanings of ethno-religious or pop-nationalistic street graffiti, slogans, posters and stickers (hereinafter: pop-nationalistic graffiti) in Banja Luka and Republic of Srpska (hereinafter: RS) created between 2006 and 2014. To decipher their cultural and political symbolism in the light of civil war and aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter: BIH), as well as in context of dominant post-war and post-genocidal new speech, memory narratives and politics of remembrance imposed by ethno-political and ethno-intellectual elite in RS and its Belgrade mentors. Banja Luka is taken as case study as once a military and a strategic and nowadays a political center of RS, violently gained political community of Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade ethno-colonial politics.

The goal is to present symbolic correlations between messages and discursive meanings that elite and streets, almost simultaneously exchange and emit into the formal and informal public space. This paper is analyzing production and consummation of pop-nationalistic graffiti and then compares their texts and their meanings with mainstream political and cultural messages and official narratives of RS ethno-religious elite and institutions. Disclosure of discursive meanings of pop-nationalistic graffiti in Banja Luka isn't possible without describing historical background and without analyzing the political and cultural context of a present-day RS and a new-Serbian Banja Luka. This context is dominated by popular and official new-Serbian pop-nationalistic myths and reinterpretations of BIH and Balkan history, by ethno-mythical and ethno-exclusive culture of remembrance and by new-Serbian ethno-religious identitarian practices. In that sense, paper is giving a preview of politics of remembrance and dominant national-building patterns of new-Serbian cultural memory through discursive analysis of the changes of street names and names of local communities in Banja Luka, done by the RS elite during the war. A preview of „official memory soup” in which new generations produce and consume pop-nationalistic graffiti and other new-Serbian meta-narratives in streets, media, schools, workplaces and rhetoric. New meta-narratives which are built on top of old 19th and 20th century nationalistic mythologies and artificial constructs of „Serbian” (or any other) nation, and thus completely unrelated to the reality and supported by economical, class and political history of Orthodox Christians population in this land. Objective is to find out how this discursive dance between RS elite and streets is developing and in which directions a post-war cultural and political context of RS and BIH is changing. In that sense, pop-nationalistic graffiti can be, less read in the context of recent war, aggression and ethnic division of BIH, but more in the context of a pop-nationalistic and ethno-exclusivist dictatorship of today's RS ethno-political elite, which took the shape of completely formed ethnocracy with significant and ever-growing elements of fascism.

This research presents negative consequences of connections between RS elite and street, thus trying to open the eyes of many and demystify mainstream Serbian or new-Serbian political ideas and national-building messages in BIH and Balkans. The paper is trying to scrutinize tragic new-Serbian simplifications, falsifications and stretched reinterpretations of overall BIH historical background and political

reality, on the level of streets, institutions and media space. It wants to emphasize problems and worries of general public in Banja Luka and BIH, such as: rise of politically induced atmosphere of fear; rise of ethno-religious mythical hate; ethno-fascist intolerance, discrimination and violence; violent oblivion, distortion and revision of our common past and cultural memory; responsibility and accountability of RS elite for holding and cementing occupied and ethnically cleaned territories and ethno-fascistic divisions as new pro-European institutional and street „normality“; or responsibility for development of ethno-fascist Dayton system to the point of a new conflict.

Relatively important outcomes of this research are largely consumed in the fact that this is the first preview and analysis of new-Serbian pop-nationalistic street graffiti in social and political context of present-day Banja Luka, RS and BIH. Motive for this research, its methods and conceptual framework can be found in the author's need to stress out a destructive post-war and post-genocidal practices and effects of ethno-political elites in RS and Belgrade. Elites which brutally have exploited, distorted, disregarded and destroyed the rich and valuable culture memory and economic history of Bosnian Serbs or Orthodox Christians Bosniaks of just Orthodox Christians population (once called Vlach population) from different regions of BIH (Bosnian Krajina, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Semberija, Bosnian Posavina). This population had migrated to these areas together with advance of Ottoman Empire, as their largest and most loyal allies and nomadic colonizers of vast depopulated areas. They enjoyed religious and economic autonomy and privileges and lived mixed within and along with Muslim and Catholic population for more than three centuries, thus developing common class and cultural traditions and narratives which don't differ from narratives or cultural memories of any other population in BIH. My desire is to illuminate mechanisms and discourses of political distortion of this true past and production of new-Serbian mythical ethno-tribal, war-heroic and martyrdom meta-narratives whose sole purpose is to serve the selfish and particular interests of today's (or any national-building) political and economic elites in RS and Belgrade. This behavioral patterns and discourses of RS and Belgrade elites threatens to erase, damage and destroy, almost any ratio and sense, value, humanity and significance of true class and cultural heritage and history of Bosnian Serbs and its Orthodox Christians, Slavicized Vlach ancestors, replacing it with old martyrdom national-building mythologies and narratives or with their contemporary lucrative pop-nationalistic interpretations. Also they threaten to destroy and diminish remembrance about mutual inter-ethnic and inter-confessional class traditions and ethnographies living of BH population as well as their joined the WWII anti-fascistic resistance. Behavioral patterns and discourses of today's RS and Belgrade elites threaten to devaluate each and every victim of fascist terror of Nazis, Italian fascists and their collaborators, Ustashe and Chetniks, not just here, but all over post-Yugoslav space.

In similar, but yet distinctive way, it is possible to identify equally destructive behavioral patterns and ethno-fascist tendencies in the actions of Muslim or Bosniak and Croat ethno-political elites, which all impose to its citizens very stretched and distorted, highly unscientific and unarchived narratives and myths about centuries long national or demotic „traditions“, national continuum and antiquity of „Croats“ and

„Bosniaks” in Balkans. Though some comparative research between pop-nationalistic discourses of today’s Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks would be more than interesting, yet this paper doesn’t have such intentions, or resources. In that sense author’s purpose isn’t to imply that pop-nationalistic new speech is exclusive and specific for RS and Belgrade elites.

This research wants to explain existence of such pop-nationalism in Banja Luka as well as to emphasize how this ethno-religious and ethno-exclusive political system of RS and Dayton BIH obtains significant characteristic of ethno-fascism as RS elites even more and even harder drew from or rely on: 1) oblivion of pre-war BH experiences, 2) fear from assimilation or disappearance of Bosnian Serbs without ethno-exclusive concept of RS and Dayton BIH, 3) „liberating“ gains and successes of Belgrade aggression and war in BIH, 4) atrocities and war terrors from which RS had occurred as continuation of war-emancipatory and liberating tradition of „Serb” people, 5) denial and relativization of ethnic cleansings and genocides in RS, 6) „Dayton“ territorial ethnocracy as sole points of political legitimacy and existence of ethnically cleaned RS and all BH „constitutive nations”, 7) neo-liberal rhetoric in which RS has some new „normality“ in BIH or EU.

Of course, the intention is not to portray entire population of Bosnian Serbs as fascistic or genocidal or mainly oriented toward nationalistic hatred and ethno-fascism. Neither is the intention to present entire history or cultural traditions of Bosnian Serbs, all uprisings and wars in which they participated sometimes on quite opposite and unexpected sides, as some already determined flow of events which inevitably lead toward extreme nationalism, ethnocracy or ethno-fascism. This isn’t true, nor possible, not even close. Author’s target isn’t people, but political, religious and intellectual elites which refresh old political national-building myths as new-Serbian identitarian practices and meta-narratives, thus producing post-modern pop-nationalism. To some point, this research is trying to be a myth-busting story through which it tries to disclose most obvious myths and misapprehensions that RS and Belgrade elites impose to Serbs in author’s backyard. It tries to reveal the ways on which elites abuse human emotions, memory and already created collective feelings, consciousness and remembrances, thus radicalizing masses to a desired level, the level on which totalitarian and fascistic messages of elite can be justified with mood, or temper, or spirit of the people. While time is passing by, one is less able to discern what was created first, the messages of elites or messages of masses.

1 Research problem, phenomena and goal

Research phenomena are discursive meanings of pop-nationalistic street graffiti and messages of RS ethno-political elite in public, institutional, media and memory time-space. Part of research phenomena is production and consummation of their texts and their discursive/contextual meanings, as well as intensity and quality of the correlations between messages and narratives of elite on the one and streets on the other side. The objectives of this research are pop-nationalistic street graffiti, slogans, posters and stickers created between 2006 and 2014 in Banja Luka, whose visual codes and discursive narratives contain prevailing national and ethno-religious features, themes and myths of ethno-religious corpus of Bosnian Serb population. By emphasizing ethno-religious „origins” and differences of „the nation”, or by glorifying war-crimes and war successes or simply by promoting ethno-centrism and intolerance these graffiti can very easily become pure hatred speech in today’s post-war and post-genocidal context of RS, but also a form of street postproduction of dominant official memory narratives, identitarian practices and ethno-exclusivist new speech of ethno-political and religious elite of Bosnian Serbs and its Belgrade’s mentors. On the other, side objectives of researcher’s interest are discursive messages and narratives of RS elite and institutions produced between 1992 and 2014 and contained in the official street names, names of local communities, legislative, messages of official institutions, official memory narratives and monuments in public space and media rhetoric.

The essential goal of this research is to disclose and explain discursive meanings and narratives of pop-nationalistic graffiti and their connections with official narratives of RS elite in the context of prevailing new-Serbian media and institutional new speech, official memory narratives and identitarian practices of today’s Banja Luka and RS. Also it is trying to disclose a modus how informal narratives of pop-nationalistic graffiti are interconnected or intertwined with formal social, political and cultural framework and how they in such interactivity occupy and conquer the public space. Sub-objectives would be: 1) to present historical and cultural background of Banja Luka as a pre-context of present-day Banja Luka, 2) to present official memory narratives in RS through story about street names and names of local communities in Banja Luka, 3) to present how pop-nationalistic graffiti relate to official RS politics of remembrance, 4) to present and interpret a discursive readings of pop-nationalistic graffiti in political, media, cultural and mnemonic context of post-war Banja Luka and RS, 5) to emphasize discursive relations between messages of street and RS elite and disclose consequences and effects of such relations.

In their strong interconnection, both elite and street see the „Dayton” division of BIH and ethnically cleaned territory of RS as promised and historically merited war-gains closed with neoliberal international agreement. Such legitimization of the „Dayton” RS and BIH seeks for a constant negation of ethnic cleanings and genocide, as well as non-cathartic and mythological interpretations of latest war as one of the Serbian liberation wars, a natural continuum of previous liberation wars. In that sense elite is producing and street is reproducing two efficient levers. First is a production of a daily resonant and politically lucrative

ethno-religious identity of „new-Serbian voter“ or „Serb-Orthodox Christians voter“ or „Republic-Serb voter“ in BIH as a core socio-political value and the only way of the existence of a political subject. This prevents development of more complex political and cultural identities or a more objective cultural memory. Second lever is the creation of a culture of oblivion of unsuitable past, with extremely artificial and politically induced reinterpretations of BIH and Banja Luka's cultural memory. These levers simultaneously create mnemonic selection of suitable memory narratives and offer traditional, demotic and spiritual legitimacy for affiliation of Banja Luka to „the historical and cultural space of RS, Serbian people and transgressive Serbia“. Research is devoted to the demystification of these levers.

2 Conceptual framework and hypothesis

Research is inevitable leaning on the Stuart Hall's representation theory which emphasizes that preoccupation with meaning in culture has taken a different turn, being more concerned, not with the detail of how 'language' works, but with the broader role of discourses in culture which are clusters or formation of ideas, images and practices which define what is and is not appropriate, usefull, relevant or true in given context. Discursive approach is more concerned with the effects and consequences of representatation, its „politics”, than with how Inaguage produce meaning. How the knowledge, produced by particular discourse, in connection with power, regulates or constructs identiteties or subjectivities and defines how certain things are represented. In that sense power consistently strives to fix meanings to support its agenda so that individual minute by minute remakes received meanings, thus reafirming power. (Hall 1997) Also this research adopted Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony in which the government is maintained and legitimized as a rule of power block over the block of disempowered through number of institutional and „private“ mechanisms, as Gramsci pointed out: „What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private', and that of 'political society' or 'the State'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the State and 'juridical' government. The functions in question are precisely organisational and connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government. These comprise: 1) The 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group;... 2) The apparatus of state coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed.“ (Gramsci 1999, 145). Further more this research is focused on discursive meanings of messages that come out from two, allegedly, different sources, from iformal space (street, civil society or private sphere) and from formal space (institutions, government or political sphere), thus leaning on Gramsci's conclusions: „That the everyday concept of State is unilateral and leads to grotesque errors can be demonstrated with reference to Daniël Halévy's recent book *Décadence de la liberté*, of which I have read a review in *Nouvelles Littéraires*. For Halévy, 'State' is the representative apparatus; and he discovers that the most important events of French history from 1870 until the present day have not been due to initiatives by political organisms deriving from universal suffrage, but to those either of private organisms... But what does that signify if not that by 'State' should be understood not only the apparatus of government, but also the 'private' apparatus of 'hegemony' or civil society? It should be noted how from this critique of the State which does not intervене, which trails behind events, etc., there is born the dictatorial ideological current of the Right, with its reinforcement of the executive, etc.“

(Gramsci 1999, 529-530) However, this research didn't theorize discursive readings of graffiti, official nametags and political new speech by doing deep conceptualization of their meanings within above mentioned theories. Instead it used these concepts as silent platform for its dichotomies, definitions and vocabulary, a platform on which it wanted to deconstruct the structures of ethno-religious political representation and monolithic ethno-political hegemony in the informal and formal space. On such a platform, research wants to emphasize more fluent psycho-social process of creation of memory narratives and formation of new flows of cultural remembrance or memory which started so violently in 1992. Moreover, it wants to answer the question whether a new flow of cultural remembrance in RS, whose aim is to reach a level of independent cultural memory, can survive on such a massive and violent oblivion, distortion and revision of old flows of memory narratives and on such a quantity and intensity of artificial and pop-mythological memory narratives? Or it is doomed to collapse? Within this process of formation of cultural remembrance, this research is focused on extreme and exclusive visibility and intensity of discursive connections between informal new-Serbian pop-nationalistic graffiti and formal pop-nationalistic new speech, politics of remembrance and official memory narratives. Dance between informal and formal messages in public space of Banja Luka seems to offer a pop-mythological, demotic and spiritual legitimacy for survival of RS in BIH and for new „normality“ of RS in wider Balkans context. It also offers legitimacy for violent oblivion of multiethnic and Bosnian past or for ignoring all different interpretations of Bosnian Serbs history, other than those imposed by Belgrade ethno-intellectual elite in 1990s and set in the national-building processes of 19th and beginning of 20th century. By analyzing these connections whose meanings can be decipher only through prism of dominant new-Serbian cultural, political and war-emancipatory memory narratives, this research wants to disclose a real intention of bloodshed from which RS had appeared. It also tries to predict whether this society and its politics will continue to develop in the manner of ethno-fascism, in the manner of political regime set as a norm on the very beginning of its existence in 1992. Will RS society move toward full-scale fascistic regime in consistent manner of Umberto's „Ur Fascism“? (Eco 1995) Having in mind all this, one could set an hypothesis that informal narratives of pop-nationalistic graffiti and formal narratives of RS elite are highly connected and intersected to the point which implies that RS ethno-political elite has successfully constructed a new cultural and political reality in BIH: a RS society, completely artificial and based on military success, war-atrocities and neoliberal „Dayton“ contract. A reality that can survive only if street and elite successfully use and impose artificially constructed concepts of ethno-religious identities, pop-nationalistic symbols and memory narratives, which main tasks are to: 1) politically destruct, violate, distort and forget cultural memory of BIH and vivid remembrance of pre-war inter-ethnic life, by imposing official culture of oblivion; 2) impose new-Serbian historical revisionism and amnesia, simplify, plagiarize and mythologize memory narratives about place and role of Bosnian Serbs in the history of Banja Luka, BIH and Balkans; 3) deconstruct leftist ideologies and alternatives in BIH and impose Chetniks' ethno-fascistic perspectives of World War II and Serbian ethno-imperialistic ideologies from the beginning of 20th century; 4) offer a cultural, political and war-emancipated „continuity“ and

„normality“ of RS, no matter how thin and mythical it is and regardless if it is based on a conquest, genocide and bloodshed from which RS appeared; 5) produce an atmosphere of barrenness and impossibility of inter-ethnic (co)existence with Bosniaks and Croats in post-war Banja Luka and BIH, by imposing „Dayton“ and its discriminative and ethno-fascistic interpretation as an everlasting social norm and political order, along with the dictatorship of amnesia, Serbian ethno-myths, ethno-narcissism, hatred to the different, Orthodox Christians reconciliation and religious fundamentalism, all to the edge of new armed conflict.

This is possible only in the wide-accepted and „liberating but totalitarian“ neo-liberal regime that has strong Serbian or Orthodox Christians ethno-exclusive and religious fundamentals, with „unifying“ identitarian construct and mythological memory narratives. For large number of Serbs this is the „Dayton RS“, for non-Serbs and minority of Serbs this is a pure ethno-fascism. In that way conceptual framework for this research is found in the Umberto's elements of everlasting „Ur-fascism“ (Eco 1995), but also in the theoretical works of other anthropologists, culture historians, sociologists and critics of multiculturalism, such as Brian Barry's „Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism“ (Barry 2006). Especially of those authors who dealt with the cultural and social constructivism of the national identities and who did an anthropological, linguistic or historical analysis of the folklore narratives, literature and myths. The research is inspired by the demystifying interpretations and conclusions about Balkans' past in Todorova's „Imagining the Balkans“ (Todorova 2009).

For deconstructing official mnemonic selection of suitable memory narratives this research uses conceptual settings of Jean Brockmeier, who set three dimensions of narrativity: linguistic (what signs are talking to us), semiotic (how they are communicating meaning to us) and performative or discursive (where this meaning is coming from and how does affect us). Brockmeier concluded: „The argument that I originally put forward (let me call it A1) was that narrative is an important integrating force in the mnemonic system of a culture; this, I have suggested, is the pivotal function of narrative for cultural memory. But this is different from the argument that narrative is a particular synthesis of distinct elements (let me call this A2). ... I propose that narrative is such a powerful integrating force within this symbolic space precisely because of the synthesis function just outlined. Narrative not only 'emplots', on all three levels, diverse elements into a whole (A1); it also interweaves, at the same time, these three orders, fusing quite diverse forms of discourse and symbolic mediation (A2). Narrative, in fact, integrates an amazing diversity of forms of life that range from spoken and written language to architecture and the arts.“ (Brockmeier 2002, 36-37) For this author, texts, monuments, signs or archives when consumed in given political and social context always hide some memory narratives, thus acting as some memory texts or practices. In such way memory narratives become basic thread which knit and shape a fiber of our cultural memory. Cultural memory is forming by capturing oral narrative into the memory texts and practices and they all are intertwined within or subjected to the narrativisation. Memory texts can't be decoded without analysis of cultural conditions of time and space of their origin. This is because cultural memory isn't simple psychologized pile of individual and group memories about flow of past events and uncertain future, but it is weaved out of social, ideological and

material settings of the community of people who remember and forget, as well as out of expectations, predictions of outcomes and hopes which all impose to us our desired and almost certain future. In the process of forming cultural memory, past, present or future have no clear frontier, nor are they ontological categories. So Brockmeier defines a cultural memory as multidimensional temporal process in given social, cognitive and symbolic framework of presence which can every day repetitively regenerate some cultural remembrance or enable cultural oblivion of the community, in continuous reconfiguration, selection, amalgamation and unbundling of past and present events, experiences, knowledge, causes, consequences and desired outcomes. This social framework within which we learn, remember and forget, Brockmeier calls a selected memory framework. Thus, individual remembrance becomes mix of cerebral operations of remembering and forgetting and selected memory framework of given community or culture, and cannot operate outside this framework. This selection of remembrances that won't be forgotten and will become prevailing or official cultural memory Brockmeier calls a mnemonic selection of symbolic memory framework, which can be re-questioned, deconstructed, but cannot be ignored. This framework, as well as this selection has a function of amalgamation of individual or group experiences, expectations and projections in one symbolic memory space of presence, which person can call her/his community or culture where s/he belongs. That's how culture memory acts as cognitive, ideological and valuable continuum of community and culture.

Pop-nationalistic graffiti as well as street names, names of local communities and schools or media rhetoric of politicians and institutions are nothing else but memory texts, which in social, cultural and political framework of a present-day RS and BIH offer selected memory narratives that regenerate desired culture remembrance and inevitably produce cultural oblivion. To experience the meanings of pop-nationalistic graffiti which present the knights of the medieval Kingdom of the *Nemanjić* or state „Srpska for the Serbs!“, or to live on the street address *Cara Lazara 4* Street or to go to Elementary School *Sveti Sava*, or to ride a bus between Banja Luka's local communities *Lazarevo* and *Obilićevo* means that an individual or a group is immediately put in a vivid relation with dominant pop-nationalistic ideology, political and cultural settings and toward desired ethno-religious identitarian and memory practices which are selected and imposed mainly by RS and Belgrade political and intellectual elite. Suddenly graffiti or official names aren't just memory texts. They become a memory narratives which symbolically encircle territories of „new-Serbian“ Banja Luka, RS and lands and artificially converge the ideological, economical, value and cognitive horizons of „Serbian“ past and „new-Serbian“ presence and produce symbolic „all-Serbian memory time-space“. Memory time-space which acts not just as memory framework, but also as political, cultural and ideological framework in which every new elite and generation of voters can invoke retouched past and create one, unique, only possible and universal „all-Serbian“ presence. By converging horizons of past and presence RS elite artificially knit culture memory in reverse order from our presence to our past, readjusting and reinterpreting past events and time-flow so that they look like and must be read only in one way – in the way which must inevitably lead to our presence as we should or do experience it. Thus selected and artificial memory time-

space always has tendency to explain past events from the ideological horizons of presence, by putting horizons of past in memory narratives and ideological frameworks of the presence. This time-space inversion in reinterpretation of historical events towards the past, instead from the past, is almost unavoidable and condition for establishing of ideological and political explanations of our presence or some part of our reality, regardless how rational or irrational this explanation sounds. By consuming these memory narratives hidden in graffiti or street names we suddenly acquire certain cultural and political feeling that we all are nothing else but a part of continuous and unbroken chain of historical and political events which all deterministically and inexorably flow and lead generations of people to our reality as it precisely look like today, in which I, a person of precisely historically determined ethnic or religious identity and of precisely historically determined ideology, should live in today's Banja Luka, be a part of dominant ethno-political space, and not someone else. This inversion is therefore legitimizing and use memory narratives as its agency. In some community this time-space inversion in given memory time-space is almost unnoticeable, but in others it is extremely visible, all the way to the absurdity, like in today's Banja Luka and RS or Skopje. Why is this inversion in reading of memory narrative from presence toward past even possible? It is possible since the way people's community perceive time and remembrances, has nothing to do what so ever with the concept of physical or even psychological time-flow. Physical time-flow imply temporally linear, one-dimensional model of forming and interpreting events in causal direction from cause toward consequence, from past toward the future. What is even more important, events in physical time-flow go from the state of lower entropy toward the state of higher entropy in the direction of increasing the volume of entropy, or in other words from the state of smaller chaos toward the state of greater chaos. Human consciousness produces its own, so called physiological arrow of time-flow which makes us remember the past and not the future. (Hawking 1988, 144-145) The other way around would represent a miracle. In such psychological perception of time-flow, there is a certain deflection of the principle of entropy, especially in communities of people, where common memory text and practices (transformed into cultural memory narratives) transcribe individual and group remembrances into collective memory. Human minds and impulses of memory are both focused and opened toward constant evocation and reinterpretation of past experiences and events, as well as to anticipation and prediction of the future events and patterns. It is somehow neurologically learned behavior thanks to which we can learn, resolve obstacles and survive next day. But also thanks to which we can make a logically or ethically wrong choices, repeat mistakes or evoke old solutions from past for new challenges of future in which we are trying to counter and oppose entropy principle instead to embrace it and go along with it. At individual level some corrections can be made by using pure logic. But on the collective level volumes of implied logic are getting smaller as volumes of potential and implied social and political powers are getting bigger. All our individual behaviors including evocation or forgetting of past, are under constant pressure and steering that comes from exercises of various forms of social and political powers of elite or community, which largely rely on the emotion factors (fear, hunger, lost, comfort, happiness, etc). Our individual remembrance is suddenly

occupied with memory narratives that transgress onto us various ideological, religious and political interventions, concepts, rationalities and irrationalities. And we comply, emotionally and then cognitively. Thus, our psychological perception of time-flow and our group and collective remembrance is suddenly free from the laws of entropy and logics and is free to interpret events from consequences toward causes, to choose most adequate and most desirable instead most probable cause(s) which are explaining our reality today and here, regardless whether these adequate and desirable causes are logical, or complex, or complete, or objective enough to cause our complex reality now. Consciousness about existence of entropy and physical time-flow becomes less important and ignored. Because of such characteristics of human remembrance, especially collective one, I think that even absolute absence of consciousness about physical time-flow (like absence of clock, calendar, shifts between night and day or starlit sky) wouldn't influence, change or produce some significantly different way of creation of our psychological perception about time-flow. This absence wouldn't change the way we are remembering or the way in which our consciousness about ephemerality, repeatability or predictability of events is created. Even if physical time would flow opposite to physical arrow of time of our existing cognitive world, from the future toward past in the direction of decrease of entropy, I think that universality and timelessness of human remembrance and psychological arrow of time would make that in our trip toward past we remember „future” (a state of greater entropy) same as now we remember past (a state of lower entropy), thus mixing horizons of presence and past events, again without obligation to stick to the principle of entropy. In same manner as we interpret past today, we would probably create desirable interpretations of future causes that would have to explain consequences in the past which stand in front of us. Only formats of remembering would probably be slightly different, as we would be in total darkness.

Our individual remembrance isn't completely rationalized, naturalized and logical, because we adopt and inherent dominant memory narrative through which we gain cultural meanings and enter in symbolic flow of remembrances of our community. Our personal remembrances are becoming more and more collectivized through the process of mnemonic selection, whereas the important role in that process plays repetitive and emotional experiences, evocations and reinterpretations of most important and thus selected historical, political, cultural and ideological symbols. Whoever governs these symbols or this selection, influences and governs collectivization, the values and contents of both our individual and collective memories. In Banja Luka and RS we are witnessing rigid and intensive selection of values, ideological and cultural contents that are desirable or suitable to experience, evoke and remember (Serbian) from those that are desirable to forget (non-Serbian). I think that such mnemonic selection imposed by elite, particularly in Banja Luka, is far more artificial, irrational, non-archived and non-objective than in other similar communities. It stretches human capacity to comprehend reality to the edges of rational thinking and thus imposes irrational explanations of our past and even more irrational legitimization of our presence. Furthermore, it tries to impose an artificial order in the chaos of the past events and ideas, and thus to conduct a totalitarian and impossible decrease of present and future entropy, ignoring the fact that entropy

was smaller in the past than it is today and that it will be even greater in the future. Above presented conceptual framework and overall approach, with a lot of empiric data, can open many questions, and yet neither one would bring to the final conclusion. But also it can offer divers yet intertwined playgrounds on which empiric data and our reality can be widely previewed and described in a coherent manner, or later they can be researched in deeper way. Potential lack of this approach is that discursive readings of pop-nationalistic graffiti, street names or narratives of RS elite can look stretched or unfounded, especially without substantive understanding of RS and BIH context, but this approach can trigger and open a wide space for intellectual and social debate, which is more than necessary. Short texts of graffiti or street names, or short but strong language in politicians' rhetoric hide more than one contextual meaning, very difficult to distinct and border, especially when you are looking and re-questioning whether these messages in their contextual surrounding have elements of totalitarian ideologies, such as Umberto's Ur-fascism (Eco 1995). The very base of this paper lays in an old dilemma. Whether informal narratives of streets are just a manifestation of spontaneous desires, attitudes and declarations which were always present among Bosnian Serbs, or they are originated under strong and prevailing influence of intellectual and political elite, social institutions, official narratives and overall mnemonic and political framework of Serbian political societies? If we can assume a hypothesis that narratives of street graffiti wouldn't be originated in such number, or wouldn't carry such strong pop-nationalistic meanings, or simply wouldn't be that significant or have central position in public and political space without constant official bombarding of Bosnian Serbs with ethno-centric images, pop-nationalistic myths and false interpretations, then another hypothesis can be imposed. If the narratives of street graffiti, as well as dominant identitarian practices, declarations and memory narratives of Bosnian Serbs are not original, spontaneous and well archived, but merely induced, officially imposed and artificial, and if RS and Belgrade elites and institutions are constructing our reality and remembrance mainly on highly artificial and imposed foundations, whether present „RS society” can survive and build its own cultural memory, and thus become culturally independent and sovereign memory time-space? If answer is „no”, there are only two hypothetical options for the future of that society. The first option for „RS society” and its elite is to constantly increase production and level of pop-nationalism to the point where ethno-fascism becomes social and political norm, just to remain on the „no man's land”, halfway between its own flow of cultural memory and more archived and objective flows of BIH, inevitably leftist, cultural memory. Other option is to collapse in what will be a new conflict which would hopefully have universal, anational and leftist ideological bases and constructions, but which could also have extreme nationalistic and neoliberal origins. In a case of first model, there is a hope that BIH remains the last stronghold of true supranational and inter-ethnic solidarity and living in Balkans. In case of the second model there will be no more than 10% of Bosnian Serbs remain living here.

In order to theorize hypothesis stated above, this research must focus on giving the answer on following hypothesis: if RS and Belgrade elites directly and intensively influence production and consummation of pop-nationalistic graffiti and official memory narratives in the way they are doing that in

last 7 – 8 years, with strong ethno-exclusive and pop-nationalistic discursive meanings, then final effects and consequences of such process will lead toward two possible ends - the *status quo* and isolated „RS society” in which ethno-fascism becomes social and political norm and finally political regime or the collapse of „RS society” in what will be a new conflict!?! Answer on this hypothesis should satisfy the main goal and sub-goals of this research, mentioned in sections above.

3 Methodology

This research is trying to explore contemporary anthropological phenomena, street graffiti as well as official narratives in public space (official names, legislative, messages of official institutions, official memory narratives and monuments, media rhetoric of elite) by using methodological cross-disciplinary approaches of culture studies. Graffiti as well as official narratives are explored here as texts which carry distinctive meanings and discursive narratives behind its superficial „linguistics“. In that sense research relies on concept and methods of Stuart Hall representation theory to decipher discursive meanings behind texts of graffiti and official narratives. It does that by interpreting them in the context of political, economic, literature, testimonial and intimate stories, historic papers and narratives from pre-war, war and post-war periods of Banja Luka. Especially in the context of political and military creation and existence of ethno-exclusive new-Serbian political community called „Republic of Srpska“, in which these official and unofficial narratives are created. To set a stage for deeper elaboration of their discursive meanings, author described the historical background of Banja Luka and presented factual consequences of recent history and war, such as demographic data, manifestation of official war and cultural politics, official regulations, facts about war crimes, ethnic cleanings and genocides, facts about old and new memory narratives and mnemonic selections imposed by Belgrade and RS war elites. As final act in stage setting, author presented most recent politics of remembrance and media and institutional new speech of RS elite in Banja Luka. Within such stage and given empiria, author is playing with notions of contextual production and contextual consummation of meanings. In order to further distinguish causes and consequences, sources and outcomes, responsibilities for certain cultural and political actions or contextual production and consummation of meanings, author had borrowed the concept of cultural and political hegemony of elite over masses.

All collected and photographed street graffiti, media texts and other empiria are analyzed within this stage. Visual and written texts of street graffiti on the one side and texts of official narratives on the other side are compared on this stage. Texts of pop-nationalistic street graffiti and official narratives of political elite have been grouped in six different categories borrowed from Umberto's "Ur-fascism" (Eco 1995) and backed with six different storyboards in the *Appendix C*. With this approach author got six playgrounds for interpretation, conclusions and building of terminology (ethno-religious, ethno-exclusive, ethno-political elite, pop-nationalism, ethnocracy, ethno-fascism, etc). This was very helpful for interpretation of discursive narratives behind texts of graffiti and for defining certain characteristics of street graffiti as ethno-religious or pop-nationalistic. Also it was helpful for explanation of their enormous quantity and total domination in public space, for depiction of extreme ideas and mind settings that are standing behind them and for analysis of their sources and consequences. All this helped author to additionally define, describe and analyze official narratives, political meta-narratives, desires, rhetoric and actions of RS elite and their consequences in the past and presence. By interpreting past and present official memory narratives and imposed mnemonic

selection of RS and Belgrade elites, author tried to pour a little light on the recent and brutal past and to bypass layers of oblivion and amnesia so firmly rooted into the present-day culture of remembrance or better to say culture of oblivion in RS.

All street graffiti, slogans, posters and stickers (which sometimes include ethno-religious celebration flyers, false street name tags and prints on T-shirts and clothes) are photographed and collected by the author. Empiric materials for this research were also the official names of streets, squares and local communities in Banja Luka, official honorary medals, exhibitions, public events and political spectacles in Banja Luka, monuments and other memorabilia in public space as well as institutional messages and propaganda. Inevitably, research had to explore news, media stories and statements in daily and weekly press, on-line and broadcasting media outlets and professional publications, as well as constitutions, laws, regulations, decisions, policies and strategies of RS, BIH and Serbian institutions. Documents from ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia) Hague Tribunal and testimonies as well as literature and verbal testimonies from 1992-1995 war and aggression in BIH and post-war period were unavoidable emporia. In the end, author used available censuses on the territories of Banja Luka, BIH and Yugoslavia from 1991 and earlier, census of killed and disappeared citizens of BIH in war 1991-1996 and other available historic, statistical and documentary literature.

This research used the research methods and techniques of qualitative cultural and anthropological researches such as:

- a) Photographing and categorizing the street graffiti created in Banja Luka between 2006 and 2014;
- b) Data collecting and analyzing street names and names of local communities in Banja Luka and the changes between 1992 and 1995;
- c) Data collecting and analyzing media and election campaign messages and statements of RS elite between 1992 and 2014;
- d) Data collecting and analyzing of official laws, regulations, decisions, policies and other official documents of RS elite on the entity and local government levels between 1992 and 2014;
- e) Data collecting and analyzing documentary and statistical sources, testimonies, expertise and prior researches related to the 1992-1995 war and aggression in BIH and documents from International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in Hague;
- f) Collecting and analyzing statistical and demographic data and expertise;
- g) Quantifying and comparing collected data;
- h) Qualitative comparing and discursive analyzing of messages of the pop-nationalistic graffiti and dominant media, political and institutional messages and official memory narratives of RS elite;
- i) Interviewing consumers, especially those who are affected with messages of pop-nationalistic graffiti.

4 Historical background and context

Region of today's Banja Luka and northwest part of BIH (region of today's *Bosanska Krajina*) were always crossroad of interests, armies, politics, ethnographies, cultures and religions. Since the times when these areas were inhabited with Illyrian tribes of Maezaei and Iapodes, different frontiers had been stretching across it. Frontiers of Roman provinces of Pannonia and Dalmatia, lines of encounter of Rome with Germanic and Avaric tribes and lines of political delimitation and influence of West and East Roman Empire, later Rome and Byzantine. After migrations of Slavic and Avaric tribes into this region in 7th and 8th century this region was largely under political and religious influence of Frankish and later Hungarian Empire and Roman Curia Bishops and in much lesser extent of Romano-Byzantine Empire and Constantinople Patriarchs. Since the end of 8th century onward and somewhere between these two major political and religious players, first more or less vassal or independent political communities of Slavic military-tribal elites are developing, melting together cultures of ethnic Slavs, Avars, Bulgarians, Tatars and Pechenez with cultures of more or less Romanized ethnic groups of Illyrians, Celts, Saxons and others, into the broad mix mash of ethnographies and heritages imbued with growing Eastern and Western Christianity. These communities are developing largely on the high plates of the immediate hinterland of Adriatic Sea, such as Narentine, Travunia, Zeta, Dioklea, littoral Croatia, Rashka and Bosnia. Despite to the popular believe Banja Luka's region and north-western part of today's BIH through entire medieval period was political periphery, a military significant frontier under the direct rule of Hungarian Crown and government of Hungarian-Slavic nobility of *Babonići*, *Hrvatinići*, *Šubići* and other vassals to the Crown. It wasn't part of medieval Kingdom of Bosnia except for a short period during reign of Bosnian King *Tvrko I Kotromanić* between 1353 and 1391, due to the manorial marriages.

Nobody knows for sure whether Hungarian medieval names such as *Orbaz*, *Orbasz*, *Urbaz*, *Wrbaz*, *Orgaszczag* or *Orbaz-Vesarhelyjem* have been used to mark the fortress where Banja Luka stands today, but the first known mention of Banja Luka as small fortified town post in pre-Ottoman period, happened in document which testified that Hungarian-Slavic Catholic nobility and commanders of fortresses in the Vrbas valley, among them „...Georgius Mykwlasych in Banyalwka...”, were gathering an army to confront Ottoman invasion from the south, after the Christian army suffer a defeat in Battle at *Krbavsko* Field in 1493. This artifact dated on February 6th 1494 was the first time published in Budapest in 1915 by *Lajos Thalóczy* in *Monumenta Hungarie Historica vol. XI*. (Ravlić 2003, 15) By that time Ottomans already have ruled lands of the *Nemanjići* dynasty for more than 100 years, medieval Bosnian lands for more than 30 years and Herzegovina for some 15 years. At that time Banja Luka was part of Duchy of Jajce, one of two Hungarian defensive military provinces formed in 1463 to resist the Ottoman onrush governed by Hungarian-Slavic Duke *Hrvoje Vukčić-Hrvatinić*. And it resisted some 60 years after fall of Bosnia. Hungarian Duchy of Srebrenik had fold in Ottoman hands in 1512, Duchy of Jajce together with Banja Luka in 1527, and in 1592 town of Bihać. Numerous remainings of churches and monasteries as well as other records from pre-

Ottoman period prove that prevailing religion influence in Banja Luka region was that of Roman Curia, through big Roman-Catholic centers, Salzburg and Budapest. Due to the close Slavic origins and language, manorial marriages and essentially the same Catholic ordinance this region sensed a strong influence of Bosnian feudal families of *Kotromanići*, *Vukčiči*, *Kosače* and others. Also it sensed the influence of Bosnian Christian Church from the central parts of Bosnian Kingdom whose religion canon didn't deviate from Roman Catholic one, but whose organization was politically adjusted to the growing needs of Bosnian nobility to control and elect religion hierarchy and use it for acquiring and protecting political independence from Hungarian Crown. The closest influences of medieval Slavic dynasty of *Nemanjići* that came near Banja Luka were areas of Usora (nowadays Doboj) and Soli (nowadays Tuzla), through the manorial marriages between the dynasty of *Nemanjići* and Bosnian nobility and during very short periods in 13th and 14th century. Presence of Orthodox Christianity hasn't been obvious in Banja Luka region until several decades after Ottoman conquests and colonization of this region and entire Bosnia with Orthodox Christians population of Slavicized Vlachs and Slavs which followed expansion of Ottoman Empire as their trusted allies who enjoyed the privileges of Ottoman *millet* system. After Ottoman expansion toward Bosnia, Banja Luka and further West, Orthodox Christians Peć's Patriarchy was revived under *Mehmed-Paša Sokolović* patronage and religion leadership of his nephew *Makarije Sokolović*, as part of the *millet* privileges of Orthodox Christians population. With Ottomans' arrival to the Banja Luka region the ethnic, economic and political scenery of this area was changing rapidly. One could say that immediately after Ottoman conquest, Banja Luka's prevailing experience of peripheral military post ended, and new experience of Banja Luka as inhabited and trading city place, a political center of something, had emerged. This already happened with *Sofi-Mehmed-Paša* who as a governor of Bosnian sanjak shifted the seat of sanjak's military and administrative authority in Banja Luka in 1553. Beneath the remainings of the medieval Hungarian fortress *Banyalwka* in southern parts of today's Banja Luka (today's *Gornji Šeher*), he built trade and crafts urban center, market place, several mosques and urban settlements or *mahale*, such as *Careva*, *Sofi-Mehmed pašina*, *Ilidža*, *Tabaci*, *Grabska*, *Kubad-agina*, etc. But crucial development of the city happened due to the political power and building endeavors of Bosnian Sanjakkbey (1574), later Beylerbey (1580) *Ferhad-Paša Sokolović*, who moved the administrative center of Bosnian Eyalet in Banja Luka a fast growing town with status of *šeher*, where it will stay from 1583 to 1639. In short period between 1560s and 1640s *Ferhad-Paša* and his successors had constructed some 215 administrative, military and public buildings, including three big mosques *Ferhadija* (1579), *Arnaudija* (1581) and *Gazanferija* (1590s) public hot baths, religious schools, waqf, Town Bridge across the Vrbas River and big Castle in the city center as it looks today. (Husedžinović 2005) He shifted urban center of the city from *Gornji Šeher* toward North, where it is now.

Due to the Ottoman military successes Bosnian-Slavic and later Hungarian-Slavic nobility together with the vast population of native Slavic Catholic population had fled from Bosnia and Banja Luka's region toward Adriatic coast and west to Habsburg's lands, leaving towns, fortresses, monasteries and vast areas of land uninhabited. Bosnia and Banja Luka region were vastly depopulated and empty. Only few of nobility

and native population remained and were exposed to changing political and religious environment. Despite popular believe, conversion to Islam of native Bosnian population and nobility wasn't imposed violently or massively, and was not perceived as some „betrayal” but as a way of living in the Empire, of maintaining land property, economic or class status or advancing in the military or administrative hierarchy. Thus, myth about numerous Bosnian-Muslim bey families as descendants of old Bosnian-Slavic nobility, whose fate was „Bogomilism” and who converted to Islam, has no foundation in the historiography. As well as myth that Bosnian Muslims are descendants of native Bosnian „Bogomil” population. This „myth about our antiquity” first time emerged in 16th century and spread around Bosnia and Balkans in 18th and 19th century as an attempt of a very stretched legitimization and explanation for political and economic continuity or „antiquity” of land-property rights of Bosnian-Muslim bay families, which property right allegedly goes all the way to the medieval period and old Bosnian-Slavic nobility of „Bogomil” religion?!? This myth was especially consumed and reinterpreted during Austrian-Hungarian period due to the struggle of Bosnian-Muslim bays to keep their land properties as their „ancient rights”. Though this myth hasn't been used for occupation of territories, but for preservation of land properties of one class, later it will be used by promoters of Yugoslav unity idea as a political counter-narrative to the myths spread among Serb Orthodox Christians population about Bosnian-Muslims as „Turk” and thus hostile population, the enemies of national liberation, of Serbian-hood or Yugoslavian-hood. Second part of that myth which emphasizes „Bogomilism” as ancient pre-Islam religion of Bosnian-Muslim bays (or population) went for the more patriotic and less problematic explanation of religion conversion to Islam during Ottoman era. Simplified story goes like this: today's Muslims are not converters from Catholicism or Orthodox Christianity, nor they are descendants of Turk and ethnic groups from Anatolia, but converters from Slavic „Bogomils”?!? With such narratives Bosnian-Muslim nobility as well as population were perceived by „good old, ancient and faithful Slavs” (Serbs or Croats) as much more Slavic, religiously unproblematic and thus patriotic. Of course all these narratives are garbage and historiography is much more disappointing for Croat, Serbian or Bosnian nationalists as facts show that there were no „Bogomils” among Bosnian-Slavic nobility and population in medieval Bosnia, what so ever. Numerous Bosnian-Muslim landowner nobility developed not from the old medieval Bosnian-Slavic „Bogomils” nobility, as it was interpreted in this „class and social myth” but out of the vast economical process of *čiflučenje* that affected Bosnia in 18th century (Kamberović 2003, 67-84).

On the other side, dominant narratives emphasize that during Ottoman era the great number of Orthodox Christians population converted to Islam by force and tyranny imposed by Ottomans, ethnic Turks. This myth also goes into the category of garbage, as facts tell us a completely different story. New Ottoman authorities had organized new military-administrational districts in resemblance to the Byzantine themes, such as sanjaks, eyalets and later beylerbeys. Medieval feudal system of fiefs ceased to exist as it was replaced with new but essentially similar land managing and military duty system of *timar* or *lena* (in lowlands) and *has* or *filur* (in highlands). As Ottoman found vast areas of conquered lands depopulated they had allowed and encouraged their colonization with Slavicized Vlach nomads and Slavic serf population of

Orthodox Christians religion who came from the high plates of eastern Balkans. Why them? Well, despite popular believes and nationalistic myths the most trusted and loyal Ottoman's allies, soldiers, army logistic and population in general, in the first three centuries of Ottoman presence in Europe were Orthodox Christians Serbian and Bulgarian nobility who have largely converted to Islam to gain ranks and privileges as well as Slavic and Slavicized Vlach nomadic population of Orthodox Christians religion. In general, Orthodox Christians (both Greeks and Slavs) weren't exposed to the conversion to Islam that much, as they had gained conditional religious freedom and privileges within Ottoman Empire after the fall of Constantinople. This, for the Western horizon of that time, very unusual social and religious *millet* system granted broad cultural and economic autonomy and class privileges to the different groups of non-believers (Orthodox Christians, Jews, and later Catholics) on different levels (central or regional, political, economic or military). But, it requested greater obligations, official military duties and services, war or border militia service, road guardian service and other inner land duties. This was an ancient imperial principle imposed by Ottomans, especially visible in case of Slavicized Vlach and Slavic nomadic and agricultural population of Orthodox Christians religion. During the decades of military expansion toward west, Ottoman army recruited vast Orthodox Christians largely nomadic population of Balkans, both as economic logistic (craftsmen, cattlemen, food producers) and as soldiers. This population colonized Bosnian highlands, grasslands and frontiers along with Ottoman advance westwards and was included in existing Ottoman systems of fiefs and *millet*, thus living as semi-free serfs and nomads, with privileges unimagined for non-believers and lowlander serfs in Ottoman Empire or their contemporaries in medieval France or Austria. Though they paid certain taxes, such as *filur*, but they were generally exempt from tax *harač* and other levies. Ottoman authorities had granted to Orthodox Christians, Slavicized Vlach population the migrations to Bosnia and further west, free practice of their religion, economical reservations, self-management of taxes within their tribal communities and other privileges. In return, large parts of this population were fulfilling war and border militia service for the Ottoman authorities, as well as duties to guard and protect villages, mountain passes, roads and caravans, repair roads, organize trading caravans, collect taxes and levies. In return Ottomans gave them rights to settle down, work and poses, even inherent possession of vast areas of grassland mainly in inner highlands and establish big families and clannish households in a form of *vlaška filurdžija* (in Turkish: *filurdži eflekan*). Around 50 such households were used to form a *katun* represented by a Duke (in BHS language: *knez*). Sanjak-bey governed several such *katun* communities, collecting from them only *filur*, an annual gold ducat tax, but not a *harač*, *glavarina* and other levies. Slavicized Vlach population had rights and possibilities to do periodical nomadic locomotion, carry arms, poses and ride horses, especially in their road guardian duties, called *martoloz*. They also had rights to sell their grazers' products to town markets and also to organize and charge transportation of goods within Empire and abroad in their own caravans, called *ponosništvo* or *kiridžiluk*. (Truhelka 1941, 33-35) On the frontiers this population enjoyed similar duties and privileges organized in fiefs called *has*, within which they exploit vast lands as cattlemen or farmers, giving to Empire a border guardian service in exchange. During

Ottoman military campaigns, a part of economically most powerful parts of this population, especially Dukes and their families used to join imperial army, thus gaining access to fiefs system called *timar* or *lena* for the purpose of expanding their economic and political power. This was sometimes followed with conversion to Islam as official imperial duty offered much more to the individual and his family if they are Muslims.

Ottomans surely didn't impose Islam violently and intensively, as it is presented in later national romanticist literature and narratives. First conversions to Islam in Bosnia and Banja Luka were those of native Bosnian-Slavic nobility and population, with the aim to preserve their economic statuses, land properties, fiefs privileges or military and political careers. Because of conflicts with Catholic West, Catholic clergy and population didn't enjoy religion autonomy and related class privileges of *millet* system, so they were much more exposed to the taxation and political pressures, especially after the military campaign of Prince Eugene of Savoy in 17th century. Thus, conversions to Islam or emigrations were quite logical steps. These gradual conversions of Christian population (both Catholics and Orthodox Christians) to Islam happened mostly due to the economical or class reasons, related to keeping privileges or advancing regarding the land management, manufacturing, trading and other economic systems. Other motives for conversion to Islam were military, border protection or administrative service, especially available to the Orthodox Christians population. Also, same as European empires, the Ottoman imposed a system of *kuloglan*, a model of recruitment of the children age 9 to 12, which were send on military and general education in Istanbul, after which they will become most trusted imperial military class of janissaries (in BHS language: *janičari*). In Balkans these children were mainly from Christian families, but in other parts of Empire such recruitment were imposed to everyone. Due to this ethnic mix mash within imperial military and administrative systems and hierarchy, very soon great number of upper class and aristocracy members or military and administrative officials in Ottoman Empire will be those of Slav and Slavicized Vlach origins. This is another fact that deconstructs a wide spread myth about Bosnian-Muslim nobility or Bosnian Muslims in general as ethnic Turks and thus „natural” enemies and oppressors of the „long-lasting Serbian” nation. Ottomans avoided massive conversions of non-believers to Islam, because they would lose great part of tax incomes that non-Muslims paid. Also they protected broad privileges to the Orthodox Christians, because otherwise they would cause depopulation of vast highlands and border regions of Empire. This would be a strategic mistake especially on western borders of the Empire. The more privileges one had, lesser reasons for conversion there were. Some sources reveal that the conversion to Islam reached its highlight around 1530 and after that continued but with much lower intensity and scope. In fact, Ottoman tax censuses of lands and households in Bosnian Eyalet reveals that over the centuries number of Muslim population gradually decreased and number of non-Muslim, mainly Orthodox Christians raised. Number of Catholic population declined from 1/4 to 1/6 of all non-Muslim population (see Table A.1 in the *Appendix A*). (Moačanin 2013, 114) Other estimations drawn out of Ottoman registries reveal that through out the 18th century Ottoman Europe population increased from 3,7 and 5,5 million. Bosnian vilayet during 19th century had from 1 to 1,2 million people (Palairt 1997, 6). Maria Todorova emphasize the relation of the Ottoman

empire toward ethno-religious issues: „...For all justified objections to romanticized heartbreaking assessments of Christian plight under the 'infidel' Turk, the Ottoman Empire was first and foremost an Islamic state with a strict religious hierarchy where non-Muslims occupied the backseats. While this statement can be refined as to degrees of validity in different periods, there hardly seems to be a serious objection to its overall relevance; 'the comprehensiveness of Islam - the bedrock of the Ottoman social system' can be interpreted as an idiom whose 'operational rules were shared by many Ottomans of both low and high status.' Islam formed a vertical self-sufficient space within Ottoman society that was not coterminous with the whole population of the Ottoman Empire. But it is not only the strict division on religious lines that prevented the possible integration, except in cases of conversion. At no time, but especially in the last two centuries, was the Ottoman Empire a country with strong social cohesiveness or with a high degree of social integration. Not only was there no feeling of belonging to a common society but the population felt it belonged to disparate (religious, social, or other) groups that would not converge. This is not meant as an evaluative statement—in other words, it can be translated simply as meaning that the Ottoman state until well into the nineteenth century was a supranational (or, better, nonnational) empire with strong medieval elements, where the bureaucracy seems to have been the only common institution linking, but not unifying, all the populace. That the Ottoman Empire did not create an integrated society is beyond doubt; what some Balkan historians seem not to want to understand is that this empire did not necessarily strive to achieve such integration, let alone assimilation (Todorova 2009, 163)

After the end of Ottoman expansions Ottoman frontiers on the west were pushed close to today's western borders of BiH, so Banja Luka region will find itself on the border again. Muslim population from lost territories in today's Hungary and Croatia fled eastward to Bosnia or further. On the other hand significant parts of Orthodox Christians, Slavicized Vlach population which followed or were part of Ottoman army colonizing territories along with Ottoman advance in 16th and 17th century, haven't retreated together with Ottoman army, but stayed on colonized territories, on unpopulated regions of today's Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary. In Banja Luka region, and in the whole Bosnia, trade declined and need for military service of local population decreased significantly. Millet system of privileges started to crack and portions of Orthodox Christians and especially Catholic population fled out of Bosnia to the Habsburg's territories northward and westward of Banja Luka region. They were especially attracted with system of privileges designed by Habsburg Crown called „military border” (in BHS language: *vojna krajina*) which offered a religious and economic autonomy for Orthodox Christians if they settle down and do a military and border service in the vast unpopulated frontier regions toward Ottoman Empire, in today's Vojvodina, Slavonija, Banija, Kordun, Lika, Dalmatia, Zagorje, Međimurje and Bela Krajina. Generally military situation deteriorated so Banja Luka experienced couple of wars and battles between Ottomans and Habsburgs, among which wars of 1688 and 1737 left significant marks on the city. Also, in today's Herzegovina, Lika, Dalmatia and Montenegro agricultural landscape deteriorated due to the large deforestation caused by shipbuilding and house building in coastal regions and widespread nomadic economy. Thus, large nomadic clans and families of Slavicized

Vlach population were left without fertile land, grasslands and food, what triggered a lot of smaller clannish inner migrations from these areas toward northern parts of today's Bosnia and further to the North. The first such economic migrations occurred already in late 16th century but it will intensify greatly in the times of decline of Ottoman Empire in Europe. With this migration, parts of nomadic population changed their economic style of living by settling in lowland as agricultural serf population. This will influence even greater ethnical mishmash of today's BIH and Banja Luka region¹.

As political situation deteriorated, Ottoman authorities were forced to decrease privileges and tax exemptions during 18th and 19th century and put more economic pressures on serfs, both Orthodox Christians and Catholic. Without military expansions and new territories to colonize, number of Muslim landowners, beys, increased but their individual land properties were downsized through economic process of *čiflučenje*, thus creating a new form of land aristocracy which should replace military aristocracy as protectors of imperial interests. With Orthodox Christians population now serving Habsburgs in wars against Ottoman Empire, Istanbul stopped to rely on local Orthodox Christians population to provide them with military or border service, and thus started to ship soldiers and commanders from Anatolia and Eastern Balkans to BIH. Local aftermath of 18th century was a general downsizing of old imperial trading practices, slow evaporation of *millet* system of privileges for rural population, big economical migrations and decrease of nomadic population, several plague epidemics (among which 1813 epidemic was the biggest), depopulation and impoverishment of old town population, great autocracy of new land aristocracy, lawlessness and corruption of peripheral Ottoman administration, absence and rejection of modernity and education. All this together with conservative economic and political practices of landowners, traders and imperial administration will put great economical pressure on both Christian and Muslim serfs in rural areas. This class oriented tyranny together with increase of rural population would led to the great impoverishment of serf population, both Christian and Muslim, and to the enrichment of great number of Muslim and Orthodox Christians landowners and traders. In that way, the first half of 19th century in Bosnian sanjak was marked with frequent and joint rebellions of local serfs, both Christians and Muslims. Unfortunately, this general deterioration of economy and living conditions which hit lower classes regardless of the religion, will serve to the promoters of Serbian national-building narratives and national romantists of 19th century to build up political myth about centuries long oppression of „Turks“ over Orthodox Christians „Serbs“ uninterruptedly from the time of „battle on Kosovo Field“ where „centuries old Serbian empire was once lost“ all the way to „our days“. This myth together with myth about violent and massive conversion to Islam of Orthodox Christians population, myth about Bosnian Muslims as traitors of their forefathers' faith and dehumanizing perception of Bosnian Muslim as „hostile Turks“ who brought defeat at *Kosovo polje* and „400 years of tyranny“, will be the foundation of the future national identity of „Serbs“ which emerged in the late 18th century Vojvodina and spread to Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro during 19th

¹ One folk saying state: „Herzegovina populates everything, but do not depopulate itself!“ or in BHS language: *Hercegovina sve naseli, a sebe ne raseli!*

century. In reality, isolated and poor yet mixed and interconnected life of Bosnian and Herzegovinian rural population of different religions, tribal, clannish or ethnic traditions but with similar economical practices and class positions will „fossilize” very unifying cultural practice and identities of inter-ethnic and cross-religion mutual living and communicating in different parts of today’s BIH. It will create very vivid cross-confessional ethnographies and large number of small pockets of diverse autochthonous inter-ethnic and cross-confessional cultural models of living that could be named „Bosnian and Herzegovinian” or „Balkan” or just melting pot. These cultural models survived and preserved some of their specific characteristics all the way to the 1992². Banja Luka and other towns were inhabited with craftsmen, tradesmen, soldiers, miners, blacksmiths, Islamic clergy, clerks, teachers, scribes and other necessary professions that came following the army of various ethnic groups. In the pick of expansion and especially later, due to the depopulation of Bosnian towns during 18th century, Orthodox Christians traders, caravan-organizers, road guardians, craftsmen and manufacturers of fine goods and arms who got rich on the foundation of their *milet* privileges of *kiridžiluk* or trading caravans, inhabited town peripheries, as growing non-Muslim urban petty bourgeoisie. Same as Orthodox traders, the first Sephardic Jews traders inhabit towns and places close to big open markets in late 17th century and later these traders are bringing their families. This process of in settlement of non-Muslim populations in towns was very visible in second half of 18th century and especially in first half of 19th century, propelled by 1840 decision (in BHS language: *ferman*) of Sultan Abdul Medžid which recognize the civil rights to the all Jews and Christians in towns, allowing them to inhabit and build their religion objects, schools and religion municipalities in towns. From early 19th century towns are getting their first Latin, or Catholic quarters. Along with famous Muslim landowners, traders and craftsmen families such as *Maglajlići, Džinići, Maglajlije, Čivljak, Filipovići, Kapidžići, Čerimagići*, etc and Jew families such as *Kastl, Levi*, etc Orthodox Christians traders and craftsmen families such as *Radulović, Jungić, Pišteljić, Miljić* and *Delić* were the most significant ones in Banja Luka in the 19th century. Bosnian towns became urban melting pots of different languages, ethnic and cultural traditions, Slavic, Turkic, Anatolian and Asian. Growing Muslim, Orthodox Christians, Jew and later Catholic traders, landowners, craftsmen and manufacturers, along with administrative class will create first petit but politically fragmented bourgeoisie in Banja Luka and other Bosnian towns. Reminisces of such inter-ethnic and multicultural life in Bosnian towns will be preserved until the 1992 war and aggression on BIH.

On such political, economic and cultural conditions in Bosnian Eyalet, 19th century brought artificial national-building narratives, due to the influence of Slavic Enlightenment centers in Zagreb, Vienna, Sremski Karlovci and Belgrade. Orthodox Christians and Catholic clergy as well as Orthodox Christians town bourgeoisie and educated ones will be the first to comprehend political and economic lucrativeness of the new ethno-religious constructions of „national” identities. So they absorbed it immediately. Orthodox Christians traders whose families and clans grew ever richer on the wings of economical privileges of *milet* system and inhabited towns suddenly became „Serbs” with „century long common history” shared with all

² One folk saying state: „A thousands villages, thousands traditions!” or in BHS language: *Hiljadu sela, hiljadu običaja!*

Orthodox Christians Slavs all over Balkans?!? Absence of written history and archives as well as dominantly verbal and thus quite epic and mythological formation of cultural memories of Orthodox Christians clans and families made it possible for these artificial and unifying „Serbian” national-building narratives to overwrite common and objective economic, class and cultural memories of Muslims and non-Muslims. Slavicized Vlach population of Orthodox Christians religion and their unwritten and unarchived identities and remembrances suddenly were target of Serbian national-builders and their carefully tailored national-liberating narratives which consisted of proper mixture of verbal epic poetry, heroic myths and economical truths. This „national shirt” was tailored large enough to cover the majority of tribal, clannish and family unwritten and uncertain remembrances and myths of vast Orthodox Christians population, to abuse their gloomy economic truths and class positions of presence and to promise them rich, holly and honorable perspectives of „their nation’s” future. Thus, these national-building narratives were set in such a way to be recognizable by all the Orthodox Christians as „our story”. Success of national-building stories is in their ability to produce a self-recognition mirror in which „our” religion and ethnic traditions, class positions or economical habits will be seen not just as elements of „our long-lasting national” identity but as the points of severe differentiation from „others”. That’s way national-building promoters will add several more exaggerations, historical forgeries, mythical and romantic reinterpretations in order to make „us” as much „antique” and uninterrupted on „our” territory as possible and present „others” as much despicable, repulsive and hostile in relation to „us”. Similar developments were also happening with Catholic population who will be more and more perceived as „Croats”, despite the fact that their ethnic, cultural and economic traditions and origins are largely the same or similar to those of the Orthodox Christians or Muslims, or despite the fact that completely different family, cultural or linguistic traditions such as Slovenian, Czech, Polish, Italian, Hungarian or German, were suddenly perceived as „Croat national identity”.

Petite bourgeoisie who bought lands and properties in towns and prompt their children on education, started to recognize themselves in constructed national-building myths and narratives tailored in Sremski Karlovci and together with Orthodox Christians clergy sponsored and organized first activities on spreading these unifying national ideas and identities, largely on the wings of the national freedom movements and emerging institutions of Enlightenment. In that sense, most significant efforts are those of Franciscans Monk, poet and enlightener *Ivan Franjo Jukić* (born 1818 in Banja Luka) and *Vaso Pelagić*, Orthodox Christians priest, teacher and national romanticist, who have established and managed Banja Luka’s first Orthodox Christians theological school in 1866 and published educational books and teacher guides³. „Serbian” national-building narratives grew stronger especially in towns as independent Principality, and afterwards the Kingdom of Serbia grew stronger. That was especially visible during 1875 Herzegovinian rebellion which was directly organized and supported by the Orthodox Christians and parts of Muslim petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals from Sarajevo, Mostar, Herzegovina and Montenegro, as well as by politicians

³ An example of such practice is “Educational manual for Serb-Bosnian, Herzegovinian, Old-Serbian and Macedonian teachers” (in BHS language: „Rukovođa za srpsko-bosanske, hercegovačke, starosrbijanske i makedonske učitelje”) which is published in Belgrade in 1867 and distributed in Banja Luka and entire Bosnian Eyalet and Balkans.

and intellectuals from Serbia, especially those close to the dynasty of *Karađorđevići*. *Petar Karađorđević* even took part in this rebellion in region of *Bosanska Krajina* under the name of *Petar Mrkonjić* (after whom the town Skucani Vakuf had been renamed in Mrkonjić-Grad in 1930s).

Political situation in BIH deteriorated after Berlin congress 1876, when Austrian-Hungarian used opportunity and got right to military intervene and takeover Bosnian sanjak. They overtook BIH after short and fragmented armed resistance from Muslim and Orthodox Christians rebels and one small battle on the northern outskirts of the Banja Luka. Finally in 1878 Banja Luka's region and entire BIH became a part of Habsburg Empire under direct rule and military authorities of the Crown in Vienna. Back then, BIH had around 1,1 million people, town of Banja Luka had some 9500 and district (in BHS language: *kotar*) of Banja Luka some 86000 inhabitants, mostly Orthodox Christians, Muslim and Catholic population, with Muslim majority in the city (see Table A.2 in the *Appendix A*). From the Banja Luka's perspective, one old pre-modern imperial principle was gone and one modern, more secular and bourgeois-imperial principle have arrived. Vienna immediately started to develop modern municipal and court administration, hospitals, land registries, urban planning, roads, sewage, water supply, etc. They introduced equal obedience of all subjects to civil and criminal codes and brought first modern enterprises, followed by the first usage of paper money and development of commercial and trade laws and practices that had especially great effect on economic status of Orthodox Christians, Catholic and Jew traders. The first printing houses and photo-shops emerged, followed by first printed newspapers, postcards, posters, brochures. Fashion influences quickly changed the looks and dress codes of urban population and environment. Forests exploitation and mining intensified, followed by development of railways and manufacturing and machining industries, such as construction, architecture, steam and water powered mills, production of steel and iron, hydro-power plants, pharmacy, breweries, brick factories, textile factories, wine production, etc. Banja Luka and wider region had been overwhelmed with western technologies of that time, which brought all sorts of craftsmen, technicians and workers from different parts of the Empire. Large portion of newcomers came to serve as administration, soldiers or engineers following industrial ventures. Pioneers of these industries processes in Banja Luka were Trappist monks who established their monastery, economy and manufactures on the north-east outskirts of today's Banja Luka during 1870s (cheese and bear production, modern water mills and sawmills, first hydro-power plant in BIH, etc). In fact, much of these technological and economical processes were started and carried by newcomers such as Germans, Italians, Czechs and Hungarians or settlers in the city periphery and rural areas such as Ukrainians, Galician, Ashkenazy Jews, Poles, Slovaks and Slovenians. The first Ashkenazy Jews came to Banja Luka already in mid 19th century, long before Austrians took over BIH, as consequence of draconic laws of Joseph II which had limited the settlement of Jews in the Empire. Smaller portions, largely Slavs from the Empire came using opportunities to buy and colonize agricultural land, mainly near the border. Part of these economically and technologically based migrations were Orthodox Christians from Lika and Dalmatia, who came to this region because of the

intensive need for knowledgeable and educated working force, especially teachers, railway workers, forest guards and public servants with knowledge of local language and customs.

National-building, now more national-liberation processes of „Serbs” and „Croats” have intensified, on the wings of the new institutions of the Enlightenment and modernity, universal trading, civil and criminal codes, semi-colonial industries, printing media, bourgeois education and social norms. But, now the new enemy was on the doorstep – the foreign imperial ruler with anti-Slavic feelings and hostile imperialistic politics towards the small ethno-imperial Kingdom of Serbia. Despite the efforts of official Vienna and Benjamin Kallay to use print media and education system to create and strengthen the Bosniak identity as universal nationality of all residents of BIH regardless of religion, new identitarian constructs of Catholics („Latins”) as „Croats” and Orthodox Christians („Vlachs”) as „Serbs” were selling extremely good, especially in urban areas. Vienna prompts the newspapers and other official narratives which will promote concept of „Bosniak” identity, but influence of new national concepts of Serbian-hood and Croatian-hood spread swiftly, infecting the growing number of literate and educated people, clergy, teachers, educated youth, poets and readers of very same printing press that Austrians introduced in Bosnia. But, masses of impoverished and illiterate population in rural areas, small towns and city peripheries weren't that much affected with these national myths during 19th century. Absence of the Enlightenment institutions in rural areas caused that these urban myths were very slowly and fragmentarily accepted by rural population, mainly through the agency of Orthodox Christians clergy. Much of Catholics still will call themselves „Latins”, Orthodox Christians would call themselves „Vlachs” and Muslims will very rarely use reference „Bosniak” to describe themselves. Events such as Austrian-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia in 1908, mini-imperial territory successes of Serbia in Balkans' wars 1912 and 1913, Sarajevo assassination 1914 and especially WWI (World War One) will spread these nationalistic myths and ideas on rural population, thus intensifying and exaggerating ethnic and religious differences between Orthodox Christians, Catholics and Muslims in BIH.

In these myths Orthodox Christians population was depicted as „antique” and uninterrupted descendants of old medieval „Serb” population ruled and „enlightened” by the Serbian dynasty of the *Nemanjići*, mythical narratives of „Croats” stated that medieval Bosnians were Catholic population and thus „they must have been us, the Croats”. Both ethno-myths stated that Muslim nobility and population were largely converted from Catholics or „Croats” or in other interpretation from Orthodox Christians or „Serbs”. Both were so aggressive in igniting religion and national differences and feelings, that they soon succeeded to transform rational issues standing between different classes and communities largely related to land property, poverty, class privileges and taxes, to the huge piles of irrational and artificial problems, thus transforming minor cultural or linguistic variations and major economical and class differences into the great ethno-political and nationalistic hostilities. Economic issues and inequality were abused and transformed into national issues of „final liberation from oppressors” in order to ignite the senses of belonging to the „oppressed” and the flames of hate toward „oppressors”.

Muslim bey nobility suffered from the already mentioned myth about Bosnian-Muslim nobility as descendants of medieval Bosnian „Bogomil” nobility, but in their case Austrians were especially careful, hoping that they will accept and push identitarian concept of „Bosniak” and convey all other confessions to accepted as well. This myth, together with absence of locally archived cultural memory of Bosnian population, helps Austrian-Hungarian authorities to sell new national identity of „Bosniak” to the masses. By 1910 it was obvious that efforts of Vienna will be futile in relations to Catholics and especially Orthodox Christians. By that time Croat and Serb national-political identities and myths were pretty stable in towns and Muslim nobility had built up some kind of firm political identity, though they didn't insist on special names and unique story about national creation and enlightenment. All these national-building and identitarian myths and narratives had sole mission to set the myth about „our antiquity” and to gain „our historically granted” economic and political position and property over territory and resources. Yet, with no objective or archived historiography, ethnography and scientifically based facts, what's so ever.

In late 19th century and the first decades of 20th century vast majority of population in BIH didn't have same „national” needs, ideas and expectations as Catholics and Orthodox Christians in Croatia or Serbia, who were by that time under great influence of official national-building institutions and narratives for almost 100 years. In reality Bosnian people had much more in common between each other than they had with Catholics or Orthodox Christians in Croatia and Serbia. This characteristic will remain the core value of Bosnians and Herzegovinians all the way to our days, and first thing targeted by nationalists in turbulent times. In the 1910s national identities in BIH will be additionally cemented in the form of very first political parties in BIH, such as Muslim People Organization (abbreviation in BHS language: MNO), Serbian People Organization (abbreviation in BHS language: SNO), Croatian People Community (abbreviation in BHS language: HNZ) and Archbishop Stadler's Croatian Catholic Community (abbreviation in BHS language: HKZ), organized by political and economic urban elites of that time largely educated in Belgrade, Zagreb, Istanbul and Vienna. Young revolutionaries and national romanticists, anti-imperialists and anarchist often were young pupils and students of rural background and educated in cities, which lost their rural collective cultural identity and were in pursuit for some new political identity. Soon Balkans wars and WWI will prove that „political liberation of ours” will imply a biological, cultural and political annihilation of „others”. One could say that inter-confessional issues of BIH were internationalized after annexation 1908, Balkan wars and WWI, due to the different expectations of K&K (abbreviation for „kaiserlich und königlich” in English language: „Imperial and Royal”) Empire and Croats, Slovenians and Serbs within it on the one side and Kingdom of Serbia on the other side. Liberation of people in 1918 didn't bring expected equal political treatment and dialogue, as the *Karađorđevići* preferred less complex approach summarized in the principle: „accept rules of more powerful or stay occupied.” Bosnia will find itself somewhere in between with poorest and least developed regions of new common political community of southern Slavs. Banja Luka was center of District (in BHS language: *srez*) and after 1929 center of Vrbas Province (in BHS language: *Vrbaska banovina*). Inter-confessional issues as well as issues of economic inequality, land property and class

privileges remained, but this time in slightly different environment as new political rulers were Slavs, or to be more precise Serb-Croats, or even more precise Serbs. Elite was trying to construct some model of unifying national Serb-Croat or Yugoslav identity for Southern Slavs as new identitarian layer on the top of mythical, unarchived and chaotic identitarian practices of wannabe „Serbs”, „Croats” and „Bosniaks” (see Table A.3 in the *Appendix A*). This new construction couldn't cover significant parts of linguistic, ethnical, religious and cultural identities of Slav-speaking population within the borders of Yugoslavia, and today's BIH. One could say that some 1,5 million of Slav-speaking population was left at the margin of nation building game, hoping that they would assimilate to the „Serb” or „Croat” national political identities with preservation of their religion believes and cultural specifics. These hopes were especially obvious in the case of Bosnian Muslims perceived as ex-Serbs or ex-Croats and Macedonians perceived as ex-Serbs from Old Serbia. The 1948 and 1953 censuses in 2nd Yugoslavia will repeat similar discursive mind settings in the case of Slav-speaking Muslims, describing them as „Muslims with Yugoslav origin”.

Soon, political frustrations derived out of artificial and unfinished political constructions of national and supranational identities, together with unresolved economic and political issues between different political elites and classes, and under-developed legal system and parliamentarism will produce class of very conservative and right-winged bourgeoisie and politicians of 1930s, who will continue to reinterpret old national-building narratives and myths, this time in much different political concepts of wild essentialism, blood and soil theories, Nazism and Fascism. Mythical ethno-religious constructions and national divisions and frustrations will face the beginning of WWII (World War Two) and produce ethno-religious fascist regimes of ISC (Independent State of Croatia) and Serbia of collaborationist government of *Milan Nedić* as well as numerous collaborators and fascist groups in Kosovo, Macedonia, Vojvodina, Montenegro and Slovenia. Yugoslav leftists and communists, progressive but small and official forbidden political force in Kingdome, which overcame ethnic and religious divisions succeeded to organize anti-fascist resistance first in BIH, out of very small worker population and due to the successful recruitment of masses of young rural population motivated to fight by massive religion based slaughters and cleansings of Jews, Orthodox Christians and Gypsies done by ISC special forces called Ustashe. Region of Bosanska Krajina and Banja Luka were in the focus of that anti-fascistic resistance and in the same time the new administrative center of ISC in the plans of Headman *Ante Pavelić*.

WWII and the darkness of ISC drastically changed and decreased ethnical and cultural diversity of Banja Luka, making Jews practically disappear from this area. After WWII and massive atrocities, communism introduced an official cultural and ethnical egalitarianism, replacing political ethno-religious and class differences with full-scale partisan and economic singularity. Rich and well positioned citizens, traders, landowners, industrials, right-winged intellectuals and clergy, mainly from the urban centers were unsuitable for the new order and thus exposed to nationalization of the properties, great political pressures, banishments, prosecutions and executions. Of course, among first were collaborators, fascists, war-criminals and members of the collaborating authorities in Zagreb and Belgrade, so called „enemies of the

people". But on the margins of these prosecutions a lot of members of upper classes were hit as well. A lot of war-criminals were caught and executed but without trials or public hearings. Also a lot of lives and families were destroyed without proper cause and trials. In the first years of the communism, Banja Luka was abandoned by Czech, Polish, Slovenian, Italian, Hungarian and German families, also by the remaining Jews. Some of them left to return to homelands which their ancestors left one, two or three generations ago, as Slovenians or Polish did, but some of them, mainly urban class of manufacturers and traders such as Czech, Italians and Germans found their ideological and economical refuge in the western European countries. German landowners were expelled from their houses and lands. Remaining Jews went to the newly formed State of Israel, leaving all their possessions to new Yugoslavia. Rich Orthodox Christians, Catholic and Muslim families, if they survived first wave of the unselective and unarchived revanchism, escaped to Italy, France, Turkey or other countries and towns with which they had built trading connections over the decades. Artificial communist egalitarianism was imposed very violently at first, and then in self-governing mode. What was good about this is that issues of ethno-religious and national identities were put into the secular, statehood and revolutionary political frame of AVNOJ, producing five republics with obvious national-political identities and one republic without obvious national-political identity, BIH. When this was done, there was no need to discuss these ethno-religious issues in the open public forums in BIH. Strategy „Don't ask, don't tell, don't practice!“ was adopted with a lot of silence, sub-audition, unwritten national compromises. Also, religion was put in the private sphere so in public sphere one could sense equality of all ethnicities and religious groups. Old social pillars in BIH in which each ethnicity or religion group had lived its life had decomposed and suddenly old cultural melting pot in BIH reappeared, this time backed up with the mixed marriages, socialist economy, regional and cultural identities of „Bosnians“ and „Herzegovinians“ and political identity of „Yugoslavs“. But unfortunately some old ethno-religious issues and memory narratives, especially in BIH were put under the carpet and submitted to the private and intimate storytelling. Ideologization of cultural remembrance, lack of the culture of dialogue, lack of political and ideological pluralism, as well as the fatal lack of the inter-religion and inter-ethnic dialogue, were definitely bad side of this social order. Yugoslav socialism partially builds itself on the mnemonic selection of memories and oblivion, but not for the reasons of dominance of one ethnicity over other, as it is now the case, but because of much humane „peace in the house“. Egalitarian society wasn't sponsor of the differences and it marginalized institutions and organizations that were emphasizing any differences, especially ethnic or religious ones. In public space these differences were balanced and kept in the background, visible and mentioned largely only in the historical and educational institutions, cultural societies, folk dances and their choreographies, ethnographic museums, monuments, history school books, etc. Official religious communities and churches, as primary carriers of national identities in BIH and Yugoslavia weren't prohibited but their activities and presence were kept under the tight surveillance and scrutiny and distanced from the public formal and semiformal sphere. Thus, national or religious identities were lost in public space, but not completely disappeared. They remained to vegetate deep in the parts of the communist political and

intellectual establishment, reformist circles and clergy. Banja Luka in that Yugoslavia was the 9th largest city and the 2nd in BIH with some 120.000 citizens in 1948 and some 195.000 in 1991 (see Table A.2 in the *Appendix A*). Quite big industrial, food production and trading center of northwest Bosnia, but also one huge military fortress with 2 military airfields, 1 giant military training camp and 6 military camps, a seat of the Banja Luka's Corp of YPA (Yugoslav People's Army). Later in the war and aggression on BIH this fact would be crucial in the war plans of Belgrade elite to use Banja Luka as strategic war center and giant army warehouse for controlling and managing the aggression and conflicts in Croatia and BIH.

When this good-bad political and economic system started to rock and collapse, ethnicized and private, often hurtful memories started to flow into the public space and to be exaggerated and abused. „Commune-nationalism” was already well established ideology among the fake communist elite of 1980s, especially among intelligence and security forces. Elite started to prepare themselves for economic and political reforms, upcoming democracy, but also for much greater and violent historical recalculations. Along with these reforms there was huge empty space of silence, oblivion and unacknowledged painful memories suitable for abuse, sacralization and revision. When well controlled space was replaced with „democratic” freedom of speech, first things that have poured into the „new” public forum were massive torrents of untold and unresolved national frustrations, passions, unpunished war-crimes of WWII, revived national myths, fantasies and romanticisms of 19th century and 1930s; then streams of repressed remembrances and contra-remembrances, political ambitions, cleric-fascistic new speech and patriotism; then rivers of intellectual margins and academic frustrations, criminals, military officers, spooks, men in black and clergy with crosses and guns; and after that new „free” but drafted socialist workers and peasants, „the great new Serbs” and huge army arsenals from Banja Luka's military camps; and then the fear; and after the dark! New national-socialistic political elite in Belgrade, Banja Luka, Pale and Knin and their supporters started to write history in reverse from „our present” toward „our past” and with great expectations of „our future”. They started to „correct” the „errors” of the history on the cruelest possible way and to resolve contemporary issues of 21st century using cultural and political practices and models of pre-modernity and early modernity, copying national romanticisms and enlightenment processes, ethno-religious cleansings, integrations and homogenizing so typical for the Europe's last four centuries.

To initiate differences, mistrust and hatred and to catalyze bloodsheds between neighbors Belgrade war lords and local Serbian security (*Jovica Stanišić, Franko Simatović, Stojan Župljanin, Nedeljko Kesić, Đuro Bulić, Simo Drljača, Marko Pavić, Zoran Karlica*, etc) and political leaders (*Radovan Brđanin, Nenad Stevandić, Radislav Vukić, Predrag Radić, Vojo Kuprešanin, Gugo Lazarević*, etc), through SDS (Serbian Democratic Party, in BHS language: *srpska demokratska stranka*) and criminal clan of *Pantelija Damjanović* consisted of criminals from Lauš and Karanovac had staged several „anti-Serbian” incidents in Banja Luka such as case of „*Srbe na vrbe graffiti*” (autumn of 1991), bomb attack on local Serbian politicians and citizens in Banja Luka (winter of 1991) and even organized killings of Serb policemen and crime-inspectors in Banja Luka, Bosanski Petrovac and Prijedor (spring and summer of 1992). These „anti-Serbian” incidents

were largely done by Serb criminals organized in SOS (Serbian Defence Forces, in BHS language: *srpske odbrambene snage*) and security forces of rebels' „Republic of Serbian Krajina” which already had one full year of prior experience in starting bloodshed and conducting the war in Croatia. Founders and commanders of SOS in Banja Luka were *Pantelija Damjanović*, now prominent businessman, drug smuggler and politician and *Nenad Stevandić*, now most prominent politician of SDS, an oppositional party to Dodik's SNSD (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, in BHS language: *savez nezavisnih socijal-demokrata*). For these „anti-Serbian” actions and killings of Serb policemen they accused, well who else but Muslim and Croat criminal groups and generally entire Muslim and Croat population in Banja Luka. In mean time, during 1991 and through their criminal and intelligence connections, above mentioned Serbian war lords have been selling small shipments of light firearms from army warehouses to the Croats and Muslims in the bigger villages of Bosnian Krajina (such as Večići near Banja Luka or Kozarac and Hambarine near Prijedor), thus creating the base for media propaganda about „armed and dangerous” Muslims and Croats who are preparing themselves to massacre Serbs „once again”. Despite the fact that such small portions of arms won't influence outcome of future conflict, as Serbian war lords in Bosanska Krajina have had available army resource made out of 3 Corps of YPA, local Banja Luka's Corp which was part of the 1st Army Zone with command in Belgrade and two corps, Ljubljana's and Varaždin's one, pulled out of Slovenia and Croatia. These two corps were part of 5th Army Zone with command in Zagreb which retreated to Banja Luka area during summer and autumn 1991. No one in Bosanska Krajina had even the slightest chance to organize some resistance to the Serbian war lords and remains of YPA which served solely to the Serbian politicians and criminals in Croatia and BiH, let alone to undertake some attack. Muslim and Croat leaders in Banja Luka were fully aware of that fact. But that didn't stop Serbian propaganda machinery such as Belgrade TV, newspapers *Politika* and *Večernje novosti* and local newspaper *Glas* to falsify truth and spread lies and fears about endangerment of Serbs and „anti-Serbian” agendas of Muslim and Croat leaders in Croatia and BiH. In such way, during autumn 1991, and especially in winter 1991/1992 and spring 1992 they had created the atmosphere of fear and mistrust among Serbs and sense of impossibility of living and communicating across the ethno-religious lines. In same time war and Belgrade aggression in Croatia had caused many deaths of YPA soldiers drafted from Banja Luka and Bosanska Krajina, what have additionally electrified Serb population in Banja Luka. Soon arena for the bloodshed, aggression and ethnic cleansing was prepared and atrocities officially started at the end of the March 1992 with paramilitary coup performed by SDS, Serbian officials and officers in police and intelligence of Social Republic of BiH and drafted criminals and murderers organized by SDS in paramilitary units called SOS. First killings and cleansing of non-Serb civilians, largely local politicians, shop owners, rich and influential families in Banja Luka started already in April 1992 and continued all through the war. Though Banja Luka was never military zone, Serb elite and their executors had murdered between 150 and 300 unprotected Banja Luka's non-Serb civilians and banished more than 65000 of them, thus expatriating some 95% of Bosniaks and some 82% Croats from the city (Tabeau *et al.* 2003). All 17 mosques of Banja Luka were demolished to the

ground, including famous *Ferhadija*, *Arnaudija* and *Gazanferija* mosques and numerous architecture of Ottoman period. Several Catholic churches were leveled including the Banja Luka's Franciscan monastery (Husedžinović 2005). All non-Serbian, Muslim or Croatian or ideologically unsuitable official nametags on the streets, schools and public spaces were erased, imperatively favoring symbols and names of new-Serbian pop-nationalistic discourse. Fine and fragile construction of local cultural egalitarianism and remembrance of Banja Luka was crumbled and demolished and new narratives were promising that Serbs will eat with „golden spoons” after another „national emancipation and liberation” from despicable „others”.

It happened that the bloody criminal war and aggression in BIH became sudden end for the Bosnian egalitarian model of inter-ethnic living and melting pot that lasted for 50 years, but praise for the „durable” and sterile pillar model of consensual democracy as well as for „stable” but hypocrite minority model of multiculturalism. Either way, what we are experiencing is violent, imposed and highly artificial „culturalization” of each ethnic group in the framework of highly liberal political community ruled by ever more corruptive elites, once conflicted in bloody war. In such framework even most absurd group rights has priority over individual and common rights and multiculturally negotiations about ethnic or common interests and politics have priority over universal solidarity of people, an individuals which are much more in their lives, then just Serbs, Bosniaks or Croats. As Brian Barry notice, „Entire idea of ‘politic of diversity’, as we sow in different contexts, is to demand an abolition of protection for individual members of minority groups, a protection which is otherwise provided by liberal state. When one group is qualified as ethnic minority within liberal state, multiculturalists usually consider that that group should have a freedom to bring their own rules and laws, maybe for example rules which provide a monopol of power to the male leaders of the group, within given system. Those laws, they say, wouldn't have to be subordinated by norms of 'liberal constitutionalism' so they should be able to unpunishable discrimnate women or members of religions that are different from the religion of majority... Even in the cases where power of collective decision making isn't given entirely to the unliberal groups, multiculturalism again insists that liberal protection of individuals should be withheld every time and where ever such protection is confronted to the possibility of the minority to live accordingly to their culture. (Barry 2006, 392)” Precisly such logic of liberal multiculturalism is pushed to the limits of absurdity in today's BIH, where once equal citizens of different ethnicities had been divided into the „*übermenschen* ethnic groups” and each such „relative *übermenschen* minority” has its own *untermenschen* „minorities” within. Serbian nationalistic liberals proffited the most, as they had encircled this unjust model with ethnically cleansed political community called “Srpska”.

Next central part of this paper will try to continue the story about Banja Luka through the stories about new official nametags and pop-nationalistic graffiti in public space of new-Serbian, post-Dayton Banja Luka.

5 Pop-nationalistic graffiti and culture of oblivion: Pop-mythological bordering of territory

5.1 Textual and contextual elements of pop-nationalistic graffiti

Pop-nationalistic graffiti are inflammable form of street art which narrative and visual codes or symbols contain and re/produce prevailing national and ethno-religious and national-political features, themes and myths, in this case, of Serbian ethno-religious corpus in BIH. This street messages are very easily becoming open political hatred speech in post-war BIH context, by reproducing and emphasizing ethno-religious origins, or territorial rights of one ethnicity, or by emphasizing differences, glorifying Serb war-crimes and war successes in Bosnian war or by insulting and promoting intolerance toward the „different”.

To enter into the zone of Serbian ethno-religious street messages and thus to become pop-nationalistic, graffiti (stickers and posters as well) need to have or carry certain visual or written elements and characteristics in their overall visual texts. Usually visual elements are religious symbols of Serbian Orthodox Christians Church, Eastern Orthodox Christians crosses, icons and images of Orthodox Christians holly ones and saints, images or layout of churches. Often they show classical Serbian ethnic and national symbols, flags, shields, coats of arms of modern day Serbia or of medieval kingdoms. Also, military signs and symbols, army patches, flags, guns, uniforms or their parts and military color schemes from different historical periods and conflicts are present as are the images of anonymous soldiers, Chetniks, rebels, *hajduk*, *komita*, armed individuals, freedom fighters or dangerous masked and armed fellows, imaginary or real ones. Very popular elements are street stance portraits or sticker and poster portraits of Serbian leaders, generals, politicians and patriotic historical figures such as the first president of RS *Radovan Karadžić*, *Slobodan Milošević*, army general *Ratko Mladić*, WWI generals *Živojin Mišić* or *Radomir Putnik* or WWII Serbian ethno-fascist leaders *Dimitrije Ljotić* or *Drago Vasić*, or nowadays radical right-winged politician *Vojislav Šešelj*. Also there are stance portraits of those Serb leaders to whom authors openly send hate messages, perceive them as traitors or weak politicians.

5.2 Culture of oblivion and images of pop-nationalistic graffiti

As we are distancing our consciousness and memory from the darkness of the war, ethnic cleansing, genocide and violent homogenization of the Serbs in one political territory within today's Bosnia, memories on the reality of these events is fading away rapidly. We are forgetting all the depravities and perversions of those times, irrationalities, criminal and profiteering catalysts and backgrounds of the conflict. We are forgetting its political lucrateness for the regimes of these days, in first instance for the regimes in Belgrade, Pale and Knin and then for the regime in Zagreb. Post-war ethnic division of Bosnia is easily accepted as „necessary state of mind”, as „normality” after the bloodshed, something as *vis maior*.

Citizens, deeply saturated with scenes of violence, blood, deaths and fear, as hypnotized have accepted „the state as it is”, along with slogan „it is good as long as there is no war” and with beginners’ courses of neoliberal and cowboy privatization, democracy and consumerist culture. Political elites in RS don’t even want to start thinking to relax public space of Banja Luka, to try to do „a cultural restoration” and bring back inter-ethnic character and openness to this city, especially in period 2006-2014. They are doing quite opposite, constantly resending messages of hate and intolerance, reviving old/new divisions, evoking individual and group war remembrances and pains and inflaming new generations with old/new „Serbian patriotism”, irrational and empty in its core. Sadly, those Serbs who had suffered the most (families of killed soldiers and civilians, war veterans, prisoners of war, families and survived victims of war crimes) with their emotional abysses are their most faithful listeners and receivers of such quasi-patriotic messages. New-Serbian symbols in the public space from the monuments, street and other official names and institutional signs all the way to the graffiti and signs of popular culture, though some made during the war still serve to the new Serb elite in „new-Serbian” Banja Luka and RS. They serve to reproduce irrational memory narratives and political messages which constantly reclaim the Serb possession of Banja Luka and other parts of Bosnia, occupied by mono-national and homogenized RS after 1992. Also they are there to reproduce cultural and political oblivion of old Yugoslavian, Bosnian (generally non-Serbian) or communist and Titoist (leftist in generaly) narratives. As Mitja Velikonja stated, “We now have new protagonists, new political myths, symbols and rituals, and new 'jargons of authenticity', all infinitely reproduced much like those in the past. Within these, Tito and yugonostalgia generally figure as insults or convenient disparagements. The personality cult of the former Marshal all but disappeared from dominant discursive constructions. Or, more accurately, it moved elsewhere. (Velikonja 2008, 17)” Further more, this author emphasizes a phenomena he named „the depoliticization symptom“ as tendency to depoliticize reappearances of Tito and generally other symbols of old political power, as a political figure or politically relevant narratives today. Precisly such effects new-Serbian narratives in nowadays Banja Luka have on minds and hearts of people. They are removing entire cultural remembrance of the city, as inevitable and unavoidable step, a true *sine qua non* for dismanteling of main cultural levers of old political system. Only than elite can (re)establish the old/new cultural remembrance, old/new economic and political „order“. In that sense, new-Serbian narratives are not to be touched or to be re-questioned. These symbols are there to constantly (re)reproduce oblivion and some „brand new remembrance“. These symbols are there simply to exist until some new conflict. (Velikonja 2008)

In that way street names, names of schools or local community as well as pop-nationalistic graffiti can be observed as memory texts and their contextual messages can be understood as memory narratives selected and put into the public and official space of ethnically cleansed and „new-Serbian” Banja Luka. In their existence these memory narratives are acting as witnesses of violence, violence that have cleansed Banja Luka biologically and culturally. But as time passes by, they are slowly becoming witnesses of absence. Next stop for them is to become witnesses of neoliberal and consensual „normality”. The small

visual marks that marked the end of inter-ethnic and egalitarian multicultural life in Banja Luka, and also the beginning of uncertain future of today's „new-Serbian” Banja Luka.

5.2.1 Erase and forget your communities, streets and neighbors


The culture of oblivion is most visible in case of changing the street names and names of local communities in Banja Luka during 1992-1995 war and aggression in BIH. RS war elite had changed names of 15 out of prewar 57 or 58 today's local communities (26%), thus erasing from public space and memory of Banja Luka ¼ of its urban toponyms, 50 or 100 year old. The most significant cleansing had happened in the center of the city⁴, where half of the local city communities (8 out of prewar 17 or today's 12 local communities) lost its old and got a new „Serbianized“ name. Around 1/3 of local communities of city periphery (3 out of prewar 10 or 11 today's local communities) had been renamed in the same manner. In rural areas of Banja Luka, elite had changed names of 4 out of prewar 31 local communities. (Decisions on declaring of the changes of local community name, Municipality of Banja Luka, 1994) In this way RS war elite changed name of local community *Mejdan* into *Obilićevo*, *Budžak* into *Lazarevo*, *Čaire* and *Hiseti* into *Kočičev Vijenac*, *Gornji Šeher* into *Srpske Toplice*, *Šargovac* into *Srpski Milanovac*, etc. (see Graph B.1 in the *Appendix B*) These changes happened in several occasions between March 1992 and December 1995, but most intense actions of RS elite in this sense were between February and October 1994. During these 8 months, war elite had adopted 6 decisions with which they renamed 11 local communities. For each local community process of renaming went through two stages. The first stage was organizing a referendum of citizens living on the territory of the targeted local community. The second stage was adopting the declarative decision in the local assembly which declares the name change, constituted by citizens' votes on referendum. Sole fact that RS and Banja Luka war elite had organized referendums about „Serbianization“ of official urban toponyms, in the conditions of, aggression and ethnic cleansing of Banja Luka and territories held by RS army, in the time of war psychosis and fear which overwhelmed its still multiethnic local communities, sounds surrealistic, ridiculous and absurd. But in fact these referendums and decisions represent parody, simulation and ethnicization of democracy and pure cynicism of RS war elite. It was also a manipulation with citizens of Serb ethno-religious identity. Who went and voted on these referendums? Much of voters of non-Serbian ethno-religious identity, who didn't succeed to left Banja Luka as city held by new Serb ethno-exclusivist and ethno-fascistic government, simply couldn't get the possibility to vote, let alone to express their opinions on such referendums. They had been living in constant fear for their lives and families with very limited freedom of movement and communication and with seriously threatened and endangered biological and economic existence. Even more, some of these citizens hadn't been living on their prewar addresses, neighborhoods and local communities, but hiding in other parts of the

⁴ According to the criteria from article 5 of still valid Decision on organization of the territory of City of Banja Luka, published in Official Gazzete of City of Banja Luka No. 9/03

town where people didn't know them. International organization called these cases „floaters“⁵. Thus, the great almost unilateral majority of voters on these referendums were citizens of Serb ethno-religious identity, mainly women, since men were recruited into the army and on battlefields. Later these referendums' results were processed by commissions constituted by Serb members only and declarative decisions were made by local assembly of City of Banja Luka in which Serb members constituted almost absolute majority. Citizens of non-Serb ethno-religious identity weren't political subjects, or free or safe citizens in „new-Serbian“ Banja Luka.

RS war elite focused their attention on the local communities of the city center and old urban area as symbolic conquest of the political center of power and decision making. What is even more interesting, they had been focused to change the names of those local communities in which citizens of non-Serb ethno-religious identity were majority in relation to the Serbs, according to the 1991 census. Thus, collected data show that in city center where war elite had renamed half of local communities lived some 94,000 citizens (53% non-Serbs and 47% Serbs) and in city periphery where they had renamed 1/3 of local communities lived some 44,000 citizens (45% non-Serbs and 55% Serbs). Renaming were the least present in rural areas in which 57,000 citizens lived (32% non-Serbs and 68% Serbs) and where they had renamed just 1/10 of local communities. Correlation between the scope of renaming and ethno-religious structure of city center, periphery and rural areas, gives an impression that changes were most frequent in the city center and those local communities in which number of non-Serb population was bigger than number of Serbs (see *Graph 5.1*). That was obviously the case with local communities *Mejdan, Hiseti, Čaire* and *Budžak 1*.

Graph 5.1: Correlation between the ethno-religious composition (percentage of Serb population) and the scope of renaming of local communities in city center, periphery and rural areas



Source: Author, on the base of Municipality of Banja Luka Decisions on declaring of the changes of local community name (Banja Luka Official Gazette, 1994) and Institute for Statistic of Social Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sarajevo (Statistical Bulletin No. 219, 220 and 221, 1991)


⁵ It is estimated that during the war there were 228 families in Banja Luka who had to leave their homes and find shelters in basements, lumberrooms or under the bridges. These people were called „floaters“ – refugees in their own city, according to the testimonies published on the web site of Society for Threatened Peoples – BiH in text *Banja Luka - Povratak u aparthejd*, available at: http://gfbv.ba/index.php/Publikacije/articles/Banja_Luka_-_Povratak_u_aparthejd.html

Graph B.1 in the *Appendix B* additionally confirms such research impressions, showing that in 7 out of 8 renamed local communities of city center, citizens that declared themselves other than „Serbs“ were majority in relation to those who declared themselves as „Serbs“ – from 54% up to 65%. Also, there were local communities which fulfilled these criteria, but still kept their old pre-war names, such as *Borik 1* and *2* (58% of non-Serbs), *Borik 3* (55% of non-Serbs) and *Borik 4* (61% of non-Serbs) or *Centar 1* (51% of non-Serbs) and *2* (55% non-Serbs). This implies that ethno-religious structure and central position of local communities weren't only motivation criteria of renaming. Thorough analysis shows that this additional criterion was an etymological root of the word in the official name of local community. Thus, RS war elite decided to keep the names which are carried by the words that have Slavic or Serbian origin, or that have been perceived as domestic, „Serbian“ words (*Centar, Borik, Vrbanja, Nova Varoš, Rosulje, Starčevica, Paprikovac, Petričevac, Lauš*, etc.). On the other side, they have changed names which were carried by the words that have etymological origin in Turkish, or Arabic or Old Persian languages, but which became „natural“, domestic and everyday words in “old Serbian” language. Such words weren't perceived by RS elite as „Serbian or patriotic enough“ so they have been cleansed from the public space. This is the case with the following names of local communities:

- Local community *Čaire* – contains word *čajr* whose origin lays down in the Turkish word *çayır*, which stands for a meadow which is being mowed, or an hayfields, or a pasture (Croatian language portal, available at: <http://hjp.srce.hr/index.php?show=main>);
- Local community *Hiseti* – contains word *hiset* whose origin lays down in the Arabic word *hisar*, which stands for a castle, or a fortress, a fortified town, additionally a word of Arabic and Turkish origin *hisarnik* stands for a small town (Vujaklija 1980);
- Local community *Mejdan* – contains word *mejdan* whose origin lays down in the Turkish word *meydan* and/or Arabic word *māydān*, which stands for a) a bigger empty space in the city of the oriental type, or a field, or a square and b) a cattle fair (Croatian language portal, available at: <http://hjp.srce.hr/index.php?show=main>), additionally – *Mejdan*, arap. *maydan*: a wide field, a bigger empty space in the town, a square, fair, market place, place of the battle, a duel (Vujaklija 1980);
- Local community *Budžak* – contains word *budžak* whose origin lays down in the Turkish word *bucak*, which stands for a hidden corner, or a hidden place in the house, or a place where you can find anything and everything [he hide himself in *budžak*] (Croatian language portal, available at: <http://hjp.srce.hr/index.php?show=main>), additionally – *Budžak*, tur. *bucak*: a corner, a nook (Vujaklija 1980);
- Local community *Gornji Šeher* – contains word *šeher* whose origin lays down in the Turkish word *şehir* and/or Persian word *sehr*, which stands for a city, or a big town (Croatian language portal, available at: <http://hjp.srce.hr/index.php?show=main>), additionally – *Šeher*, perz. *sehr*, tur. *gehir*: a town, city in nook (Vujaklija 1980).

Similar destiny hit local community *Ivanjska* whose name has origin in the name of Christian saint *Sveti Ivo* or *Sveti Ivan* (Saint John the Baptist), the most celebrated saint among Bosnian Catholics. This name was erased and new pure geographical name *Potkozarje* was introduced. Also, local community *Šargovac* whose name most probably came from the word for the oriental string instrument *šargija* or *šarkija* (similar to the long-necked mandolin) and as such has origin in Arabic word *sarqiyy* (in Turkish language: *garki*). This name was also erased and new name *Srpski Milanovac* was imposed to public space. Both local communities populated by majority of Bosnian Croats/Catholics. All above described examples of cultural cleansing are ethnically or religiously based, but there was one local community renaming of which was purely ideologically motivated. That was a case of local community *Bulevar Revolucije* (in English language: Boulevard of Revolution), which „lost“ word *Revolucije* and now carry ideologically neutral name *Bulevar* (in English language: Boulevard), accordingly to the neoliberal political (quasi)correctness and proclaimed ideological (quasi)neutrality. In same time name of street in the center of that local community was changed from Boulevard of the Revolution to the *Cara Dušana* Boulevard.

Graph 5.2: Number of erased and new added street names with each decision




Source: Author, on the base of Municipality of Banja Luka Decisions on determining of the names of streets and squares (Banja Luka Official Gazette, 1991 – 1997)

As in a case of local communities, RS war lords did massive renaming of street names in Banja Luka. Elite had decided which old street names, names of persons, events and other symbolic toponyms weren't desirable, acceptable and justifiable enough for the new political reality of Banja Luka, RS and BIH. And of course which were. (see Table B.2 in the *Appendix B*) Thus, they have erased names of more than half of the streets in Banja Luka, some 244 street names had been lost forever (or 53% of all streets). They have erased street names on several levels of meanings, but most obvious cleansing was on the level of binary opposition of „non-Serbian – Serbian“ street names, identifications, representations and memory narratives

in public space. Elite did all this in 7 decisions between November 1991 and September 1997, but most intense street renaming happened during the war and ethnic cleansing of Banja Luka between July 1992 and October 1994. Just in two swift decisions in February and March 1994 Serbian war lords erased almost 200 old street names. In first and second post-war decision RS elite have continued to erase 9 and 27 street names. (see Graph 5.2)

Cultural cleansings of unsuitable street names happened at several levels of meaning. First was at the **level of (un)suitable ethno-religious or national identifications, representations and memory narratives** of street names in public space. RS elite erased undesirable ethno-religious, national and cultural identities and memory narratives. Most frequently erased street names at this level were names of persons and narratives which were perceived as Muslims and Croats. Out of 467 streets before the war, there were some 21,2% (or 99) street names which had carried names of persons who were perceived as Muslims. After the war only 1,1% (or 5) such old street names had survived. Also, there were 13,7% (or 64) street names which had carried names of persons who were perceived as Croats, while after the war only 3,2% (or 15) such old street names had survived. Slovenian and Macedonian (1,3% or 6 and 0,6% or 3 before the war) ethnic or national identifications in street names were completely erased during these cleansings, while Jewish identifications decreased from 0,6% (or 3) to 0,4% (or 2). On the other hand, number of street names which carry names of persons and narratives which are perceived as Serbs almost tripled during the war. Before the war there were some 28,1% (or 131) „as Serbian perceived” street names, and after the war 69,4% (or 324) street names carry old or new-Serbian identifications and memory narratives. (see Graph 5.3)


Graph 5.3: Participation of different ethnic identifications and representations that could be percept in the street names of Banja Luka before and after the war (in % out of 467)



Source: Author, on the base of Municipality of Banja Luka Decisions on determining of the names of streets and squares (Banja Luka Official Gazette, 1991 – 1997)

The second was at the **level of ideological identifications, representations and memory narratives** in the public space. Under the oblivion attack of RS elite were undesirable historical, ideological and political identifications and memory narratives related to the communist revolution, communism, socialism, liberation war and anti-fascistic struggle in WWII. Within this group of leftist street names all Yugoslavian, AVNOJ's (Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, in BHS language: Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije) and ZAVNOBIH's (State Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in BHS language: Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Bosne i Hercegovine) memory narratives were erased from the Banja Luka's street names, despite very popular images and meta-narratives, present among majority of Serbs and Serbian elite, which depict Serbs as most numerous victims of fascism, members of Partisan and anti-fascistic forces in WWII or Serbs as the only nation who truly wanted Yugoslavia, created it and invested the greatest efforts to protect and preserve it during 90s!?! Out of 467 streets before the war, there were in total 272 leftist street names (or 58,2%) which carried the names of communists, youth from SKOJ (Young Communist League of Yugoslavia, in BHS language: Savez komunističke omladine Jugoslavije), revolutionaries and freedom fighters, Partisans' heroes and units, political events and thus had explicit ideological color of leftism, communism and revolution, supranational Yugoslavian-hood or supranational identifications of BiH. (see *Graph 5.4*) RS war lords had erased more than half of them, so after the war remained some 111 (or 23,8%) leftist street names, mainly names of Partisan's fighters who are perceived as Serbs and few Croats.

Graph 5.4: Number of street names with explicit ideological and/or religion identifications and representations that could be percept in the street names of Banja Luka before and after the war



Source: Author, on the base of Municipality of Banja Luka Decisions on deterring of the names of streets and squares (Banja Luka Official Gazette, 1991 – 1997)

It is interesting to see with what new ideological identifications, narratives and meanings RS elite replaced the old street names. Before the war most visible street names with explicit ideological narratives


were those leftist one, but within them one could find different and balanced ethnic or national identifications and representations. Paradoxically, after the war street names became ideologically more diverse in their explicit ideological or religion identifications and narratives, but within this entire „diversity” one could find a total domination of only one ethnic or religion identification and representation. The Serbian and Orthodox Christians ones! Other ethnicities or religions are kept on the level of „democratic incident”. Beside 111 (or 23,8%) leftist street names from prewar era, RS war lords had poured into the public space some 125 (or 26,8%) brand new and explicit ideological identifications and narratives, mainly out of the hot soup of Serbian national-building romanticism and Enlightenment, old and new-Serbian mythologies, Serb-Orthodox Christians essentialism and clerical nationalism.

The most frequent new discourse in official street names carry modern Serbian monarchist, warrior & rebellion national-building narratives and ideological tastes, marking streets with names of Serbian and Montenegrin princes, kings, generals, dukes, tribal leaders, leaders of uprisings and rebellions, demotic outlaws from last two centuries, as well as names of foreign but „friendly”, mainly Russian monarchs and generals. There are 58 (or 12,4%) such names, for instance: *Aleksandra I* and *Petra II Karađorđevića*, *Careva Romanovih*, *Vojvode Radomira Putnika*, *Petra Pecije*, *Relje Krilatice*, etc. Next most common new added ideological discourse is coming from Serb-Orthodox Christians religion narratives which marks the streets with names of Orthodox Christians saints, priests, churches and temples or have international pan-Orthodox Christians, Greek or Russian touch. There are 27 (or 5,8%) such names, for instance: *Vidovdanska*, *Vasilija Ostroškog*, *Manastira Gomionice*, *Visokih Dečana*, *Patre*, *Carigradska*, etc. Next are street names with old Serbian national-building mythological & epic narratives from demotic literature, later redesigned within national-building political traditions of 19th and first half of 20th century. Of course, the most often names are from the Kosovo and post-Kosovo epic cycles. There are 23 (or 4,9%) such names, as: *Miloša Obilića*, *Majke Jugovića*, *Kraljevića Marka*, *Majke Jevrosime*, etc. Then there is a group of street names from medieval Orthodox Christians monarchist narratives, mainly from the medieval dynasty of the *Nemanjići*. There are some 11 (or 2,4%) such names, as: *Uroša Nejakog*, *Bulevar Cara Dušana*, etc. At the end of this ideological charade, RS war lords threw into the public space and memory the Chetniks & ethno-fascist collaborators narratives, mainly names of leaders and ideological fathers and supporters of Serbian Chetniks' movement, but also Chetniks' operatives, Nazi collaborators, Serbian ethno-fascists from Dalmatia and Bosnia. This movement was a heterogeneous compound of Serbian royal military officers (with different level of closeness to Serbian nationalistic ethno-exclusivity, ethno-fascism and sympathies toward German Nazism, Italian and Bulgarian fascism), local Serbian national and Orthodox Christians religion leaders, nationalistic scourer-avenger leaders and groups, its helpers and sympathizers. All 4 Chetniks whose name carry streets in today's Banja Luka, were proven Chetniks' ideologists, Nazi and fascist collaborators, war criminals and proponents of Serbian pan-Slavic nationalism, *Dragiša Vasić*, *Stevan Moljević*, *Vojvoda Uroš Drenović* and *Rade Radić*. Beside these 4 names, there is also a street

Ravnogorska Street which marks the widely adopted name for WWII Chetniks' movement, a Movement of *Ravna Gora*. (see Graph 5.4)

There is no need to mention that Muslim religion or non-leftist Bosnian ideological narratives doesn't exist in Banja Luka's public space, and there is only one Catholic narrative, *Ivan Franjo Jukić*. Also, majority of Muslim and Croatian identifications and representation within the group of leftist street names were erased. Even on this level of meanings, dominant roles in street name cleansing once again had ethno-religious or national perceptions and identifications. Within this group Slovenian and Macedonian identifications were totally expelled as well as majority of Muslim, Croat and Jewish identifications (see Graph 2.5). Within this group of 272 leftist street names before the war, some 37,1% (or 101) street names had Serbian, some 15,8% (or 43) Croatian, some 29,4% (or 80) Muslim, some 1,5% (or 4) Slovenian, some 1,1% (or 3) Macedonian and same portion of Jewish ethno-religious or national identification. Also, there were some 11,8% (or 32) ethno-neutral and around 2,2% (or 6) international identifications. After the war, out of 111 remained leftist street names, some 78,4% (or 87) have Serbian, only 7,2% (or 8) have Croatian and just 1,8% (or 2) have Muslim ethno-religious or national identification, while there are some 9,0% (or 10) ethno-neutral and around 2,7% (or 3) international identifications. Thus, 22 ethno-neutral and leftist street names have been erased, such as *SKOJ-a*, *AVNOJ-a*, *Bulevar Revolucije*, *ZAVNOBIH-a*, *VI Krajiške brigade NOB-a*, as well as half of international names, such as *Lenjinova*, *Bulevar Marksa i Engelsa*, etc.

Graph 5.5: Participation of different ethnic identifications and representations that could be percept in the group of leftist street names of Banja Luka before and after the war (in % out of 272 / 111)



Source: Author, on the base of Municipality of Banja Luka Decisions on determining of the names of streets and squares (Banja Luka Official Gazette, 1991 – 1997)

And the third was at the **level of perception about suitable and unsuitable geography**. Before the war some 30,8% (or 144) of all streets in Banja Luka had some ethno-neutral, mostly geographically related names. Within this group, some 32 streets carried the ethno-neutral and leftist names of Partisans units and important events from liberation war and revolution and some 111 streets carried the names of geographical

toponyms, cities, lakes, mountains and rivers from BIH, Croatia, Serbia and entire Yugoslavia, as well as names of urban toponyms of Banja Luka. After the war, portion of these names in total number of streets have been decreased and now it is around 20,3% (or 95) of all streets in Banja Luka. Now, within this group there are only 10 ethno-neutral and leftist street names and some 83 streets have geographically related names. What is interesting here is that in the same time while they draw their bloody maps of „Serbian lands” on the frontlines all over Croatia and BIH, RS war lords had been also drawing a map of „suitable” new-Serbian and „unsuitable” geography in the map of Banja Luka’s streets. Thus, RS elite erased „not Serbian enough” geographical street names such as *Bihaćka, Mostarska, Travnička*, etc., probably because this geography was too Bosnian and Herzegovinian. Then they erased street names *Bosanska, Halilovac, Tabaci, Bana Kulina, Maglajlića sokak, Mejdan*, etc, because they probably had Bosnian historical and supranational narrative or Muslim cultural identification. Frequently erased street names were *Triglavska, Bledska, Pohorska*, etc., because they over the night became a part of „someone’s else”, a „foreign” geography or street names such as *Dalmatinska, Zagorska, Zagrebačka, Osječka*, etc. which apparently became part of geography of „our enemies”. On the other side, RS elite kept or introduced new geographical street names which stand much better with Belgrade ethno-colonialism, Serbian ethno-religious, historical and geographical identification and perceived „Serbian soli”. That’s how Banja Luka kept old street names, such as: *Kupreška, Moslovačka, Moravska, Kosovska*, etc, or got new ones: *Trg Krajine, Ravnih Kotara, Kninska*, etc.


Such incredible massiveness in cultural cleansing of official public names of local communities and streets implies that for Serbian elite was very important to deconstruct public space, cultural identity and multiethnic memory of Banja Luka with oblivion and selective remembrance. And then to completely conquer and occupy them with new-Serbian ethno-religious and nationalistic pan-Serbian identities and identifications, as well as Orthodox Christians religion, monarchist and epic-mythical images and meanings which should serve to the elite to tailor quasi-statehood narrative construct of RS. Of course decisive battle was fought for the city center as political center of the decision-making process. In that sense all new street names and names of local communities created in war go in direction of revision, distortion and „Serbianization” of cultural identity and memory of Banja Luka, in direction of single-minded, mono-national collectivization of public space toward all-Serbian Orthodox Christians religion and political congregation in which there is no room for differences. Such „Serbianization” of public space is most often justified by the elite with demographic arguments. According to one such arguments elite emphasizes that in 1991 Serbs have made majority population in entire municipality of Banja Luka. According to other, during the war Banja Luka was additionally inhabited with Serb refugees and displaced population from Croatia and other parts of BIH, and number of non-Serb population was decreasing due to the „spontaneous emigrations”, as Serbian elite like to qualify ethnic cleansing of the city during the war. With such arguments elite wants to present that street names have been „spontaneously” renamed as demographic picture of Banja Luka was also „spontaneously” changing. But, such „spontaneity” contains certain illogicalities. First, it is true that Serbs

were majority in the entire municipality, but in city center numbers are telling a different story as less than one half of citizens had declared as Serbs. Comparison of the ethno-religious identifications in street names and factual ethnic composition of city center and entire municipality before the war shows strong correlation between these two numbers and implies that pre-war communist government had strived to balance local national demographic with national identifications in official political space of Banja Luka. When it comes to other arguments, which emphasize immigration of Serb refugees and displaced persons and „spontaneous emigrations“ of non-Serbs out of Banja Luka, arguments clearly show that non-Serbs were banished and finally almost completely cleansed from the city between April 1992 and December 1995, as well as that significant number of Serb population inhabited city between May 1991 and December 1995 mainly from other parts of BIH, and less from Croatia. But, arguments show that such a change of demographic features during these 4 or 5 years wasn't sole and independent initiator and motive for such massive street renaming and conversion of city cultural identity, because in the time of largest renaming at the beginning of 1993 and 1994, numbers of incoming Serb refugees and banished non-Serbs weren't in such a proportion to justify complete erasing of non-Serbian identifications in public space. In those days Banja Luka city still wasn't urban center with significant Serb majority as it will become one and a half year later, in winter 1995/96 when final demographic and political „solutions“ reach its today's point of ethnic purity. And beyond that, there is no „spontaneity“ what so ever in the fact that only in two municipal decisions war elite erased almost 200 street names which were perceived as non-Serbian or not Serbian enough, and introduced more than 200 new-Serbian street names. This example talks more about clear intention, a conscious desire to conquest the city, a violent political construction of new cultural identity and revision of pre-war memory of public space of Banja Luka. In summer and autumn 1995 Banja Luka had received a significant number of refugees and displaced Serbs from territories of West Bosnian municipalities and Croatia. About in the same time, Banja Luka experienced a final massive wave of prosecution of non-Serb population, with significant help of international organizations, religious communities and security elite of RS. This was in a way, a politically agreed, severe inhumane „exchange“ of population as political continuation of brutal and criminal military campaign of ethnic cleansing, which differ from prosecutions and cleansings on the beginning of war, only by stronger presence of international humanitarian organizations. Even methods and techniques remained the same, despite international presence: demolition of religious objects, intimidations, beatings and brutal evictions of non-Serbs out of their homes, tortures, arrests and certain number of murders and disappearances, largely not investigated and prosecuted to this very day. In that way nobody can honestly state that in time of these massive renaming Banja Luka was an ethnically pure Serb city. It became that after winter 1995/96. You can say that by doing ethno-religious and ideological cleansings of street names RS war lords had constructed something that will become an exact demographic reality on the field, some year or two after.

The first post-war estimations of ethnic composition of BIH and newly formed entities, published by group of ICTY court experts in 2003 had concluded that between 1991 and 1997-98 number of Muslim

population had decreased for 95,5% and number of Croat population for 82,5% on the sample of 43 post-Dayton municipalities in RS (including Banja Luka). Amazingly, when above mentioned percentages are compared with percentages of downsizings of number of street names with Muslim or Croat ethno-religious identifications in Banja Luka between 1992 and 1995, you come to very disturbing conclusion that they match completely. Number of street names with Muslim ethno-religious identification had dropped for 94,9% (and Muslim population for 95,5%) and those with Croatian ethno-religious identification for 76,6,0% (and Croat population for 82,5%). At the same time number of street names with Serbian ethno-religious identification in street names had increased for 147,3% (and Serb population for 70,1%). (see *Graph 5.6*).

Graph 5.6: Change of ethnic composition of Banja Luka and change of ethno-religious identifications in the street names of Banja Luka between 1991 and 1997-98



Source: Author, on the base of data from Institute for Statistic of Social Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sarajevo (Statistical Bulletin No. 219, 220 and 221, 1991) and Tabeau *et al.* (2003)

These comparisons, additionally diminish arguments that depict genocides and ethnic cleansings in BiH as „spontaneous migrations“ as well as arguments which favor theory of „spontaneous street renaming“, as „natural“ political outcomes of „spontaneous migrations“ and demographic changes. What can be stated as conclusion with high certainty is that RS and Banja Luka war lords didn't have any picture about ethnic composition, nor a clear image about demographic outcomes of ethnic cleansing of Banja Luka from non-Serb population in February 1993 and March 1994 when they have undertaken a massive cleansing of Muslim and Croatian ethno-religious identifications from street names. Nor elite could have this picture until end of 1995, and first post-war years. RS elite could have certain and very inconsistent information about number of banished non-Serbs and inhabited Serb population in May 1993 when Center of Security Services in Banja Luka had created a list of dislodged and inhabited citizens in Banja Luka⁶. Or in February 1995 when Sector for State Security of RS Ministry of Internal Affairs made a review of number

⁶ According to the Banja Luka Center of Security Services List of citizens who moved out and moved in on the territory of Banja Luka: official number: ERN: B009-8148-B009-8153, published by the Center of Security Services Banja Luka in May 1993

and national composition of population between 1991 and 1995 on the territory under authority of Banja Luka's State Security Center⁷. ICTY judges' decisions in case of Radoslav Brđanin, show that RS and Banja Luka war lords knew and were informed that Muslims and Croats are been systematically terrorized, evicted, banished and murdered in the city and that their number rapidly fall down in the entire municipality, since military and political cue and Serb takeover of Banja Luka in second half of March 1992. Parts of Serbian elite in Banja Luka even took active role in creation of atmosphere of fear and terror, in murders and robberies, in agitating for ethnically based violence and its later justification and cover up, as well as in creation of conditions in which dislodging and moving of non-Serbs out of Banja Luka, especially out of city center were *sine qua non* for their biological as well as psychological salvation. Significant number of non-Serbs were internally displaced within Banja Luka and surrounding villages, leaving their pre-war settlements and neighborhoods and hiding in others where nobody knew them as non-Serbs (international humanitarian organizations called this category of displaced people „floaters“). Also significant number of non-Serb citizens ended in prisons, concentration camps such as Manjača (in Banja Luka municipality) or Omarska (in Prijedor municipality) and even greater number of men population of non-Serb was taken and recruited into the „labor obligation unit“ which are used by Army of Bosnian Serbs as slave manpower for making land roads and fortifications, for digging trenches and cutting the forests on the frontlines. Also, a lot of Serbs who disagree with war madness, had left Banja Luka or simply have been recruited and shifted to the frontline.

So, RS elite couldn't know for sure how many people lived in Banja Luka or its ethnic composition, until the first few post-war elections. Only the first few post-war elections and final scores of refugees and displaced populations in BIH and in region would show a true structure and proportions of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Banja Luka and entire RS. During the war RS war lords could only guess, and they did precisely that, not in accordance to the objective data but in accordance with their marauding desires. They projected their ethno-exclusivist and ethno-fascist desires and intentions on the street and local communities renaming, committing *culturecide* before they finally sealed the biological and demographical fate of non-Serbs in Banja Luka. Thus, final demographic changes of ethnic composition took place some year or two after massive cleansings of Muslim and Croat ethno-religious identifications in street names. Culturecide in Banja Luka as a form of official „cultural politics“ of RS elite preceded genocide and announced final solution of Serb-Muslim and Serb-Croat relations in this city, in a form of total cultural, political and demographic annihilation of non-Serbs.

Between 1992 and 1995 Serbian political elite in Banja Luka undertook cleansing of non-Serbian identities and identifications in street names and local communities (generally in public space) with clearly expressed intentions, desires and visions that future scope, proportion and structure of final demographic ethnic cleansing and genocide in Banja Luka follow already proclaimed cultural politics in RS. Also,

⁷ According to the Banja Luka Sector for State Security Review of data on number and ethnic composition of population on the territories of municipalities under authority of Banja Luka's State Security Center for 1991 and 1995: official number: ERN: B003-1169-B003-1183, published by the Sector for State Security of RS Ministry of Internal Affairs in February 1995

culturally announced genocide projected such desirable sizes and directions of ethnic, cultural and political cleansing of non-Serbs which will eventually lead to the consequences that we are observing and acknowledging right about now in 2014, in the year of the first post-war BH census. And those consequences are culturally and ethnically cleaned „new-Serbian” city of Banja Luka. This all speaks in favor of the thesis that massive „Serbianization” of public space and cleansing of all Muslim and Croat ethno-religious identities in street names during the war was:

1. The pure nationalistic and political construction and sign of irrational politician will for conquering and appropriation, without rational political or any other rational fundamentals, except military and war power and criminal motives;
2. The pure projection of the final ethno-religious composition of the city and image on how future desirable political outcome of war should look like in Banja Luka, and generally BiH;
3. Indications about true initial intentions, desires, motives and probable strategies with which Serbian war lords in Belgrade and BiH started the aggression and armed conflict in BiH.

This process and its shameful post-war consequences continuously send a clear message to all banished and dislodged non-Serbs that their demographic as well as cultural or political presence won't be welcomed and desirable in „new-Serbian” Banja Luka. Some 20 years after, this renaming can tell us a story about very probable sealing of the fate of Muslim and Croat ethno-religious identities in Banja Luka, even before war and prosecutions ended. In the matter of speaking, a drawn final census before final line is drawn. Final line in final solution of ethno-territorial disputes between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in BiH and Banja Luka for which Serbian elite in Banja Luka and Belgrade still hopes that would remain and last or that some kind of restitution will ever happen. It is strange that pop-nationalistic street graffiti created in Banja Luka between 2006 and 2014 though they should be informal and alternative or subversive expressions of mind settings are conveying similar new-Serbian ethno-exclusivist and even ethno-fascist narratives and meanings as official street names and names of local communities, despite the fact there is a time gap of 15 to 20 years between them. This clearly shows that Dayton regime had frozen political conflict and thus petrified Belgrade ethno-fascist and ethno-colonial ideas and politics which started the conflict in the first place, for the generations that are coming. It is incredible with what precision graffiti additionally back up and further elaborates dominant official ethno-exclusive narratives, nurture official and imposed cultural oblivion and amnesia and builds new fake street narratives and remembrances for new, revised and highly artificial flows of new-Serbian cultural memory of Banja Luka (see *Picture 5.1*). One could say that Banja Luka's official and unofficial street narratives are both radiating popular images of:

1. All-time „Serbian” traditionalism and religion fundamentalism;
2. Fake continuity of political and cultural nation of „Serbs” and everlasting ethno-religious war-emancipation of „Serbian lands” from 12th century dynasty of the *Nemanjići* to 21st century RS;
3. True identitarian crisis of Serbs in BiH through reproduction of narcissistic hatred and frustrations toward „others” with whom we share so much similarities and so little differences;

4. Wannabe elitism of Serbian political and cultural nation and spurn toward weak „others” (especially Muslims and Bosniaks as well as Albanians);
5. Fear of mighty and inhumane „Serbian” enemies and of everlasting „anti-Serbian” conspiracies;
6. Cult of guns, heroes, soldiers and brave warriors, regular freedom fighters;
7. Inevitable, honorable and permanent „Serbian” „liberating” and „nation building” war(s);
8. „Serbian” treason, Anti-Antifascism and final all-time „Serbian” ideological reconciliation (between partisans/communists and Chetniks/royalists);
9. True ideological confusion and irrationality.

Picture 5.1: Photos of graffiti, street name tags and monuments in today’s Banja Luka



Source: Author, in center of Banja Luka, between 2009 and 2014

The images that are radiating out of graffiti make of them a true pop-nationalistic street art. By combining all these images in their visual, textual and contextual messages, graffiti manage to reproduce old Serbian national-political myths from 19th century and first few decades of 20th century, especially these originated within and under patronage of Serbian Orthodox Christians clergy and their main ideologist *Nikolaj Velimirović*. They are reproducing very same myths which were revived during the Serbian ethno-colonial wars of 1990s, but in much different form and social context. Now, these old-school and mainstream nationalistic messages and myths are transmitted through very alternative form of art, street graffiti. Old, traditional and regressive narratives and myths suddenly take the veil of seditious and contemporary form of expressing the cultural and political ideas in public sphere, thus refreshing and upgrading their political life and existence for new generations as very acceptable and „sexy” popular nationalistic ideas. As official and media messages may represent struggle for the political space, pop-nationalistic graffiti represent the struggle for the actual life space. By conveying strong ethno-religious and nationalistic narratives and messages in very attractive form they are retelling the „good old” myths of Serbian ethno-exclusivism and ethno-fascism such as:

1. myth that Muslims or Bosniak as well as Catholic and Croats, were all Serbs once, but then the weakest of them had changed their religion and thus became transgressors and apostates from true faith;
2. myth about purity of Serb ethnic origin and political nation which allegedly imply that „Serbs” as demotic community experienced their cultural and national enlightenment during St. Sava and since 12th century „Serbs” always have been and still are „self-conscious” about „belonging” to their continual „pure ethnic national identity” which wasn’t created in national-building processes of 18th and 19th century out of mixture of different ethnographies, social classes, economic logics, languages, tribal roots and religion influences, but which was always there from the beginning of national history;
3. myth about continuity of Serbian nation from the *Nemanjići* dynasty in 12th century all the way to the Republic of Srpska in which there were several „second-comings” (in the character of *Karađorđe/Obrenović* and *Milošević/Karadžić*) in everlasting process of reviving of national identities by retelling the national-building memory narratives in reverse order from the presence to the past and through the images of national-building dynasties or leaders;
4. myth about ancient and never-ending rights of „political nation of Serbs” over the lands and territories which in some point of time were in possession of elites or people who can be (re)positioned in presence as members of a demotic group that represent continuity links between today’s „Serbs” and alleged demotic roots of „Serb” nation that goes back in 12th century;
5. myth about Eastern Orthodox Christians Christianity and its fraction called *Svetosavlje* as binding fabric which laterally and longitudinally connects „Serbs” in temporally and spatially one nation from 12th century onward, and thus represents unbreakable part of „Serb” national identity;
6. myth about Serbian heroic and righteousness wars that had nothing to do with small scale imperialism and ethno-colonialism but with the liberation of „people” in which Serbs are always portrayed as martyrs and „good guys” who are always winners of wars (at least moral ones) but losers in peace times;
7. myth about long list of mighty Serb enemies (such as Vatican clergy, Turks, Catholic Europe, etc.) and friends (Russians, Greeks, French, etc.) which occasionally take the forms and scopes of global anti-Serbian conspiracy and historical Serb-Russian or Serb-Greek or Serb-French alliances;
8. myth about Chetniks of *Dražo Mihajlović*, members of group *Dimitrije Ljotić*, government of *Milan Nedić* and other Serbian collaborators as „undercovered” antifascists who couldn’t be true Nazi collaborators or pro-Nazi oriented, but merely freedom fighters who collaborated with Nazis from time to time in order to spare Serbs from Nazi war crimes and revenges;
9. myth about „natural” and „traditional” Serbian anti-globalism, anti-imperialism and wannabe international leftism in which the main „anti” elements are in fact nothing more but an ordinary ethno-religious traditionalism and ethno-exclusivist tendencies.

6 Contextual connection between messages of ethno-religious graffiti and political elite

Most significant messages and symbols that can be read in the mutual communication between ethno-religious graffiti and pop-nationalistic paroles and doings of the elite, which together produce significant feedback from the ordinary readers are: messages of ethno-religious traditionalism and cult of cultural continuity of Serb nation and territory; messages of glorification of 1991-1995 patriotic-liberation war as continuation of ethno-religious emancipation of nation and territories and cult of guns and heroes; messages that carry fear of enemies, frustration and hate from narcissism of small differences and cult of anti-Serb conspiracies; messages of elitism and spurn toward weaker ones and cult of Serbian manhood; messages of inevitable, honorable and permanent war(s), militarism and cult of nation of warriors; and messages of treason, rejection of antifascism and irrationality and cult of lost battles.

6.1 Images of ethno-religious traditionalism and cult of cultural continuity of Serb nation and territory

Political strivings as well as media, institutional and social reality of RS are in continuous search for sufficient quantity of „tradition” which could rationalize and justify the occurrence and existence of itself (see Storyboard C.1 in *Appendix C*). One could say that this is a case in almost every society. As Umberto Eco state, „The first feature of Ur-Fascism is the cult of tradition. Traditionalism is of course much older than fascism. Not only was it typical of counter-revolutionary Catholic thought after the French revolution, but it was born in the late Hellenistic era, as a reaction to classical Greek rationalism. In the Mediterranean basin, people of different religions (most of them indulgently accepted by the Roman Pantheon) started dreaming of a revelation received at the dawn of human history. This revelation, according to the traditionalist mystique, had remained for a long time concealed under the veil of forgotten languages – in Egyptian hieroglyphs, in the Celtic runes, in the scrolls of the little known religions of Asia. This new culture had to be *syncretistic*. Syncretism is not only, as the dictionary says, 'the combination of different forms of belief or practice'; such a combination must tolerate contradictions (Eco 1995, 6).“ Delineated at the beginning, created in the very own and bloody Bosnian war and legalized with Dayton peace agreement, RS constantly impose to its political elite a strong need to rediscover the „new speech”, new rhetoric and new messages with which elites would present and conserve „the story and reasons of the RS creation and survival” to its ethno-subjects. Such need is growing even bigger over the course of time. The thing I am talking about here, I would call ethno-political traditionalism of the territory. This is a sum of images, symbols, rhetoric, statements and attitudes which we hear and see as the messages of the RS political elite, whose goals are to represent historic, traditional and cultural justifiability of the RS territory, especially the city of Banja Luka, as well as naturalness and normality of its current ethno-religious, cultural and spatial shaping. This sum very often contains extremely inconsistent and impossible combinations of different historical heritages and times and stretched reinterpretations of historical events, periods and ethno-traditional elements of culture.

In that sum it is very hard to differentiate what are the real and objective ethnological and traditional practices and elements of culture, for example of Orthodox Christians population in BIH, and what are the political motivated and malicious ethno-religious reinterpretations and narratives. Especially without proper and impartial scientific institutions and approaches to these issues.

By creating these images, nowadays RS elite draws cultural and ethnical parallels between certain territories and regions today and selected historical periods and events on these territories whose bearers and dominant actors were Serbian national romanticists and representatives and Belgrade political, religious and royal elite of 19th and 20th centuries. With such an approach, RS elite tries to ascribe and obtain an ethno-political tradition for RS, a tradition which arguably and undeniably would show to which ethnicity the territories of nowadays RS always belonged, as well as why are these territories of BIH now a part of RS. During this process of repetitive and selective recollection and recreation of the Serbian or new-Serbian memories and narratives, images about other, less important or non-Serbian periods, events, figures or ethnicities, slowly are sinking into the oblivion. Thus, for nowadays western part of RS, Banja Luka area and Bosnian Krajina, as a connecting and unifying tradition and culture of remembrance Serb elite often (ab)uses following symbols: a Serbian poet, patriot and peoples' representative *Petar Kočić*; rebellions and uprisings against Muslim beys in 19th century and their leaders; a big 1875 rebellion in Herzegovina and Bosanska Krajina; 1878 Austrian-Hungarian „occupation“ of BIH and alleged „hostility“ toward Orthodox Christians people; *Gavrilo Princip* and 1914 assassination of Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo; King *Petar I Karađorđević* „the liberator“; Viceroy *Milosavljević* and Vrbas banate as administrative province in Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Orthodox Christians „Temple of Jesus Christ the Redeemer“ built in 1929 during reign of Viceroy *Milosavljević* and the *Karađorđevići* (demolished in 1941 by Ustashe), WWII concentration camp Jasenovac as a symbol of sufferings of Serbian people in BIH, etc. Cultural and political agency of these symbols and images are complemented with the existing and agency of social and political institutions as RS Institute for Protection of Historical Heritage, RS Museum and RS Museum of Contemporary Arts, RS Academy of Science and Art, etc. Additionally, these images are supported and wrapped up by the official name of entity „Republic of Srpska“ given as the possessive noun; constitutional definitions of the entity as the „state of the Serbian people“; with emblem of RS and Banja Luka; with administrative center of RS Government seated in the center of Banja Luka city; etc. All these components together create and seek, produce and consume the justification for existing of RS in this city and in this part of BIH and for belonging of this city and this part of BIH particularly to this entity.

6.2 Images of glorification of 1991-1995 patriotic-liberation war as continuation of ethno-religious emancipation of nation and territories and cult of guns and heroes

By creating these images, RS elite bombards citizens with messages and texts which talk about fratricidal, civil and criminal war and aggression on BIH as freedom-loving, honorable, „patriotic-liberation“ war, without which Serbs wouldn't survive and exist on these territories any more (see Storyboard C.2 in

Appendix C). The integral part of these images is a syncretistic media and institutional concatenation of recent Bosnian war and aggression on BIH with WWII People liberation war, as well as with earlier Serb patriotic wars and conflicts. RS elite proclaim participants of this war as official or unofficial heroes and mix them with honorable „Serb” heroes of WWII People liberation war and WWI. RS police and army, a fundamental generators and carriers of aggression on BIH, civil war, war crimes and ethnic cleansing in 1990s are transposing to the useful and positive social institutions of „new, European oriented, RS” that are worth of remembering and honoring. The final result: a „patriotic-liberation” war is a „natural”, an essential continuation of the WWII People liberation war, and their joined outcome is a Dayton peace agreement, political structure of nowadays BIH and RS – „a state of Serbian people in BIH” as the eternal truth uttered once for all times, past and future. Some parts of elite goes even further and connects into one whole the newest „patriotic-liberation” war with rest of „patriotic” and „liberation” wars of Serbia in 20th century (1st and 2nd Balkan war and WWI) as well as with 19th century rebellions and uprisings in BIH against Muslim beys and their agents, leaders and prominent figures, largely from Serbia and Belgrade of those days, such as *Petar Mrkonjić* an alias of future King *Petar I*, *Petar Pecija Petrović* and others. Indispensable parts of this syncretistic welding are the religious motives, images of protecting saints, holly martyrs and of course a prominent mythical and literature heroes of the Kosovo epic and mythical cycles. The latest Serbian 1992-1995 war against Muslims, put into the same frame with 1389 Kosovo mythical battle and 19th century uprisings against Muslim beys, effectively become the war or clash of civilizations, a freedom war against „Mujahedeen”, against „other kind”, a something that Serbs allegedly didn’t want but what had been imposed to them as the „civilization” duty, in a long line of inevitable clashes and wars between religious in Balkan. Thus, for RS and great part of Belgrade elites, the 1992-1995 war is justified as right and necessary „war episode” in eternal process of ethno-cultural emancipation of Serb nation which already has its „honorable” and „liberating” tradition, a nation which now finally is wrapping up its ethno-political territories and ethno-military tradition into the one package, easy to understand by ordinary people.

Honorable warfare inevitably requests images about heroes and about honorable death of the heroes as such deaths can exist in the reality of a person who is dying. Elite of RS is recuperating such images, even now 15 or so years after the war, thus building up the image of „fatherland war” as a feat of heroes, those who survived and those little less lucky, „classical” heroes and those „heroes of Hague”. Out of all images that RS elite uses to justify existence of RS, images of heroes are most cynical ones and emotionally the cruelest. With such images RS elite continuously exploit and deplete emotionally the families and friends of people who lost their lives for criminals, persuading them that those casualties and their sacrifices in Slavonia 1991, or in „corridor” 1992 or in Bihac 1994 or in Sanski Most 1995 were decisive one and had some meanings and justifications in all that irrationality, needlessness and criminal filth of this Belgrade’s war. It is cynical, almost unbelievable how RS elite consider that families of dead soldiers and „heroes” now should be proud for they have lost their members and peace, and because of what – so that wartime and present RS elite could materially and politically profit out of it, earn money and get rich in the

continuous process of wartime and then privatization looting. The example of this cynicism is greatest in the case of mayor Milan Tepić, who blew up the Yugoslav People Army warehouse full of explosives and ammunition in Bjelovar in 1991 and killed himself in the process. In about same time political, security and police elite of Serbs in Belgrade, Knin, Pale and Banja Luka had traded a dozen of such warehouses with so called „enemies”, selling arms and ammunition to the Bosniak and Croats. This illegal arm trading, together with drug smuggling, illegal and legal war trade of oil and food and lootings during ethnic cleansings and persecutions had continued all the way to the end of war, while war was swallowing one by one, more than 20000 soldiers on Serbian side, more than 30000 on Bosniak side and around 5500 soldiers on Croatian side, as well as around 33000 Bosniak, more than 4000 Serbian and more than 2000 Croatian civilians (Tokača 2013). So, war was and still is a „heroic” source of enormous post-war richness of new economic elite in RS, who had revolved this bloody war capital at least 5 times since the end of war and now secure it politically in the form of eternal RS. In social reality of nowadays RS, elite gave to the war veterans and families of dead soldiers, the monuments, streets and poor social payments, just as the reminder of their bloody cynicism. Images of heroes are one of the crucial pillars of nowadays RS elite which successfully marginalize 99% of characteristics and effects of this criminal and genocidal war, the smallest dirtiest European war ever, and emphasize just 1%. And that 1% is saying: war was inevitable, war has defended and wrapped us up in one unity, glory to the heroes because now they finally have our eternal aspiration, the RS, which we will manage and exploit for you.

6.3 Images of enemies, fear, frustration and hate of small differences’ narcissism and cult of anti-Serb conspiracies

Previously described images about cultural, ethnical and historical tradition and about violent war emancipation of culture, are inevitable lean onto the images about actual and eternal enemy (see Storyboard C.3 in *Appendix C*). Fear of enemy is something that binds us all together into the one homogeneous whole on the one and only territory, acquired in blood. For the fear of enemy to become alarming and mobilizing enough, this enemy has to be as much different from us as possible, despite the fact that „we” and „our” enemies share so much same and similar cultural features. „We” just hate being so similar to „our” despicable enemy, so „we” must transpose this hate into frustration, then into the „irreconcilable differences and gaps”, after that into actual hate toward enemy, and then into the ethno-narcissism and dehumanization of enemy. It is highly desirable to perceive that „we” had suffered some historical oppressions, injustices and humiliations from „our” enemy, largely because of its power over us. It is necessary that „our” enemy is still powerful enough so that „our” hate and animosity toward „them” can be justifiable, but not too powerful, because „we” must radiate picture that „we” are able to bear „them” down at the end of the day. At the end, it is desirable that „our” enemy don’t act alone, but that „they” plot against us. It is ever better, if these conspiracies against us are ever more international.

With such images RS elite permanently and intensively produce fear among people. Small portions of ethno-religious fear from our ethno-religious enemies, for our ethno-religious children! A long the way elite also produce a fear from „otherness”, promote intolerance, readiness and need for conflict and violence and thus emphasize „the only way for us”. On other hand, with such underlining of differences, people our ethno-children, are persuaded into the validity, righteousness, brighter future and superiority of „our“ ethno-political position and war legacy. From the depth of ethno-cultural heritage, RS elite select bits of material and generate a messages about centuries long religiously and ethnically based oppressions and humiliations of Serbs by Turks, Muslim beys, Germans, Hungarians, Croats, Catholics, Latins, etc. These messages radiate general understanding that oppressed and humiliated people, people who suffered exodus and massive exterminations, „as Serb people did“ , can't ever be wrong or make a mistake. Such people are always moral winners, and can't perpetrate injustice or crimes. Most common narratives out of which RS elite build up these images are: narratives about past Islamization of „Serb” people; narratives about forgotten or suppressed cultural, religious or linguistic identity of „Serb“ people in BIH, without RS; narratives about Bosniaks/Muslims as contemporary symbols of past tyranny and oppressions of Muslim beys over „Serb” people; narratives about „white plague” which is destroying „biological corpus of Serb nation” and about natal superiority of Bosniaks; narratives about humiliating oppressions of Ustashe and Independent State of Croatia over Serbs and Orthodox Christians during WWII which actually have continued in 1991, resulted in massive exodus of Serbs from Croatia and now is threatening to repeat in BIH; narratives about wide alliance and conspiracy of Islamic countries against Serbs with aim to create Islamic state in the middle of Europe; narratives about Bosnian Muslims as „branch or Islamist terrorists and Jihad in Europe” a „white Al-Qaeda or ISIS”; narratives about powerful global enemies of Serbs and wide international conspiracy against Serbs which main players are international community, NATO alliance, Americans, CIA, Germany, Vatican and multinational corporations, which all together have demolished socialist Yugoslavia, demonized Serbs and helped Bosniaks and Croats in war, directly fighting the war against Serbs and now are forcing Serbs to „live” together with Bosniaks and Croats in BIH; narratives about Orthodox Christians religion as old genuine Christianity and thus most peaceful and tolerant religion in world; etc.

6.4 Images of elitism and spurn toward weaker ones and cult of Serbian manhood

It is interesting that RS elite frequently uses images of humiliation and oppression of „ours“ by „the others“ as a foundation for constructing the collective sense of disgust and contempt toward neighboring people, ethnicity, their localities, social constructions, even goods and everything that represents that neighboring people (see Storyboard C.4 in *Appendix C*). This is especially emphasized toward the culture of Muslims or Bosniaks, and through this „European-Christian“ filter of „oriental inferiority“, RS elite cultivates the contempt toward everything that carries the name „Bosnia“, „Bosnian“, or toward any part of Ottoman, or Arab, or Muslim culture and heritage that comes from well-known East. In the political space, they

practically equalize „Bosnian“ and „oriental/Asian“ in most pejorative meaning and often politically and culturally renounce from that part of memory narratives and history of Orthodox Christians people in Bosnia. Marvelously lobotomized from the unpopular history of Bosnia, RS elite often symbolically and rhetorically attributes to the culture of Bosnian Muslims retrogressive, hunker and disruptive character in comparison to the cultures of Christian ethnicities in Bosnia, by emphasizing more civil, more pro-European, more westernized and pro-Christian culture practices of Bosnian Orthodox Christians and Catholics. Moreover, the fact is that both share very same linguistic, cultural and even religious practices and narratives with Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks, yet in a way that their closest neighbors in Serbia and Croatia could never tell the differences between Bosnians of different religions or ethnic origins. At the same time, RS elite tries to forget and actively denies common, multi-ethnic and melting pot experiences of Banja Luka and BIH shared and lived by every religion and ethnicity in BIH till 1992. Simply, it isn't just enough to be different from the culture or ethnicities with which your culture or ethnicity shares the greatest resemblances in whole wide world and in the course of known time. It is highly necessary that you „demonized“ others and on the back of such contempt to build up the elitism and moral superiority of your culture. To be short: „We are gentlemen, real men and they are oriental fagots“. These images are regularly backed up with similar pictures describing ethno-religious and political identity of Bosniaks as nonexistent, worthless and fictional, as well as Bosnian or Bosniak language. For wrapping up these images RS elite often use a well-known popular myth, a deeply ingrained thesis of Serb and Orthodox Christians intellectuals and academics that depict Bosnian Muslims as merely descendants of Orthodox Christians population that allegedly were converted to Islam during Ottoman rule.

It is incredibly funny how RS elite is falling into the spiral of stigmatization or self-stigmatization as they developing the image about “us” and “them” through the prism of Western xenophilia which is characterized by the benign perception of foreign culture as having a lower value, as Maria Todorova elaborates. She states, „Unlike Western observers who, in constructing and replicating the Balkanist discourse, were (and are) little aware and even less interested in the thoughts and sensibilities of their objects, the Balkan architects of the different self-images have been involved from the very outset in a complex and creative dynamic relationship with this discourse: some were (and are) excessively self-conscious, others defiant, still others paranoid, a great many arrogant and even aggressive, but all without exception were and continue to be conscious of it (Todorova 2009, 61).“ As elaborated RS elite takes old Western stigmas of Balkan (or other non-Western culture) and reuse them on their neighbors, but with one great difference – RS „architects“ have very close relation with the object they are stigmatizing, as they are inevitable part of that object, despite the fact that they are hectically trying to escape from it. That's way this stigmatization of Muslims in BIH is actually a self stigmatization of Bosnian Serbs, made in poor attempt to run away from our own „other“, as this small differences narcissism has a sole goal to deepen very small differences between people and cultures to the ultimate frontiers of presence and to the maximum depths of past, at the same time imposing a spatial and time hierarchy of people and ethnicities and religions within

which everybody should know „who came first here” and „who is the elite here”. Maria Todorova emphasizes that stigmatization originating in one society can have a rippling effect through others, and the responsibility for conflicts both within and between societies is not to be underestimated. As she illustrated, multidisciplinary studies of stigma have revealed its three most important aspects: fear, stereotyping, and social control, which are its primary affective, cognitive, and behavioral components. These studies also assert that, alongside the usually invoked restrictive effect undesired differences have on social realization and opportunities, the imposition of social control are decisive in stigmatization. (Todorova 2009, 61)

In combination with previously described images, this element of elitism serves not only for spatial, territorial homogenization of Serbs, but also for creation of monolithic structure of „nation's timeline and history” as well as for „cultural purity of Serb nation in BiH”. RS elite as, any other, uses vast simplifications, within which they present to the ordinary people that Muslim population in Bosnia is belonging to the one monolithic cultural timeline from the time they accepted Islam and separate themselves from the „old Serb branch” and that Orthodox Christians population is belonging to the other, separate and older monolithic cultural timeline which had suffered and clashed with Muslims and all those who converted to Islam, since the moment of their first contact, guess where? On Kosovo, where else! From there, Serb cultural timeline was demolished and oppressed and damned for bare survival till modern days and appearance of guess who? *Karađorđe*, of course, an everlasting model of Serbian manhood, whose leadership in the first Serbian upheaval is still perceived as „the second appearance of the savior of the virgin nation”. Undoubtedly, RS elite, Belgrade elite, or for that matter the academic one, cares little about the fact that the logic of time simply doesn't function in such a single-channel way. Such reverse narrative, where storytelling goes from present days toward past events, remodeling those past events to fit to the known outcomes and desirable interpretations of latter and present days, is highly artificial, biased and self-demolishing for the community that adopted it. RS elite doesn't care that generations of youth who are decoding and consuming their artificially and wrongly coded ethno-centric and ethno-exclusive narratives in street names, monuments and in media new speech, latter reproduce the most vulgar and most violent messages of intolerance and hate in graffiti and public space.

6.5 Images of inevitable, honorable and permanent war(s), militarism and cult of warrior's nation

Images about 1992-1995 patriotic-liberation war as continuation of ethno-religious emancipation of nation and territory is just partially founded on honorable, warrior and heroic tradition of liberating wars of Serbs from this and that side of Drina river (see Storyboard C.5 in *Appendix C*). RS elite simply cannot play on everything they/we got with this old set of cards, using these traditional, pre-modern and outworn narratives in one essentially postmodern and globalized environment. They must modernize them. They simply must feed them with new confirmations and testimonies. In this manner Belgrade and RS elite figured that warriors' culture has to be revived and continuously reproduced and re-consumed, to stay fresh and functional. Elite does it by radiating the narratives and practices of self-consciousness of Serbian

people and sending the messages of caution and vigilance to all Serbs. These messages say to average Serb voter where Serbians live, with whom and who are their traditional and eternal enemies. In mutual communication between elite and people, community constructs hard beliefs about necessity, normality and bright prospects of hate, conflicts and wars between ethnicities and religions in Balkans and BiH, as ultimate means of protection of the nation's biological, political and cultural positions.

Myths about „wild” yet such near „Balkan” coming from or to Balkan are instigating life of such pop-nationalistic believes. Historian Maria Todorova reveals that images of permanent conflicts, violent periphery and irrational brutality are in the core of the construction of „balkanism” as largely negative Western image about Balkan, an image which have entered deeply into the political, media and popular construction of our own self-portrait here in BiH, as we are „those people” which cannot live without war or some kind of vivid remembrance about conflicts between each other. Reports of western journalists and authors, depicting 1912/1913 Balkan wars, atrocities and ethnic cleansings done first by Orthodox Christian Slavs and Greeks over Muslims and *vice versa* as well as between Serbs, Bulgarians, Macedonians and Greeks, had helped the creation of the term „balkanization”. As Maria Todorova state, „The expression 'balkanization' appeared in the aftermath of World War I: the first entry for the term in the *New York Times* falls on 20 December 1918. Under the title 'Rathenau, Head of Great Industry, Predicts the Balkanization of Europe', the paper published an interview with the famous head of the German Electrical Company AEG (Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft)... 'Balkanization' was used by Rathenau to convey an expectation of nearly apocalyptic devastation. His statement did not have any concrete meaning for 'balkanization' except to imply that only a strong and powerful Germany could be the counterbalance to this dreadful prospect. It was used, however, as an effective specter to wave in the face of the Western allies, playing on the fear of an imminent clash between East and West (Todorova 2009, 34).“ Maria Todorova further concludes, „What I define as balkanism was formed gradually in the course of two centuries and crystallized in a specific discourse around the Balkan wars and World War I. In the next decades, it gained some additional features but these accretions were mostly a matter of detail, not of essence. In its broad outlines, it was and continues to be handed down almost unalterable, having undergone what Clifford aptly defines as 'discursive hardening' and Said explains by introducing the category of 'textual attitude' that is, the fallacy 'of applying what one learns literally to reality' (Todorova 2009, 19).“ Such self-stigmatic language and narratives, unfortunately still exist in the diplomatic language and attitude of the political and intellectual elite, individuals and groups who are influencing or affecting the biggest political and cultural processes in BiH. And, as it can be seen, it is widely present in the language of the street.

Where does come from this persuasion of elite and people about the war as an inevitable and outside of the desire and will of local leaders? Maybe it is a substitute for powerlessness or for deprivation from military force or military allies (nonexistence of RS Army, or military service or guns and ammunition)? Or the discursive meaning of these narratives hides some invisible armies and weapons, which exist somewhere and somehow? Or some low intensity conflict mechanisms such as those used on Maiden or

Crimea? The topics of general disarmament of people and arming of ethnically divided private security companies are being ominously ignored in public speech of RS elite. As well as topics of Serb ultra-right winged organizations which are flourishing in RS since 2006. So, did the tradition of everlasting liberating wars of Serbs get its contemporary version in the Dayton peace agreement, as ultimate legalization of Serbs „war accomplishments”, atrocities and genocide over Bosnian Muslims? Every new elections since 2008 are bringing the issues of separation of RS from BIH and constitutional changes and reforms of Dayton constitution and BIH. Dayton peace agreement is in the essence of the contextual meaning of permanent conflict as „the greatest” product of Bosnian war. From the symbol of peace this international agreement became a symbol of permanent but frozen conflict. Instead to punish Belgrade aggression, genocide, war crimes and political creations that came out of Bosnian war, „Dayton“ prized them in the form of RS, post-war division of BIH and highly dysfunctional central state of BIH. When RS elite wants to send inflammable messages regarding the constitutional changes, reforms or similar political issues which can start some kind of conflict in future, they regularly reach for „Dayton“. Dayton as a destiny! As something that could be changed only by war. Something that Serbs and RS must protect and defend even with open conflict. It is quite unimaginable that I, my child and perhaps my grandchild for all or most of our lives will live the signatures of three or four dead lunatics. Marvelous! Once achieved „Dayton“ must be frost bound for eternity, until the course of time doesn't erase memories and one old „abnormality” called Bosnia and set a post-war „normality” as a new „norm” for our brand new future. Or else... there will be war!

6.6 Images of irrationality, rejection of antifascism and cult of lost battles

In the very essence of all the above described images lies irrationality. Irrationality, not as a characteristic, but as a life philosophy and ideology of a confused and lost nation in everlasting search for its everlasting essence (see Storyboard C.6 in *Appendix C*). Of course that nation was lost in one big fateful but lost battle, and process of „rediscovering of nation“ some 5 centuries later demands glorification of lost battle(s) and resurrection of lost nation. This entire process binding together horizons of present and past so directly and with no cultural or economic or political agents, cannot be other than irrational and based on emotions. Irrationality demands that this search don't end with rational, objective, factual yet complex answers to one very hard question: how one is, what s/he is or how Bosnian Serbs are what they are, that Paul Valery once imposed. RS elite doesn't know, doesn't want to search an answer to this question. They don't need facts, objective history or archived and complex cultural memory, because these elements would constitute some other and far less irrational cultural identities of Serbs in Bosnia, such as Bosnian, or Bosniak, or *Krajišnik* or Herzegovinian. These identities, though very live and logical, are not emotional enough to move or influence Serb people. What RS needs is some completely new and inflammable, but at the same time old identity for Serbs in Bosnia. And they invented it as they have successfully constructed the „Republic of Srpska“ identity, largely composed of the pan-Serbian national-building symbols and narratives of Serbs from Serbia from 19th and 20th centuries. But this brand new identity doesn't have

anything with true and autochthonous culture of Orthodox Christians or Serbs in BIH or with vast intercultural elements that Orthodox Christians or Serbs have created in their long and prosperous inter-existence with other religions and ethnicities in Bosnia and thus accepted them as their own in everyday reality. These autochthonous and intercultural elements of Bosnian Serbs are deliberately forgotten and abandoned in political or formal space in RS and Serbia. Now Bosnian Serbs are borrowing and using the national identity of Serbs from Serbia to build up an identity of average Serb voter in BIH. Such „Republic of Srpska“ identity is an empty political shell without its complex and objective cultural foundations, whose surface is very fragile and confused sum of lies and few political and mythical symbols of resurrected Serbian nation of modern or nowadays Serbia.

Thus, with irrationality as national or political strategy one can explain, not just creation of new „Republic of Srpska „ identity of present days Serbs in Bosnia, but also all others constructions that are inventing the continuity of territory or continuity of Serb-Orthodox Christians or pan-Serb or „Republic of Srpska“ nation on that territory. With irrationality you can explain the attempts to justify the everlasting necessity of all past and future „patriotic-liberating“ wars and cults of heroes, or fears and conspiracies, or elitism and contempt towards „others“. Irrationality is deeply rooted strategy of humans or communities who cannot bear with notions of presence and progress, as well as with existence of unimaginable number of possibilities and multiple choices, imposed by freedom of individual thoughts and acts. Post-communist elite in RS, as well as all other post-Yugoslav countries couldn't bear with such great amounts of individual freedoms. But reaction of Belgrade and RS elite were the most notorious ones. They conditioned these new individual freedoms with ethnic and religion belongings of one person, and thus transposed these personal freedoms into the personal fear, of course, ethnically and religiously based fear. The fear as a new format of consummation of freedom! The most desirable manifesto of ethnic or national freedom for every ethnocracy would be following: „I am free to be different from that despicable 'other', to be as much non-similar with 'them' as possible, to be deeply afraid of becoming the 'same' with those 'others' regardless of the names. I am free to use this fear as a justification to evoke all humiliations which I have suffered as a nation. All frustrations emerged from our common living, brotherhood, unity and so tiny differences between me and 'others', because of which my language is so dam similar to 'their' language, my cuisine to 'their' cuisine and 'their' writers to my writers. Because of all that, I am free to contempt and hate those of whom I am so afraid and from whom I want to separate my existence. I am free to remodel, construct and nurture myths and conspiracies as a brand new history, to get my revenge and to wish for or easily accept every conflict that comes along. I am free and I am ready for eternal hostility and war. So help me God!“

And so, with every year, with every election and with every decade, a layer by layer of irrationalities is stacking one on the top of another, without any critical questionings and reexaminations, without courage of individuals and groups to step out from that production-consumption line and say „enough“. Because of such irrationalities, it is possible very easily to reject a peace for sake of bloody war in a single day and with motto „better war than pact“. It is possible to sell and justify war to the ordinary people, as „logical“ and

„punishable“ war because of unnecessary political dissolution of Yugoslavia, a state of all Serbs, instead of the image of war as unnecessary war started because of unnecessary violent resistant and reaction of Serbs to the very necessary political dissolution of Yugoslavia. Because of such irrationalities, it is easier to sell to the people and make them accept all the war crimes, ethnic cleansings, persecutions, genocide, ethnical cleaning of RS territory as historical necessities for Serbs, eternal aspirations or military emancipation of Serbs. With irrationalities one can reconcile completely opposite and once confronted ideological concepts of communism and fascism, along the way with mandatory abolishment of one and revival of other. In such constellation it is very easy to uncritically and unscientifically forget the antifascism, AVNOJ or ZAVNOBIH, for the sake of uncritical and pseudoscientific emancipation of Chetniks' movement and collaborationists. Irrationalism makes possible that former partisans and sworn communists renounce entire their life and ideological believes over the night, and become hardcore Chetniks and nationalists who suddenly started to pilgrimage Orthodox Christians monasteries and churches in the massive events of bus-baptizing. And all that for the sake of irrational pan-Serbian national unity and abusive ethno-political congregation! In that way RS now looks like as a „rational“ political reality, while idea of „great Serbia“ now is a little bit irrational. Or is it? But both political realities are telling us a lot about current situation: ethnically wrapped up and circled territories at any cost!

At the end, irrationality turns each criticism and disapproval into the treason. And treason of our perfectly rational, logical and natural irrational need is nothing else but pure „irrationality, anti-patriotism, seduction and adventurism“. Since only our irrational expectations are actually the rational ones. The game one can play endlessly, until people become saturated and lose their ability to recognize their complex and true image in the mirrors of past. Then all compasses are lost and road to fascism is open.

7 Conclusion

There is one joke from Banja Luka that goes something like this: „Generations born in the second half of the 1970s and after didn't remember President Tito, generations born in first half of the 1980s and after didn't remember 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo and generations born in second half of the 1980s and after doesn't remember Muslims and Catholics in Banja Luka!“ It's pure fascism but it is also a pure truth.

By analyzing messages of Banja Luka streets and RS elite, one can perceive fantastic resemblances and comparability. Generally ethno-religious and pop-nationalistic graffiti slogans, posters and stickers of the streets and informal space were created in period after 2006, when generations born in the second half of the 1980s and after were growing up without any remembrances, what so ever, about pre-war multiethnic life in Banja Luka and BIH and contaminated with fake narratives and pop-mythological history produced by intellectual and political leaders of 1990s Serbian nationalism. Also this period is period of strengthening of RS elite and period of intensive oblivion of „undesirable“ common intercultural past of ordinary citizens in Banja Luka and BIH. Of course, one could always post a question what happened first, ethno-religious graffiti or their political construct? After examining messages of the street and elite in storyboards (in *Appendix C*), one can see that street is reproducing precisely what RS ethno-religious, cultural and political elite is emphasizing and imposing in the public, cultural or political space, since 2006 and especially since 2009. This research showed that contextual meanings as well as much of texts and contents of street graffiti from last 7 to 8 years were preceded and constructed by actions and new speech of all RS and Belgrade elites from 1990s onward. In street graffiti a careful observer can find a lot of echoes of violent, traumatic and ethno-exclusive messages that 1990s Belgrade and RS war elite had imposed and produced, and thus left as war heritage for the future generations of Serbs. Graffiti portray and celebrate main political symbols of all-Serbian gains of aggression and war in BIH. Thus, beside the corps, massive graves, concentration camps and ethnically cleansed cities and villages they depict all consequences of cultural cleansing of formal and semi-formal spaces in today's Banja Luka and RS, such as official names of streets, squares, schools, local communities and municipalities, monuments, archives and other manifests of pure and clean mono-national politics of remembrance. Also, today's street graffiti testify about vivid and pervasive post-war maintenance of such a culturally and ethnically cleansed social and political space, now called „Republic of Srpska“. Post-war RS elite between 1996 and 2005 had quietly cherished these war and genocidal heritages and accomplishments of RS militaristic existence, though they didn't openly celebrate them, due to the strong international, ICTY and NATO (North-Atlantic Treaty Organization) presence in BIH. Elite didn't want to renounce from these bloody consequences of Belgrade ethno-colonialism, nor they wanted to change or deconstruct them, they didn't even try. By 2005, just small parts of RS elite admitted responsibility of RS institutions and leaders for war crimes in BIH and genocide in Srebrenica, but they never acknowledged true mini-imperialistic and ethno-colonial nature of RS and its existence, or admitted that BIH citizens, villages and cities have suffered a true aggression by Belgrade and Serbian ethno-colonial

ideology and politics, still fresh in mind of many. After 2006, when international presence slowly faded away, RS elite gradually (ab)used more and more political capacities of Dayton division of BIH and capacities of political entity of RS, making it more and more obvious that future of BIH will become radically shifted, complicated and uncertain. Since 2006 RS elite became more nationalistic and openly radical in their rhetoric, institutional new speech, separatism and denials of BIH, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Certain issues such separation of RS, dissolution of BIH, hate speech toward Sarajevo and Muslims flooded the public and political space, in a way that was quite unimaginable just few years before that, especially after 2009. Majority of today's messages in street graffiti and other public texts in Banja Luka have occurred since 2008, precisely in those times of radicalization of political stage in RS and BIH, largely due to the gradual amplification of the ethno-exclusive and extreme nationalistic rhetoric of RS politicians. Today's RS elite, led by *Milorad Dodik*, had revived and strengthened all that all-Serbian war heritages and gains build in the „Dayton“ peace agreement and today's RS. Suddenly, all that RS and Serbian security and political elite, led by *Karadžić* and *Milošević*, accomplished and set as political and cultural „values“ of Serbian nation East and West from the Drina River during the 1990s, became now an ethno-exclusive political manifest for today's RS elite. A manifesto whose main components are condensed in the fact that 22 years after beginning of ethnic cleansing and genocidal war efforts of RS and Belgrade elite in BIH, parts of BIH called RS are now ethnically and culturally cleansed spaces, occupied with oblivion of all non-Serbian and non-Orthodox Christians values and remembrances and with imposed fake new-Serbian history and pop-mythological Serbian narratives that has a little to do with true history of Orthodox Christians or Serb population in inter-ethnic and inter-confessional BIH over the centuries. According to this manifesto, such a culturally and ethnically clean RS territory and society frenetically is building cultural memory and political identity of its population calling for its independence, using well-known religiously based and mythological features of Serbian national identity from the end of 19th and beginning of 20th century, revived in the 1990s by parts of Belgrade intellectual and political elite. For today's RS elite *Radovan Karadžić* isn't political opponent anymore, but a fresh historical figure, a father of RS, whose legacy is an everlasting political platform for the new generations of Serbian politicians and for all Serbs in BIH. Present RS elite, by managing to win all elections in RS since 2006, is becoming increasingly convinced that their ideological and ethno-political attitudes and actions are widely recognized and accepted as positive, patriotic and highly desirable by majority of youth, Orthodox Christians Serb voters, clergy and RS intellectual elite. As visible on the „Serbian“ streets! Together with this striking resemblance and comparability between messages of street and elite, one can conclude that production and consummation of ethno-religious and pop-nationalistic graffiti slogans, posters and stickers is happening under the strong and crucial influence of RS elite, RS institutions and overall RS regime within the frames of post-Dayton RS and BIH. This influence on the authors and readers of these graffiti is already set in the private sphere of family storytelling and pop-mythical narratives, as well as by religious, educational and cultural institutions of RS society. It is strengthened by political and administrative institutions of RS, and revived every day in the media presence,

statements and rhetoric of RS politicians, party leaders and almost every Serbian media outlet in BIH. One could conclude that such amount of production of street messages couldn't possibly happen nor it would have such a significance on readers, if present RS elite didn't sharpen its ethno-centric and pop-nationalistic position to the scale on which it is quite „normal” and „patriotic” to be Serbian nationalist, or to hate everything that carry the name „Bosnia” or „Bosnian”, or to be a proud Serbian veteran of dirty criminal war and aggression on your closest neighbor, or to be a Serbian separatist, all at the same time. As members of RS elite are passing by in their black limousines powered on the public money, they occasionally notice „beautiful” visual Serbian ethno-religious symbols and messages created by „beautiful” and „promising” new generations of Serbs, ready to defend RS and Serbian-hood once again, if needed, along with all „beautiful” privileges that RS elite enjoys. The public space occupied with visual ethno-fascism in form of Serbian ethno-religious and pop-nationalistic graffiti, delight and inspire RS elite to produce even newer new-speech in everlasting spirals of pop-nationalistic rhetoric. Those who were always in this kind of mind setting are now on the pick of their political life and excitement. Those who weren't that much into such ethno-patriotism before, now comply or eventually will comply with official mainstream, trying to stay neutrally happy or will bow their head deep into amnesia and denial. Amnesia and denial which is induced and widely supported by religious, educational, media, cultural, political and even artistic institutions in RS and Serbia. Very few are openly rejecting this ethno-fascistic regime in RS. In fact, almost none of the Serbs from BIH now want to recognize, admit or even remember the carnages that Serbian and RS war elite and armed forces did it 1991-1995 in Croatia and BIH and 1997-1999 in Kosovo in the name of Serbian-hood, „patriotism”, „liberation” and pan-Serbian myths.

It seems that these new pop-nationalistic discourses 2006-2014 are under the influence of the new ethnocentric rhetoric and new-speech described in the central part of this work. As well as under the influence of refreshed and rehabilitated Serbian pop-nationalistic myths, martyrdom narratives, religious raptures and conspiracy rhetoric, even more present in media, institutional and public space. Initial flame of production and consummation of pop-nationalistic myths in RS is coming from the above. RS elite and institutions don't block or disable pop-nationalism and micro-fascism to prevail, just the opposite, they openly lead political radicalization of masses, making pop-nationalism a dominant social discourse and they profit on it. Today's RS elite came on the already formed terrain of Serbian ethno-exclusivism created by Belgrade tanks and legitimized with „Dayton“, and they didn't deconstruct or amortize it, but they have continued to shape it, closing it and wrapping it up in what is now a complete and total ethnocracy in RS. Such ethnocracy nurtured war gained domination of one ethnic group, discrimination of „others“, domination of one ethno-cultural narratives and remembrances based on fake pop-mythological and religious interpretations of Serbian political identity and history, inflammable and elitist hate speech rhetoric, aggressive calls for mono-national purity, unity and independence of RS, as already clean and ethno-religiously circled territory. As such ethnocracy carries great conflict potentials, rely on its war successes and military traditions, and doesn't exclude a violence and armed resistance in order to maintain its post-

genocidal political and economic space, unjustifiably noted as „Serbian“, one can conclude that such ethnocracy has strong elements of ethno-fascism, as a dominant practice of political and social communication. Ethno-fascist politics always search for populist support and thus create atmosphere of fear of „others“, state of ethno-emergency, a climate of ethno-panic and often hatred toward „other“, state of political and economic dependence from „our way“, constantly ignoring and blocking „others“ to become equal political subjects in „our“ political space and on „our“ territory. Ethno-fascist politics in European countries often exist these days in blurry midland between formal political space and streets, and sometimes they find their way to become official and influential political discourses in formal space, even for short period of time. It is shifting from social to political discourses through political parties, radical and interest groups as agents of radicalization. In case of Serbian political spaces in BIH (what will later become „Republic of Srpska“) and Croatia (what will later become „Republic of Srpska Krajina“) situation was reverse. Ethno-fascism have quickly passed the stage in which it exists only in midland between politics and street and rushed into the official political space on the wave of ethnic militarization and violence, war and ethno-religious propaganda (between winter 1990 and spring 1992). Ethno-fascism in RS was and still is practically build into the constitutional foundations of RS and Dayton regime and thus it is inevitable part of official political space. Entire political and constitutional frame of RS, at the time of its occurrence (January - April 1992) had entailed and foreseen the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs and ethnic based homogenization of Serbs and territories which were mythically declared as „old Serbian territories in BIH“ by vast majority of Belgrade and BIH (Serb) intellectuals, poets, military and security elites. From this position brutal ethno-fascism emerged in a shape of sharp hatred toward Bosniaks and Croats, quick process of dehumanization of enemies, war violence, vast ethnic prosecution and cleansing of Bosniaks and Croats from „old Serbian territories in BIH“, genocides and war crimes. This RS paradigm is still present in political structure of BIH, and visible in every corner of BIH from inter-entity border and Orthodox Christians Church sacralization of institutions, political and public spaces, to triumphing and glorification of war efforts and ethnic cleansing, prevailing all-Serbian politics of remembrance and memory narratives, etc. From this political sphere ethno-fascism very clearly and suggestively influence society and social context of everyday living, as well as economy. This can be seen everywhere, in graffiti on the walls, in the commercials, on the football matches, in the vacancy or tender procedures. To express different patriotic affiliation or citizens' identification, for example Bosnian and Herzegovinian, or to express different political view is very difficult and still unpleasant, sometimes even dangerous experience in RS. In the best case, you would be either totally ignored or blacklisted. If you are Bosniak or Croat in RS, you can live quite pleasant in RS (if you have a job) but only if you don't politicized your ethnic or citizens' position in the direction of criticism of RS regime or RS and Dayton constructs. Then you will get the etiquette of enemy of Serbs and RS and your non-Serbian personality would be equally dehumanized as it was during the war. But, if you politicized your ethnic position as it was prescribed by RS and Dayton constructs (formal representation of different ethnicities in the assembly or judicial or executive government structures) as „good and obedient Bosniak“,

or „good and obedient Croat“ then your life can be even better. If you add inflammable pop-nationalistic media propaganda and political rhetoric to such ethno-exclusive political and ideological frame of RS (and Dayton in general) you will inevitably get a process of imposing of ethno-fascism as „normal“ and „acceptable“ political rule and trend to the citizens and voters. This will additionally strengthen and multiply micro-fascisms on the level of individuals, families, working places and groups. Ethno-fascism accepted as official political trend and additionally erased and revised collective memory and memory narratives, especially those pro-Bosnian ones or those about inter-ethnic living and tolerance or about existence of „others“ on the territory which ethno-fascism proclaims as „ours“. Also this ethno-fascistic trend strongly determines economic allocation of incomes, goods, labor and GDP, caring about personal interests and wealth of ethno-exclusive clique who simultaneously masks itself with veil of „ethnic or national interests“. Such ethno-political economy really does allocate resources mostly to the ethnically justifiable spots, to the symbols of ethnic identity, independence, representation and success of RS and Serbs in BIH. Thus producing economic and cultural, as well as political isolation of entire ethno-exclusive constructs of RS, its own citizens and its desirable memory narratives. Suddenly you got fully formed ethnocracy as a political regime and model of ethnic oligarchy, usually impersonated in the figure of one strong leader, in case of RS, *Milorad Dodik*. While in many European countries such development of political and social practices would be highly unconstitutional, sometimes fully illegal and certainly undemocratic way of governing, in „Dayton BIH and RS“ this is fully constitutional, fully legal and only „democracy“ we know, thanks to passiveness of many in and abroad. While there is a peace among „wild Balkan tribes“, brought by „Dayton“ there is no need for Europe to interfere and change such political construction of BIH. After the strong ones had slouther the weak ones in series of ethnic cleansings and genocides, and after they created some semi-stable mono-national quasi-statehood political communities within BIH, of course with help of our shuttle diplomacy, we will name them „Western Balkan“ and watch them how they „progress“ toward EU integration, as our mentally disabled younger brother from some periphery, who we don't want honestly to acknowledge as truly our own. And really, as Tanja Petrović in her study illustrated, „The Germanist Andreas Musolff studied the dominant metaphors in debates about the EU using a comprehensive corpus of political discourses in Great Britain and Germany. The metaphors, or concepts, pinpointed by Musolff are also present in discourses about the *Western Balkan* countries' accession to the EU. The most frequently used are the metaphor of *family* and those from the conceptual domains of *journey/road* and *edifice/building* (Musolff in Petrović 2009, 34).“ Further down, same author pinpoint, „In 2006, Lonely Planet published the *Western Balkans Travel Guide*, which was one of the first serious signs that the term was spreading from the political sphere into the other spheres of life. The *Western Balkans* travel guide covers Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia & Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania; obviously unencumbered with the political burden of the term *Western Balkans*, the authors included Slovenia as well. Although the authors themselves admitted that a more appropriate title would be *Former Yugoslavia and Albania*, they opted for a widely known and extensively used political term. However, the discourse of this guidebook does

not completely ignore the established semantics relating to this term: the authors emphasize that this is *the compact region of six republics (with two more possibly on the way)*, which is *after the tumultuous 1990s, ready to welcome visitors again*. They also mention the *region's ethnic complexity*, for which *it is renowned*, and add that *despite its recent history it is far from a bad thing* (Western Balkans 2006, 4) (Petrović 2009, 33).“

Suddenly in such conditions ethno-fascism gets a new spin, a new acceleration. Ethno-exclusive and ethno-fascistic messages dropped down from politics onto the street are reused by citizens itself and reproduced as graffiti or individual nationalistic attitudes, hate speech, hostile feelings or discrimination acts toward already defined „enemies“. After a while, such ethno-religious and pop-nationalistic narratives on the streets are re-read and re-interpreted along with the same political matrix and context of RS and Dayton BiH, especially by younger generations. These re-readings alter social reality in such a way that they confirm and backup old pop-nationalistic myths and narratives, and yet give them a new „quality“, a quality of ideology liberated from the remembrance, dilemmas, burdens and truths that are carried by older generations, an ideology of self-producing and self-determining „new wave of nationalism“. In absence of old truths, younger generations will produce their new truths, but in the case of RS that would happen in conditions of total and utter oblivion and disregard of objective history and vast parts of BH and Banja Luka cultural memory, especially those narratives that speak about inter-ethnic living and respect. Part of these new truths, in absence of objective knowledge, will be quasi-scientific, quasi-historical stretched justifications of Serbian ethnocracy and ethnic exclusivity particularly in this territory and this point of time. Suddenly elite and citizens will consume, abuse and speak same stories, same monuments, same historical figures, same myths, same fake memory narratives in street and school names, reinterpreting and explaining them in reverse flow from presence toward past, in order to justify their ethno-political position here and now. Thus, in RS one can hear new myths, for example that famous Nobel Prize winner *Ivo Andrić* had symbolically foretold and predicted a creation of political community of Orthodox Christians Serbs in BiH, or that *Gavrilo Princip* a young anarchist, while shooting Austrian Archduke, had a vision of political community of all Orthodox Christians Serbs in one country, and RS in particularly. In such conditions of ethno-exclusive insanity, ethno-fascism suddenly became, not only a political norm that describes what is „politically normal“, but a social norm which defines what is a new cultural „normality“ and social expectation. After ethno-fascism as a social norm reaffirmed its position in society, largely due to active support and passiveness of politicians and institutions to seize last moment in sanctioning and stopping these tendencies, then this social norm slowly becomes a norm of behavior of groups and individuals, pushing them toward even more frequent small scale individual or group violence. And ethno-fascism in RS today shows its violent potential, as number of religiously and ethnically based attacks on „others“ in RS is in rise. In this point ethno-fascism had created a vast platform for mobilization of masses, and what does it need is just small push or encouragement by Serbian elites (or supporters from abroad) to undertake actions in achieving all those social and political expectations that ethno-fascism in RS is representing as

the only and honorable path for Serbs in BIH. Is it a referendum for independence, or small victories within Dayton *status quo*, or something else, it doesn't matter? By mobilizing masses on the base of ethno-exclusive and ethno-fascistic ideas as now very firm social and political norms are built not only in political construct but also in important parts of society (intellectual sphere, academia, youth, religion, etc.), RS elite will finally create a true fascism as a model of political regime – very similar one to the regimes of *Slobodan Milošević* and *Radovan Karadžić*, but this time hundred times more ethno-religiously circled, complete, purer and freed from all those extra luggage represented in leftist traditions or undesirable pro-Bosnian or pro-Yugoslavian memories. It is not the case of circulating or repeating the „history“, because international and political conditions now are much different than in 1990s, but it is the case of ordinary evolution of totalitarian ideas and practices, simple as that. Nothing special or unseen before! Nazism didn't became full scale social or political norm and regime just by entering of Nazi party in government, nor by entering in WWII, nor by annihilation of millions of Jews and others, but by providing acceptance and justification for all that by so many. In this sense RS and vast parts of political and social scene in Serbia, are already deep in the „socially accepted“ ethno-fascism. Someone would say that you need massive violence and prosecutions to characterize regime as fascistic. Yes, but that layer of cake had been already cooked, as bloody and violent foundations of RS ethnic exclusivity have been already set in the war, and then paused by Dayton, enabling for ethno-fascism to peacefully develop itself true legal political institutions of „Dayton RS and BIH“, as well as to reinvent itself in the new layers of post-war political narratives of RS elites and streets. I may say, not without strong but silent presence of violence as an old paradigm of creation and existence of RS. All those fake, stretched and revised narratives of cultural memory (official names, monuments, historical-political myths, churches and monasteries, celebrations of Orthodox Christians saints as official holidays of institutions, municipalities and RS, etc) as well as street responses (such as graffiti, paroles, stickers, etc) that are imposed to the citizens of Banja Luka and RS in such absurd, hostile, aggressive and totalitarian manner, are nothing else but quasi-postmodern eruption of invisible violence rooted in very recent creation and existence of RS.

Having all this in mind, in such political and social context as well as in spiral dance between messages of political elite and street, narratives (textual and contextual) of pop-nationalistic street graffiti created in last 7 or 8 years in Banja Luka has strong and definite fascist meanings and sources, as they are emerging out of clear and undoubted micro-fascistic attitudes, statements and actions of RS political, religious and intellectual elites and their uncritical supporters. Such fascist narratives in messages of streets are getting ever stronger as today's ethno-political elite in RS is sinking in the stalling spiral of ethno-totalitarianism, religious fanaticism and ethno-chauvinism, with which they are reaffirming and strengthening the one and the only purpose of RS existence – an total mono-national domination and isolation of 49% of BIH, thus creating mental, territorial and political borders of RS ethnocracy created in the first years of massive ethnic cleansing and war genocide. In last 7 to 8 years, these borders had been massively used for spiral creation of externally semi-controlled, ethno-fascistic political regime of RS ethnocracy, which differ

But this last option won't go without defrosting armed conflict which has been frozen in 1995. It is almost like the scenario in which Nazi political regime wasn't defatted completely in 1945, but left to exist and develop in whole its glory and war heritage only in one province. Existence of RS ethnocracy is pushing the limits and borders of „acceptable“ nationalism, patriotism and right-winged ideologies in Europe in 2000s and 2010s and totally redefine European relationship with Hitler's historical Nazism. By accepting RS occurrence out of bloody genocide and massive scale ethnic cleansing, entirely triggered and carried out by Serbian politics and institutions in 1990s, visits of European politicians to the Banja Luka capital of ethno-religious regime, like those one of Baroness Aeshton in 2010s, look almost like a British PM Chamberlain visits to Berlin in 1930s. Example of RS ethnocracy, once again, is showing that every nationalist ideology and ethnocracy with its self-satisfaction, containment and militancy, will sooner or later sink into the abyss of ur-fascism which had been conceptualized in Umberto Eco's elements of eternal fascism (Eco 1995). Simply, it is a game which can be played in any given time and space, in thousand ways, but only with one ending – nurturing of political violence and politics of violence, regardless whether we talk about past, present or the forth-coming violence.

What this research had tried and hopefully succeeded to show is that pop-nationalistic messages of streets aren't there as authentic and self-generic political mood of what essentialists like to call „autochthonous people/nation“. They are highly induced and fabricated products of behavior, actions and expressed attitudes of political, religious and intellectual elites over two decades of existence of RS. But street messages in Banja Luka are revealing something that any moderate conservative politicians would rather left undisclosed. Their discursive meanings are revealing the final effects of culturecide in Banja Luka and in every municipality in the RS. Together with demographic ethnic cleansing, Banja Luka had experienced vast cultural and ideological cleansing, here portrayed in the massive renaming of official names of local communities and streets and demolition of Muslim and Catholic architectural legacies. Entire cultural remembrance of Banja Luka has been dismantled and significant parts erased, largely those that have been declared as non-Serbian or anti-Serbian and thus unsuitable. This affected that Banja Luka went true swift, bloody and painful process of conversion of its cultural identity from Bosnian-and-Herzegovinian multiethnic and inter-ethnic city into the mono-national, ethnically clean, Serbian city. Cultural oblivion and cultural memory had been shaped and conversion of cultural identity of Banja Luka had happened on several levels, as following:

- level of unsuitable and suitable ethnic and/or religious affiliation, identification and symbolisms;
- level of unsuitable and suitable (left-right) political-ideological narratives, symbols, events and figures;
- level of unsuitable and suitable Yugoslav and Bosnian communists, leftist, partisans and revolutionaries;
- level of unsuitable and suitable historic narratives, events and figures and their political-mythological interpretations and forgeries;
- level of unsuitable and suitable geography;

- level of binary opposition: civil/individual – rural/collective;
- level of binary opposition: pro-Western – anti-Western (pan-Slavic, pro-Russian, anti-American)
- level of binary opposition: lyric/enlightened/feminine – epic/martial/military/manly
- level of binary opposition: all-Serbian (arch)enemies – all-Serbian (arch)friends.

Described conversions of ethno-religious, ideological and thus cultural identity of pre-war Banja Luka formally happened in less than four years of war, simultaneously or even before real ethnic cleansing of the city, in a way predicting, some two years ahead, the outcomes of final solutions for non-Serbs in Banja Luka and RS – total annihilation of unsuitable. In this formal phase of conversion Banja Luka lost more than 30% and city center more than 55% of its pre-war citizens, non-Serbs, at least 65000 souls, and more than 150 civilians at least, had been murdered in terror campaigns in the city, nearby concentration camps or in slavery work on the war frontlines. Only because they were non-Serbs or not pure Serbs, but Muslims, Catholics, Croats, Bosniaks, ethnically or religiously mixed families and their members, and thus unprotected from criminals, extremists but also from entire ethno-fascist RS ethnocracy. But this research has also showed that this entire RS ethno-story, started in the beginning of 1990s is finally circling and maturing up right about now, as we speak, with new generations of „well-bred“ Serbs and RS politicians. Today, one can see how RS elite and large portions of publicity are closing up Serbian mythical and nationalistic memory narratives in a fake but coherent old-new political identity, path and statehood of „Serbian community“ in Banja Luka and BIH, celebrating things for which Nurnberg 1945 or Hague 1993 tribunal have been established in the first place. While at the same time one can feel how Banja Luka loses, bit by bit, of its well-known and centuries old ethnic and cultural diversity, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional memory. Times after the war strongly disclose RS warlords as well post-war elites in their attempts to mask or justify genocide, culturecide and conversion of inter-ethnic into the Serbian Banja Luka, by pointing out majoritarian representation of Serbs in Banja Luka and other parts of today’s RS, or political „feelings“ of Serb people or discrimination and „endangerment“ of Serbs immediately before the military operations had took place after dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia. There is no more war or alleged endangerment of Serbs, but war names of streets, schools and local communities are still there, Orthodox Christians religion celebrations and saints within public institutions are still there, even 20 years after the war. RS and Belgrade elite are even announcing new patriotic street names which will carry the names of Serbian warlords *Radovan Karadžić* or *Ratko Mladić*. They are erecting monument of medieval monarch Stefan Nemanja in front of RS Museum in Banja Luka or opening imaginary all-Serbian city of *Andrićgrad* in the center of east Bosnian city Višegrad, severe ethnically cleansed from Muslims during the war, thus forging history and setting Serbian mythical-political fairytales as a regular bedtime reading. Simultaneously denying and depriving all citizens of BIH from the objective and archived knowledge about true political and cultural history of their towns, local communities and entire country. By doing all that they are making final brush-ups on the grand statue of genocide and culturecide in BIH, simultaneously providing themselves with political power and brand-new four-year government. As a rationale behind, in their funny way, street graffiti

and street names are telling us a story whose main punch is: an extremely violent and ethno-fascist political homogenization of Serbs and pretended Serbian ethno-territorial and political property in BIH (or Croatia, or Kosovo) and transposing of everything that isn't Serbian or Orthodox Christians enough into the eternal Serb-Orthodox Christians historical, territorial and political possession. And as a matter of fact, all post-war RS elites, especially today's one consider erased, denied, cut and ignored cultural memory and absence of prewar identity of Banja Luka as one of main legacies and acquisitions of war. RS elite retention of post-war status quo and symbolical enumeration of Banja Luka in the list of „Serbian” cities, find the most important task in their attempt to obtain or retain political power. If a young mind grows up in such an environment it isn't strange at all s/he produces such pop-nationalistic visual content, thinking that s/he did something rebellious, patriotic, anti-imperialistic, anti-American, etc. That is how post-war elite doesn't want to change war names of streets or schools or try rebuilding and restoring cultural diversity and true memory of Banja Luka. Fight for streets or public spaces is fight for political space and power, regardless whether it is formal, like in case of street names or informal in the case of street graffiti. Described discursive meanings and elements of mainstream messages of streets and politics as well as discursive meanings of cultural oblivion and conversion are totally in the line with Brockmeier's conceptualization of source, role and impact of memory narratives (formal or informal, written or verbal, visual/graphical/spatial or textual) and chosen frame of mnemonic selection in given ideological, historical and social context of one's community for shaping and building cultural memory in that community.

In today's Banja Luka, cultural identity and memory is built mainly on oblivion, with vast quantity of romanticized and mythologized narratives of recent and far past. Communism in Yugoslavia also nurtured partial cultural remembrance allowing and sponsoring an oblivion of significant part of objective Yugoslav, demotic, regional, urban and local memory narratives and remembrances of times before 1945, including memory narratives (especially atrocities) of quisling states of Independent Croatia and Serbia of *Milan Nedić*. As we are heading into the future, it seems that quantity of things that are desirable to be forgotten is getting exponentially larger, and apparently next thing needed to be put under the carpet of cultural oblivion are Belgrade genocide, ethnic cleansing and aggression war in BIH. Gaps left after pro-active forgetting will be fulfilled with semi-narratives which carry much more desirable cultural and political constructs and discursive meanings more acceptable for new-Serbian ethno-political elites in Banja Luka and Belgrade. In such a way cultural remembrance in RS dominantly is built on the foundations of violent and imposed oblivion and demolition of all memory texts, from historic documents to the street names, monuments and architecture. Under the stroke of oblivion were and still are all non-Serbian ethno-religious memory narratives, especially Muslim and Bosnian, but also all memory texts and evidence which are very objectively showing history of diverse Orthodox Christians (Slavicized) Vlach and Orthodox Christians Slav populations in Ottoman and Austrian-Hungarian era on the territories of today's BIH. Population which will be the largest reservoir for later modeling and creation of „Serb political nation in Bosnia“ during the entire 20th century especially after the WWI and during 1980s. A national-building process that was enhance and

speed up by Serbian aggression and 1992-1995 war in BiH and which is being wrapped up right about now in the worst possible portrait, a portrait of „Republic-Serb“ – an „authentic“ RS Orthodox Christians-Serb voter. Also under the stroke of oblivion were and still are all that can testify about successes and possibilities of inter-ethnic and interreligious life, from ethnically and religiously mixed marriages to leftist legacy of ZAVNOBIH and cultural and civil institutions of Social Republic of BiH (museums, archives, artistic and cultural legacy) and Banja Luka as typical inter-ethnic and culturally multilayered and mixed Bosnian town. Local warlords didn't miss opportunity to use a wave of economic and political transition from communism to (quasi)capitalism, as an additional argument for justification of such vast cultural oblivion, especially in erasing the memory on leftist ideological narratives, destroying workers' class left ideological base (offering weapons, war and Orthodox Christians religion fundamentalism as replacement), denying international, secular and supranational character of Yugoslav and BiH societies, denying significant participation of Muslims and Croats in the anti-fascist struggle in WWII. With violent erasure of BH and Banja Luka cultural memory, emerging holes are fulfilled with pointless and destitute, yet aggressive narratives about eternal suffering of Bosnian Serbs from Turks, Ustashe, Muslims; about Bosnia as land of Serbian medieval kings and thus land of Serbs; about Serb people as only truthful freedom fighters against Ottoman and Austrian-Hungarian rule or against Nazis and fascists; about Serbian people as only one who have cared about Yugoslavia, who have invested in its creation everything they've got and made the biggest mistake. These meta-narratives are intertwined with medieval and religious mythical texts dated in the time of *Nemanjići* dynasty, Serbian epic poetry and demotic myths of Kosovo's and post-Kosovo's literature cycles. These historiography and literature texts, standing alone are not the problematic, but their later interpretations are, especially the pop-nationalistic interpretations from the end of 20th and beginning of 21st century. The roots of the first, religious based, political and national-building interpretations of these demotic texts can be found in the works and political manifests and practices of Serbian Orthodox Christians clergy of Sremski Karlovci Metropolitanate and rich Serbian traders of in 18th and 19th century Vojvodina (part of Habsburgs' Empire then). Sremski Karlovci and Novi Sad were the seats of influential Serbian Orthodox Christians Metropolitanate during the first and second Serbian uprisings and Serb Orthodox Christians traders and intellectuals in Hungary who were crucial for ideological conceptualization and creation of Serbian national idea and political identity. So it doesn't surprise that the first origins of today's most popular Serbian historical, political and nationalistic myths can be found precisely here. Later, these historical and national-building interpretations of demotic epic poetry and myths will developed in 19th century Principality and Kingdome of Serbia and finally in 1880s and 1890s will be wrapped up in the coherent Serbian political national identity and classical nationalistic narratives we know today, preserving all main columns of all-Serbian religious and national myths. This ideology had test itself in the first decades of 20th century in 1st and 2nd Balkan war and later in WWI and in creation of 1st Yugoslavia. In those first decades of 20th century, one can notice that 19th century Serbian national and political identitarian narratives, now set in direct political contact with other southern Slav national or ethno-religious narratives, will develop in quite new

directions, mainly in the works of Serb-Orthodox Christians Church Bishop *Nikolaj Velimirović*, politician *Dimitrije Ljotić*, academic *Drago Vasić* and others. Old national-building myths and narratives now become a base for developing of Serbian ethno-exclusive and cleric-nationalistic ideology of purity and everlasting continuity of Serbian nation from 11th century onward, mainly represented in national-enlightenment concepts of *Svetosavlje*, a religious national-building cult of Saint Sava, perceived as first Serbian national „enlightener“!?! These theories of blood and soil from 1910s and 1920s during 1930s will develop in several directions of Serbian proto-fascist and fascist ideas, movements and political parties, thus creating actual fascists' political regime of Serbia in 1941. After the end of WWII these ideas weren't defeated, and together with Bishop *Nikolaj Velimirović* have moved over Atlantic and continued to influence new generations of Serb Orthodox Christians priest and bishops during 1950s and 1960s. Later, three most important pupils and followers of *Nikolaj Velimirović*, Bishop *Longin* (Dalmatia), Bishop *Amfilohije* (Montenegro) and Bishop *Atanasije Jevtić* (Herzegovina) played significant role in radicalization of Orthodox Christians Serb and Montenegrin population in Croatia, BIH and Montenegro in 1980s and beginning of 1990s. *Nikolaj Velimirović* is declared as saint of Serb Orthodox Christians Church in 2000 and *Drago Vasić*, *Milan Nedić* and some others are officially rehabilitated by Serbian courts in 2000s. Development and rise of Serbian nationalistic and ethno-exclusive ideas outside of Serbia found a fertile ground in last half of 20th century, especially in BIH because vast parts of Orthodox Christians population in BIH in comparison to the Serbs in Croatia where the least hit by the national-enlightenment ideas, mainly due to the late modernization. WWI and later formation of Kingdom of SHS and Yugoslavia brought Serbian national narratives and identities more close to the all rural Vlach population through schooling system, print media and ideological work of Serb Orthodox Christians clergy. Transformation of Orthodox Christians population of Slavized Vlachs into the „political nation of Serbs“ in BIH got a new speed during the WWII much because of atrocities of independent state of Croatia. Communism didn't manage to deconstruct and to give an objective, archived and scientific backgrounds and interpretations for different national narratives of Yugoslav nations, but instead it filtered national myths and narratives, moved those inappropriate and hardest symbols on the margin (or abroad) and reused acceptable parts of national myths and narratives (especially those glorifying wars, people freedom fighters and rebellions) for the purpose of building all-national or supranational Yugoslav unity and brotherhood, as a form of additional narrative which would bring Communism and Marxism closer to the rural population of Yugoslavia (95% in 1945 and 65% in 1991). But one could say that final establishing and wrapping up of political nation of Serbs in BIH happened due to the Belgrade aggression on BIH and the work of Serbian clergy and nationalist intellectuals. Actually it is still going on in the framework of RS ethnocracy. RS ethnocracy as well as RS and Belgrade warlords, clergy and intellectual elite had reused and recycle the worst and bloodiest nationalistic and ethno-exclusive political myths and narratives from Serbian fascism of 1930s and embedded into the brand new platform for postmodern all-Serbian pop-nationalistic mythology. The four main columns of this genius and carefully crafted 1980s platform were and still are: (1) myth about pan-Serbian Slavism (in which all Southern Slavs

are in fact Serbs); (2) myth about pure, virgin and continues cultural and ethno-religious identity of today's Serbs in Balkan from 11th century onward in which term „Serb“ as modern political national identity was created in the time of alleged Serbian „enlightener“ Saint Sava in 12th century and for God sake it can't be a consequences of 19th century national-building processes, a pure construct made out of various tribal and ethnic origins, political and religious classes, language groups, economical and cultural communities and their demographic mergings and divisions over the last five centuries of Balkan history; (3) myth about religiously predetermined identity of Serbian nation which is bind and defined within Orthodox Christianity, or more precisely within Orthodox Christians cult of Saint Sava (*Svetosavlje*) as well as with mythological chain of Serbian rulers, kings and despots which accepted *Svetosavlje* (dictated by Orthodox Christians church and clergy) as a way of existing and lasting of the nation in the body of the holly elite and church (this imply absolute impossibility that someone is a Serb Catholic, or Serb Muslim, or Serb Buddhist as same as it is rather „un-natural“ to be Polish Orthodox Christians or Croat Orthodox Christians, in same manner in which Michael Sells in theory of Christos-Slavism explain main features of such „natural“ and „un-natural“ amalgamation of religion and nation) and finally (4) myth about today's (or 20th century) Croats and Muslims as descendants of once Serbs who massively converted or were massively forced to convert to the Catholicism or Islam (Serbian essentialists especially emphasize Islamization during Ottoman rule from 15th to 18th century and Catholic unitarization in 18th and 19th century after Habsburgs' abolishment of military provinces on the eastern frontiers of empire in Dalmatia, Slavonia, Banija, largely populated with Orthodox Christians population).

On the base of this archaic platform RS elites violently construct new pop-nationalistic semi-narratives which slowly build up new institutional, local and cultural remembrance which didn't reach level of new cultural memory yet, but definitely is striving to. These new semi-narratives are imposed to the society with special intensity, aggressiveness, emotions and suggestiveness, mainly in linguistic and semiotic form, and with mandatory orientation toward religious and mythical historicism. By analyzing one school book or street name or name of local community, or monument in Banja Luka, you can write a lot more about facts and meanings that are missing or are unsaid and objectively it should be there, than about things that are said and emphasized in those narratives. In some extent it is quite absurd, though only possible that creation, survival and isolation of RS and „Serbian“ Banja Luka from rest of BIH is justified and legitimized not with remembrance but with oblivion. In this way oblivion produce cultural regression and artificial cultural isolation and maladjustment of ideological but also epistemological premises of RS society and citizens in relation to the European post-modernity, history and globalization. Any form of performative narrative doesn't exist here, it isn't desirable and as such it is often subjected to the auto-censorship, because culture regression and oblivion in Banja Luka and RS don't seek any action, criticism, re-questioning, reinventions or dynamic changes of social and political paradigms. That's way pop-nationalistic street graffiti in Banja Luka though they should be performative and socially provocative, self-questioning, progressive aren't all that, but merely another static and petrified memory narrative which reuse official and regressive memory

texts in order to confirm narrativization of „our” past as well as to narrativize the essentialist and nationalistic expectations of future times. Precisely this is a difference between official pop-nationalistic street names as static semiotic narratives and pop-nationalistic street graffiti as dynamic, more postmodern narratives, because street names don't invite or announce any further political changes or don't have dynamic capabilities for the expected and hopeful memorization of the future and thus inevitable time flow. Though strongly leaned on the official static and semiotic narratives graffiti, in their form are, dynamic and performative political statements about future development of memorization, thus represent pop-nationalistic expectations and hopes toward even greater political and cultural isolation and independence of RS cultural memory flow, from the rest of BiH. But what are subverting this performative effect of graffiti are exactly semiotic and regressive memory texts and narratives they are carrying. This fact deprives them from greater political power, but in RS society pop-nationalistic graffiti are not there to challenge power or support mainstream politics, but simple to conquer the space and impose fear, thus reproduce and recycle mainstream RS and Belgrade politic for the street usage. As a kind of hobby of the lost generations of young Serbs and entire RS society, in total absence of progressive ideas, narratives and power games to play, whose lives and minds official politic has put on the deepest margin of political and cultural logic and intellect. On this margin, graffiti are conveying the message that political change is necessary but only in the direction of further development of ethno-fascism, until everybody forget atrocities from which RS emerged. Nurturing of oblivion and pop-mythological narrativization in RS has precisely that goal, a normalization of absence, disruption and annihilation of objective BH cultural memory flow, as people after layers of time won't be able even to notice existence of absence and oblivion, let alone to recognize that such absence and oblivion are not normal and humane, but bloody and violent, unethical, pre-modern regardless of the fact that it is happening in the 21st century. Relativization is a name of the game. What happened, happened, let's try to live now as if nothing have happened at all. That's way citizens of Banja Luka, even most educated once are very passive and difficult to set in motion. They are tranquilized and benumbed with cultural collectivity and unity, relativization and patriotism, which are present in every corner of public life and space.

Regarding the question from hypothesis – whether one cultural memory can be fully formed (and more important survive) on the base of such massive oblivion, thus providing independent cultural flow and memorization to the political community which cherish that oblivion? And if it they can't, what will happen with such cultural remembrance and that political community? I think that answer to the first question is no, it can't, thus implying that cultural remembrance of RS political community based on massive oblivion, is condemned on the life on the margin as long as RS exists, jammed between imposed, selected and artificial remembrances and collectiveness on one side and European and regional collective memory and history on other. This margin is not only cultural one, but eternal epistemological, technological, educational, economic and political dead-end street for thousands of young minds and generations living in it. Sooner or later such ethnicized and traditional memory flow will lead to the informal or formal disintegration of that political

community. It is utopia about pre-modernity, nostalgia toward never lived antiquity, utopia in stalemate. It is not a pro-active and critical nostalgia, but regressive and totally irrational one. Author Mitja Velikonja in his study „Titostalgia” describes nostalgia toward disrupted (Yugosavian or Tito’s) times, and clearly describes the dichotomy between nostalgia as re-action and nostalgia as action, nostalgia as utopia and alternative, nostalgia as resistance against oblivion and disruption and nostalgia as mean of oblivion. As he argue, „While the two readings above criticize nostalgia for supporting dominant ideologies despite apparently opposing them (first by escaping into the imaginary past, and second by legitimizing the emptiness of contemporary societies), the third espouses it as an explicit opposition to the present. In my understanding nostalgia is also a dissident discourse, a kind of resistance to the blanket accusations of the past, and a survival strategy in a fast-changing world. I fully agree with Boym (2001, 354) that 'nostalgia can be both a social disease and a creative emotion, a poison and a cure.' Nostalgia also has its third face: it is an emotional protection against the narrative breaks in people's life stories; it has a cathartic, therapeutic and healing effect. It resists the criminalization of the past and 'strikes back', preserving in this way the continuity of identity threatened by historical discontinuities. It protects the past that would otherwise be stolen, in the sense of Milan Kundera's famous maxim that 'the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.' As such, nostalgia is utopian and alternative, and transcends the existing order. Some may find this aspect of it contradictory, since it actually yearns for *old times* and the *things already experienced*. At any rate, the simple fact that it searches for and anticipates a world that would be *more just than the present one*, makes nostalgia a potential engine and means of emancipation. For this reason, I do not see it only as re-action, but also as action; not only as healing wounds, but also as creating cracks within whatever is currently dominant; not only as a denial of reality, but also as a construction of a new reality; not only as a *pious wish*, but also as an initiative for its realization. (Velikonja 2008, 128)“ Power of new-Serbian memory narratives in Banja Luka aren't based on lived or well archived memories. In the official and iformal memory narratives in today's Banja Luka there is no true and constructive nostalgia, or true and complex feelings about our close or distance past, just a lot of media noise and utopia made of propaganda. Even slight remembrance on Tito's times will shake that hous of cards.

As memory texts and practices (who are used for creation of memory narratives in given community) are more written, scientific, easily accessible, factual, objectified and archived and less selective, oral, interpretative and un-transparent, than memory narratives (and complete cultural remembrance and memory build out of these narratives) are more accessible, stable, objectified, socially balanced and fair, thus more integrative and significant for the larger portions of people and communities. On such conclusion also suggests Brockmeier, who point out: What are the consequences of the principle of mnemonic selection? Selecting information, be it for encoding or retrieving, means rejecting and excluding other information—information deemed to be obscured, repressed or forgotten. Furthermore, because remembering as selecting always creates gaps, distortions, contradictions and other incoherences, it also is reconfiguring: by closing or ignoring gaps and omissions, it arranges new orders and creates new

coherences. That is, it is organizing and reorganizing the selected fragments of memory into meaningful schemata, to use Bartlett's term. Again, what is not integrated into schemata (and that is subsumed under certain ideas of meaningfulness) is left out, suffering the fate of most of our experiences: to drift from a short life in consciousness into oblivion (Brockmeier 2002, 22)." In less selected and less oral conditions of creation of memory narratives oblivion is harder and more difficult to implement, as it seeks violent action, such as book burning, burning of archives, demolition of architectural and urban memory, massive changes of official names and symbols in public space, etc. Precisely such violent oblivion happened in Banja Luka during Belgrade 1992-1995 aggression and war in BiH, as new implemented memory narratives are leaned by large, on unarchived or poorly archived, unscientific, biased, suspicious and even forged and anti-humanistic memory texts and practices which are full of oral, privatized, romanticized, epic, mythological, suspicious and irrationalized remembrances and interpretations of memory time-flow, portrayed as „national history of Serbs“. As practices and contents of remembrance are more oral and pre-modern, memory narrative is less visible, comprehensive and significant, thus subjected to the automatic collectivization of individuals, to the hierarchy of social relations and eventually subjected to the segregation on the line of un/selected or un/desirable remembrance or forgetting. As Brockmeier point out further, such oral practice disables formation of collective cultural memory in one's community, memory narratives is unstable, collective remembrance is formed mainly on forgetting, which all lead sooner or later to the disintegration of that community. In another words, what we all don't remember in the same way, what doesn't bind us together through time and space, must be forgotten, burn, unwritten, ignored. As today's post-modernity implies many things that makes as mutually different and diverse, thus things that are binding us are too poor to prevent disintegration of our culture. That's how cultural communities are disappearing. But if our differences and different remembrances are something we all must equally remember, time-space layers of remembrance than become objectified masses of archived cultural memory. Narratives become timely stable and resistant to oblivion, because now they have more complex structure and story, twists and dichotomies, and are able to respect and comprehend official and mainstream as well as subversive text, texts of power as well as texts of oppression, discourse of remembrance and contra-remembrance in a same time. In this way memory narrative is getting closer to the more truthful comprehension of remembrances and memory texts, but also it acquires a form of performative expression. In vast oceans of memorized material of today's community or political situation, it isn't enough for narrative to communicate only on the linguistic and semiotic levels – descriptively and statically tell a story about event, thus tranquilization consumers and gives a one-dimensional and imposed message. Postmodern narrative seeks such combination of text, action and media that would allowed its context to be complex, free for re-questioning and open – to be political statements and acquire a political power. Such memory narrative can activate consumer, through whose action a power of narrative will be materialized and its political statement will transform into the political action and change. Performative narrative is in function of continuous change and degradation of traditional cultural certainties and historical explanations of cultural presence and

memory. The modernist desire for remembrance, as one of the first of its 'archeologists', Walter Benjamin (1983/1999), described it, originates between the ruins of traditions and the awareness of uncertainty as a basic condition of life in a capitalist world. For Benjamin, the existential need to remember is a by-product not so much of the effort to capture lost time (as in Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*), as of time passing, the time of a reality that is in permanent flux." (Brockmeier 2002, 20) Continuing further down: "Viewed in this way, a narrative is a functional action that unfolds an objective; it realizes a goal; it aims to do something. Arguably, the material structure designed and realized by Micha Ullmann *does* something or, at least, is intended to achieve something. It is an artistic and political statement that, as just mentioned, intervenes in a mnemonic system and, indeed, alters it—at least to a certain degree. And it does so not primarily because... it is not the *narrated event* but the *narrative event* that makes a plot. It is not the historical 'facts' as such but the discursive practices of their presentation that symbolically activate this installation and turn it into an agent in a cultural system. To grasp the power of narrative as 'activity', 'performance' or 'discourse', we thus must identify the way it is situated in a local cultural context, a point emphasized by Bauman (1986) and other contextualist theoreticians of narrative... To view narrative as performance (or, more specifically, as performativity) is to foreground the narrative event as a site where the social is articulated and its contradictory implications are struggled over (Langellier, 1999; Parker & Sedgwick, 1994). The notion of narrative performance thus refers to a process of co-narration, a social process of telling and enacting in which teller and listener are not stable and permanent positions but moments of an interplay whose outcome remains open." (Brockmeier 2002, 35-36) Precisely these Brockmeier's observations explain why pop-nationalistic graffiti in Banja Luka aren't performative, and thus have very limited and from above controlled power. Memory narratives in graffiti, as well as in official new-speech don't want degradation of traditional cultural certainties and historical explanations of cultural presence and memory of RS and Serbia. Quite opposite, they want to preserve all that mythological and essentialist, often ethno-fascistic interpretation of Serbian cultural existence and presence in BIH, give them new taste and extend present all-Serbian nationalistic ideology into the certainty of future memorization in BIH as well as in Serbia. Also pop-nationalistic graffiti as well as mainstream messages of RS elite don't have enough power to significantly influence or change status quo because their memory narratives are empty shells, pure copies of classical mythological narrativization about Serbian culture and history from Belgrade (too oral, traditional, historical, biased, unarchived, unproven, unconfirmed, passive, uncritical, ethno-religiously exclusive and hierarchical, thus too collectivized and segregation) thus highly unauthentic and fake for the objective cultural texts, practices and remembrances of Orthodox Christians population in BIH. Entire RS memory flow emerged out of Belgrade media propaganda and quasi-scientific works of Belgrade historians and poets in the first years of 1990s Belgrade aggression and wars in post-Yugoslav countries. As such it has been ethno-religiously selected, purified from any Bosnian or even Yugoslav memory and entirely leaned on the cultural memory of Serbia as neighboring political community, especially pre-Yugoslav cultural memory of Serbia. With such main features of remembrance, Banja Luka and RS will

never succeed to develop independent fully functional collective cultural memory, as this is impossible without entering into the flow of Bosnian (and Herzegovinian) cultural memory. Also RS won't be able to permanently use all-Serbian cultural memory, as it does not do today, nor RS citizens will be recognized as generic and autochthonous part of BIH, while using all-Serbian myths and memory narratives. Thus, it will be easier to remove them out of BIH in the future developments. Either way, as long as there is a RS as political community, Serbs in BIH won't be able to enter into the objective memory flow and cultural history of BIH, region and Europe, nor into the cultural space and memory of today's Serbia, because it never was its authentic part. Also, such hollow and emptied cultural identity and memory narratives of present day RS, Banja Luka and its citizens won't be able to survive trapped in today's official frame and mnemonic selection of distortive and non-catharsis collective remembrance, nor it can be fully isolated like it is a case with North Korea. Status quo is impossible, if nothing else than because cultural memory of human communities inevitable flows in the direction of the ever increased entropy, from static and simple toward ever more dynamic and complex realities, which doesn't support existence of static truths. This all suggests that this bloody cultural and political experiment of RS must collapse on some level, whether that will happened in a form of peaceful political and cultural transition and integration in BIH or in a form of harsh conflict from which RS had been emerged in a first place. Whether it will be conflict for independence or conflict for integrity, or something third, this conflict will be conflict of remembrances for the remembrance, for new cultural memory of new spatial collectiveness, same as last war was conflict in which one cultural memory and space was degraded and disrupted.

8 Povzetek magistrskega dela v slovenskem jeziku

8.1 Uvod

V tem delu želim podati širši pregled diskurzivnega pomena etno-verskih in pop-nacionalističnih grafitov, parol, posterjev in stikerjev (v nadaljevanju besedila: pop-nacionalističnih grafitov) v Banja Luki in Republiki Srbski (v nadaljevanju besedila: RS) nastalih med letoma 2006 in 2014. Dešifrirati njihov kulturni in politični simbolizem v luči državljanske vojne in agresije na Bosno in Hercegovino (v nadaljevanju besedila: BIH) kot tudi v kontekstu dominantnih povojnih in pogenocidnih novogovorov, memorijskih narativov in politik spomina vsiljenih s strani etno-politične in etno-intelektualne elite v RS in njihovih beograjskih mentorjev. Banja Luka je izbrana za študijo primera kot nekoč vojno-strateški, sedaj pa politični center RS, nasilno ustvarjene politične skupnosti bosanskih Srbov in beograjske etno-kolonijalne politike.

Moj cilj je pokazati simbolične korelacije med sporočili in diskurzivnimi pomeni, ki jih elita in ulica, skoraj istočasno, izmenjujeta in emitirata v formalni in neformalni javni prostor. To delo analizira produkcijo in konzumacijo pop-nacionalističnih grafitov ter primerja njihovo besedilo in njihov pomen z maintream političnimi in kulturnimi sporočili in oficialnimi narativi etno-verske elite in inštitucij v RS. Razodevanje diskurzivnih pomenov pop-nacionalističnih grafitov v Banja Luki ni možno brez prezentacije zgodovinskih ozadij in brez analize političnega in kulturnega konteksta današnje RS in novo-srbske Banja Luke. V tem kontekstu dominira populistična in oficialna novo-srbska pop-nacionalistična mitologija in reinterpretacija zgodovine BIH in Balkana, potem etno-mitska in etno-ekskluzivna kultura spomina in novo-srbske etno-verske identitetske prakse. V tem smislu daje delo pregled politik spomina in prevladujočih nacionalno zgrajenih obrazcev novo-srbskega kulturnega spomina z diskurzivno analizo sprememb naziva ulic in naziva krajevnih skupnosti v Banja Luki, opravljenih v času vojne s strani elite RS. Pregled „oficijalne memorijske juhe“, v kateri nove generacije proizvajajo in konzumirajo pop-nacionalistične grafite in druge novo-srbske metanarative na ulici, v medijih, v šolah, na delovnem mestu in v retoriki. Nove metanarative, ki so se izgradili na podlagi starih nacionalističnih mitologijah 19. in 20. stoletja in umetnih konstrukcij „srbske“ (ali katerikoli druge) nacije in kot taki popolno odtujeni od dejanske in argumentirane ekonomske, klasne in politične zgodovine pravoslavnega prebivalstva v tej deželi. Cilj je odkriti, kako se ta diskurzivni ples med elito in ulico v RS razvija in v kateri smeri se menja povojni kulturni in politični kontekst RS in BIH. V tem smislu se pop-nacionalistični grafiti vse manj pojavljajo v kontekstu zadnje vojne, agresije in etničnih delitev v BIH, ali vse bolj v kontekstu pop-nacionalistične in etno-ekskluzivistične diktature današnje etno-politične elite v RS, ki je v popolnosti dobila obliko zaokrožene etnokracije s pomembnimi elementi fašizma, ki konstantno postaja vse močnejši.

To raziskovanje želi pojasniti obstojanje takih pop-nacionalizmov v Banja Luki kot tudi poudariti, kako ta etno-verski in etno-ekskluzivni politični sistem v RS in daytonski BIH vsebuje pomembne lastnosti etno-fašizma, kako elita v RS vse bolj črpa iz in se opira na: 1) pozaba predvojnih izkušenj BIH, 2) strah od

asimilacije ali izginitev bosanskih Srbov brez nekega etnoekskluzivnega koncepta RS in daytonske BIH, 3) „osvoboditvene“ pridobitve in uspehe beograjske agresije in vojne v BIH, 4) masovne zločine in vojni teror, na katerih je nastala RS kot nadaljevanje vojno-emancipatorskih in osvobajajočih tradicij „srbskega“ naroda, 5) negiranje in relativizacijo etničnega čiščenja in genocida v RS, 6) „daytonsko“ teritorialno etnokratico kot edino točko politične legitimacije in obstoj etnično očiščene RS in vseh BH „konstitutivnih narodov“, 7) neoliberalno retoriko, v kateri ima RS neko novo „normalnost“ v BIH ali EU.

8.2 Raziskovalni problem, fenomen in cilj

Raziskovani fenomeni so diskurzivni pomeni pop-nacionalističnih uličnih grafitov in sporočilo etno-politične elite RS v javnem, inštitucionalnem, medijskem in memorijskem času in prostoru. Del raziskovanih fenomenov je tudi produkcija in konzumacija njihovih besedil in diskurzivnih/kontekstualnih pomenov kot tudi intenziteta in kvaliteta korelacij med sporočili in narativi elite na eni strani in ulice na drugi strani. Predmet tega raziskovanja so pop-nacionalistični ulični grafiti, parole, posterji in stikerji nastali med letoma 2006 in 2014 v Banja Luki, katerih vizuelni kodi in diskurzivni narativi vsebujejo prevladujoče nacionalne in etno-verske lastnosti, teme in mite etno-verskega korpusa bosanskih Srbov. Na drugi strani so predmet raziskovalnega interesa diskurzivna sporočila in narativi elite in inštitucij v RS, proizvedeni med letoma 1992 in 2014 in vsebovani v nazivih ulic, krajevnih skupnostih, regulativah, uradnih sporočilih inštitucij, oficialnem memorijskem narativu in spomenikih v javnem prostoru in medijski retoriki.

Osnovni cilj raziskovanja je odkriti in pojasniti diskurzivne pomene in narative elite v RS v kontekstu dominantnega novo-srbskega medijskega in inštitucionalnega novogovora, oficialnih memorijskih narativov in identitiranih praks v današnji Banja Luki in RS. Prav tako je cilj poskusiti odkriti način, na kateri so neformalni narativi pop-nacionalističnih grafitov povezani in prepleteni s formalnim družbenim, političnim in kulturnim okvirom in kako le-ti v taki svoji medsebojni prepletenosti okupirajo in osvajajo javni prostor. Podcilji raziskovanja so: 1) prikazati zgodovinsko in kulturno ozadje Banja Luke kot predkontekst današnje Banja Luke, 2) pokazati oficialne memorijske narative v RS skozi zgodbo o nazivih ulic in krajevnih skupnosti v Banja Luki, 3) pokazati kako se pop-nacionalistični grafiti obnašajo do oficialnih politik spomina v RS, 4) pokazati in interpretirati diskurzivna branja pop-nacionalističnih grafitov v političnem, medijskem, kulturnem in mnemoničnem kontekstu povojne Banja Luke in RS, 5) poudariti diskurzivne relacije med sporočili ulice in elite v RS in odkriti posledice in efekte teh relacij.

8.3 Konceptualni okvir in hipoteza

Raziskvanje se neizogibno naslanja na teorijo reprezentacije Stuarta Halla, ki poudarja, da moč nenehno teži, da fiksira pomene, ki podpirajo red te moči kot tudi na Gramscijev koncept kulturne hegemonije kot srestva za vzdrževanje in legitimiziranje vladavine bloka močnih nad blokom tistih, ki te moči nimajo. Ali, ta raziskava ni teoretizirala diskurzivnega branja grafitov, uradnih nazivov in političnega novogovora tako, da bi izvajala globoko konceptualizacijo njihovih pomenov v okvirih zgoraj nevedenih

teorij. Namesto tega je raziskovanje prevzelo te koncepte kot tiho osnovo za svoje dihotomije, definicije in izraze, osnovo, na podlagi katere je želelo dekonstruirati strukture etno-verske politične reprezentacije in monolitno etno-politično hegemonijo v neformalnem in frontalnem prostoru. V okviru te platforme želi raziskovanje naglasiti bolj živahne psiho-socialne procese kreacije memorijskih narativov in oblikovanja novega toka kulturnega spomina, ki se je začel tako nasilno leta 1992. Prav tako želi odgovorite na vprašanje, ali novi tokovi kulturnega spomina v RS, ki stremijo k temu, da dožeže raven neodvisnega kulturnega memoriranja, sploh lahko obstane na tako masivni in nasilni pozabi, distorziji in reviziji starih tokov memorijske narativnosti in na taki številčnosti in intenzivnosti novih umetnih pop-mitoloških memorijskih narativnosti? Ali pa je obsojen na propad? V okviru tega procesa kreiranja kulturnega spomina, je raziskovanje fokusirano na ekstremno in ekskluzivno vidljivost in intenziteto diskurzivnih vezi med neformalnimi novo-srbskimi pop-nacionalističnimi grafiti in oficialnimi pop-nacionalističnimi novogovori, politikami spomina in memorijskimi narativnostmi elite. Ples med neformalnimi in oficialnimi sporočili med elito in ulico v javnem prostoru Banja Luke se zdi, kot da ponuja pop-mitološko, narodnostno in duhovno legitimacijo za obstoj RS v BIH in za novo „normalnost“ RS v širšem balkanskem in evropskem kontekstu. On prav tako nudi legitimacijo za nasilno pozabo multietične ali bosanske preteklosti kot tudi za ignoriranje vseh ostalih interpretacij zgodovine bosanskih Srbov, razen tistih, ki jih je vsilila beograjska etno-intelektualna elita v 90.-tih letih prejšnjega stoletja, ki pa so postavljene v nacionalno grajenih procesih 19. in v začetku 20. stoletja. Z analiziranjem te konekcije, katere pomeni se lahko rešijo (z ugibanjem) samo s prizmo dominantnih novo-srbskih kulturnih, političnih in vojno-emancipacijskih memorijskih narativnosti. Ta raziskava želi odkriti pravi namen krvoprelitja/morjenje/ubijanja/, iz katerega je nastala RS. Prav tako želi predvideti, ali se bosta ta družba in njene politike dalje razvijali v maniri etno-fašizma, v maniri političnega režima, ki je že na samem začetku eksistence te družbe, leta 1992, postavljena kot norma njene ureditve. Ali bo družba RS utonila v popoln fašistični red v dosledni maniri Umberto Echevega „ur fašizma“?

Glede na vse navedeno se lahko postavi hipoteza, da so neformalne narativnosti pop-nacionalističnih grafitov in oficialne narativnosti elite RS močno povezane in prepletene do nivoja, ki kaže na to, da je etno-politična elita v RS uspešno konstruirala novo kulturno in politično realnost v BIH: družbo RS, popolnoma umetno in utemeljeno na vojnih uspehih, vojnih zločinih in neoliberalnem „daytonskem“ sporazumu. Stvarnost, ki lahko obstane samo, če ulica in elite uspešno rabijo in vsiljujejo umetno konstruirane koncepte etno-verskih identite, pop-nacionalističnih simbolov in memorijskih narativnosti, katerih glavne naloge so da: 1) vsiljujejo oficialno kulturo pozabe, politične nazore, porušijo, zakrivijo in pozabijo kulturni spomin BIH in žive spomine na predvojno interetnično življenje; 2) vsilijo novosrbski zgodovinski revizionizem in amnezijo, poenostavitve, ponarejanja in mitologiziranja memorijskih narativnosti o mestu in vlogi bosanskih Srbov v zgodovini Srbov v Banja Luki, BIH in Balkanu; 3) dekonstruirajo levičarske ideologije in alternative v BIH ter vsiljujejo četniške etnofašistične perspektive na 2. svetovno vojno in srbske etno-imperialne ideologije z začetka 20. stoletja; 4) ponudijo kulturno, politično in vojnoemancipacijsko „kontinuiteto“ in „normalnost“ RS, ne glede na to kako so le-ti tenki in mitološki in ne

glede na to, da so zasnovani na osvajanju, genocidu in krvoprelitju, iz katerih je nastala RS; 5) z vsiljevanjem „daytona“ in njegove diskriminirajoče in etnofašistične interpretacije kot večne družbene norme in političnega reda, proizvedejo atmosfero, v kateri je interetična (ko)ekzistenca z Bošnjaki in Hrvati v povojni Banja Luki in BIH nevzdržna in nemogoča ter skupaj z diktatom amnezije, srbskih etnomitov, etnonacizma, sovraštvom proti drugačnemu, s pravoslavnim saborništvom in z religiozno fundamentalnostjo pripeljejo do roba novega vojaškega konflikta.

Ta raziskava za destrukcijo oficialne mnemonične selekcije željenih memorijskih narativov koristi konceptualne domneve Jeans Brockmeierja, ki pravi, da besedila in arhivi, ko se konzumirajo v danem političnem in družbenem sobesedilu, v sebi vedno skrivajo memorijske narative - osnovne niti, s katerimi je spleteno in oblikovano tkivo kulturne memorije dane družbe. Kulturna memorija se za tega avtorja formira z ujetostjo oralnega narativa v memorijska besedila in prakso, vsi ti pa so pretkani z naracijo ali pa so podrejeni narativizaciji. Memorijska besedila se ne morejo dekodirati brez analize kulturnih pogojev časa in prostora njihovega nastanka. Ker, kakor on poudarja, kulturna memorija ni enostaven psihologiziran velik kup individualnih in kolektivnih spominov v teku preteklih dogajanj in o negotovosti prihodnosti, temveč je stkana iz socioloških, idejnih in materialnih izhodišč skupnosti ljudi, ki pomnijo in pozabljajo, prav tako pa tudi iz pričakovanj, predvidenja izhoda in človeških upanj, ki nam vsiljujejo našo željeno in skoraj gotovo prihodnost. V oblikovanju kulturne memorije preteklosti, sedanjosti in prihodnosti nimajo niti jasne meje, niso pa tudi ne ontološke kategorije. Zato Brockmeier določa kulturno memorijo kot časovni večdimenzionalni proces v danih družbenih, spoznavnih in pomenskih okvirih sedanjosti, ki vsak dan znova lahko regenerira nek kulturni spomin ali pa omogoči kulturno pozabo skupnosti, v stalni rekonfiguraciji, selekciji, združevanju in ločevanju preteklih in sedanjih dogodkov, izkušenj, znanj, vzrokov in posledic in željenih izidov. Ta družbeni okvir, znotraj katerega se mi učimo, pomnimo ali pozabljamo, Brockmeier naziva selektivni memorijski okvir. Tako individualen spomin postane miks cerebralne operacije spominov in pozabljanja in selektivnega memorijskega okvira dane skupnosti ali kulture, zunaj tega okvira pa samostojno ne moremo obstajati. To selekcijo spominov, ki se ne bodo pozabili in ki bo postala dominantna ali oficialna kulturna memorija, Brockmeier imenuje mnemonična selekcija simboličnega memorijskega okvira, ki se lahko preiskusi in dekonstruira, ali ne ignorira. Ta okvir kot tudi selekcija imata funkcije lepljenja individualnih in skupinskih izkušenj, pričakovanj in projekcij v eden simbolično memorijski prostor sedanjosti, ki ga posameznik lahko imenuje kot svojo skupnost ali kulturo, ki ji pripada. Tako kulturna memorija deluje kot kognitivna, ideološka in vrednostna kontinuiteta skupnosti in kulture.

Pop-nacionalistični grafiti kot tudi nazivi ulic, krajevnih skupnosti in šol kot tudi medijska retorika politikov in inštitucij niso nič drugega kot memorijska besedila, ki v družbenem, kulturnem in političnem okviru današnje RS in BIH nudijo selektirane memorijske narative, urejajo željeni kulturni spomin in neizogibno proizvajajo kulturno pozabo. Doživeti pomen pop-nacionalističnih grafitov, ki prikazujejo viteze srednjeveškega kraljevstva Nemanjičev ali izjavo „Srbska Srbom!“, ali živeti v hiši na naslovu *Ulica Cara Lazara br. 4*, ali hoditi v Osnovno šolo *Sveti Savo*, voziti se z avtobusom med banjaluškima krajevima

skupnostima *Lazarevo* in *Obilicevo* pomeni, da se posameznik ali skupina postavjajo neposredno v živ odnos do dominantnih pop-nacionalističnih ideologij, političnega in kulturnega setinga in do željno pričakovanih etno-verskih identitiranih in memorijskih praks, ki so selektirane in vsiljene s strani politične in intelektualne elite RS in Beograda. Naenkrat grafiti ali uradni nazivi niso samo memorijska besedila. Le-ti postanejo memorijski narativi, ki simbolično zaokrožajo teritorij „novo-srbske“ Banja Luke, RS in umetno spajajo ideološke, ekonomske, vrednostne in kognitivne horizonte „srbske“ preteklosti in „novo-srbske“ sedanjosti in tako proizvedejo simboličen „vse-srbski memorijski čas-prostor“ v današnji Banja Luki in v tem delu BiH.

8.4 Metodologija

To raziskovanje poskuša raziskati sodobne antropološke fenomene, ulične grafite kot tudi oficialne narative v javnem prostoru (uradne nazive,legislative, sporočila uradnih inštitucij, oficialne memorijske narative in spomenike, medijsko retoriko elite) z uporabo interdisciplinarnih metodoloških pristopov kulturoloških študij. Grafiti kot tudi oficialni narativi se tukaj raziskujejo kot besedila, ki imajo poseben pomen in diskurzivne narative pod svojo površinsko „lingvistiko“. V tem smislu se raziskovanje opira na koncept in metode teorije reprezentacije Stuarta Halla, da dešifrira diskurzivne pomen pod besedilom grafitov in oficialnih narativov. To dela z interpretacijami le-teh v kontekstu političnih, ekonomskih, literarnih in intimnih zgodb in pričevanj ter zgodovinskih zapisanih dokumentov in narativov iz predvojnega, vojnega in povojnega časa Banja Luke. A prav posebej v kontekstu politične in vojne ustvarjalnosti in obstoja etno-ekskluzivistične novo-srbske politične skupnosti imenovane „Republika Srbska“, v kateri ti oficialni in neformalni narativi tudi nastajajo.Da bi postavil areno za globljo elaboracijo diskurzivnih pomenov, je avtor opisal zgodovinsko ozadje Banja Luke in predstavil dejanske posledice mlajše zgodovine in vojne, kot so demografski podatki, manifestacije uradne vojne in kulturne politike, uradne regulative, dejstva o vojnih zločinih, o etničnih čiščenjih in genocidih, dejstva o starih in novih memorijskih narativov in mnemonični selekciji vsiljenih s strani vojnih elit Beograda in RS. V takšni kontekstualni areni in dani empiriji se je avtor igral s pojmi kontekstne produkcije in kontekstne konzumacije pomena. S ciljem, da bolj vidno naglasi vzroke od posledic, izvire od izida ter odgovornosti za določena kulturna in politična delovanja ali za kontekstualno produkcijo in konzumacijo pomena, si je avtor izposodil koncept kulturne in politične hegemonije elite nad masami.

Vsi zbrani in fotografirani ulični grafiti, medijski naslovi in druge empirije so analizirani znotraj omenjene arene. Vizualni in pisani ulični grafiti na eni in teksti/besedila/ oficialnih narativov na drugi strani se mesebojno primerjajo znotraj te kontekstualne arene. Besedila pop-nacionalističnih grafitov in oficialnih narativov politične elite su razdeljeni po skupinah v šest različnih kategorij izposojenih iz „Ur fašizma“ Umberta Ecca in podkrepjenih s šestimi „storibordi“ v prilogi. Avtor je s takim pristopom dobil šest terenov za interpretacijo, sklepanje in gradnjo terminologije (etno-verski, etno-ekskluzivni, etno politična elita, pop-nacionalizem, etnokracija, etno-fašizem itd.). To je bila velika pomoč za interpretacijo diskurzivnih narativov,

ki se nahajajo za besedilom grafita ali pa za obrambo določenih lastnosti uličnih grafitov kot etno-verskih ali pop-nacionalističnih. Prav tako je to pomagalo avtorju, da dodatno definira, opiše in analizira oficialne narative, politične metanarative, želje, retorike in akcije elite RS ter njihove posledic v preteklosti in sedanjosti. Z interpretacijo preteklih in sedanjih oficialnih memorijskih narativov in vsiljeno mnemonično selekcijo elite Beograda in RS, je avtor želel podati malo svetlobe na nedavno in brutalno preteklost ter da se izogne slojem pozabe in amnezije, ki so tako močno ukoreninjeni v sedanji kulturni spomin ali bolje rečeno kulturo pozabe v RS.

8.5 Pop-nacionalistični grafiti in kultura pozabe: Pop-mitološka omejevanje teorije

Pop-nacionalistični grafiti so vnetljiva oblika street arta, katerih narativi in vizualni kodi ali simboli vsebujejo in re/producirajo dominantne nacionalne ali etno-verske in nacionalno-politične lastnosti, teme in mite, v danem primeru, srbskega etno-verskega korpusa v BiH. Ta ulična sporočila zelo lahko postanejo odprt politični govor sovraštva v povojnem kontekstu BiH, in sicer tako, da reproducirjo in poudarjajo etno-versko poreklo ali teritorialne pravice ene entitete ali pa poudarja razlike in slaveč srbske vojne zločince in vojne uspehe v bosanski vojni ali pa z žalitvijo in promoviranjem netolerancije do „drugačnih“.

Da bi grafiti vstopili v cono srbskih etno-verskih uličnih sporočil in tako postali pop-nacionalistični govor morajo imeti ali pa morajo nositi določene vizualne ali pisane elemente in lastnosti v svojem celokupnem vizualnem prikazu. Običajno so vizualni elementi verski simboli srbske pravoslavne cerkve, ikone in križi vzhodnega pravoslavja, predstavljanj svetnikov in predstavljanje ali tlorisi cerkev. Zelo pogosto le-ti prikazujejo klasične srbske etnične in nacionalne simbole, zastave, ambleme in grbe moderne srbske države ali srednjeveškega kraljevstva *Nemanjića*. Prav tako so navzoči vojni znaki in simboli, vojne označbe, amblemi in zastave, orožje, uniforme ali deli le-te in vojni maskirni okraski iz različnih zgodovinskih časov in konfliktov kot tudi predstave anonimnih vojakov, četnikov, upornikov, hajdukov, komitov, oboroženih posameznikov, borcev za svobodo ali nevarnih maskiranih in oboroženih podob, resničnih ali izmišljenih. Popularni elementi so šablonirani portreti ali nalepke in posterji srbskih vodij, generalov, politikov in patriotskih zgodovinskih osebnosti kot so prvi predsednik RS *Radovan Karadžić*, *Slobodan Milošević*, general *Ratko Mladić*, generali iz 1. svetovne vojne *Živojin Mišić* ali *Radomir Putnik*, ali pa srbska etno-fašistična voditelja iz 2. svetovne vojne *Dimitrije Ljotić* ali *Drago Vasić*, ali pa današnji radikalni desničarski politik *Vojislav Šešelj*. Prav tako so prisotni šablonirani portreti tistih srbskih voditeljev, proti katerim avtorji odprto pošiljajo sporočilo sovraštva, doživljajoč jih kot izdajalce ali slabe politike.

Ko časovno oddaljujemo našo zavest in spomin od mraka vojne, etničnega čiščenja, genocida in nasilnega homogeniziranja Srbov na eno politično ozemlje znotraj današnje Bosne in Hercegovine, spomin na te dogodke vse bolj blede. Pozabljajo se vse izprijenosti in perversnosti tega časa, vse iracionalnosti, kriminalni in dobičkarski katalizatorji in ozadje konflikta. Pozablja se njegova politična lukrativnost za tedanje politične režime, predvsem kninski, paljanski in beograjski, potem pa tudi zagrebški.

Povojna etnična delitev BiH se je lahko sprejela kot „nujno stanje zavesti“, kot „normalnost“ po krvoprelitju, nekaj kot *vis maior*. Državljeni globoko natopljeni s scenami nasilja, smrti in straha, so kot hipnotizirani sprejeli stanje „tako kot je“, s parolami „dobro je, samo da ni vojne“ in z začetniškimi tečajji neoliberalne in kavbojske privatizacije, demokracije in potrošniške kulture. Politična elita v RS ne želi niti začeti razmišljati o tem, da relaksira javni prostor Banja Luke, da poskuša začeti „kulturno restavracijo“ in vrniti interetnični karakter in odprtost temu mestu, prav posebno v letih 2006-2014. Oni delajo prav nasprotno, stalno in vedno nanovo pošiljajo sporočila sovraštva in netolerance, oživljajoč stare/nove delitve, z oživljanjem spomina na individualne in skupinske vojne spomine in trpljenja in vnemanje nove generacije za stari/novi „srbski patriotizem“, irealen in prazen v svoji vsebini. Žalostno je, da vsi tisti Srbi, ki so največ pretrpeli (družine padlih vojakov in civilov, borci, vojni ujetniki, družine žrtev vojnih zločinov in preživeli) so s svojimi emotivnimi globinami najbolj zvesti poslušalci in konzumenti takih kvazi-patriotskih sporočil. Novi novo-srbski simboli v javnem prostoru, od spomenikov, nazivov ulic in ostalih uradnih nazivov in inštitucionalnih označb vse do grafitov in znakov popularne kultur, čeprav so nekateri nastali tekom vojne, danes še vedno služijo novi srbski eliti v „novo-srbski“ Banja Luki in RS. Služijo, da bi stalno in vedno znova reproducirali iracionalne memorijske narative in politična sporočila, ki konstantno potrjujejo srbsko pravico posedovanja Banja Luke in drugih delov Bosne, okupiranih s strani enonacionalne in homogenizirane RS. Zato se le-teh ne dotika in znova ne preiskuje. Ti simboli so tukaj, da reproducirajo pozabo in nek „popolnoma nov spomin“. Ti simboli so tu, da enostavno obstajajo do nekega novega konflikta. Zato se nazivi ulic, nazivi šol in krajevnih skupnosti kot tudi pop-nacionalistični grafiti lahko smatrajo za memorijska besedila, njihova kontekstualna sporočila pa se lahko razumejo kot memorijski narativi, selektirani in postavljeni v javni in oficialni prostor etnično očiščene in „novo-srbske“ Banja Luke. V svojem obstajanju ti memorijski narativi delujejo kot priče nasilja, nasilja, ki je očistilo Banja Luko, biološko in kulturološko. Ali kakor čas teče, se odmika, le-ti počasi postajajo priče odsotnosti. Naslednja raven za njih je, da postanejo priče neoliberalne in konsensualne „normalnosti“. Mali vizualni listki, ki označujejo konec interetničnega in egalitarnega multikulturnega življenjav Banja Luki in začetek negotove prihodnosti današnje „novo-srbske“ Banja Luke.

Kultura pozabe ni vidna v primeru spremembe naziva ulic in krajevnih skupnosti v Banja Luki tekom vojne in agrsije v BiH 1992-1995. Vojna elita v RS je spremenila nazive 15 od 58 predvojnih ali 57 današnjih krajevnih skupnosti (KS), z brisanjem iz javnega prostora in spomina Banja Luke $\frac{1}{4}$ njenih urbanih toponimov, starih 50 ali 100 ali še več let. Najpomembnejša prečiščevanja so se zgodila v ožjem mestnem območju, kjer je polovica krajevnih skupnosti (8 od 17 predvojnih ali 12 današnjih KS) izgubilo svoje stare in dobilo nove „srbijanizirane“ nazive. Približno $\frac{1}{3}$ KS predmestja (3 od 10 predvojnih ali 11 današnjih KS) je preimenovano na enak način. Na ruralnih območjih mesta je elita spremenila nazive 4 d 31 predvojnih KS. Na ta način je vojna elita spremenila nazive KS kot npr. *Mejdan* v *Obilićevo*, *Budžak* v *Lazarevo*, *Čaire* in *Hisete* v *Kočićev vijenac*, *Gornji Šeher* v *Srpske Toplice*, *Šargovac* v *Srbski Milanovac*, *Ivanjska* v *Potkozarje*, itd.

Vojna elita RS je fokusirala svojo pozornost na KS mestnega centra in stara mestna območja kot akt simboličnega usvajanja političnega centra moči in odločanja. Kaj je še bolj zanimivo, fokusirali so se na to, da zamenjajo nazive tistih KS, v katerih so meščani nesrbske eno-verske identitete bili v večini v razmerju do Srbov po popisu iz leta 1991. Tako zbrani podatki kažejo, da je v ožjem mestnem območju, kjer je elita preimenovala polovico KS, živelo približno 94.000 meščanov (53% ne-Srbov in 47% Srbov), v predmestjih pa, kjer je preimenovana 1/3 KS je živelo okrog 44.000 meščanov (45% ne-Srbov in 55% Srbov). Preimenovanj je bilo najmanj v ruralnih območjih mesta, v katerih je živelo okrog 57.000 meščanov (32% ne-Srbov in 68% Srbov) in kjer so preimenovali samo 1/10 KS. Bolj natančna analiza kaže na to, da je zraven etno-verske strukture stanovnikov in centralnosti pozicije KS, obstajal dodatni motivacijski kriterij preimenovanja. Ta dodatni kriterij je bil etimološki koren besed v uradnem nazivu KS. Tako je vojna elita v RS odločila, da zadrži nazive, ki nosijo besede slovanskega ali srbskega porekla, ali pa besede percipirane kot domače, „srbske“ besede (*Centar, Borik, Vrbanja, Nova Varoš, Rosulje, Starčevica, Petričevac, Paprikovac, Lauš*, itd.). Po drugi strani so oni menjali nazive KS, ki so vsebovali besede, ki imajo etimološko poreklo v turškem ali arabskem ali v starem perzijskem jeziku, ki pa so bile udomačene in vsakodnevne v srbsko-hrvaško-bosanskem jeziku. Ti nazivi in besede niso percipirane s strani elite kot „srbske ali dovolj patriotske“ besede ter so očiščene iz javnega prostora. Tak je primer z nazivi KS, kot npr.: *Čaire* – beseda, ki ima poreklo v turški besedi *çayir*, ki označuje travnik, ki se kosi, pašnik; *Hiseti* – beseda, ki ima poreklo v arabski besedi *hisar*, kar označuje graščino, grad, trdnjavo in dodatno *hisarnik*, arabska in turška beseda, ki označuje mali grad/ malo mesto, itd.

Kot v primeru KS so gospodarji vojne v Banja Luki izvršili množično preimenovanje ulic. Elita je odločala, kateri stari nazivi ulic, imen oseb, nazivi dogajanj in ostali simbolični toponimi niso več zaželeni, sprejemljivi ali dovolj upravičeni v novonastali politični resničnosti Banja Luke, RS in BiH. Pa tudi katera in čigava so. Tako so iz kulturnega spomina Banja Luke izbrisali več kot polovico nazivov ulic, približno 244 starih nazivov ulic je za zmeraj odšlo (ali 53% vseh predvojnih nazivov ulic). Oni so brisali nazive ulic na nekoliko pomenskih ravni, a najbolj očitno prečiščevanje se je zgodilo na ravni binarne opozicije „ne-srbski – srbski“ nazivi ulic, identifikacije, reprezentacije in memorijski narativi v javnem prostoru. Elita je to storila že v sedmih odločbah sprejetih med novembrom 1991 in septembrom 1997, najintenzivnejše preimenovanje ulic pa se je zgodilo tekom vojne in etničnega čiščenja Banja Luke, med julijem 1992 in oktobrom 1994. Samo v dveh hitrih odločitvah februarja in marca 1994, so srbski gospodarji vojne izbrisali skoraj 200 starih nazivov ulic.

Prva raven pomena, na kateri so preimenovanja bila najintenzivnejša je raven (ne)primernih etno-verskih ali nacionalnih identifikacij, reprezentacij in memorijskih narativov v nazivih ulic. Najbolj pogosto brisani nazivi ulic na tej ravni so bila imena oseb in narativi, ki so percipirani kot Muslimani ali Hrvati. Od 467 ulic pred vojno približno 21,2% (ali 99) nazivov je nosilo ime osebe, ki je bila percipirana kot Musliman. Po vojni je ostalo samo 1,1% (ali 5) takih starih nazivov ulic. Prav tako je pred vojno 13,7% (ali 64%) nazivov ulic nosilo imena oseb, ki so doživljeni kot Hrvati, a po vojni je preživelo samo 3,2% (ali 15) takih starih

nazivov. Slovenske ali makedonske etnične ali nacionalne identifikacije v nazivih ulic (1,3% ali 6 in 0,4% ali 3 pred vojno) so tekom teh prečiščevanj popolnoma izbrisane, medtem ko so judovske identifikacije zmanjšane z 0,6% (ali 3) na 0,4 % (ali 2) nazivov. Na drugi strani pa se je število nazivov ulic, ki nosijo imena oseb ali narative, ki so percipirani kot Srbi ali srbski, skoraj potrojilo. Pred vojno je bilo 28,1% (ali 131) nazivov ulic percipiranih kot srbski, po vojni pa 69,4% (ali 324) nazivov ulic, ki nosijo srbsko identifikacijo in memorijske narative.

Druga raven pomena je bila raven ideoloških identifikacij, reprezentacij in memorijskih narativov v javnem prostoru. Pod pritiskom pozabe elite v RS so bile nezaželjene zgodovinske, ideološke in politične identifikacije in memorijski narativi povezani s komunistično revolucijo, komunizmom, socializmom, narodnoosvobodilno vojno in antifasistično borbo v 2. svetovni vojni. Na tej ravni so iz naziva banjaluških ulic izbrisani skoraj vsi jugoslovanski, AVNOJ-ski in ZAVNOBIH-vski memorijski narativi, kljub zelo popularnim predstavam in metanarativom, navzočih pri večini meščanov in srbski politični eliti, ki govorijo o Srbih kot najštevilčnejših žrtvah fašizma, pripadnikov partizanskih in antifasističnih moči v 2. svetovni vojni ali o Srbih kot edinem narodu, ki je iskreno želel Jugoslavijo, ustanovil jo je in se najbolj trudi, da jo zaščiti in ohrani teh 90 let. Od 467 ulic je bilo pred vojno skupaj 272 levičarskih nazivov (ali 58,2%), ki so nosili imena komunistov, skojevcev, revolucionarjev in partizanskih borcev, herojev in enot političnih dogodkov in kot taki so imeli eksplicitno noto levice, komunizma in revolucije nadnacionalnega jugoslovanstva ali bosanskohercegovsko nadnacionalno identifikacijo. Gospodarji vojne v RS so izbrisali več kot polovico teh nazivov in po vojni je ostalo okoli 111 (ali 23,8%) teh nazivov ulic, predvsem so to nazivi partizanskih borcev, ki se percipirajo kot Srbi in samo nekaj Hrvatov.

Zanimivo je videti s katerimi novimi identifikacijami, narativi in pomeni je elita v RS zamenjavala stare predvojne nazive na novi pomenski ravni. Pred vojno so bili najbolj vidni nazivi ulic z eksplicitno ideološkimi narativi tisti levičarski, znotraj teh pa so se lahko našle raznovrstne in izbalansirane etnične ali nacionalne identifikacije in reprezentacije. Paradoksalno je, da so povojni nazivi ulic postali tako ideološko raznovrstnejši v svoji eksplicitni ideološki ali religiozni identifikaciji in narativih, ampak znotraj vse te „raznovrstnosti“ ste mogli najti izključno in absolutno dominacijo samo ene etnične ali verske identifikacije in reprezentacije. Srbske in pravoslavne! Druge etnicitete in religije so zadržane na nivoju „demokratskega incidenta“. Zraven 111 (ali 23,8%) ideoloških nazivov ulic ostalih iz predvojnega časa so gospodarji vojne v RS posuli v javni prostor še okoli 125 (ali 26,8%) popolnova novih in eksplicitno ideoloških identifikacij in narativov, predvsem iz vroče juhe srbskega nacionalno nastajajočega romantizma in razsvetljenstva, starih in novo-srbskih mitologij, srbsko-pravoslavnega esencializma in kleronacionalizma. Najbolj pogosti novi diskursi v uradnih nazivih ulic nosijo moderni srbski monarhistični, vojni in nacionalno nastajajoč narativ in ideološko noto z imenovanjem ulic z imeni srbskih in črnogorskih knezov, kraljev, generalov, vojvod, plemenskih vodij, vodij uporov in narodnih hajdukov iz zadnjih dveh stoletij kot tudi imena tujih, ampak „prijateljskih“, predvsem ruskih monarhov in generalov. Takih novih nazivov je 58 (ali 12,4%) kot so: *Aleksandra I, Petra II Karađorđevića, Careva Romanovih, Vojvode Radomira Putnika, Petra Pecije, Relje*

Krilatice in pd. Naslednji najbolj običajen novododani ideološki diskurs prihaja iz srbsko-pravoslavniških verskih narativov, ki nazive ulic vežejo za imena pravoslavniških slav in svetnikov, duhovnikov, pravoslavniških cerkev in manastirov ali pa imajo internacionalno pan-pravoslavno, grško ali rusko noto. Takih novih nazivov je 27 (ali 5,8%) kot so: *Vidovdanska, Vasilija Ostroškog, Manastira Gomionice, Visokih Dečana, Patre, Carigradska* in pd. Po številčnosti so potem nazivi ulic s starimi srbskimi nacionalno nastajajočimi mitološkimi in epskimi narativi iz ljudskega izročila in književnosti, pozneje preoblikovani znotraj nacionalno nastajajoče politične tradicije 19. in prve polovice 20. stoletja. Razumljivo, najbolj običajni nazivi prihajajo iz kosovskega in pokosovskega epskega ciklusa. Takih nazivov je 23 (ali 4,9%), kkot so: *Miloša Obilića, majke Jugovića, Kraljevića Marka, majke Jevrosime* in dr. Po teh sledi skupina nazivov ulic, ki so iz srednjeveških pravoslavniških monarhističnih narativov, predvsem tistih povezanih s srednjeveško dinastijo *Nemanjića*. Takih nazivov je okoli 11 (ali 2,4%), kot so: *Uroša Nejakog, Bulevar Cara Dušana*, in pd. Na koncu te ideološke pestrosti so gospodarji vojne v RS v javni prostor in spomin dodali še četniške in etno-fašistične kolaboracionistične narative, predvsem imena vodij in ideoloških liderjev in simpatizerjev srbskega četniškega gibanja, četniških operativcev, nacističnih kolaboracionistov, srbskih etno-fašistov iz Dalmacije in Bosne. To gibanje je predstavljalo heterogeni spoj srbskih oficirjev kraljeve jugoslovanske vojske (različnega nivoja bliskosti s srbskim nacionalističnim etno-ekskluzivizmom, etno-fašizmom in s simpatijami do nemških nacistov in italijanskih in bolgarskih fašistov), lokalnih srbskih nacionalističnih in pravoslavniških vodij, razbojniško-maščevalnih vodij in skupin ter njihovih skrivačev in simpatizerjev. Vsi štirje četniki, katerih imena nosijo štiri ulice v današnji Banja Luki so bili osveščeni četniški ideologi, nacistični in fašistični kolaboracionisti, vojni zločinci in zagovorniki srbskega pan-slovanskega nacionalizma, *Dragiša Vasić, Stevan Moljević, Vojvoda Uroš Drenović* in *Rade Radić*. Zraven teh štirih nazivov obstaja ulica z imenom *Ravnogorska ulica*, ki označuje pozneje udomačen naziv za četniško gibanje iz 2. svetovne vojne.

Ni potrebno poudarjati, da muslimanski verski ali nelevičarski bosanski/probosanski ideološki narativi ne obstajajo v tem banjaluškem javnem prostoru, obstaja pa samo eden katoliški verski narativ, *Ivan Franjo Jukić*. Prav tako je izbrisana večina muslimanskih in hrvaških identifikacij in reprezentacij znotraj skupine levičarskih nazivov ulic. Celo na tej ravni pomena je v prečiščevanju naziva ulic spet imel dominantno vlogo faktor etno-verske ali nacionalne percepcije ali identifikacije. Znotraj te skupine nazivov sta slovenska in makedonska identifikacija povsem izbrisani, kot tudi večina muslimanskih, hrvaških ali judovskih identifikacij. Znotraj te skupine z 272 levičarskimi nazivi ulic pred vojno je okoli 37,1% (ali 101) nazivov imelo srbsko, okoli 15,8% (ali 43) hrvaško, okoli 29,4% (ali 80) muslimansko, okoli 1,5% (ali 4) slovensko, okoli 1,1% (ali 3) makedonsko in mali odstotek judovsko etno-versko nacionalno identifikacijo. Zraven tega je bilo tudi okoli 11,8% (ali 32) etno-nevtralnih in okoli 2,2% (ali 6) internacionalnih identifikacij. Po vojni ima od preostalih 111 levičarskih nazivov ulic okoli 78,4% (ali 87) srbsko, samo 7,2% (ali 8) ima hrvaško, a samo 1,8% (ali 2) ima muslimansko etno-versko ali nacionalno identifikacijo, medtem ko je sedaj okoli 9,0% (ali 10) etno-nevtralnih in okoli 2,7 (ali 3) internacionalnih identifikacij v nazivih ulic. Tako je izbrisano 22

etno-nevtralnih in levičarskih nazivov ulic, kot so *SKOJ-a*, *Bulevar Revolucije*, *ZAVNOBIH-a*, *VI Krajiške brigade NOB-ja*, kot tudi polovica internacionalnih nazivov, kot so *Lenjinova*, *Bulevar Marksa i Engelsa* itd.

Tudi tretja raven pomena je raven percepcije o primerni in neprimerni geografiji. Pred vojno je imelo okoli 30,8% vseh ulic v Banja Luki (ali 144) neki etno-nevtralen, predvsem geografsko določen naziv. V tej skupini je okoli 32 ulic nosilo etno-nevtralne in levičarske nazive partizanskih enot in pomembnih dogodkov iz NOB-ja in revolucije, okoli 111 ulic pa je nosilo nazive geografskih toponimov, mest, jezer, planin in rek v BIH, na Hrvaškem, v Srbiji in celi Jugoslaviji, kot tudi toponime banjaluških naselij in delov mesta. Po vojni je število nazivov iz te skupine zmanjšano in sedaj znaša okoli 20,3% (ali 95) vseh ulic v Banja Luki. Sedaj znotraj te skupine obstaja samo 10 etno-nevtralnih in levičarskih nazivov ulic, 83 ulic pa nosi geografsko določene nazive.

Zanimivo je, da so gospodarji vojne v RS istočasno z risanjem svojih krvavih načrtov „srbskih dežel“ na bojiščih širom Hrvaške in BIH, risali tudi načrte „primerne“ in „neprimerne“ geografije na zemljevidu banjaluških ulic. Tako je elita v RS izbrisala nazive ulic, ki so označevali „nezadostno srbsko“ geografijo, kot so *Bihačka*, *Mostarska*, *Travnička* in dr., verjetno zato, ker je ta geografija bila preveč bosansko-hercegovska. Zatem so izbrisali nazive ulic *Bosanska*, *Halilovac*, *Tabaci*, *Bana Kulina*, *Maglajlića sokak*, *Mejdan* in dr., verjetno zato, ker so imeli bosansko-hercegovsko zgodovino in nadsacionalno noto ali muslimansko kulturno identifikacijo. Pogosto brisani nazivi ulic so bili *Triglavska*, *Bledska*, *Pohorska* in dr., ker so imena čez noč postala del „tuje“ geografije, ali nazivi ulic kot so *Dalmatinska*, *Zagorska*, *Osječka* in dr., ker so imena očitno postala del geografije „naših sovražnikov“. Z druge strani je elita RS zadržala ali uvedla nove geografske nazive ulic, ki so bolj pristajali k beograjskemu etno-kolonializmu, srbsko etno-verski in zgodovinsko-geografski identifikaciji ali percipirani „srbski deželi“. Tako je Banja Luka zadržala stare nazive ulic *Kupreška*, *Moslovačka*, *Moravska*, *Kosovska* in dr. in dobila nove *Trg Krajine*, *Ravnih Kotara*, *Kninska* in pd. Ta neverjetna masovnost v kulturne čiščenju oficialnih javnih nazivov krajevnih skupnosti in ulic implicira, da je srbski eliti bilo zelo pomembno, da javni prostor, kulturno identiteto in memorijo multietnične Banja Luke najprej dekonstruira s pozabo in selektivnim spominom. Potem pa, da jo popolnoma osvoji in okupira z novo-srbskimi etno-verskimi in nacionalnimi pan-srbskimi identitetami in identifikacijami, kot tudi s pravoslavnimi, monarhističnimi in epsko-mitološkimi predstavami in pomeni, ki bi morali služiti eliti, da skroji kvazidržavni narativni konstrukt RS. Seveda je odločujoča bitka vodena za mestni center kot politični center odločanja. V tem smislu so vsi novi nazivi ulic in nazivi krajevnih skupnosti nastali v vojni, grejo v smeri revizije, distorzije in „posrbljanja“ ali „srbijanizacije“ kulturne identitete in memorije Banja Luke v smeri enoumne, mononacionalne kolektivizacije javnega prostora v vsesrbsko in pravoslavno-politično sabornost, v kateri ni mesta za različnosti.

8.6 Kontekstualna veza med sporočili pop-nacionalističnih grafitov in politične elite

Najpomembnejša sporočila in simboli, ki se lahko preberejo v medsebojni komunikaciji med etno-verskimi grafiti, pop-nacionalističnimi parolami in delovanja elite, ki pa skupaj proizvajajo pomembno

povratno reakcijo povprečnega konzumenta-bralca so: sporočila o etno-verskem tradicionalizmu in kultu kulturne kontinuitete srbskega naroda in ozemlja; sporočila o glorifikaciji osvobodilno- domovinske vojne 1991-1995 kot nadaljevanje etno-verske emancipacije nacije in teorije in kulta orožja in heroja; sporočila, ki prenašajo strah pred sovražnikom, frustracijo in sovražnost narcizma malih razlik in kult anti-srbskih zarot; sporočila o elitizmu in preziru do slabših in kultu srbske moškosti; sporočila o neizogibnem, častnem in permanentnem vojskovanju, militarizmu in kultu vojaške nacije; sporočila o izdaji, odklanjanju antifašizma in iracionalizma in kultu izgubljenih bitk.

8.6.1 Podobe o etno-verskem tradicionalizmu in kultu kulturne kontinuitete srbskega naroda in ozemlja

Politična stremjenja, medijska, inštitucionalna in družbena realnost RS so v stalnem iskanju za zadostno količino „tradicije“, ki bi racionalizirala in opravičila nastanek in obstoj nje same (pogledati storibord v *Prilogi C.1*). Reklo bi se, kot skoraj v vsaki drugi družbi. Narisana na začetku, nastala pa v lastni in krvavi vojni in legalizirana z dytonskim mirovnim sporazumom, RS stalno vsiljuje svoji politični eliti močno potrebo, da izmisli „novogovr“, novo retoriko in nova sporočila, s pomočjo katerih bi elita s svojimi etno-subjekti predstavila in konzervirala „povest in razloge o nastanku in obstoju RS“. Ta potreba se povečuje s potekom časa. To, o čemu tukaj govorim, bom imenoval etno-politični tradicionalizem ozemlja. Seštevek predstav, simbolov, retorik, izjav in odnosov, ki jih slišimo in vidimo kot sporočila politične elite RS, te pa imajo za cilj, da nam prikažejo zgodovinsko, običajno in kulturno upravičenost ozemlja RS, posebej še mesta Banja Luke, kot tudi naravnost in normalnost njene trenutne etno-verske, kulturne in prostorske upodobitve. Ta seštevek zelo pogosto vsebuje ekstremno nekozistentne in nemogoče kombinacije različnih zgodovinskih dediščin in časa in nategnjene reinterpretacije zgodovinskih dogodkov, epoh in etno-tradicionalnih elementov kulture. V tej sumi je zelo težko razlikovati, kaj so resnice in objektivne etnološke in navadne prakse in elementi kulture, npr. pravoslavnega prebivalstva v BIH, kaj pa so politično motivirane in maliciozne etno-verske reinterpretacije in narativi. Predvsem brez ustreznih in neodvisnih znanstvenih inštitucij in pristopa tem vprašanjem.

S kreiranjem te predstave današnje elite v RS se delajo kulturne in etične paralele med posameznimi ozemlji in religijami danes in selektiranimi zgodovinskimi epohami in dogajanja na teh ozemljih, katerih nosilci ali dominantni akterji so bili tedanji srbski nacionalni romantiki ali tribuni in beograjska politična, verska ali kraljeva elita 19. in 20. stoletja. S takim pristopom poskuša elita v RS pripisati in zadržati etno-politično tradicijo v vseh krajih današnje RS, tradicijo, ki nedvoumno in neoporečno mora govoriti o tem, čigav je od nekdaj bil ta del BIH in zakaj se ta ozemlja BIH danes sploh nahajajo v sestavi RS. Pri tem procesu repetativnega in selektiranega spominjanja in ponovnega kreiranja srbskih in novo-srbskih spominov in narativov, predstave o drugih, manj pomembnih ali nesrbskih epoh, dogodkih, osebnostih ali etnicitetah počasi tonejo v pozabo. Tako elita v RS za današnji zahodni del RS, banjaluško regijo in Bosansko krajino, kot povezujočo in zedinjujočo tradicijo in kulturo spomina, največkrat (zlo)rablja naslednje simbole: srbskega pesnika, patriota in narodnega tribuna *Petra Kočića*, upore in vstaje zoper muslimanke bege v 19. stoletju

in njihove vodje; velika vstaja v Hercegovini in Bosanski krajini 1875; avstroogarsko „okupacijo“ BiH 1878 in animoziteto do pravoslavnega prebivalstva BiH; *Gavrila Principa* in atentat na avstrijskega nadvojvoda v Sarajevu 1914; kralja *Petra I. Karađorđevića* „osvoboditelja“; *bana Milosavljevića* in Vrbaško banovino kot upravno rovinco Kraljevine Jugoslavije; *hram Hrista Spasitelja* zgrajenega 1929 v času vladavine *bana Milosavljevića* in *Karađorđevića* (porušen 1941 s strani ustašev, oboroženih formacij Nezavisne države Hrvatske); koncentracijsko taborišče iz 2. svetovne vojne Jasenovac kot simbol trpljenja srbskega prebivalstva v BiH, itd. Kulturno in politično delovanje teh simbolov in predstav se dopolnjuje z delovanjem obstoječih družbenih in političnih institucij, kot so Zavod za zaščito spomenikov RS, Muzej RS, Muzej sodobne umetnosti RS, Akademija znanosti in umetnosti RS, its. Dodatno se te predstave podpirajo in okvirjajo z uradnimi atributivnim nazivom entitete „Republika Srbska“, z ustavno definicijo entitete kot „države srbskega naroda“, z grbom in amblemom RS in Banja Luke, z zgradbo upravnega centra Vlade RS, ki je postavljena v samem centru Banja Luke, itd. Vse te komponente skupaj ustvarjajo in iščejo, proizvajajo in konzumirajo opravičilo za obstoj RS v tem mestu in v tem delu BiH in za pripadanje tega mesta in dela BiH prav tej entiteti.

8.6.2 Podobe o glorifikaciji osvobodilno-domovinske vojne 1991-1995 kot nadaljevanje etno-verske emancipacije nacije in teorije ter kultu orožja in herojev

S kreiranjem te predstave elita bombardira meščane s sporočili in besedili, ki o bratomorilski, meščanski in kriminalni vojni in agresiji na BiH, govorijo kot o osvoboditveni, častni, „oslobodilačko-otadžbinski“ vojni, brez katere ne bi bilo več Srbov na teh prostorih (poglej storibord v *Prilogi C.2*). Sestavni del teh predstav je tudi sinkretistično medijsko in inštitucionalno navezovanje te zadnje vojne in agresije na BiH na narodno-osvobodilno vojno kot tudi na prejšnje srbske patriotske vojne in konflikte. Elita v RS proglašča sodelovalce te zadnje vojne kot neuradne in uradne heroje in jih meša s poštenimi „srbskimi“ heroji NOB-ja. Policija in vojska RS, osnovni začetniki in nosilci agresije na BiH, državljanske vojne, vojnih zločinov in etničnega čiščenja v devetdesetih letih, se transponirajo v splošnokoristne in pozitivne družbene institucije „nove evropsko orientirane RS“, ki si zaslužijo omenitve/spomina in časti. Končna rezultanta: „oslobodilačko-otadžbinski“ rat/ „osvobodilna-domovinska“ vojna je naravno nadaljevanje NOB-ja, a njihov skupni izid je dytonski mirovni sporazum, sedanja politična ureditev BiH in RS – „države srbskega naroda v BiH“, kot večna resnica izrečena enkrat za vse čase, pretekle in prihodnje. Neki deli elite v RS gredo še korak naprej ter zadnjo „osvobodilno-domovinsko“ vojno in NOB povezujejo v eno celoto z ostalimi „patriotskimi“ vojnami Srbije v 20. stoletju (1. in 2. balkanska vojna in 1. svetovna vojna) kot tudi z upori in vstajami zoper muslimanske bege v 19. Stoletju v BiH in njihovim vodjem in prominentnim figuram, kot so *Petar Mrkonjić* alias *Petra I. Karađorđevića*, *Petar Pecija Popović* in ostali. Neizbežni deli tega sinkretičnega stapljanja so religiozni motivi, predstave svetnikov zaščitnikov, svetih mučencev in prominentnih mitskih in literarnih junakov kosovskega epskega in mitskega ciklusa. Zadnja srbska vojna zoper muslimane 1992-1995 je postavljena v isti memorijski okvir z mitsko kosovsko bitko iz leta 1389 in vstaj zoper muslimanske bege iz 19. stoletja, efektivno postaja vojna ali konflikt civilizacij, osvobodilna vojna zoper „mudžahedine“, zoper

„drugo vrsto“, nekaj česar Srbi menda niso hoteli ali pa sem ji je to vsililo kot „civilizacijska“ dolžnost v dolgem nizu neizbežnih konfliktov in vojn med religijami na Balkanu. S tem se ta vojna za elito v SR in dobršen del elite v Beogradu opravičuje kot pravilna in nujna „vojna epizoda“ v večnem procesu etno-kulturne emancipacije srbskega naroda, ki že ima svojo „častno“ in „osvoboditeljsko“ tradicijo, naroda, ki sedaj dokončno zaokroža svoje etno-politične teritorije in etno-militaristično tradicijo v en paket, ki navodnemu ljudstvu lahko razumljiv.

Častno vojskovanje nujno zahteva tudi predstave o herojih in herojski smrti, kot da takšna smrt sploh lahko obstaja v stvarnosti tistega, ki umira. Elita v RS najde take predstave še celo sedaj, 15 in več let po vojni in tako gradi prestavo o „domovinski vojni“ kot podvigu herojev, tistih, ki so preživeli kakor tudi tistih manj srečnih „klasičnih“ herojev in tudi tistih „haških herojev“. Od vseh predstav, ki jih elita v RS uporablja, da opraviči obstoj RS, so te najbolj cinične in emocionalno najbolj sirove. Elita v RS s takimi predstavami kontinuirano eksploatira in emotivno izčrpava družine in prijatelje padlih oseb, ki so izgubile svoja življenja za kriminalce, prepričajoč le-te, da so njihove žrtve v Slavoniji 1991 ali na koridoru 1992 ali v Sanskem Mostu 1995 bile odločilne in da so imele smisel v vsej tej iracionalnosti, nepotrebnosti in kriminalni umazaniji te beograjske vojne. Cinično je in neverjetno, da elita v RS sedaj meni, da družine padlih vojakov in „herojev“ sedaj morajo biti ponosne, ker so izgubile svoje člane in svoj mir in to zaradi česa – da bi vojna in današnja elita RS mogli materialno in politično profitirati iz vsega tega, služiti denar in se bogatiti v neprekinjenem procesu vojne, potem pa tudi privatizacijske kraje. To je najbolj cinično v primeru majorja Milana Tepića, ki je skupaj s seboj dvignil v zrak skladišče orožja jugoslovanske ljudske armade v bjelovarski kasarni 1991, medtem ko je istočasno politična, varnostna in policijska elita Srbov iz Beograda, Knina, Pala in Banja Luke trgovala s tremi skladišči z t.im. „sovražniki“, prodajajoč orožje in municijo Bošnjakom in Hrvatom. Ta nelegalna trgovina z orožjem, skupaj s tihotapljenjem mamil, legalna in ilegalna trgovina z nafto in s hrano in vojno krajo tekom etničnega čiščenja in pregona, se je nadaljevala do konca vojne, v času, ko je vojna požirala enega človeka za drugim, več kod 20000 vojakov na srbski, okoli 30000 na bošnjaški in okoli 5500 na hrvaški strani, in tudi okoli 33000 civilistov na bošnjaški, več kod 4000 na srbski in več kod 2000 civilistov na hrvaški strani. Tako je vojna predstavljala in še vedno je, „herojski“ izvir ogromnega povojnega bogatstva nove ekonomske elite RS, ki je do sedaj vsaj petkrat obrnila ta svoj krvavi vojni kapital in sedaj ga je politično zavarovala v obliki večne RS.

V družbeni realnosti današnje RS, daje elita borcem in družinam padlih vojakov spomenike, ulice in skromne invalidnine, samo kot spomin na njihov krvavi cinizem. Predstave o herojih so eden od ključnih stebrov sedanje elite RS, ki veščno marginalizira 99% lastnosti in učinkov te kriminalne in genocidne vojne, najmanjše, najbolj umazane vojne sploh in poudarja samo 1%. Ta 1% se glasi: vojna je bila neizbežna, vojna nas je obranila in zaokročila celoto, slava herojem, ker sedaj imamo končno naše večno stremljenje, RS, s katero bomo mi sami upravljali in eksploatirali za vas.

8.6.3 Podobe o sovražniku, strahu, frustracija in sovraštvo narcizma malih razlik in kult anti-srbskih zarot

Prejšnje opisane predstave o kulturni, etnični in zgodovinski tradiciji in o nasilni vojni emancipaciji kulture, se nujno naslanjajo na predstave o aktualnem ali večnem sovražniku (poglej storibord v *Prilogi C.3*). Strah pred sovražnikom je nekaj, na kar nas vse skupaj povezuje v eno homogenu celoto na območju pridobljenem s krvjo. Da bi strah pred sovražnikom bil dovolj alarmanten in mobilizirajoč, mora sovražnik biti čim bolj različen od nas, kljub dejstvu, da „mi“ in „naši“ sovražniki delimo toliko istih in podobnih kulturoloških lastnosti. „Mi“ tako sovražimo biti podobni „našim“ neznosnim sovražnikom, da „mi“ moramo transponirati to sovraštvo v frustracijo, potem v „nespravljive razlike in jezove“, potem v dejansko sovraštvo do sovražnika, potem pa v etno-narcizem in dehumanizacijo sovražnika. Zelo važno je percipirati, da smo „mi“ od tega sovražnika doživljali zgodovinska zatiranja, krivice in ponižanja, v glavnem zaradi njegove premoči. Potem je potrebno, da je ta „naš“ sovražnik tudi sedaj dovolj močan, da bi se „naše“ sovraštvo in animoziteta do „njega“ lahko opravičila, ali spet ne preveč močan, ker „mi“ moramo poslati sliko, kako „mi“ vendar imamo možnost, da „njih“ na koncu obvladamo. In na koncu je zaželeno, da „naš“ sovražnik ne deluje sam, temveč da „oni“ proti „nam“ kujejo zarote, čim bolj internacionalno, to bolje. S temi predstavami elita v RS proizvaja kontinuirano in intenzivno pri ljudeh strah. Male porcije etno-verskega strahu od etno-verskega sovražnika za naše etno-verske otroke. Zraven tega strahu elita proizvaja tudi strah od vsakega „drugačnega“, promovira netoleranco, pripravljenost in potrebo za konfliktom in nasiljem ter poudarja „edino in pravo pot za nas“.

Z druge strani se s takim poudarjanjem razlik narod ali etno-otroci prepričujejo v pravilnost, poštenost, lepšo prihodnost in superiornost „naše“ etno-politične pozicije in vojne pridobitve. Iz globin zgodovinske etno-kulturne dediščine elita v RS selektira delčke gradiva in generalizira sporočila o stoletnem etno-versko zasnovanem zatiranju in poniževanju Srbov s strani Turkov, muslimanskih begov, Nemcev, Ogrov, Hrvatov, katolikov, Latinov in še koga ne. Ta sporočila izžarevajo splošno razumevanje, da zatirani in poniževaninarod, narod, ki je pretrpel ekzoduse in masovne izkoreninjenosti, „kot so to Srbi“, se nikdar ne more motiti in ima vedno prav. Tak narod je vedno moralni zmagovalec, ki ni nikdar drugim delal krivice in zločinov. Najbolj pogoste predstave, s katerimi elita v RS gradi take predstave so: narativi o islamizaciji „srbskega“ naroda, narativi o izgubljanju ali potlačenju kulturne, verske ali jezične identitete „srbskega“ naroda znotraj BIH, brez RS; narativi o Bošnjakih/Muslimanih kot sodobnem simbolu zgodovinske tiranije in zatiranja „srbskega“ naroda od muslimanskih begov; narativi o „beli kugi“, ki uničuje „biološki korpus srbskega naroda“ in o natalitetni superiornosti Bošnjakov; narativi o ponižujočem ustaškem pokolu nad Srbi v času 2. Svetovne vojne in NDH, ki se je dejansko nadaljevala v letu 1991 in rezultirala masovni pregon Srbov iz Hrvaške, sedaj pa grozi, da se ponovi v BIH; narativi o širši aliansi i zaroti islamskih držav proti Srbom s ciljem, da se sredi Evrope naredi islamska država; narativi o bosanskih muslimanih kot „veja islamskih teroristov in džihadistov v Evropi preko BIH, „beli Al-Quaidi ali ISIS“; narativi o močnih svetovnih sovražnikih Srbov in širši mednarodni zaroti zoper srbski narod, katerega glavni akterji so mednarodna

skupnost, NATO, Američani, CIA, Nemčija, Vatikan in multinacionalne korporacije, ki so raztrgali SFRJ, satanizirali Srbe, pomagali in podpirali Bošnjake in Hrvate v vojni, direktno se boreč proti Srbom in, ki na koncu tirajo Srbe, da „živijo“ skupaj z Bošnjaki in Hrvati; narativi o pravoslavni religiji kot starem in originalnem krščanstvu, ki je kot taka najbolj miroljubna in najbolj tolerantna religija na svetu; in pd.

8.6.4 Podobe o elitizmu in preziru do slabšega in kult srbske moškosti

Zanimivo je, da elita v RS pogosto na temeljih predstav o ponižanjih in zatiranjih „naših“ s strani „onih drugih“ pri ljudeh budijo čustva gnusnosti in prezira do sosednjega naroda, do njihovih etnicitet, lokalitet, družbenih struktur, izdelkov in do vsega, kar jih predstavlja (poglej storibord v *Prilogi C.4*). Posebno je to naglašeno do kulture Muslimanov ali Bošnjakov ter skozi ta „evropsko-krščanski“ filter „orientalnega nazadnjaštva“, elita v RS kultivira prezir do vsega, kar nosi naziv „Bosna“ ali „bosanski“, ali do kateregakoli elementa osmanske ali arapske ali muslimanske kulture in dediščine, ki prihajajo iz tako dobro poznanega Vzhoda. V političnem prostoru oni pravzaprav izenačujeno „Bosansko“ z „orientalnim/azijskim“ v najpejorativnejšem smislu in pogosto se politično in kulturno odrekajo tega dela memorijskih narativov i zgodovina pravoslavnih narodov v Bosni. Čudovito lobotomizirani od tako nepopularne bosanske zgodvine, elita v RS pogosto simbolično in retorično pripisuje kulturi bosanskih muslimanov regresiven, nazadnjaški in moteč karakter v primerjavi s kulturami krščanske etnicitete v Bosni, poudarjajoč bolj meščanske, bolj pro-evropske, bolj zahodnjaške, bolj pro-krščanske kulturne prakse bosanskih prsavoslavcev ali katolikov. Kljub dejstvu, da obe krščanski religiji delita z bosanskimi muslimani ali Bošnjaki iste jezikovne, kulturne in celo tudi religijske prakse in narative v takem razmerju, da tudi njihovi najbližji sosedi v Srbiji in na Hrvaškem ne morejo in tudi nikdar ne bodo mogli razlikovati Bosancev različne vere ali etničnega porekla. Istočasno poskuša elita v RS pozabiti ali aktivno negirati skupno, multietnično in melting-pot izkušnjo Banja Luke in BiH, ki se je delila in živela s strani vseh ver in etnij v BiH do 1992. Enostavno ni dovolj samo biti različen od kulture ali etnije, s katero tvoja kultura ali etnija deli največ podobnosti in skladnosti v celem svetu in v znanem teku zgodovine. Nujno je potrebno, da se oni drugi „demonizira“ in da se na osnovi takega prezira gradi elitizem in moralna superiornost lastne kulture. Skratka: „Mi smo gospoda, pravi moški, oni pa so orientalni pederji“. Takšne predstave so redno podpirane s podobnimi predstavami, ki opisujejo etno-versko in politično edentiteto Bošnjakov kot neobstoječih, brrezvrednih in izmišljenih, kot tudi bosanski ali bošnjaški jezik. Da bi elita v RS te predstave dobro zavila, pogosto koristi popularne mite, globoko vsajene teze srbskih in pravoslavnih intelektualcev in akademikov, ki opisujejo bosanske muslimane samo kot potomke pravoslavne populacije, ki je islamizirana v času osmanke vladavine. Ta narcizem malih razlik ima za cilj, da zelo male razlike med narodi in kulturami poglobijo do maksimalnih meja sedanost in do maksimalnih globin preteklost, istočasno pa vsiljajoč prostorno in časovno hijerarhijo naroda, etnicitet in religij, znotraj katere bi bilo potrebno vedeti „kdo je prišel prvi“ in „kdo je tukaj elita“.

Ta predstava o elitizmu v kombinaciji s predhodno obdelanimi predstavami služi ne samo za prostorno, teritorialno homogeniziranje Srbov, ampak tudi za izgrajevanje monolitne strukture „nacionalnega

časovnega toka in zgodovine“ ter za kreacijo „kulturne čistosti srbskega naroda v BiH“. Elita v RS, kot tudi vse druge, koristi številne simplifikacije znotraj katerih navadnim ljudem prezentira, da muslimanska populacija v Bosni pripada enemu monolitnemu kulturnemu časovnemu toku, od časov, ko so sprejeli islam in se odvojili od „stare srbske veje“, a da pravoslavna populacija pripada drugemu, odvojenemu in starejšemu monolitnemu kulturnemu časovnemu toku, ki je bil zatiran s strani muslimanov in ki se je spopadal z muslimani in z vsemi tistimi, ki so sprejeli islam, in sicer od trenutka, ko so se prvič srečali, ugotovite kje? Na Kosovskem polju, vendar, kje drugje! Od takrat je srbski kulturni časovni tok rušen, zatiran in obsojen na golo preživljanje, vse do modernega časa in pojavljanja, ugotovite koga? *Karađorđa*, vendar, seveda splošnočasovnega modela srbske moškosti, čigar liderstvo v prvi srbski vstaji se še vedno doživlja kot „drugi prihod rešitelja deviške nacije“. Seveda eliti v RS, kot tudi ne tisti beograjski, a tudi ne tisti akademski, nič ne pomeni to, da logika časovnega toka v realnosti enostavno ne funkcionira na tako enostaven način. Tak inverzivni narativ, pri katerem gre za pripovedovanje pripovedi od sedanjosti proti preteklim dogodkom in remodelira pretekla dogajanja tako, da se le-ti lahko vklopijo v znane izide in željene interpretacije poznejših časov in naše sedanjosti, je zelo umeten/sploh ni naraven, ni objektiven in samodestruktiven za skupnost, ki ga sprejme/objame. Eliti v RS ne pomeni mnogo niti to, da generacije mladih, ki dekodirajo in konzumirajo njihove umetne in napačno kodirane etno-ekskluzivistične narative na ulici, na spomenikih in v medijskem novogovoru pozneje reproducirajo najbolj vulgarna in najbolj nasilna sporočila netolerance in sovraštva na grafitih in v javnem prostoru.

8.6.5 Podobe o neizogibnem, častnem in stalnem bojevanju, militarizmu in kult bojevniške nacije

Predstave o „osvobodilno-domovinski“ vojni 1991-1995 kot nadaljevanju etno-verske emancipacije naroda in ozemlja, so samo delno zasnovane na častni, borbeni in herojski tradiciji osvobodilnih vojn srbskega naroda, tako s te kot tudi druge strani Drine. (poglej storibord v *Prilogi C.5*). Morajo jih modernizirati. Enostavno jih morajo hraniti z novimi potrditvami in spričevali. Zato je elita v Beogradu in v RS spoznala, da se kultura bojevniškega naroda mora oživljati in stalno reproducirati in rekonzumirati, da bi ostala sveža in funkcionalna. Elita to dela z narativi in praksami o samozavednosti srbskega naroda in s pošiljanjem sporočil previdnosti in budnosti vseh Srbov. Ta sporočila povprečnemu srbskemu glasovalcu govorijo, kje in s kom živi in kdo so mu tradicionalni in vekovečni sovražniki. V medsebojni komunikaciji med elito in narodom gradi skupnost trdno prepričanje o nujnosti, normalnosti in svetlejši perspektivnosti sovraštva, konflikta in vojn med narodi in religijami na Balkanu in v BiH. Miti o „divjem Balkanu“, ki prihajo z ali na Balkan, zelo pomagajo življenju teh predstav. Takšen jezik in narativi še, na žalost, vedno obstajajo v diplomatskem jeziku in tezah tistih posameznikov in skupin, ki s svojimi odločitvami vplivajo na politične in kulturološke procese v BiH, ali pa le-te ustvarjajo.

Od kod takšna prepričanost elite in naroda, da je vojna neizogibna in zunaj želje in volje domačih vodij? Mogoče je to zamenjava za nemoč ali odvzeto vojno moč in vojaških zaveznikov (neobstoj vojske RS ali služenje vojnega roka ali orožja in municije). Ali diskurzivni pomen tega narativa skrivajo neke nevidne

vojske in orožja, ki nekje in nekako obstajajo? Ali neke mehanizme konflikta nizke intenzitete, kakor tiste koriščene na Majdanu ali Krimu? Teme razorožitve naroda in naorožanje etnično razdeljenih zaščitniških firm se ignorirajo s pretnjo v javnem diskursu elite v RS. Kot tudi teme srbskih ultradesničarskih organizacij, ki v RS hitro naraščajo od leta 2006. In, ali je tradicija večnega osvobodilnega vojskovanja Srbov dobila svojo sodobno enačico v daytonskem mirovnem sporazumu kot ultimativni legalizaciji srbskih „vojnih dosežkov“, zločinov in genocida nad bosanskimi muslimani? Vsake nove volitve od 2008 prinašajo tudi vprašanja odcepitve RS od BIH in ustavnih sprememb in reform daytonske ustave in BIH. Kot „največji“ produkt/rezultat bosanske vojne je v srcu kontekstualnega pomena stalnega konflikta sigurno daytonski mirovni sporazum. Od simbola miru je ta mednarodni sporazum postal simbol stalnega ali zaledenelega konflikta. Namesto da kaznuje beograjsko agresijo, genocid, vojne zločine in politične kreature, ki so izšle iz bosanske vojne, dayton jih je nagradil v obliki RS, povojne razdelitve BIH in izredno disfunkcionalne centralne države BIH. Ko elita v RS želi poslati zelo vnetljiva sporočila glede ustavnih sprememb, reform ali podobnih političnih vprašanj, ki bi tukaj lahko začele neko vrsto konflikta v prihodnosti, le-ti redno posezajo za „daytonom“. Dayton kot usoda. Nekaj, kar se lahko spremeni samo z vojno. Nekaj, kar Srbi in RS morajo zaščititi in braniti, pa tudi za ceno odprtega spopada. Ne more se zamisliti, da jaz, moj otrok in mogoče tudi moj vnuk, tekem celega ali večine naših življenj, živimo podpise treh ali štirih mrtvih norcev. Čudovito! Enkrat dosežen „dayton“ se mora zaledeneti za večno, dokler tek časa ne izbriše spomina in ene stare „nenormalnosti“ imenovane Bosna in povojno „normalnost“ postaviti kot novo normativnost naše nove bleščeče prihodnosti. Drugače se bo zgodila vojna!

8.6.6 Podobe iracionalnosti, odklanjanja fašizma in kult izgubljenih bitk

V osnovi vseh navedenih predstav leži iracionalnost. In to ne kot lastnost, ampak kot življenska filozofija in ideologija konfuzne in izgubljene „nacije“ v stalnem iskanju za svojo večno esenco (poglej storibord v *Prilogi C.6*). Seveda je ta „nacija“ izgubljena v eni veliki usodni ali izgubljeni bitki, a proces „ponovnega odkrivanja nacije“ in kakih pet stoletij pozneje išče glorifikacijo izgubljenih bitk in vstajenje izgubljene nacije. Ves ta proces, ki spaja horizonte sedanjosti in preteklosti, ne more biti tako direktno in brez nekih kulturnih, ekonomskih ali političnih agensov, nič drugega kot iracionalen in zasnovan na emocijah. Iracionalizem zahteva, da se to iskanje ne konča z racionalnimi, objektivnimi, faktičnimi ali kompleksnimi odgovori na eno zelo težko vprašanje: kako je nekdo tisto, kar je ali kako so bosanski Srbi to, kar so, ki ga je enkrat postavil Paul Valery? Elita v RS ne ve, ne želi iskati odgovora na to vprašanje. Njim niso potrebni fakti, objektivna zgodovina ali arhivirana in kompleksna kulturna memorija, ker bi ti elementi mogli konstituirati neko drugo in mnogo manj iracionalno kulturno identiteto Srbov v Bosni, kot tudi Bosancev ali Bošnjakov ali Krajišnikov ali Hercegovcev. Te identitete, čeprav zelo žive in logične, niso dovolj emotivne, da sprožijo ali zaženejo ali vplivajo na srbski narod. Tisto kar RS potrebuje, je kompletno nova in vnetljiva, istočasno pa tudi stara identiteta za Srbe v Bosni. A oni so jo izmislili tako, da so uspešno konstruirali „republika-srbsko“ identiteto, v glavnem skrpano iz pan-srbskih nacionalno graditvenih simbolov

in narativov Srbov iz Srbije iz 19. in 20. stoletja. A ta popolnoma nova identiteta nima nič skupnega z tisto pravo in avtohtono etnografijo in kulturo pravoslavcev ali Srbov v BiH, a tudi ne s številnimi interkulturalnimi elementi, ki so jih pravoslavci ali Srbi razvili v svoji drugi in napredni medeksistenci z drugimi religijami in etnicitetami v Bosni in ki so jih sprejeli kot svoje v vsakodnevem življenju. Ti avtohtoni in interkulturalni elementi bosanskih Srbov se namerno pozabljajo in opuščajo v političnem in formalnem prostoru RS in Srbije. Sedaj si bosanski Srbi izposojajo in uporabljajo nacionalne identitete Srbov iz Srbije, da bi zgradili identiteto povprečnega srbskega volilca v BiH. Ta republika-srbska identiteta je prazna politična lupina brez kompleksnih in objektivnih kulturnih temeljev, katere površino sestavlja zelo lomljiva in konfuzna suma laži in nekoliko političnih in mitoloških simbolov vstale srbske nacije moderne ali današnje Srbije.

Tako se z iracionalizmom kot nacionalno in politično strategijo lahko pojasnijo ne samo nastajanje nove republika-srbske identitete današnjih Srbov v Bosni, temveč tudi vse ostale konstrukcije, ki si izmišljajo kontinuiteto ozemlja ali kontinuiteto srbsko-pravoslavne ali pan-srbske ali republika-srbske nacije na tem ozemlju. Z iracionalizmom lahko pojasniš poskuse opravičenosti večne nujnosti za vsemi preteklimi in prihodnjimi „osvobodilno-domovinskimi“ vojnami, kot tudi kult herojstva ali strahove in zarote, ali pa elitizem in prezir do „drugih“. Iracionalizem je globoko vkoreninjena strategija človeka ali skupnosti, ki se ne more spoprijeti s sedanostjo in napredkom, z obstojem nepredstavljujoče količine opcij in različnih izbir, ki jih je prinesla svoboda misli in delovanja. Pokomunistična elita v RS, kot tudi v drugih jugoslovanskih državah, ni mogla prenesti tako veliko količino individualnih svobodnosti. Samo reakcija elite v Beogradu in RS je bila ena najbolj sirovih. Oni so nove individualne svobode pogojili z etnično in versko pripadnostjo osebe ter te osebne svobode transportirali v osebne strahove, etnično in versko bazirani strah. Strah kot novi format konzumiranja svobode. Najbolj zaželen manifest etnične pa tudi nacionalne svobode bi se za vsako etnokratijo glasil: „Svoboden sem, da se razlikujem od neznosnega „drugega“, da sem čim manj podoben „njemu“, da me je zelo strah, da ne postanem „eno“ s tem „drugim“, pa je vseeno kako se to imenuje. Svoboden sem, da zaradi tega strahu, priključem v spomin vsa ponižanja, ki sem jih kot narod trpel. Vse frustracije zaradi našega skupnega življenja, bratstva in enotnosti in tako majhnih razlik med mano in „drugimi“, razlik, zaradi katerih je moj jezik tako podoben „njihovemu“ jeziku, moja kuhinja tako podobna „njihovi“, „njihovi“ pisatelji skoraj isti kot moji. Svoboden sem, da zaradi vsega tega, preziram in sovražim tistega, ki se ga bojim in od katerega želim ločiti svojo eksistenco. Svoboden sem, da zaradi tega popravljam, konstruiram in negujem mite in zarote kot novo zgodovino, da se maščujem, pričakujem in lahko akceptiram vsaki konflikt, ki pride. Svoboden sem za in pripravljen za večno sovraštvo in vojno. Bog mi pomagaj!/Naj mi Bog pomaga!

In tako vsako leto, z vsakimi volitvami in vsako desetletje, se iracionalnosti zlagajo plast za plastjo, brez vsakršnihkoli izpraševanj. Brez hrabrosti posameznika ali skupine, da izstopijo iz te proizvodno-požiralne linije in reče „dovolj“. Zaradi tega iracionalizma je zelo lahko v enem dnevu odbiti kakšen takšen mir, zaradi krvave vojne v stilu *bolje rat nego pakt* /„rajši vojno kot pa pakt“. Mogoče je narodu prodati in opravičiti vojno kot „logično“ in „kazensko“ vojno zaradi nepotrebne političnega raspada Jugoslavije,

države vseh Srbov, namesto slike vojne kot nepotrebne vojne začete zaradi nepotrebne nasilnega odpora in odklanjanja Srbov, da sprejmejo zelo potrebno politično disolucijo Jugoslavije. Zaradi takih iracionalizmov je mogoče narodu prodati ali storiti, da sprejme, vojne zločine, etniška čiščenja, preganjanja, genocid in etnično čisto RS kot zgodovinsko nujnost za Srbe, večno stremljenje ali vojno emancipacijo Srbov. Z iracionalizmom se lahko pomirijo ideološko popolnoma različni in nekoč sprti koncept komunizma in fašizma, z obveznim pregonom enega in oživljanjem drugega. V taki kontelaciji je zelo lahko nekritično in brez znanosti pozabiti antifašizem, AVNOJ ali ZAVNOBIH, zaradi nekritične in psevdoznanstvene emancipacije četniškega gibanja in kolaboracionistov.

Iracionalizem omogoča, da se nekdanji partizani in zapriseženi komunisti čez noč odrečejo celega svojega življenja in ideoloških prepričanj in postanejo najhujši četniki in nacionalisti, ki naenkrat romajo v pravoslavne manastire in cerkve v masovnih hepeningih bus-krstitev. A zaradi iracionalne pan-srbske nacionalne enotnosti in grdega ravnanja etno-politične sabornosti. Zaradi tega danes RS ne izgleda kot „racionalna“ politična resničnost, a ideja o „veliki Srbiji“ je sedaj vendarle iracionalna ideja. A obe politični realnosti govorita o eni in isti objektivnosti, trenutni situaciji: o etnično zavutih in zaokroženih teorijah za vsako ceno! Na koncu iracionalizem vsako neujemanje in kritiko pretvarja v izdajo. A izdaja „naše“ popolno racionalne, logične in naravne iracionalne potrebe ni nič drugega kot „iracionalnost, anti-patriotizem, zavedenost in avanturizem“. Zato, ker so samo naša iracionalna pričakovanja racionalna. Igra, ki se lahko igra brez kkonca, vse dokler se narod ne zasiti in dokler ne izgubi možnosti prepoznavanja svojega kompleksnega in resničnega lika v ogledalu preteklosti. Tedaj pa se izgubijo vsi kompasi in pot k fašizmu je odprta.

8.7 Sklep

V Banja Luki obstaja ena šala, ki se glasi nekako tako: „Generacije rojene 1975 in po tem letu, se ne spominjajo Tita, generacije rojene 1980 i po tem letu, se ne spominjajo olimpijade, a generacije rojene 1995 in pozneje, se ne spominjajo muslimanov in katolikov v Banja Luki!“ To je čisti fašizem, ali to je prav tako čista resnica. Z analiziranjem sporočil banjaluških ulic in elite v RS, se dobi fantastična podobnost in skladnost. Generalno so etno-verski in pop-nacionalistični grafiti, parole, posterji in stikerji na ulicah in v neformalnem prostoru v času po letu 2006, ko so generacije, rojene 1985 in pozneje, odraščale in sicer brez kakršnihkoli spominov o predvojnem multietničnem življenju v Banja Luki in BIH ter kontaminirane z lažnimi narativi in pop-mitološko zgodovino, ki so jih prizvedle intelektualne in politične vodje srbskega nacionalizma devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja. Prav tako je ta čas tudi čas učvrstitve elite v RS in čas intenzivne pozabe „neželjene“ skupne interkulture preteklosti navadnih meščanov Banja Luke in BIH. Po raziskovanju sporočil ulice in elite v storibordih (v prilogi), se lahko vidi, da ulica reproducira prav tisto, kar poudarja etno-verska, kulturna in politična elita v RS in prav to vsiljuje javnemu, kulturnemu in političnemu prostoru, od leta 2006, a zlasti še od leta 2009. To raziskovanje je pokazalo, da so kontekstualnim pomenom in večini besedil in vsebin uličnih grafitov iz zadnjih 7 do 8 let, dejansko predhodile in da so jih tudi konstruirale akcije

in novogovori vseh elit v RS in Beogradu od 1990-tih let in naprej. Pozoren opazovalec bo v uličnih grafitih našel veliko odmeva nasilnih, travmatičnih in etno-ekskluzivnih sporočil, ki sta jih beograjska in RS vojna elita vsiljevali in proizvajali v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja in jih tako pustili kot vojno dediščino za prihodnje generacije Srbov. Grafiti portretirajo in slavijo glavne politične simbole vse-srbskih dobitkov v agresiji in vojni v BIH. Tako le-ti zraven trupel, masovnih grobnic, koncentracijskih kampov in etnično očiščenih mest in vasi orisujejo vse posledice kulturnega čiščenja formalnega in polformalnega prostora v današnji Banja Luki in RS, kot tudi tiste vidne v oficialnih nazivih ulic, trgov, šol in krajevnih skupnosti in občin, spomenikih, arhivih in ostalih manifestacijah čiste in očiščene mononacionalne politike spomina. Današnji ulični grafiti pričajo o zelo živahnem in upornem povojnem vzdrževanju teh kulturno in etnično očiščenih družbenih in političnih prostorov, ki se sedaj imenujejo „Republika Srbska“. Tako za današnjo RS elito *Radovan Karadžić* ni več politični oponent, ampak sveža zgodovinska figura, oče RS, čigar zapuščina je dolgovečna politična platforma za nove generacije srbskih politikov in za vse Srbe v BIH. Sedanja RS elita, ki je uspela zmagati na vseh volitvah v RS od 2006 do sedaj, postaja vse bolj in bolj prepričana, da so njihove ideološke in etno-politične opredelitve in akcije široko prepoznavne in sprejete kot pozitivne, patriotske in zelo željene s strani večine mladih, pravoslavni srbskih volilcev, klera in intelektualne elite v RS. Prav tako kot je vidno na „srbskih“ ulicah. Glede na tako osuplo podobnost in skladnost med sporočili ulice in elite, se da skleniti, da se produkcija in konzumacija etno-verskih in pop-nacionalističnih grafitov, parol, posterjev in stikerjev godi pod močnim odločilnim vplivom elite v RS, RS institucij in celotnega režima v RS, a znotraj okvira poddaytonske RS in BIH. Ta vpliv na avtorje in konzumente/bralce teh grafitov je že ustvarjen znotraj sfere dužinskih pripovedi in pop-mitoloških narativov kot tudi znotraj religijskih, izobraževalnih in kulturnih institucij RS družbe. Učvrščen je s političnimi in upravnimi institucijami RS in vsakodnevno oživiljen v medijski navzočnosti, v izjavah in retoriki RS politikov, strankarskih vodij in skoraj vsakega srbskega medija v BIH. Lahko se zaključi, da se taka količina produkcije uličnih sporočil ne more niti zamisliti, niti bi imela tak pomen za konzumente brez delovanja RS elite, ki brusi svojo etno-centrično in pop-nacionalistično pozicijo do ravni, na kateri je povsem „normalno“ in „patriotsko“ biti srbski nacionalist, ali pa sovražiti vse, kar nosi naziv „Bosna“ ali „bosanski“, ali pa biti ponosen srbski borec umazane kriminalne vojne in agresije na svoje najbližje in sosede, ali pa biti srbski separatist, vse v istem času. Kot pripadniki RS elite se vozijo po ulicah v svojih črnih limuzinah na pogon za javni denar, občasno opazijo „prelepe“ srbske etno-verske vizualne simbole in sporočila ustvarjene s strani „prelepih“ in „obečajočih“ novih generacij Srbov, pripravljenih, da branijo RS in srbstvo še enkrat, če je potrebno, skupaj z vsemi „prelepimi“ privilegijami, ki jih uživa RS elita.

To, kar je ta raziskava poskušala in upam, da je uspela, pokazati je, da pop-nacionalistična sporočila ulice niso tu kot avtentična in samogeneralizirana politika razpoložnja nečesa, kar esencialisti radi nazivajo „avtohtoni narodnacija“. Oni so močno inducirani in fabricirani proizvod obnašanja, akcij in izraženih opredelitev političnih, religioznih in intelektualnih elit zadnji dve desetletji obstoja RS. Ali ulična sporočila v Banja Luki odkrivajo nekaj, kar bi vsak umerjen konzervativni politik rajši pustil neodkrito. Njihovi diskurzivni

pomeni odkrivajo končne afekte kulturocidov v Banja Luki in v vsaki občini v RS. Skupaj z demografskim etničnim čiščenjem je Banja Luka doživela tudi značajno kulturno in ideološko prečiščevanje, tukaj portretirano v masovnem poimenovanju oficialnih nazivov krajevnih skupnosti in ulic in uničevanju muslimanske in katoliške arhitekturne dediščine. Celotni kulturni spomin Banja Luke je razmontiran, pomembni deli pa totalno izbrisani, in sicer predvsem tisti, ki so bili etiketirani kot ne-srbski ali anti-srbski in zaradi tega nedostojni. To je povzročilo, da je Banja Luka šla skozi silovit, krvav in bolni proces konverzije njene kulturne identitete od bosanko-hercegovskega multietničnega in inter-etničnega mesta v mononacionalno, etnično očiščeno, srbsko mesto. Kulturna pozaba in kulturni spomin sta se oblikovala, konverzija kulturne identitete Banja Luke pa se je zgodila ne nekoliko ravneh:

- raven nespodobnih in spodobnih etničnih in/ali verskih afiliacij, identifikacij in simbolike;
- raven nespodobnih in spodobnih (levo-desno) politično-ideoloških narativov, simbolov, dogodkov in figur;
- raven nespodobnih in spodobnih jugoslovanskih in bosanskih komunistov, levičarjev, partizanov in revolucionarjev;
- raven nespodobnih in spodobnih zgodovinskih narativov, dogodkov ter figur in njihovih politično-mitoloških interpretacij in falsifikatov;
- raven nespodobne in spodobne geografija;
- raven binarne opozicije: meščansko/individualno – ruralno/kolektivno;
- raven binarne opozicije: pro-Zahodno – anti-Zahodno (pan-slovansko, pro-rusko, anti-ameriško);
- raven binarne opozicije: lirsko/razsvetljeno/žensko – epsko/vojaško, bojevniško/ militantno/moško;
- raven binarne opozicije: vse-srbskih (arhi)sovražnikov – vse-srbskih (arhi)prijateljev;

Na bazi te arhaične platforme RS elita nasilno konstruira nove pop-nacionalistične pol-narative, ki počasi gradijo nov inštitucionalni, lokalni in kulturni spomin, ki še ni dosegel ravni nove kulturne memorije, ampak definitivno stremi k temu. Ti novi pol-narativi se vsiljujejo družbi z močno intenziteto, agresivnostjo, emocijami in sugestivnostjo, vglavnem v lingvističnih in semiotičnih oblikah in z obvezujočo orientiranostjo na religijski in mitološki historicizem. Z analizo enega šolskega učbenika ali naziva ulice ali naziva krajevne skupnosti ali spomenika v Banja Luki, lahko napišete več o dejstvih in pomenih, ki manjkajo ali ki niso izrečeni, objektivno pa bi morali biti tu, ampak o stvareh, ki so izrečene in poudarjene v teh narativih. Skoraj pa da je absurdno ali tudi edino mogoče, da se ustvaritev, preživetje in izolacija RS in „srbske“ Banja Luke od ostanka BIH opravičuje in legitimizira ne s spominom, ampak s pozabo. Na ta način pozaba proizvaja kulturno regresijo in umetno kulturno izoliranost in neprilagojenost ideoloških pa tudi epistemoloških premis družbe in meščanov v RS v razmerju do evropske po-moderne zgodovine in globalizacije. Ali se tedaj ena kulturna memorija lahko v popolnosti formira (in še važnejše obstoji) na temeljih tako masivne pozabe in s tem proizvajajoč neodvisni kulturni tok in memorizacijo politične skupnosti, ki to pozabo neguje? In če ne more, kaj bo s to kulturo spomina in s to politično skupnostjo? Menim, da je odgovor na prvo vprašanje „ne“, ne more“, kar implicira, da je kultura spomina politične skupnosti RS utemeljena na masivni pozabi,

dejansko obsojena na životarjenje na margini vse dokler obstaja RS, zagozdena med vsiljenimi, selektivnimi in umetnimi spomini in kolektiviteti na eni strani in evropske in regionalne kolektivne memorije in zgodovine na drugi strani. Ta margina ni samo kulturna, temveč tudi večna epistemološka, tehnološka, izobraževalna, ekonomska in politična slepa ulica za tisoče mladih umov in generacij, ki živijo v le-tej. Prejkoslej bo tak memorijski tok dovedel do neformalne ali formalne dezintegracije take politične skupnosti. Vse to sugerira, da se ta krvavi kulturni in politični eksperiment imenovan RS mora podreti na neki ravni, pa naj bo to v obliki mirne politične in kulturne tranzicije in integracije v BiH ali pa v obliki sirovga spopada, prav tistega, iz katerega je nekoč nastala RS. Ali bo to spopad za neodvisnost ali spopad za integracijo ali nekaj tretjega, ta spopad bo vojna spomina, ali za spomin, za novo kulturno memorijo novih prostorskih kolektivitet, prav tako kot je zadnja vojna bila spopad, v katerem je ena kulturna memorija in prostor razgrajena in prekinjena.

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Appendix A: Censuses in Banja Luka and on the territories of today's BiH

Table A.1: Ottoman censuses of taxation units and households in Bosnian Eyalet

Year	Taxation unit <i>glavarina</i>	non-Muslims	%	Muslims	%	Total	Year	Taxation unit "glavarina"	non-Muslims	%	Muslims	%	Total
1663.	65.000	370.000	48,1	400.000	51,9	770.000	1775.	78.090	390.450	56,7	298.200	43,3	688.650
1692.	14.369	359.225	44,4	450.000	55,6	809.225	1780.	89.000	445.000	58,5	316.200	41,5	761.200
1696.	13.889	347.225	43,6	450.000	56,4	797.225	1783.	96.000	480.000	59,5	327.000	40,5	807.000
1713.	39.000	292.500	43,8	375.000	56,2	667.500	1788.	99.855	499.275	59,1	345.000	40,9	844.275
1717.	39.200	294.000	45,4	353.927	54,6	647.927	1790.	80.000	400.000	53,2	352.200	46,8	752.200
1730.	33.600	252.000	43,4	329.003	56,6	581.003	1792.	91.000	455.000	60,5	352.200	46,8	752.200
1735.	43.200	324.000	59,6	219.336	40,4	543.336	1794.	92.406	462.020	55,8	366.600	44,2	828.620
1740.	63.440	317.200	59,6	214.949	40,4	532.149	1803.	103.327	516.860	56,4	400.000	43,6	916.860
1763.	68.545	342.725	57,3	255.000	42,7	597.725							

Source: Močanin (2013, 114)

Table A.2: Austrian-Hungarian and Yugoslavian censuses of Banja Luka

Year	1879.	%	1910.	%	1921.	%	1948.	%	1971.	%	1981.	%	1991.	%
District / Municipality of Banja Luka (<i>kotar/srez/opština</i>)	86.209	100,0	73.160	100,0	77.579	100,0	120.471	100,0	158.736	100,0	183.618	100,0	195.692	100,0
Only rural area	76.649	88,9	58.360	79,8	59.578	76,8	89.248	74,1	67.905	42,8	59.681	32,5	52.613	26,9
Orthodox / after 1948 Serbs	64.186	74,5	45.112	61,7	46.835	60,4	75.460	62,6	92.465	58,3	93.389	50,9	106.826	54,6
Muslims	12.350	14,3	9.029	12,3	9.565	12,3	12.573	10,4	24.268	15,3	21.726	11,8	28.558	14,6
Catholics / after 1948 Croats	9.486	11,0	17.991	24,6	19.877	25,6	29.812	24,7	33.371	21,0	30.442	16,6	29.026	14,8
Jews, Yugoslavs & Others	187	0,2	1.028	1,4	1.302	1,7	2.626	2,2	8.632	5,4	38.061	20,7	31.282	16,0
Only Town Banja Luka (<i>varoš/gradsko područje</i>)	9.560	11,1	14.800	20,2	18.001	23,2	31.223	25,9	90.831	57,2	123.937	67,5	143.079	73,1
Orthodox / after 1948 Serbs	1.893	19,8	3.698	25,0	5.324	29,6	10.861	34,8	41.292	45,5	51.839	41,8	70.155	49,0
Muslims	6.474	67,7	6.593	44,5	7.201	40,0	9.951	31,9	23.407	25,8	20.916	16,9	27.689	19,4
Catholics / after 1948 Croats	1.006	10,5	3.939	26,6	4.718	26,2	8.662	27,7	17.912	19,7	16.314	13,2	15.700	11,0
Jews, Yugoslavs & Others	187	2,0	570	3,9	758	4,2	1.749	5,6	8.220	9,1	34.868	28,1	29.535	20,6

Source: Institute for Statistic of Social Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Statistical Bulletin No. 233, 1993) and (Statistical Bulletin No. 219, 220 and 221, 1991)


Table A.3: Results of the 1921 census in Kingdom of SCS (Yugoslavia) and 6 districts of today's BiH

Kingdom of SCS (Yugoslavia) - first language		Kingdom of SCS (Yugoslavia) - religion		6 Districts that covers today's BiH - first language		6 Districts that covers today's BiH - religion					
Serbo-Croatian	8.911.509	74,36	Christians	10.571.569	88,21	Serbo-Croatian	1.826.657	96,63	Orthodox	829.290	43,87
Slovenian	1.019.997	8,51	Orthodox	5.593.057	46,67	German	16.471	0,87	Muslims	588.244	31,12
German	505.790	4,22	Roman Catholics	4.708.657	39,29	Polish	10.705	0,57	Catholics	444.308	23,50
Hungarian	467.658	3,90	Protestants	229.517	1,92	Rosins	8.146	0,43	Others	28.595	1,51
Arnaut (Albanian)	439.657	3,67	Greek Catholics	40.338	0,34	Czech and Slovak	6.377	0,34			
Romanian	231.068	1,93	Muslims	1.345.271	11,22	Slovenian	4.682	0,25			
Turkish	150.322	1,25	Jews	64.746	0,54	Others	17.402	0,92			
Czech and Slovak	115.532	0,96	Others	1.944	0,02						
Ruthenian	25.615	0,21	Atheists	1.381	0,01						
Russian	20.568	0,17									
Polish	14.764	0,12									
Italian	12.553	0,10									
Others	69.878	0,58									
TOTAL	11.984.911	100,0		11.984.911	100,0		1.890.440	100,0		1.890.440	100,0

Source: Institute for Statistic of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Statistical Bulletin No. 233, 1993)

Appendix B: Destiny of the local community names and street names in Banja Luka

Graph B.1: Ethnic composition and renaming of local communities' names in the city center, city periphery and in rural areas of Banja Luka



Source: Author, on the base of Municipality of Banja Luka Decisions on declaring of the changes of local community name (Banja Luka Official Gazette, 1994) and Institute for Statistic of Social Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sarajevo (Statistical Bulletin No. 219, 220 and 221, 1991)

Table B.2: Extract from the full list of old and new street names in Banja Luka, massively changed between 1992 and 1995

Old street name	New street name	Result	Old street name	New street name	Result	Old street name	New street name	Result
Abduselama Blekića	Prote Todora Srdića	name changed	Idriza Masle	Jesenjina	name changed	Rade Kondića	Rade Kondića	name not changed
Ada	Ada	name not changed	Igmanska	Igmanska	name not changed	Rade Ličine	Nikole Pašića	name changed
Adema Bajagilovića	Pere Slijepčevića	name changed	Ishaka dr Zukanovića	Milutina Bojića	name changed	Rade Marjanca	Rade Marjanca	name not changed
Adema Čeleša	Veljka Petrovića	name changed	Ilije Gribića	Ilije Gribića	name not changed	Rade Vranješević	Bulevar vojvode Živojina Mišića	name changed & moved
... AVNOJ-a	... Skendera Kulenovića	name changed	... Ivce Mažara	... Vojvode Momčila	name changed	... Rušida Džehverovića	... Mileševska	name changed
Banijska	Banijska	name not changed	Jadranska	Jadranska	name not changed	Safeta Frica Filipovića	Monahinje Jefimije	name changed
Benešev	Save Mrkalja	name changed	Jajačka	Velibora Janjetovića Janje	name changed	Safeta Krupića	Tromeđe	name changed
Beogradska	Beogradska	name not changed	Jaroslava Hašeka	Jaroslava Hašeka	name not changed	Sanska	Sanska	name not changed
Bihačka	Manastira Moštanice	name changed	Jaroslava Plecitija	Jaroslava Plecitija	name not changed	Sarajevska	Sarajevska	name not changed
... Bulevar solidarnosti	... Bulevar vojvode Petra Bojovića	name changed	... Jusufa Terze Imamovića	... Vojvode Uroša Drenovića	name changed	... Svetozara Markovića	... Svetozara Markovića	name not changed
Čaire	Čaire	name not changed	Karapovac	Zvezdana Mandića	name changed	Šandora Petefija	Miće Ljubibratića	name changed
Četnaeste (XIV) srednjobos. brig.	Četnaeste (XIV) srednjobos. brig.	name not changed	Karla Rojca	Kralja Petra II	name changed	Šarplaninska	Šarplaninska	name not changed
Četvrti prigradski put	Četvrti prigradski put	name not changed	Kasima Hadžića	Cara Lazara	name changed	Šefketa Maglajića	Vojvode Pere Krece	name changed
Četvrtog (4.) jula	Knjaza Miloša	name changed	Kasima Hercegovca	Kalemegdanska	name changed	Šegina	Stevana Musića	name changed
Četvrtog (IV) krajiškog part. odr.	Četvrtog (IV) krajiškog part. odr.	name not changed	... Kupreška	... Kupreška	name not changed	... Šumadijska	... Šumadijska	name not changed
Dabulhanića	Kolubarska	name changed	Labinskih rudara	Goluba Babića	name changed	Tabaci	Jovana Cvijića	name changed
Dalmatinska	Stojana Jankovića	name changed	Leskovačka	Leskovačka	name not changed	Tadije Odića	Jovana Jančića	name changed
Danice dr Perović	Ivana Kosančića	name changed	Lipovačka	Lipovačka	name not changed	Talijanskog bat. Mateoti	Talijanskog bat. Mateoti	name not changed
Danijela Dalka Halimića	Isidore Sekulić	name changed	Lovčenska	Lovčenska	name not changed	Tarasa Ševčenka	Tarasa Ševčenka	name not changed
... Dvanaeste (XII) Krajiške brig.	... Majke Kristine	name changed	... Lutvije Smajlagić	... Raška	name changed	... Tuzlanska	... Tuzlanska	name not changed
Džemala Bijedića	Braće Pišteljić	name changed	Ljevcanska	Ljevcanska	name not changed	Ustanički put	Ustanički put	name not changed
Dževada Karajlića	Zmijanjska	name changed	Ljubice Gerovac	Ljubice Gerovac	name not changed	Užička	Užička	name not changed
Džinića	Gorana Radulovića Bimbe	name changed	Ljubice Mrkonjić	Ljubice Mrkonjić	name not changed	Vaclava Haviika Vene	Vaclava Haviika Vene	name not changed
Đorđa Jovetića	Đorđa Jovetića	name not changed	Ljubijskih rudara	Ljubijskih rudara	name not changed	Vahide Maglajić	Anke Drakulić	name changed
Đure Jakšića	Đure Jakšića	name not changed	Ljubljanska	Vladimira Zvonara	name changed	Vase dr Butozana	Patre	name changed
Đure Đakovića	Đure Đakovića	name not changed	Maglajića sokak	Branka Majstorovića	name changed	Vase Pelagića	Vase Pelagića	name not changed
Edhema Lede Karabegovića	Koste Vojinovića	name changed	Mahmuta Bušatlije Buša	Od Zmijanja Rajka	name changed	... Vuka Karadžića	... Đure Daničića	name changed & moved
Ejuba Kobašića	Radoja Domanovića	name changed	Mahmuta Ibrahimpašića	Miloša Pocerca	name changed	Zagorska	Svetog Nikole	name changed
Elmaza Sarajlića	Hiljaduitrista (1300) kaplara	name changed	Majevička	Majevička	name not changed	Zagrebačka	Meše Selimovića	name changed
Elvije Čelebije	Vase Kondića	name changed	... Mustafe Zaimovića	... Kosovke djevojke	name changed	ZAVNOBIH-a	Trive Amelice	name changed
... Eugena Kumičića	... Eugena Kumičića	name not changed	Nade Valenčić	Dalibora Dače Stojića	name changed	Zdrave Korde	Zdrave Korde	name not changed
Fadila Maglajića	Solunska	name changed	Natalije Jović	Natalije Jović	name not changed	... Zvonka Radmana	... Despota Stevana Lazarevića	name changed
Fadila Šerića	Mis Adeline Irbi	name changed	Nazima Džabića	Tome Radulovića	name changed	Žarka Vranješevića	Save Tekelije	name changed
Fahreta Dedića	Patrijarha Arsenija Čarnojevića	name changed	Nevenko Dadasović	Visokih Dečana	name changed	Žarka Zgonjanina	Žarka Zgonjanina	name not changed
Fahrudina Mahića	Fahrudina Mahića	name not changed	... Nurije Pozderca	... Miloša Obilića	name changed	Želje Barića	Milana Rakića	name changed
... Fruškogorska	... Fruškogorska	name not changed	Njegoševa	Njegoševa	name not changed	Željeznička kolonija	Željeznička kolonija	name not changed
Gajeva	Gajeva	name not changed	Ognjena Price	Ognjena Price	name not changed	... Živojina Preradovića	... Živojina Preradovića	name not changed
Gavrila Principa	Gavrila Principa	name not changed	Ohridska	Ilije Smiljanića	name changed			
Georgi Dimitrova	Petra Velikog	name changed	Omera Ahmetašića	Saničkih žetalaca	name changed			
Goce Delčeva	Kajmakčalanska	name changed	Omladinska	Omladinska	name not changed			
... Gundulićeva	... Gundulićeva	name not changed	... Otokara Keršovanija	... Jovana dr Raškovića	name changed			
Habije Bećirbašića	Baje Pivljanina	name changed	Partizanskih avijatičara	Bulevar srpske vojske	name changed			
Halilovac	Sentandrejska	name changed	Paše Jamakovića	Jovana Kršića	name changed			
Halilpašina	Bogdana Marića	name changed	Paule Kogut	Bogdana Milovanovića Krajišnika	name changed			
Hasana Brkića	Jug Bogdana	name changed	Pave Radana	Pave Radana	name not changed			
... Hvarska	... Hvarska	name not changed	... Pete (V) kozarske brig.	... Pete (V) kozarske brig.	name not changed			

Source: Author, on the base of Municipality of Banja Luka Decisions on determining of the names of streets and squares (Banja Luka Official Gazette, 1991 – 1997)

Appendix C: Storyboards

Storyboard C.1: Images of ethno-religious traditionalism and cult of cultural continuity of Serb nation and territory (chapter 6.1)

Collage C.1a: Texts and messages of graffiti, stickers, posters and semiformal events in Banja Luka 2006 - 2014:

Picture C.1a-1: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2009



Picture C.1a-2: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2009



Picture C.1a-3: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2010



Picture C.1a-4: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2012




Picture C.1a-5: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2006



Picture C.1a-6: Mural on the school *Branko Ćopić* in the center of Banja Luka in 2012



Picture C.1a-7: Graffiti & sticker in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.1a-8: Graffiti in *Gornji Šeher*, now officially *Srpske Toplice*, Banja Luka in 2012



Picture C.1a-9: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2014



Picture C.1a-10: Sticker in Banja Luka in 2014



Picture C.1a-11: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.1a-12: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2014



Source of pictures:
Author (except otherwise stated)

Collage C.1b: Texts and messages of RS elite and events in formal public and political space:


Picture C.1b-1: Mainstream cultural spectacle in 2010 - The 2010 exhibition celebrating the 80th anniversary of foundation of RS Museum in Banja Luka, until the war a Museum of Bosanska Krajina



Source of picture: *Glas Srpske*. 2010. Muzej RS slavi 80. rođendan, 12 January. Available at: <http://www.glassrpske.com/kultura/vijesti/Muzej-RS-slavi-80-rodjendan/lat/33618.html/>

„...‘We don’t mark only the 80th anniversary of Museum of Republic of Srpska, but also the 80 years of organize cultural development of Banja Luka and what we have today is part of that tradition and spirituality which we mustn’t forget. A 81 years ago Banja Luka had became the capital and center of Vrbas Province, and today is capital of Republic of Srpska which stride toward developed European region with huge steps forward’ as it was emphasized by Mr. Radmanović”


Source: Rajković, A. 2010. Osam decenija kulture i duhovnosti. *Glas Srpske*, 26 September. Available at: <http://www.glassrpske.com/kultura/vijesti/Osam-decenija-kulture-i-duhovnosti/lat/46252.html/>



Picture C.1b-2: Messages of selective remembrance 2004-2014 - Picture on the left is showing the bust in vestibule of Ban’s palace and picture on the right is showing the monument of Ban Tisa Milosavljević, the first Ban of Vrbas Province 1929-1934, in the center of Banja Luka close to the Orthodox temple, both memorabilia were officially unveiled by RS elite on 20th May 2004 on the official Orthodox religion holiday of City of Banja Luka *Spasovdan* and are works of Belgrade sculptors Dragoljub and Miodrag Dimitrijević



Picture C.1b-3: Mainstream social spectacle 1993-2014 - Picture on the left is showing the 2009 ceremony of opening and consecration of reconstructed Orthodox temple of Christ the Savior in the center of Banja Luka and picture on the right is showing bell tower of the temple, erected first time in 1929, damaged in the Nazi bombing on 6th April 1941 and demolished in 1942 by Ustashe




Picture C.1b-4: Messages of selective remembrance 2006-2014 - Monument to the victims of WWII concentration camp Jasenovac in front of the Parliament of Republic of Srpska, commemorating the day of the uprising of camp prisoners 22nd April 1945, the monument is officially unveiled by elite in April 2006 and it is a work of Belgrade artist Zoran Banović




Picture C.1b-5: Messages of massive oblivion 1992-2014 - The 50% or 250 of all street names and ¼ or 15 of all names of local communities in Banja Luka has been erased and replaced with „more suitable” names during the war 1992-1995, erasing all symbols of Muslim and Croat identification and large portion of symbols of Partisan Antifascist Struggle and Revolution - culturecide that still last



Picture C.1b-6: Sacralization and serbianization of spaces 1992-2014 - New-Serbian Orthodox Church built in 2009 in front of the Kastel fortress from Ottoman period, on the spot where no religion object had ever stud before, on this site once was the small park with bronze sculpture of the girl called *Emina* of the academic sculptor Ahmed Bešić, as an artistic expression of the urban Banja Luka’s legend of *Safikada* that dates from the Ottoman times



Picture C.1b-7: Messages of RS political institutions 1992-2014 - Old and new „serbianized“ coat of arms of City of Banja Luka, coat of arms of Social Republic of BiH, old coat of arms of Republic of Srpska and current emblem of Republic of Srpska



Source of picture on the left: City of Banja Luka / Source of picture on the right: BH & RS Government



Picture C.1b-8: Messages of RS cultural institutions 2011 - Archeological richness of Republic of Srpska at the spotlight: „...higher associate for archeology in Bureau for protection of cultural, historical and natural heritage of Republic of Srpska reveals that archeological excavations have started in Doboј, because a large number of Paleolithic locations have been registered there. A space of northern part of Republic of Srpska had been researched since the beginning of 20th century. War at the beginning of 1990s has interrupted any form of archeological activities and researches... These (new) field researches have changed the look of the archeological map of the northern part of Republic of Srpska.”

Source: Ležić, B. 2011. Arheolozi otkrićima svjedoče o bogatstvu RS (Foto). *Nezavisne novine*, 27 November. Available at: <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/drustvo/Arheolozi-otkrićima-svjedoče-o-bogatstvu-RS-Foto-116664.html/>

Picture C.1b-9: Messages of RS cultural institutions in the process of falsifying history 1992-2014 - Picture lower left is showing a road sign for the Orthodox monastery *Krupa* near Banja Luka, implying that this religion object was monastery of Serb Orthodox Church since 13th century, despite the fact that it was a Franciscan monastery from 12th century and it was bought from Zagreb Diocese in 19th century, by Orthodox clergy and picture on the right is showing monument to *Stefan Nemanja* erected in 2014 in front of National and University Library of RS



Picture C.1b-10: Messages of RS cultural institutions 1992-2014 – The 40th anniversary billboard of the Museum of Contemporary Arts of Republic of Srpska, a former City Gallery of Banja Luka



Picture C.1b-11: Messages of media institutions 1992-2014 - The 68th anniversary billboard of the daily newspaper *Glas Srpske*, former city and regional daily newspaper *Glas*, but always a journal of political majority and regime



Picture C.1b-12: Messages of brotherhood between political and religious elite 1992-2014 - Picture on the left is showing celebration of the official holly day of the City of Banja Luka, an Orthodox religion saint called *Spasovdan* (40th day after Orthodox Easter) by RS elite and picture on the right is showing poster on the public school inviting children to participate on school competition in Orthodox religion education, an official subject of school curriculum



Source of picture above: City of Banja Luka



Picture C.1b-13: Messages of political institutions in 2007 - Picture on the left is showing the tallest building in the Banja Luka and Republic of Srpska, new and suspicious building of the Government of Republic of Srpska and picture on the right is showing the road sign welcoming you on your entrance in the RS



Source of pictures:
Author (except otherwise stated)

Storyboard C.2: Images of glorification of 1991-1995 patriotic-liberation war as continuation of ethno-religious emancipation of nation and territories and cult of guns and heroes (chapter 6.2)

Collage C.2a: Texts and messages of graffiti, stickers, posters and semiformal events in Banja Luka 2006 - 2014:

Picture C.2a-1: Stickers in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.2a-2: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.2a-3: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2012



Picture C.2a-4: War graffiti somewhere in northern Bosnia 1992-1995



Source of picture above: unknown

Picture C.2a-5: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2012



Picture C.2a-6: Rampage during the celebration of beginning of reconstruction of the *Ferhadija* mosque in 2001 (7 May) and 2002 (7 May), outcome 1 dead (Murat Badić) and symbolic death of Banja Luka



Source of picture above: unknown. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pe-3KUKFDH8/>

Picture C.2a-7: Rally iconography in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.2a-8: Badge in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.2a-9: Medal for the kick-boxing tournament dedicated to the war criminal Željko Ražnjatović Arkan in Prijedor in 2002



Picture C.2a-10: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.2a-11: Parole and poster in Banja Luka 2002-2011



Source of pictures above: <http://www.facebook.com/pages/Noz-Zica-Srebrenica/208761162477870/>

Picture C.2a-12: Graffiti from 2006 and sticker from 2014 in Banja Luka



Source of pictures: Author (except otherwise stated)

Collage C.2b: Texts and messages of RS elite and events in formal public and political space:

Picture C.2b-1: Messages of political institutions of RS and Serbia 2004-2014 - Picture upper right is showing the child-soldier Spomenko Gostić, the youngest fighter of RS Army in the 1992-1995 war

Source of picture above: *Serbian News Agency - SRNA*. 2013. Zahtjev za izgradnju spomenika jednom od najmladih boraca RS Spomenku Gostiću, 18 March. Available at: <http://vijesti.in.rs/vijesti/zahtjev-za-izgradnju-spomenika-jednom-od-najmla%C4%91ih-boraca-rs-spomenku-gosti%C4%87u/>

Law of Republic of Srpska on war veterans, war invalids and families of dead soldiers of the defensive-patriotic war: Article 2: „Soldier, in the sense of this Law, is a person who: 1) participated in armed operations and armed combat on the territory of former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia as the member of armed forces and forces of security services of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia or military formations under the command of these armed forces in period between August 17th 1990 and May 19th 1992, for the purpose of the defense of Yugoslavia or Republic of Srpska; 2) conducted military or other duties for the purpose of the defense of Republic of Srpska as the member of armed forces of Republic of Srpska in war in former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, or BIH in period between May 19th 1992 and June 19th 1996. Soldier in sense of this Law is a person who was the member of armed forces of Republic of Srpska as army volunteers after the May 19th 1992... Soldier is also a person who conducted military or other duties in connection with participation in armed operation undertaken in time of peace for the purpose of the defense of Republic of Srpska, or BIH.... Soldier is also a person who participated in antifascist and liberation combat during 20th century as a member of Serbian, Montenegrin, Yugoslav army or fighter of People Liberating War.“

Source: *Official Gazette of Republic of Srpska* (No. 46/04, 53/04 and 20/07)



Picture C.2b-2: Messages of RS political institutions 1993-2014 - Picture lower left is showing ordens and medals of RS

Source of picture below: unknown. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=do_P166VMjM/

Law of Republic of Srpska on Ordens and Medals: Article 7: „Ordens are: 1) Orden of Republic of Srpska on collar and stripe, 2) Orden of the Flag of Republic of Srpska with golden and silver gloriole, 3) Orden of *Nemanjići*, 4) Star of *Karadžorđevići* of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd order, 5) Orden of Honor with golden and silver rays, 6) Orden of *Miloš Obilić*, 7) Orden of *Njegoš* of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd order, 8) Cross of Mercy. Article 8: Medals are: 1) Medal of *Petar Mrkonjić*, 2) Medal of Major *Milan Tepić*, 3) Medal of Merits for the People, 4) Golden and silver Medal for Bravery, 5) Medal for Military Merits, 6) Medal for Soldiers Virtues.“

Source: *Official Gazette of Republic of Srpska* (No.4/93, 26/93 and 48/02)



Picture C.2b-3: Messages of RS political leaders in 2011 - „President of RS emphasized that Dayton agreement had verified international capacity of RS which celebrates tomorrow, with full right, its 16th anniversary of signing of this agreement. ‘It is beyond the doubt that Dayton agreement is one of the most successful contracts in recent political history’, Dodik stated and added that today it would be very difficult to preserve BIH, even under coercion of international community, if there is no Dayton agreement.”

Source: *Nezavisne novine*. 2011. Dodik: Srpska uspješna u odbrani svojih vrijednosti, 20 November. Available at: <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/BIH/Dodik-Srpska-uspjesna-u-odbrani-svojih-vrijednosti-115837.html/>

Picture C.2b-4: Messages of RS political elite 1992-2014 - Memorial plaque and street of Milan Tepić, the Serb hero on the picture below



Source of picture: Radio-Television of RS – RTRS, RTRS Channel. 2011. *RTRS News*: „Sjećanje na majora Tepića“. Banja Luka, 29 September. Available at: <http://rtrs.tv/vijesti/vijest.php?id=47033/>

Picture C.2b-5: Messages of RS political institutions 1992-2014 - Picture on the left is showing demolished Ferhadija mosque in May 1993 and pictures on the right is showing the monument to the RS policemen killed in 1992-1995 war and aggression on BIH erected in Banja Luka in 2014, RS police had demolished Ferhadija and other mosques in the city in 1993

Destruction of „unsuitable” cultural and religious monuments in Banja Luka: Mosque in Vrbanja, *Hadži-Zulfikarova* or *Telek’s* mosque, *Behram-Efendijina* mosque, *Sofi-Mehmed Paša* mosque, *Mehdi-Begova* mosque, *Gazanferija* mosque, *Hadži-Kurdova* mosque, *Hadž-Pervizova* mosque in Potok, *Hadži-Omerova* mosque in Dolac, *Arnaudija* mosque, *Ferhadija* mosque, Old Clock-Tower, etc.



Source of picture on the left: unknown



Picture C.2b-6: Messages of RS political and religious elite 1992-2014 - Pictures on the right are showing Serbian Orthodox priests blessing the Serb „heroes” and wearing guns in the 1992-1995 war and aggression on BIH

„...Just as same as Great Martyr Saint Dmitry had sacrificed himself for the Christianity, so did the Serbian soldiers for their people and Republic of Srpska in past patriotic war 1992-1995. We had created it, we will preserve it – this is a message from the celebration of *Mitrovdan* an official Holly Day of Organization of War Veterans of RS.”

Source: Jović, R. 2008. Sjećanje na srpske junake. *Srpski Borac Broj 112-113*, September-November 2008. Available at: http://borackars.org/wp-content/uploads/bsk-pdf-manager/2_BORAC_112-113.PDF/



Source of pictures above: unknown

Picture C.2b-7: Messages of political elite 1992-2014 - Taped conversation between war criminal Radovan Karadžić and Serbian poet Gojko Đogo, after the session of BH Parliament in October 1991.

Source: Sarajevo Television – TVSA, TVSA Channel. 1991. *TVSA News*. Sarajevo, 1991. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCPhRI45yd0/>

Picture C.2b-8: Messages of political leaders in 1994 and 2009 - Denial of the 1994 Markale massacre in Sarajevo, by Karadžić in 1994 and Dodik in 2009.

Source: Radio-television of FBiH - RTVFBiH, FTV Channel. 2009. *FTV Political magazine „60 minuta”*. Sarajevo, 2009. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7MuSHw1Pdm&feature=related/>

Picture C.2b-9: Spectacle of RS political elite in 2011 - Rally of the support to Ratko Mladić in Banja Luka on 31st of May 2011



Source: *Večernje novosti*. 2011. Banjaluka: Miting podrške Mladiću, 31 May. Available at: <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.69.html:332618-Banjaluka-Miting-podrske-Mladicu/>

Picture C.2b-10: Performance of RS political elite 1992-2014 - Dodik in front of the ceremonial squad of RS police in 2013, on the picture below



Source of picture above: *Ministry of Internal Affairs of RS - MUP RS*. 2013. Proslavljena Krsna slava MUP-a RS Arandelovdan, 21 November. Available at: <http://www.mup.vladars.net/lat/index.php?vijest=10113&vrsta=novosti/>

Ivica Dačić, Serbian politician from Serbia: "...RS is one and only victory of Serbian people in past decades and the first Serbian entity across the Drina river in our history and don't allow that because of your disunity you lose this attainment and that all sacrifices be in vain.", on the joint RS- Serbia celebration of the anniversary of RS police or official Holly Day of Police of Republic of Srpska, Saint Archangel Michel (*Sveti Arhangel Mihajlo*) on 21st of November 2011 in Trebinje.

Source: Gutić, R. 2011. RS pobjeda srpskog naroda. *Večernje novosti*, 21 November. Available at: <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.300.html:354416-RS-pobjeda-srpskog-naroda/>

Source of pictures:
Author (except otherwise stated)

Picture C.2b-11: Messages of RS political elite in 2011 - Milorad Dodik, leader of RS on the picture right



Dodik: "...Time has showed that we were right when in 1992 we started to defend the Serbian territories in BiH with the Army of Republic of Srpska. That's way Republic of Srpska never can be questioned, because if there is no Republic of Srpska here, there were be no Serbs here, or there were be as much Serbs as there is now in Federation of BiH. It is a colossal achievement of political and military leaderships of those days, who together had given everything in order to create a state of Serbian people on this side of Drina river."

Source: *Info-Neretva News Blog*. 2011. Dodik o RS - država srpskog naroda sa ove strane Drine, 28 June. Available at: <http://infoneretva.blogspot.com/2011/06/dodik-o-rs-drzava-srpskog-naroda-sa-ove.html/>

Picture C.2b-12: Messages of RS political elite - Momčilo Krajišnik, a convicted war criminal, posing in front of the judges of the ICTY tribunal, on the picture right



Source of picture on the right: *UN ICTY*. 2009. Momčilo Krajišnik Sentenced to 20 Years by Appeals Chamber, 17 March. Available at: <http://www.icty.org/sid/10079/>

Krajišnik on January the 9th 1992 (official Day of the Republic of Srpska): "...I am concluding that Assembly of Serbian people in BiH had adopted a Declaration on establishment of the Republic of Serbian people 'BiH', as well as declared that Republic of Serbian people 'BiH' is a federal unite in composition of Federative Republic of Yugoslavia..."

Source: Katana, E. 2011. Čemu služi obilježavanje Skupštine srpskog naroda u BiH. *Radio Slobodne Evrope*, 25 October. Available at: http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/cemu_sluzi_obiljezavanje_skupstine_srpskog_naroda/24371113.html/

Storyboard C.3: Images of enemies, fear, frustration and hate of small differences' narcissism and cult of anti-Serb conspiracies (chapter 6.3)

Collage C.3a: Texts and messages of graffiti, stickers, posters and semiformal events in Banja Luka 2006 - 2014:

Picture C.3a-1: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2012




Picture C.3a-2: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2011 and 2014



Picture C.3a-3: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2014




Picture C.3a-4: Graffiti in Banja Luka (Laktaši) in 2009




Picture C.3a-5: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2009, 2011 and 2012



Picture C.3a-6: Graffiti in Banja Luka (Laktaši) in 2009



Picture C.3a-7: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2012



Picture C.3a-8: Poster and graffiti in Banja Luka in 2011



Verse continues with: "...everyone else was a Catholic and I was an Orthodox!" (in BHS language: ...svi su bili katolici a ja pravoslavac!)

Picture C.3a-9: Graffiti in 2009 and T-shirt „statement” in Banja Luka in 2011



Source of pictures: Author (except otherwise stated)

Collage C.3b: Texts and messages of RS elite and events in formal public and political space:

Picture C.3b-1: Messages of RS political leaders in 2011 - Picture upper right is showing Milorad Dodik, leader of the social democrats in RS in the popular demagogic position

Source of picture: *Kurir*. 2011. Dodik: BiH bi za 20 godina mogla biti samo bošnjačka, 17 November. Available at: <http://www.kurir-info.rs/dodik-BiH-bi-za-20-godina-mogla-biti-samo-bosnjacka-clanak-123132/>

„President of Republic of Srpska and leader of Union of Independent Social Democrats Milorad Dodik has stated that BiH in next 20 years could become exclusively Bosniaks' country, in case of abolishing of principle of parity which is foundation for forming a state institutions... 'The essence of problem why there are no 10 new ministers lays right there. There are no 10 new ministers because one fundamental and basic principle of constitutionality of people is being desolated through the concept which tries to appoint members of certain ethnicity accordingly to the structure of BiH population and not to preserve balance and parity', Dodik stated.”

Source: *Nezavisne novine*. 2011. Dodik: BiH bi za 20 godina mogla da bude samo bošnjačka zemlja, 17 November. Available at: <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/BiH/Dodik-BiH-bi-za-20-godina-mogla-da-bude-samo-bosnjacka-zemlja-115544.html/>



Picture C.3b-2: Messages of political leaders 2011-2014 - Picture lower left is showing two leaders of social democrats in BiH, Milorad Dodik and Zlatko Lagumdžija

Dodik: „...we see an early danger from creation of some majorities others then those which exist in BiH...“

Source: Radio-Television of RS - RTRS, RTRS Channel. 2011. *RTRS Political talk show „Presing“*. Banja Luka, 2011. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=9yOdynZKHK0/>

Dodik: „...in BiH someone wants a majorization (of Serbian people)...“

Source: *Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty*. 2011. Interview: Republika Srpska President Dodik, 14 October. Available at: <http://www.rferl.org/media/video/24360035.html/>

Picture C.3b-3: Messages of RS political leaders in 2011 - „...Turkey has been on the side of Serbian enemies during the wars in 1990s, and these relations haven't been changed till nowadays, Dodik has stated when asked to comment the statement of head of Turkish diplomacy...“

Source: *Nezavisne novine*. 2011. Dodik: Posredovanje Ankare protiv srpskih interesa, 31 August. Available at: <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/BiH/Dodik-Posredovanje-Ankare-protiv-srpskih-interesa-103893.html/>

Picture C.3b-4: Messages of political leaders in 2012 - Picture right is showing the poster of Serbian radical party and its leader Vojislav Šešelj stating „We don't want into EU“ in Banja Luka and pictures far right is showing the 2012 election campaign billboard of Milorad Dodik and Putin as two allies.

Source of pictures on the right: Author



Picture C.3b-5: Messages of RS political elite in 2011 - Picture on the right is showing Milorad Dodik in front of the flags of RS and Israel

„Ambassador of Israel in BiH, David Koen had stated tonight in Banja Luka that Jewish and Serbian people have a common history and that there is no nation as these two, which had suffered that much during the WWII.“

Source: *Press RS*. 2011. Dodik: Srpska i Izrael neguju prijateljske odnose, 1 November. Available at: http://pressrs.ba/sr/vesti/vesti_dana/story/3238/Dodik%3A+Srpska+i+Izrael+neguju+prijateljske+odnose.html/



Picture C.3b-6: Messages of Banjaluka war elite „the notorious four“ 1992-1995 - Picture right is showing three out of four war lords of Banja Luka Radić, Vukić, Kuprešanin and Brđanin

Radislav Vukić: „Not a one Muslim child (it was used an abusive name in BHS language: *balinče*) nor Croat child (it was used an abusive name in BHS language: *ustaša*) will be born in Banja Luka's hospital anymore!“ The statement that medical doctor Radislav Vukić stated on the rally of the Serbian Democrat Party in Banja Luka in 1992 was practically implemented during the war 1992-1995. „All ethnically mixed marriages should be divorced and invalidated and children from those marriages are only good enough for production of soap!“ The statement that medical doctor Radislav Vukić stated on Radio Banja Luka in summer 1992. Radovan Brđanin: „ We can accept no more than 2% of non-Serbs to live on Serbian territories!“; „I suggest to mixed marriages not to make a winter preserves of pickled cabbage this autumn, they won't have time to eat it!“ Both statement Radovan Brđanin stated on Banja Luka's radio during summer 1992.

Source: *UN ICTY*. 1997. Opinion and decision from paragraph number 147 in the case number IT-94-1 Tadić, 7 May and author's remembrances




Source of pictures above: *Glas Srpske* and *Sensa Agency*.

Picture C.3b-7: Messages of Serbian intellectual elite in 2011 - Actor and musician Nikola Pejaković in his text „Mixed meat“ states „...My humble opinion is that marriages which remain mixed, in which you don't know who is the man and who is woman, nor to which God children should prey, in which there is no Easter or Bajram – is nothing else but disaster, for those in love and for their children. You should be a very, very serious and stable person to enter in such, so called mixed marriage. Order a portion of mixed meat, instead of the steak, if you are that hungry, but take care you don't over eat yourself , and that such huge amount of meat don't make you feel bad...“

Picture C.3b-8: Messages of Serbian intellectual elite 1992-2014 - Picture on the left is showing the Slobodan Jarčević's book „Ex Serbs“

Source of pictures: Slobodan Jarčević



Source of pictures: Author (except otherwise stated)

Storyboard C.4: Images of elitism and spurn toward weaker ones and cult of Serbian manhood (chapter 6.4)

Collage C.4a: Texts and messages of graffiti, stickers, posters and semiformal events in Banja Luka 2006 - 2014:

Picture C.4a-1: Badges in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.4a-2: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2010



Picture C.4a-3: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2009



Picture C.4a-4: Graffiti from 2009 and sticker from 2011 in Banja Luka



Picture C.4a-5: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.4a-6: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2013



Picture C.4a-7: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2013



Picture C.4a-8: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2012



Picture C.4a-9: Graffiti in Ljubljana in 2011



Source of pictures: Author (except otherwise stated)

Collage C.4b: Texts and messages of RS elite and events in formal public and political space:

Picture C.4b-1: Messages of RS political leaders in 2009 - Milorad Dodik about Bosniaks in the talk show „Telering” on OBN television



Source: Open Broadcast Network - OBN, OBN TV Channel. 2009. *OBN Political talk show „Telering”*. Sarajevo, 28 June. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SMP137_wkHI&feature=related/

Picture C.4b-2: Messages of RS political leaders in 2011 - Milorad Dodik about Sarajevo in the talk show „Svedok” on Serbian national television



Source: Serbian Radio-Television - RTS, RTS 1 Channel. 2011. *RTS Political talk show „Svedok”*. Beograd, 2011. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmFGQQqusi&feature=related/>

Picture C.4b-3: Messages of RS political elite 1992-2014 - Picture is showing map of compensation - Kosovo for RS



Source of picture: *Info-Neretva News Blog*. 2011. Ruski medij - Srbima Kosovo kompenzirati u BiH, November. Available at: <http://infoneretva-izbor.blogspot.com/2011/11/moskva-ako-doe-do-promjene-granica.html/>

Dodik: „...Struggle for identification among Bosniaks is only related to the attempts to create any kind of BiH. Bosniaks are people which don't exist anywhere else, but in BiH. That's the people which declared themselves for a nation in 1993. They cannot build up their own identity, if they don't destroy the identity of other constitutive nations... BiH is way too artificial in many areas so in the area of international relations...”

Source: *Info-Neretva News Blog*. 2011. Dodik: Bošnjaci su narod koji je sam sebe proglasio narodom 1993. godine, October. Available at: <http://infoneretva-izbor.blogspot.com/2011/10/video-dodik-bosnjaci-su-narod-koji-je.html/>

Picture C.4b-4: Messages of RS political elite in 2007 - Milorad Dodik in the talk show on HRT television

Dodik: „... the possibility to have their own federal unite should be granted to Croats in BiH ...” Aleksandar (host of TV show): „...Would you give to this federal unit a region of Posavina?” Dodik: „Of course not!” Aleksandar: „Why?” Dodik: „Why should I? I wouldn't give it because Republic of Srpska already has its own status...”



Source: Croatian Radio-Television - HRT, HRT 1 Channel. 2007. *HRT Political talk show „Nedeljom u dva”*. Zagreb, 16 December. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P48-TsSC8T8/>

Picture C.4b-5: Messages of RS political leaders in 2010 – Picture is showing Milorad Dodik in the political ritual of kissing the RS flag

„...Dodik has repeated that he doesn't perceive Sarajevo as his capital, though it is a political center of BiH...”; „In Sarajevo you can find more Chinese then Serbs or Croats.”; „...What I had said before that Sarajevo looks like Teheran, it is still my opinion today, because Sarajevo got more mosques then Teheran’, Dodik emphasized and added that he would rather cheer for Croatian representation in some match between Bosnia and Croatia”; „...’You want find single Croat here in BiH who wouldn't cheer for Croatia in some match between Croatia and Bosnia’, Dodik estimated and added that he thinks that Croats in BiH should have their own territorial political unite, community or federal unite which would be in the borders of former Herzeg-Bosnia.”; „...Talking about possible separation of Republic of Srpska, he stated that, hypothetically speaking, if and when someone would work on that issue, the moment for that would be chosen in such way that Republic of Srpska would be recognized by many.”

Source: Nova TV, Nova TV Channel. 2010. *Nova TV News: Mislav Bago interview with Dodik: „U Srebrenicu ću ići kada Hrvati sa mnom dođu u Jasenovac”*. Zagreb, 5 December. Available at: <http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/u-sarajevu-ima-vise-kineza-nego-hrvata-i-srba.html#video/>



Source of picture on the right: *Radio-Television of FBiH - RTVFBiH*. 2011. *Abecedom kroz 2011. godinu*, 30 December. Available at: <http://www.federalna.ba/bhs/vijest/6691/Vijesti%20u%20pet/>

Picture C.4b-6: Messages of political elite in 2011: Kučan: „... only Republic of Srpska is functional (in BiH)!”

Source: *Nezavisne novine*. 2011. Kučan: Jedino je RS funkcionalna, 27 November. Available at: <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/BIH/Kucan-Jedino-je-RS-funkcionalna-116832.html/>

Picture C.4b-7: Racist and homophobic rhetoric of Rajko Vasić - Picture lower right showing Rajko Vasić promoting his book „BiH doesn't exist”

Source: *Žurnal on-line magazine*. 2010. Rajkov kutak: Vulgarni homofob, 5 February. Available at: <http://zurnal.ba/novost/1106/vulgarni-homofob/>

Rajko Vasić, politician from Union of Independent Social Democrats, wrote in 2012: „...Because of Sarajevo's Ottomanic highhandedness, that genetic characteristic of Sarajevo's political circle, there will be no BiH ever, not even Bosnia...”

Source: Vasić, Rajko. 2012. *Osmanlijsko političko Sarajevo*. Vasić Rajko Blog (1826), 4 November. Available at: <http://vasicrajko.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2011-12-31T15:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2012-11-09T22:12:00%2B01:00&max-results=50&start=65&by-date=false/>



Storyboard C.5: Images of inevitable, honorable and permanent war(s), militarism and cult of warrior's nation (chapter 6.5)

Collage C.5a: Texts and messages of graffiti, stickers, posters and semiformal events in Banja Luka 2006 - 2014:

Picture C.5a-1: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2006



Picture C.5a-2: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.5a-3: Graffiti in East Sarajevo in 2009



Picture C.5a-4: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2009



Picture C.5a-5: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2014



Picture C.5a-6: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2014



Picture C.5a-7: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2014



Picture C.5a-8: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2012



Picture C.5a-9: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2012



Source of pictures: Author (except otherwise stated)

Collage C.5b: Texts and messages of RS elite and events in formal public and political space:

Picture C.5b-1: Messages of political leaders in 2009 - Milorad Dodik on Butmir negotiations about constitutional changes



Source: B92 Television, B92 Channel. 2009. *B92 News*. Beograd, 10 October. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kZp5cYnhNwE/>

Picture C.5b-2: Messages of RS political leaders 2010-2011 - The election campaign billboard of Milorad Dodik's party

„President of Union of Independent Social Democrats Milorad Dodik had stated to the journalists that on upcoming meeting of the BH political leaders in Italy, won't be talks about actual political issues in BiH and that he isn't ready to talk about BH government system in some foreign country. '... I am not ready to negotiate about BH government system on different locations all over the world, because everything about that is already settled. There is a Constitution which should be respected.' Dodik stated. Leader of Serbian Democrat Party, Mladen Bosić had stated earlier that formation of BH Council of Minister isn't a topic of the meeting in Italy, nor it is possible to find some kind of solution about that issue on such meeting. He emphasized that it is clear to everybody that regarding the formation of BH Council of Ministers, problem lays in Federation of BiH and that representatives of international community are familiar with this. There is no sense in initiating some new meetings again, on which we will listen same old skirmishing and starting arguments', Bosić emphasized. Commenting the topic of the meeting in Italy, a compliance of BH Constitution with EU standards, Bosić had evaluated that BH Constitution is in accordance and compatible with requests of EU and that there were no problems in that area except the implementation of EU Court decision in a case 'Sejdić-Finci', about which he expressed hope that this will be agreed too.“

Source: *Nezavisne novine*. 2011. Novi sastanak političke šestorke - ovaj put u Italiji, 26 November 2011. Available at: <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/BiH/Novi-sastanak-politicke-sestorke-ovaj-put-u-Italiji-116760.html/>



Source of picture above: Reuters News Agency

Picture C.5b-3: Messages of RS political elite 2011-2014 - Aleksandra Pandurević, a MP in the BH Parliament in behalf of opposition Serbian Democrat Party: „After the implementation of decision of EU Court for Human Rights in the case 'Sejdić-Finci', BiH should put a moratorium on stories about some new constitutional changes...“

Source: *Nezavisne novine*. 2011. Moratorijum na promjene Ustava nakon provođenja odluke Sejdić-Finci, 26 November. Available at: <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/BiH/Moratorijum-na-promjene-Ustava-nakon-provodjenja-odluke-Sejdic-Finci-116708.html/>

Picture C.5b-4: Messages of RS political elite 2010-2014 -

Picture on the right showing Milorad Dodik on the election campaign poster „Dayton forever“: „...or original Dayton will be respected or Bosnia will dissolve as once Yugoslavia did...“

Source: *Novi magazin*. 2011. Dodik: Dejton ili raspad, 3 December. Available at: <http://www.novimagazin.rs/svet/dodik-dejton-ili-raspad/>

Source of picture on the left: Midhat Poturović (RFE/RL)



Picture C.5b-5: Messages of RS political elite 2010-2014 -

Picture on the left showing Nikola Špirić, former BH Prime Minister, current politician of Union of Independent Social Democrats Špirić: „...every invocation of Dayton 2 represent playing with the stability of BiH.“

Source: *Serbian Radio-Television – RTS*. 2010. Prizivanje novog Dejtona ugrožava BiH, 2 March. Available at: <http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/11/Region/537931/Prizivanje+novog+Dejtona+ugro%C5%BEava+BiH.html/>



Picture C.5a-6: Messages of intellectual and political elite 2006-2014 -

Promotion slogan „War between ancient Serbs and Atlantis” for the book „Prophesies to the Serbs from grandpa Vukan”, by Nenad Gavrilović and Publishing company „Fatherland”, on the 2009 Book Fair in Belgrade

Source: *E-novine*. 2009. Hit sa Sajma knjiga: Vizije deda Vukana -Srpski Odbrambeni Prorok, 29 October. Available at: <http://www.e-novine.com/entertainment/entertainment-licnosti/31587-Srpski-Odbrambeni-Prorok.html/>



Picture C.5a-7: RS intellectual elite in 2012

Srdan Rajčević, young intellectual from Republic of Srpska, a director o Agency for IT Society of Republic of Srpska: „Existence of healthy national spirit is a precondition of the survival but also of further development...”

Source: Rajčević, Srdan. 2012. Deset pogleda na budućnost Republike Srpske. *Nova srpska politička misao*, 24 April. Available at: <http://www.nspm.rs/sudbina-dejtonske-BiH-i-republika-srpska/deset-pogleda-na-buducnost-republike-srpske.html?alphabet=/>

Picture C.5a-8: Messages of RS religious and political elite 2006-2014 -

Picture on the right showing spiritual unity of RS politicians, clergy and intellectuals during celebration of *Vidovdan* a holly day of RS army in Dobrun near Višegrad in 2011

Source: *Info Center of RS Government*. 2011. Prime Minister Džombić Attends Celebration of St. Vitus Day, Saint Patron of Republic of Srpska Army and Third Infantry (Republic of Srpska) Regiment, 27 June. Available at: http://www.vladars.net/eng/vlada/prime_minister/media/news/Pages/Prime_Minister_Dzombic_Attends_Celebration_of_St_Vitus_Day.aspx/



Picture C.5a-9: Paroles of Serb elite in Banja Luka in 2011 - Picture is showing one of the protesters on the Ratko Mladić support rally with „proper” iconography

„Representative of ultra-right-winger organization ‘Serbian Gates’ (*Srpske dveri*) from Belgrade, Srđan Nogo had addressed to all those gathered on the rally and said that Belgrade is ruled by traitors who cannot forgive Ratko Mladić the fact that he had saved Serbs in BiH and prevented of happening of new genocide over Serbs. ‘Only one holly thing nowadays is Republic of Srpska... There are a lot of ‘Mladićs’ in Serbia now and they will continue our struggle’ said Đogo.”



Source: *Žurnal on-line magazine*. 2011. Miting podrške u Banja Luci - Volim Mladića više nego sebe, 31 May. Available at: <http://zurnal.ba/novost/7531/volim-mladica-vise-nego-sebe/>

Source of pictures: Author (except otherwise stated)

Picture C.5b-10: Messages of Serb elite 1990-2014 - Comparative picture below is showing barricades and Orthodox priests on the beginning of the war and aggression in Croatia in 1991, during unrests in North Kosovo in 2011 and on the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2014

Predrag Simić, Belgrade political analyst: „As now things stands, I think that Dayton peace agreement can’t be changed without use of some huge force, for which I don’t know who would apply it in this moment, so Dayton is a destiny of BiH.”

Source: *Nezavisne novine*. 2011. Dejton je sudbina, 19 November. Available at: <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/BIH/Dejton-je-sudbina-115760.html/>



Source of picture on the right: Author

Storyboard C.6: Images of irrationality, rejection of antifascism and cult of lost battles (chapter 6.6)

Collage C.6a: Texts and messages of graffiti, stickers, posters and semiformal events in Banja Luka 2006 - 2014:

Picture C.6a-1: Stickers in Banja Luka in 2009



Picture C.6a-2: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2012



Picture C.6a-3: Graffiti and sticker in Banja Luka in 2009 and 2012



Picture C.6a-7: Paroles in Srebrenica in 2009 - Young members of the patriotic movement *Obraz* rallying in Srebrenica shouting „This is Serbia!“



Source: *Radio Free Europe*. 2009. Četnici u Srebrenici, 30 July. Available at: <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/media/video/2014019.tml/>

Picture C.6a-4: Graffiti in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.6a-6: Graffiti and sticker in Banja Luka in 2011



Picture C.6a-5: „NGO“ spectacle in Banja Luka 2009-2014 - Rally and commemoration to the WWII Chetnik commander and Nazi collaborator Uroš Drenović organized by Chetniks' movement *Ravna Gora*, (so called *četnički sabor*) on mountain Manjača near Banja Luka



Source of picture above: Open forum of the on-line magazine *Pogledi*. Available at: <http://www.pogledi.rs/diskusije/viewtopic.php?t=14569&view=next&sid=9c7929c9e3b2a788a35f292c40ee9bfd/>



Source of picture above: Open forum of the on-line magazine *Klix.ba*. Available at: <http://www.klix.ba/forum/cetnički-skup-na-manjaci-19-jula--t50725s50.html/>


Source of pictures: Author (except otherwise stated)

Collage C.6b: Texts and messages of RS elite and events in formal public and political space:

Picture C.6b-1: Messages of RS political leaders 1992-2014 - „He (Dodik) claimed that 25th of November cannot be celebrated as Day of BH Statehood, because until 1992 BiH didn't have an international legitimacy... 'Persistence on that story tells us that Bosniaks wants to redeem themselves for their previous sins from the WWII, because they were members of the fascist movement on the massive scale and the members of Nazi SS *Handžar* brigades, and as such performed atrocities against Serbs. Only when it was obvious that anti-fascist coalition will win the WWII, only then they have joined massively to the anti-fascist movement, two months before the war.', claimed, among other things, Dodik.“

Source: *Daily Newspaper Blic*. 2011. Dodik: 25. novembar nije praznik Bosne i Hercegovine, 24 November. Available at: <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Republika-Srpska/291674/Dodik-25-novembar-nije-praznik-Bosne-i-Hercegovine/>

Picture C.6b-3: Messages of RS political leaders 1944-2014 - Picture on the left is showing representatives of Nazi collaborators Chetniks, Ustashe and Domobran on the meeting in central Bosnia in 1944 and picture on the right is showing former President of Republic of Srpska Nikola Poplašen, a Serb radical politician from Sarajevo, now living and teaching at Banja Luka Law Faculty



Source of picture on the left: *United States Holocaust memorial Museum*. Washington. Photograph #46718. Available at: <http://digitalassets.usmmm.org/photoarchives/detail.aspx?id=1140009/>


Source of picture on the right: Huseinović, Avdo. 2011. Uhapšen Brane Vlačo, upravnik vogošćanskih logora smrti i inovator živog štita. *Bošnjaci.net web magazine*, 31 August. Available at: <http://www.bosnjaci.net/prilog.php?pid=43238/>

Picture C.6b-5: Messages of RS political elite in 2011 - TV Coverage of all-Serbian and Chetniks' rally (*svesrpski i četnički sabor*) on Manjača near Banja Luka in organization of Chetniks' movement *Ravna Gora* and co-sponsorship of War Veteran Association of Republic of Srpska (*BORS*) which also includes antifascist fighters of WWII and its leader Pantelija Čurguz



Source of picture on the left: Radio-Television of RS - RTRS, RTRS Channel. 2011. *RTRS Daily show „Srpska danas“*. Banja Luka, 21 July. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y3LxWmcoyY/>

Picture C.6b-2: Messages of RS political and intellectual elite 1992-2014 - Picture on the right is showing the map of „Great Serbia” created in May 1994 by mr Stevo Pašalić, demographer who testified in front of Hague tribunal that there were no genocide or ethnic cleansings in BiH but merely spontaneous migrations of population caused by the fear and deteriorating economic situation and picture on the left is showing RS president Dodik in front of the map of RS in 2014



Source of the picture on the left: Marić, B. 2013. RS traži da joj se vrate oduzete nadležnosti. *Politika*, 21 November. Available at: <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/region/RS-trazi-da-joj-se-vrate-oduzete-nadleznosti.lt.html/>

Source of the picture on the right: mr Stevo Pašalić (map is in Author possession)

Picture C.6b-4: Messages of RS political elite 2006-2014 - Picture on the left is showing official nametag of the square *Trg jasenovačkih žrtava* with sticker of the RS ultra-nationalist group SNP 1389 and picture on the right is showing the monument to the victims of death-camp Jasenovac erected in 2006 on above mentioned square



Source of pictures above: Author

Instrumentalization of the Serb victims of the 1941-1945 fascist terror for the sole purpose of legitimization of the genocide, ethnic cleansing and existence of RS is done by those very forces who participated in the ethnic cleansings and homogenization of the territories now called „Republic of Srpska” and who are in some cases followers of ethno-fascist Chetniks' ideology.

Picture C.6b-6: Messages of RS political elite in 2014 - war, genocide and RS vol. I

„National Assembly of Republic of Srpska consider that ‘tragic war conflict’ in BiH, as a part of process of dissolution of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, caused because of memorization of Serbian people in BiH, had a characteristics of ‘civil war’ with elements of inter-ethnic and high degree of involvement of international factors.”

Source: Official Gazette of Republic of Srpska number 92/13

Dodik: „... ‘Genocide didn’t happened in Srebrenica, and it is another thing if someone is thinking that everyone else should be compelled to think as they think.’ Dodik had said, asked to comment newly adopted law in Federation of BiH which sanction a denial of genocide in Srebrenica with prison sentence.“


Source: *Nezavisne novine*. 2014. Dodik: U Srebrenici se nije dogodio genocid, 12 July. Available at: <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/BIH/Dodik-U-Srebrenici-se-nije-dogodio-genocid-253258.html/>

Picture C.6b-7: Messages of RS political elite in 1995 - war, genocide and RS vol. II - RS General Ratko Mladić is distributing bread before genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995



Source of picture above: Car, Ivo. 2010. Pismo Ratku Mladiću. *Lupiga online magazine*, 30 November. Available at: <http://www.lupiga.com/vijesti/pismo-ratku-mladicu/>

Picture C.6b-8: Messages of RS political elite in 1995- war, genocide and RS vol.III - Invitation for the celebration of the Foundation Day of Republic of Srpska and its official Orthodox patron saint an Holy Archdeacon Stephen on 9th of January 2013 in Banja Luka



Source of picture above: Author

Picture C.6b-9: Messages of RS political elite in 2009 - Picture below is showing Rajko Vasić in front of the 2010 election campaign billboard of Union of Independent Social Democrats



Source of picture: *E-novine*. 2010. Jebao sam mater Bosni, 3 November. Available at: <http://www.e-novine.com/entertainment/entertainment-licnosti/41944-Jebao-sam-mater-Bosni.html/>

„Executive secretary of Union of Independent Social Democrats Rajko Vasić asks: ‘if fagots can rally in BiH why not Chetniks or those who call themselves Chetniks ... I cannot judge about whether they are fascists or not. Chetniks didn’t have concentration camps so the difference between Chetniks and Ustashe must be made. Here in this country it is often that people equalized Ustashe, Chetniks and Balije or Turks, depending on how someone call Muslims, Bosniaks or Army of BiH, Mujahedins. People put everything in the same basket out of the pure ignorance. I perceive Chetniks as funny parody, folklore and I don’t see that something should be forbidden there’ said Vasić.”

Source: *24 Info*. 2009. Vasić: Ako se u BiH okupljaju pederi zašto ne bi mogli i četnici ili oni koji sebe zovu četnicima, 6 May. Available at: <http://www.24sata.info/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina/6180-Vasic-Ako-BiH-okupljaju-pederi-zasto-mogli-cetnici-ili-oni-koji-sebe-zovu-cetnicima.html/>

Picture C.6b-10: Messages of RS elite 1992-2014 - we are one successful nation - The 2012 election campaign poster of Union of Independent Social Democrats



Source of picture on the left: Author

Transformation of RS constitution: 1992 war constitution - Article 1: „Republic of Srpska is a state of Serbian people.”; Article 2, 1st paragraph: „Territory of Republic of Srpska is made of areas of Serbian ethnic domains, including the areas on which the genocide over Serbian people has been committed.” 1994 war amendment XXVII – new Article 1: „Republic of Srpska is a sovereign state of Serbian people. All citizens of Republic of Srpska are equal.” 1996 post-war amendment XLIV – „Republic of Srpska is state of Serbian people and all its citizens.” 2002 post-war amendment LXVII imposed by International High Representative of Peace Implementation Council – „Republic of Srpska is singular and indivisible constitutional and legal entity. Republic of Srpska independently conducts its constitutional, legislative, executive and judicial functions. Republic of Srpska is one of two equal entities in BiH. Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats as constitutional nations, Others and citizens equally and without discrimination participate in executing powers in Republic of Srpska.“

Source: *Official Gazette of Republic of Srpska* (No. 3/92, 6/92, 8/92, 15/92, 19/92, 21/92, 28/94, 8/96, 21/02, 30/02 and 150/02)

Picture C.6b-11: Messages of RS elite 1992-2014 - we are one successful elite - The 2012 propaganda billboard of RS Government celebrating 20th anniversary of creation of RS



Source of picture on the left: Author

Dodik: „Republic of Srpska stronger than ever before!” at the celebration of the Foundation Day of Republic of Srpska and its official Orthodox patron saint an Holy Archdeacon Stephen (*Sveti Arhidakon Stefan*) 9th of January 2013 in Banja Luka.

Source: *Nezavisne novine*. 2013. Dodik na Svečanoj akademiji: Srpska stabilna i jača nego ikad, 9 January. Available at: <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/BIH/Dodik-na-Svecanoj-akademiji-Srpska-stabilna-i-jaca-nego-ikad-174745.html/>

Picture C.6b-12: Messages of RS elite 1992-2014 - he is one successful ethno-leader - Picture on the right is showing present master of RS Milorad Dodik and picture below two war lords of RS Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić



Source of picture on the left: *Daily Newspaper Blic*. 2013. Meron: Presuda Karadžiću 2015, kraj procesa Mladiću 2016, 5 December. Available at: <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/425299/Meron-Presuda-Karadzicu-2015-kraj-procesa-Mladicu-2016/>

Dodik: „ Republic of Srpska is the least in the debt, among all countries in the region... Republic of Srpska Forever!” Prijedor, 3rd September 2009.

Source: *Union of Independent Social Democrats*. 2010 Election campaign in Prijedor, 3 September. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hlpr0UR_qY/

Picture C.6b-14: Messages of RS elite 1992-2014 - they are one successful ethno-party - „Ethical Committee of Socialist International has suggested on the world congress in Cape Town that Union of Independent Social Democrats should be excluded from this organization due to the lack of any progress in the actions and rhetoric of this party, emphasizing that nationalism and extremism are still very present in the work of Union of Independent Social Democrats.”

Source: *Buka on-line magazine*. 2012. SNSD isključen iz Socijalističke internacionale?, 30 August. Available at: <http://www.6yka.com/novost/27731/snsd-isključen-iz-socijalisticke-internacionale/>



Source of picture on the right: *Bosna Press elektronske novine*. 2015. Dodik odredio datum za otcpljenje entiteta Republike Srpske od BiH, 10 April. Available at: <http://bosniapress.net/dodik-odredio-datum-za-otcpljenje-entiteta-republike-srpske-od-bih/>

Picture C.6b-13: Messages of RS elite 1992-2014 - this is one successful ethno-house - The 2010 election campaign poster of Union of Independent Social Democrats



Source of picture: Web presentation of the prominent politician of the Union of Independent Social Democrats, *Mrs. Dušanka Majkić*. Available at: <http://www.dusanka.majkic.net/>

Source of pictures: Author (except otherwise stated)