

UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE

Nataša Sbrizaj

Nemška kulturna diplomacija

Magistrsko delo

Ljubljana, 2011

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Povzetek

Z razvojem marketinških ter PR oprijemov v mednarodnih odnosih je predstavljanje kulture, družbe, gospodarstva ter politike neke države danes postala ustaljena praksa zunanje politike. V primerjavi s tradicionalno diplomacijo, kjer gre predvsem za medvladno sporazumevanje, je javna diplomacija razumljena kot posredna oblika vplivanja na razmišljanje in obnašanje tujih državljanov. Skupno delu na področju javne diplomacije je koncept t.i. mehke moči. Ta je razumljena kot sredstvo prepričevanja glede na privlačnost, ki izvira iz kulture, politike, vrednot, idealov in obnašanja neke države. Kulturna diplomacije je razumljena kot tisti del javne diplomacije, ki posreduje svoj vpliv preko aktivnosti na področjih kulture, izobraževanja, umetnosti, znanosti, športa ipd. Ena njenih glavnih nalog je premagovanje konfliktov in gradnja vzajemnega zaupanja. Magistrsko delo opisuje razumevanje in izvajanje Nemške kulturne diplomacije. Poleg tradicionalnih oblik diplomacije ter zunanjih ekonomskih odnosov, kulturna diplomacija tvori tretji steber nemške zunanje politike. Njen cilj je predstaviti moderno in raznoliko podobo Nemčije ter (iz)graditi zaupanje v le-to v svetu. Pri tem je pomemben dejavnik vpliva nemški odnos do kulture in svoje bližnje zgodovine, tj. do še nedavnega izkoriščanja nemške kulture v politične namene. Organizacijsko gledano poleg dobro razvite mreže diplomatsko-konzularnega predstavništva sodelujejo tudi številne druge institucije. Slednje odraža tudi drugo pomembno lastnost: obravnavanje zunanjepolitičnih zadev na zvezni ravni, medtem ko so dežele (*Länder*) tradicionalno zadolžene za področji kulture in izobraževanja.

Ključne besede: kulturna diplomacija, javna diplomacija, vpliv, mehka moč, Nemčija

German cultural diplomacy

Summary

With increasing development of marketing and PR mechanisms in international relations, representing nation's culture, society, economy and politics is part of almost each country's foreign relations today. In contrast to traditional diplomacy, which is mainly an inter-governmental affair, public diplomacy is understood as another form of influencing the attitudes of foreign public. Inherent within all public diplomacy work is a concept of soft power: power to attract and persuade that steams from country's culture, policies, values, ideals and behaviour. Cultural diplomacy is understood as that type of public diplomacy, which mediates its influence through the activities related to the fields of culture, education, art, science, sport, etc. One of its main tasks is bridging the conflicts and building mutual trust. This MA thesis tries to explain the understanding and praxis of German cultural diplomacy. Alongside classical diplomacy and foreign economic policy, cultural diplomacy forms the third cornerstone of German foreign policy. Its main goal is to provide a modern and multi-layered image of Germany and to re-build trust in Germany. An important factor of influence is German attitude towards culture and its recent history. This can be considered as a response to the past misuse of German culture for political purposes. Thus organizationally looking, along the diplomatic network also many other institutions take part in German cultural diplomacy. Later pointing to its second characteristic: classification of foreign relations as a federal matter, while having *Länder* responsible for culture and education.

Key words: Cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, influence, soft power, Germany

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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL PART

“Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed”. This often quoted principle from the Constitution of UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization),¹ organization designed to maintain peace and contribute towards security by fostering international cooperation in education, science, culture and communication, was the basic logic behind the fostering of cultural cooperation between countries after the second world war. ‘Constructing’ peaceful nature and a positive image was but even more important factor behind the developments of cultural diplomacy of the Federal Republic of Germany (from now on only Germany) after the Second World War, for the consequences of the war and country’s defeat in it required diplomatic, as well as cultural reintegration into international society (Schulte 2000, 62; Singer 2003, 23–4).

As acknowledged already by Paulmann (2007, 168), representing nation’s culture, society, economy and politics abroad is part of almost each country’s foreign relations today. If diplomacy is a means of communication between the countries, then cultural diplomacy is a specific form of this communication, running on the level of culture. Culture in this respect represents a positive agenda for cooperation and bringing the conflicting countries together, for apart from other traditional areas of cooperation, the importance of winning political points here is the lowest.

When we use the word “culture” we usually mean the shared practices and values, collective stories, arts and institutions that characterise a particular place or group as they recognise themselves. It can encompass anything from language and clichés to legal frameworks, from architecture and dance to political traditions (Counterpoint Global). In this respect culture is a very important determinate or component of anything social. To understand how people react towards different (international) diseases, to economic crises, security threats or to new technological inventions we need to focus on how culture shapes their perception, their behaviour, and their use of resources.

¹ Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 16 November 1945. United Nations Conference for the Establishment of an Educational and Cultural Organisation. Conference for the Establishment of an Educational and Cultural Organisation. Held at the Institute of Civil Engineers, London, from 1 to 16 November 1945. Available at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001176/117626e.pdf> (26.9.2011).

Cultural diplomacy can therefore be not only about bridging conflicting situations or building stronger fundamentals for cooperation between countries, but also about improving or gaining a favourable image of a country and its politics before a general public, by influencing people's perceptions throughout well-considered cultural activities (Ham 2003, 431; Melissen 2005, 14–15; Wang 2006, 91). It is about making the others see the world through country's own lenses and value system. Different scholarship programmes, student exchanges and cultural institutes are therefore not only generous by-products of this; they are first and foremost means of socializing others in the country's own way of life. Countries therefore develop models of cultural diplomacy suited to their global outlook, capacity and their pre-existing profile.

German cultural diplomacy is a perfect example of a model which encompasses all these aspects. Alongside classical diplomacy and foreign economic policy, the so called "foreign cultural and educational policy" officially forms the third cornerstone of German foreign policy. As stated on the webpage of German Federal Foreign Office (in continuation also Foreign Office or German foreign ministry), its objective is to present an up-to-date image of Germany and to participate in fostering mutual understanding between people, but also to (re)gain trust and sympathy for Germany around the world (Auswärtiges Amt 2011a).

The purpose of this master work is to review and examine the concept and practice of German cultural diplomacy. It first explains the concept and significance of cultural diplomacy and its linkage to the promotion of country's image abroad. It then analyzes the German view and practice of cultural diplomacy. The paper finally outlines the German public image on a concrete case study of Spanish public opinion surveys.

Spain is a good example of a country, in which German cultural diplomacy is focused above all on transmitting a modern and appealing image of Germany and intensifying further cooperation between the two countries. For the public interest for Germany – especially its role inside the European Union (EU) framework – is relatively high in Spain, it would be interesting to see if and how the recent negative movements in Spanish-German relations affected the image of Germany in this country and how the cultural diplomacy could 'save' this.

Two principal questions are to be addressed: Firstly, how is the German cultural diplomacy officially seen and defined by the respective actors or institutions; and consequently, how is it

implemented. The analysis in this first part will therefore focus on the comparison between what the official German politics “believes” is a German model of cultural diplomacy and what it “delivers” according to this framework. And secondly, based on the empirical findings from the case study of Spanish public opinion, the focus will be put on to what extent the delivered image of Germany is actually perceived by a foreign public, i.e. in what way Germany is perceived in Spain.

The two research hypotheses are therefore analyzing the patterns of perception and impact of German cultural diplomacy from two different research angles and with two different methodological approaches:

Hypothesis 1: German cultural diplomacy work matches the official view on cultural diplomacy and is in line with foreign political guidelines.

Hypothesis 2: Public perception of Germany in Spain matches the given objectives of German cultural diplomacy.²

Structurally, the work is split into three parts. The first part is dedicated to the theoretical background, where the main theoretical concepts and definitions dealing with cultural diplomacy and image management are explained. The second part then deals with the German cultural diplomacy specifically: it first outlines briefly the German foreign-political character and places cultural diplomacy as part of it; and secondly, it investigates its aim and goals, structure, actors and program (i.e. main initiatives and projects). Special attention is, as pointed before, put on the comparison between the understanding and implementation of German cultural diplomacy. This then to certain extent serves also to explain the third part, where practical data on the perception of Germany on the side of foreign public are presented on a case study of Spain, taking into account that other circumstances apart from German cultural diplomacy might as well affect the perception of Germany on the side of Spanish public. In theoretical part we will use mostly the secondary sources, whereas in the practical or research part these will be supplemented also by the primary sources and, where necessary, historical analysis.

² These are: raising awareness about Germany, promoting learning of German language, transforming ‘cool’ and modern image about Germany, and winning support and sympathy for Germany and its foreign policy.

1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CLASSIFICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Numerous labels and concepts are used to express external (re)presentation of a state: public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, cultural cooperation, intercultural dialogue, image management, nation branding, state propaganda, international public relations (PR), soft power, etc. To make it clearer what the following thesis is dealing with, we should first understand some basic concepts and definitions connected with cultural diplomacy. In the following paragraphs I will describe public diplomacy, soft power, image management and finally cultural diplomacy.

1.1 Public diplomacy

There are several definitions or better said interpretations of the term public diplomacy in today's political realm. United States Information Agency (USIA), now integrated into the U.S. Department of State, and the German Foreign Ministry for example explain their public diplomacies as follows:

“Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences” (USIA Strategic Plan 1997–2002).

“Public diplomacy seeks to stimulate interest in Germany, to explain German foreign and domestic policy, to provide information on and discuss developments in society, to promote understanding of our value system through dialogue and to build up lasting ties with Germany” (in Zöllner 2009, 263).

As can be immediately noticed, both definitions emphasize that public diplomacy is an instrument serving the goals of foreign policy. Since enforcement of country's own interests and values by influencing the behaviour of other actors is the essential element of foreign policy,³ public diplomacy can be therefore understood as the means of foreign policy, through which countries try to explain and promote their national interest or value system. Like this the main actor or better said coordinator of public diplomacy is usually the ministry for foreign affairs (with its diplomatic network). However, the performers or executors of public

³ This is defined by Petrič (1998, 878) as “the activity of state, respectively its organs, through which the state tries to carry out its own values and goals in relation with other actors (mostly states) in international environment with means and methods available”.

diplomacy can also be other ministries, institutions, or even nongovernmental organizations and individuals (Noya 2007, 108).

Further on, above mentioned definitions also share the assumption that opinions, attitudes and behaviour of citizens of other countries are important to governments, having a clear impact on foreign policy. One of the essential reasons for growing importance of public diplomacy is therefore growing importance of international public (Pettersson 2003, 211). This shift, which on one hand reflects the increase of knowledge and on the other its potential ‘power’, is what makes the public opinion being taken more into account in international relations. As a consequence, countries today take more care of their international image because, as proven for example during the Cold War period or in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, foreign public opinion plays an important role in influencing one country’s foreign politics (Leonard 2005, 5).

Also important for understanding public diplomacy is Manheim’s (1994, 4) classification of diplomatic relations, according to different levels of communication or actors involved:

- Government-to-government communication (traditional form of diplomacy): the formal exchange of communications between the countries;
- Diplomat-to-diplomat communication: diplomacy that analyzes and regulates the interactions between those persons involved in diplomatic activities;
- And additionally between the two types of public diplomacy:
 - People-to-people communication, under which fall cultural and educational exchanges, as for example the U.S. Fulbright Program or German DAAD scholarships.
 - Government-to-people communication, which is public diplomacy itself: “All activities of one nation’s government designed to influence the general public or the elites of another nation in order to facilitate the objectives of foreign policy” (Manheim 1994, 4).⁴

⁴ A good example here would be an IPS-Scholarship (*Internationales Parlaments-Stipendium*) given yearly by the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) to around 120 young people from Eastern, South-Eastern and

Leonard *et al.* (2002, 9) outline four purposes of public diplomacy: 1. *increasing familiarity*: making people think about your country and updating their image of it; 2. *increasing appreciation*: creating positive perceptions of your country and getting others to see issues from your perspective; 3. *engaging people*: encouraging people to see your country as an attractive destination for tourism and study, or encouraging them to buy its products and subscribe to its values; 4. *influencing people's behaviour*: getting companies to invest, encouraging public support for your country's positions, and convincing politicians to turn to it as an ally.

The fundamental goal of public diplomacy is therefore to influence the attitudes of foreign public for different purposes; be it to influence the behaviour of a foreign government indirectly or for economic reasons. For this, public diplomacy policies carry out tasks of three types: informational, educational and cultural (Brown 2002). Nevertheless, there are several problems, which might stem from this. One of them is given in the matter of information: public diplomacy should provide neutral information, without trying to deceive the audience, or else has a propaganda nature (Brown 2002). Notwithstanding, for some analysts public diplomacy does already present a sophisticated form of propaganda or at least they point to the interconnectedness between these two concepts, when neglecting the negative connotation of the word propaganda (look Berridge 2002, 125; Plavšak Kranjc 2004, 6–13). However, it would be difficult to picture or describe today public diplomacy barely in the popular understanding of it as a manipulation of foreign public. This might be possible before, when the citizens were not able to access the various sources of information as (easily as) they do today.

1.1.1 Relation to the traditional diplomacy

Rosen and Wolf name several characteristics of public diplomacy in contrast to the “official” diplomacy: public diplomacy is public and transparent, whereas official diplomacy is opaque or even secret, and directed to very specific ‘parts’ of society, usually political and economic elites of another country; and secondly, public diplomacy seeks to always get to the general public, whereas official or conventional diplomacy always points to the governments of other countries (Rosen and Wolf 2005, 1).

Central Europe, Israel, France and United States enabling them to experience and learn how the German model of democracy works “from the inside” (Bundestag: International Parliamentary Scholarship).

We must bear in mind however that traditional diplomacy has never been totally indifferent to public opinion neither. As Jonsson and Hall write, “official communication aimed at foreign publics is no new phenomenon in international relations. /.../ References to the nation and its image go as far back as the Bible, and international relations in ancient Greece and Rome, Byzantium and the Italian Renaissance were familiar with diplomatic activity aimed at foreign publics” (Jonsson and Hall 2005, 3). Therefore, instead of differentiating the traditional and public diplomacy we should according to Riordan discuss and practice these two ‘forms’ complementarily (Riordan 2005, 142).

On the other hand, public diplomacy also serves as a stage of continuity, by maintaining the link of communication between countries when formal diplomatic relations is whether damaged or broken (Brown 2002). Public diplomacy is therefore a means of traditional diplomacy as long as it opens opportunities for contacts between people, which can eventually transform into official ties, but it is also useful in times when traditional diplomacy fails, for it allows continuity of relations between the countries when formal negotiations fail permanently or are temporarily put on hold.

1.2 Soft Power

Inherent within all public diplomacy work is Nye’s idea of soft power. While hard power is usually seen as the ability to coerce (through military or economic means), soft power is the ability to attract and persuade, attractiveness that steams from country’s culture, policies, values, ideals and behaviour (Nye 2003, 30). It is a structural face of the power: the ability to achieve the desired results without having to force people to change their behaviour through payments or threats (Nye 2004, 256). In other words, if one country is able to convince others that they share the same values or ideals, which are leading to the same goals, then the use of ‘stick and carrot’ is no longer necessary.

In definition, soft power is therefore the ability to “get others to want what you want” (Nye 2004, 256). Therefore, soft power is also the ability to shape the agenda of other actors. The author stresses that it is an indirect way of exercising power: a country can get the results it wants, because other countries want to follow its lead, admiring its values, emulating its example, and aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness (Nye 2003, 30). In basis, the notion of soft power therefore comprises two very different skills: ability to attract or to seduce (persuasion); and ability to set preferences (ideology).

1.3 Image management

As an important objective behind the public diplomacy activities is also the positive projection of country's image before the international public – in opinion of Szondi (2009, 297) these two are even “recurrent terms” – we should dedicate few lines here to the concept and role of image, i.e. image management. Image management for countries is not a new phenomenon, countries have long engaged in its cultivation (Kunczik 2003, 400–404; Melissen 2005, 3–4).

Each state directs its image outside the borders the moment it is perceived and known by the citizens of another country. To understand concrete actions of public diplomacy that make real changes in the international realm we should according to Noya (2007, 27) understand first, that it is country's image that influences behind foreign policy. In this respect we can say that public diplomacy is mostly about perceptions, attitudes and images. Creating and promoting a positive image of a country remains the ultimate, but also the hardest measurable goal of public diplomacy (Szondi 2009, 298).⁵ Rainer Hülse (2007, 5–7) in this context argues that we are in the middle of a paradigm-shift, where foreign policy becomes foreign image policy, popularity becomes more important than (material) power, and country's actions become guided by the logic of attractiveness rather than by the logics of consequentiality or appropriateness (see also Fougner 2006, 165).

Images that states have about each other are a major factor of relevance for their mutual relations. The image of one state is perception of past or present experiences and future expectations, as recognized economist Kenneth Boulding already at the end of the 50s. The state image(s) and international system, he argued, are formed through mixture of processes of past narratives, memories and conversations, upgraded by quantity of (many times badly formed) information (Boulding 1959, 120). The image may refer to the country in general or to a certain aspects of it, as for example its economy, politics, or even to the people, that means nation as a whole. And as often proves to be the case, the positive evolution of the first one does not necessarily repeat itself in respect of the second one (Boulding 1959, 120).

The images of countries can be divided into different aspects. There are number of labels that are treated as interchangeable in the analysis of the image of countries: stereotypes and

⁵ Szondi (2009, 298) further argues that instead of a positive image it is more appropriate to speak and search for a positive reputation as the overall goal for countries; for reputation must be earned, while images can be created, manipulated, and they do not always reflect or represent reality.

prejudices about the people, confidence or reliability between people and between governments, prestige of culture, institutional reputation etc. A good example in this respect is Anholt Nation Brand Index, measuring people's perceptions of a country across six areas of national competence: tourism, exports, politics, investment and immigration, culture, people (look the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index 2011):

According to Anholt (2005, 297), tourism is the most visible dimension among all. Countries spend each year more on the promotion of tourism abroad (look the UNWTO World Tourism Barometer 2011). According to the World Tourism Organisation (WTO), Germany is on the top among countries in spending on tourism or tourist promotion, however only on the sixth place in receiving them (UNWTO World Tourism Barometer 2011, 7–9). Exports are becoming more and more important as well. The “made in” affection, preference for products and services from a certain country are slowly becoming a key aspect of the external image.⁶ On the political side the perception of inner politics is measured, evaluating if the government of a country is democratic and effective, but the survey also evaluates country's foreign policy, i.e. if the country is contributing to global peace and security. The fifth pillar is the culture, under which cultural heritage of a country is evaluated. Finally, the sixth and final side of the hexagon are the people. This on one hand includes human capital – a willingness to host people from a particular country – but also questions the hospitality of the country's nationals or citizens.

1.3.1 State's international reputation

Image is often used as a synonym for concepts such as reputation, perception, credibility, attitude, and image management sometimes understood as impression management (Szondi 2009, 298). Desire for recognition and moral credibility has always been one of the reasons for the external action of the states. As says Leonard: “Image and reputation of a country are public goods that can create an environment beneficial or deleterious for the transactions of individual actors” (Leonard *et al* 2002, 8–9).

⁶ In the framework of the ‘globalisation discourse’, image is believed to become increasingly linked also to the economic matters. States thus stopped being (potential) enemies in political terms, but instead became more and more competitive in economic terms (Cerny 1997, 251). In this new ‘self-definition’ they are said to be competing with each other for foreign investments, tourists, skilled labour etc. (van Ham 2002, 255).

Mercer for example also connects state reputation to the security issue, in a way that it influences the behaviour of other actors towards that state. Although he comes to the conclusion that state's behaviour towards another state is not always influenced by that state's reputation, it nonetheless assumes that the other state's actions will depend as well on its reputation (Mercer 1996, 14–74).

1.3.2 Image management: Public diplomacy and nation branding

Managing an image of a country should always take into account two variables: the visibility and valence (Manheim 1994, 132). Visibility is the degree of recognition that one country has in another, which is measured in terms of variables such as frequency of their appearance in the media, social networking (travel, friends, etc.), and cultural exchanges. Valence, on the other hand, is the evaluation of the country, based on the attractiveness that this country has for the one assigning the value, which can be positive or negative (*ibid.*).

The principles and tools of communication described above are valid for public diplomacy and nation branding. Public diplomacy is of a more political character and therefore appropriate for more 'powerful' states, with international influence. While nation branding, on the other hand, is with less political and more commercial profile, usually carried out from countries with less weight on the international scene, but an objective to achieve it. The policies of nation branding are often a projection of national identity. At the bottom line it is the same as with commercial brands (van Ham 2002, 264). Brands are not only useful to sell more goods and services, but also serve to unite the company, especially when it comes to working in multinational countries and in very different cultures (*ibid.*).

This way public diplomacy too contributes to the image management in international politics. The 9/11 terrorist attacks showed for example that a negative image of a country abroad may not only cause economic, but also serious security problems.⁷ The opinion of a foreign public over one country and its policies in the world – that is how a foreign public sees and accepts one country – therefore now became central also to the security questions. How states are able to cope with the challenges posed by non-state actors (terrorists) as well as by other states

⁷ The 9/11 terrorist attacks were suppose to happen because of the hatred for the U.S. and the whole 'western system' in the Muslim countries. The negative image of the U.S. among the people on Arab streets was then trying to be 'improved' by activating different public diplomacy tools and "winning peoples' hearts and minds" (van Ham 2003, 427–8).

(their competitors in the global marketplace), is found to depend exactly on the state's image and its management through public diplomacy (Hülse 2007, 9).

Looking ahead, the question is to what extent the soft power may (eventually) become more important than the hard power? In any case, the 'manipulation' of state's image meets the constraints and limits imposed to it by reality, because to be credible, a state's image cannot be created from the scratch, that is neglecting the weight of history, culture, etc.

1.4 Cultural diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy can be described as that part or form of public diplomacy, which uses communication through cultural activities (different cultural and educational programs, language promotion, exhibitions, conferences etc.). It is therefore a "tender-minded" way of public diplomacy, to use the words of Signitzer and Coombs (1992, 140–2). If public diplomacy incorporates political informing and communication with a goal to influence views of foreign public, then cultural diplomacy tries to do it without direct persuasion; it tries to do it more subtleness through understanding, knowing and trusting each other, as a consequence of intercultural ties (*ibid.*). Undoubtedly, cultural diplomacy is the historical background and the core basis of public diplomacy. For that reason the labels of cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy are (sometimes) treated as interchangeable.

At the same time cultural diplomacy remains within the lines of classical diplomatic functions of cultural departments at the embassies, promoting friendly relations between the foreign and host country with developing good cultural and scientific cooperation. Culture represents a positive agenda for it is not 'burdened' with the weight of the all time changing political circumstances and relations between the states and like this serves also as a means of rapprochement of states in conflict (US Department of State 2005, 2). An important element of cultural diplomacy is therefore that it serves to improve international relations, as says Mark Donfried. "In its broadest terms, cultural diplomacy is the ability to communicate internationally through culture, values, and ideas. /.../ The idea behind such ventures is always the same: to improve international relations by making others like your country" (Donfried 2008).⁸ This view corresponds good also to the Cummings's definition of cultural diplomacy,

⁸ In the context of image management or nation-branding theory one could hence even ask themselves what is the cause and consequence here: is the cultural diplomacy improving international relations by making others 'like your country' or is it about improving international relations, with the aim for making others like your country.

who defines it as: “exchange of ideas, information, art and other cultural sights between nations and people, with an aim to develop mutual understanding” (Cummings 2003, 1). However, Cummings is in his definition more concentrated on international cultural cooperation and exchange, neglecting the ‘political’ dimension of it, which is that cultural diplomacy can serve (or serves) also country’s national interest, hidden behind the programs.

Mitchell (1986), on the other hand, differentiates between cultural diplomacy and cultural cooperation. Cultural diplomacy has, according to Mitchell two levels of meaning: one refers to the negotiation of formal cultural agreements, the other applies to the “execution” of these and the conduct of cultural relations (Mitchell 1986, 4). This may be seen either as the “extended responsibility of governments or as something delegated by governments to agencies and cultural institutions” (Mitchell 1986, 4). The goal of cultural diplomacy is therefore to produce positive attitudes towards one’s country with the hope that this may be beneficial to over-all diplomatic goal achievements, while cultural cooperation is resulting in mutual benefit of both countries, therefore moving from unilateral to bilateral or multilateral advantages: “at their most effective, their purpose is to achieve understanding and cooperation between national societies for their mutual benefit” (Mitchell 1986, 5).

Further on, cultural diplomacy is (as public) not only about bridging conflicting situations or building stronger fundamentals for cooperation between countries, it is also about winning approval and legitimization for country’s own actions in the eyes of the foreign public. This makes it a subtle form of influencing foreign government activities and decisions by influencing the people’s perceptions through well-considered cultural activities (Signitzer and Coombs 1992, 138). Mette Lending in this respect argues that “cultural exchange is not only ‘art’ and ‘culture’ but also communicating a country’s thinking, research, journalism and national debate. In this perspective, the traditional areas of cultural exchange become part of a new type of international communication and the growth of public diplomacy becomes a reaction to the close connection between cultural, press and information activities, as a result of new social, economic and political realities” (Lending 2000, 13–14). Cultural institutes subsequently prefer to keep the term ‘cultural relations’ for their own activities, serving the national interest indirectly by means of trust-building abroad. Cultural relations are in this view distinct from public diplomacy, in the sense that they represent the non-governmental voice in transnational relations (Melissen 2005, 22).

To contribute more effectively to foreign policy goals, it is however important to enable cultural diplomacy to reach its full potential. “The practice needs to be understood better, particularly its contributions to national image, branding and /domestic/ social cohesion” (Mark 2009, 1). In presenting a national image abroad, cultural diplomacy can therefore overcome audience suspicion of official messages and serve to provide as well substance to national reputation (*ibid.*).

Cultural diplomacy can be however a double edged sword. The first limitation of cultural diplomacy is the ambivalence of culture: “The malleability of culture /.../ makes it difficult to measure the effects of cultural diplomacy” (Rose and Wadham-Smith 2004, 17). This, however, has as a result also uncertainty about its results, as the greater knowledge of another public does not automatically translate into greater sympathy (Austin 2005, 8).

There are additional component worth mentioning when speaking about cultural diplomacy. First thing is the two-way communication of cultural diplomacy. If in public diplomacy the government is interested only in how to present its message in a most effective way to the foreign public, the cultural policy is interested also in knowing the specifics of foreign culture and based on adapting the content of the message. By doing so, the exchange of material and immaterial components (in form of views, values, ideology and way of life) is operating in both ways. In words of Lynch (2005, 16), cultural diplomacy simply should not consist in talking, but “paying attention to how others hear what is being said”. In this way cultural diplomacy and its two-way communication touches upon the Habermas’s vision of ethical communication or the so called “discourse ethics” (Habermas 1999). This is supposed to move away from the ‘monological’ approach and rather encompass full, open, and non-coercive dialogue aimed at achieving consensus: “discourse ethics prefers to view shared understanding about the generalizability of interests as the result of an intersubjectively mounted public discourse” (Habermas 1999, 203).

And the second component is time. While public diplomacy has more short- or middle termed goals, with immediately seen results (for example getting a broad support for current specific state policy), cultural diplomacy is more of a long term investment, which make it again difficult to measure its (un)success (Cummings 2003, 2; Sablosky 2003, 2). That is why it is more of a ‘belief’ that the things are really functioning or working good. On the other hand, as Nye points out, the effects of cultural diplomacy also depend a lot on the specific field we are

looking at. Exchanges of people in educational field are for example much more (or sooner) visible than exchanges of influence or ‘trends’ in popular culture (Nye 2004, 46).

1.4.1 Factors of Influence

There are several factors that pull the demand for cultural diplomacy. Two of the most traditional reasons on the side of foreign policy are the security and political reasons. In a changed international environment after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, more and more of today’s world conflicts seem to find their roots in distinctness between different cultures and religions. For one of the main tasks and challenges of cultural diplomacy is exactly bridging the conflicts and building mutual trust and understanding, culture in this respect represents a positive agenda for cooperation and trust-building. As argue Martin Rose and Nick Wadham-Smith (2004, 34–5), diplomacy is not primarily about building trust, but about achieving specific, policy-driven transactional objectives. “Trust is often a by-product of diplomacy” (*ibid.*), but tends to be in the shorter rather than the longer term. Cultural diplomacy is thus important for it tends to achieve trust with the ‘long-term affecting’.

On the side of political reasons, cultural diplomacy is (as mentioned) important for winning approval and legitimization for country’s own actions in the eyes of the foreign public. It is about making the others see the world through country’s own value system or its ‘lenses’. Different scholarship programmes, student exchanges or cultural institutes are therefore not only a ticket to new experiences or better possibilities for individuals, they are first and foremost means of socializing these individuals in the host country’s own way of life or telling its own version of a ‘narrative’. Different countries thus develop models of cultural diplomacy suited to their global outlook, capacity and pre-existing profile (Bound *et al.* 2007, 23).

For the purpose of this master work and better analysis of German cultural diplomacy in continuation, I will therefore consider all the above mentioned aspects and use the definition of cultural diplomacy in its broadest sense, looking at it as *part of public diplomacy and image management of one country, which tries to achieve the goals of its foreign policy through culturally-oriented work (later being understood as an exchange of values and good-practice through exchange of people and their work in the field of art, culture, education and sport, but also as intercultural dialogue).*

2 GERMANY AND GERMAN CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Since country's reunification in 1989/90, Germany has been struggling with the task to define its new role in the world. Will this new most populous EU member state (with approx. 82 million inhabitants), an economic giant (the world's number four and Europe's number one as per gross domestic product),⁹ and a cultural bridge between European 'East' and 'West' eventually come to dominate European politics? What role should it play in connection with the international military interventions, still being carefully limited? Or in the words of Oliver Zöllner (2009, 262): "what is, or should be, Germany's modern identity, her image, and her message to the world?" To better understand German engagement in the field of cultural diplomacy, we should therefore dedicate first few lines to the German foreign-political character.

2.1 Introduction: German foreign-political character

It is sometimes hard to underline or show clearly the nature of German foreign-political character today. In literature, it is mostly described as a: civil force, engine of European integration processes, transatlantic ally, economic power and mediator between the eastern and western Europe (Hyde-Price 2000, 6; Bulmer *et al.* 2000, 127; Harnisch and Maull 2001, 128; Schmalz 2002, 515). In line with these broad indications of the German character, we can describe Germany today as a postmodern country, one which voluntarily accepts limits on its sovereignty, avoids the use of military power, works in the framework of multilateralism or international law and norms, and pursues goals related to the well-being rather than the warfare (Rittberger and Wagner 2001, 315–6).

With the reunification of Germany at the end of the Cold War, the fear from the 'new European giant' arose again, especially by its surrounding countries (namely France and Poland), but also other European powers. While the division of Germany after the World War Two had been deliberately designed to limit German power, which had been big enough to destabilize Europe twice, reunification now removed the limitations to German power. As it was soon agreed, the reunification had largely changed Germany's position in Europe in many ways. Firstly, the 'new' Germany was bigger in its territory, population and its economy. Secondly, Germany gained back full sovereignty as a result of the Two-plus-Four

⁹ Look the World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2011).

Treaty.¹⁰ Finally, after the end of the East-West conflict, Germany was no longer located at the front line of a global conflict, but right in the middle of Europe (Rittberger 2001, 1). Consequently, there were fears in Europe that this gain in power would make Germany to change its foreign policy and become a destabilizing factor in Europe again. The renewed fear had been a result of mainly three factors: economic (the fear of economic power, particularly the expansion of German multinationals), political (the fear of political control over the EU) and finally social (the vision of the Germans as xenophobic people as a result of the holocaust) (Ozment 2005, 322). However, due to the policy of self-restraint and discretion, Germany seemed able to calm down all these fears (Rittberger 2001, 1).

On the other hand, reunified Germany caused also a rise of interest and respect for Germany. Hoffmann and Mass sum up good this ambivalence in new German position: “Five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain there are more questions than convincing answers. On one hand Germany’s image in the world has many spots and certainly is a distorted picture. On the other, the interest in Germany and in the collaboration with German partners has never been greater” (Hoffmann and Maaß 1994, 7). This ambivalence towards the central role of Germany in the EU is also reflected in the attitude of political elites during the so called ‘processes of deepening’, especially in the context of the monetary union. On the one hand, the model along the lines of monetary policy and the role of German Central Bank was interpreted as a sign of the hegemony of the new central European power; at the same time it was thought that the sacrifice of the German Mark to enter the Euro was a way of submission of Germany to the “European designs” (Jopp 2002, 17).

Indeed, as often highlighted by German foreign minister Westerwelle in his public speeches, German foreign policy today is defined as a peace-policy or “*Friedenspolitik*” (German Representative Office: *Deutsche Außenpolitik ist Friedenspolitik*). Looking at the priorities, later are divided into: peace policy, European policy, diplomatic relations, support for foreign trade and investments, promotion of cultural dialogue, promotion or improvement of

¹⁰ Two-Plus-Four Treaty or the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany”, signed between The Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on 12th September 1990; confirming the unification of Germany and establishing Germany as a state with definitive borders, limiting its weapons and military forces, regulating the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and permitting its continued membership in NATO. Available at: <http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/372800/publicationFile/153338/ZweiPlusVierVertrag.pdf;jsessionid=581F2155D80CFA5E6FD7179906113868> (26.9.2011).

country's good image abroad, and protection and assistance to German citizens abroad (Auswärtiges Amt: Foreign & European Policy).

2.2 Understanding German cultural diplomacy

German understanding of cultural diplomacy is in a big part based on history, more precisely on the painful experiences of the twentieth century. The disastrous misuse or even abuse of culture for political propaganda of the Third Reich meant that a new beginning was urgently needed after the end of the Second World War, which explains the rejection of any politicization of international communication. Therefore Germany has always privileged the soft or subtle cultural aspects in its approach of "reaching to the world" (Hemery 2006, 201). "Rebuilding trust", an expression coined as the leading motive for the work of the Goethe-Institut, was the 'dictation' on which German understanding of cultural diplomacy work has been based after the war (Spiegel 2002).

Alongside classical and economic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy (the so called foreign cultural and education policy) forms the third cornerstone of German foreign policy.¹¹ As stated on the webpage of the German Federal Foreign Office, the main objective of its foreign cultural and educational policy is to "present Germany as a country with a lively, multifaceted and internationally renowned cultural scene, to strengthen Germany as a location of higher education, to promote interest in the German language, to contribute to international crisis and conflict prevention, and to create a stable foundation for international relations by fostering dialogue" (Auswärtiges Amt 2011a).¹² The basic 'logic' behind it is therefore the promoting of Germany with communicating the modern and 'multifaceted' identity of it, but also the dialogic approach in solving the international tensions.

There are several tasks and focuses on which German cultural diplomacy is working on: promotion of German language abroad; advocating global educational exchange and strengthening Germany as higher-educational and scientific destination; promotion and transfer of art and culture from Germany to other countries; conflict prevention through

¹¹ The term "cultural diplomacy" is rather rarely used in German political terminology. Instead more used terms in German language are "ausenpolitische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit" (foreign-policy public relations) or "auswärtige Kulturpolitik" (foreign cultural policy).

¹² The German Bundestag makes available almost 0.5 percent of the national budget for this policy, and the number has been on the rise in the past few years (in 2009 a total of 1.436 million euros were provided for foreign cultural and education policy activities. For 2010 funding was increased to 1.513 million euros) (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government).

intercultural dialogue; winning sympathy for Germany and mediation of modern image of Germany; support for European integration process; and promotion of general objectives of German foreign policy (Auswärtiges Amt – Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit 2011, 9). To sum up, we can say German cultural diplomacy is essential element of German foreign policy in mainly three aspects: working for stronger Europe, securing peace, and maintaining good relations with already established partners and/or formation of new ones (Auswärtiges Amt 2011b, 3). In addition I will analyze a little bit more the German view on cultural diplomacy through the historical overview and the analysis of its structure, main actors and programmes.

2.3 Recent history and development of German Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy is nothing new to Germany and its foreign politics, however its today's usage, content and management is quite different from the one before or from some other examples in the world. Unlike in France for example, where culture and cultural activities had always been at the heart of its foreign policy, in Germany this played for a long time a subordinate role, intended simply to keep alive the German language and culture among migrant communities abroad (Znined-Brand 1999, 32).

After the Second World War, however, German leaders were aware of the need to improve Germany's image in the world. In United States for example, Jewish PR company was hired to represent West Germany and reinforce the message of "belonging to the western world" by emphasising the country's cultural achievements and commitment to quality (Aspden 2004, 13). In 1951 Konrad Adenauer won the support of groups like the American Council in Germany and the Society for the Prevention of World War Three and won a positive attitude towards the efforts for reconstruction of Germany (*ibid.*). But it has been under the famous Kanzler Willy Brandt in 70s, also known for his policy of reconciliation with the East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union (the so called *Ostpolitik*), that the importance of foreign cultural policy has been placed at the same level as the security and economic diplomacy and named the "third pillar" of German foreign policy (Bach 2011).

At the end of the 80s and early 90s changes in the international environment favoured the German language and culture and encouraged a change of strategy in German cultural diplomacy. From a strategic perspective, the main change occurred with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany. By the end of the 90s cultural activities outside of Germany already started to pay more attention to the Eastern Europe and the Baltic region, in which Goethe-Institut opened a dozen of new centres (Müller 1992, 131; Goethe-Institut:

History). Once the Soviet Union moved out of these two regions, the countries enhanced their interest and demand in German as the language of instruction for trade and economic relations with the new ‘German giant’; whereas expectations, steaming from the new German capacities, at the same time followed this demand also in the rest of Europe (Harnisch 2000, 10–12).

Given these expectations, Germany followed a policy of restraint and discretion, however starting also to show clear ‘appetite’ for a bigger role played on the international scene, especially in Europe. Later can be noticed in the rhetoric of Kanzler Kohl, who said: “United Germany is number one in Europe. We have about 80 million people. We are the country with the strongest economy, we are particularly well organized. We have our pluses and minuses. But taking everything together we will not get into trouble, if we take our place in the /European/ house. Naturally the others accept that we will need the biggest flat” (in Harnisch 2000, 8). Subsequently, Germany at that time also started its plea for German language becoming one of the official working languages in the European institutions (alongside English and French), a wish that has been till today also successfully ‘answered’.

The traditional communication of “what is Germany” has been finally with the new era after reunification joined by the targeted and active search for old and new partners for intercultural dialogue, exchange and cooperation (Spiegel 2002). This produced the shift towards new cultural diplomacy, where cultural relations are no longer only about one’s culture and society, but also about dialogue, exchange and cooperation between different cultures and people. Zöllner (2009) in this context even speaks about this new or current German cultural diplomacy as the “dialogue between cultures”. Ultimately it is, however, also about opening perspectives for the better international relations, by enhancing Germany’s reputation as a reliable and credible partner and building networks crucial to the political and economic cooperation (Auswärtiges Amt – Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit 2011, 7). As we can see, cultural diplomacy therefore serves vital interests and goals of German foreign policy, as named at the beginning.

Among recent developments should also be noted the strong emphasize that German government put on the Muslim world after the 9/11 events. German Foreign Office for example appointed a supervisor for dialogue with Islam to oversee the “European-Islamic Cultural Dialogue”. Later includes a website (www.qantara.de) about German and Muslim culture and politics, as well as seminars and exchanges run by respective German cultural

organisations (look Taylor 2006, 25–6). Additionally, the Foreign Office also opened a German Information Centre in Cairo, which informs journalists about the official government positions and seeks to give Germany a platform, from which to become more present in the Arab media (Auswärtiges Amt: German Information Centres). German universities as well opened three universities in Egypt, Jordan and Syria, with the support of public and private funds and the guidance of the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt: German Universities Abroad). Since 2003, ifa edits the online magazine Nafas (literally: “Breath”), which focuses on art in the Muslim world and aims to contribute to a “real dialog among cultures”, understood as “communication between individuals from different cultural realms who grant each other self-determined and also changing identities, and who do not deduce these, as rigid constructs, from the mere origin of the other” (Nafas, art magazine). Taking into account all these projects, there is no doubt that a “dialogue of cultures,” especially one with the Muslim world, is a high priority of the German cultural diplomacy. A question that remains is, however, why is (inter)cultural dialogue so important for Germany and why is it particularly interested for the one with the Muslim world? Apart from the U.S. position, who clearly suffered deterioration of its image in the Muslim world, there is no such case for Germany, at least not in the Muslim world abroad. Is this then one of the approaches Germany is taking in solving its problems with multiculturalism and integration of immigrants at home? Or perhaps is Germany’s interest purely the one of cultural diplomacy – improving the international relations by producing mutual understanding between the countries and nations – without any ‘hidden’ national interests or intensions. Nevertheless, German approach does integrate a large number of mutually contradictory actors and positions on both sides, which is a precondition for any kind of dialogue to be truly meaningful in the first place.

2.4 Organization and management of German cultural diplomacy

Beside strong impact of historical experiences and present development on its content, further (structural) feature of the German cultural diplomacy is the official state classification of foreign relations as a federal matter, while the 16 federal states or Länder are responsible for the fields of culture and education. This division means that a good cooperation between the ministers of education and cultural affairs of the Länder is needed for the success of German cultural diplomacy (Spiegel 2002). For this reason the intermediary organizations (such as the Goethe-Institut, DAAD and others), removed from the federal government, are more convenient partners and performers of country’s overall cultural diplomacy (*ibid.*).

A very important and unique aspect of German cultural diplomacy is therefore its management and the role of different cultural institutes abroad. The German Foreign Office is the principal but not sole player in conducting this ‘cultural’ mission abroad. A considerable proportion of country’s foreign cultural activities and relations are as said fostered by the Länder, other Federal Ministries as well as local authorities and private institutions. Respectively, the network of different actors and programmes, performing a cultural-diplomatic work is quite extended, with many institutes having also their own programmes and financial resources, making the distinction between the ‘policy initiator’ and ‘policy performer’ sometimes quite blurred.

2.5 Actors

As said, political guidelines establishing the priorities for German cultural diplomacy are formulated and coordinated by the German Federal Foreign Office. Later however delegates the execution of it to the independent cultural organizations and political foundations, such as the Goethe-Institut, German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (ifa), Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Central Agency for Schools Abroad (ZfA), Deutsche Welle, German UNESCO Commission, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and others, along with the relevant funds from the federal budget. Accordingly bodies such as the DAAD and Alexander von Humboldt Foundation run also their own scholarship and travel grant programmes.

The organizations are in general free to create their own programmes, however they need to be coordinated and in line with the German foreign-political guidelines. In this connection the representations of these cultural organizations abroad also cooperate closely with the German embassies around the world. The tasks covered extend through many different fields of work: Goethe-Institut for example assists foreign teachers of German, organizes readings, theatre or film events and discussions, and (co)participates in various cultural and educational programmes, while ifa is primarily engaged in cultural dialogue (more about the work of Goethe-Institut and ifa later on).

Additionally, for the successful country promotion abroad, German Foreign Office also runs nine German Information Centres around the world (in Brasilia, Mexico, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, France and USA). They are designed to provide information about Germany in their host countries and gain support for German positions, waken interest in

Germany, as well as build understanding for German policies and German ‘way of life’ (look Auswärtiges Amt: German Information Centres). “The German Information Centres are intended to support the work of the embassies and highlight the activities of German intermediary organizations and partners in the areas of cultural relations and education policy, development cooperation and business in their respective regions” (*ibid.*).

2.5.1 The Goethe-Institut

Founded in 1951 by the German Academy in Munich, today Goethe-Institut is probably one of the most well-known and important ‘brands’ of German cultural diplomacy and its most networked cultural institution worldwide. Initial task was to provide further training for German teachers, but also helping to (re)shape German identity after the war through the language (Eckard 2004, 208). Today this non-profit German cultural organization continues promoting the study of German language abroad, encourages international cultural exchange, but also fosters knowledge about Germany by providing information on its culture, society and politics (Article 1 of the Basic Agreement).¹³ In the course of the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Goethe-Institut in July 2001, the philosophy of its founding years was cited: “The Goethe-Institut was to represent a country, which wanted a decentralized cultural relations policy /.../ and one which conveys not just its cultural values but also its inner turmoil and its reservations about itself”, referring with later to the socio-political dimension of its engagement (in Spiegel 2002).

According to the statistics provided by the Goethe-Institut, for its 50th anniversary in 2001 Goethe-Institut ran 15 Institutes in Germany, 128 Institutes and 57 libraries abroad and had 24.953 participants in its language courses at home and 153.083 abroad. Its budget (financial contributions from the Federal Foreign Office) consisted of around 434 million DM (cca. 221.9 million Euro) (Goethe-Institut: 60 Jahre Goethe-Institut). In comparison to this year’s 60th anniversary, the number of Institutes in Germany went down to 13, while the number of Institutes abroad rose to 136. The number of people taking German courses as well rose up till 31.833 at home and 185.235 abroad. In comparison to 2001 the amount of federal money assigned to Goethe-Institut is now higher (it consists of 290.3 million Euros) (*ibid.*).¹⁴

¹³ Basic Agreement, drawn up and signed between the Federal Republic of Germany, represented by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Goethe-Institut on 12th August 2004. Available at: <http://www.goethe.de/mmo/priv/3606214-STANDARD.pdf> (26.9.2011).

¹⁴ Budget Committee of the German parliament Bundestag for the first time substantially increased the funding available to the Goethe-Institut in 2007. Compared to 2006, the total income from public funds rose by 24.0

The cooperation between the Goethe-Institut and the Federal Republic of Germany (represented by the German Foreign Office) is governed by the Basic Agreement. It operates, as mentioned before, 136 institutes overseas.¹⁵ Each institute is assigned to a Regional Institute and offers language, cultural and information services focussed on the respective locations. Additionally Goethe-Institut also runs 11 liaison offices, whose mission and the programmes vary according to the requirements of their locations.¹⁶

As can be seen from the above presented data, since 2001 the German cultural diplomacy reduced the resources of the Goethe-Institut in Europe in order to steer them towards the Arab world and Asia. In late 2008, the Goethe-Institut launched also the “Culture and Development Initiative” to intensify and consolidate its activities in over fifty development cooperation countries. It began with conceptual focal points in Southern Asia, Southeast Asia and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Pilot programmes were carried out also in sub-Saharan Africa (Goethe Institute: Culture and Development Initiative). These figures show that Goethe-Institut is a very good networked and an extremely important player in German foreign policy and its cultural diplomacy.

Furthermore, beside promotion and teaching of German as a foreign language or presenting German cultural achievements worldwide, an important task is also the promotion of Europe and the ‘common European culture’ outside and inside the EU borders. As written in its statute, Goethe-Institut tries to “promote an understanding of Europe at a global level and develop common European perspectives. Within Europe, multilingualism and an awareness of European citizenship are essential for closer unity” (Goethe-Institut: Mission Statement). Indeed European focused cultural diplomacy is or might be an advantage for Germany, because it allows it to kill two birds at once. On one hand it ‘distracts’ the fear of the new

million Euro or 11.5%. Increases were generated in particular by income from language courses and examinations and from third party allocations (Goethe-Institut: Annual Report 2007/2008).

¹⁵ The list includes: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China (PRC), Côte d'Ivoire, Columbia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Gulf-Region (Abu Dhabi), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordania, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Vietnam SR (Goethe-Institut: Institutes Worldwide).

¹⁶ These are in: Dubai (United Arab Emirates), Havana (Cuba), Ho Chi-Minh City (Vietnam), Erbil (Iraq), Kano (Nigeria), Kigali (Ruanda), Lilongwe (Malawi), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Skopje (Macedonia), Teheran (Iran) and Ulan Bator (Mongolia) (Goethe-Institut: Institutes Worldwide).

central-European giant, while on the other seems like a good solution to compete with other globally spread cultures, such as the “American” one.

2.5.2 The Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations

The Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations), shorter ifa, is a mediator of German foreign cultural policy on behalf of the Federal Foreign Office. Ifa fosters cross-cultural understanding through international cooperation in all aspects of culture. It is responsible for designing and supporting the departure of German artists abroad, also operating as a centre of cultural documentation of interest to researchers and practitioners from artistic fields, providing a database of profiles and bibliographical information on German artists and architects (Statutes ifa 2003, 1). Additionally, it edits the *Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch* (Newspaper for cultural exchange) (ifa: About us).

Ifa is funded by the German Foreign Office, the State of Baden-Württemberg and the City of Stuttgart (ifa: About us). It was created already in 1917, and was put back into place after the war. Initially, the aim was to maintain and strengthen links with the community of Germans abroad. Since 2003, in cooperation with the Federal Foreign Office and other non-profit foundations, it has financed many cultural centres and programmes abroad, above all in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent States (*ibid.*).

2.5.3 DAAD

Academic exchange programs depend on a number of foundations and institutes, of which the best known is DAAD (*Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst* – German Academic Exchange Service), one of the most important in the world. DAAD lecturers teach German language, literature, culture and other subjects with a German connection at universities abroad. Furthermore, DAAD also arranges and supports study and research scholarships at German universities, as well as arranges scholarships for summer schools and language courses for ‘talented’ and ‘socially attentive’ foreign students (DAAD: About DAAD).

With an estimated budget of almost 348 million Euros in 2009, DAAD allocates half of this amount for the stays of foreign students and researchers in Germany and the rest, in equal shares, to the promotion of German language and culture abroad on the one hand, and educational cooperation with underdeveloped countries, on the other (DAAD: Annual Report 2009). It is in a big part also thanks to the successful work of the DAAD that Germany managed to establish itself as the third largest academic host country, with nearly 10 percent

of all students at German universities coming from abroad (Facts about Germany: Facts and figures).

The aim is therefore to invest in young talented students and to strengthen German as a major international language, however, also to advance interest in, knowledge of and understanding for Germany (Zöllner 2009, 265). Another goal of the DAAD is supporting economic and democratic reforms in developing countries through the promotion of academic and scientific advancement. As part of the general German objective to promote a Western–Muslim dialogue, the DAAD is also one of the sponsors of the German University in Cairo (look Auswärtiges Amt: German Universities Abroad).

Finally, educational exchanges are also performed through the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, established in 1953, and others like the Educational Exchange Service (PAD), the Central Office for Foreign Education, and the German Research Foundation (DF). The first of them, the Humboldt Foundation, is aimed especially at postgraduate students and researchers mostly in science, but also humanities and engineering (Humboldt Foundation: About Humboldt Foundation).

2.5.4 Central Agency for Schools Abroad

The Central Agency for Schools Abroad (*Zentralstelle für das Auslandsschulwesen – ZfA*) has an infrastructure of some 140 German schools abroad, with almost 81.000 pupils (ZfA: Deutsches Auslandsschulwesen in Zahlen 2010, 4). Additionally, it is also offering German school programmes in 870 schools in 66 countries (ZfA: Deutsches Auslandsschulwesen in Zahlen 2010, 8). ZfA promotes German schools abroad as well as language diploma schools in 95 countries by assigning German teachers abroad and providing them with support on pedagogical matters. It seeks “globally recognized qualifications in line with international standards and promotes quality oriented schools development” (ZfA: About ZfA). The activities of the ZfA therefore include: pedagogical and administrative consulting of the German schools and educational institutions abroad, preparation and further education for teachers, financial responsibility for German teachers abroad and program teachers, preparation for German and international certificates (for example also formation and performing of examinations of German as a foreign language (DaF) and the German Language Diploma (DSD) awarded by the Conference of Ministers of Culture), job-related education, and admission of grants in line with the foreign cultural and educational policy (*ibid.*).

2.5.5 Deutsche Welle

As for the mass media is concerned, German cultural diplomacy relies greatly on Deutsche Welle. Deutsche Welle Radio has an audience of some 140 million listeners, broadcasting in 30 languages; there are also a Deutsche Welle TV with programming in English, German and Spanish, and a web [dw-world.de](http://www.dw-world.de), a multimedia internet service in 31 (Deutsche Welle: About Deutsche Welle). Deutsche Welle is therefore another important actor in spreading and maintaining German language and culture through radio, television and internet tool.

Goals, as defined in the Deutsche Welle Act,¹⁷ reflect exactly what seems to be Germany's understanding of the country's cultural diplomacy. According to the Act the work of Deutsche Welle is intended to “convey the image of Germany as a cultural state in the European tradition and as a free and democratic constitutional state. /It/ should provide a forum in Europe and on other continents for German (and other) points of view on important topics, primarily in the areas of politics, culture, and economics, with the aim of promoting understanding and the exchange of ideas among different cultures and peoples. In so doing, Deutsche Welle shall, in particular, promote the German language” (Article 4).

Deutsche Welle can be thus described as a non-profit public institution for foreign broadcasting. Particularly during the Cold War era (but also still today) it served as an important source of information in countries with media censorship and biased reporting on domestic or international news (Deutsche Welle: About Deutsche Welle). Additionally, another important factor, for which Deutsche Welle keeps maintaining its TV and internet programmes still today, has also been the overall spread of English language and the ‘American culture’ in the media field. In words of the director of Deutsche Welle: “the growing domination of Anglo-American media in the audiovisual landscape requires a strengthening of the supply of foreign language services and international cooperation” (in Price 2002, 204).

2.5.6 Political foundations

A distinctive feature of German cultural diplomacy is also the particular significance of the financing of the German political parties or more precisely their foundations, such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of the Social Democratic Party SPD, and the Konrad Adenauer

¹⁷ Deutsche Welle Act, governing the Public Broadcasting Corporation “Deutsche Welle”, amendment by German Bundestag on 15th December 2004. Available at: http://www.dw-world.de/popups/popup_pdf/0,,694423,00.pdf (26.9.2011).

Foundation of conservative CDU/CSU. They perform a great amount of outdoor activities to promote democratization of countries in which they are placed, before especially in Latin America, now for example in China. Germany's political foundations are very largely financed by federal and Länder government funds. Most of them are project-related.

Friedrich Ebert Foundation has an annual budget of about 137 million Euros and a network of centres and offices in more than 100 countries (Friedrich-Ebert Foundation - Über die FES). Its objectives include, firstly, to build democratic political culture through political-educational programs, and secondly to facilitate access to higher education through scholarship programs for young people from different countries. Finally, it as well fosters cooperation and dialogue between countries to prevent conflicts (*ibid.*). Developed international projects are classified in the following fields:

- Economic and social development
- Information and socio-political education
- Media and communication
- Advice to political parties and social organizations

Almost half of the budget is given for cooperation with political parties, trade unions and NGOs (non-governmental organizations), differentiating programs between the developed and developing countries (Friedrich-Ebert Foundation - Über die FES). In the first group, the objective is especially to contribute to the dialogue among political forces and to prevent destabilizing conflicts. So far the foundation intensified its efforts in the processes of democratic transition in the countries of southern Europe, acting in the field of political dialogue, and it has been doing so recently also in the Eastern Europe, where the political objectives were being supplemented also by economic – to support the transition from a socialist economy to the market economy (Friedrich-Ebert Foundation – Mittel- und Osteuropa). On contrary, in developing countries stronger emphasis is put on strengthening of political parties and business- and labour organizations, on cooperation between the media to intensify the public sphere and on the North-South dialogue (Friedrich-Ebert Foundation – Africa Department).

Konrad Adenauer Foundation was established in 1956. It currently operates about 200 projects in more than 120 countries (Konrad-Adenauer Foundation: About Konrad Adenauer

Foundation). Like Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the funds come from the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Cooperation and Development. The objectives of foreign involvement as well do not differ substantially from the previous foundation, although as expected, more weight is given to Christian values and support of the CDU/CSU party line.

Other German political foundations, fulfilling the whole picture, include Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, Heinrich-Böll Foundation, Hanns-Seidel Foundation and the Rosa-Luxemburg Foundation.

2.6 Main Initiatives and the content of German cultural diplomacy

Examples of the German language and educational promotion are programmes such as “Schools: Partners of the Future” (shorter: PASCH) initiative, “Connecting worlds of knowledge” initiative, and many private or public scholarship programmes, giving talented young people from abroad a possibility to study in Germany. Besides giving young people the opportunity of learning German and enjoying German education, the PASCH initiative has been conceptualized also to stimulate interest in modern Germany and the German language amongst young people – especially in the priority regions of Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia (Auswärtiges Amt: PASCH).

Seeing that the number of people learning German abroad is declining, the Federal Foreign Office started in 2010 also with the “German – Language of Ideas” campaign. This is looking to get young people abroad interested in the German language, as well as to “encourage” decision makers in politics, education, commerce and in the media at home or abroad to support the promotion of German as a “foreign language worldwide” (Auswärtiges Amt: Deutsch – Sprache der Ideen).

Academic relations between Germany and the wider world are another important focus of German cultural diplomacy. All the activities, known as “research and academic relations policy”, are carried out in line with the Federal Government’s strategy to internationalize higher education and research in Germany (look Auswärtiges Amt: German Foreign Policy for more Education, Science and Research). The objective is to raise Germany’s international profile as a centre of learning and research and at the same time promote close cooperation with partners both in Germany and abroad (*ibid.*). Scholarships and academic exchanges are therefore the ‘winning combination’ of cultural diplomacy agenda for higher education and research. The data show that foreign students are increasingly opting for a German university

education, making Germany now the most popular place to study after the United States and Great Britain (Facts about Germany: Facts and figures).

“12 Worlds of Knowledge” initiative was produced in the course of the “Research and Academic Relations” initiative in 2009, with twelve researchers attesting to Germany’s importance as a centre of research and scholarship and illustrating their role as “bridge builders for international understanding and mutual respect” (Auswärtiges Amt: 12 Worlds of Knowledge). Germany is increasingly supporting also partnerships between German universities and universities in other parts of the world (such as in Kazakhstan, as well as also in Indonesia, China and Oman). In a number of cases this has resulted in new dual degree courses and even the founding of new universities like the German University in Cairo or most recently the German-Turkish University in Istanbul (Auswärtiges Amt: German Universities Abroad).

In the field of official country presentation and promotion in the world, Germany has so far produced a policy that tries to present it as a modern European nation of culture and a “Land of Ideas,” as the official slogan of country’s nation branding campaign says. As is described on its webpage: “Land of Ideas’ suits Germany. We are a land of poets and thinkers, engineers and inventors, and innovative products “made in Germany”. The term “idea” aptly describes the strengths of Germany, its people and its powers of innovation” (Germany – Land of Ideas).

Finally, on the side of development policy and intercultural dialogue, Federal Foreign Office launched the “Aktion Afrika” programme, through which it tries to intensify their cooperation with African countries (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) in the field of culture and education. Through the Ernst Reuter Initiative, Germany is trying to expand its cooperation with Turkey and under the motto “Germany and China – Moving Ahead Together”, a series of events in China is being planned that is supposed to be one of the biggest presentation of Germany abroad so far (Auswärtiges Amt: Interkultureller Dialog). An important actor here is also the Federal Cultural Foundation (*Bundeskulturstiftung*), with many programmes and projects on cross-border intercultural dialogue (Federal Cultural Foundation). Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Federal Foreign Office as well launched the already mentioned “European-Islamic Cultural Dialog” to help improve mutual understanding with the Muslim world (Auswärtiges Amt: Interkultureller Dialog). Zöllner (2009, 263) in this respect criticizes the ‘dialogue conceptualization’ of German cultural diplomacy, saying that it is

more based on the strategic action oriented to success, rather than on discursive or communicative action ('ethical communication'). Indeed this can be seen for example in the strategic selection of partner countries for cultural dialogue or in the placement of German centres abroad (China, Turkey, Russia, India, Brazil or some northern African countries), but also in the stated objectives of promoting Germany as an attractive location for investment, education and research in the so called "Land of Ideas" initiative.

2.6.1 New initiatives in foreign cultural policy

Since 2009, German cultural organisations are also receiving the support of young volunteers in performing their work abroad. In cooperation with the German UNESCO Commission, the Federal Foreign Office facilitates its cultural-diplomatic work through the voluntary programme "kulturweit". As written on its webpage, this is supposed to benefit both: the young Germans, as well as German cultural diplomacy work and initiatives abroad (UNESCO Kommission Germany: *Kulturweit*).

Sport is another field of cultural diplomacy to which Germany is lately paying more and more attention. Since sport is supposed to 'bring people together', the Federal Foreign Office launched the "People on the Move – Beyond Borders" initiative, concentrating on establishing and extending popular sport. The assistance provided, which is seen as a "help towards self-help", aims towards building civil society structures in the country in question (Auswärtiges Amt: International Sport Promotion).

3 CASE STUDY OF GERMAN PUBLIC IMAGE IN SPAIN

After defining the concept of cultural diplomacy in the first part and analyzing the German interpretation and practice of it in the second, in the final part of this master thesis I want to touch upon the reality or effects of such a policy on country's image abroad, based on concrete study of German public image in Spain.

That the German cultural diplomacy is performing a solid results and the German public image is doing good in the world show for example recent international polls conducted by the BBC World Service.¹⁸ In March 2011 Germany indeed emerged from this particular international survey as “the most popular country” – 62 percent of people surveyed from 27 countries believed that Germany's influence in the world is positive (BBC country rating poll 2011). Immediately afterwards, the German state secretary at the Foreign Office commented the results as a “vindication of Germany's efforts over decades to consistently promote civil society exchange across borders,” pointing with these words on the efforts in German cultural diplomacy work (in Auswärtigen Amt: Germany's Good Image in the World).

The same prove also results of the Spanish public opinion survey BRIE (*Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano*) from 2006. According to these, Germany is the most important country in the EU, far ahead before United Kingdom with 26 percent and especially before France, which was only mentioned by 12 percent of respondents. Additionally, Germany is also seen as the richest, the most advanced in science and technology and, above all, the country with best future prospects (BRIE June 2006, 19).¹⁹

Table 3.1: *Evaluation of Spanish public opinion on Germany in 2006*

	France	Germany	Italy	UK	No answer
Rich	8.1	49.8	1.0	37.6	3.5
Democratic	34.7	26.2	5.4	26.1	7.7
Advanced in science & technology	8.3	67.6	0.7	19.3	4.1

¹⁸ The BBC World Service Country Rating Poll has been surveying views on countries' influence in the world since 2005. The 2011 results are based on more than 28,600 interviews in 27 countries carried out by international opinion research institutes between December 2010 and February 2011.

¹⁹ Evidently we cannot neglect a cyclical effect for that time, when the leadership of Merkel and hosting FIFA World Cup had a favourable effect for Germany. Putting aside these (minor) side effects, however, there is no doubt that Germany has a great soft power in the case of Spain.

Culturally cultivated	36.4	27.0	8.5	23.8	4.6
Important in the EU	12.3	57.9	1.5	25.9	2.4
With future prospects	12.0	58.1	4.6	20.8	4.5

Source: BRIE (June 2006)

Further on I will therefore concentrate on concrete case study of current public opinion of Germany in Spain, as mentioned already in the introduction to thesis. Based on public opinion surveys from last two years I will analyze the development and current performance of German public image and its cultural diplomacy in this country.

3.1 Background: German presence in Spain

Germany is currently presented in Spain through many German cultural institutions, as well as political foundations, and performs a variety of the programmes and projects envisaged in the official plan of cultural diplomacy (such as PASCH, “Deutsch – Sprache der Ideen”, etc.). Just Goethe-Institut alone has in Spain four centres: in Madrid, Barcelona, Granada and San Sebastián (Deutsche Botschaft Madrid: Deutsche Institutionen in Spanien).²⁰ Additionally, Goethe-Institut and the Spanish Instituto Cervantes perform together in the European network of cultural institutes EUNIC (European Union National Institutes for Culture).

DAAD is another example of very active German cultural organization in Spain. It offers many scholarship possibilities for Spanish students, alone or in combination with the Spanish bank Caixa, with the DLR (*Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt* – German Aerospace Centre), and with the German company Roche Diagnostic (DAAD Spain). Together with the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation, DAAD has additionally created also a common subprogram “Acciones Integradas Hispano-Alemanas”, whose object is to intensify the cooperation and exchange of scientists based on concrete projects (Acciones Integradas Hispano-Alemanas). Besides having its central office and centre of information in Barcelona, the DAAD lectors are additionally placed around different Spanish universities in Barcelona, Madrid, Granada, Salamanca, Santiago de Compostela, Sevilla, Valencia and Vitoria (the Basque country) (DAAD-Lektorate in Spanien). Active in the field of scholarships for student

²⁰ Among European countries only France and Italy have more – seven. However, looking proportionally for a country with a population of approx. 46 million this is not bad, especially when we think that Great Britain, with its population of a little bit more than 60 million or Turkey with more than 71 million have only 3 Goethe-Institutes and Poland, on the other side, with its more than 38 million population have only 2 centers.

exchanges to Germany are also the Humboldt Foundation and IAESTE (International Association for the Exchange of Students for Technical Experience) in Spain.

Among many other German institutes and organizations active in Spain we can further on find as well economic organizations, such as the German Chamber of Commerce for Spain (AHK), German Trade and Invest (GTAI), German National Tourist Office (ONAT), Circle of German-speaking managers (kdf); a net of German schools in Madrid, Sevilla, Málaga, Bilbao, San Sebastian, Gran Canaria, Tenerife, Barcelona, and in Valencia; other teaching centres, like the Europäische Wirtschaftsakademie (EWA) and DAAD Information Center Barcelona; cultural organizations like (as already mentioned) Goethe-Institut, German Archaeological Institute (DAI), Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Goethe Foundation; political foundations like Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Friedrich Ebert Foundation; and finally the German Speaking Evangelical Parish in Madrid (Deutsche Botschaft Madrid: Deutsche Institutionen in Spanien).

There are many German cultural initiatives (especially in linguistic field) active in Spain, like exchange of German and Spanish “students of excellence” (Intercambio de Alumnos Premio);²¹ the initiative PASCH – Schools Partners of the Future, with 23 German schools in Spain; Initiative Deutsch-Sprache der Ideen; bilateral exchange of linguists from both countries and many more. Especially useful in the field of language promotion is also the Deutsche Welle for Spanish, with its cultural and audio-visual program for learning German language (Deutsche Welle Español).

From April 2011 the German Embassy together with other German cultural organizations in Spain is also organizing a so called “Space for Spanish-German Meetings 2011”. Several activities were conducted already, from concerts, exhibitions, business meetings, university conferences and political events to festivals (see Espacio de Encuentro Hispano-Aleman). The objective of this project is to transmit a current image of Germany, and to present the importance of politics and business, science, education and culture in Spanish-German relations, and to subsequently intensify further cooperation in the relevant fields (*ibid.*).

²¹ PAD (Pädagogischer Austauschdienst) in cooperation with the German embassy in Madrid each year organizes the so called “Prämienschülerprogramm/Intercambio de Alumnos Premio”, an exchange of young scholars aged between 16 and 18 from both countries with excellent knowledge of the language of the other country. Students therefore spend one month in another country, learning a foreign language but also the culture and habits of the other country and visiting other cities (*ibid.*).

In line with new focus put on sport as cultural diplomacy, German embassy in Spain also opened a new section on its website, dedicated entirely to the promotion and informing about football in Germany. It looks like the German side sensed the importance of this sport for the Spanish society and is therefore trying to bring the sympathy for its country closer to Spanish also through this most popular sport discipline in Spain. Nevertheless, sport can be as much a soft power tool of one country in trying to reach the hearts and minds of the citizens of another country as culture, what the German diplomats apparently know very good.

3.2 Image of Germany in Spain

Historically looking, there was an empathy and inclination towards Germany in Spain already during the years of Nazi Germany, prevailing on the side of Spanish political right (Right), later supported by the Franco regime (Montero 2007, 111–12). On the other hand, the political left (Left) was for traditional reasons, but also for the offer of political asylum to the exiled republicans during and after the Spanish Civil War, more inclined towards France.

Nevertheless, the image of Germany has been constantly changing. The transition period as well brought new changes and therefore played an important role in this regard. Gradually in the final years of Franco's rule, important thinkers from the Frankfurt School (*Frankfurter Schule*), like Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Jürgen Habermas, reached Spain. The Spanish Left therefore finally started to “Germanize” itself (Noya 2010, 2).

Moreover, both major German foundations made a great contribution during the Spanish political transition. The support of the German social-democratic SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) to the Spanish social-democratic PSOE (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*) was in opinion of Noya instrumental in consolidating democracy (Noya 2010, 2). German political foundations were therefore crucial promoters of help from the older and more ‘experienced’ German democracy to the younger democracy of Spain.


Another important factor of influence was also a good relation between the German Kanzler Helmut Kohl and the Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González in the late 80s and the beginning of 90s (Noya 2010, 3). Spain, for example, strongly supported the reunification of Germany, finding in later a strong supporter and ally on the way to EU. In short, except at peak times, political and diplomatic relations have been cordial and started to be gradually mediated also in the framework of EU and European institutions.

Looking at the side of economy, in recent times the international financial crisis and the Greek debt crisis has strained the relations between the two countries. In German politics and media several speculations were made on the Spanish poor economic state, already verbally putting Spain in line with Greece and therefore causing additional speculations and deterioration of Spanish image on financial markets (look Schwenn 2010). For this reason the Spanish public subsequently became more critical on German performance in solving the Greek debt crisis and its attitude towards Spain (look the surveys presented below). In this context many questions are to be raised: has the change in German attitude towards Greek debt crisis moved or changed somehow the Spanish public opinion on Germany? Has the image of Germany in this respect worsened? And finally, can we speak of a merely current ‘situation opinion’ or a general deterioration of German image in Spain?

3.3 BRIE May-June 2010

In recent years, at least until the summer of 2010, there has been no deterioration of German image in Spain, whose evaluation level in years from 2004 to 2010 has always remained above 6 points on a scale from 0 till 10. This trend is confirmed in the survey conducted by the Elcano Royal Institute, BRIE May-June 2010 (in Noya 2010, 6–7). At the very end we can however already see a decrease in the valuation of Germany for 0,2 point.

Graph 3.1: Evaluation of Germany in Spain between 2004 and 2010




Source: BRIE May-June 2010 (in Noya 2010, 7)

3.3.1 Data

The Barometer of the Elcano Royal Institute conducted during May and June last year includes a great number of questions about Germany. To ‘sharpen’ a little bit the image of Germany in Spain responders were presented with pairs of adjectives and asked to choose the one that best describes what they think about this Central European power:

Graph 3.2: *From the following adjectives (pacific / aggressive, knowledgeable / uneducated, selfish / altruistic, pro-European / anti-European, hardworking / lazy, exporter / importer, boring / fun, reliable / unreliable), which would you identify Germany and Germans with?*




Source: BRIE May-June 2010 (in Noya 2010, 8)

The greatest consensus was found in the belief that Germany is a “knowledgeable” (88 percent) and a “hardworking” (86 percent) country. Containing still clearly positive and fairly high rates, the majority of people asked opted for adjectives “pro-European” (66 percent), “peaceful” and “exporter” (65 percent), and “reliable” (62 percent). The only two adjectives chosen with negative connotations were also the ones receiving fewer consensuses on it: “selfish” (51 percent) and “boring” (51 percent).

According to other factors, the men identified with much greater extent than women Germany as “hardworking” (90 percent), “exporter” (75 percent), “pro-European” (73 percent), “peaceful” (71 percent) and “reliable” (71 percent), but also as “boring” (55 percent).





Graph 3.3: *Adjectives describing Germany according to division by sex*



Source: BRIE May-June 2010 (in Noya 2010, 9)

According to social class distribution, respondents from high and medium-high class stand out with ratios above the average: 7 points more for “boring”, 6 for “knowledgeable” and “reliable”, 5 points for “selfish”, 4 for “pro-European” and 3 points for “hardworking”. Again it proves that it is not about having a positive image of the country, but about having a more or less clear image of it, including both positive and negative stereotypes. This is seen also in the case of respondents with higher educational background, where response rates are much higher, reaching above average in 17 points, as in the case of “reliable” but also in 8 points for “boring”. Taking into account the ideological background of respondents, it is on the side of the Left, where the percentages exceed above the average, although the differences are not as high as in the case of other indicators (especially in the case of educational level).

Graph 3.4-7: *Adjectives describing Germany according to division by age, social class, university degree and political orientation.*



Source: BRIE May-June 2010 (in Noya 2010, 10–13).


In short, Germany has a good image in Spain. This is especially true among people with more privileged social positions: upper class, college, etc. Therefore we can say it is in a big way a matter of an (un)informed and disinterested opinion, which gives sometimes more negative results. Ignorance about another country can however put more in front also the stereotypes. As a consequence, the Spanish many times see Germans only as tourists on the Spanish coast or as the manufacturers of appliances and very powerful but more expensive machinery and cars, such as Bosch, BMW, Mercedes, etc. As we see in the case of Spain, this quality-machines positioning reinforces stereotypes on Germany as a powerful and advanced country,

but also rather cold and boring. Therefore, despite generally very good and positive image, these negative associations, related to boredom or individualism, still prevail among Spanish society.

3.3.2 Germany and the EU

The 2010 data also reveal that 75 percent of Spanish consider “positive” or “very positive” Germany’s contribution to the EU (BRIE May-June 2010 in Noya 2010, 14). Only 5 percent of people asked were critical.

Graph 3.8: 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, how would you say has been the contribution of Germany to the EU?



Source: BRIE May-June 2010 (in Noya 2010, 14)


The positive valuation was again highest among men, reaching 82 percent, compared with 70 percent of women. The patterns with the previous question measured were also the same in all other cases (age group, educational level, social class and ideological/political background). The difference was however this time biggest in the case of educational level, with a difference of 26 percentage points in the positive rating among those with less educational attainment (63 percent) and those with higher education (89 percent). Also high this time was the percentage among respondents of age under 30 years (82 percent), showing to the highly positive attitude towards German contribution in the EU context among younger generation in Spain (BRIE May-June 2010 in Noya 2010, 15–17).

3.4 The impact of German response to the Greek Crisis

At the beginnings of 2010 concerns about rising government deficits and debt levels were raised in Europe, after Greece officially announced its horrifying financial reality. Another in a row of countries with credibility problems was among Portugal, Ireland and Italy also Spain. In the EU, especially in countries where sovereign debts have increased sharply due to bank bailouts, a crisis of confidence has emerged between these countries and other EU members, most importantly Germany. Some sort of tension was therefore recognized also between the ‘better-off’ Germany and the more ‘sensitive’ Spain. This was seen especially through media, criticizing the performance or behaviour of one-another.

Apparently, until June 2010 the Greek debt crisis have not taken its toll on Germany’s positive image in Spanish public opinion polls. Neither the image of Germany nor the one of German contribution to the EU have suffered any severe deterioration. However, the performance of Germany in the management of Greek debt crisis was approved by “only” 59 percent of the Spanish population after that time. In comparison to the previous question on the overall contribution of Germany to the EU, the support for German performance on the Greek debt crisis has therefore fallen for 15 points, which is a significant difference in statistical terms, indicating that the new German strategy is perceived and valued more negatively.

Graph 3.9: *What is your opinion on performance of Germany in the European institutions to resolve the crisis in Greece?*



Source: BRIE May-June 2010 (in Noya 2010, 19)

As was the case with other two questions, the positive valuation was again higher among men, reaching 61 percent (6 points higher than among women). Taking into account the age groups, those who approved of Germany's performance more were respondents between the age of 30 and 44 (65 percent of approval). The support for the German performance towards the Greek debt crisis also felled among respondents of lower class, giving 56 percent. In the distribution by educational level only 50 percent of those with primary education or less made a positive assessment, compared with 70 percent of the holders of university degrees (BRIE May-June 2010 in Noya 2010, 20–2). Looking at the ideological background the most support for German performance gave the respondents from the political centre (67 percent), while the most critical this time were the ones from the Left, giving to German performance towards the Greek debt crisis only 57 percent, which is a significant drop considering that the Left was the strongest supporter of Germany and its performance inside the EU framework in the previous two questions (*ibid.*).

The assessment of Germany's role in the Greek crisis therefore differs substantially from the valuation of the country itself. The decline in support for Germany is notable. On the other hand, given what happened to the country's overall image, the behaviour during the Greek crisis is now censored by the Left, for which the sympathy for Germany on the Left has suffered. Voters with more liberal or socialist ideological-political background may have

felt betrayed, expecting more solidarity towards Greece and greater involvement in the defence of Spain against the attacks of the markets.

To sum up, despite the good rating in Germany, the Barometer of Elcano Royal Institute from May-June 2010, conducted during the full Greek crisis, showed some dissatisfaction with the German strategy. Significantly, the increase in criticism towards Germany has grown on the Left.

As already mentioned, shortly afterwards the attack of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung happened. This liberal-conservative German newspaper criticized badly the Spanish government (look Schwenn 2010). The result in Spain was the negative Spanish opinion against Germany. The question for the next survey therefore arises, whether these attacks of the German newspaper deteriorated (additionally) the image of its country?

Be it true or not, it can be finally said that for the Spanish, Germany is a world power, a vital member of the EU and an ally of Spain. However, this does not prevent ‘spoilage’ of the image, particularly among the Left, which already starts to raise some discomfort in its attitude to German behaviour towards economic problems of the Eurozone countries. The ‘notch’ due to the resolving of the Greek debt crisis can become a gap if certain sectors of the political class or the German press persist in their attacks against Spain. Germany enjoyed till the Greek crisis some sort of a soft power position that should not be wasted so easily.

3.5 BRIE May-June 2011:²² The image of crisis or crisis of image?

3.5.1 Image of Merkel

With 6 points, Angela Merkel has established itself as the second best leader according to the Spanish public opinion in 2011:


Table 3.2: *For each of the personalities listed, please evaluate each one of them from 0 to 10, with 0 as very bad and 10 as very good.*

²² Sample size: 1,100 individuals. Sampling: Stratified directly proportional to the distribution of the national population with proportionate quotas to the national population, by sex and age. Sample error: ± 3.0 for data concerning the entire sample (1,100 n), ± 4.0 for data related to subsamples (550 n), $p = q = 0.5$ and a confidence interval of 95.5.

	Evaluation	Does not know	No evaluation
David Cameron	5.5	11	13.2
Nicolás Sarkozy	5.2	2.4	5.5
Barack Obama	6.7	0.9	5.3
Muhammar Gadafi	1.4	4	6.8
Silvio Berlusconi	2.4	2.9	5.9
Angela Merkel	6	7.7	7
José Manuel Barroso	5.3	20.5	11.4
Herman Van Rompuy	5	38.4	15.1
Catherine Ashton	5.1	37.3	14.1
Dominique Strauss-Kahn	2.7	22.5	10.5

Source: BRIE May-June 2011, 16

Graph 3.10: *Comparison of evaluation of European leaders in February and June 2011*



Source: BRIE May-June 2011, 18

As we can see, Merkel's popularity suffered a little bit from the previous survey of Spanish public opinion conducted at the beginning of 2011. In recent months the note that Spanish gave to the president of German government dropped almost for one point: from 6.7 to 6. Several factors may have caused this decline. On the one hand, the most important factor is the rescue-saving plan of the EU, which in part of the Spanish public opinion has been attributed to Germany and Merkel. On the other hand, the second major factor has without a

doubt been the so called Cucumber crisis, followed by the food crisis in early June. German health officials linked cucumbers from Almeria (Spain) to a deadly outbreak of the bacteria E. Coli in Hamburg, which caused in a very short time 22 deaths and hundreds of infections in Germany, Sweden and other countries. Later all tests for the rare E. coli strain have come back negative, but the Spanish agricultural export (note that Spain is the biggest exporter of fruits and vegetables in Europe, most of them to Germany), as well as reputation of Spanish producers have been shattered severely.

3.5.2 Deterioration of German Image

The second quarter of 2011 was again a period of turbulence in Spanish-German relations. The previous tensions caused by the financial crisis and speculation around a rescue plan for Spain have been now additionally ‘burdened’ also by the previously mentioned Cucumber crisis, which erupted exactly in time the survey was conducted.

Although the image of Angela Merkel in Spain is still good, this wave of data already records some deterioration of her image. There are also indications that the image of Germany in Spain already suffers some deterioration as well. Almost each second person asked (46.5 percent) believes that Germany has changed its policy towards Spain and is now more distant in its relation towards Spain (BRIE May-June 2011, 57). Only one out of four thinks that no changes have occurred (*ibid.*).

Table 3.3: *With respect to Spain, do you think that Germany has changed its policy?*

Closer	Did not change	More distant	Do not know
13,0	26,3	46,5	14,2

Source: BRIE May-June 2011, 57

In any case, the Spanish do not seem to take the thing too “personal”. The change in German attitude towards Spain is perceived in line with a turn in German foreign policy towards the EU (at least according to Spanish opinion). A similar percentage of Spanish who saw an ‘anti-Spanish’ tendency on the site of Germany also sees a growing anti-Europeanism in Germany (40 percent) (BRIE May-June 2011, 57). 25 percent of people questioned do not see any change (*ibid.*).

Table 3.4: *Would you say that Germany has changed its policy towards Europe?*

More European	Did not change	Less European	Do not know
20,6	25,0	40,5	13,9

Source: BRIE May-June 2011, 57

To sum up, there is a reason to suppose that the Cucumber crisis had a bigger impact on Spanish public opinion this time than the management of Greek's financial debt. The evaluation of other leaders, weather on national or EU level, has hardly changed from February till June this year. Although Merkel has in a way shown less 'friendly' face towards the Greek crisis in this last period, the management of debt crisis of countries in Eurozone would affect negatively also other leaders, which it did not.

In any case, returning to Germany, the Greek debt crisis and the Cucumber crisis have damaged the image of Merkel and Germany in Spain. Still, the image of Kanzlerin resisted both pretty good, taking into account that she is still remaining the second highest-rated leader the eyes of the Spanish people.

4 FINAL CONCLUSIONS

German cultural diplomacy seeks to explain and discuss Germany's role and image in the world, and plays a major role in creating support for its foreign (and domestic) policies. Since the Second World War, cultural diplomacy has traditionally been out of the hands of the federal foreign ministry or government and promoted instead by Germany's strong system of independent institutes and foundations, which are coordinated by the Foreign Office. This decentralized structure is perhaps the major 'unique' characteristic of the German model of cultural diplomacy, which subsequently also defines and makes it different, both in terms of what does it want to achieve and how does it do it.

Looking at the main focal points of German cultural diplomacy, we can say that these went through some changes in development. If it was initially focused mainly on improvement of German image after the Second World War (away from the 'Nazi past') by showing Germany as a stable and trustworthy partner in international relations, it is now more concentrated on promotion of its language and image for economic reasons, attracting talented foreign students, researchers and investors. Lately however the "dialogue of cultures," especially one with the Muslim world, has as well emerged as a common denominator of German cultural diplomacy activities.

German cultural diplomacy is therefore also about bringing people closer together and leading the intercultural dialogue. This reflects one of the main components of German foreign policy, the peace policy. However, it can also be said that it developed and enhanced further with the changes in international environment. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks we can for example notice that German foreign policy and subsequently also cultural diplomacy are searching for much more dialogue, understanding and exchange with the Muslim world.

Moreover, this dialogic approach is well in line with the true purpose of cultural diplomacy and perhaps I can also say with the new approach of the 'western world' after 9/11. The cultural diplomacy approach moves away from the 'one-way streaming' of information abroad, towards engaging with foreign audiences. German cultural diplomacy's move towards "intercultural dialogue" as one of its leading motives reflects this general awareness of the need for a global culture of participation.

Nevertheless, many questions remain open in this context, such as: is cultural dialogue really put into practice or is it simply a 'catchy phrase' to gain trust and bigger visibility, acceptance

and popularity in the world, later serving mostly economic interests (but also political and security ones)? What could be the impact of such an attitude for domestic policy and what does it say about country's role and identity in the world? What sort of meanings does it produce along? And finally, how can this aspect of cultural diplomacy be evaluated – apart from measuring popularity and knowledge about Germany in foreign public opinion polls or showing numbers of increase of foreigners learning/speaking German, how do we measure “mutual understanding” between people?

The German example on the other hand also points to the fact that cultural diplomacy is after all not only about ‘noble’ cause of improving international relations by enhancing mutual understanding, but also about ‘selling’ a positive image and country's economic, scientific and cultural achievements to the world. The logic behind German cultural diplomacy is therefore to make Germany benefit from it. If that is the case, it is hard to see the German promotion of intercultural dialogue as an ‘ethical’ discursive process in Habermasian terms, as presented in the theoretical part to the thesis. Rather, it is to be seen as strategic action oriented to success. German cultural diplomacy, from my point of view, still remains rather confusing in this context.

Comparing at the end the goals, organizational scheme and the content of German cultural diplomacy work, I can conclude that the performance of German cultural diplomacy is in line with the aims and goals of German cultural diplomacy, as stated by German foreign ministry and other relevant institutions. However, the defining or understanding itself might sometimes not show as being consolidated, but rather still in its development. Since cultural diplomacy is supposed to be based on strong identity, this one is in the German case (at the moments) still showing signs of light inconsistency.

Speaking about German image in Spain, most of the polls measuring country's overall image and its international contribution show it as positive. We might say this is in part because of the Germany's long-term development work and its cultural diplomacy, however as proven, also other factors such as media reporting and bilateral relations play an important role in shaping public opinion of one country in another. On the other hand, basic image and knowledge people have about Germany is still very much based on the stereotypes, such as are the German cars and machines, showing that Germany is still seen more as a land of engineers and inventors, rather than that of poets and thinkers.

As far as the second hypothesis is concerned, we can therefore based on the given data conclude that the objectives of German cultural diplomacy in Spain match in some cases more than in the others. German cultural diplomacy undoubtedly played and still plays a big role in raising awareness and interest for Germany in Spain. Germany is seen as a politically and economically some sort of a 'role model' country: highly advanced and well organized, appealing to study, work or live in; but also as a country of cultural achievements (knowledgeable or culturally cultivated country). Also support for German foreign policy is pretty high and stable, connected with an important role Germany plays inside the EU and perhaps in this framework also an important role it played during the Spanish political transition.

On the other hand, Spanish public opinion is still very much based on stereotypes of Germans being cold and without sense of humour or sense for fun. In this respect we can say that German cultural diplomacy in Spain has failed in its task to present the more multi-layered modern image of Germany. Also the support for Germany's foreign policy is lately on decline in Spain, with the German management of Greece's debt crisis and the Cucumber crisis seen as the main causes for this decline in Spanish (generally looking still) positive opinion. Due to negative reporting about Spain in German media in connection with these two crises, the Spanish now see Germany as "negatively oriented towards Spain". However more as a failure of German cultural diplomacy in Spain, we should here speak about the negative role of other factors (such as media). Nevertheless, as these are usually short-term shocks, and cultural diplomacy is designed to produce long-term effects, it is now especially on the later to "win back" the Spanish public opinion and support, and continues with further work on German modern image in Spain and exchange of good practices between the both countries. A good example of this later would be in my personal opinion stronger promotion of Germany as a higher-education and scientific destination in Spain. Another might be, however, also the promotion of German model of a solid working democracy and an organized engaged civil society, which Spain (and the rest of Europe or the world) seems to need now more than ever.

5 DALJŠI POVZETEK V SLOVENSKEM JEZIKU

»Ker se vojne začnejo v glavah ljudi, sloni na glavah ljudi, da se izgradi obramba miru.«²³ To večkrat citirano načelo Organizacije Združenih Narodov za izobraževanje, znanost in kulturo (UNESCO – *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*),²⁴ organizacije, ki je bila ustanovljena z namenom prispevati k miru in varnosti s spodbujanjem sodelovanja na področju izobraževanja, znanosti, kulture in komunikacij med narodi, je bilo glavno vodilo razcvetu mednarodnega sodelovanja na področju kulture po drugi svetovni vojni. 'Izgraditi' miroljubno naravo in pozitivno podobo države navzven pa je bil tudi eden ključnih razlogov za razvoj kulturne diplomacije Zvezne republike Nemčije (v nadaljevanju Nemčije) po letu 1949, saj so posledice uničujoče vojne in poraz države zahtevali ponovno reintegracijo države v mednarodno skupnost tako na področju diplomacije, kot na področju kulturnih odnosov (Schulte 2000, 62; Singer 2003, 23–4).

Z naglim razvojem in uporabo marketinških ter PR (*public relations* – odnosi z javnostmi) oprijemov v mednarodnih odnosih, je predstavljanje kulture, družbe, gospodarstva ter politike navzven danes postala že skoraj ustaljena praksa zunanje politike skoraj vsake države (Paulmann 2007, 168). Pri tem obstajajo različni načini predstavljanja države navzven ter številni motivi za takšne dejavnosti. V primerjavi s tradicionalno diplomacijo, kjer gre predvsem za medvladno sporazumevanje, je javna diplomacija razumljena kot drugačna oblika vplivanja na tuje vlade, tj. preko vpliva na razmišljanje in obnašanje njihovih državljanov (Melissen 2005, 5).²⁵ Preko komuniciranja s tujimi javnostmi, pa naj bi javna diplomacija pomembno prispevala tudi k popravljajanju javne podobe države oziroma pridobivanju naklonjenosti njenim politikam in vlogi v svetu (Ham 2003, 431; Melissen 2005, 14–15; Wang 2006, 91).

Skupno vsemu je koncept t.i. »mehke moči« (angl. *soft power*) ameriškega politologa Josepha Nye-a. Če je 'hard power' navadno razumljena kot zmožnost prisile (na primer preko vojaških oz. ekonomskih sredstev), je mehka moč sredstvo pridobivanja zanimanja in prepričevanja –

²³ Izvirno: »Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed«.

²⁴ Ustava Organizacije Združenih Narodov za izobraževanje, znanost in kulturo, sprejeta 16. novembra 1945 v Londonu. Dostopno na: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001176/117626e.pdf> (26. 9. 2011).

²⁵ Ker je uveljavljanje interesa in vrednot neke države preko vplivanja na obnašanje drugih akterjev ključni element zunanje politike vsake države, je javna diplomacija razumljena predvsem v vlogi sredstva zunanje politike. Slednja je po Petriču (1998, 878) definirana kot »dejavnost države oziroma njenih organov, s katero skuša v odnosih z drugimi subjekti (predvsem državami) v mednarodnem življenju ta država uresničiti lastne vrednote in konkretne cilje s sredstvi in metodami, ki jih ima na voljo«.

privlačnost, ki izvira iz kulture, politike, vrednot, idealov in obnašanja neke države (Nye 2003, 30). Kulturna diplomacija je tako razumljena kot tisti del javne diplomacije, ki v največji meri deluje oz. posreduje svoj vpliv preko aktivnosti na področjih kulture, izobraževanja, umetnosti, znanosti, športa ipd. (Noya 2007, 112–28). Eden njenih glavnih nalog in izzivov je premagovanje konfliktov in (iz)gradnja vzajemnega zaupanja ter razumevanja. Če je diplomacija razumljena kot sredstvo komunikacije med državami (Berridge 2005, 1; Watson 1982, 120–5), potemtako je kulturna diplomacija posebna oblika takšne komunikacije, ki se odvija na ravni kulture in posledično poleg uradnih državnih institucij zajema tudi druge akterje. Kultura je pri tem – po definiciji, ki jo poda Counterpoint Global – razumljena kot skupek praks in vrednot, kolektivnih zgodb, umetnosti ter institucij, značilnih za posamezno skupino oz. določeno mesto. To lahko zajema vse, od jezika in klišejev, do pravnih okvirjev; od arhitekture in plesa, do politične tradicije. Kulturne aktivnosti kot medij oz. sredstvo vplivanja v tem pogledu lahko predstavljajo pozitivno platformo za sodelovanje in premagovanje morebitnih nestrinjanj med državami, saj je za razliko od ‘tradicionalnih’ oblik sodelovanja, pomembnost ‘nabiranja političnih točk’ tu najnižja. Obenem pa je pri obstoječih kulturnih razlikah na globalni ravni pomembno poznavanje in razumevanje le-teh oz. zavedanje o njihovem obstoju in sprejemanje le-tega.

Po drugi strani pa pri kulturni diplomaciji, tako kot pri javni, ne gre le za premoščanje konfliktnih situacij in izgrajevanje trdnih temeljev sodelovanja med državami, temveč tudi za pridobivanje podpore za določena dejanja oz. obnašanje države v očeh tuje (lahko pa tudi domače) javnosti. Le-to daje kulturni diplomaciji možnost subtilnega vplivanja na aktivnosti in odločitve vlad drugih držav, z vplivanjem na samo percepcijo ljudi preko dobro premišljenih kulturnih aktivnosti. Vseeno pa kulturni inštituti pojem »kulturnih odnosov« raje uporabljajo zgolj za definiranje svojih lastnih aktivnosti, in tako prepuščajo služenje nacionalnemu interesu zgolj neposredno preko učinkov izgradnje zaupanja na tujem. Kulturni odnosi so tako s tega zornega kota gledano drugačni od diplomacije, saj zastopajo nevladni glas v mednarodnih odnosih (Melissen 2005, 22).²⁶

Kot dalje pravi Mette Lending: »Pri izmenjavah na področju kulture ne gre zgolj za ‘umetnost’ oz. ‘kulturo’, temveč tudi za posredovanje nacionalnega razmišljanja, raziskovanja, poročanja ter debate. V tem pogledu tradicionalna področja kulturne izmenjave

²⁶ Kot pravita Martin Rose in Nick Wadham-Smith (2004, 34–5) pri diplomaciji ne gre zgolj za izgrajevanje zaupanja, temveč predvsem za doseganje določenih, politično usmerjenih (transnacionalnih) ciljev. Zaupanje je tako le stranski učinek javne diplomacije, ki ima v tem primeru bolj kratkoročni kot dolgoročni učinek.

postanejo del nekega novega primera mednarodnega sporazumevanja in rast 'javne diplomacije' postane reakcija na tesno povezanost med aktivnostmi na področjih kulture, medijev ter informacijskih dejavnosti, kot posledica novih družbenih, ekonomskih in političnih stvarnosti« (Lending 2000, 13–14). Gre za to, da vsak vidi svet skozi 'očala' in vrednostni sistem neke družbe in države v kateri živi. Različne študentske izmenjave ter aktivnosti kulturnih institucij so tako lahko razumljeni zgolj kot 'velikodušna' sredstva socializiranja drugih na način in v pogledu, lastnem neki državi. Lahko pa so, dolgoročno gledano, tudi dejavnik k boljšemu medsebojnemu poznavanju in razumevanju. Različne države posledično razvijejo različne modele kulturnih diplomacij, glede na svoj svetovni nazor, zmogljivosti in pred-obstoječi profil.

Nemška kulturna diplomacija je zgleden primer modela, ki vključuje vse omenjene poglede. Poleg tradicionalnih oblik diplomacije ter zunanjih ekonomskih odnosov, kulturna diplomacija tvori tretji steber nemške zunanje politike. Kot je zapisano na uradni spletni strani nemškega zveznega zunanjega ministrstva (nemško: *Auswärtiges Amt*; angleško: *German Federal Foreign Office*) so glavni cilji te politike »predstaviti Nemčijo kot državo z živahno, raznoliko in svetovno-slovečo kulturno podobo, utrjevanje Nemčije kot višje-izobraževalnega središča, spodbujanje interesa za nemški jezik, prispevanje k reševanju mednarodnih kriz in konfliktov ter ustvariti stabilne temelje za mednarodne odnose s spodbujanjem dialoga« (Auswärtiges Amt 2011a). Cilj je torej posredovati 'moderno' podobo Nemčije ter spodbujati medsebojno razumevanje med ljudmi, tako kot tudi (iz)graditi zaupanje v Nemčijo oz. nemško politiko v svetu.

Pri tem je kot pomemben dejavnik vpliva potrebno izpostaviti nemški odnos do kulture in svoje bližnje zgodovine. Le-to je lahko zaslediti v samem poimenovanju zgoraj naštetih dejavnosti kot »zunanja kulturna in izobraževalna politika«, ki se izogiba uporabi termina »diplomacija«, saj bi bilo lahko le-to drugače razumljeno tudi kot oblika propagande (Brown 2002, 2; Mannheim 1994), ki ima zaradi preteklega izkoriščanja nemške kulture v politične namene v Nemčiji negativen predznak. Kot piše Hemery (2005, 198), »grenki priokus« politične propaganda tretjega Rajha razloži odklon od politizacije kakršnihkoli mednarodnih odnosov in aktivnosti na področju kulture, čeprav je Nemčija oz. nemška politična elita tradicionalno vedno poudarjala kulturne vidike veliko bolj kot katerakoli druga država. V kolikor je Nemčija hotela ponovno izgraditi zaupanje v svetu po drugi svetovni vojni, je torej morala svoje kulturne odnose organizirati stran od uradne politike.

Organizacijsko gledano tako pri nemški kulturni diplomaciji poleg dobro razvite mreže diplomatsko-konzularnega predstavništva pomagajo tudi številne druge institucije. Slednje pa že kaže na drugo pomembno lastnost nemške kulturne diplomacije in nemškega odnosa do kulture širše, tj. samo obravnavanje zunanje-političnih zadev na zvezni ravni, medtem ko so zvezne dežele (*Länder*) tradicionalno zadolžene za področje kulture in izobraževanja. Politične smernice, ki določajo prioritete nemški kulturni diplomaciji so tako oblikovane na strani nemškega zveznega zunanjega ministrstva, medtem ko je samo izvajanje delegirano različnim neodvisnim organizacijam, med njimi Goethe-Institutu (GI), Nemški akademski službi za izmenjavo (*Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst* – DAAD), Inštitutu za odnose s tujino (*Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen* – IFA), Fundaciji Alexandra von Humboldta, Centrali za šolstvo v tujini (*Zentralstelle für das Auslandsschulwesen* – ZfA), Deutsche Welle – radijski postaji, in drugim. V povezavi s tem vse institucije tesno sodelujejo skupaj z nemškimi veleposlaništvom v tujini, vendar pa imajo pri natančnejšem oblikovanju programov relativno proste roke. Poleg tega DAAD in Alexander von Humboldt Fundacija za svoje študentske programe zagotavljata tudi lastna finančna sredstva.

Primeri programov na področju promocije nemškega jezika in izobraževanja so: iniciativa »Šole: partnerji prihodnosti« (*Schulen: Partner der Zukunft* oz. PASCH), iniciativa »Povezovanje svetov znanja« (*Connecting worlds of knowledge*) ter številni drugi javni ali zasebni programi štipendiranja, ki omogočajo zainteresiranim mladim iz celega sveta možnost študiranja v Nemčiji. Poleg dajanja mladim dijakom in študentom možnost učenja nemščine in uživanja nemškega izobraževalnega sistema pa je iniciativa PASCH osmišljena tudi tako, da spodbuja interes v moderno Nemčijo in nemški jezik še posebej med mladimi v regijah večjega (geopolitičnega) pomena, kot so: Srednja in Vzhodna Evropa, Bližnji Vzhod ter Azija (Auswärtiges Amt: PASCH). Ker se je število tujcev, ki se učijo nemškega jezika med letoma 2005 in 2009 zmanjšalo iz sedemnajst na približno štirinajst milijonov, je nemško zvezne zunanje ministrstvo v letu 2010 začelo tudi s kampanjo "Nemščina – jezik idej" (*Deutsch – Sprache der Ideen*), katere cilj je povečati zanimanje za nemški jezik pri mladih, kot tudi spodbuditi vse ljudi v politiki, izobraževanju, gospodarstvu in medijih k podpori pri promociji nemščine kot tujega jezika po celem svetu (Auswärtiges Amt: Deutsch – Sprache der Ideen).

Akademski odnosi med Nemčijo in širšim svetom so drugo pomembno težišče nemške kulturne diplomacije. Vse aktivnosti, skupno imenovane »politika raziskovanja in akademskih odnosov«, se izvajajo v skladu s strategijo zvezne vlade za internacionaliziranje visokošolskega izobraževanja in raziskovanja v Nemčiji (Auswärtiges Amt: German Foreign

Policy for more Education, Science and Research). Cilj je povečati mednarodni sloves Nemčije kot centra učenja in raziskovalne dejavnosti ter obenem promovirati tesno sodelovanje univerz z različnimi partnerji tako v Nemčiji kot v tujini (prav tam). Štipendije in akademske izmenjave so glavna 'zmagovalna kombinacija' delovanja kulturne diplomacije na področju visokošolskega izobraževanja in raziskovanja. Podatki kažejo, da se tuji študentje čedalje bolj odločajo za študij na priznanih nemških univerzah, kar Nemčijo že uvršča med najbolj zaželene študijske destinacije, takoj za Združenimi državami Amerike (ZDA) in Veliko Britanijo (Facts about Germany: Facts and figures). Iniciativa "12 svetov znanja" (*12 Worlds of Knowledge*) je bila začeta v sklopu programa na področju raziskovanja in akademskih odnosov s strani zveznega zunanjega ministrstva leta 2009. Dvanajst tujih raziskovalcev v Nemčiji tako priča o pomembnosti Nemčije kot centra raziskovalne dejavnosti in štipendiranja ter prikazuje vlogo takšne dejavnosti kot "graditelja mostu za mednarodno razumevanje in vzajemno spoštovanje" (Auswärtiges Amt: 12 Worlds of Knowledge). Nemčija vse bolj spodbuja tudi partnerstvo med nemškimi univerzami ter univerzami v drugih delih sveta, kot na primer v Kazahstanu, ali pa Indoneziji, Omanu in na Kitajskem. V številnih primerih se to izraža kot dvojna diploma ali celo kot odpiranje novih nemških univerz na tujem, kot sta na primer Nemška univerza v Kairu ter Nemško-Turška univerza v Istanbulu (Auswärtiges Amt: German Universities Abroad).

Na strani medkulturnega dialoga je nemško zvezno zunanje ministrstvo začelo s programom "Aktion Afrika", s pomočjo katerega želi poglobiti sodelovanje Nemčije z afriškimi državami (predvsem iz Podsaharske Afrike) na področju kulture in izobraževanja; z iniciativo Ernst Reuter, kjer želi razširiti svoje sodelovanje s Turčijo; pod motom »Germany and China – Moving Ahead Together« (»Nemčija in Kitajska – Pomikanje naprej skupaj«) pa je predvidena tudi vrsta aktivnosti oz. dogodkov na Kitajskem, ki naj bi predstavljali tudi najboljše promocijo oz. predstavitev Nemčije v tujini do sedaj (Auswärtiges Amt: Interkultureller Dialog). Pomemben igralec na tem področju je tudi Zvezna kulturna fundacija (*Bundeskulturstiftung*), s številnimi programi in projekti na področju čezmejnega medkulturnega dialoga. Nekatere privatne fundacije, kot je Bosch-Stiftung, čedalje bolj pa tudi zvezne dežele same kot sponzorji dopolnjujejo to sliko. Skladno s spremenjeno mednarodno podobo po terorističnih napadih 9/11 je nemško zvezno zunanje ministrstvo začelo tudi s posebnim programom »Evropsko-Islamski kulturni dialog« (*European-Islamic Cultural Dialog*), ki naj bi pomagal izboljšati vzajemno razumevanje med dvema različnima kulturnima ozadjema (Auswärtiges Amt: Interkultureller Dialog). Slednje je bilo v zadnjih

letih dopolnjeno s številnimi drugimi aktivnostmi, med drugim odprtjem nemških univerz v Egiptu, Jordaniji in Siriji, oblikovanjem spletne strani o nemški in muslimanski kulturi ter politiki »qantara.de«, ter iniciranjem revije Nafas, ki se osredotoča predvsem na umetnost v muslimanskem svetu. Vse to pa poraja vprašanje, zakaj je muslimanski svet nenadoma postal tako pomembno težišče zanimanja nemške kulturne diplomacije in ali gre pri omenjeni zadevi res zgolj za medkulturni dialog (torej dvosmerno komunikacijo) in boljše medsebojno razumevanje, ali nemška kulturna diplomacija postaja vse bolj strateško usmerjena? Nenazadnje je Nemčija po svetu odprla tudi devet t.i. kulturnih centrov (v Braziliji, Indiji, Rusiji, Turčiji, Egiptu, Južnoafriški republiki, ZDA, Franciji ter na Kitajskem), s katerimi želi tem državam približati Nemčijo, nemško politiko ter način življenja, tako kot tudi zbuditi večje zanimanje zanjo (v smislu večjega političnega in gospodarskega sodelovanja) (Auswärtiges Amt: German Information Centres). Prav tako zgovorna pa je tudi marketinška kampanja »Nemčija – dežela idej« (Germany – Land of Ideas), ki predstavlja Nemčijo kot državo inovativnih idej, ljudi in izdelkov.

Namen tega magistrskega dela je bil torej pregledati in raziskati koncept ter prakso nemške kulturne diplomacije v luči njene zunanje politike ter odpreti prostor za oceno njene doslednosti in uspešnosti.²⁷ V ta namen v teoretskem delu najprej pojasnim glavne pojme, povezane s konceptom in pomenom kulturne diplomacije ter samo definicijo. Nato v glavnem delu analiziram nemško razumevanje in prakso kulturne diplomacije. Kot zadnje pa se v magistrskem delu osredotočim še na nemško javno podobo in študijo le-te v Španiji.

Španija je dober primer študije države, v kateri je nemška kulturna diplomacija še posebej osredotočena na projeciranje sodobne in privlačne podobe Nemčije ter krepitev medsebojnega sodelovanja med obema državama na kulturnem področju. Javni interes za Nemčijo, še posebej njeno vlogo znotraj Evropske unije, je v Španiji relativno visok. Zatorej mi je bilo še posebej zanimivo tudi vprašanje, če in kako so morebitni negativni dogodki v medsebojnih odnosih (pri tem imam v mislih predvsem špekulacije s strani nemških medijev o finančni pomoči Španiji ter neutemeljeno obtoževanje španskih pridelovalcev zelenjave za izbruh epidemije bakterije E. Coli v Nemčiji spomladi letos) vplivali na podobo Nemčije v Španiji.

²⁷ Kot primer naj navedem, da je Nemčija v okviru mednarodne ankete BBC World Service to leto že četrtyč zasedla mesto »najbolj priljubljene države«. Kar 62 odstotkov vprašanih iz 27 držav je vpliv Nemčije ocenilo kot pozitiven (BBC World Service Country Rating Poll). Dostopno na: www.bbc.co.uk (26. 9. 2011).

Glavni dve vprašanji, okoli katerih je dotično magistrsko delo zastavljeno, sta tako: prvič, kako je nemška kulturna diplomacija razumljena in opredeljena s strani njenih glavnih akterjev, ter posledično kako jo le-ti izvajajo; in drugič, na kakšen način je podoba Nemčije dejansko zaznavana s strani tuje javnosti, v tem primeru Španije, oz. ali je le-ta v skladu s cilji nemške kulturne diplomacije? Temu ustrezno sta zastavljeni tudi obe hipotezi:

Hipoteza 1: Izvajanje nemške kulturne diplomacije se ujema z uradnim pogledom na to, kaj naj bi le-ta bila oz. predstavljala.

Hipoteza 2: Javna percepcija Nemčije v Španiji se ujema s cilji nemške kulturne diplomacije.

Kot je na koncu ugotovljeno, v primeru prve hipoteze lahko rečem, da se izvajanje nemške kulturne diplomacije popolnoma ujema z zastavljenimi cilji slednje, kot tudi s samimi prioritetami nemške zunanje politike. Vseeno pa je pri samem razumevanju občasno opaziti nekakšno nekonsistentnost. Lahko bi dejali tudi, da je sama narava nemške kulturne diplomacije še vedno v razvoju (skladno z zunanjepolitično identiteto Nemčije in mednarodno stvarnostjo). Tako na primer v primeru medkulturnega dialoga nisem prišla do jasnega zaključka ali le-to služi promociji vsesplošnega dialoga med različnimi akterji, vrednotami, kulturnimi ozadji, pri katerem naj bi Nemčija igrala vlogo nekakšnega posrednika oz. promotorja k izboljšanju mednarodnih odnosov (v stilu EU); ali ta 'plemeniti' namen kulturne diplomacije služi le ožjim in kratkoročnim interesom Nemčije, predvsem političnim in ekonomskim. V tem primeru težko govorimo o nekem pravem dialogu oz. dvosmerni komunikaciji ter lahko kulturno diplomacijo dejansko enačimo z javno diplomacijo, ki zasleduje konkretne in kratko- oz. srednjeročno zastavljene cilje, predvsem pa služi zgolj nacionalnemu interesu države, ki jo izvaja.

Kar se tiče druge hipoteze, na primeru danih podatkov ugotavljam, da se cilji nemške kulturne diplomacije v primeru Španije bolje ujemajo v nekaterih pogledih, kot v drugih. Nemška kulturna diplomacija je nedvomno odigrala pomembno vlogo v času španske politične tranzicije (predvsem s podporo političnih fundacij, kot sta Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung), ter jo še vedno igra tudi danes. Nemčija je videna kot nekakšen vzor, tako v gospodarskem kot v političnem smislu. Tudi podpora nemški zunanjepolitični vlogi, predvsem znotraj EU, je pri španskem javnem mnenju precej visoka.

Obratno pa špansko javno mnenje v določenih primerih še vedno gleda precej skozi očala stereotipov o Nemcih, kot tehničnih ljudeh in zatorej bolj hladnih in brez smisla za humor ali

zabavo. V tem pogledu lahko rečemo, da je nemška kulturna diplomacija »padla na izpitu« promocije Nemčije kot moderne, večplastne, zanimive in atraktivne države. Prav tako v zadnjem času pada podpora nemški zunanji politiki, predvsem zaradi negativnega mnenja glede nemškega pristopa k reševanju grške dolžniške krize ter neutemeljenega obtoževanja španskih pridelovalcev in izvoznikov zelenjave v Nemčijo, kar je bil za Španijo (gospodarsko gledano) precej velik udarec. Kakorkoli pa za ta rahel padec v (še vedno pozitivni) javni podobi Nemčije v Španiji ne gre kriviti zgolj 'neuspešnega' dela nemške kulturne diplomacije. Bolj kot to so zanj krivi drugi dejavniki: nepremišljene izjave odgovornih ljudi v javnosti in posledično negativno poročanje medijev. Tako je sedaj v rokah nosilcev nemške kulturne diplomacije, da izboljšajo splošno naklonjenost Nemčiji v Španiji, še naprej poglobijo medsebojno sodelovanje in izmenjave med ljudmi ter osvestijo Špance o celostni in 'aktualni' podobi Nemčije.

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