

UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI  
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE

Ivan Kančev

**Ameriška zunanja politika do Afrike,**

**paradox neokolonializma**

**U.S. foreign policy towards Africa,**

**the paradox of neo-colonialism**

Magistrsko delo

Ljubljana, 2013

UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI  
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE

Ivan Kančev

Mentor: prof. dr. Calvin Mouw

Somentor: red. prof. dr. Bogomil Ferfila

**Ameriška zunanja politika do Afrike,  
paradox neokolonializma**  
**U.S. foreign policy towards Africa,  
the paradox of neo-colonialism**

Magistrsko delo

Ljubljana, 2013

# **POVZETEK**

## **Ameriška zunanja politika do Afrike, paradox neokolonializma**

Namen magistrskega dela je preučiti povezavo med zunanjo politiko Združene države Amerike (ZDA) in družbeno-političnega stanja afriških držav. Združene države Amerike so država, ki v Afriko prispeva največ sredstev ter so obenem tudi glavni podporniki večine afriških režimov. Kljub temu, da je bila podarjena že več kot trilijone dolarjev pomoči, je večina afriških držav nerazvitih. Analiza primerov 12 različnih afriških držav kaže na zgodovinski vzorec vpletenosti ZDA. Glavni cilj zunanje politike ZDA je ustvariti nerazvite države z diktatorskimi režimi, ki so zvesti ZDA. Raziskava vključuje tudi analizo dveh svetovnih sil, ki ogrožajo ameriško hegemonijo na celini. Ob tem se postavlja tudi vprašanje dejanske učinkovitosti zunanje pomoči ZDA. Dokazi mednarodnih finančnih institucij in mnenja nekaterih vodilnih ekonomistov kažejo na to, da je ameriška zunanja pomoč, z zmanjševanje gospodarske rasti in dvigom inflacije, dejansko prispevala k rasti revščine v Afriki. Posledica tega je vlada diktatorskih in skorumpiranih režimov po vsej Afriki. Režimi, ki so zagrešili najhujše kršitve človekovih pravic v celotni zgodovini človeštva, so bili neposredno ali posredno podprti s strani ZDA. Vzpon in padec teh diktatorjev je neposredno povezan s finančno podporo in pomočjo s strani ZDA. Ko je določen afriški režim postajal gospodarsko uspešen in politično neodvisen, je bila pomoč in podpora prenesena na njegove zgodovinske nasprotnike z namenom da se ustvari trajni spor. Ti spori so nelogični in nehumani, njihov izključni namen pa je ohranitev vojnega stanja, kot tudi vzdrževanje nerazvitosti. Neo-kolonialna politika vzdrževanja nerazvitosti, bo preganjala ZDA z številnimi paradoksi, ki presegajo v različnih eksponentno naraščajočih varnostnih groženj.

## **U.S. foreign policy towards Africa, the paradox of neo-colonialism**

This thesis will analyse the correlation between US foreign policy and the socio-political state of African countries. The United States are Africa's greatest aid donors and main supporters of most African regimes. Although trillion dollars of aid has been donated, most of the African countries can be classified as underdeveloped. Through case analysis of 12 different African countries, the research shows a historical pattern of US involvement. The main goal of this foreign policy is to create underdeveloped states with dictatorial regimes loyal to the US. The analysis will also include the involvement of two world powers that threaten US hegemony in the continent. The question of the effectiveness of the US foreign aid is also raised. The results show that US foreign aid has contributed to the rise of poverty in Africa, by reducing the economic growth and causing inflation. As a consequence, corrupt regimes rule across Africa. These regimes have perpetrated the worst human rights violations in the history of the world, and yet they were supported directly or indirectly by the US. The rise and fall of these dictators was directly linked to US aid and financial support. When an African regime had become economically successful and politically independent, the aid has been transferred to their opponents, creating a never-ending conflict. These African conflicts are brutal as they are illogical since the main goal and purpose is the continuation of the war and the maintenance of the economical underdevelopment. This neo-colonial policy of perpetual underdevelopment and conflict will come to haunt the US in several paradoxes that transcend into various security threats that are growing exponentially.

# Table of contents:

<b>1. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>15</b>
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION .....	12
<b>2. THEORETICAL APPROACH.....</b>	<b>13</b>
2.1 U.S. BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES .....	19
2.1.1 Liberia.....	20
2.1.2 Nigeria .....	23
2.1.3 Libya .....	28
2.1.4 Somalia .....	38
2.1.5 Ethiopia.....	48
2.1.6 Egypt.....	53
2.1.7 Equatorial Guinea.....	60
2.1.8 Democratic Republic of Congo.....	64
2.1.9 Uganda.....	73
2.1.10 Rwanda .....	79
2.1.11 Zimbabwe.....	85
2.1.12 Gambia.....	89
<b>3. COMPETITORS TO US HEGEMONY .....</b>	<b>92</b>
3.1 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA .....	92
3.2 IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA .....	96
<b>4. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA .....</b>	<b>100</b>
4.1 ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENT .....	102
4.1.1 <i>The consequences of development aid</i> .....	102
4.1.2 <i>Foreign aid and economic growth in Africa</i> .....	109
4.2 HUMANITARIAN AID AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. FOOD AID TO AFRICA .....	125
4.2.1 <i>The negative effects of Food Aid</i> .....	128
4.2.2 <i>U.S. goals for Food Aid</i> .....	143
4.3 MILITARY ASSISTANCE.....	152
4.4 AID BY OTHER MEANS.....	156
<b>5. CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>161</b>
<b>6. POVZETEK .....</b>	<b>163</b>
<b>7. LITERATURE.....</b>	<b>171</b>



## List of figures:

FIGURE 1.1: DIVISION OF COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THE WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORY (SOURCE: WALLERSTEIN, 2004) .....	19
FIGURE 1.2: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DEPENDENCY (SOURCE: GALTUNG, 1971,84) .....	20
FIGURE 2.1: TRIBES IN LIBYA (SOURCE: STRATFOR,2011).....	34
FIGURE 2.2: TERRITORIAL GAINS MADE BY AL-SHABAAB FROM JANUARY 31, 2009 (LEFT) TO DECEMBER, 2010 (RIGHT) .....	45
FIGURE 2.3: THE TOWN OF LABIAGH 2008 BEFORE THE ETHIOPIAN ARMY ATTACK (SOURCE: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2008,45) .....	56
FIGURE 2.4: THE TOWN OF LABIAGH 2008 AFTER THE ETHIOPIAN ARMY ATTACK (SOURCE: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2008,46) .....	56
FIGURE 2.5: EQUATORIAL GUINEA OIL EXPORTS (SOURCE: GLOBAL ATLAS, FACTS GLOBAL ENERGY,2010).....	66
FIGURE 2.6: EQUATORIAL GUINEA LNG EXPORTS (SOURCE: GLOBAL ATLAS, FACTS GLOBAL ENERGY,2010).....	66
FIGURE 2.7: RWANDA AND UGANDA OCCUPATION ZONES DURING THE WAR IN CONGO(SOURCE:REID,2006,75) ..	87
FIGURE 3.1: COMPOSITION OF CHINA'S IMPORTS FROM AFRICA (SOURCE: THE IMPACT OF CHINESE PRESENCE IN AFRICA, AFRICA PRACTICE,2007) .....	98
FIGURE 4.1: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH OF RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE (SOURCE: WORLD BANK,2013).....	115
FIGURE 4.2: US BILATERAL AID TOWARDS ZIMBABWE (SOURCE: WORLD BANK,2013) .....	116
FIGURE 4.3: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH IN SOUTH AFRICA (SOURCE: WORLD BANK,2013).....	117
FIGURE 4.4: US BILATERAL AID TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA (SOURCE: WORLD BANK,2013) .....	118
FIGURE 4.5: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH IN ZAIRE/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (SOURCE: WORLD BANK,2013).....	118
FIGURE 4.6: US BILATERAL AID TOWARDS ZAIRE/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (SOURCE: WORLD BANK,2013).....	118
FIGURE 4.7: DISTRIBUTION OF PL 480, FOOD FOR PEACE PROGRAM, FY 1992-2009, (SOURCE: USAID CONGRESS BUDGET JUSTIFICATION,2010).....	132
FIGURE 4.8: TYPES OF FOOD AID (SOURCE: USAID,2007) .....	132
FIGURE 4.9: ETHIOPIA: WHEAT FOOD AID AND PRODUCTION (SOURCE: FAO,2004).....	136
FIGURE 4.10: ETHIOPIA: WHEAT PRODUCTION AND FOOD AID PER CAPITA (SOURCE: FAO,2004) .....	137
FIGURE 4.11: FAILURE OF FOOD PRODUCTION IN AFRICA RELATIVE TO GREEN REVOLUTION IN ASIA (LOG OF INDEX OF FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA,2009).....	138
FIGURE 4.12: ETHIOPIA: WHEAT FOOD AID AND THE US PRICE OF WHEAT (SOURCE: FAO,2004) .....	151
FIGURE 4.13: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEREAL FOOD AID, PRICES AND STOCKS 1990-2002 (SOURCE: FAO,2003) .....	151

## List of tables:

TABLE 2.1: U.S. OIL INTERESTS IN AFRICA (SOURCE: US ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,2012).....	25
TABLE 2.2: US FOREIGN AID TO LIBERIA IN MILLION US DOLLARS (SOURCE: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,2012,73) .....	28
TABLE 2.3: US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO NIGERIA IN MILLIONS US DOLLARS (SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ANNUAL CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND CONGRESS RESEARCH SERVICE,2012) ....	30
TABLE 2.4: US SHIPS ATTACKED BY PIRATES (SOURCE EUNAFOR, SOMALIA,2011) .....	50
TABLE 2.5: MACROECONOMIC COST TO SELECTED COUNTRIES IN US DOLLARS (SOURCE: BOWDEN, 2010,25) ...	52
TABLE 2.6: TOTAL COST OF MARITIME PIRACY IN US DOLLARS, 2010 (SOURCE: BOWDEN, 2010,).....	52
TABLE 2.7: US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT IN MILLION US DOLLARS (SOURCE: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,2011) .....	59
TABLE 2.8: US MILITARY AID TO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO IN US DOLLARS (SOURCE: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,2011).....	74
TABLE 2.9: US FOREIGN AID TO UGANDA BY FISCAL YEARS (SOURCE: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,2011) .....	79
TABLE 2.10: UGANDA AND RWANDA SPOILS OF THE CONGO WAR (SOURCE: REID, 2006,78) .....	87
TABLE 2.11: US FOREIGN AID TO RWANDA BY FISCAL YEARS (SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012).....	90
TABLE 3.1: U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CHAD IN US DOLLARS (SOURCE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,2009) .....	100
TABLE 4.1: FOREIGN AID PER CAPITA (ANNUAL AVERAGE; CURRENT US DOLLARS) (SOURCE: WIJBERGEN ,1987) .....	112
TABLE 4.2: FOREIGN AID IN PERCENT OF GNI (ANNUAL AVERAGE) (SOURCE: WIJBERGEN ,1987).....	112
TABLE 4.3: INFLATION (GDP DEFLATOR, ANNUAL AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE) (SOURCE: WIJBERGEN ,1987) .....	113
TABLE 4.4: EXTERNAL TRADE BALANCE (ANNUAL AVERAGE; IN PERCENTAGE OF GDP) (SOURCE: WIJBERGEN ,1987) .....	113
TABLE 4.5: LIST OF AFRICAN DICTATORIAL LEADERS FINANCED WITH US FOREIGN AID (SOURCE. WORLD BANK,2013).....	119
TABLE 4.6: FOREIGN AID TOWARDS UGANDA (SOURCE: UGANDA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, “BACKGROUND TO THE BUDGET,” 1999–92 THROUGH 2002–03).....	128
TABLE 4.7: UNDERNOURISHMENT IN AFRICA, 1990–92 TO 2010–12 (SOURCE: FAO,2012) .....	135
TABLE 4.8: FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING IN AFRICA BY FISCAL YEAR IN MILLION US DOLLARS (SOURCE US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE,2012).....	158
TABLE 4.9: AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL (SOURCE: A.U.2012) .....	<a href="#">160</a>
TABLE 4.10: US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BY COUNTRY IN MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS, 1945-2010 (SOURCE: USAID,2011) .....	162

## List of abbreviations:

AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
ANC	African National Congress
BBL/DAY	Barrels per day
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CFA	Communauté française d'Afrique (French Community of Africa)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CCJPZ	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
CNDP	National Congress for the Defence of the People
DOD	The Department of Defence
DCS	Direct Commercial Sales
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EIA	Energy Information Administration
EDA	Excess Defence Articles
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FDLR	Democratic Forces of Liberation of Rwanda
FFW	Food for Work (US food aid program)
GAO	Government Accounting Office
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	High Indebted Poorest Country
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMET	International Military Education and Training
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MPLA	Popular Liberation Movement of Angola
MI6	Military Intelligence, Section 6 (United Kingdom)



NTC	National Transitional Council (Libya)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
P.L.480	Public Law 480 (Food for Peace)
REER	Real Effective Exchange Rate
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Army
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
TFG	Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)
UNJHRO	United Nations Joint Human Rights Office
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

# 1. INTRODUCTION

In the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, one third of the countries in Africa are failed states, where poverty, famine, and diseases are combined with civil wars. The rest of the African countries represent underdeveloped states, which are addicted to aid and governed by dictatorial regimes. This research has a purpose for identifying the link between the undemocratic African regime and US foreign policy.

Since its birth as a nation the US was involved in the African continent. From times when slave labour was essential to the economy to today's ever growing thirst for oil, US foreign policy has only changed tactics while the goals remain the same. The main purpose for this policy is the control of the economic high ground, Africa's mineral wealth. The hypothesis in this thesis is that the US foreign policy in the African continent is outdated and creates instability in the region.

The analysis shows the US foreign policy from its early beginning, dating back from The Barbary Wars in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century till today development in North Africa with Libya and Egypt in particular. The US economic, political and military strategy has proven to be hazardous not only for the people living in Africa but also for the American people and their best interest. Throughout history we can see the political mistakes that resulted in great tragedies and by that we can learn to anticipate future developments. The creation of AFRICOM (United States African Command) in 2008 and the election of the first African-American President who pledged greater involvements in Africa are evidence that US strategic interests are shifting towards the black continent.

The African continent is home for over billion people that live in 56 countries. The research within this MSc thesis is focused on a case study related to twelve very different countries for which the US has different policy. These countries are not selected randomly; they represent a pattern of US foreign policy that has been repeated for the last sixty years. The covert regime change tactic has repeated many times in Africa, but the end result was a regime that is favourable to western interests. Such were the cases in Liberia, Congo, Uganda, Rwanda and more recently Libya. When the friendly regime takes power, US foreign assistance, both military and economic, floods the country till it becomes addicted and dependable to aid. The support for Africa's kleptocratic leaders is one of the most controversial parts of this foreign policy. As the African population starves, the political elite have amassed massive wealth, donated by the US taxpayers. The military assistance that is given to these regimes can have great consequences for the future security of the continent. The military assistance and training of the armies of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda has created a situation where the armed forces cause the greatest human rights violations. The situation is being repeated in Nigeria, Somalia and escalated in Egypt where the country was run by military junta.

The US foreign policy is not relying only on foreign proxy armies. AFRICOM is the US military command for the African continent and has troops strategically deployed across the continent. Although it is new military formation it has waged undeclared wars in Libya, Somalia, Sahel region and Central Africa. The enemy represents religious militias, Christian and Muslim, poorly equipped and trained. These conflicts are brutal as they are illogical, whose goal is only to be continuous. The reasons known to the American public are that US military personal are spreading freedom and democracy in the region. But behind the media propaganda the truth lays deep underground in Africa's rich natural resources.

The real challenges in Africa are in the political system that is now present. Current US foreign policy is guided towards keeping the political, social and economic status quo. But in reality the entire system of countries in whole of Africa is fragile like house of cards. The countries today are, in territorial terms, just remnants of former colonies. The population is a mixture of different tribes practicing different religion and speaking thousands of different languages. The nation building process that took centuries in Europe has never materialized in Africa. The whole economic system is based around the exploitation of the natural resources and receiving aid. The biggest problems are in the political elites that are deeply entrenched in their countries. Since the end of colonialism, there has not been any democratically elected government that was not overrun by a military coup.

The current US foreign policy regarding the African Continent is outdated and it is still guided by the principals of the cold war. In a world with diminishing natural resources and fragile environment, another cold war waged with China on the African Continent will result only in failure and human tragedy. Instead of competitors and cold war enemies, partnerships should be formed that will include not just the great powers but the African people. Instead of containment policy towards PR China, US should form economic cooperation with PR China. Instead of AFRICOM and Department of Defence, the US State Department should conduct the foreign policy in Africa. The political elites must realize that hegemony can be shared with other emerging powers. The only beneficiaries of this new cold war are the corrupted and dictatorial African regimes.

The best and only term for describing the political order in the continent is kleptocracy. The level of corruption in almost every African country is unprecedented in modern history. The result is poverty, hunger, diseases and child mortality on a biblical scale. The problems facing the people in Africa are global problems and cannot be solved unilaterally by the US. New foreign policy should be implemented that will be beneficiary for the people in US and Africa. Policy that will not support the status quo but will create new political and social order in Africa. Containment strategy should not be imposed towards China, but towards the corrupted African regimes that are the main cause of the problem. The new order in Africa can be created only through international organization like the UN, because the continent's problems as well its recourses are world heritage.

In reality there are relatively small chances for the only superpower and the emerging countries to change their foreign policy goals. They will continue to pursue their national interests and act unilaterally without consulting the international organizations. The main chessboard for this decade will be Africa, and the prize will be its natural resources. The cost of the neo-colonialism will be paid by the common and ignorant people in Africa, US and Europe.

## 1.1 Research Question

The core question to this research is related to whether the United States foreign policy towards Africa has been intended for promoting democracy, regional stability or for creating semi-failed states with dictatorial regimes.

This research uses mixed method of analysis, quantitative and qualitative approach. The analysis of the US foreign policy towards the African continent is complex matter as it is wide in scope. The US has complex bilateral relations with 56 African states and numerous multilateral regional organizations within Africa. Amid this maze of power and politics, there is a simple repeating pattern that has led to my research question. Although the official US policy towards Africa is in supporting democracy and stability, the reason of this research is analysis of the truth through historical analysis. The research will analyse the US bilateral relations with 12 African countries, the influence and the reason for American involvement. The African case studies are not randomly analysed but represent pattern of US involvement, with a goal of creating semi-failed states.

This research also encompasses the competitors in US foreign policy. The foreign policies of two countries in Africa are analysed. The case studies of China and Iran are selected to analyze the difference between economic competitor and strategic enemy. The final question in this research concerns the US foreign aid and is probably the most important for the future aid and development policy. Through a historical analysis and today's economic indicators, the evidence shows how the US foreign aid has failed in ending poverty in Africa. Over one trillion dollars spent of foreign aid has made the economic situation worse.

## 2. THEORETICAL APPROACH


The United States foreign policy towards the African continent in this research is analysed using the dependency theory and the world system theory through a historical perspective. The analyses of the past can show a pattern of behaviour in the US foreign policy that is consistent in maintaining underdevelopment in Africa.

The core of this research may be found in the dependency theory. Although this theory has been rarely used in the past decades and its original founders were concentrated in South America, the theory is also compatible for Africa in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The dependency theory is a critic of the current modernization theory of development. According to the modernization theory, the African countries should follow the directions given by the developed countries as way to achieve economic prosperity (Rostow, 1960). Parallel to the economic reforms dictated by the developed countries the African nations should continue to accept development aid as the only path towards development (Sachs, 2005). However half a century later the African countries are in worse economic state than before they received aid (Moyo, 2009).

The Dependency theory gives explanation for this state of underdevelopment in the African countries. Similar to the South American countries, the African nations are among the peripheral countries in a world system designed to benefit only the core countries, US and its main allies. This division of countries to developed industrial countries and underdeveloped peripheral countries has been used by numerous dependency theorists (Amin, 1976) (Santos, 1995) (Frank, 1978). This system, according to the dependency theory is maintained by exploitation of the peripheral countries, their raw materials and ultimately their labour force. Under such conditions the peripheral countries cannot prosper since they are trapped in a permanent underdevelopment. According to Dos Santos, one of the lead dependency theorists, dependency is: “a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected” (Dos Santos, 1995). In this system the international division of labour is constructed in a way that the peripheral countries serve the interests of the core countries. The core countries can further develop their economies and can be self-sustaining, while the periphery countries can develop only as a reflection of that expansion (Dos Santos, 1970).

The complexity of the African problems in relation to the US foreign policy compels the usage of another group known as semi-peripheral countries (Wallerstein, 2004). This division of countries has been used in the World System Theory by Immanuel Wallerstein. The semi-peripheral countries in Africa are crucial in preserving the underdevelopment of the continent while they support the US hegemony. According to this theory the countries in the world are divided into core countries, semi-peripheral countries and peripheral countries as shown on the following figure (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Division of countries according to the World-System Theory



Source: Wallerstein (2004)

According to the World System theory the semi-peripheral countries are in between the core and the peripheral countries (Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, 1989, 2004). They have reasonable socio-political stability and they act in the same time as an exploiters and exploited. These semi-peripheral countries in the African context are the most developed countries such as Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria. These countries are also regional powers and they have been used by the core countries to maintain the socio-political status-quo.

Apart from economic exploitation of the peripheral countries, the semi-peripheral countries have been called upon to intervene militarily. The case studies of Liberia, Somalia, Congo and Ethiopia in the second chapter of this research show the US involvement. The end goal of these conflicts is to maintain the underdevelopment of the region, for as war is the ultimate destructor of economic and human progress.


The semi-peripheral status is the ultimate achievement that is allowed for a country in Africa. History has shown that countries that had great economic prospects for the future have experienced great tragedies. Among the cases analysed in the second chapter is the case of Libya, Egypt and Rhodesia. The semi-peripheral status is maintained by acquiring capital from the core countries either by selling raw materials or by foreign aid. This fact confirms the thesis that even the semi-peripheral countries are depended from the core countries.

Another important fact is that the semi-peripheral and peripheral status is not permanent. Countries can rise or fall in their development status depending on their policies and the will of the core countries. It is a fluid system where loyalties and ideology are worthless in the real African politics. Only the economic interests of the core countries are important and the need to maintain the underdevelopment. As an example of this fluid system is the case study of

Zaire, a vital US ally, whose dominant position was taken over in a decade long war. Other authors add another fourth category of countries that illustrate the least developed countries or the Fourth World, the periphery of the periphery (Sens, 2012). This category of countries is crucial for explaining many of the unrecognized countries and the failed states. In numerous instances the fourth type of countries acts as generator for conflict and instability. The case studied of Uganda, Somalia and Mali described in the second and final chapter explain this situation. The end goal is to maintain the poverty level by staling development and progress.

The dependency theory does not end in an international level it also manifested internally within a country. This internal dependence is especially important for the African countries as it explains the class and power division in the African society. The political and economic elite represent the minority in the peripheral countries that is most responsible for the African underdevelopment. Their goal is to maintain the socio-political status-quo and further their grip on power while in the same time increase their wealth. These political and economic elites of the peripheral African countries conspire among each other to maintain the system of underdevelopment. As a result there are numerous regional economic and security organisation across Africa such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The culmination of these organizations is the African Union, an unholy alliance of autocratic regimes with a task to maintain the status-quo of underdevelopment of Africa. The elites in Africa are also in permanent contact with the ruling elites in the semi-peripheral countries and the core countries, from where they receive their financial and economic support. Numerous development economists link the African underdevelopment with their corrupted regimes. However few authors have analysed the interconnectivity of the underdevelopment system and the internal dependence. The term internal dependence was used by Antonios Karam, who divided international dependency on internal and external. According to Karam: “the internal dependence is a constellation of domestic forces that keep the country economically underdeveloped” (Karam, 1976). This internal dependency was further analyzed by John Galtung who saw center and periphery within a country. This model of dependency is shown in the diagram below (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2: Internal and External Dependencies



Source: Galtung (1971, 84)

Figure 1.2 shows the general idea of Dependency theory by Galtung which has three general points.

1. There is harmony of interest between the center in the Center nations and the center in the Periphery nations. This means that the political and economic elites have same interests and goals.
2. There is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery nations than within the Center nations. The core countries have better living standards and low unemployment in contrast with the harsh living conditions of the periphery countries.
3. There is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Center nations and the periphery in the Periphery nations (Galtung, 1971).

The first point according to Galtung is the link of harmony between the elites of the core countries and the elites of the periphery countries. The financial and military support for the African regimes by the core countries, with the US in particular is one of the most conclusive evidence for the validity of the dependency theory. This method of indirect rule or international influence is not new. Many African colonies were governed by indirect rule or in societies that were divided into privileged ruling group and unprivileged ruled group. The same methods continue as form of neo-colonial dependence. The ruling group deprives the resources for themselves and for the metropolitan ruler that is from the core countries (Mizuno & Okazawa, 2009). In the fourth chapter this US support for the African dictators has been analyzed through a historical perspective.

In the African context the second point is probably the most important factor for the underdevelopment of the continent. The political elite in the peripheral African countries is in direct confrontation with the majority or the working class of the people. This point has been analyzed in the second chapter with the case studies of Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Egypt, Gambia and Ethiopia. The brutality of these African regimes is second only to their corruption. They are repressive regimes that have committed serious human rights violations and the prime generators of corruption. Under these conditions there cannot be any serious economic development on the long term.

The unequal exchange and the lack of modern infrastructure in Africa are important factors for the underdevelopment of the Dark Continent. However their influence is negligible compared with the harmful policies implemented by the African regimes. Hence the core countries do not have to implement complicated economic measures to maintain the African underdevelopment, since the African leaders are more than capable to stall and even destroy the economic progress.

Another important factor is that the international system of dependency that exists in neo-liberal capitalism is further controlled and maintained by the international finance institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The US has the dominant voting power in both of these institutions and has used them to its advantage in the African continent (Blomberg & Broz, 2006) (Weiss, 2011). The loans and grants of these institutions is of benefit only for the elite that is on power while the rest of the population has to bear the burden of paying back the loans with interests (Perkins, 2004). The existence of the international capitalism has been acknowledged by all the dependency theorists as a crucial component in the world system theory.

The unequal exchange between the peripheral countries in Africa and the core countries such as US and its western allies is one of the key instruments of maintaining the underdevelopment. The peripheral countries products that are mainly raw materials, mineral



and energy have low labor costs. These products are exchanged with products of the core countries that have high labor costs. The result is the unequal exchange that sends disproportionate surplus value to the core countries. This unequal exchange has been analyzed as the Singer–Prebisch thesis, which originated from the first dependency theorists.

According to the dependency theory in this world system there cannot be an independent growth and development for the periphery countries in Africa (Horvath & Grabowski, 1999). The system may allow a short-run development, however on the long-term there can be only underdevelopment. According to Andre Gunder Frank the underdevelopment of the periphery countries is a direct result of the development of the core countries. In contrast to the mainstream development economist that sees the African underdevelopment as the sort of the original state of nature, Gunder Frank gives another explanation. The state of underdevelopment is created in the periphery through the growth and the expansion of the center (Frank, 1978). This dependency model of the 1970s is being repeated on a larger scale in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the rural parts of Africa. Four elements converge to create this model: the growing price of food, biofuels, African regimes and multinational agricultural corporation. The “land grabbing” economic exploitation model has been analysed in the fourth chapter. It is a repetition of the internal and external model of dependency theory. The internal dependency is manifested as the exploitation of the rural areas by the African political and economic elite that are centred in the urban areas. The external part comes as the multinational corporations buy large arable lands in the poorest African countries. Under the pretext of free trade, large quantities of agricultural commodities are being transferred in the core countries. Rural areas serve as sources of surplus which is then transferred to the city which is in turn partly transferred out of the African country (Horvath & Grabowski, 1999).

Another form of maintaining underdevelopment is the Andre Gunder Frank’s idea of monocultures. This instrument, forced by the core countries, implies that the periphery countries should concentrate their production on one or on a limited number of mainly agricultural products and raw materials. This is deliberate and successful attempt by the core countries, mainly the US, to render the peripheral African countries incapable of becoming economically self-reliant. As a result countries such as Nigeria, Libya and Angola bound to extract oil while the other sectors of economy are stagnated. Ivory Coast is concentrated to produce cocoa, Ethiopia coffee and Liberia rubber as its main source of income. All of the African countries are dependent on the market prices that are dictated by the core countries, mainly the US.

The earnings from this monoculture “denies the labourer even with the minimum necessary for substance by any definition and which, at some times and places, prohibits even the reproduction of labour power” (Frank, 1978). In this situation when even the basic needs of the people cannot be met, the African periphery countries cannot find resources for development. These countries were and still are in underdevelopment trap. Apart from the creation of the monoculture system, the peripheral countries have the highest unemployment of labour force. According to Samir Amin, the high unemployment in the periphery is not a natural law but an act of policy. The ruling elite in the peripheral African countries stimulate and maintain the high unemployment so they can keep the wages down. When the wages are lowered, the price of exported commodities will be lowered (Amin, 1969). In this perspective the unemployed class, which is substation in the African periphery countries, is the greatest collateral damage of the world system. Transcended into the words of the Keynesian economist Joan Robinson: “the misery of being exploited by capitalist is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” (Robinson, 1964,45).The history of periphery

capitalism, Amin argues, is full of short-term 'miracles' and long-term blocks, stagnation and even regression.

Another group of dependency theorists see the US monetary hegemony as crucial for the underdevelopment in the Third World (Wallerstein, 2004), (Vernengo, 2004). The US Dollar is the world reserve currency, and the US policy makers have used this advantage to the highest potential. The US has followed the monetary policy that privileges its domestic interests. In a time of recession the interest rates are drastically reduced, and then raised when the economy recovers. As a result the dollar has fluctuated in a medium term cycles. The African periphery countries on the other hand are forced to raise the interest rates in the middle of the recession. In other words, the dollar hegemony has provided the US an instrument to pursue counter-cyclical policies, while the African peripheral countries are forced to suffer a recession that they did not cause (Vernengo, 2004). The monetary hegemony eliminates the balance of payments constrain and allows the US to grow foreign exchange limitations. For the peripheral African countries on the other hand, the balance of payments is the main constrain on growth (Sweezy & Baran, 1966).

The main difference between the US and the peripheral African countries is in the financial straight or the inability of the peripheral countries to borrow in their own currency. The U.S. dollar represents the asset of ultimate redemption, and it is used as the measure of international liquidity (Davidson, 1982). As a consequence of the dollar hegemony combined with incompetent and corrupted African leaders, the debt crises and sovereign default has become routine. According to Christian Suter, the external debt crises of peripheral countries are a recurrent phenomenon and a characteristic of the core-periphery countries interaction (Suter, 1989). The effects of the dollar hegemony to the fledgling African economies has been analysed in the fourth chapter.

In Africa the modernization theorists have repeatedly advocated the integration of the periphery countries or the Third World into the world economy, as the only way that they can develop. However history has shown such integration would lead only to the prolongation of the existing poverty, economic stagnation and dependency. The African economies have never been equal in the international market economy and the partaking into the global market is identical to the free submission of a nation's economy and society to exploitation. The foundations of the world system and neoliberal capitalism cannot allow the developing African countries to prosper. According to Andre Gunder Frank:,"the now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped". Under these conditions the political independence is meaningless for the African countries, since their economic system is dependent in a new form of neo-colonialism (Nkrumah, 1965).

The African countries are not the only victims of the western foreign policy. The entire international system that has relied on dependency is in danger to collapse of its own internal contradictions. For the US the first cracks are already visible on three levels in relations with Africa.

First and foremost is the security structure that has been collapsing with the Arab spring and threatens to end with whole out African collapse of the status-quo. Relevant to this point are the various terrorist organizations and newly formed Islamic governments. The second paradox of US foreign policy can be found in the financial and economic sector. The convergence of the US fiscal cliff and the greater need of the African countries for aid have the potential to create disaster with epic proportions. The financial and monetary sector is the crucial link in the US invisible empire and its greatest tool for influence. However, this financial tool that supposed to be Africa's saviour has turned to be the reason for many of the continent's problems. The trillion US dollars donated to Africa have not only added to US

debt but also created inflation and agricultural stagnation in the Dark Continent. The third and greatest loss of the US foreign policy is probably the loss of the country's moral high ground. The country that was formed as revolt against tyranny and oppression has become the greatest supporter and sponsor of African dictators.

The system of dependency that maintains perpetual underdevelopment is old colonial type of control and exploitation that should be abandoned and not modified and changed.

## **2.1 U.S. bilateral relations with African countries**

This research analyses the US foreign policy and influence on twelve African countries. The pursuit for access to the mineral wealth and geopolitics has had great influence in these countries. In many instances the actions of the US government were with good intentions as in providing humanitarian aid and security. But, in complex African societies and states this assistance has greatly increased and prolonged the conflicts. US foreign aid has also created and maintained the world's greatest dictators.

US major allies in Africa represent regional powers that have influence in the security and politics in their respected area. Egypt and Morocco are the major US non-NATO allies that safeguard US interests in North Africa. Eastern Africa is controlled and influenced through Ethiopia and US AFRICOM troops in Djibouti. Western Africa is contained by Nigeria and the regional union of ECOWAS. Central Africa illustrates the US foreign policy to the extremes with replacing dictators as the conflict continues without end in sight. Today's main US proxy forces in Central Africa are Uganda and Rwanda.

The regimes in these countries are among the most brutal and corrupted in world. These leaders are former rebels, warlords that have committed serious human rights violations are now respectable world leaders and US allies. Their countries are among the richest in natural resources, ranging from arable land to oil, gas and mineral ores. But they have received massive amount of US assistance, militarily, economic and political.

This research shows the negative effects of this geopolitical strategy, that harms the people in Africa and the United States. It also does not fulfil its geo-strategic objectives as shown in many cases; these regimes can easily change sides to the highest bidder.

The main interest of US policy makers in Africa are the vast mineral and energy reserves of the continent. The continent of Africa is abundant with natural resources ranging from strategically important energy such as oil, gas and uranium to mineral ores necessary for the US economy. African mineral reserves rank first and second place for bauxite, cobalt, diamonds, phosphate rocks and platinum. African continent has 95% of world's bauxite, 44% of chromate, 57% of cobalt, 21% of gold, 39% manganese, 46% of natural diamond, 31% of phosphate rock, 13% petroleum, and 16% uranium (Yager, et al., 2007).

US oil consumption has reached 21 million barrels per day in 2011, but the domestic production is only 6 million barrels per day. As a result the major share of this crucial resource must be imported. With the constant violence in the Middle East, the US has to look for alternative sources of the black gold. In February, 2010 the US military's Joint Forces Command issued the Joint Operating Environment 2010 warning military commands that states: "By 2012, surplus oil production could entirely disappear, and as early 2015 the shortfall in output could reach nearly 10 million barrels per day" (Macalister, 2010). Today more than 20% of the oil imports come from Africa, with Nigeria, Angola, and Algeria as the main client states. Table 2.1 shows the US and African oil producing countries.

Table 2.1: U.S. Oil interests in Africa

Country	Oil reserves in billion barrels	Oil production in barrels per day	Years of depletion
United States	19,2	5,5 million	10 years
Libya	47	1,8 million	23 years
Nigeria	36,2	2,28 million	43 years
Angola	13,5	1,9 million	19 years
Algeria	13,42	1,7 million	22 years
Sudan South Sudan	6,68	111,7 million 375,0 million	/
Gabon	3,7	241,7 million	/
Equatorial Guinea	1,1	330,0 million	/

Source: US Energy Information Administration (2012)

Overall the US foreign policy towards Africa is outdated and it does not refer to the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century while it creates more instability. The twelve countries analysis shows the pattern of the US foreign policy paradox in Africa.

### **2.1.1 Liberia**

Liberia was the first republic in the continent of Africa. Its inhabitants are local tribes and former slaves from the United States. The members of the American Colonization Society, group of Quakers and former slave owners, can be said to be the founding fathers of the first African republic. The new republic was controlled by settlers, known as American-Liberians, who effectively held power for 133 years. They believed that their holy mission was to Christianize and civilize Liberia and they ruled the country like a colony. The American-Liberians established feudal structure with political, social, economic power in their own hands as they terrorized the indigenous population. Actually they were taking the role of their previous white masters in the southern USA.

Instead of democratic society, Liberia turned to be failed state which was in ever needing support from the US. With its historical linkage Liberia is known as America's Stepchild. Although Liberia was an independent country it has been always dependent on the US for its support. In 1822 The US government granted 100.000 US dollars for development, which was a considerable amount for those days. In 1860 Liberia's territorial boundaries, were expanded,

with assistance from the United States. The US navy waged small wars, conducts treaties and land purchases for the purpose of expanding the Liberia's coastline to 600 miles.

In a time when Africa was colonized out by the Europeans, the republic of Liberia presented a thorn in their eyes. The only protection the Liberians had was the one from the emerging power, the United States. In 1917, the US administration pressured Liberia to declare war on Germany. In that time the fragile Liberian economy was tightly connected with Germany, but the historical connections with the United States proved to be greater. The German response was manifested with shelling of the capital Monrovia and ending all commerce. In this instance the US failed to hold its part of the deal with protecting the Liberian coastline.

The economy of Liberia was devastated, and the US help came in the form of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company. The company got one million acres of land for 99 years and the right to exploit any gold, diamond, and other minerals found on that land. Rubber was not the only commodity that was exploited by this company. The working conditions and minimal wages in this US based company are no different than to slave labour camps (UNMIL, 2006). This controversial company has continued to operate throughout Liberia Civil Wars and well in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The US has been always the largest donor in Liberia. In the days of the Second World War the United States build the seaport and airport in Monrovia. Also large contingents of black US army soldiers were located in the country. Although the country did not hold any strategic location during the war, the US maintained its special relationship with Liberia. During the Cold War, US provided generous support for the country, from loans to major infrastructure projects. The army of Liberia was trained and armed by the US military. Liberia held the position as Israel in Africa, as an unofficial major ally.

In the 1970, the twenty third president of Liberia, William R. Tolbert, decided to make changes in domestic and foreign policy. The price of rubber was falling on the world markets while the price of food products was rising. This situation created social instability and even rice riots. To resolve the social difficulties the President demanded higher taxes from the US rubber company. On the foreign policy Liberia was accepting aid from communist countries, Cuba and the Soviet Union (McPherson, 2004). Liberia even cut off relations with Israel after the Yom Kippur war and demanded creation of a Palestinian State. With this foreign policy he hoped for aid from Arab countries and Libya in particular. As a result of this Liberian foreign policy the relations with the US became stranded. President Tolbert was assassinated by a group of non-commissioned officers led by Sergeant Samuel Doe.

This created a turning point in Liberia's political history. The chain of presidents that belonged to the American Liberian descent was broken. Master Sergeant Doe was from native Krahn ethnic group and despised the former political elite that have ruled Liberia for 133 years.

Although Sergeant Samuel Doe had only elementary education and apparent reading problem, he was resourceful and deterrent leader. The assassination of the President was accompanied with a massacre of twenty six of Tolbert's closest supporters. The following days the government ministers were humiliated as they marched naked in the capital to their execution. For the supporters of the former regimes staged courts were placed in order to humiliate and justify the killings. With this massacre Sergeant Doe managed to liquidate the educated elite that run the executive administration, judicial system and the economy. Sergeant Doe proclaimed himself as the new president of Liberia as the country began to disintegrate. There were several allegations of who ordered the coup and why a regime change was necessary. In 2008 under the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Monrovia allegations were made that

CIA ordered and conducted the coup. This theory is highly probable since the US government had motives for the regime change and sergeant Doe did not had the capacity for the coup (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2009).

After 6 weeks of the military coup and the massacres, US relations normalized and Liberia was once again US ally. The new president agreed to all the demands of the US and a modification of a mutual defence pact that granted staging rights on 24 hour notice at Liberia seaports and airports for US Rapid Deployment Forces. Telecommunication towers of the Voice of America and the intelligence agencies were placed in Monrovia as Liberia became the staging point of US incursion in Africa. In exchange for the loyalty the Reagan administration granted \$500 million of financial aid. Military support ranging from training and equipping the army, was also granted to Liberia (Bright, 2002).

Under Doe's regime the gross domestic product decreased by 13 %, the countries health statistics became the worst in the world and 80 % of the people were illiterate. Liberia also had the worst human rights abuses in the world. The United States was embarrassed of the conduct of its closest ally in western Africa, and demanded democratic elections in Liberia. The elections were held in 1985 but were neither free nor fair, as Doe's militias jailed or killed all those who opposed him and allow only one opposition party.

Samuel Doe's brutality was matched only by his greed and corruption. Although Liberia was one of the poorest countries in the world and its economy and people survived form foreign aid, Samuel Doe was using the countries budget as his personal account. When the cold war was coming to end, US had no more need of the African dictator and threatened to end the aid. Aware that the regime cannot survive without aid funds, Doe requested American financial advice. The US financial team was sent to Liberia to help Liberia to balance its budget and get the economy in order. They realized that the economy was in free fall and the administration was in chaos. After Doe's massacred the intellectual and economic elite there was nobody to run the country effectively. US financial advisors discovered that more than 40% of Liberia funds were transferred to Does personal expenses as his second budget. As the people starved Doe build presidential palaces and had sixty luxury cars.

The Bush administration was aware of the brutality and corruption of the Liberian regime, but decided to turn a blind eye. The opposition had been growing for several years and it had been clear that Liberia was heading to civil war and anarchy. The civil war started as an opposition against state terror evolved into tribal war with foreign intervention. Libyan and West African countries funded and equipped warlords like Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson. The first Liberian civil war raged for 6 years and took a death toll of more than two hundred thousand people. The brutality of the civil war, the torture, mutilation, mass killings, rapes and even cannibalism marked this conflict as the Liberia's uncivil war. The massive casualties and the brutality of the conflict clearly indicated genocide in progress. But the UN did not send the international peacekeepers nor did the US wanted to intervene. Although the United States is s stated signatory of the Genocide Convention, the policy makers in Washington decided not to intervene. In an interview of the Assistant of Secretary of State for African affairs, Herman Cohen, stated that in the White House meetings Robert Gates imposed his opinions that the US has no interests in Liberia and the historic ties are meaningless.

During the conflict, President Doe accused the US for supporting the rebels. On September 9<sup>th</sup>, 1990 the President of Liberia was abducted by a rebel fraction lead by Prince Johnson. Samuel Doe was tortured, castrated and mutilated before being executed on state television. The rebel leader Prince Johnson reported that he was following orders from the US embassy, but the alleged US involvement was never confirmed.

According to US ambassador to Liberia James Bishop, The Bush administration did not want to get involved in evacuating President Doe and his family, because they did not want to have any degree of moral responsibility for letting Charles Taylor to become the next president (Bright, 2002). After the Cold War was over, US relief assistance in the fiscal years 1990-1993 has totalled approximately 259 Million US dollars. Although Liberia failed to repay its debt towards the US, and was technically bankrupt, the Clinton administration continued to pour in money. All support was masked as humanitarian aid since other assistance is prohibited by the Brooke Amendment. The Second Liberian war was even more brutal and caused the deaths of another three hundred thousand people.

The US backing and funding the dictatorial regime of Samuel Doe represents one of the greatest foreign policy blunders. As in the case of Mobutu in Zaire, US policymakers created a corrupt, brutal regime and after certain period of time the aid was cut, leaving the country to path of self-destruction. The consequences of these actions lead to genocide, civil war and failed state.

Liberia is more than an impoverished country in Africa; it represents US foreign policy vision for Africa. It is the first major US endeavour on the Dark Continent. What started as project to get rid of the black population in mainland US, evolved into a US foreign policy towards Africa. Unlike the Europeans that formed colonies and run them directly, the US approach would be different. US policymakers would rule behind the curtains as dictatorial regimes rise and fall, while the African countries remain undeveloped. The case of Liberia illustrates the US foreign policy vision to the extremes. Although the country resources are of little strategic value, US involvement was present through its history. After the two civil wars in Liberia, US foreign military and development assistance continued, although Liberia was famous for its corruption. Table 2.2 shows the combined military and economic assistance to Liberia after the civil war (Cook, 2010).

Table 2.2: US Foreign Aid to Liberia in million US dollars

<b>FISCAL YEARS</b>	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Total US Foreign aid (millions USD)</b>	545,85	367,75	289,23	355,17	317,28	347,42	361,55	353,42	<b>2.937,67</b>

Source: Congressional Research Service (2012, 73)

The bilateral relation between Liberia and the US should benefit to both countries. Even though they are ocean apart and the civil wars are over, the US legacy in Liberia remains. US military and economic aid combined with covert actions that backed dictators and warlords destroyed Liberia. United States has no real economic or strategic interests in Liberia and its foreign policy should be limited to maintaining friendly relations.

### **2.1.2 Nigeria**

Nigeria gained its independence from Britain in October 1960 and now it represents the most populated country in Africa. The total population number is over 155 million people, with different ethnical, tribal, religious and linguistically differences. There are over 250 ethnic

groups, but the most populous and most politically influential are Hausa-Fulani with 29%, Yoruba 21%, and Igbo 18%. The Hausa-Fulani are predominantly Sunni Muslim and occupy the northern part of Nigeria. The Yoruba's are situated in the south-western region of the country and there are members of Christianity and Islam. Igbo people are in the south-eastern part of Nigeria and are predominantly Christian (Suberu, 2001).

With all the differences and conflicts these tribes had in the past, the union of the country seems impossible without foreign intervention. The British were its first colonial masters, who played the divide and rule strategy for decades. They joined these people and tribes whose similarity is only skin deep and forced them to live in a common country in permanent conflict with each other. Even the name Nigeria comes from the colonial masters. The name is coined after the river Niger by the mistress of a British colonial administrator (Omoruyi, 2002). It was clear that the colony of Nigeria was made for the economic gain for Britain and those that had no intention of solving the internal conflicts or the improvement of the living standards. Britain has seen that the wave of anti-colonialism was unstoppable and pulled out of the colony. They removed the military and colonial administration but not their political and economic influence. Simply stated they replaced colonialism with neo-colonialism.

The US relations with Nigeria started to improve with the turn of the century, as Nigeria ended its military rule. The United States has strategic interest in Nigeria with its vast oil and gas reserves. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, Nigeria produces around 2 million barrels per day and the US is importing 990,000 B/D (barrels per day). With this energy export Nigeria is the US fifth foreign oil supplier. Nigeria's oil exports are light, sweet crudes with low sulphur contents, what makes it easier to transport and less expensive to refine (EIA, 2012). Apart from oil products Nigeria is exporting bauxite, rubber, tobacco, cocoa and grains to the US, while importing goods and service from the US in a worth four billion US dollars (US Department of State, 2012).

With proven oil reserves of 37, 2 billion barrels, it will take approximately 45 years till the oil reserves are depleted (EIA, 2012). With world declining oil reserves and the instability in the Persian Gulf, Nigeria has become US prime ally in Africa. The vast oil reserves in Nigeria were known in the 1960 and as result, US policymakers did not criticize Nigerian leadership. Even in the Nigerian civil war of in 1967 to 1970, the US did not intervene even though genocide of 3 million people was taking place. In the next decades military dictatorships ruled Nigeria and human right violations were committed as US companies drilled for oil.

Although Nigeria is a country with great mineral wealth, its people are among the poorest in the world and as a result the US has poured in aid worth billions of dollars. The following table (Table 2.3) illustrates the US aid that is given to Nigeria in the past decade.



Table 2.3: US Foreign Assistance to Nigeria in millions US Dollars

<b>FISCAL YEAR (FY)</b>	<b>TOTAL AID IN MILLIONS USD</b>
2001	77,7
2002	66,5
2003	75,1
2004	61,1
2005	64,3
2006	80,4
2007	370
2008	533,6
2009	594,3
2010	614,2
2011	647,7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3.184,9</b>

Source: U.S. Department of State Annual Congressional Budget Justifications and Congress Research Service (2012)

Over the past decade the US government has given over three billion dollars of aid in Nigeria (USAID, 2011). But this aid was not only for humanitarian assistance and development. It also holds programs that are meant to strengthen the security forces in Nigeria. One of the main reasons for this aid is the fact that Nigeria is not using its full potential for producing oil. If it were not for the vandalism of oil pipes in the Niger Delta, the oil production could double to four million barrels per day. The second reason is the increased piracy in the Gulf, that if it is not contained it can create situation similar to that of Somalia. The third reason for the increase military cooperation is the stability of Nigeria and the whole region of West Africa.

Nigeria with its mineral wealth, population and security forces represent a regional power in West Africa. The US has regional power in every part of Africa for the purpose of congaing instability and to oppose any force that can jeopardize their interests. The idea of ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group), a military structure from West African countries, was conceived by the US to restore order in Liberia and other war zones. In order to strengthen Nigeria as partner and a West African proxy, the US army trains and equips the Nigerian security forces (Poplin, 2011). The US Coast Guard even donated 3000 tons warship to the Nigerian navy in order to counter the growing piracy in the region (Oluwarotimi, 2011).

### *2.1.2.1 Conflict in Niger Delta*

The Niger Delta is vast expanse that represents home for over thirty million people that belong to 40 ethnic groups. The Delta is also a geological wonder that holds billions of barrels of light crude oil. This area of swamps, rivers and jungle has been the conflict zone in the past decades. US multinational companies and the Nigerian government have been battling over this area with the local population in an unreported war. In the 1990s the military regime started full scale war when it deployed thousands of troops and paramilitary to punish and resettle the people. The military officers and soldiers in the Nigerian army are mostly from the northern Muslim states and they have hatred and animosity against the Christian south inhabitants that dates back to the civil war.

The Nigerian army conducted military offensive in May 1994 with wide spread terror tactics, mass killings and rapes against the unarmed local population. The Ogoni minority group was brutalized by Nigerian security forces. The following weeks more than 30 villages have been destroyed and 2000 people have been killed. This ethnic cleansing created around 100.000 refugees. The military regime of Sani Abacha was criticized by the US government and even sanctions were imposed. However, the oil imports were not involved in the sanctions which represent more than 90% of Nigeria's income.

While the Nigerian army has been used only in extreme cases, the police force and the paramilitary "Mobile Police Force" are deployed regularly in the oil producing state. This paramilitary formation is consisted of former soldiers, vigilantes that receive only few months training in a police academy. In the Nigerian society they are more feared than respected as they are well known for overwhelming use of force and even incidents of indiscriminate killings. The Mobil Police Force (MOPOL) or in their local pseudonym "kill and go" are well known for gross human rights violations across Nigeria, but in the Niger Delta the scale of torture and killing might be considered as an act of genocide (BBC, 2001).

The oil corporations are well connected to the Mobile Police Force as they pay the salaries, livelihoods and even expenses for their ammunition. In fact, the police in Niger Delta have been transformed into a private security force for the multinational oil companies, with the consent of the Nigerian federal government. US multinational companies have even publicly acknowledged the fact that they are supplying arms, ammunition and funds to the Nigerian police in an exchange for securing the oil installations (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

The Nigerian army and police units were involved in many war crimes in this unreported war against the people of Niger Delta. In January 2004, joint military and police forces were involved in killings of unknown number of civilians and the mass rape of 40 girls according to Amnesty International. The same year the police was involved in mass killings of over twenty unarmed civilians in Rivers State. But these gross human rights violations were merely the tip of the iceberg, in a country governed by kleptocratic rulers and brutal security forces. The extrajudicial killing, torture, rape continues to this day according to the US State Department reports on human rights.

In 2009, the Nigerian security forces started massive military offensive against the militants that were opposing the oil corporations. Several factors were crucial for the decision to undertake this military operation. First, the price of oil was falling dramatically in the first quarter of 2009, with prices reaching \$35 per barrel in February. This meant lower income for the Nigerian federal government which is totally dependable on the revenues of oil. The second factor was the security situation on oil installations in Niger delta. Oil bunkering and sabotage of the militants in the Delta caused a decline in oil exports of 600.000 barrels of oil. (Asuni, 2011) The militants even hijacked a tanker and took 18 Nigerian soldiers as prisoners.

The former president of Nigeria, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, had always been in favour for compromise and dialogue, but with the mounting pressure of the oil lobby, a military solution prevailed. The military operation had a striking resemblance to the offensives in the 1990s during the rule of the military junta. According to Amnesty International, helicopter gunships fired indiscriminately on villages and casualties were measured by the hundreds. The offensives resulted with a massive humanitarian disaster as more than ten thousand people fled their homes, becoming internal refugees. After a month of the operation, the President offered amnesty to the militants in order to prevent a wider civil war. The exact number of people that were killed, tortured, mutilated and raped is still unknown. The media in Nigeria are under strict censorship, while the western media are heavily influenced by the oil lobby. The reports of international aid and humanitarian agencies are the only true source for the ethnic cleansing that is happening in the Niger Delta.

### *2.1.2.2 Rise of Islamic radical movement Boko Haram*

The terrorist organization “People committed to the propagation of the Prophets teaching and Jihad” or commonly known as “Boko Haram” is relatively new organization that is destabilizing Nigeria. Although the organization started appearing in 2009, the reason for its existence dates back for decades (Walker, 2012).

The population in Nigeria is almost equally divided between Christian and Muslims, but this conflict is more than religious. It is tribal, ethnic and economic. Western media explains that the conflict is between Muslim North and Christian South and in order for the western democracy to succeed the US should aid the Nigerian government in the fight against the terrorists.

The conflict exists with the inception of colonial Nigeria. The British divide and rule policy of different tribes living together in never-ending conflict has re-emerged again in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the form of Boko Haram.

The military rulers coming from the north or being controlled by the Hausa tribe contained the conflict. With the turn of the century and the civilian rule the problems emerged with different issues. Boko Haram or “western education is sinful” represents more than a Muslim fundamentalist movement. It is a movement that has opposed the corruption of the government officials and demands a change in the economic disparity between northern and southern states of Nigeria. To further increase their hatred towards the government is the current Christian President Jonathan Goodluck who appoints his ministers and public officials from his home state Bayelsa in the south of Nigeria.

The escalation of violence happened in July 2009, when Nigerian security forces clashed with the Islamic movement and resulted with over one thousand people killed. The insurgency in 2009 started over banal dispute when the police asked bribes and penalties over motorcycles hats during a funeral procession. The corruption of the police combined with the angry mob created incident that sparked the conflict. The police reinforced with the army, surrounded and attacked the insurgents in four different cities. Unlike western anti-riot tactics, the Nigerian forces have been reported to use overwhelming force and even mortars (BBC, 2009).

After this clash, Boko Haram gained support from the local population and terrorist organization from foreign countries. With this support Boko Haram evolved into a serious terrorist organization that executed several attacks against the government officials and churches. The Government of Jonathan Goodluck imposed state of emergency in the affected states and closed the borders. But this policy of hard stance against terrorism has backfired. In a country that has functional and disciplined security force, these measures would be effective

in countering the terrorist threat. In Nigeria it had the opposite effects as the police and its paramilitary element MOPOL oppressed the people with their checkpoints and unlawful searches. The other part of President's Jonathan strategy of closing the borders, proved impossible to be conducted. The borders in western Africa exist only in the maps, as for the Nigeria northern border it is a vast area of desert that nobody controls.

Boko Haram's forces were also strengthened with arms and ammunition that come from the fallen regime in Libya. This presents another paradox in US strategy where the regime change in one country backfires to other African country. US AFRICOM commander General Ham stated that the three African terrorist groups Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabab and Boko Haram are collaborating and synchronizing their efforts against Western targets. But in Nigeria, Boko Haram does not present a serious threat for the US national security. This terrorist organization was denounced by the Muslim population and its religious leader, the Sultan of Sokoto. Sultan Muhammadu Sa'ad Abubakar is the twentieth Sultan of Sokoto, and he represents a traditional ruler from a bloodline that dates for two hundred years. For the Muslim Hausa and Fulani people he is their traditional and religious leader, and in 2011 he stated that Boko Haram is an embarrassment for Islam.

Boko Haram is a terrorist organization that has targeted civilian and UN aid worker across Nigeria. But they are far from a threat to US national security and their links to other terrorist organization are merely ideological. The Nigerian security forces with their brutality are the only factor that can escalate this conflict. The solution for the Nigerian sectarian violence can be found through dialogue and compromise. At the end, Nigeria itself is a compromise where different tribes settle their differences through dialogue and understanding.


Besides the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, the Niger Delta conflict presents the greatest weakness of Nigeria. Oil has been more of a curse than a blessing in Nigeria. Once thriving agricultural part of Nigeria has become an ecological disaster and the farmers have turned into pirates and militants (Douglas, et al., 2004). Oil and the international corporations have created and funded military juntas and today's corrupt government. As result Nigeria as of 2012 is becoming a failed state. The United States should implement policy of not intervening in affairs of Nigeria and when gross human rights violations occur sanctions should be imposed.

### **2.1.3 Libya**

The state of Libya is an artificial creation, even the name Libya is given by the Italians to unite the three colonial provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. The creation of a Libyan nation never did happen and today's population is a mixture of 140 tribes and clans (Mokhefi, 2011). The only sense of nationalism and national belong is the Arabian nationalism and Islam.

Figure 2.3 shows the major tribes in Libya, and their respectable geographical location. In the figure from STRATFOR only the three major tribes are indicated. The Arab Berber tribes are located in the north of Libya, while the major tribal subgroups and clans are mentioned on their respectable location. In the centre there is the Gadhafi or Qaddafi tribe from which the Muammar Gaddafi originates. In the south of the map (Figure 2.1) there are the Tuareg and Toubou tribes which are mainly nomadic and have darker skin.

Figure 2.1: Tribes in Libya



Source: STRATFOR (2011)

The divisions of the three major parts, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan, are territorial, tribal and even religious. The main towns in these regions are divided by vast expanses of desert and the communication between them is limited. An example is the highway between Tripoli and Bengasi, which stands as an only link between the East and West. As a result the people in the East have traditionally felt closer to Egypt than of the western Tripolitania region. In contrast the people in the western region feel closer to the Maghreb and Tunisia. The eastern part has been heavily associated with Islamism and the population is more traditional with conservative orientation. In the past two decades the eastern part has provided many recruits in Islamic opposition groups such Libyan Islamic Group which is part of Muslim brotherhood and other militant jihadist movements.

The tribal division in Libya was best illustrated in the 1993 assassination plot against Gaddafi. The assassins were Libyan soldiers, members of Warfalla tribe, who mutinied because they were not promoted in the higher ranks. Gaddafi crushed the rebellion with the air force whose members were from his tribe. As retribution Gaddafi punished the whole tribe which is located in the town of Misrata, with extrajudicial killings and cutting off all development to the area (International Crisis Group, 2011).

Foreign powers have used the mixture of population and applied the divide and rule tactics in Libya since its creation. The US involvement in Libya dates from the 19<sup>th</sup> century with the Barbary wars. The purpose for US foreign policy in this territory was always for economic gains. In the Barbary Wars, the Muslim pirates hijacked US merchant ships. That led to the

creation of the US Navy and Marines, a standing expeditionary military force that would protect the US interests worldwide. Unlike the European countries that would pay ransom and tribute to the pirates, the US was resolved to wage war. After two bloody wars against the Barbary pirates, the US was victorious. This conflict in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was a prediction for things to come as it marked the first war on Islamic extremism, terrorism and piracy.

After the Second World War, the Italians left a power vacuum in their Libyan colony. During the war the traditional leader of Cyrenaica, King Idris, led the resistance against the Axis powers. This made him an ally in the eyes of the British and Americans. Idris was nominated as King of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. The war ravaged the country and it desperately needed assistance. The British and later the US poured the country with money and development aid. In return the King granted them territory for military bases. The US established the Wheelus Air Force base which was essential for the US Strategic Air Command. But the regime would prove to be incompetent to address the basic needs of the people. The King acted more as he is emir of Cyritania than the head of state for all Libyans. Even his palace was located close to UK military base for security reasons. Although the regime was proclaimed to be under Western influence political parties were banned in 1951 while the political power was ever more centralized under the King.

The rise of Arab nationalism after the Suez crisis and the Six Day War was deciding factor for the demise of the King. The royal regime was also corrupted and had no real sense for the social demands of the people. As the regime built palaces and surrounded itself with luxury, the people lived in tents as their ancestors. The people knew about the vast oil reserves and grew impatient of the King's social policies. In the middle of the conflict there were the US and UK troops, who were considered as infidels in a Muslim and Arab countries. The British policymakers understood the situation and evacuated their bases as early in 1965. The end of the regime was expected and the regime change was done in a bloodless coup. The overthrow of the monarchical regime brought one of the most controversial dictators in the modern era, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

Gaddafi became the origin and the source of Muslim extremism and sponsor for all other terrorist organization across the globe. The US war on terror actually starts in Libya against the "mad dog of the Middle East" as American President Ronald Reagan called Gaddafi. Although the President ordered several military strikes in Libya, it had little effect.

In 1982 the US imposed the proclamation 4907 for banning the imports of oil. This embargo was soon followed by other countries and eventually led to the UN embargo. Libya like other African countries always had a weak economy that is highly dependable on exporting raw materials and minerals. In Libya's case it is oil and 95 % of all it revenues come from this source. Agriculture and food production are in a state of decline since oil was discovered in 1959. As a consequence, the people of Libya imported the bulk of their food and even depended on aid. The trade embargo and its enforcement have proven to be the best medicine for this rough regime. Without the oil revenues and politically isolated, the regime was dying out after the Cold War ended. Libya foreign relations were limited to African countries and his support for terrorist organizations also disappeared. Actually, Gaddafi himself was targeted by terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda.

The conflict between Gaddafi and the Islamic movement was just part of the confrontation. Mummer Gaddafi was the leader of the Qadadfa tribe which centres on the town of Sirte in central Libya. In Gaddafi's vision, his birthplace Sirte was to become the administrative capital of the "United States of Africa". No expenses were spared in the infrastructure of Sirte

and in few decades village of Sirte has grown to a modern town with luxury palaces. In the same time the infrastructure of the East, including the city of Benghazi was decaying.

The animosity between Qadadfa tribe and the western tribes of Cyritania date back hundreds of years. Back then parts of the Qadadfa tribe tried to settle in the east but were driven to the deserts by an alliance of tribes from the Eastern Sa'adi confederation. Muammer Gaddafi continued this tribal confrontation during his reign. In 1989 Libyan security forces rounded up thousands of suspected Islamists whom Gaddafi described as "dangerous as AIDS" (International Crisis Group, 2011). The regime practiced collective punishment. For the alleged insurrection and plans to overthrow him, Gaddafi kept the East in a perpetual state of underdevelopment. Although the oil wealth originated from the east, all the development was concentrated in the western part of Libya. The confrontation was growing as the regime was ever more isolated in the international arena and in Libya.

In desperation, Gaddafi turned to his arch enemy, the United States for support. He even paid lobby groups to support the lifting of the UN sanctions. In 2003 Libya denounced its chemical and biological weapons program. Although he was caught with a North Korea shipment of nuclear materials, the West was ready to forgive Gaddafi and let him back to the world stage. Gaddafi even collaborated with US and UK intelligence agencies and became important ally in the war on terrorism. The counter-terrorism intelligence collaboration started in the early 1990 and Libya was the first country that issued an arrest warrant for Osama bin Laden. The Intelligence links deepened during the Bush administration. CIA even brought alleged terrorists to Libya for torture under the "extraordinary rendition" program. This torture by proxy was a scandal, whose evidences were published by Human Rights Watch shows that the US and UK governments actively and deliberately participated in gross human rights violations together with the Libyan government. Even the head of Libyan intelligence, Moussa Koussa, was frequently visiting London for meetings with the CIA and MI6. Among the documents found by Human Rights Watch there were the questionnaires from which the Libyan authorities would conduct the interrogation of the alleged terrorists (BBC, 2011). In short, the US government secretly supported one of the most brutal regimes in the world, and illegally extradited US citizens and foreigners to Libyan prisons for torture.

In return the sanctions against Libya were lifted and Gaddafi was rehabilitated as a leader of sovereign African country. He even attended the G8 summit in L'Aquila as Chairman of the African Union. During this meeting he made a precedent with the handshake with President Barack Obama. The support for rehabilitation of Libya was bipartisan as Gaddafi met with Senator John McCain in 2009. The Libyan dictator made a complete 180 degrees political change from supporting terrorism and being called as the "mad dog of the Middle East" to main ally in the war on terrorism and attending public meetings with world leaders.

In 2011, the Western leaders wanted the history to be rewritten and denied any connections with the Gaddafi regime. For the US, Gaddafi represents another covertly backed African dictator that backfired with the Arab Spring.

### *2.1.3.1 UN Resolution 1973*

The UN Resolution 1973 imposed a no fly zone over Libya and authorized UN member States to use "all necessary measures" to protect Libyan civilians, with the exception of foreign occupation (UN Security Council, 2011). The reasons for this resolution were to stop Libyan planes that were bombing the rebels and to stop the offensive at Benghazi (The Guardian, 2011). Gaddafi threatened that his forces will make "rivers of blood" as his troops entered the suburbs of Benghazi. The dangers of another massacre as in Srebrenica or Rwanda

were present, but in the same time there was the fear of another Somali Black Hawk down incident. The logical step to end the bloodshed would be immediate cease fire and deployment of UN peacekeepers. But in this case the UN subcontracted the mission to NATO's militaries.

Instead of peacekeeping mission, NATO decided to implement the Kosovo style "humanitarian bombardment". The "no fly zone" that supposed to end the Libyan air bombardment was replaced with NATO air strikes (Gertler, 2011). Even with the state of the art equipment, there were civilian casualties. Human Rights Watch report states that seven out of eight of the incidents, there were no clear military targets at the area. On the eighth incident, in which three women and four children died, the target was a Libyan military officer. In these incidents 74 civilians died, including 24 children (Human Rights Watch, 2012). This report confirms that NATO, instead of protecting the civilian population, was involved in their murder. Under the laws of war, the parties in the conflict must take all feasible steps to minimize the danger to the civilians. If the civilians are killed, governments are obliged to investigate the allegations and compensate their families. NATO responded that is not compensating the families and it is not starting investigation because it had not received approval from the Transitional National Government.

NATO forces did not even enforce the "no fly zone" properly as stated in the UN Resolution 1973. The no fly zone was obligatory for all warring parties in the civil war, the Libyan air force and the rebel force (Free Libyan Air force). This selective approach shows the double standards and the clear breach of UN resolution by the US and its NATO allies. Strategically the allowance of the rebel air force to operate with impunity, gave NATO minimal or no gains. Legally and politically it represents a scandal in international relations.

The incidents of NATO and US failing to enforce the resolution 1973 were numerous. In June 2011 three MIG-21 of the Free Libyan Air Force operated with impunity against the Gaddafi loyalists (Zenko, 2011). Despite the arms embargo there were many incidents in which NATO used air drops to supply the rebels (Gelie, 2011). On these allegations of the French newspaper, Le Figaro, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen responded: "I don't consider the so-called arms drop a problem" (Rasmussen, 2011). This statement given by a high official is clear evidence that NATO was clearly and deliberately violating the UN resolution 1973. Al Jazeera reported a case where arms were smuggled inside a humanitarian aid packages. These and other reports show a deliberate violation of an UN resolution by the US in every point. The ultimate goal was a regime change in Libya. Even the US Secretary of State Leon Panetta stated: "The objective is to do what we can to bring down the regime of Qaddafi" (Garamone, 2011).

Even the part that forbids foreign troops on the ground was violated by NATO. US have sent small number of "spotters" on the ground to assist in the bombing campaign. British former government official confirmed the media reports from the BBC that dozens of British SAS were on the ground across Libya.

On the start of the war president Obama said that there will be no ground troops to Libya. But this statement apparently was not referred to CIA Special Activities Division, whose paramilitary were sent in March 2011 (Kelley, 2012). In the early phases these paramilitary troops were gathering intelligence on the strength of the Gaddafi regime and the links of the rebels with terrorist organizations. Soon after they began arming and training the rebels. The CIA officers even helped in the recovery of a US Air force pilot to escape (DeYoung & Miller, 2011).

The greatest asset the US deployed in the war were Libyan immigrants who had lived in the US, Canada, UK and France. One of them was Khalifa Belqasim Haftar who was army



commandant in the Libyan army but defected in the US. He actually lived in Virginia, just five kilometres of CIA headquarters in Leangle (Baker, 2011). When the civil war started he was sent in Libya and got the rank of a general. The Tripoli Brigade which occupied the capital had most of its militia sent from abroad and the commander was Irish citizen.

### *2.1.3.2 The death of Gaddafi and the International law*

The regime change in Libya was finalized with the assignation of Mummer Gaddafi. The UN Security council did not give authorization for the NATO bombing campaign in Libya or the execution of its leader. The latter part has created an international legal precedent and seriously violated the international law of human rights. On a political level it was seen as a warning to the regimes and leaders who oppose US foreign policy. Even the prime minister of the Russian Federation Putin asked who gave NATO the right to kill Gaddafi. This remark was seen as a signal for deteriorating relation of US - Russian relations. The evident regime change in Libya and the political assassination has created political ripple effect on a global scale.

The US government was involved in political assassination in Africa since the early 60s, with the assignations of Patrice Lumumba in Congo and Nkrumah in Ghana. President Obama intensified the assassinations with drone attacks and proxy forces. The Executive orders of presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan that forbid assassinations, was first discarded by the President Bush.

“No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”

-Executive order 12333 President Ronald Reagan (Bazan, 2002)-

President Obama has ordered more assassinations by drone strikes in his four year term than President Bush in his eight years (Bergen, 2012). The assassination of Mummer Gaddafi started on the first day of Operation Odyssey Dawn when the cruise missiles attacked Gaddafi palace. In the late stages of the war, the Libyan rebels were coordinating air strikes to continue their advance (CBS, 2011). The convoy, in which Gaddafi and his family fled, was bombed by US drone and attacked by the rebels. In the same convoy which contained over 250 people only handful survived. This last chapter of Libya's civil war sums up the US and NATO involvement, which was oriented strictly as a regime change and masked by humanitarianism. According to the witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the fleeing convoy was attacked several times by US and NATO drones and aircraft. Even when Gaddafi Loyalist were stopped and attacked by the Misrata militia they were attacked with air bursting bombs. This marks the coordination and communication between the rebels and US military. However the controversy begins with the fact that 150 people were captured after the short battle. The prisoners were subjected to the harsh torture, abuse and humiliation while 66 of the prisoners were found the next day by the Mahari Hotel (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Among the tortured and abused prisoners was Gaddafi, whose torture was recorded.

In the videos of the assignation of Gaddafi, the torture was clearly visible as Gaddafi begs for mercy. After a phone call of one of the rebels, Gaddafi was executed. Even though the images in the video were gruesome they were broadcasted on all the Western media and Aljazeera without censorship. This political assassination was almost identical with the assignation of Patrice Lumumba who was tortured and humiliated by his countrymen before taken away on a truck to be executed. Both videos were public and without censorship. The assassination of Gaddafi marked the new NTC government of Libya as a violator of an international law. Article 3 of the Geneva Convention protects the wounded in a conflict: “Persons taking no

active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other criteria" (ICRC, 2011).

The response of the torture and execution of Gaddafi was seen as a joyful occasion for many officials in the Obama Administration. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton even said on an interview: "We came, we saw, he died" (Daly, 2011).

### *2.1.3.3 Libya under the NTC (National Transitional Council)*

After the fall of Tripoli, the country was de jure under the rule of the National Transition Council. But de facto, the true leaders were not determined, while the country was in anarchy. Although the NTC claims that it has control over different anti-Gaddafi militias, the reality is that different paramilitary organizations were united only against colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

The NTC was first formed on 27<sup>th</sup> February, 2011 to act as the political face of the revolution. The Council started with 33 members and has risen up to 45, with proposal to increase its size further to 75 or 125. The head of state or the chairman of the NTC was Abdul Jalil, the former minister of Justice. His previous position, power and decisions are today forgotten and the only fact that exists is that Jalil took a stance against the human rights violations in Libya. Although Abdul Jalil sentenced to death the Bulgarian nurses, the European leaders and NATO saw the hope of New Libya in the chairman of NTC. Even the draft of the constitution that NTC brought states that Sharia law will be imposed and Islam is the state religion.

The vice chairman of the NTC is Ali Abdu Salam Tarhouni who was first appointed as chief of finance and oil in September 2011 responsible for security in Tripoli. Tarhouni spent most of his life in the US where he got his MSc and PhD degree and began teaching Economics at the University Of Washington Michael G. Foster School Of Business.

The new government in Libya has deep connection with the Western governments and will represent future US proxy. But months after the overthrow of Gaddafi's regime, the militias were fighting among each other while the eastern province declared autonomy.

The new Libyan armed forces are not unified military structure with clear chain of command. Instead, the National Liberation Army is a combination of forty different militias that are different by its weaponry, manpower and even ideology. Many of these so called brigades are Islamic militias with close ties with Al Qaeda. Other brigades are composed mainly by Libyan expatriates that have come back from US and UK. The only unifying factor to these militias was their common enemy, the regime of Gaddafi. The fractioning and tribal fighting among the revolutionaries was to be expected after the death of Gaddafi. NATO strategists were fully aware of the overthrow of Gaddafi would create a power vacuum and chaos in Libya. In a NATO report on 1<sup>st</sup> September, various strategies were developed on how to answer the new security challenges in Libya (Gaub, 2011). This official NATO report is just one of the evidences that NATO deliberately manufactured conditions for total civil war in Libya. The report also states the need of NATO troops to be deployed in Libya for bringing order and security. With the inter faction clashes continuing in Libya, foreign force will be necessary to maintain order.

As the country goes deeper into anarchy and chaos, vast amount of arms and ammunition are spread across the region. Weapons of Libya have been used in the revolt in Mali and in Nigeria. The US regime change has not only turned Libya into a failed state but also destabilized the whole region.

#### *2.1.3.4 The Ethnic Cleansing in Tawergha*

The case of Tawergha shows the true side effects from violent regime change and represents an international political scandal of epic proportion. Tawergha was a coastal town in Libya with a population of over thirty thousand people. The majorities of the people were black Libyans and were directly protected by Gaddafi. They were part of his megalomaniac plan for “United States of Africa”, where all the African countries would be under Gaddafi’s leadership (Chothia, 2011). The town of Tawergha also had a strategic role in Gaddafi’s tribal war. The goal was that Tawergha was to be containment of the Warfalla tribe in Misrata which openly rebelled against Gaddafi in the early nineties.

When the civil war started, Gaddafi used the black Libyans from Tawergha as a paramilitary force against their neighbours in Misrata. Among the locals there were mercenaries from African countries that committed war crimes. During the war, ethnic and racial hatred was created and the cycle of violence was initiated. When the tables were turned in favour of the rebels, the rebels of Misrata started their own siege of Tawergha. The rebels used heavy weapons and fired indiscriminately in revenge for the siege of Misrata. During the attack which lasted three days NATO air force was involved in bombing the Tawerghian position (NATO, 2011). The Qatari TV Al Jazeera described the offensive as, heavily coordinated with NATO Forces (Al Jazeera, 2011). After the occupation of the town by the Misrata brigade, ethnic cleansing began. The local population was ordered to leave their homes and never to come back. The commander of the Misrata brigade even proudly stated “Tawergha no longer exists”. Mass grave of 150 people was found in the city, which the rebels claim it was done by Gaddafi loyalist (Gilligan, 2011).

As of 2012 the town of Tawergha is a ghost town with no inhabitants and unknown death black Libyans. This ethnic and racial cleansing continued throughout Libya. Black Libyans were seen as supporters of the Gaddafi regime and systematically expelled out of the country. Most of the people of Tawergha now live in refugee camps in substandard condition and under continuing discrimination. NATO with its air force directly assisted in an ethnic cleansing and possibly a massacre (NATO, 2011). The Arab and Western media rarely report of this silent genocide in the new Libya.

#### *2.1.3.5 The reasons for the war*

The reasons for regime change in Libya can be divided into economic and political. The US foreign policy towards Africa is centred in creation of semi-failed states with dictatorial leaders and weak institutions. The revolution led by Gaddafi created anomaly in this African order modelled by the US. Libya under the Gaddafi regime had the highest nominal GDP per capita in Africa. In the last ten years of Gaddafi’s rule, Libya had favourable growth rates and in 2010 GDP growth of 10,6 percent, the highest in Africa. The regime was investing heavily in education since the early seventies (World Bank, 2006). As a result the literacy rate rose from 10% during the reign of King Idris to 90 %. Education was free for all citizens to university level and scholarships granted for studying abroad. Healthcare was free for all citizens as the life expectancy increase from 57 to 77 years and infant mortality rates went from 125 per 1000 live births to 15 per 1000, making the lowest infant mortality rate in Africa. The Libyan welfare system included Gaddafi’s promise “a home for all Libyans”. Entire towns were erected in the desert with running water and electricity. Gaddafi initiated a large irrigation projects called the Great Manmade River for the sole purpose of providing safe drinking water to cities on the coast. The multibillion dollar project was ridiculed by the West as “the Great Mad Man River” (Abdelrhem, et al., 2008). But when they saw the

potential of the project, NATO bombed it several times in July 2011. The Libyan regime like other Arab countries was brutal in its nature. However, unlike the Gulf States, equal rights were established for men and women of all races. For all the infrastructure projects, Libya was the only country in the region that had no debt toward foreign countries or financial institutions. Unlike King Indris who was subjected towards the Western countries, Gaddafi confronted the Western companies to increase Libya's oil revenues. He demanded from the oil companies to pay 10 % more taxes and increase royalty of 44 cents per barrel. The Libyan dictator understood the power of oil and was the initiator of the creation of OPEC and the increase of the price of oil.

But Gaddafi's ambitions were bigger than Libya. Even in the early days of his rule he demanded creation of Arab Union. Gaddafi even promised the territory and wealth of Libya as collateral to the Arab leaders. For the US and its European allies the creation of united Arab state would present a potential geostrategic catastrophe and used every means to sabotage Gaddafi's plans.

During the Cold war, Gaddafi truly represented the "mad dog of the Middle East" according to President Reagan (Weinraub, 1986). Gaddafi supported and funded almost every terrorism organization in the world. But in the late nineties Gaddafi stated that he is discouraged by the pursuit of Pan Arabism. From then on Gaddafi became obsessed with the creation of "United States of Africa", continental state under his command. In a short period of time he mastered African politics and even received the title king of kings. He used the traditional rulers and kings of Africa as a backdoor into sub-Saharan Africa. In the African Union he used the corruption of the African leaders to promote his ambitious plans. Gaddafi backed and financed almost all known African liberation and terrorist movements, tyrants and freedom fighters alike. He fought South African Apartheid system and became close friend to Nelson Mandela. Decade before he supported Uganda's dictator Idi Amin. Gaddafi even gave his daughter as a wife to the cannibalistic dictator. His obsession with black Africans escalated when he asked from the Libyan people to marry black Africans. In a speech in Tripoli, Gaddafi said: "I would like Libya to become a black country. Hence, I recommend to Libyan men to marry black women and Libyan women to marry black men" (Pal, 2011).

In a course of a decade, Gaddafi's influence and political power in African union grew and was becoming a serious threat to US foreign policy in the continent. In a direct confrontation Gaddafi oppose the creation of the AFRICOM and its headquarters on African soil (Taguem Fah, 2010). Gaddafi managed to persuade all the African countries not to allow significant US military deployment on the continent.

But one of the least known reasons for US intervention in Libya comes from monetary policy. Gaddafi always had unorthodox methods in conducting his policies but he understood the power of the oil and the world's reserve currency, the US dollar. Year before the uprising Gaddafi was publicly announcing the replacing the fiat currency with gold and silver and even the trade of oil would be done through precious metals. Had this monetary policy been implemented, it would have great consequences on the world reserve currency, the US dollar. This financial coup would present more than enough reason for the need of a regime change.

United States was not the only country that wanted a regime change and was actively equipping and training militias in Libya in direct contradiction with UN resolution. The small Arab country of Qatar was involved in a total war, where all its resources military, intelligence and economical were put into this conflict. Qatar deployed its air force in the bombing campaign, its intelligence agencies in training and equipping the rebels. Qatar Oil Corporation even sold the Libyan oil while the civil war was still going on. But the greatest

influence had the Qatari television Aljazeera which propagated the need for military intervention in Libya. United Arab Emirates was also involved in the conflict with the consent and backing of the Arab Gulf States. The logic behind this unholy alliance of the absolute monarchies against the Gaddafi is hard to understand. For the Arab sheiks and royalties in the Gulf, Gaddafi who comes from poor Bedouin family is not considered equal.

The demise of Gaddafi might start with his confrontation with the sheiks and especially the King of Saudi Arabia. At the Arab summit in 2009 Gaddafi insulted the Saudi king with: “You are always lying and you’re facing the grave and you were made by Britain and protected by the United States” (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2009). Libya was also accused for attempting to assassinate the Saudi royalty. Gaddafi even challenged the Saudi leadership in the Arab and Muslim world by proclaiming: “I am the leader of the Arab leaders, the king of kings of Africa and the imam of the Muslims” (Darwish, 2009).

From Western perspective these insults represent empty words between two old heads of states and have no impact in politics in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. But the Saudi regime dates from medieval times and sometimes acts like as it is of that time. The blood vengeance had been set in the day when Gaddafi stated his remarks. Incidentally, two years later the military intervention against Libya started on the same date. Qatar and United Arab Emirates brought the fight to Gaddafi. In some extent the United States was forced in a war by dictatorial Arab Royalties that were seeking revenge.

The US foreign policy towards Libya was full with controversy from its early beginnings. The policymakers unified Libya under a plutocratic and non-elected leader King Idriz. The support for this regime is considerable both in military and economic aid. The same policy was applied with the following leader who proved to be unpredictable. As a result, the US used the Arab Spring for their advantage and forced a regime change under the cover of UN humanitarian mission. The continuing support for undemocratic leaders has turned Libya from a prosperous country to anarchic failed state.

#### *2.1.3.6 Prospects for the future of Libya*

In regards of the dependency theory, Libya reached the bottom and for a year it was regarded as a failed state engulfed in civil war. This forth world status as of 2013 is being repaired as Libya slowly restores order.

Libya as a country represents the ultimate paradox of US foreign policy. In order to maintain the neo-colonial influence, the US policymakers have brought more harm to American people. The terrorist attacks on the Libya consulate on 11 September 2012 are merely the signs of the events that can be unfolded. However the attacks on the consulate were not unpredictable.

Detail analysis from West Point show the scale and importance of terrorists recruiting areas in Eastern Libya (Felter & Fishman, 2007). The West Point research found that eastern Libya was second most common place of origin for the terrorists that went to fight in Iraq against US troops. These extremist came from the cities Darnah, Tobruk and Benghazi. If analysed by the percentage of the total inhabitants, the Darnah, Tobruk, Benghazi triangle has the biggest number of terrorists per capita. Accidently the rebellion against the Gaddafi government started in this area. This and other reports show that many terrorists’ organizations originated form eastern Libya and that Gaddafi was actively fighting against them.

The reports that linked the Libyan rebels with Islamic extremists and terrorists were discarded during the Libyan civil war. The US and NATO forces actively and deliberately supported the

extremist elements in eastern Libya. Facing defeat, Gaddafi tried to explain the situation in Libya through a letter to president Obama: “We are fighting nothing other than al-Qaeda in what they call the Islamic Maghreb. It’s an armed group that is fighting from Libya to Mauritania and through Algeria and Mali... If you had found them taking over American cities by the force of arms, tell me what you would do?”

This excerpt from the letter explains the true situation on the ground in Libya and in North Africa. The radical Islamic movements operate in all of the northern African countries and their goal is to dismantle the secular regimes. Although Gaddafi’s regime was brutal and dictatorial it was a necessary evil that kept the radical Islamic movements under control. The letter to Obama is also a prediction, as Gadhafi mentions the terrorist elements in Algeria and Mali. The collapse of Libyan regime proved this prediction right as the war in northern Mali is intensified.

The forced regime change in Libya will prove to be Obama’s Lernaean Hydra. The death of the old dictator will signal the emergence of several terrorist movements and organizations in various countries. The wave of terrorism and radical Islam across the region will be much harder to be controlled.

### ***2.1.4 Somalia***

The United States has a rich history intervening in Somalia from the Ogaden War in 1978 to Operation Restore Hope 1992 and present day War on Terror. After the US peacekeepers withdraw from Somalia, warlords waged endless war against themselves. With the state institutions gone and the government none existing, the society broke down. The world witnessed the true state of anarchy as Somalia disintegrated into chaos.

Somalia has a complex society that is comprised of different tribes, clans and sub clans. They are placed in hierarchies that are too complex for outsiders to understand. This hierarchy and balance of power of the clans was first interrupted by the European colonizers. The very fabric of society was changed and set up chain of events that would lead the country in endless conflict (Rinehard, 2011). There is only one factor that keeps the Somali society together, Islam.

The Islamic faith gives the people in Somalia hope in despair, sense of honour in appalling misery, and justice in a state of chaos. When the state institutions collapsed, the people turned to the religious people, the sheiks, for justice, mercy and hope. The Quran teaches about Sharia law, which for people that have no alternative is the best solution. Almost spontaneously the sheiks took the power of judges and the Quran became the constitution. The Islamic Courts took even the responsibility of education and healthcare. Religious militia took the position of the police and army, as they fought the warlords and pirates. In the area that the Islamic courts had controlled, crime had been extinguished, and murders and rapes became a thing of the past. The religious militia fought the pirates and took the pirate stronghold of Harardhere. The airport and seaport in Mogadishu were opened in the summer of 2006, and a delegation of courts went to Khartoum, Sudan. As of 2005/6 the courts controlled the southern part of the country with the capital Mogadishu. The Islamic Courts Union represented short-lived kritarchy that was seen as replacement for the chaos and anarchy (Barnes, 2007).

US officials saw this popular movement as a threat and labelled it as a terrorist organization. The main fear was that this Islamic Courts Union was similar if not identical to the Taliban movement. As a result the CIA covertly funded and equipped local militias that would fight against the Islamic courts. However, with the support that the Islamic courts had among the

population, they fought back the militias and warlords. Then, the US turned to Ethiopia's army, and with heavy fighting in Mogadishu, the Islamic courts were defeated and dispersed. In 2006, the Somali people were under the occupation of their arch enemy Ethiopia and constantly bombed by US drones. The US intelligence community did not have monopoly in the covert regime change in Somalia. The US Air Force with their fire power tipped the scale in support of the Transitional Federal government. In January, 2007, US AC-130 gunships unleashed their fire in Southern Somalia (BBC, 2007). The base in Djibouti was proven indispensable for this covert war.


The invasion of Ethiopian army in Somalia represents serious breach of international law, but the UN Security Council was not convened for this incident. But the most scandalous part of this event was the involvement of the Bush administration. Recently revealed wikileaks document is showing that the US administration instigated an African proxy war in an internationally recognized country in order to conduct a regime change (Wikileaks, 2006). The report involves several meetings with assistant secretary of state for African affairs Jendayi Fraiser and rear Admiral Richard Hunt, commander of the combined forces in the Horn of Africa. The evidence shows that Ethiopian leader Meles Zenawi was pressured to invade his neighbour Somalia. In that time Zenawi was facing stiff opposition and critics for his country's human rights abuses and was even threatened with cutting aid by US Congress. President's Bush administration silenced the critic and increased the aid to Ethiopia and added military aid as well (Prince, 2011).

The Ethiopian army invaded with force of over 50,000 troops and was hoping for an easy victory. They were soon bogged down in heavy fighting's and suffered heavy casualties (Bamfo, 2009). The behaviour of the Ethiopian soldiers was not exemplary, as indiscriminate shooting, and unlawful killings were reported by international aid agencies.

The US pressure on Ethiopia to wage a proxy war against Somalia was a public secret in Africa. It is hypocrisy of superpower that was seen first by the colonial powers. But this was not the first instance of instigating a proxy war and certainly not the last. Secretary Frazier was also involved in Uganda's push towards attack against the LRA in the DR Congo and for pushing a "coalition of the willing" to overthrow Mugabe in Zimbabwe.

This secret backdoor foreign policy has opened the Pandora's Box in Somalia. The Ethiopian army withdrew since they could not contain the situation. The Islamic Courts Union mutated into a more radical movement Al-Shabaab that has links with Al-Qaeda. The new popular movement in Somalia is "Harakat Al-Shabaab al Mujahedin" or the Mujahedeen Youth movement. Commonly known as Al-Shabaab or "The Boys" this militant organization has publicly announced that it is part of Al-Qaeda. This radical movement existed in the Union of Islamic courts but it was reported that it was contained by the elders and sheiks. Youth movements are always more radical but in Somalia, Al-Shabaab went into extremes. Strict rule of Sharia Law was implemented as the militants attacked Sufi Mosques, Somali Christians and even aid workers. The following figure (Figure 2.2) illustrates the scale of the popularity of the Al-Shabaab movement as it grew in force and territory in 2009 (Laverty, 2011).

Figure 2.2: Territorial gains made by Al-Shabaab from January 31, 2009 (left) to December, 2010 (right)



Source: STRATOR (2011)

To counter the growing threat of this popular movement, US policy makers mobilized its African proxies.

Somali society is deeply religious, and the US backed Ethiopian, Ugandan and Burundi forces were seen as attack on Islam. This point to another US policymakers mistake, to use African armies that come from mainly Christian countries. Ethiopian troops were reported to be brutal in their invasion and with no respect to the mosques and local sheiks. Their Coptic Christian beliefs are deeply engraved in the Ethiopian society and even the former soviet backed regime could not break the relations between the church and state. These facts and the constant US bombings turned this conflict into an African religious war.

During the past few years the conflict involved other countries and Al Shabaab harnessed support form Eritrea, Arab states and even US and UK. Eritrea has involved its security forces in the conflict as to counter their arch rival Ethiopia. Supporting opposing proxy militias is common practice in the conflict of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The US decision to force the Ethiopians into war with Somalia has awakened another African conflict. The Eritrean regime supported Al-Shabaab in arms, logistic and finance, according to UN report (UN, 2012).

Although the Eritrean leadership it is profoundly secular and it has a history of supporting radical Islamic organizations that would harm Ethiopia. The Ethiopian invasion in Somalia was seen by Eritrea as challenging the territorial status quo and an opportunity to inflict heavy damage to the Ethiopian army. The US responded with further sanctions to this impoverished African country of Eritrea.

In a UN report, Iran, Egypt, Libya and other Persian Gulf countries were accused for supporting the Islamist extremists in Somalia. Egypt's foreign policy is centred in preserving the flow of the Nile River and the Ethiopia's plans for dams is seen as a hostile act. As a result, Egypt is constantly destabilizing Ethiopia by supporting her enemies wherever they are including the Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab gathered support from the western countries as well. It was reported by Reuters that more than forty US citizens have been included in this terrorist organization (Pelofsky, 2011). United Kingdom has large Somali community and has reported those individuals were going back to Somalia to fight in "holy war". These reports show that Al Shabaab is more



than a youth militant club but well organized terrorist organization with an ideology that inspires the youth all over the world.

In order to counter this treat, US policymakers turned to their central African proxies Uganda and Burundi for troops. Unlike the Ethiopian semi-legal invasion, the new proxy force had an UN mandate. AMISOM is more than a peacekeeping force; it is a peace enforcing army whose sole duty is to engage Al-Shabaab (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Their state of the art military equipment was paid by the US. The new government that US wanted to place in Somalia since 2000 is known as the Transitional Federal Government. This institution has a history of contradictory and for the common Somali people it represents a group of politicians brought by the west. The transition period to real elected government lasts more than twenty years and its officials at first were UK emigrants or refugees that had not stayed in Somali for over a decade. The US policymakers recognized their mistake with ousting the Islamic Courts Union and in 2009 placed the ICU former leader Sheik Sharif as the president of Somalia. Originally the intention was that the clans, sub clans and the Al-Shabaab militants would unite under the leadership of Sheik Sharif. But the decision for the new leader simply came too late. The militias from Islamic Courts suffered heavy casualties and humiliation by the warlords and the Ethiopian Army. The nominating of Sheik Sharif as president of the TFG was seen as an act of treason.

The former teacher was the last hope of TFG for long standing peace. Sheik Sharif managed to contain the more radical Islamic forces in the Islamic Courts Union. As president he had to contain the AU mission in Somalia and his own TFG security forces. According to Human Rights Watch report in 2010, Al-Shabaab was not the only military formation that committed war crimes. The Somalian army and AMISOM troops have been accused to fire indiscriminately in the capital city Mogadishu and inflicting civilian casualties.

As the war wages on, US intelligence agencies were involved in a secret drone war in Somalia. In fact the Horn of Africa is the second biggest hunting ground for predator drones. Human rights watch has criticized the legality of these attacks and asked that the drones be transferred to the military so there can be higher level of control and responsibility (Human Rights Watch, 2011). In legal terms, the Bush and the Obama administration were using the grey area with the drones "targeted killings". US troops are actually not present in the target area and the President does not have to report to Congress. But the international laws of war permit attacks during situations of armed conflict only against valid military targets and attacks that cause disproportionate loss of civilian life or property are strictly prohibited. The US doctrine in these matters even has different methodology in counting the collateral damage. According to US military, any male person that is capable of carrying a weapon and is in the vicinity of the supposed terrorist is considered an enemy combatant. As for the women and children younger than 14 years they are unfortunate collateral damage. Politically this "targeted assassination" boosts the approval rating of the President and raises the confidence in the military. But in Somalia, the attacks create resentment among the population and turns once moderate and tolerant people into radical Islamic militants. The predator drones may have gained tactical advantage over the Islamic militia but overall they represent a foreign policy blunder from two perspectives. First, the US has ruined its image with these unlawful assassinations and second has created a mortal enemy from once popular and tolerant movement.

As of 2012, the TFG and its president Sheik Sharif control only the capital Mogadishu and surrounding areas, while the militant organization Al Shabaab controls almost the whole southern Somalia. The territory of Puntland is autonomous and has its own government.

Somaliland is de facto independent since 1991 and the TFG has no control or influence in this country.

#### *2.1.4.1 Political divisions in Somalia*

Since the collapse of the communist regime, Somalia represents more a commonwealth of states and warlords than a sovereign state with its own government. To understand Somalia and its relations with the US, each major part has to be analysed separately.

##### *a) Somaliland*

Somaliland is an unrecognized country of 3, 5 million people in the north of Somalia. Unlike Somalia, this separatist republic is a stable country with government and institutions that function. The main difference in regards to US foreign policy is the fact that Somaliland does not receive foreign aid from the US while Somalia's Transitional Federal government is the principal benefactor of assistance.

The political system of Somaliland is a combination of US and British system with additional traditional African marks. The executive power is vested into the president of the republic who is the head of the government and commander in chief of the armed forces. The legislative power is divided between the two chambered parliaments. The upper house is the House of Elders which represents the traditional clans in the country. The primary responsibility of this traditional body is to manage the internal clan conflicts. The lower chamber is the House of Representatives with 82 members who are elected on general elections and serve a five year term. The House of Representatives is a new political institution what should give the impression of democracy to the outside world. But the political reality in Somaliland is that clans and sub-clans are the true creators of policy, and political parties are slowly emerging to take their place in the political system. The main difference between Somaliland and Somalia clan politics is the absence of large scale conflict in resolving the differences. In Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia small wars were waged for control of resources or some trivial matters. In Somaliland the differences are solved peacefully which creates a parliamentary atmosphere in the political life (Leeson, 2007).

The main focus on the Somaliland government is to gain an international recognition for its independence. For that purpose this small impoverished country was making considerable efforts for two decades. The semi-professional diplomats of Somaliland are lobbying in African countries, Europe and the American continent but in vain. The only country that can break this stalemate is the US. With its influence and power, the US can solve the one problem that can stabilize the Horn of Africa. However, as of 2012 the administration of Obama is waiting till one or more African countries accept the Somaliland independence.

On the continent, African politicians have made a Gordian knot that cannot be broken without force. The most powerful African nation, Egypt is against the independence of Somaliland, because it wants strong and unified Somalia that can be a contra balance against Ethiopia. The current Ethiopia-Egypt relations can be described as a cold war, since Ethiopia wants to build dams and limit the flow of the river Nile. Ethiopia on the other side supports the creation of independent Somaliland for economic and strategic reasons. The memories of the Ogaden war are still fresh in the Ethiopian conscience and unified and resurgent Somalia is the biggest fear. On the economic side, since the independence of Eritrea, Ethiopia is a landlocked country. For this reason, Ethiopia is negotiating with Somaliland for the use of the port of Berbera.

Eritrea, as an arch enemy of Ethiopia, is opposed of the independence of Somaliland and it is allegedly funding terrorist and extremist organization inside of Somalia to be opposed of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopia. The western European countries are looking at this problem from economic perspective. The untapped supplies of oil in Puntland can be measured in billions of barrels, and any recognition to Somaliland will not be seen kindly by Puntland or the other African countries. Namely, Somaliland and Puntland are in a state of war over the Sool and Sanaag region. Coincidentally the major oil fields are in those regions. In this complicated maze of US foreign policy different branches of government and agencies are shaping one of the most bizarre politics. The US State Department as of 2012 supports Sheik Sharif as the president of Somalia, and is opposed of Somaliland independence. The Department of Defence and AFRICOM that is located in neighbouring Djibouti supports the independence of Somaliland. The Pentagon is seeking parts of Somalia that work, instead of piecing the whole country together. In some reports the CIA is actively using Somaliland army against Islamic extremists in the Puntland. Even Ethiopia is involved with support of Somaliland in the dispute with Puntland (World Bank, 2005).

Unlike other African countries, international aid donors have difficulties to provide aid because the country is unrecognized. Somaliland has been out of the international attention and represents specific example how an African country can develop and prosper in peace without foreign aid and great power interference. The clans in Somaliland have found ways to live in peace and constructed a democratic state without significant foreign assistance. There is no famine as the agriculture sector in this desert country managed to feed its people. The government has managed to fund the administration and the security apparatus with minimal income.

The United States should take the leadership role in the Horn of Africa by recognizing the Somaliland as an independent sovereign country. Politically it will bring order to the most chaotic region in the world and secure the busiest oil sea route. For Somaliland the recognition will boost the economy, strengthened the democratic system and institutions. The US can gain stable ally in strategically important area.

Somaliland is not addicted and dependent on aid as the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). Somalia as Yugoslavia dissolved into chaos in the beginning of the nineties. The difference in US foreign policy is that the idea of unified Somalia still exists. The US policy makers should accept the fact that Somalia does not exist for more than two decades and grant Somaliland its independence. In legal term, Somaliland did not secede from the chaos that engulfed Somalia. As a former British colony it was granted independence and the country entered in joint state with Somalia but remained autonomous. De jure it always had its own sovereignty and the people in the country have distinguished culture markings.

#### *b) Puntland*

Puntland is the second biggest autonomous region in Somalia. In contrast to Somaliland it does not seek independence and remained unstable for long time (BBC, 2012). Somali piracy that infested the sea lanes of the region originated from Puntland's shores. The pirates from Puntland were estimated to one thousand people that worked in five gangs according to East African Seafarers Associations. The fact that the government of Puntland was involved in the piracy business alarmed the international community in 2005/6. The pirates even had their own stock exchange, where investors bought or sold shares in upcoming attacks in bourse in Harardhere. They had links to Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden supported the pirates on footage broadcasted on Al-Jazeera. Puntland profited with piracy and in 2009 it had revenues estimated at \$58 million and \$238 million in 2010.

As of 2012, Puntland is changing its economic priorities, from piracy to oil extraction. The reserves of oil are estimated at 19 billion barrels making it one of the newest and biggest oil fields in the world. Overnight the piracy story was being forgotten and history was rewritten by the Western media to the scale that the government in Puntland has always been fighting the pirates and they never originated from this part of Somalia.

The current president of Puntland is Abdurrahman Farole, who was former finance minister. Educated in Australia he is one of the few intellectuals in Puntland that have been influenced by Western countries. In 2012 he was praised by BBC and the US media for his commitment to reform the country. Generally he is known to be US ally in this highly volatile and strategically important region.

His politically carrier is full with conspiracy and scandals. During his term as a finance minister he accused the president for corruption when the oil extraction license was given to an Australian company. Soon after the allegation militia loyal to Farole entered the government building and killed several people. After this incident Farole left Puntland to finish his postgraduate studies in Australia.

He returned back to Somalia to run for president in the 2009 elections. Although the elections were far from free or fair even for African standards, Farole become the legitimate president. The Voice of America stated “the success of the Puntland elections can begin to provide a model for the whole of Somalia”. At his inauguration ceremony President Farole stated that his main goals for his presidency are to end the piracy that originates from Puntland and tackle the growing Islamic fundamentalist movement in Galgala province. The US policy makers could not ask anything more from the new president, who in his first speech pledged to accomplish all the US goals in the region. With the security forces under his command, the pirate gangs were annihilated in brutal and silent campaign. Puntland security forces were armed and equipped with NATO weapons and even a port was constructed by UK Saracen, a private military company. US intelligence agencies proved to be indispensable for Farole’s presidency. In fact the US intelligence community was first deployed in 2001 and created the intelligence and security apparatus of Puntland. Today, the security forces of Puntland are no more than CIA filial for counterintelligence, antiterrorism and antipiracy operations. In 2010 Puntland security forces were engaged in fierce fightings against Al Shabab militia of Sheik Mohamed Atom. This militia and its leader were on the top of the terrorist list of the US. But the crowning proof of loyalty towards the West was in 2012 when Farole gave the license for drilling oil in Puntland. With 19 billion barrels of oil reserves and strategic location of the Horn of Africa, Farole is fast becoming the newest US ally. With the Transitional Federal Government mandate expiring in august 2012, Farole might be the new contender for leader of Somalia.

The US policymakers are on the brink of making another mistake of supporting an African leader. US foreign policy should be the responsibly of the States Department and conducted by diplomats. The society in Somalia is complex as it is different from western countries. People are loyal to their clans and are guided by their Islamic faith. The sense of Somali nationalism has not existed for over two decades.

The clans are the key for control in Somalia, either for maintaining order or instigating chaos. They are the central part of the social fabric but in the same time the root cause of the conflict.

#### *2.1.4.2 Regional implications of piracy*

Maritime piracy can be found on three areas on the world, Strait of Malaka, Nigeria Delta, and Somali coast. Unlike the piracy of the Strait of Malaka that is decreasing, the maritime

piracy in Africa has been growing and it has become a serious threat for the global economy and regional stability. Approximately 80% of global trade travels by sea and in a case of a delay and rise of cost the whole global economy will feel the effects. This threat does not just come from failed states and rogue regimes but is perpetuated by organizations and financial institutions that profit from these phenomena. In a time period of five years (2006-2011) there have been around 1600 acts of piracy. According to the Rand Institute, piracy has inflicted damage to the world economy at estimated \$1 billion to \$16 billion.

US ships were not spared by the Somali pirates who they became bolder through the years. The initial US response was weak, while the pirates hijacked ships and even attacked US Navy destroyers. After the failed hijacking attempt of the “Maersk Alabama”, in which several pirates were arrested, the pirate leader pledged retaliation against US ships (Ploch, et al., 2011). The threats from the Somali pirates were not taken seriously by the Obama administration. The US assistance to Somalia continued, even though hostile acts were perpetrated and act of war was declared by the pirate leaders. Table 2.4 shows the scale of pirate’s activities against US ships.

Table 2.4: US Ships attacked by pirates

NAME OF US SHIP	DATE OF PIRACY	STATUS
Cruise ship “Seaborne Spirit”	2005-11-05	Capture failed
Destroyer ”USS Gonzalez” Cruiser ”USS Cape St. George (CG-71)	2006-03-18	One pirate killed and twelve captured
Cruise ship “MS nautical”	2008-11-30	Capture failed
“Maersk Alabama”	2009-04-08	Capture failed
Cargo ship “MV Liberty Sun”	2009-4-14	Capture failed
Cargo ship “Maersk Alabama”	2010-04-01	Attack repelled
Frigate “ USS Nicholas FFG-47”	2010-04-01	Attack repelled, five pirates captured
“USS Ashland”	2010-04-10	Attack repelled, six pirates captured

NAME OF US SHIP	DATE OF PIRACY	STATUS
Chemical tanker "MT Marita Marquerite"	2010-05-08 2010-12-11	5.500.000 USD Ransom paid
Cargo Ship "MV Panama"	2010-12-05 2011-09013	7.000.000 USD Ransom paid
Private yacht "S/V Quest"	2011-02-12 2011-02-22	4 US citizens killed, two pirates killed, 13 taken prisoners (CNN, 2011)

Source: EUNAFOR, Somalia (2011)

The effects of piracy can be seen all across the world, from increased cost for shipping to increased cost of food. Even the Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon, reported: "Piracy... has had an immense impact on the economies of East Africa and also the wider world ... international trade routes are threatened and goods in the region as well as Somalia are becoming more expensive. This is made worse by the bleak state of the global economy" (U.N. Security Council, 2009).

Egypt's economy is highly dependable of the Suez Canal. Around 7, 5 % of the world's trade passes through the Suez Canal, including 4, 7 % of the global production of crude oil. In the fiscal 2008 year the revenues from the Suez Canal accounted for 3, 2 % of Egypt's GDP, making it the country's third largest source of foreign currency (Bowden, 2010). With the rise of piracy in Somalia, shipping companies were avoiding the Gulf of Aden and were taking the longer route from South Africa. This means fewer revenues for Egypt. It is estimated that around 10 % of ships might re-route to avoid the Suez Canal and Egypt might be losing \$642 million per year (Bowden, 2010). Kenya's economy has also suffered from the Somali piracy. According to Kenyan Shippers Council piracy has increased the cost of imports by \$23,8 million per month, and exports by \$9,8 million per month. Also Kenya Tourist Board estimates that the number of tourists visiting Mombasa by cruise ships in 2010 has declined by 95 %. Seychelles economy has shrunk by 4 % as a direct consequence of piracy. The two most important sectors, tourism and fishery have been affected with a loss of \$10, 5 billion per year. The fishing industries in many countries have taken the price of piracy. Unlike cargo ships from which the Somali pirates ask for ransom, the fishing ships in most cases are used as mother ships for the pirates. Their crew is taken as hostage and used as slave labour. Yemeni fishing sector has reported lost \$150 million as a result of Somali pirates. Even Taiwan's fishing fleet has been scared away from the pirates. The end result is increase of food price which lead to social unrest, riots and conflict. In the case of Somalia where half of the food consumed is commercially imported or is given as humanitarian aid, food price inflation has grave humanitarian impacts. In most cases the ships that are pirated were caring humanitarian food aid to the Somalia or other African countries. The following Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show the true cost of Somali piracy and the damage it has to the African economy (Bowden, 2010).

Table 2.5: Macroeconomic Cost of Maritime Piracy to Selected Countries in US Dollars

COUNTRY	INDICATED LOSS PER YEAR
Egypt	642 million USD
Kenya	414 million USD
Yemen	150 million USD
Nigeria	42 million USD
Seychelles	6 million USD
<b>Total Macro Cost</b>	<b>1,25 billion USD</b>

Source: Bowden (2010, 25)

Table 2.6: Total Cost of Maritime Piracy in US Dollars, 2010

COST FACTORS	VALUE (US DOLLARS)
Ransoms: excess costs	176 million USD
Insurance Premiums	460 million to 3,2 billion USD
Re-routing Ships	2,4 to 3 billion USD
Security Equipment	363 million to 2,5 billion USD
Naval Forces	2 billion USD
Prosecutions	31 million USD
Pirate Deterrent Organizations	19,5 million USD
Cost to Regional Economies	1,25 billion USD
<b>TOTAL ESTIMATED COST</b>	<b>7 to 12 billion USD per year</b>

Source: Bowden (2010)

The piracy that originates from Somalia is more than a regional security problem. It has evolved into economic and social problem on a global level. The US naval presence in the region with the fifth fleet could have ended the crisis in a period of few months. As a result Chinese, European and even Iranian naval presence has been increased in the horn of Africa. US policy maker's lack of determination has allowed the Somali piracy to grow and other powers to legitimize their presence in this part of Africa.

The Bush and Obama administration have used tough measures against Union of Islamic Courts that did not represented any danger to US national security. In the same time minimal efforts were made to solve the real problem of Somali piracy.

### **2.1.5 Ethiopia**

U.S. bilateral relations with Ethiopia date back to 1903 and ceased only during the Italian occupation. Roosevelt saw the Ethiopian Empire as important part of the new post war world order. With this strategy he was opposing the British Empire that was hoping for a part of Ethiopian territory. Gross human rights violations were happening in this period but with the wave of anti-colonialism, US policymakers were indifferent to these reports. Richard Nixon as Vice President called Ethiopia “one of the United States most stalwart and consistent allies”.

During the reign of the last Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie, the US poured humanitarian, financial and military assistance. In the fiscal year 1978, the US provided \$282 million in military assistance and \$366 million in economic assistance (US Department of State, 2012). The aid was suspended when the regime was replaced by the communist Derg regime.

With the fall of the communist regime the diplomatic relations were normalized and the US government revived the foreign aid to Ethiopia. From the early nineties to 2003, around \$2, 3 billion were given to Ethiopia. This aid was steadily increased during the next years. In 2003 alone the US provided \$553, 1 million and by the end of the decade Ethiopia is receiving \$3 billion annually from external donors, the US government, World Bank, EU, Japan and Canada (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Clearly the Ethiopian government was addicted to foreign aid, but the real question is why this aid has not helped the Ethiopian people. The answer to this question is a public secret for the donor countries and aid agencies.

For the United States as the biggest donor, Ethiopia is an indispensable ally in the region. The strategic location of the country was the main reason for the US favourable foreign policy towards Ethiopia for more than a hundred years. For US policy makers in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century Ethiopia was the back door of the continent. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century Ethiopia is a counter-balance for countries and movements that are on the US black list. To the north, Ethiopia is a barrier to the militaristic regime of Eritrea, in the west the genocidal regime of Sudan and in the east the terrorist movement of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The armed forces of Ethiopia are among the best equipped troops in Africa and with constant conflicts, the most battle hardened. The Ethiopia army has participated in almost every US conflict since the end of the Cold War. From the Korean War in the 1950 to today’s war on terror Ethiopia has proven its loyalty to the US. In the peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Ivory Coast, Burundi and Rwanda conflicts, Ethiopian peacekeepers represented the African Union. Ethiopia also hosts the African Union headquarters and it has portrayed itself as the leader in African Unity.

In return the US government has spared no expense in economic and financial aid. The political support towards the Ethiopian leader and the ruling party is even more controversial.

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was a key U.S. ally in the East Africa. Even though he is considered as a dictator in his country and abroad for the US he is a role model for African leaders. Meles Zenawi has received several awards that praise his leadership. Zenawi was awarded the World Peace Prize for his contribution global peace and his effort to stabilize the Horn of Africa. Even NGO’s like US-based nongovernmental organization, Tabor 100, nominated Meles Zenawi the “international leader of the year 2005” (Africa News Service, 2005). The prime minister’s leadership and his economic policy were praised by the Western media. The Economist in 2007 wrote: “Ethiopia’s economy has been growing at record speed in recent years” (The Economist, 2007). Moreover, the IMF ranked Ethiopia as the second most attractive African country for investors. These statements of bias reports were made after the Ethiopian invasion in Somalia.



But the real economic situation is that Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Half of the 85 million people live below the poverty line, and 10 to 20 % rely on food aid every year. On a BBC interview Zenawi admitted that more than five million Ethiopians were starving and if weren't for international aid organizations it would result to a humanitarian disaster (Zenawi, 2005). In the same time the official military budget of Ethiopia was close to half a billion of dollars or the equivalent of US aid to Ethiopia. As a solution to the humanitarian crisis the prime minister even suggested that the IMF should sell its gold reserves to fund his country (Zenawi, 2009).

The controversial part in Ethiopia is the democratic deficit and gross human rights abuses. Meles Zenawi has been accused for genocide, torture, and creation a single party state with international aid funds. The deficit in democracy is most evident in the Ethiopian elections. In 2005 election resulted with opposition protests and police brutality. The aftermath resulted with 200 deaths and 30.000 people arrested. Despite the massacre and the torture of the arrested people, The Carter Centre, US and UK government praised the Ethiopian government. A British parliamentary delegation led by Laurence Robertson stated that the government should oppose those who try to use “undemocratic and unconstitutional means” to change the regime. These elections were clear signal to Zenawi that the West will oppose a democratic change and that Ethiopian security forces were given carte blanche to apply any means necessary for the survival of the regime. In international community where the term democracy is a justification for massacre and brutal dictators have been given peace prize, the humanitarian disaster in Ethiopia was a logical outcome.

Five years later in the general elections in May 2010 the ruling party won 99, 6 % of the parliamentary seats after a long campaign of intimidation, persecution of political opponents and restricting the media. The ruling party Ethiopian People's Revolutionary democratic Front (EPRDF) has used the donor-supported programs, salaries and training opportunities as a political weapon to control the population. In a case of unrest or support for the opposition the aid programs would be cut to the whole community. This policy of political aid distribution has created situations where one village would have enough humanitarian aid, seed and fertilizer and the neighbouring village will be facing starvation for their support for the opposition. Aid agencies were silent of this brutal policy of the government, because they were afraid for the security of their staff and the future of their mission in Ethiopia. These reports from Human Rights Watch were denied by Ethiopian government (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

The Ethiopian government and ruling party have been accused for gross human rights abuses and even genocide from several non-governmental organizations.

#### *2.1.5.1 The genocide of the Anuak people*

The Anuak people live in south western part of Ethiopia in the Gambela region. They are distinguished by the colour of their skin which is darker. From a Western perspective this marginalization for a whole ethnic community seems absurd but for the complex Ethiopian society the racial and facial differences are self-evident and the root cause for the discrimination. The Anuak people are victims of an unreported genocide that is perpetrated by the Ethiopian government. Human Rights Watch, Genocide Watch and other nongovernmental organizations have reported massive human rights violations in the Gambela region (Human Rights Watch, 2005) (Genocide Watch, 2004).

Since the end of the communist Derg regime, the Ethiopian government implemented a system known as “Ethnic Federalism” that practices fostering tribalism and racial division. In

the Gambela case the Anuak people are considered racially inferior by the Highlanders and the Central Government. As a result of this ethnic hatred the Government has initiated a campaign of terror against the “racially inferior” Anuak people. The Ethiopian army was assisted by the Highlander’s militia which is actually band of killers from Tigray Region from where the Prime Minister Zenawi comes from.

Major massacres have occurred on December 13<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup>, 2003 in which 424 Anuak people were killed, over 200 wounded and 85 people were reported missing. Since that massacre sporadic murders and widespread rapes have continued in the Gambela region according to NGOs Genocide Watch and Human Rights Watch.

The reasons for these atrocities are not just tribalism and racism. Major international corporations have interest in the Gambela region. There are reports of vast untapped oil reserves, platinum and gold in this area. Pinewood Resources Ltd. of Canada, Petronas from Malaysia and Chinas CNPC are the major oil corporations that have invested in oil explorations in Gambela region. Apart from mineral extraction the Ethiopian government has given land concession to Chinese, Saudi and Indian agricultural corporations (Genocide Watch, 2012). The local population that has lived on that land has been forcibly removed by the government security and paramilitary forces.


The genocide of the Anuak people is just another part of the Africa’s unreported tragedies. Ethiopia is continuing to receive military and economic aid while the main donor, the United States, is silent about the human rights abuses. As the US government has denied the existence of the genocide, on February 8<sup>th</sup>, 2004 the US Department of State Consular Information Sheet provided a travelling warning: “Interethnic clashes are prevalent in the western-most tip of the Gambella Region in west Ethiopia. A Flare up interethnic conflict from December 13-17, 2003, has claimed many live” (US Department of State, 2012).

#### *2.1.5.2 War Crimes in the Ogaden*

The Ogaden insurgency represents one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts in Africa. The superpowers clashed over this desert land in the Ogaden War of the seventies. The communist regime committed atrocities to the people of Ogaden during the period in what was known as the red terror. However, the insurgency did to end in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but intensify and became forgotten for the world. The war crimes committed in the Ogaden are not reported and its victims are not counted. No reporters are allowed in the conflict area and if they entered they risk of being killed or simply disappear. Several Western media and non-government agencies have broken the silence.

The Independent reported that the situation in Ogaden has mirrored the genocide in Darfur. The Ethiopian army was accused of applying scorched-earth strategy with massacres of entire villages and mass rapes of women and children (The Independent, 2007). These and more horrifying evidence of war crimes and acts of genocide were reported by the Human Rights Watch and Genocide watch. Satellite images are part of the evidence of the genocide in the Ogaden. Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 show the level of the destruction and the ethnic cleansing in the town of Libiagh in 2008 (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

Figure 2.3: The Town of Labiagh 2008 before the Ethiopian army attack



Source: Human Rights Watch (2008, 45)

Figure 2.4: The Town of Labiagh 2008 after the Ethiopian army attack



Source: Human Rights Watch (2008, 46)

The tactics applied by the Ethiopia security forces is repeated through Ogaden and Oromia. First the villagers were given six days to pack and leave the villages. On the seventh day the Army and militias would burn the huts and destroy the houses with the entire infrastructure. If anybody is caught he is tortured and killed. The women and children have been raped and used as sex slaves while the cattle and other animals are either impounded or killed. As in the Congo, Liberia, Sudan and other African conflicts zones, mass rape is the instrument of terror. Mass rape destroys families and entire communities and in a religious and conservative society of the Ogaden, rape victims are ostracized from the community. This tactic of scorched earth that is visible on satellite images is similar to the Darfur genocide.

International humanitarian aid has been used as a weapon in this conflict. The supporters for the opposition in Ethiopia are not entitled to humanitarian, or assistance in any form. But in the Ogaden, whole ethnic community is being collectively punished. The people were and still are starved to death by their own government, while the international aid is being distributed to the ruling party supporters. The BBC has made this scandal public in 2011 while the UK still remains Ethiopia second biggest donor after the US (BBC, 2011).

However, US Deputy Secretary of State for African affairs Jendayi Frazer criticized the rebels and stated that the military abuses were merely allegations. This statement of high US official was to be expected, given the Ethiopia special status with the US. But geopolitics was not the only reasons for hiding the genocide, economic interest were involved as well.

According to US Energy Information Administration Ethiopia has an oil and gas reserve in the Ogaden region (Control Risks Group, 2012). The oil reserves are only 428.000 barrels of oil but the gas reserves are estimated at 4 trillion cubic feet. These reserves will place Ethiopia in the top ten countries by gas reserves. In comparison the reserves of the United States are 7,7 trillion cubic feet in 2009 that are rapidly declining.

The United States taxpayers are directly funding an African regime that has committed acts of genocide against its own people. This statement is equally shocking and hard to believe, but the US foreign policy has several similar examples. In the 1980, the US backed unknown sheik Osama in a country which most Americans could not find on a map. For the past two decades US is again backing a relatively unknown regime in a country where the people desperately need humanitarian assistance. Tribal confrontation combined with brutal dictator has produced genocide, oppression and torture. With all the crimes that Ethiopian regime has committed it should be given strict sanctions instead of foreign aid and assistance. International peacekeepers should distribute the humanitarian aid to all people and not to the Ethiopian government and to its loyal supporters.

In the Ethiopian case Senator Ron Paul statement on Foreign aid is completely true: "On foreign aid, that should be the easiest thing to cut. It's not authorized in the Constitution that we can take money from you and give it to particular countries around the world. To me, foreign aid is taking money from poor people in this country and giving it to rich people in poor countries" (Real Clear Politics, 2012).

In 2008 US foreign aid totalled \$969 million, in 2009 \$916 million, in 2010 \$513 million and in 2011 \$586 million. In the same time Ethiopian businessmen and politicians have been making record financial gains despite the economic crisis. Among them is the Ethiopian businessman Mohammed Al Amoudi who has a net worth of \$12, 3 billion, which makes him on the 63 richest people in the world according to Forbes Magazine. TPLF party members have become the new oligarchy in Ethiopia, owning banks, coffee plant and hotels. Even the prime minister Melees Zenawi was estimated to have a net worth of a billion dollars according to Ethiopian review.

The United States should not be allied with dictatorial regimes that commit genocides for it devolves the moral ground and identity of the American people. US taxpayer's money is being used by an African dictator in the creation of a genocidal single-party state. The Foreign aid paradox to Ethiopia is best summoned by speaker on behalf of the World Bank: "I like to compare the current donors to the Italians who built roads for Haile Selassie. Without the Italian roads, the Emperor could not have controlled the state. Without the donors' money, Zenawi could not hold it together-the PSCAP and PBS and the donor -funded bureaucracy. The donors should be more careful" (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

### ***2.1.6 Egypt***

Egypt, a country with over 80 million people, is one of the major US non-NATO allies and it is the only African country that is not under the AFRICOM sphere of interest. With its geostrategic position, the Suez Canal, Egypt represents indispensable ally for the US.

The exclusion of Egypt from the AFRICOM is a fundamental mistake for the US military and policymaker officials. Territorially, Egypt is part of Africa; it borders African countries and shares their problems. Its greatest threats and opportunities come from the African continent as the river Nile comes from eastern Africa. The British understood the ethnic religious and racial differences but also the link with Egypt's geography and hydrology. Egypt has never been a true British colony but was influenced and manipulated to support the European causes.

The US approach in influence in Egypt shares some similarities with the British model. US interests in Egypt can be summarized of four points:

1. Suez canal;
2. US main interest in Egypt is to maintain good relations with Egypt and later to capitalize on Egypt's leadership role in the Arab world (Mark, 2002);
3. The third interest is to keep the Israeli-Egyptian treaty;
4. Defence Cooperation.

The following table, Table 2.7, shows the extent of the US foreign aid to Egypt. The data from the Congressional Research Service show the scale of the massive assistance packages that the Egyptian military has received over the years (Sharp, 2011).

Table 2.7: US Foreign Assistance to Egypt in million US Dollars

<b>FISCAL YEAR</b>	<b>ECONOMIC</b>	<b>MILITARY</b>	<b>IMET</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
1948-1997	23.288,6	22.353,5	27,3	45.669,4
1998	815,0	1.300,0	1,0	2.116,0
1999	775,0	1.300,0	1,0	2.076,0
2000	727,3	1.300,0	1,0	2.028,0
2001	695,0	1.300,0	1,0	1.996,0
2002	655,0	1.300,0	1,0	1.956,0
2003	911,0	1.300,0	1,2	2.212,2
2004	571,6	1.292,3	1,4	1.865,3
2005	530,7	1.289,6	1,2	1.821,5
2006	490,0	1.287,0	1,2	1.778,2
2007	450,0	1.300,0	1,3	1.751,3
2008	411,6	1.289,4	1,2	1.702,2
2009	250,0	1.300,0	1,3	1.551,3
2010	250,0	1.300,0	1,9	1.551,9
2011	250,0	1.300,0	1,4	1.551,4
<b>Total</b>	<b>30.820,8</b>	<b>39.211,8</b>	<b>43,0</b>	<b>70.075,6</b>

Source: Congressional Research Service (2012, 18)

US foreign assistance to Egypt has averaged over \$2 billion every year since 1979. In this package the majority of the funds are for the Egyptian military and only fraction is for economic development. These funds are in a way tribute for the peace treaty with Israel following the Camp David Peace Accords.

According to the State Department, the US taxpayers are paying over \$1.3 billion annually for equipping and training the Egyptian army. With this military assistance Egyptian armed forces represent major regional power. They acquired state of the art US fighter jets and even the technology and license to produce the latest generation main battle tanks. The US and Egypt's militaries also participated in combined annual military exercises which give the troops valuable experience (Axelrod, 2011). With this military might, which is not matched on the continent, Egypt has created anomaly in the balance of power in Africa. For the US policymakers Egypt's military might provides security in volatile region. But it also created arms race in the poorest region in the world.

In exchange for this massive aid, the US has several benefits. The US Navy warships are getting “expedited processing” through the Suez Canal (Wang, 2011). According to Wikileaks, President Mubarak and the military leadership consider the US military aid as “untouchable compensation” for maintaining peace with Israel.

For the US military the billion dollar tribute represents good deal in four parts. Egypt remains at peace with Israel; US military enjoys propriety accesses to the Suez Canal and free pass through Egyptian air space. The third benefit is the loyalty of the tenth largest army in the world. During the first Gulf War Egypt deployed 35.000 of his forces and represented the third largest contingent after US and UK. Egypt regularly contributed to UN peacekeeping missions, in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Darfur and Liberia. Egypt is also one of the greatest US allies in the war on terror. Egypt’s military might is second only to its reports on human rights abuses. President Bush tried to link the military assistance to Egypt’s human rights progress but the idea was dismissed as unrealistic (US Department of State, 2011).

The other part of Egypt’s assistance is the economic development aid which has declined over the past decade but is generally in the hundreds of millions annually. Some of this aid directly benefits US economy. The aid money was used for importing US goods and services. Egypt’s agricultural imports from US are about \$2 billion, mainly in wheat.

However, there is one kind of assistance that Egypt does not want to receive. From the period of 1999 to 2009 US had been financing NGOs in Egypt that promote democracy and good governance. Wikileaks documents have shown that Egyptian government has asked USAID to stop financing organization that was not properly registered as NGOs with the government. Even president Mubarak was described in the reports as “deeply sceptical of the US role in democracy promotion” (Nixon, 2011).

#### *2.1.6.1 President Mubarak as US proxy*

Over 79 billion of dollars of US taxpayers’ money were given over several decades to Egypt according to Congressional Research Service. But for thirty year rule as president, Mubarak and his family have amassed wealth that is estimate between 40 to 70 billion dollars.

African and Arab leaders have a long history of corruption but Egyptian example sets new standards. The Egyptian revolution has shown the true state of the economy where corruption was endemic ranging from the top to the lowest public servant. Mubarak’s ministers have also accumulated great wealth that is impossible to acquire through their government salaries. The housing minister has estimated net worth of more than 11 billion Egyptian pounds, Minister for trade 12 billion and the Interior minister 8 billion. These politicians have not been secret about their wealth; instead they have surrounded themselves in luxury. This created a perception among the Egyptian people that only people that benefit from the nation’s wealth were businessmen with ties to Mubarak’s ruling party. In Egypt the proverb “wealth fuels political power and political power buys wealth” illustrates the economic situation (Hassan, 2011).

In Egypt, white-collar crime and political corruption began with the Presidency of Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak saw the US military and development aid as an opportunity to enrich himself. The vast US military equipment that was given to Egypt had to be transported to its respectable location in Egypt. President Mubarak’s transport companies demanded bribes and kickbacks but despite the reports and complains of American contractors there were no critic from the US Government. The military aid was of strategic essential of the US, it secured the peace with Israel and Egypt became US most influential ally in the Arab world. The US government turned a blind eye for President Mubarak’s criminal allegations. The criminal

activities in Egyptian political elite did not end with the military aid but expanded to all spheres of the economy, tourism, oil, gas, and public construction. To maintain the public secret of corruption, country ministers and their subordinates were involved in ever more complex criminal activities (Patel, 2011).

While the political elite were getting richer and more powerful, the people were getting poorer and more desperate. The unemployment rate in Egypt has been growing in a steady rate. In the 1960 during the reign of President Nasser the unemployment rate was less than 200.000 people. By 1976 the unemployment has reached 850.000 and 1986 during the Presidency of Mubarak the figure was more than two million. By 2011 the number increased to 5 million and unofficially 7 million people. In a traditional Muslim society the unemployment and poverty have grave effect on the youth. Without livelihood and money they cannot afford dowry and cannot marry. The welfare system in Egypt does not exist. In a country where the population of youths under 25 is more than 50 % and the unemployment was high, the social unrest was the logical expectation. But the government of Egypt did almost nothing to address the social situation. By 2011 nearly half of the people in Egypt lived under or just above the poverty line. The inflation in Egypt and especially the rising of food prices was the breaking point of the social unrests.

By that time Egypt's deficit was about 8 % of GDP, food prices were at 17 % and unofficial unemployment was about 25 % according to BBC. All these factors including the abusive and corrupt government created a perfect storm in Egypt. The riots represented true expression of democracy, first for over thirty years of dictatorial regime. The protests saw solidarity between Christians and Muslim, extremist and moderates, but also clashes with Mubarak supporters. The international media tried to make sense of the uprising by branding it as Islamic revolution or anti-Mubarak protest. The protestors demanded change in the regime, end of torture and corruption, but foremost they wanted bread. Egypt's protests were the first major social revolution that protested on wealth inequality and rising food prices. Mubarak and his regime were seen as the symbol of the Egyptian plutocratic regime. Within 18 days of protests, the regime was toppled.

After more than 70 billion dollar of US military and economic assistance, US main ally in Africa was toppled by thousands of poor and desperate people. Egyptian army, armed with modern US tanks, marched in the streets of Cairo but was powerless against the unarmed people.

#### *2.1.6.2 The role of the military*

The Egyptian armed forces represent the most powerful military organization in the region. With half a million troops in active service and approximately the same amount of reserve it is the world's tenth largest army. But unlike its Western counterparts, the Egyptian army is not de facto subordinate to the civilian authorities.

The military is in fact a state within a state, where the soldiers and officers live with their families in confound towns and villages. The army has its own economic infrastructure, companies, shops, malls and even factories (Abdelhadi, 2012). Their products are heavily subsidized and have a tax break. The true state of the Egyptian military industrial complex is public secret in Egyptian society. Even though the military has these unfair advantages oppose to the civilian companies, the troops and military in general are highly respected in the society.

The economic might of the military grew exponentially during the rule of Mubarak, who was also a military officer. Until the revolution in 2011 the Egyptian military controlled from 15



to 40 % of the Egyptian economy according to Al-Jazeera analyses. The military owns over 35 factories and companies that produce everything ranging from food products to electronic equipment and cars. They own restaurants, football stadiums and the employees are usually conscripts or their family members. The army is also a great land owner and has been the prime real-estate speculator in the past (Tadros, 2012).

The reason for this state within a state was to maintain the social order in the country. Egypt has waged several wars in the past and has maintained enormous standing army. In fear of instability when the troops needed to be disbanded after the last major war in 1973 they created these military subsidized companies. Over time the military became ever more autonomous. Even Mubarak feared the officer core and held them in tight leash with early retirement as form of punishment or a director position in a company as a reward. It is estimated that Mubarak retired up to 250.000 officers in his 30 years reign. These former officers and their families represent the new economic elite and the powerbase of the regime.

US policymakers were aware of the position of the army in Egyptian society, and that is the reason for diverting all the aid to military instead of economic development. It is easier to maintain 1,5 million people that are under arms and control the other 80 million impoverished Egyptian people. After the fall of the Mubarak regime, the army officers took the reign of power.

The Supreme Council of Armed forces supposed to be temporary transition government to truly democratically elected government. But for the people of Egypt the military junta was more repressive than the ousted dictator. The officer core was in fact the same people in the Mubarak regime and although the President was brought down the power structure remained intact. The protestors believed that their revolution was hijacked and they were used in regime change.

The military junta's first action was to declare that Egypt will honour all regional and international obligations and treaties. This statement was referred to the Egypt-Israel Peace treaty and the special relations with the US. The military officers needed the US aid more than ever and although the Mubarak has been toppled, the regime would survive. On August 7<sup>th</sup>, 2011, the military junta under Field Marshal Tantawi swore in office 15 new governors. These unelected officials were former military officers, members of the old regime and there were no women or Coptic Christians.

The military Junta was becoming ever more aggressive towards the people. During the 30 year rule of Mubarak, some 1200 cases were heard by military courts, while since the overthrow of the dictator on 11<sup>th</sup> February 2011 until January 2012 around 14.000 cases were assigned to military courts (Mende, 2012). The generals have also increased their oversight of the military budget in Parliament. This meant that the military would remain separate entity in the Egyptian society.

The military junta reacted brutally against demonstrates, arresting them under newly introduced offence of "reckless behaviour" (Mende, 2012). The brutal crackdown on the protestors, inhumane beatings and torture of Egypt security force horrified the world public. The military junta was especially brutal against the Christian population, the Copts. Although Arab and Egyptians, the generals tried to shift the uprising to religious war.

On 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> October 2011, soldiers and police clashed with Coptic protesters. This clash resulted with 28 deaths and more than two hundred injured when the security forces opened fire on the unarmed protestors and used their armoured personal carriers to run over the crowd. The state television within called upon "all noble Egyptian patriots to protect the military against the violent crowd of Copts." This message from the government run media

sparked religious clash with Muslim Egyptian crowds marching in the streets of Cairo. The background of the Coptic Christians was the burning of their church and the denial of the right to reconstruction by the authorities.

The Copts in Egypt were facing state terror under the military Junta and the radical Islamists in Egypt. Under Mubarak, the Copts enjoyed limited freedom, even though they had to ask for special permission to build or renovate a church. In the new political reality under the military junta they are facing silent genocide as the generals tried to start a religious conflict. The massacre in Maspero was not the only incident of gross human rights violations against the Christian minority.

This massacre illustrates the paradox of US foreign policy in Egypt. Billions of dollars of US taxpayers money were used for the creation of best equipped military force in the region. Instead of peace and stability that armoured force was seen in massacring the Egyptian people. For over three decades the US government has poured billions of dollars to create this massive Egyptian military industrial complex led by a military junta that has no respect for human rights. But the greatest problem for the future will be the control or the containment of over one million armed troops.

### *2.1.6.3 Egypt's Water Conflict*

“Egypt is the gift of the Nile”

-Herodotus-

From ancient times the river Nile was the source of life and without it Egypt would be nothing more than a desert wasteland. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century Egypt's 82 million people are completely dependable on the river Nile. Without the waters of the Nile, Egyptian population will face extinction. With the decrease flow, Egypt will face economic collapse and starvation. The main problems that are facing Egypt future are coming from East and Central Africa. The River Nile runs across ten African countries and is used by 400 million people. Its waters are essential substance for life and a cause for conflict as well.

The conflict over the waters of the Nile River is probably the oldest in human history. The Ancient civilizations of Egypt and Ethiopia were in a state of a cold war over the centuries. The Emperor of Ethiopia Menelik threatened to divert the water of the Nile, an ancient power politics, when he demanded tribute from the Egyptian pharaohs. The British understood the power of the Nile River and they crafted their African colonial empire with the flow of the rivers. In the Nile River they made treaties with Ethiopian king not to build dams and gave Egypt the monopoly over the water. With the rise of Arab nationalism and independence of Egypt, the British were the first to use the river Nile as political bargain. They constructed dams in Sudan which seriously shrank the flow of water in Egypt (El-Fadel, et al., 2003).

After the Suez Crisis, US replaced Britain as the superpower in the region. US backed Egyptian presidents Sadat and later Mubarak turned their backs on Africa and their influence in upper Nile countries diminished.

United States in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is in a paradox situation with supporting two African countries that are in conflict over one river. For Egypt the water from the Nile represents 95% of its water supply. For Ethiopia the river Nile is the resource that can deliver them out of poverty. Both countries receive billions of dollars from the US and are vital allies in the war on terrorism.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will be the largest electrical dam in Africa and the seventh largest in the world. This project, when completed in 2014/15, will generate electricity that will suffice Ethiopia needs and will be exported to Sudan. The reservoir of the dam will prevent the annual floods in Ethiopia and improve agricultural. The contributions to the Ethiopian economy are evident but for Egypt it may be catastrophic. The reservoir from the dam contains water that is equivalent to the annual flow of the Nile at the Sudanese-Egyptian border. Another effect will be the evaporative losses from the dam's reservoir will permanently reduce the flow of the Blue Nile.

When finished in 2014/15 the population in Egypt will grow to 88 million people and the water flow will decrease. In 1970s Anwar Sadat threatened the communist regime of Ethiopia with war if they constructed dams (Kameri-Mbote, 2007). The Egyptian President even stated: "The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water."

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century with the global warming and unpredictable rain seasons, the conflict between these two countries is highly probable. According to leaked Stratfor report acquired by Wikileaks, Egypt was planning to strike the dams in Ethiopia with the Sudanese assistance. This secret pact between Bashir and Mubarak involved the use of Sudanese air base from which the assault would be conducted (Wikileaks, 2012). Even in 2012 with the regime change in Egypt, the flow of the Nile is considered as a strategic matter.

On the other hand the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is not needed from technical point of view. Critics and experts conclude that smaller dams would be more cost effective. If the main purpose to Ethiopian presidents was electricity generation, smaller dams would be the answer. But if the plans are to control the flow of water to other countries the current project will suffice.

With the billions of dollars of US military and economic aid Ethiopia and Egypt have the greatest military force in the region. Without this aid the balance of power would be achieved through negotiations.

#### *2.1.6.4 Prospects for future US-Egypt relations*

The United States should accept the fact as the British Empire realized, that Egypt's population of 80 million is too big to be controlled, Arab affairs are too complex to be influenced and the repercussions of failed foreign policy could be catastrophic for the whole region. The US should break the habit of supporting dictatorial or corrupt regimes that are easy to be influenced and controlled. The United States is a nation born in a revolution against a tyrannical regime and it is against every principle to support or aid regimes that do not have the same strive for freedom and liberty.

The invisible empire that the US tried to manufacture with arms donations worth billions of dollars collapsed in just 18 days by a mob of ordinary unarmed people. The US sponsored government of Mubarak is behind bars, and the whole society is in a state of chaos. The military junta that represented the transitional government has proven to be far more brutal than the old regime. The general's council has perpetrated grave human rights violation such as torture and massacres. They have tried to change the revolution into a religious war, by violating the right of religious expression and massacring Christians. The regime of Mohamed Morsi will most likely continue to oppose the United States on various issues. President Morsi is expected to be more forceful advocate for Palestinian rights and will continue to question US and Israeli position in the region. The new regime that originates from the Muslim Brotherhood is a Pan-Islamic movement which will demand greater link with all the Arab countries. This notion is confirmed with President Morsi's recent visits to Saudi Arabia and

Qatar where he received substantial support both in political and financial sense. Beside Morsi's foreign policy, the domestic policy of the Muslim brotherhood is more frightening. The constant oppressions towards the ethnic and religious minorities and the growing dictatorial powers of the Presidency have the potential to create regional disaster. The turning point of the US-Egypt relations began on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2012, with the attacks on US embassies in Libya and Egypt. In Cairo, the US flags were torn down and replaced with Islamic flags. This event was marked with the weak US response that looked as an apology for the video "Innocence of Muslims". On the other hand, Presidents Morsi's respond was seen as defiance to US dominance. The logical US respond for the embassy incidents should be to end the US assistance towards Egypt, but the Obama administration has continued the assistance, In fiscal year 2013, President Obama has requested \$1,55 billion in bilateral aid to Egypt, from which \$1,3 billion is military aid (Sharp, 2012). In order for the paradox of the US foreign policy to be greater, President Obama stated in an interview: "I don't think that we would consider them an ally, but we don't consider them an enemy" (BBC, 2012).

In the past decades the US has provided Egypt with \$71,6 billion, created the most powerful army in the region and in one sentence the US has not only lost a major non-NATO ally but probably gained a strategic Islamic opponent in Africa. The case of Egypt illustrates the paradox of neo-colonialism in which foreign government cannot be bought and controlled without creating a regional instability and dictatorial regimes like Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi.

The US respond to the Egypt's continuing revolution should be inaction, while the political and social storm passes. Egypt represents more of financial quick sand than a US geostrategic ally. Egypt has used British, Soviet and US assistance to serve its own purposes and increase its power and influence in the region.

### ***2.1.7 Equatorial Guinea***


Equatorial Guinea is a small country in West Africa about the size of Maryland with a population of 700.000 people. Equatorial Guinea was proclaimed as the "new Kuwait" but in fact it was a new oilfield with old corrupt dictator. The reason why the US supports this regime is the fact that Equatorial Guinea provides 20 million barrels of oil per year to the American economy (Once upon a coup, 2009).

The relationship with the US intensified in the early 1990s. With the Kuwait oil infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and the insecurity in the Middle East, the US oil companies tried to diversify their oil imports from African countries. The events on 9/11 just speed up that resolve and Equatorial Guinea seemed as a good investment for the Bush administration. There were few setbacks in the country such as abuse of human rights, torture, brutal dictator, piracy and corruption. All that was ignored for the purpose of obtaining a cheap energy source. The oil reserves found in this country are low on sulphur, easy to refine and the royalties paid are minimal (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

According to the Oil and Gas Journal, Equatorial Guinea has proven reserves of 1,1 billion barrels and 1,1 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves as of January, 2011. The production has reached as 330.000 barrels per day and the local consumption is negligible 2.000 barrels per day. Almost all of the crude oil and natural gas is being exported.


The following two figures (Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6) show the oil and gas exports from Equatorial Guinea.

Figure 2.5: Equatorial Guinea oil exports



Source: Global Atlas, facts global energy (2010)

Figure 2.6: Equatorial Guinea LNG exports



Source: Global Atlas, facts global energy (2010)

While the big oil companies like Chevron, Texaco, were pumping up oil, and Washington officials thought they found the “new Kuwait” free of conflict, they forgot to learn the history of the country and its leader.

Equatorial Guinea was a Spanish colony till 1968. Unlike other African colonies, the Spanish helped Equatorial Guinea to achieve one of the continent's highest literacy rates and develop a good network of health care facilities. At independence in 1968, Equatorial Guinea had one of the highest per capita incomes in Africa, and nobody knew of the vast oil reserves. (U.S. Department of State, 2012)

The great hopes for freedom and prosperity were substituted with tyranny and dictatorship. The country's first dictator was Francisco Macias Nguema, current President's uncle, who came to power, by the only free and democratic elections in 1968. His atrocities began when he ordered the execution of his political adversary and continued till his death in 1979. By that

time Equatorial Guinea was known as “Dachau of Africa”. During his reign of terror, nearly 100.000 people, or approximately one third of the population were killed or fled into exile. Nguema proclaimed himself as president for life and eliminated the political opposition. Then he turned his focus on the Roman Catholic Church, which he saw as an opposition. With the terror and intimidation towards the priests, the government claimed: ”There is no God than Macias” and “God created Equatorial Guinea thanks to Macias-without Macias Equatorial Guinea would not exist” which later became a mandatory part of all church services (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The regime and its leader were against teachers and intellectuals, which were tortured, executed and even crucified. He organized spectacles in the capital’s stadium where hundreds of people were executed while in the background, the song “Those were the days” was played.

Macias even banned the term “intellectual” in 1973, while he executed the countries remaining teachers and intellectuals. The country’s economy virtually collapsed after the 11-year dictatorship and the Macias declared himself as “The Great Miracle”. Macias ruled with an iron fist, terror, African black magic and occult (Time magazine, 1979). His subordinates feared him and believed that he has supernatural powers. Macias was deposed by a military coup led by his nephew and then minister of defence, General Teodoro Obiang. Macias was trialled for mass murder and treason, while surrounded by white sheets, to neutralize his supernatural powers. After a brief trial, Macias was executed and his body torn apart.

The regime was also unpredictable on the international stage. The relations with US started to deteriorate and Macias started to get support from Communist countries, including the Soviet Union, China and Cuba. On several occasions Macias accused the United States of complicity in alleged plots to overthrow him (Ockerman, et al., 2010). Although there were serious bilateral tensions and massive human rights violations in Equatorial Guinea, the US government decided to continue with its embassy presence in the country. The reason in that time were the geostrategic position of the country and the possible uranium reserves in Rio Muni that the US did not want to fall into the hands of the Soviet Union (Ockerman, et al., 2010).

This dictatorial rule does not end with Macias, but continues well onto the 21<sup>st</sup> century with president Obiang. While the new regime was more refined and discrete in its atrocities, it has the same elements as his uncle Macias reign of terror. Now, president Obiang has the support from the only superpower and a great wealth of oil. Obiang’s role and history in his uncle brutal regime is carefully concealed secret for the US and Equatorial Guinea. The US policy makers wanted to clear up Obiang’s history, now when the country has rich oil reserves. Obiang was a general in one of the most brutal regimes that organized mass murders, tortures and even crucifixions. He was also head of the notorious Black Beach Prison, where inmates were known to be tortured. Obiang was involved in the genocide in Equatorial Guinea that killed 100.000 people and never faced justice.

In fact his actions and policies are practically identical as his uncle’s. In July 2003, the State run radio announced that Obiang was “like a God in Heaven ...he has power over men and things...He can decide to kill without anyone calling him to account and without going to hell because it is God himself with whom he is in permanent contact, who gives him strength” (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

Obiang’s regime was also involved in a diplomatic scandal in 1995, when he accused the US ambassador for witchcraft. These actions followed after the ambassador’s report on the human rights violations. Despite this incident the oil lobby pressured the US State Department to reopen the US embassy.

Obiang was especially cruel towards the opposition, which he routinely accuses for plotting a coup to overthrow him. As a result opposition activists were arrested, tortured and in most cases sentenced for several years. Obiang was elected for president two times in the eighties without any opposing candidate. In the next elections Obiang won the total majority of the votes which ranged from 98 % to 103 % of the votes. In the parliament his party holds 99 of the seats and the opposition has only one representative. The elections were condemned as undemocratic and fraudulent by the international observers. In 2006 article in “Der Spiegel: Obiang was quated”What right does the opposition have to criticize the actions of a government” (Smolczyk, 2006).

The US military had strong collaboration with the military of Equatorial Guinea. For eight years, from 1984 and 1992, the US funded the military training of Equatorial Guinea’s officers in the most prestigious US military academies. Even a patrol boat was donated to the navy of this small country in 1988. According to former US ambassador Frank Ruddy, the military used this ship in an act of piracy the next day after its commission.

The control of the military is vital for Obiang’s regime. But this is not a military in the classic Western sense. It is in fact a tribal, clan paramilitary run by the President’s closest relatives. The commanding structure is around nine generals, from which seven are the President’s relatives and two belong from his tribe. The Fang tribe is politically dominant since the independence of the country and every soldier comes from this tribe. The Fang tribe is divided into sixty seven clans and constitutes 80 % of the population. Among these clans, Obiang’s Mongomo clan holds most power.

According to CNBC report, ritual cannibalism has been committed by the security forces in Equatorial Guinea. This is common in West African tradition where the victor eats his opponent to gather his powers. These brutal and pagan rituals of the ruling elite started with the first dictator Macias whose powers originated in a human skull. After his assignation, President Obiang as the commander in chief has the possession of that skull.

The brutality and lack of discipline of the army has been reported by diplomatic staff and oil workers. Even the President Obiang himself does not trust his army. Instead he uses 350 Moroccan mercenaries as his own personal guard. But the Moroccans are not the only mercenaries in Equatorial Guinea. Since 2000, MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated) are training and advising the security forces in Equatorial Guinea. MPRI is in fact US based private military company, whose members are former officers of all branches of the US military. They were involved in the Croatian War, Columbia drug war and more recently in protecting the regime of Obiang. Given the composition of its staff, they represent US silent army in conflict where it is embarrassing for the formal US military to get involved. This private military company is just one of the evidence that United States is supporting a dictatorial regime in Africa. MPRI also saved Obiang’s regime in 2004 coup attempt. This has led to a paradox situation when Spain, US and South African mercenaries came into conflict over the oil in Equatorial Guinea.

Spain, the former colonial master, wanted more influence and oil from Equatorial Guinea. Obiang, in the other hand, had fresh memories from the Spanish colonial rule and allowed only symbolic Spanish presence. Even the date for the coup preceded the Spanish election, in a case that the new government should not support this covert politics. Spain dispatched two navy ships with 500 soldiers that would serve as peacekeepers in the new post Obiang Equatorial Guinea. The coup ended when the mercenaries were arrested in Zimbabwe and details of the coup came public. After this incident Obiang became even more opposed at the

Western countries and seek new partnership with China. Mugabe has become his principal African ally and China has got its share in Equatorial Guinea's oil.

The terror of Obiang's army is not limited to Equatorial Guinea. In 2006 Cameroon fishermen were killed by Obiang's soldiers. This incident created tensions between the two countries and the two African dictators. The same year Obiang's military seized 15 Belgian Pandur Armoured Personal Carriers which were intended for the peacekeeping mission in the DR Congo. This unlawful action was considered as an act of piracy committed by a sovereign country.

Equatorial Guinea's regime is a kleptocracy run by rootless dictator and his family. Tribal genocide, mass murder, torture, rape and cannibalism are the trademarks of the government of Equatorial Guinea. The future of this small country and its relations with the US will dictate the future development of the whole African continent. Obiang regime proves the point that US have only economical and strategic aims in Africa, and human rights, genocide prevention are not on their agenda. The second point is that military rulers can be portrayed as democratic leaders and their crimes against humanity can be forgotten. The US doctrine of democratic evolution should not apply to dictators that commit mass murders, genocide and cannibalism. US Public Relations agencies may try to change the image of Obiang but on the end the truth will come out. Currently "Cassidy and Associates" are US based public relations company that is responsible for improving the image of Obiang. Also the US government has been responsible for improving the image of Obiang and treating his as a normal head of state. There is bipartisan support for support of this dictatorial regime. US secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called Obiang a good friend and Obama even meet him in the White House.

United States is trading its moral principles for freedom and democracy for less than a billion barrels of oil. It has protected the dying regime with mercenaries and allowed corrupted money and officials into its shores. Equatorial Guinea regime constitutes an "outpost of evil" alongside Zimbabwe, and does not deserve aid from US taxpayers. Economic sanctions instead of oil investments should be placed by the US and UN. The possible loss of oil import would be negligible for the US economy. In return, United States would regain its moral high ground and bolster its image for not compromising to dictatorial regimes that are terrorizing its people.

### ***2.1.8 Democratic Republic of Congo***

The mineral wealth of Congo is the cause for the involvement for all the regional and world powers for over two centuries. Although this vast country in the hearth of Africa was colonized by the Europeans, ravaged by dictators and wars it still has wealth worth of 24 trillion dollars or the combined GDP of Europe and United States.

The reserves of copper, diamonds, gold, cobalt and coltan are vital raw materials for the Western industry. For these scarce minerals the US waged secret conflicts with its allies and foes, supported brutal dictators and stood aside while the country was torn apart in the bloodiest war on the continent. The history of the US involvement in Congo begins with the pressure for decolonization. The Belgian colony of Congo was a barrier for the US interests.

The independent history of Congo can be divided at the time ruled by its dictators. But in the background western aid is the fuel that runs this vast country, and without it, everything falls apart as seen in the first and second Congo War.



### *2.1.8.1 Independence of Congo till the death of Lumumba*

Patrice Lumumba was the first and last democratically elected leader of Congo. His political carrier although brief, was a precursor for events that were coming to Congo and Africa. During Lumumba's three month rule as a prime minister, the country dissolve into chaos, while the Congolese forces committed their first genocide. The Congo crisis was a dangerous combination of ethnic, tribal and racial cleansing with involvement of the cold war powers.

After the first five days of the independence, Congo had proven the true nature of its security forces. The Force Public was a Belgian colonial invention for controlling the local population. A paramilitary organization of brutal local Congolese militants who would spread terror though their countrymen, as the Belgians excavated Congo's mineral wealth. The cycle of violence was started with this military force and in 1960 when the Congo received its independence, the conflict escalated.

The soldiers mutinied with demands for promotion and higher wages. In the same time they pillaged and raped the Belgian white community and the local African. These scenes from the 60's were to be repeated through the half of century independence till this day. The Belgian community of 100.000 white settlers who held the administration, industry and the officer corps were subjected to unseen brutality by the Congolese army and local militias.

Prime Minister Lumumba made several enemies during his brief political carrier. On the first day of the independence Lumumba read his speech as defiance to the Belgian King. But his biggest mistake was to place colonel Mobutu in charge of the army and to ask assistance from the Soviet Union. Lumumba's demands for Pan-Africanism and his leaning towards the Soviet Union alarmed Washington. Lumumba would share the faith of several African leaders that share his visions on united Africa and end to neo-colonialism. The assassination of Patrice Lumumba was the end of democratic rule in Congo and the start of US involvement in Africa. The regime change did create a US ally in the Cold War, but the cost was in Congo's future and the morality of US foreign policy.

### *2.1.8.2 Mobuto's Zaire*

The assassination of Lumumba was subcontracted to colonel Mobutu, a relatively unknown officer in Congo but praised as extremely intelligent from the US ambassador. Mobutu was recruited by the CIA to stop the soviet incursion and in return he was given the leadership of the Congo. There was even no US criticism of the 1965 coup d'état when colonel Mobuto took the reign of power.

US support and backing brought Mobutu to power and the latter withdraw of the aid dissolved the whole country. Significant aid was given to Mobuto's regime throughout the Presidency of Jonson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan and Bush. Economic and financial aid was only the part of the support. The military and political support for Mobuto expanded as the US was indirectly involved in the war between Zaire and Angola in the late 70's, known as Shaba wars. In these conflicts Mobuto's army and regime were on brink of collapse if it were not for his Western sponsors. Morocco, France and Egypt supplied the troops while the US military provided airlift and logistical support. Even in peace time the foreign aid to Zaire was steadily increased.

For over 30 years of Mobutu's rule, the US embassy helped with the payment of the soldier's salaries. CIA front company, the Western International Ground Maintenance Organization (WIGMO) provided maintenance for Zaire's air force and provided mercenary pilots. In 1990 Zaire received an estimated US \$711, 1 million in development assistance, and the biggest

part was paid by the US. This sum represented a decline from US \$805 million in foreign aid in 1987.

From 1960 to the end of the Cold War the US has invested heavily in Mobutu's regime. The billions of dollars can be justified in the geostrategic position of Congo, the vast mineral resources and Soviet incursion in Africa. During his reign, Mobutu had a free hand in his rule. Political repression, torture, mass executions and other human rights abuses were committed as the US stayed silent. Mobutu will go down in history as one of the greatest kleptocratic leaders in history. His personal wealth was estimated to five billion dollars, as the people starved and the country went bankrupt. Mobutu was eccentric even for African standards. He wanted to rebrand the country with changing the name of the country, its citizens and even his own name. His African name was known as Mobutu Sese Seko or "the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, goes from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake" (Gbadolite, 2001). Then he ordered every citizen to change his name into African name. Even priests were severely punished if they baptize children with Western names.

From the start of his rule he did not accept critic or political opposition. According to Mobutu, the politicians ruin the country for five years and as a result he would not allow a political party for five years. In fact he did not allow the term politician, and political parties started to reappear only in 1990. Elections were staged but Mobutu was the only candidate, and the voters had to choose between him and chaos. Not surprisingly Mobutu always won 99% of the votes. The parliament was only a facade of the democracy, since only his party was allowed. Membership in Popular Movement of the Revolution was mandatory for every citizen. The party's ideology was "neither left nor right" with elements of capitalism and communism. In reality the regime was plutocracy, the ruling party a facade for democracy, and the ideology was the evidence of the ignorance and insanity of Mobutu. The sanity of the President was brought into question in 1975 when Mobutu accused the US for plotting to overthrow him. Later he used these accusations to conduct purges and mass killings against the military officers (Schmidt, 2010).

By the end of the eighties not even the US could keep with the increasing costs of Mobutu. Zaire went bankrupt, but the President's family continued its spending spree. Palaces in the US and France, luxury cars and even shopping with Concord planes were the extravagances of the regime. Mobutu's greed was matched only by his cruelty. The regime in Zaire was on a self-destructive path and with the US change of proxies in the nineties, Mobutu regime went into history. Given the background of Mobutu Sese Seko and his dictatorial regime it is remarkable why would the US funded and backed Zaire.

### *2.1.8.3 First Congo war*

Laurent-Desire Kabila deposed Mobutu in the first Congo war in 1997. His Presidency lasted four years until his assassination in 2001. Laurent Kabila started his political carrier as a Lumumba supporter in the Katanga province. Later his ideology would change toward socialism as he opposed Mobutu. He was also involved in the infamous Simba rebellion in Congo. In this insurrection, Kabila's interests were directly opposed US foreign policy.

The Simba rebellion as all revolts in Africa was especially brutal and absurd from Western point of view. The organizers of the rebellion were actually the traditional leaders and their ideology was based on African magic and occult. The so called Simba warriors were drugged young men who believed that they are indestructible even by bullets. In the conflict there were several instances where whole battalions of the Zaire army would retreat by the charge

of several Simba warriors (Clayton, 1999). Mass killings, rapes and pillaging were the aftermath of the fighting and the white population including the missionaries bore the brunt of these atrocities. As a result the Government of Congo asked assistance from the US. This resulted in full scale invasion by Belgian paratroopers carried by US air force planes. CIA backed mercenaries were also involved in ending the rebellion (Fitzsimmons, 2009). Although Kabila took part in this rebellion his involvement and the war crimes committed were never raised.

Three years later Kabila was involved in another insurrection in the eastern provinces of the Congo. In this insurrection Kabila was directly assisted by the PR China and Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara. Although the rebellion was intended to create socialist mini state, Kabila combined collective farming and gold exploitation for his personal fortune. With his newfound wealth he bought houses in Uganda and even a brothel in Tanzania (The Economist, 2001).

In Uganda, Kabila met Museveni and Kagame who were at that time still rebels. As Museveni and Kagame grabbed power in Uganda and Rwanda, they needed a Congolese face to represent their invasion in Zaire. Although the invasion of Zaire was supported by the US, there was no protest to the selection of Kabila, given his background. Kabila was seen as not very ambitious person who can be easily bribed and controlled as puppet leader in the Congo. Even Che Guevara expressed his doubts about Kabila, stated that he lacks “revolutionary seriousness”. In seven months of the invasion Rwandan and Ugandan troops placed Kabila to power. In this brutal war where two countries would invade a sovereign country of Zaire, the international community stood silent. On the spearhead of the invasion were the “kadagos” child soldiers, who would bring Kabila to the presidential throne.

For the US the old unreliable dictator Mobutu was replaced with new inexperienced and not very ambitious leader that they could control. Kabila would surprise everybody when he ordered to Rwanda and Uganda to pull out of his country. He stayed in power and got support from African nations. His pursuit for power and unwillingness to compromise will result in the first continental African war when Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Sudan, and Libya backed the DRC.

The ideals fought in the First and the Second Congo war were not about Pan-Africanism or African solidarity but greed of African dictators and warlords. Kabila promised them a cut in Congo’s vast mineral wealth. President Kabila also showed that he did not forget anything that he learned from the Cuban and Chinese. The new President spoke about one party state and nationalizing the mineral extraction. His mistrust for the Western governments and the financial institutions and companies re-emerged. He even tried to act like Lumumba, playing one power against another, but on the end he created more enemies than friends. His human rights record was even worst of that of Mobutu (Human Rights Watch, 1997). Kabila had also tendency to execute his closest friends and comrades when he felt threatened by their popularity. In his short period as President Kabila set up a personality cult, with the assistance of Mobutu’s former minister of information.

US planed regime change in Congo resulted to the African holocaust with millions deaths and African dictators fighting over the spoils of Congo. With intervening in Congo the US policymakers opened the Pandora Box, from which the horrors of war, starvation, and diseases haunts Central Africa well into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Kabila was assassinated under strange circumstances and died on the same date as Lumumba. Pure accident or warning for the son of Kabila who succeeded his father as President. The assigation of Kabila spurred much controversy that included ambitious military officers,

Rwanda involvement, Lebanese diamond dealers, and even the US government. Congo mysteries are usually uncovered after several decades, as in the cases of torture of Congo Free State and the murder of Patrice Lumumba.

The process of transition of power from father to son went without any difficulty. The US and the international community did not object to this political nepotism. Joseph Kabila was the youngest head of state in Africa, and in the eyes its eastern neighbours easily controllable. At the celebration of 50 years of independence president Kabila stated: "Slowly but surely Congo is recovering like a giant after a long sleep" (Al Jazeera, 2011). But for the ordinary Congolese this so called long sleep was a nightmare, and Kabila was the one who created it.

President Kabila was portrayed as young president who is democratically elected and is part of the new leaders in modern Africa. The US State Department stated that they are proud in their role in the peace process in the DRC (US Department of State, 2012). US President Bush met with Kabila in 2002 and the bilateral relations were continued with the Obama administration. Secretary Clinton paid an official visit in 2009 and in 2011, AFRICOM commanding officer Gen. Ham also met with DRC officials. But the embarrassing truth in these bilateral relations is the history of regime in DRC. Current president Joseph Kabila was rebel commander of child soldiers, so called "kadagos". His militia was engaged in the fierce battles in the Congo War, and gross human rights abuses were committed. Kabila was not elected as President; he just took the reign of power from his father who was assassinated in strange circumstances. He got support from several African dictators from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. This "unholy alliance" was vital in the Second Congo war and assured preservation of the Kabila dynasty. The US poured development and military aid into the DRC as well. In 2010 \$306 million of us taxpayer's money were given to Kabila's regime as a bilateral assistance. US government is also funding one third of MONUSCO's \$1 billion annual budget. Table 2.8 shows the scale of the military assistance that the Kabila regime receives from the US.

Table 2.8: US Military Aid to Democratic Republic of Congo in thousands of US Dollars

<b>FISCAL YEAR (FY)</b>	<b>IMET (INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING)</b>	<b>FMF (FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING)</b>	<b>DCS (DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES)</b>	<b>FMS (FOREIGN MILITARY SALES)</b>	<b>EDA (EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES)</b>
FY 02	0	0	0	0	0
FY 03	0	0	0	0	0
FY 04	321.000	0	0	0	0
FY 05	180.000	150.000	0	0	0
FY 06	306.000	0	0	1.255.000	0
FY 07	263.000	0	0	1.464.000	0
FY 08	477.000	397.000	0	0	0
FY 09	500.000	600.000	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2.047.000</b>	<b>1.147.000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2.719.000</b>	<b>0</b>

Source: Congressional Research Service (2010, 19)

The presidential elections in Congo were farce, although the US government put massive effort to make the regime look democratic (Human Rights Watch, 2009). In contrast from his father, who was portrayed as a dictator with no respect for human rights, today's Kabila is more refined leader who speaks with lower tone and carefully selected words. His opponents for the presidential elections were either killed or disqualified as war criminals by the ICC. Such was the faith of Jaen Pierre Bemba, former warlord and greatest political opponent to Joseph Kabila. If the Western world did not have double standards, Kabila would share the bench with Bemba in the International Criminal Court for his war crimes. But in that case, almost all officers and soldiers of the DRC army should be held accountable.

During an official visit to the DRC, Secretary Clinton expressed serious concerns about the reports of mass rape in eastern Congo (Dagne, 2010). In the statement the main perpetrators of mass rape against women and children are FDLR and Mai-Mai militias. Rape has been used as a terror weapon in the Congo wars, but on a scale that is not seen in modern history. The part that Secretary Clinton failed to mention was that mass rape was being conducted by the army of the DRC. As for the FDLR and the Mai Mai militias, they are considered to be proxies of the Kabila government. Their equipment and weapons was being supplied by the government and in many cases they are practically indistinguishable from the government forces.

The DRC army is in fact a combination of militias with no real chain of command. This army was formed after the government was formed in 2003. It brought together militants from all of the main rebel groups including the former Mobutu government army and formed a military organization with officer position divided between them (Human Rights Watch, 2009). In order to strengthen the unity they mixed up different rebels in several brigades. These

brigades of former enemies, rapists and war criminals were given three months basic training and later deployed around the country. The troops were poorly equipped and without proper training. Their salaries were minimal and in many cases the officers stole the money, according to report of Human Rights Watch. As a result the soldiers of the DRC are stealing and raping anywhere they are deployed. DRC army has been one of the main perpetrators of documented mass rape in Congo. In 2007, MONUC found that 54 % of all sexual violence cases reported in the first six months of that year were committed by the DRC troops (Human Rights Watch, 2009). UN officials in North Kivu warned that the number of reported rapes by FARDC soldiers was on the rise.

One of the evidence that the DRC armed forces are de facto horde of rapists, robbers and murderers is the case of the 14<sup>th</sup> Brigade. This military organization was comprised of former Mai-Mai rebels, RCD-Goma fighters and other Tutsi and Hutu militias. There were several official languages in the brigade, while the soldiers were all former enemies. In 2006, the 14<sup>th</sup> brigade was sent in Kivu province to fight against the Tutsi militia CNDP. Laurent Nkunda was CNDP warlord who did not want to join Kabila's army and continued his armed rebellion. In 2007, although superior in number, the 14<sup>th</sup> brigade was in total retreat after a humiliating defeat by the CNDP. Along the way the soldiers of the brigade pillaged and raped the local population. The government in Kinshasa decided that the brigade needed a rest and send it south in the town of Kabare. From January to December 2008 the 14<sup>th</sup> brigade reined havoc on the civilian population. Mass rapes, torture, murders have happened on daily basis. The soldiers even torn down the wooden huts and used the material as fire wood. The government had forgotten about the accommodation, logistic and even salaries for entire brigade. As a result the troops made barricades and extorted money form the local population. When the commanding officers ordered the troops to move further south, the soldiers mutinied. Old tribal differences emerged and on the 26<sup>th</sup> June the violence escalated. According to Human Rights Watch report even the commanding general could not order the troops and reported back to Kinshasa on the radio that he had lost control over the 14<sup>th</sup> brigade (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

These war crimes are serious violations of the international humanitarian law and responsibility must be taken in order to prevent repetition. The commanding officers, ministers and even the commander in chief, President Kabila, share the responsibility when the army is vandalizing the civilian population. The DRC armed forces have proved that they are horde of undisciplined soldiers that commit unseen atrocities. The United States should distance itself from the DRC government and their army. AFRICOM should stop training and equipping that the DRC army. There is not any training that can turn band of murders and rapists into professional soldiers. The Congo's armed forces have shown that they lack discipline in 1960 when they mutinied and committed their first genocide, against the white Belgian settlers. The same soldiers raped and pillaged when they were defeated in the Simba rebellion and in the Shaba wars. They mutinied and vandalized the country when they did not receive their salaries in the early 90's, as their commander in chief Mobutu, bankrupted the country. Their vandalism erupted in the first and second Congo war, Kivu and Ituru conflict. In the period of a half of century the US has poured money in equipment and training in an army that could never materialize. The military aid for creation of unified military is not the solution for the problems of Congo; it is the reason for the chaos in Central Africa.

Democratic Republic of Congo is a combination of failed state and terror state, where militias and armed gangs rule the country. The DRC should not receive aid. In a contrary, given the human rights violations the logical step would be sanctions. The DRC army must be disbanded and DRC demilitarized if there can be lasting peace.

#### 2.1.8.4 Prospects for the future of the Congo

Today's Democratic Republic of Congo is an oxymoron, it is neither democratic nor republic. It is vast territory run by plutocratic government and warlords that claim to be the official army of the country. It is not a true republic (*Res-Publica*), but more a kleptocratic confederation of former military rulers, and it is not democracy but a failed state with gross human rights abuses.

The Future of Democratic Republic of Congo as of 2012 is still uncertain. The biggest curse is the mineral resources that make the DRC a vulnerable prey in the international arena. Without the mineral ores, copper, cobalt and coltan, the DRC would be insignificant and peaceful country. Without foreign military aid this region of Central Africa would find balance and coexist in peace. The US as an only superpower should lead in this part of the world, but with different methods. DRC and surrounding countries have to be demilitarized, not trained and equipped by the AFRICOM. Western style professional armies cannot be created in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sooner or later the officer corps will topple the civilian government and the vicious cycle of death and destruction will continue. The US can influence this part of Africa with diplomacy and humanitarian aid and in return it will have democratic countries with open markets.

Military and financial aid paid by the American tax payers helped to sustain one of the worst dictatorships, Mobutu Sese Seko. The lack of that assistance toppled the regime in the bloodiest war that the continent has seen. But the US did not just left the heart of Africa, they changed their proxies. The new allies are now Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, with their armies trained, paid and equipped by the AFRICOM. Military aid should be ceased to all African countries and especially the countries around the Great lakes. The political, ethnic, tribal situation is too complex and fragile, and the best course of action for the US is inaction. The balance of power can be maintained without foreign interference and demilitarization of the region. As for the DRC the biggest problem is not the terrorist and militant organizations like the Lord's Resistance Army, FDLR, but DRC's own army. DRC armed forces are responsible for the worst human rights abuses such as torture, mass rapes and even massacres. According to the U.S. State department in the fiscal year 2011, DRC received a military aid of \$22 million (Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 2, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, 2011). These funds would be used to train and equip a battalion of the Congolese army that would stabilize the eastern provinces. But in reality, only the UN peacekeeping force with wider mandate can bring peace and stability.

#### 2.1.8.5 MONUSCO

MONUSCO is the UN peacekeeping force and it is the only military organization in the DRC that is not involved in mass killings, rape and torture. Even with its strength of twenty thousand personnel and a price tag of nearly \$9 billion it is not capable of stopping the chaos of the DRC (UNJHRO, 2010).

The UN peacekeeping mission is seen broadly as failure, as it failed to prevent all the atrocities in the DRC. The reasons for the results of MONUSCO can be found in the:

1. Unclear mandate
2. Lack of leadership and resources
3. Lack of political will

The MONUC forces have strict rules of engagement that are in fact contradictory orders made up by civilian diplomats. The peacekeepers are under strict orders not to engage militias that are committing atrocities. In a case when they are attacked, they must give verbal warning to the enemy and ask permission from the nearest UN representative to return fire. In this process they must not risk harming the local civilian population. This presents impossible feat for any soldier, since the militants are always in the villages. For the peacekeepers on the ground this orders are insulting and demoralizing. Even a former MONUC commanding officer stated on an interview:

“My hands are tied; we cannot do what we supposed to do unless the rules of engagement are re-written”

- General Bipen Rawa, MONUC officer (Al Jazeera, 2009)-

MONUSCO mandate, as stated in the UN resolution 1856, is to protect the civilian population and the humanitarian workers. In the same time the peacekeepers have to train the Congolese armed forces and conduct patrols with them (UN Security Council, 2008). The problem is in the fact that the Congolese Army is just a group of former militants that are responsible for human rights violation, ranging from mass rapes, murder and torture. MONUC's task is to give the former militants three months of basic training, uniform, assault rifles and few hours of military conduct lessons. But these lessons for civilized behaviour go to deaf ears, as these soldiers see the training to refresh their strength and arm themselves. Without MONUC they were starving poorly equipped, untrained militants who vandalized the civilian population. With MONUC they are well equipped and trained rapist and murderers who represent the armed forces of a sovereign country. The biggest problem of the MONUC peacekeeping operation is that there is no real peace to keep. The UN soldiers mandate was to keep the peace and not to enforce it. The naivety of the UN diplomats is that they actually believed the African leaders that the war is over and the peace needs to be upheld. The First and Second Congo war together with Uganda Bush War, Rwanda genocide and more recently Kivu and Ituri conflicts are linked and represent one continuous war. The pauses in-between are made just to regain strength and to rearm. MONUSCO troops are scapegoats that are to be blame for not keeping the peace that never actually existed (Al Jazeera, 2009).

The second reason for the failure of the UN mission is the lack of leadership and resources. The composition of the MONUSCO soldiers and their officers is one of the evidence. The majority of the soldiers are from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Benin, Egypt and South Africa. Their troops are paid by the UN MONUSCO budget which is one third funded by the US. In return MONUC receives soldiers with poor training and motivation. In the DRC there were several scandals involving the peacekeepers, ranging from buying drugs to smuggling gold and diamonds. The officer staff was also reported by the BBC to be involved in mineral smugglings in 2005. The first commanding officer even resigned after a couple of months, when he realized that he cannot make any real change. The equipment of the MONUC forces is relatively basic for the peacekeeping operation. It is a mixture of poor countries armies that are actually trying to make money from the peacekeeping operation (Al Jazeera, 2009). In comparison to AMISOM mission in Somalia where the US equipped Ugandan and Burundi troops have the state of the art equipment, MONUC peacekeepers are hopelessly underequipped.

The third and certainly the most important reason for the failure of the mission was the lack of political will. The blue helmets were sent without clear goal or mandate. They were temporary solution that takes more than a decade and there is still no end in sight of the



conflict. The peacekeeping force was expected to fail from its inception. Too many interests are involved in this region, and too many powers do not want to see this conflict to end. If there was strong political will to end the conflict, more power would be given to the commanders of MONUC and their mandate would be changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcing. Disarmament of the DR Congo could have ended the conflict and not arming the DRC army.

The United States with their involvement in Central Africa and Congo in particular have opened the Pandora box. Endless wars, genocide, starvation, mass rapes are the results of the foreign involvement and empowerment of the new breed of African dictators. The greatest mistake of US foreign policy was the backing of these so called new generation African leaders, Museveni, Kagame and Kabila.

### ***2.1.9 Uganda***

Uganda proclaims itself that is a modern republic, but in reality its political system is more complex. It is a mixture of traditional kingdoms, tribal chiefs, political movements and a dominant paramilitary movement, National Resistance Movement, (NRM) which is masked as a dominant political party run by the president Museveni.

The demographic situation and historical retrospective suggest that Uganda is more a confederation or commonwealth of tribes that are in a state of permanent conflict with each other. The largest ethnic group in Uganda is Baganda which comprise 17 % of the population. In the southwest of the country are the Banyankole and Bahina with 10 %, Bakiga 7%, Banyarwanda 6 %, the Bunyoro 3 %, and the Batoro 3 %. On north of the country are the tribes Langi 6 %, the Acholi 5 %, Lugbara 4 % and the Karamjong 2 % (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

Given the demographic diversity of the country it would be unlikely that these tribes would form a state without an outside intervening power. The British created the artificial boundaries and forced these tribes to live together in a never-ending conflict. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century this country can be sustained either by big economic growth in which the tribal, ethnic religious difference will disappear or with brutal government force. Given the unsuccessful economic situation, Uganda political elite have used its security forces to extremes. This gross human rights abuse is nothing new in Africa, but the support of the US government and self-censorship of western media is posing the question of the true goal of US government.

Uganda is a landlocked country in the heart of Africa. With a size of the state of Oregon and population of 32 million it is becoming a major player in the African political arena. It is fast becoming one of the silent ally and proxy of the United States. As the political alliance grew so did the US assistance for Uganda. In the fiscal year of 2011 the United States provided over \$600 million in assistance to Uganda. Uganda is major and regular recipient of US aid, as in military and economic assistance. Table 2.9 shows the scale of the US assistance towards Uganda in the first decade in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Table 2.9: US Foreign aid to Uganda by Fiscal Years

Fiscal Years (FY)	US Foreign aid to Uganda in US Dollars
2001	95.026.534
2002	100.704.950
2003	178.461.266
2004	215.851.630
2005	288.272.218
2006	278.393.431
2007	365.342.825
2008	455.551.585
2009	471.314.562
2010	451.133.734

Source: Congressional Research Service (2011, 22)

There are three major reasons why Uganda is becoming a major US ally. First, is the geostrategic position of Uganda. The country is located in the crossroads of mineral and energy rich region of Central Africa. On the west Uganda borders the lawless eastern provinces of the DRC. These mineral reserves are essential for the Western economy, but the region is infested with extremist militias. The second reason is the vast oil reserves of Uganda that are known to exist since the 1920. But the political insecurity, list of dictators and wars did not provide the security situation for the development of the oil industry. Only in the past few years, the oil corporations have started to invest in Uganda. The oil reserves still remain uncertain as of 2012.

The oil fields are on the western border with DRC, Lake Albert and are estimated to be in range of 2, 5 billion barrels and 6 billion. Even in the worst case scenario, Uganda will have the double reserves of oil than Equatorial Guinea. The comparison of Obiang and Museveni is concerning, not just for their own country but for the region itself. Obiang is a brutal dictator who was blessed with billion barrels of oil, and friendly United States that forgives all his human rights abuses. Museveni, a former warlord has one of the biggest newly found oil reserves and the most powerful army in the region backed by the US. The oil revenues of Uganda can have serious implications on the balance of power in the Great Lakes region (Johnson, 2003).

The third reason for the US support to Uganda is the UPDF (Uganda Peoples Defend Force). This military formation has 180.000 battles-harden soldiers that are in permanent military engagement since the early eighties. Previously known as a paramilitary National Resistance Army it helped Yoweri Museveni to become the president of Uganda. Over the years the

NRA evolved into the National Resistance Movement which is a dominant political party while the paramilitary wing became the official army.

The UPDF is important US ally and it is often used as a proxy force. UPDF was engaged in the regime change in Congo, in a peacekeeping mission in Somalia and even in the Coalition of the willing in Iraq. UPDF has 5700 troops in Somalia and has the commanding structure in AMISOM. This is a brutal war that is camouflaged as a peacekeeping operation waged by African proxies but is being funded by the US (Human Rights Watch, 2010). UPDF is part of that alliance of proxies that fights the wars that US do not want to engage in. In return UPDF is receiving funds, equipment and training from the AFRICOM.

UPDF has the best equipped and capable air force in the central African region. Although this small African country has a small military budget of less than \$100 million, in 2011 Uganda managed to pay \$750 million for a squadron of modern fighter planes. With this air power UPDF has total air superiority over the central African region. UPDF is also one of the most controversial African militaries with allegations that its troops have committed human rights violations. Numerous reports by the UN raised the concerns of using child soldiers among the ranks of the NRA and later the UPDF, but the western media and the US government paid little attention. In a Danish documentary Museveni in a military uniform proudly displays his child soldiers and in his own words says:

“In Africa, here, in by the age of four you learn how to fight, it is our tradition, if you don’t know. You fight with sticks, spears, with arrows, that is the tradition. If you think that this will disorient them psychologically, that is not the case.”

-Uganda president in interview 1985 (Expose Uganda's Genocide, 2009)-

But the crimes committed by UPDF do not stop there. The war crimes in First and Second Congo war produced a holocaust even greater than the crimes of the Nazi Germany. The mutilations, torture and mass rapes are still perpetrated by militias supported by the government of Uganda and UPDF. Even the prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo stated: “I have received complaints from many affected people in Uganda and human rights activists about the Uganda army have alleged atrocities they committed during many years of insurgency in the north”(Ntale, 2010).

Museveni become head of state after the Uganda Bush War, one of the bloodiest civil wars fought in Africa. Atrocities were made on both sides as the government and the Museveni’s NRA clashed in total war. NRA used child soldiers and land mines as a sort of terror weapon against the civilians.

#### *2.1.9.1 International Court of justice Congo vs. Uganda*

Uganda’s military intervention in Zaire and later DRC was one of the least reported wars in the history. By the scale of the conflict it was called the Africa's Continental War. By its ferocity and number of deaths it equals the holocaust of the Second World War. This forgotten war and its war crimes, involved the International Court of Justice. In the judgment of 19 December 2005, ICJ ruled that Uganda violated the principles of non-intervention under Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter and further violated international human rights and humanitarian law when it launched military operations against the DRC between 1998 and 2003. The Court rejected Uganda's claims of self-defence in this case, and the judgment stated that Uganda should pay reparations to DRC in the range of \$6-10 billion (The International Court of Justice, 2005).

This verdict from the International Court of Justice has confirmed the aggressive foreign policy of Ugandan president Museveni. The invasion in the DRC and the genocide puts Museveni in the same level as the president of Sudan Bashir.

Uganda regime crimes against humanity were not limited in the DRC. Museveni comes from a tribe in the south of Uganda, where there is animosity against northern tribes.

#### *2.1.9.2 Karamoja conflict*

Karamoja people represent just 2 % of the population of Uganda and in the north eastern province at the size of Belgium. Karamojas are nomadic tribes that are highly mobile and dependable on their cattle. They have lived this nomadic life since 1600's and are not likely to change or adapt to modern life. This way of life has come in conflict with the Uganda's and Kenya's government. Karamoja tribes are known as warrior tribes since the British Empire, and still wage wars for cattle or pillage the other tribal groups. They have even engaged the LRA in several instances.

Karamojan armed militias came into conflict with Museveni UPDF. When the UPDF tried to disarm the Karamojas, their actions were not exemplary. In the initial months of the operation for disarmament large numbers of the local population were killed and some reports stated for alleged massacres. The UPDF used Mi-24 gunships against Karamojas huts with a devastating effect (Karamoja, Uganda's Cattle War, 2008). Evidence for these genocidal attacks can be seen on the massive rocks which are considered sacred. According to US State Department report on Uganda in 2011, there were several instances when UPDF was using overwhelming force against Karamojan militias and rebels. The ferocity of the attacks and their methods are identical to the genocidal ethnical cleansing in Darfur by Sudanese government. In the same report it states that on 4-7 January, 2011 UPDF helicopter gunship fired indiscreetly into livestock and people. In this operation 13 civilians, including six children, one woman and two elderly persons were killed. Additional 32 persons were arrested and later tortured while in detention. Two weeks later five more unarmed civilians were killed by the UPDF, according to US State Department report. These brutal violations of human rights are not sporadic incidents but carefully conceived depopulation and ethnic cleansing of entire region. The reasons for this unreported genocide are twofold. One part is tribal, where president Museveni has total animosity against the Karamoja tribe. The other part is economical and it is the biggest reason for the western media self-censorship. The oil reserves of Uganda need massive logistical support and oil pipes connection to ports in Kenya. Some parts of this infrastructure will pass true Karamoja region and the pacification of the region is vital to that plan. Uganda's response is that the military action is to disarm the Karamojas who are portrayed as nomads who are pillaging and terrorizing the whole region (Bevan, 2008).

There is another way of seeing this conflict apart from the western point of view in which the formal government forces are fighting militia of nomads. The majorities of the UPDF are from the southern part of Uganda and belong to very different tribe and feel a deep resentment towards the Northern tribes, especially the Karamojas. While the ethnic cleansing continues the US there is complete media blackout for these alleged massacres and war crimes. Even international NGOs whose primary interests are human rights fall silent.

In Uganda there is a saying "you cannot wait for Karamojas". The meaning is that it will take forever for this tribe to adapt to modern life. They are seen as backward people and are treated as second rank citizens. The on-going military intervention in Karamoja region with its

ferocity and brutality represents another African silent genocide that the international community is ignoring.

The instability in Karamoja is not the only insurgency that is facing Uganda. The Lord Resistance Army is one of the oldest and bizarre uprisings in Africa.

### *2.1.9.3 Lord Resistance Army Insurgency*

“The conventional army losses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose”

-Dr. Henry Kissinger (Kissinger, 2001)-

According to the UN the worst place for a child is Northern Uganda, and the reason for this is the on-going conflict between UPDF and LRA. This is a complex conflict and cannot be simplified by dividing the sides by good and bad. The innocents in this senseless conflict are only the children.

This conflict that is continuing for more than a quarter of century started as a tribal conflict between the Acholi tribe from the north and southern tribes. The British made a system where the northern tribes Lango and Acholi dominated the military, while the southern people were active in administration and agriculture. In order for this system to work and British to command, these tribes would have to be in permanent conflict for power and influence.

Acholi militias fought against Museveni NRA during the Uganda Bush war, which resulted in his resentment of their tribe. As a result of the NRA repressive measures against the Acholi, they rise up in an insurrection of the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Auma (Gersony, 1997). This religious fanatic uprising was brutally ended by the Uganda army. Joseph Kony rose from the remnants of this movement. He claimed that he was possessed by the Holy Spirit and he is fighting to create a state which will be guided by Gods Ten Commandments. At first, he had the support of the local population, but his brutal tactics and the abduction of children made him enemy among the Acholi. UPDF organized several large scale offensives to end the LRA insurgency. The more recent was in DRC and involved the armies of Uganda, DRC and South Sudan.

Operation Lightning Thunder was a military operation by UPDF and Congolese army to eradicate the Lord Resistance Army and to kill its leader Joseph Kony. This military intervention which lasted for ninety days and has brought unknown number of deaths and destruction was backed financed by the United States. According to The New York Times, the US government paid for the fuel and ammunition for the Ugandan helicopter gunships at a cost of one million dollars. AFFRICOM also had a team of 17 officers to observe the operation (Gettleman & Schmitt, 2009). The Bush Administration and Deputy Secretary for African affairs Frasier pressured the Ugandan, Congolese and South Sudan governments to escalate the war when the conflict was ending with the Juba negotiations. With the counterinsurgency actions and repressive measures, Museveni's governance resembles to the previous Ugandan dictators Obote and Idi Amin, but without the blunt brutality. They all began with policies of tolerance and inclusion that evolved to repression and dictatorship (International Crisis Group, 2012).

The US involvement in Uganda is not only on government level. Various NGO and humanitarian organization are raising the awareness and simplifying the conflict to stereotype level. The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) is a terrorist organization that abducts children in Uganda and its lead by the warlord Kony is the simplified version that has become viral in us social networks and media. With an half an hour video, recently unknown NGO "Invisible

Children”, has shifted public opinion and US foreign policy. This group has turned anti-war movements to demand a military solution for foreign problem and human rights activist to demand an assassination of a human being. The whole news and even entertainment industry in the US is being mobilized and they are demanding military action and raising funds. Even celebrity actors are publicly asking for the murder of an African warlord. In contrary to the popular media the LRA (Lord Resistance Army) is not a real treat to US security and as of 2012 it should not be on the list of US foreign policy problems. The common US citizen never heard about the LRA or knows where Uganda is, but with the help of the documentaries ”Invisible Children” ,”Kony 2012”, and celebrities, the social networks were occupied with war hungry audience demanding for action of their government.

The US policy makers have clearly learned their lesson from the Iraqi conflict. There, the Bush administration had to explain to the public and the Congress that Iraq was a real threat. As a result the people organized themselves and staged anti-war protest. In the central Africa scenario the US policy makers would go the other way around. The public would find a problem, gain support and ask support from their elected leaders. Humanitarian activists would write letters to their Congressmen for the help of the African children and a murder of few warlords or extremists. The Congress even passed a bill which demands the US executive branch to engage in a foreign civil war and to hunt down a warlord and his associates. When the US President Barack Obama made the decision to send troops, the public was cheerful and pleased with the decision. This marks the turning point in US foreign policy as the end of “unpopular wars” and the beginning of “democratic” wars which are popular, asked by the people and humanitarian in nature. With this popular support, AFRICOM was engaged in another war and hundreds of Special Forces were stationed in Uganda, although LRA was not present in this country since 2006. The commanding officer of AFRICOM, Gen. Ham stated: “If you ever had any question if there’s evil in the world, it’s resident in the person of Joseph Kony and that organization” (AFRICOM, Pellerin, 2011).

At the end, the US armed forces had another foothold in oil rich country and their mission is popular among the people. Their opponent was the LRA, group of 250 starving men, women and children equipped with antiquated weapons. This conflict does not have any sense, goal or purpose. The only goal is it to be continuous, a never ending conflict in a rich mineral resources area where militant organizations are just changing their names. Conflict without real ideology, where human rights activists are demanding assassinations and peace activists are demanding war. Conflict fought by children, religious extremists and terrorists disguised as professional armies and freedom fighters. And in the middle, the innocent civilians on two continents are the collateral damage. Hundreds of thousands of people in Uganda, Sudan, and DRC have been killed, tortured, mutilated in this senseless war. On the other side of the ocean thousands of Americans have lobbied for their government to get involved in another war. In a situation where ideals for freedom are twisted, democracy is practiced by brutal dictators, and peace is in fact war, the real collateral damage is the truth.

Although the engagement against the LRA was small in scope it deserves special attention because is unprecedented and can be easily repeated in other parts of Africa. The existence of the LRA was not a real threat to US national security, but in fact is extremist religious militia that is operating for nearly a quarter of a century in central Africa. However, in the Great Lakes region LRA was not the only extremist militia that terrorized the civilians and its atrocities can are similar to those of the armies of Uganda, DRC and Sudan.

The crimes committed by the LRA are evident and condemned by the international community. However, there are other victims to the LRA insurgency, which are rarely mentioned. In order to protect the civilian population, Museveni forced the northern tribe

Acholi to go to “protected villages”, which are no more than concentration camps. Human rights abuses inside these camps were reported by international NGOs. Rape is used as a weapon by the UPDF in these camps to destroy the very fabric of the society in these camps.

Article 17 of Protocol 2 of Geneva Conventions allows for the forced movement of population where the security of the civilians is threatened (ICEC, 2012). However there are conditions to be met such as adequate provisions of food, water, shelter and freedom of movement. Without these preconditions the action of reallocation of population is considered illegal under international law. The economy of the Acholiland is practically non-existence and the once thriving people are being reduced to refugees that are demanding charity to survive. The collective punishment is frequent among African dictators and in this case Museveni is taking revenge on the Acholi tribe.

#### *2.1.9.4 Human Rights in Uganda*

Apart from Karamoja and Alcholiland regions, human rights are constantly being violated in Uganda. Opposing tribes, fictitious terrorist organization do not represent enough conflict for the Ugandan president. The Ugandan regime always needs enemy to gather support, and it does not matter if the opponents are real or not. In 2008, Ugandan regime declared war on the LGB community in Uganda. Even an “Anti-Homosexuality Bill 2009” was passed that required draconian penalty for homosexuals, including the death penalty (Human Rights Watch, 2011). This bill came as a shock for the international community and especially US President Obama. In a national prayer breakfast Obama condemned the Ugandan bill as odious (Reuters, 2010). This was the first time that the US President has used harsh diplomatic language against Uganda. During 30 year rule Museveni has engaged in genocide, mass killings, torture, invasion, occupation of sovereign country and used child soldiers in the process, but he was accused for violations of gay rights. It is known fact that Obama was hoping for the votes from the LGB population in the US, but in international relations critics of a dictatorial regime must be complete and not partial. Other gross human right violations are ritual killings of children. The LRA does not hold the monopoly of child abduction, torture and ritual killings. Twenty nine of these acts have occurred in Uganda in 2011 according to US State Department. The same year the security forces used excessive force, including shooting at demonstrators with live ammunition. The police department is more interested in preserving the regime, rather than law and order.

The regime in Uganda is not democratic by any standards. It is de facto a dictatorial regime that came to power by force and it has kept the reign of power with intimidation and force. The United States should not create Uganda as regional force in Central Africa. The regime will never be loyal ally and will easily change allegiance to the highest bidder in the future. Museveni as other African leaders has committed gross human rights violations and should be trialled by the International Court of Justice for war crimes for the war in DRC.

#### *2.1.10 Rwanda*

Rwanda is a country in the hearth of Africa. It is about the size of Maryland. The recent history of this country has changed the region and the foreign policy of major powers. The history of this country is tragic and too complex for Westerns to understand and influence. Great mistakes were made by the Europeans who colonized this land, divided the people in different ethnicity and forced them to live in one country in a state of permanent conflict. This politics of divide and rule still haunts Rwanda and many of the roots of the conflict can be found in this policy. The greatest foreign policy blunder of the Belgians is that they tried to

Europeanize the African terms and problems. The Tutsi and Hutus are not just ethnicities, they were social casts and the balance of power was created in hundreds of years. These and other tribes understood the fragility of situation and the scarcity of resources. Although conflicts arose, they were solved without major conflict. The Belgians distorted that balance of power and ignited the conflict that created several genocides that were never seen in Africa. The other lesson the Europeans learned is the fact they cannot control the African population, either with force as colonies or as partners and allies in neo-colonialism. The spread of influence in order to have an invisible control over African countries is misleading. In many case as in Rwanda, African leaders or dictators are using foreign aid to stay in power.

The same mistakes of not understanding the situation in Rwanda and the conflict has engaged the United States. Although it is the general perception that the US was not involved in Rwanda, the facts suggests that the greatest superpower has always been behind the scene. The foreign policy towards Rwanda centres on few people who hold the political power. Among them is Rwanda's President Paul Kagame, former rebel, accused for war crimes and today's most renowned and celebrated leader in the World.

The President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, is being portrayed as a role model for Africa. Rwanda itself is called as "Africa biggest success story" by the US mainstream media (Zakaria, 2009). The country is in peace, the economy is growing at a steady rate and the president is enjoying an international support from the western countries, especially the US. In 2006, Kagame was praised by President Bush in the White House (Administration of George W. Bush, 2006).

"President Kagame is a man of action, he can make things done. I'm proud of your leadership. I want to thank the president for committing troops in AU mission in Sudan to help what I call genocide."

-President George W. Bush-

31 March 2006, the White House

But behind this facade of democratic leader and a prospering country lies the truth of tribal war, hidden genocide, and war profiteering and human rights abuses. While all this was taking place, the US was not only indifferent but funded and supported the leaders in genocide.

Kagame's political carrier actually started in Uganda, where he fought alongside today's Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni in the Uganda Bush War. In 1986 Kagame became the head of military intelligence in the Ugandan military. During 1990 Kagame was undergoing military training by the US army in Fort Leavenworth. When the Tutsi rebellion movement invaded Hutu-ruled Rwanda, the US military transported him and his comrades to Rwanda. This was seen as a signal that the US is taking sides in this Hutu-Tutsi conflict. The US and the UK militaries provide further training and logistical support for the rebel Tutsi army the RPF. This led to paradox situation where the US and UK supported the Anglophone Tutsi militia and the French were discretely helping the francophone Hutu army.

The silent conflict expanded even to Europe, when the French judge concluded that Kagame ordered the shooting of the Rwandan presidential plane. In this incident that ignited the Rwanda genocide, three French citizens were killed. The evidence that linked Kagame and nine high ranking Rwandan officials were dismissed by the government of Rwanda. President Kagame reacted fiercely on this accusation and cut of all diplomatic relations with France.

President Kagame is also well known for violating human rights in his own country and even against his own tribe. According to The Economist, Kagame "allows less political space and press freedom at home than Robert Mugabe does in Zimbabwe, and anyone who poses



slightest political threat to the regime is dealt with ruthlessly” (The Economist, 2008). According to Reporters without Borders, President Paul Kagame and his government have never accepted that the press should be guaranteed genuine freedom” (Smith, 2012). Rwanda is also known to be repressive against journalists that are not keen on the regime. Reporters without borders also put Rwanda at “the third lowest-ranked African Country” in terms of freedom of the press and stated that “Rwanda, Yemen and Syria have joined Burma and North Korea as the most repressive countries in the world against journalists”. During the last presidential election where Kagame won 95 % of the votes, reporters without borders cited a “climate of terror” with the murder of the deputy editor of Rwanda opposition media.

Presidents Kagame’s human rights violations do not end in Rwanda. The foreign policy of Kagame was full with controversy as Rwanda was engaged in the greatest war in Central Africa.


#### *2.1.10.1 First and Second Congo War (The Coltan Wars)*

Rwanda came out from a civil war in the 90s that led to genocide and an invasion of the DRC that, in turn, led to continental war. Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPF) together with Ugandan army invaded, occupied and pillaged Zaire in one of the most brutal and unreported war in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The reasons for the invasion were justified by presence of Hutu militia that was responsible for the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

However, there was another genocide that nobody mentions, the genocide of the Hutus in the DRC committed by the RPF. The revenging Tutsi militias showed little or no mercy for Hutu Interahamwe militia and the civilian population.

The US involvement did not end with Kagame’s victory and the end of the Tutsi genocide. The RPA received even more weapons and training while they were preparing to invade Zaire which was backed by France. According to The Washington Post the US involvement was more extensive than previously disclosed, including psychological operations and tactical Special Forces exercises that occurred a few weeks before the start of Rwanda-led insurgency in neighbouring Congo. The US military supplied large military equipment of vehicles, arms, medicines to Rwanda ( Prunier, 2009).According to Prunier the US military was preparing his African proxy to wage one of the bloodiest wars in Africa. This military aid was actually second hand Warsaw Pact equipment, with a purpose that the US involvement cannot be traced. At first the equipment was supplied with USAF C-141 Star lifters and C-5 Galaxy cargo planes. When the war started, the supplies were airdropped. With this military hardware, Rwanda’s military combined with Uganda easily overcome Zaire’s defences. Rwanda becomes a regional power with the first and second Congo War. In this war the battlefield was the real reason for the war. The territory of DRC is a geological wonder with mineral wealth that is estimated to 24 trillions of dollars. In the 1990 two events were unfolding, the rapid expansion of mobile phone industry and the discovery of vast reserves of coltan, mineral that is vital for the electronic industry. According to BBC, Congo has more than 80 % of the world’s coltan reserves (BBC, 2001). Accidently, the Rwandan army occupied large section of Congo’s territory that had the coltan reserves. Figure 2.7 shows the Rwanda and Uganda zones of control during the Congo war.

Figure 2.7: Rwanda and Uganda occupation zones during the war in Congo



Source: Reid (2006, 75)

The two wars fought in the Zaire were actually fought for the mineral wealth of the Congo. In order to illustrate the scale of the pillaging of Congo's wealth this following table (Table 2.10) shows the excavation of minerals in 2000 (Reid, 2006).

Table 2.10: Uganda and Rwanda spoils of the Congo War

	<b>RWANDA DURING 2000</b>	<b>UGANDA DURING 2000</b>
<b>Diamond Trade</b>	40 million \$	1,8 million \$
<b>Authorization Payments</b>	4,0 million \$	0,0 million \$
<b>Gold</b>	15,0 million \$	104,9 million \$
<b>Coltan</b>	191,0 million \$	6,2 million \$
<b>Niobium</b>	0,0	0,8 million \$
<b>Timber</b>	0,0	0,7 million \$
<b>Tax revenue transfers</b>	0,0	60,0 million \$
<b>Total Income</b>	250,0 million \$	174,4
<b>Troops</b>	30,0 million \$	23,6 million \$
<b>Ammunition, Equipment and Maintenance</b>	8,4 million \$	3,8 million \$

	<b>RWANDA DURING 2000</b>	<b>UGANDA DURING 2000</b>
<b>Flights</b>	21,6 million \$	0,0
<b>Total Cost</b>	<b>60,0 million \$</b>	<b>27,4 million \$</b>
<b><u>Net Income</u></b>	<b>190,0 million \$</b>	<b>147,0 million \$</b>

Source: Reid (2006, 78)

The wars in Congo were fought by nine African countries by their dictatorial leaders but they were funded by the developed world with the mobile phone industry. The Second Congo War which was Africa's First Continental war that resulted in destruction and casualties unprecedented in modern history. The war crimes committed in this war and the death toll of seven million people can be compared to the holocaust of the Second World War.

#### *2.1.10.2 Support for DRC rebel militias*

Rwandan military and militias never did leave the DRC, even though the second Congo war ended in 2000. The main reason was always the mineral riches of the DRC but the official story is that they were fighting the Hutu genocide militia the FDLR. Rwanda backed a Tutsi paramilitary force lead by the warlord Laurent Nkunda who became famous in his fight in the Kivu province. Directly supported by Rwanda and a close friend to Paul Kagame he fought the Congolese army and Hutu militias backed by Angola and Zimbabwe. In this conflict where every country had its own interest, atrocities were committed by all sides. According to Refugees International, the CNDP militias have committed gross war crimes, such as mass murder, rape and pillaging of civilian villages. Nkunda also mobilized children as young as age of 12 to fight in his militia.

In 2007, CNDP on the orders of Nkunda raided ten secondary schools and for primary schools where they abducted children (BBC, 2007). According to a UN report, the boys are used as fighter, and the girls as sex slaves. Given the atrocities committed by this militia which was clear violation of international law, there was little international action. The actions of Nkunda can be seen similar to those of Joseph Kony. The abduction of children, raiding and pillaging villages, mass rapes, mutilation and religious fanatics are also the trademarks of Nkunda. From this point comes the question why was there no campaign "Nkunda 2007" similar to "Kony 2012", but instead interview with NBC (Nkunda, 2009). Although the war crimes committed by Nkunda's CNDP and Kony's LRA are almost identical, there was no pressure by the international media to condemn the CNDP. The reason is in the close relationship between Nkunda and Rwandan president Kagame. CNDP is a Rwandan proxy force and Kagame's personal mining company for minerals such as coltan and gold.

In 2008 Nord Kivu conflict, the connections between Nkunda's CNDP and Rwanda was evident and even drafted in UN report. The evidence have shown that Rwanda has supplied CNDP with weapons and ammunition, funded the conflict through banks in Rwanda and even used the territory of Rwanda to launch attacks against DRC. This was a clear act of an aggression and a war by proxy force. The report stated another more brutal human rights violation that is common in Africa, the use of child soldiers. Rwandan officers have brought recruits some of them children to fight on behalf of the rebel CNDP (BBC, 2008). Rwanda always denies this or similar allegation on serious human rights violations and threatens to pull back its peacekeepers from Darfur. As the conflict in eastern Congo intensified Nkunda

became an embarrassment for Rwanda and was eventually arrested. The arrest signaled another controversy in Rwanda since Nkunda was held under custody without any charge of a crime or legal proceedings.

Bosco Ntaganda was the new proxy warlord for Rwanda, since Nkunda's crimes could not be concealed and he had to be eliminated from the political stage. Interesting for the new warlord is the fact that he is a double proxy, for Rwanda and DRC. Bosco Ntaganda, also known as "Terminator Tango" was a general in the Army of the DRC and was indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes. Ntaganda began his career in the Rwanda Patriotic Army and fought with Kagame to overthrow the Hutu-Led government in 1994. During the Congo Wars he joined the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo and even became the chief of military operations. According to Human Rights Watch he has been involved in numerous massacres and mass rapes.

In April 2008 he joined CNDP under the command of Laurent Nkunda. Although he was indicted war criminal by the ICC and was involved in serious human rights violations, he was appointed to the rank of general by the president of DRC, Kabila. In 2011 the UN reported that Ntaganda controls mines in the Kivu province and gained large revenues through extorting money from the miners by his "parallel" mining police. African politics may be strange and even absurd to western observers but in complex situation in Central Africa there can be amnesty for war criminals and forgiveness for genocide. At the end almost all politician, military commanders in Central Africa have committed serious human rights violations and if they do not forgive (or forget) each other nobody will.

At the end only the dead have seen the end of the war in Congo and their number ranges from six to nine million people. Hundreds of these murders were committed by Bosco Ntaganda, war criminal, rapist, child abductor supported by the President of Rwanda and made general by the President of DRC.

The connection of President Paul Kagame with warlords in the DRC has been proven and reported by various humanitarian NGOs and independent media.

Kagame In order to improve the image of Rwanda and distance himself from these warlords, in 2009 the Rwanda government engaged a US public relations firm - Racepoint group. This US base public relation firm had previously improved the image of Muammar Gaddafi and Libya, Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Angola and Senegal.

The US foreign policy towards central Africa is consisted by spreading influence and control with friendly regimes. The case of Rwanda is particularly important from economic and strategic point of view. The geostrategic position of the hearth of Africa, close to the mineral wealth to Congo makes the US Rwanda partnership crucial and necessary. The collateral damage in this policy can be divided in three points.

The first casualty is the democracy and the human rights in Rwanda. Today there is a minority rule in Rwanda as Tutsi represent 10 to 15 % of the total population and Hutus are approximately 85 %. To cover this fact Rwandan President banned the tribal expression. In his defence he was trying to prevent genocide. The US stood silent at this minority rule, even though they confronted Rhodesia minority rule few decades ago. The elections in Rwanda, the greatest evidence of democracy in the country, are proved false as Kagame won 95 % of the votes. The second collateral damage is the hidden genocide and plunder of the first and Second Congo War. The case of Rwanda makes a dangerous precedent, when a rebel fighter can become respected president, invade a sovereign country and commit genocide and not to face justice. The third and greatest misconception is the fact that Rwanda's president will stay a loyal ally to the US. Kagame has been critical of US development aid in Africa. In his view

Western countries keep African products out of the world's marketplace. In the same time he praises Chinese policy of investment and aid.

Even with all of the controversy surrounding President Kagame, the US has continued to provide considerable assistance to Rwanda. The following table (Table 2.11) illustrates the US foreign aid to Rwanda in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Table 2.11: US Foreign Aid to Rwanda by Fiscal Years

<b>Fiscal Years (FY)</b>	<b>US Foreign aid to Rwanda in US Dollars</b>
2001	38.548.020
2002	47.394.420
2003	47.393.112
2004	58.975.595
2005	75.501.669
2006	102.676.634
2007	121.377.777
2008	171.686.021
2009	169.170.630
2010	220.892.847

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2012)

The best US foreign policy action in this region is inaction. The cutting of all aid towards Rwanda will restore the balance of power this region of Africa. The case of Rwanda has proven that true democracy cannot be exported by the US; it has to originate from the people. Former warlords and rebels cannot become respectable world leaders and the truth of their crimes of humanity will eventually emerge.

### ***2.1.11 Zimbabwe***

The involvement of US in southern Africa and Zimbabwe in particular, shows the paradox of a superpower's foreign policy. The lack of vision for the future, the lack of knowledge and understanding of the policymakers and the inconsistency of US foreign policy towards Zimbabwe/Rhodesia has created a problem that is beyond solving. In short the US intervened against a white minority ruled country by backing rebel leader who turned to be racist dictator that orchestrated genocide.

The US policy towards this country starts with appeasing its ally Great Britain and the African American lobby. Namely the US opposed the white ruled Rhodesia and on 16 December 1966 for the first time in the history the UN imposed mandatory economic

sanctions on a state (US Department of State, 2012). The US recalled its Consul General from Rhodesia and even withdrew the USAID and the USIS library. The sanctions against Rhodesia were total, all trade had been stopped, funds were frozen and even flights cancelled. This policy of sanctions had been lifted in part by the US Congress in order to import strategic minerals such as chrome.

In that time in Rhodesia there were no massive human rights violations or apartheid as in South Africa. In contrast to other African Countries, the people, blacks and whites had a high standard of living. The Rhodesian economy in the early 1970's had a modest boom and the real per capita income was high for whites and blacks in comparison with other African countries. On a security level, Rhodesia was facing a double invasion by Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) backed by China and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Party (ZIPRA) backed by the Soviet Union (Lohman & MacPherson, 1983).

After the successful Lancaster negotiations, the United States was the first nation to open an embassy in the capital of Zimbabwe. Although the elections in which Mugabe won an overwhelming victory were not free or fair, the US did not stop with their assistance towards the new state. Mugabe saw this support as a *carte blanche* by the western world. He was not satisfied with his *de facto* one party state where the ruling party controlled all spheres of life and even wanted a "*de jure*" one party state.

Since its inception, Zimbabwe was poured with aid money. In 1981 more than 630 million UK pounds were promised. The US alone pledged \$225 million for post-war reconstruction and distribution and development of land. By the end of fiscal year 1986, the US donated \$380 million in Zimbabwe, although the Matabeleland massacres were in motion (US Department of State, 2012). All the sanctions were lifted and corporations were encouraged to invest in Zimbabwean economy. The whites in Zimbabwe had to sell their land to the state in a course of ten years. The US and UK would fund this racial cleansing which they formulated as land reform. In the meantime military aid was arriving from all directions. Military training from the UK, funding from the US, tanks and armoured personal carriers from North Korea, China and Soviet Union were given to the Zimbabwean army. This latest foreign aid would prove to be disastrous for the coming decades not just for Zimbabwe but for whole Africa.

#### *2.1.11.1 Matabeleland Genocide in the 1980s*

President's Mugabe true nature was shown shortly after the elections in 1980, when he confronted his former allies from Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). In the western area of Matabeleland, Mugabe unleashed his army in Zimbabwe's first genocide. Although this massacre of 20.000 people and the widespread violence with total disregard for human rights happened in front of the international community, there was little or no protest from the US and UK. Mugabe was even given a Knighthood in 1994 by Queen Elizabeth.

Matabeleland genocide is one of the crimes against humanity that was never recognized and its perpetrators never faced justice. In fact these war criminals are today the political and military elite in the sovereign country of Zimbabwe. In these massacres, Mugabe's troops were part of the elite Fifth Brigade, which was trained and equipped by North Korea. This military unit was set apart from the conventional army of Zimbabwe. It had better weapons, different uniforms and reported directly to Mugabe and not to regular military chain of command (Eppel, 2008).

North Korea was not the only country that was training and equipping Zimbabwe. According to the BBC, Britain was giving huge sums in economic aid and was training the Zimbabwe army (Hill, 2005). The British Government knew about Mugabe's campaign of mass

slaughter but chose to ignore it. British diplomat told BBC Panorama: "I think this Matabeleland is a side issue; the real issues were much bigger. We were extremely interested that Zimbabwe should be a success story, and we were doing our best to help Mugabe and his people bring that about" (BBC, 2002).

In Zimbabwe this hidden genocide was known as "Gukuruhundi" or the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains. The name was ominous for the events that followed in Zimbabwe. Given the massacre of 20,000 people presents the "early rain" for Mugabe one could only imagine what the spring rains could mean to him (CCJPZ, 1999).

The US inaction and lack of interest boosted Mugabe's confidence. By the end of the eighties Mugabe demanded one-party state in his party rallies. Zimbabwe's ruling party trained and sponsored the National Youth Service, which the US Department of State is describing as a paramilitary of undisciplined child-soldiers. The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) is using these children to suppress political dissent and to commit state terrorism. In many instances the child soldiers were under influence of government-issued narcotics. The camps of this paramilitary organization were a public secret in Zimbabwe. The barracks are sub-standardized while the children were practically starving and are being in some cases sexual abused by their instructors. Their training is comprised with indoctrination of the ruling party doctrine and military training (Andersson, 2004). Across Zimbabwe these children were known for their brutality against opposition and white Zimbabweans and they were referred to as "The Green Bombers" (Meldrum, 2003). Through history, there has never been a country that has drugged their own youth and forced them into a paramilitary organization, but in Zimbabwe this gross human rights violation is still perpetrated in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In 2005 Mugabe started operation "Murambatsvina" (drive out the rubbish), which represented an example how one country can literally be self-destructed by one dictator. Mugabe's government justified the campaign as an effort to tackle with crime and illegal housing. But in reality he was systematically eradicating entire neighbourhoods that were supporting the opposition. The UN has strongly opposed this act of violence by Mugabe that has directly affected 700,000 people through loss of their home or livelihood and indirectly affected 2, 4 million people (Tibaijuka, 2005). The whole security apparatus of Zimbabwe was organized in this operation, the army, police and even the National Youth Service. Many inhabitants have been forced to destroy their own homes at gunpoint of Mugabe's militias. The displaced people became refugees overnight in their own country. Some of these people found themselves in government camps with none of the basic sanitation infrastructure (International Crisis Group, 2005). If it were not for the international aid agencies these camps would be nothing more than concentration camps. Mugabe's policy of punishing entire communities can be compared with Uganda's camps for the Acholi people. In both cases there is undergoing genocide and the international community is not only staying silent but pouring more aid money.

Zimbabwe's regime is also famous for its treatment to the white Zimbabweans. This silent genocide is continuing with decades and Mugabe is still defiant. The Zimbabwean political leadership has publicly stated its intentions for the terror and racial cleansing of the white minority: (Selby, 2005) Mugabe even stated in December 2000 that: "Our Party must strike fear into the heart of the white man. They must tremble."

White people are subjected to all known human rights violations, such as murder, torture, mutilation and rape. Men, women and even children were and still are subjected to this torture by a racist regime. Although this genocide can be compared with the ethnic cleansing in

Bosnia or Kosovo, no action is taken by the US. The end result did not mean only the destruction of the white community in Zimbabwe but also to the agricultural sector. As Zimbabwe Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and main critic to Mugabe concludes: “Zimbabwe turned from bread basket to basket case” (The Economist, 2002).

Mugabe’s reign of terror was not limited only in Zimbabwe. In 1998 Zimbabwe was directly involved in the Second Congo War which was known also as the Great War of Africa. Zimbabwe had the best trained and best equipped air force in the conflict. The combat planes were bought from UK and their commanding officer Perence Shiri even attended the Royal College of Defence Studies in London. Although Shiri commanded the infamous Fifth brigade in the genocide Matabeleland, he could freely go to UK’s most prestigious military academy (BBC, 2007).

The outcome of the Second Congo war was determined by Zimbabwean armed forces. With this military adventure Zimbabwe has become a regional power and Mugabe, a serious threat to the regional stability. Zimbabwe has managed to deploy 11.000 troops in the conflict with at the cost of \$22 million per month by IMF approximations (BBC, 2000). In the same time the people in Zimbabwe were starving and the cholera epidemic was spreading. This illogical military intervention of a poor country was pushed solely by Mugabe and his political party. The motives were to plunder the mineral wealth of the DRC. Diamonds and coltan were the price that DRC president Kabila had to pay for Mugabe’s soldiers (Johwa, 2004). Even 500.000 hectares of farm land were given to Zimbabwean state run Agricultural and Rural Development Agency. In the same time the US stood silent as Mugabe was entrenching his position in his economic colony. Zimbabwe’s troops were also active in the Kivu conflict in the DRC (BBC, 2008).

In more recent foreign policy adventures, Mugabe has pursued his “look East policy”. Among the most controversial is the military and economic partnership with Iran. Iranian oil and weapons were traded for Zimbabwean uranium. With Pakistan, Mugabe spent his last US dollar reserves for arms and military training.

Zimbabwean troops were also reported in the fighting in Libyan civil war in 2011 (Swain, 2011). Mugabe has always been ally with Gaddafi’s regime (The Zimbabwe Mail, 2011). In 2011 when the Libyan embassy staff reported that they were changing their allegiance towards the transitional government, Mugabe expelled the embassy staff. Today Mugabe remains among the few regimes that are not recognizing the new government in Libya. Unofficially Gaddafi was offered asylum to Zimbabwe, but he refused (Al Jazeera, 2011). This would not be the first time that Mugabe is harbouring foreign dictators and war criminals. Former Ethiopian Dictator Haile Mariam still lives in his villa in Zimbabwe, despite being sentenced to death by an Ethiopian Court of Crimes against humanity. Major Protais Mpiranya from the Rwandan army is another of the infamous Mugabe’s guests. Mpiranya is wanted for genocide and crimes against humanity by the UN War Crimes Tribunal. This cases show that Mugabe has no respect towards international law.

Zimbabwean security forces were also engaged in a diplomatic scandal in 2008 when they attacked an abducted US and British diplomats. Although this incident was a clear breach in international law, US are still continuing its policy of bilateral relations with Zimbabwe.

The US military support and cooperation was finally terminated in 2001 by US Congress (US Department of State, 2012). At the turn of the century the US has taken a more critical position towards Zimbabwe, calling for a democratic evolution. Although officially sanctions are imposed against Mugabe, in reality it is a financial and visa restrictions against selected



individuals. The US is continuing to pour in money and in the period of the sanctions 2002-2008 more than \$900 million were sent in a form of humanitarian assistance (USAID, 2011).

US bilateral relations towards Rhodesia and Zimbabwe present one of the greatest paradoxes in foreign policy. The US foreign policy towards Rhodesia was centred towards sanctions and blockade. Although Rhodesia had white minority rule it had record high per capita income for blacks and whites. The capital city Salisbury was the safest city in Africa with running tap water and electricity. During its brief existence Rhodesia did not apply apartheid rule and there were no serious human rights violations.

In contrast, Zimbabwe is a model of a failed state where genocide, cholera and brutal regime are combined. During its three decade rule, Mugabe has led the country from two genocides, hyperinflation, starvation, wars to systematic destruction of entire towns and cholera epidemic. Zimbabwe is world leader in three economic fields. The unemployment rate is up to 95 %, the public debt is 219, 7 % of its GDP and the hyperinflation of its currency has reached astronomical figures (CIA, 2012). Today the Zimbabwean dollar is officially dead and the state has lost its power over the monetary policy. The real economy and the people of Zimbabwe are surviving from foreign aid. The AIDS epidemic has ravaged the country and some reports show that Mugabe's loyalists are reselling the antiviral drugs donated by the international community. The state of Zimbabwe represents a continuous silent genocide by one dictator for more than 32 years. The crimes that Mugabe and ZANU-PF have committed in their own country and abroad put them in a classification of terrorists. The US first mistake is the start of negotiation with ZANU-PF and later their direct support and indifference for genocide. The true nature of Mugabe and ZANU PF was even noticed by the Soviet Union and decided to support other fraction in the Rhodesia bush war.

President Mugabe with its foreign and domestic politics has shown that he has used to his advantage all the great powers in a Machiavellian manner. Politically Mugabe has outlived six American presidents, used generous US aid and became one of the greatest enemies of the Western World. Mugabe has used the Soviet Union, China, North Korea and today even Iran to strengthen his grip on power. Mugabe committed genocide, ethnic and racial cleansing and never faced justice.

President Mugabe is another US foreign policy blunder from the eighties that reins havoc in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The endgame in Zimbabwe can be found either in the Power Sharing deal with Morgan Tsvangirai or in Mugabe's prostate cancer. The lesson that the US policy makers should learn from Zimbabwe is that the Aid model does not solve problems but creates them, or as economist Dambisa Moyo concludes: "The aid model makes good leaders bad and bad leaders worse" (Moyo, 2009).

### ***2.1.12 Gambia***

The US has normal diplomatic relations with Gambia and it is considered as a silent ally in western Africa. According to the US State Department the last few elections in Gambia were legitimate, although with small incidents. Gambia has participated in many peacekeeping missions as a part of ECOMOG in Liberia but also in Bosnia, Kosovo, Eritrea, and the DRC. In May 2012 the US ambassador in Gambia praised the leadership role of President Yahya Jammeh:

"The Gambian leader has been strong and played a critical role in moving forward concretely what can be done in Guinea Bissau and Mali crisis and the United States of America does appreciate his wisdom and his own experience in the region"- Pamela White, US ambassador to Gambia (Fadera, 2012)-

The current president, Yahya Jammeh, came into power in 1994 through a military coup, and has ruled the country in an increasingly authoritarian manner since then (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012). He was a colonel in the Gambian army and student in the US Army School of the Americas. He is the only African dictator that has graduated from this prestigious military institution. Most of the dictators that graduated from the US Army School of the Americas are from South and Central America like Manuel Noriega and Manuel Contreras. This military school was made famous for educating and training the most brutal and dictatorial regimes that support the US interests around the world. Among the critics of the Army School of the Americas was US Congressman Joseph Kennedy who stated: “The U.S. Army School of the America is a school that has run more dictators than any other school in the history of the world” (SOA Watch, 2012).

The President of Gambia was not the only benefactor of US military aid. Prior the 1994 coup the whole Gambian army received technical assistance and training from the US (U.S. Department of State, 2012). After the coup US-Gambia relations were stranded and most of the non-humanitarian aid was temporarily suspended. After the election of 2001 the Bush administrations decided that Gambia had a democratically elected government and all sanctions were lifted. Although the elections were seem generally free and fair, there was government intimidation to the voters. The human rights violations did not stop there, in fact they intensified, and the lift of the sanctions was seen as an encouragement to the President. The freedom of the press is practically none existing as journalists are disappearing or being killed. In a BBC interview the President claimed that he allowed: “too much expression” and the journalists must obey the government or “they can go to hell” (BBC, 2011).

In April 2000, a year before the sanctions were lifted, the army opened fire upon unarmed students who were protesting. The massacres did not end and in 2004, 44 Ghanaian emigrants were killed by the security forces (U.S. Department of State, 2001). In 2008 the President Jammeh announced his “final ultimatum” against the gay people in Gambia. According to local media the President threatened to “cut off the head” of any gay person and that the laws against homosexuality would be stricter than those in Iran (Daily Observer, 2008). In 2009 the New York Times reported that Gambia is on a witch-hunting campaign, and the President is accusing people of witchcraft over his aunt’s death (Nossiter, 2009).

The president Jammeh is a devoted Muslim, but on his views on freedom of religious beliefs he concludes: “If you don’t believe in God, you can never be grateful to humanity and you are even below a pig.” (Ndow & Fadera, 2010) The human rights abuses and the brutality of the Gambian regime can be matched only by its absurdity.

The President Yahiya Jammeh claims that he can cure HIV-AIDS virus on Thursdays, while on Saturdays he cures asthma with traditional African medicine. In the course of the bizarre treatment, the President forbids the use of anti-retroviral drugs in spite that the scientific community and the UN urged the president to stop this practice because it harms the patients and reduces the AIDS awareness. This issue has brought the President’s sanity into question as well (Al Jazeera, 2007). Although Gambia is a small country, the President’s illogical and unpredictable actions may cause more problems in this highly instable part of Africa.

It is evident that the US backed; educated and funded leader of Gambia has backfired and turned himself not just a tormentor of his people but also a real threat to Western countries. In 2010 he stated: “What the West should do to Africa is to say thank you, and at least bring back 25 per cent of what they have looted from the continent and then they can talk about democracy” (Freedom Newspaper, 2010). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit the pattern of arrests and imprisonments of journalists and politicians on dubious charges of

treason has increased and that state of Gambian democracy is hollow at best (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012).

The US should return to the policy of Clinton administration with sanctions against Gambia. Having a bilateral relations with delusive dictator does not serve with the best interests for the people of the US or Gambia. The US should regain its leadership role in West Africa by holding the moral high ground. The foreign policies towards this impoverished African country can be achieved with sanctions and humanitarian aid. The President of Gambia with his actions has shown that he has lost not only his sanity but his legitimacy to lead a sovereign country in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Neither the geostrategic position of Gambia nor its alleged oil reserves should be reason for the good relations with the US.

### **3. COMPETITORS TO US HEGEMONY**

The presence of competitors of the US hegemony in the African continent represents one part of the paradox of neo-colonialism. In order to show the unintended consequences of the present US foreign policy in Africa, this research will analyse the Chinese and Iranian involvement in the continent. These two particular countries are chosen to demonstrate the difference between a potential economic partner and strategic opponent.

In both cases the present US foreign policy paradigm has been proven as harmful for the US interest and African People. The containment policy towards PR China has the potential to create a new cold war, waged on the African continent. This scenario is not in anybody's best interests. Cooperation instead of confrontation between the two great powers and the African nations can bring economic prosperity for all. This idealistic socio-political symbiosis can be denied only with the continuing path of neo-colonialism.

The second part is devoted to the Iranian involvement in Africa. As a direct contrast of PR China, the Iranian doctrine is destructive in nature. This foreign policy skilfully uses the side-effects and leftovers of the US neo-colonialism - the African autocratic leaders. The despotic leaders of Eritrea, Sudan, Zimbabwe, DRC and Gambia have been reused by Iran in order to break the status quo. However, the US intervention has proven not to be necessary. The Iranian incompetence combined with African autocrats has created a situation where the Iranian influence is being rejected. On the other hand if the autocratic leaders were not given aid in the first place, their alternative - a democratically elected government would certainly not cooperate with rogue regimes.

The Paradox of US neo-colonial policy in Africa is the fact that it can ignite a new cold war with China and complicate the security situation with the Iranian involvement.

#### **3.1 People's Republic of China**

The biggest problem facing the US in their resource finding politics is that they are not alone in Africa. Their greatest competitor People's Republic of China (PR China) is present in the continent for decades spreading its influence and demanding share of the strategic raw materials. With the increase demands of scarce raw minerals and energy, there is possibility of a new cold war between US and PR China over Africa's resources.


This new cold war is not fought over ideology but for pure economic reasons. For the US the control of friendly regimes is vital for its foreign policy but for China, African raw materials and market are essential for its survival. This conflict has also seen the clash of development strategies for Africa, the Washington consensus and Chinese model for development, known as the Beijing consensus.

China has a historic relation with African people that dates back to 700 AD, that resulted with trade and sharing of cultural values. Today's Chinese foreign policy in Africa has the legacy of supporting African independence movements, and generous development aid. In this long-term foreign policy Chinese policymakers have walked carefully and humbly, with respect to African sovereignty and not interfering with internal problems including human rights.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century PR China is facing shortage of raw minerals and oil for its economy and millions of people that need employment. For Chinese policymakers Africa is more than a strategic and economical gain but a chance for social stability and survival of the communist regime. African countries provide raw materials and oil but also they are the market place for Chinese made goods. In 2009 China became Africa's biggest trading partner, with 90 billion

US dollars, as compared to United States 86 billion dollars. The following figure (Figure 3.1) indicates the composition of China's imports from Africa (Idun-Arkhurst & Laing, 2007).

Figure 3.1: Composition of China's imports from Africa



Source: The Impact of Chinese Presence in Africa, Africa practice (2007)

However, compared to US and Europe model of development, the Chinese are building the foundations for a successful and sustainable economic development. In DRC, the Chinese companies are building 2.300 km roads, 2000 miles of railroad, 32 hospitals, 145 health centres and two universities. In exchange, China got the license to excavate DRC natural resources with 10 million tons of copper and 400.000 tons of cobalt (Whewell, 2008).

In Nigeria, China is building the greatest infrastructure project in decades, the 1.315 km long railroad between Kanu and the port city of Lagos. China also granted Nigeria a loan of \$2,5 billion and much of these funds were diverted for the railroad project (BBC, 2006). In Nigeria this project is not only indispensable for the economic growth but it is link between the Muslim north and Christian south of Nigeria. In comparison to Western US and European corporation who are concentrated to oil projects that are seen as destructive for the environment and corrupted, Chinese companies are involved in building infrastructure and seen in more positive light. In Angola, Chinese companies are involved in major construction projects such as roads, schools, hospitals, football stadiums and shopping malls and other projects. Chinese banks have stepped in to grant \$5 billion of loan. In return, Angola has mortgaged its oil reserves, what made Angola the biggest Chinese oil supplier.

In many of these bilateral trade agreements African countries are trading their mineral resources directly for infrastructure projects without using the world's reserve currency the US dollar. China's development banks have placed the IMF and World Bank on the second place in their grants and loans for African development. The China Development Bank and the China Export Import Bank offered loans worth more than \$110 billion to governments and firms in developing countries in 2009 and 2010. The Chinese government has over \$2 trillion of foreign exchange reserves and is granting loans in Africa in order to promote its strategic objectives. These banks are also known as policy banks, for their mandate to promote

Beijing's interests (Hogg, 2011). Chinese banks have shown to be more competitive and better adapted for doing business in Africa.

Apart from economic and financial presence, China is involved militarily in Africa. PR China has sent peacekeepers in Liberia, West Sahara, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and the DRC. These deployments are carefully balanced to show to the African countries that China is interested in long term security, but also it is conducted in small numbers so it will not look as a re-colonization (Hellstrom, 2009). In contrast to US Africa command Chinese peacekeepers are seen in more favourable light.

Although China is a contributor for peace in Africa it is also the greatest exporter of small arms. Chinese companies have been reported to supply Zimbabwe with weapons ranging from assault rifles to moderns attack aircraft (Beresford, 2008). In exchange the regime of Mugabe has granted mining concessions, tons of tobacco and even ivory. This unorthodox semi legal Sino-African trading has been repeated almost everywhere in Africa. China has exported weapons to friendly regimes, militias and even genocidal African dictators. In Liberia, Charles Taylor militias were armed with Chinese weapons that were paid with lumber (Amnesty International, 2006). Even in Rwanda genocide, the Hutu militias hacked their Tutsi victims with machetes made in China. Sudan is the greatest importer of Chinese arms although there are sanctions for the Darfur genocide. Chinese helicopters and planes have been bought as civilian and militarized in Sudan (Andersson , 2008). The weapons made in China are considerable cheaper compared with Western arms and their effectiveness and mass use has made them into weapons of mass destruction in Africa.

In 2006, China has violated its own rules of none interfering in African affairs and stepped into a Western tactic of regime change. In 2006 military coup was an attempted against the pro-Taiwanese President Idriss Deby of Chad. President Deby rules Chad since 1990 when he came to power with a military coup. He holds power as French and US backed dictator, while surviving several coup attempts. Chad has become an oil exporter since 2003 with oil reserves of over 1,5 billion barrels according to BP survey. The coup failed after French intervention and the rebel forces were driven back to Sudan. As a result from this rebellion, President Deby started buying arms with his oil revenues. The World Bank threatened to cut funds if Chad continues continued with the arms purchases instead of economic development. Then the President made a decision to recognize PR China instead of Taiwan and received arms and loans from its new ally. The Chadian case represents a strategic and diplomatic victory for PR China. But it also started a cold war with the old neo-colonial power France.

The case of Chad also involves the US government which has been supporting and financing the regime of president Deby for over a decade. The following table (Table 3.1) shows only the military assistance that this country has received in the past decade from the US.

Table 3.1: U.S. Military assistance to Chad in US Dollars

<b>FISCAL YEAR</b>	<b>IMET</b>	<b>FMF</b>	<b>DCS</b>	<b>FMS</b>	<b>EDA</b>
FY 2002	216.000	0	0	472.000	0
FY 2003	253.000	5.000	0	362.000	0
FY 2003	573.000	0	0	608.000	0
FY 2004	331.000	2.200.000	0	42.000	0
FY 2005	342.000	0	0	1.816.000	0
FY 2006	392.000	0	43.000	100.000	0
FY 2007	95.000	\$0	0	0	0
FY 2008	275.000	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	2.477.000	2.205.000	43.000	3.400.000	0

Source: Congressional Research Service (2009)

The chart from Congressional Research Service shows that millions of US taxpayer's money was given to one of the most brutal army in Africa. This military assistance has sparked cold war with PR China and caused an African arms race in the region. Another fact that is also important comes from the US Department of State, about the Human Rights report of Chad in 2007, where it states: "The law prohibits the use of child soldiers; however, child soldiers were used by the ANT [Chadian National Army]" (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

US fears of new cold war in the 21<sup>st</sup> century were justified as China continues to supply rogue regimes in Africa. This notion has been confirmed by numerous reports from US military officers. Among them Lt. Colonel USAF Mark O. Yeisley in his analysis stated: "Unlike, the Cold War, access to strategic resources rather than ideology would lie at the heat of future US-Sino competition, and the new great game will most likely be played in Africa" (Yeisley, 2011).

Apart from several security incidents, Chinese interests in Africa are only economical and centred in the oil industry (Hurst, 2007). PR China has to import a substantial quantity of oil to support its growing industry. As of 2009 China consumes 9.400.000 barrels per day (Lee, 2012). Forty five per cent from all the Chinese oil is being imported. As the world reserves of oil are depleting, PR China has started a global quest for oil and sometimes in dangerous regions. In order to win the oil concessions, China is taking unconventional steps that other countries would never agree upon. In Sudan, Chinese workers are drilling for oil in a middle of a war zone. For the drilling rights more than \$15 billion have been invested in infrastructure, ranging from roads to pipelines and new tanker port. In Nigeria the price for drilling rights was a hydropower plant and an oil refinery in Kaduna. Unlike US and European companies, Chinese oil corporations are willing to pay enormous amounts for crude oil. This points the fact that Chinese policymakers are desperate for raw materials especially crude oil, which has been imported up to 5.080.000 barrels per day in 2011.

As a result of the energy dependency, PR China had severe diesel and coal shortages in 2008 (Intech, 2008). With the steady increase of population and growing demand for oil, Chinese domestic oil reserves are expected to be depleted in thirteen years. After this period PR China will be completely dependable on foreign oil.

The biggest problem of the Chinese communist regime is the overpopulation. Responding to this demographic problem, more than half a million Chinese live and work in African countries that have raw materials, such as South Africa, Zambia and Nigeria. For the government in Beijing, enough supply of minerals and energy means solid industry which translates to social stability.

For the United States, China is not a strategic competitor in Africa, but merely an emerging power that tries to survive in the globalized world. The true benefactors of this new cold war are the corrupt African regimes who now have several aid options to consider.

### **3.2 Iran's foreign policy in Africa**

The Islamic Republic of Iran represents the greatest threat to US interests in Africa. Although Iran is an emerging power it does not spare any cost in its involvement in Africa. Iran's involvement in the continent is unorthodox in the fact that it relies on covert means in expanding its sphere of interests.

Iran's African Doctrine can be summarized in five points:

1. Gaining allies and influence;
2. Exporting the Islamic revolution;
3. Countering US interests;
4. Promoting economic interests, since the sanctions have harmed Iranian economy;
5. Establishing Iranian presence in the region in strategically important areas with unconventional forces.

Unlike the old colonial and neo-colonial powers, Iran's doctrine is brutally direct, with the use of all instruments of the Iranian security apparatus. Many African countries have seen the dual game of Iran and choose not to have more close relations. Such were the cases of Senegal, Gabon and Somalia. Iran, in its foreign policy, does not wish to gain strategic presence in Africa as the US and from that point to influence the continent. Instead, Iran is seeking ways to contradict US influence and to obtain short-term political and economic gain. In some point Iran divides the African countries to Muslim and Christian, which then reflects which country should get more assistance. Its military presence is not through official UN peacekeeping channels as in the cases of the US, France and China but through the paramilitary Quds forces. These paramilitary forces are the main exporters of Iranian Islamic Revolution. Its methods are hidden and its actions are in many instances illegal by the international law. In order to achieve its policy Iran shows disorder and chaos in order to disturb the territorial and political status quo in Africa.

The best US course of action in countering the Iranian foreign policy is inaction. African political elites have proven to be more of a political quicksand rather than loyal allies and Iranian Islamic revolution is simply not compatible with African culture and society. Ahmadinejad sees the African countries as a cheap ally that he can use in the broader foreign policy. But in fact it is the African dictators and their elites who are using Iran's wealth in order to firm their position.



Iran has been active in number of African countries and signed bilateral agreements of economical nature with the continent's worst regimes. Iranian relations with Zimbabwe have intensified in the past several years. Both countries were named as "outposts of tyranny" by Condoleezza Rice and their political elites have anti-Western policy (BBC, 2005). But behind the friendship of these countries there is the instinct of surviving of two very different dictatorial regimes. Mugabe's regime is not only dictatorial but also racist and anti-white, while Iranian Islamic regime is known to support only Islamic countries. Only the isolation and the need to survive politically have made Ahmadinejad and Mugabe allies. For Iran the sanctions and the need for uranium are the reasons for his involvement with Zimbabwe. Iran's aging uranium stockpiles, which it acquired from South Africa in the 1970, are mostly depleted (Fite, 2012). For that reason the Islamic Republic is focused in Africa, mainly in Zimbabwe, Senegal, Nigeria and the DRC (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2009).

For Robert Mugabe the partnership with Iran is more of an economical point of view than of an ideological. Zimbabwean economy is steadily collapsing and the regime must find new allies in order to survive (Chigora & Goredema, 2011). In March 2010, Iran and Zimbabwe signed a secret nuclear mining deal which gives the Islamic republic exclusive rights to mine Zimbabwe's untapped uranium reserves. It is estimated that Iran will mine 455.000 tons of uranium over the next five years. In return Iran supplies Zimbabwe's oil needs. This bilateral agreement is a clear breach of UN sanctions over Iran and the Security Council resolution 1737. With this action Mugabe's regime has proved yet again that is a threat not only to its people but to the whole international community. On the other side, the US has shown lack of leadership in terms of sanctioning Zimbabwe's hostile actions.

The case of Gambia and Senegal represent the failure and immaturity of Iranian foreign policy towards Africa. Iran and Gambia enjoyed close relations with several bilateral agreements on economic area. Gambia supported the Iranian nuclear policy and in return Iran invested heavily in Gambian industry. Economically, Iran has no gains in Gambia, which is the smallest and poorest country in West Africa. Only the strategic position of Gambia may be of some significance for the Islamic republic. However, in November 2010, Gambia cut all diplomatic ties with Iran and cut all projects and programs with Iran. Three months later Senegal cut all diplomatic relations with Iran as well. Iran's response was that these actions were "unjustified and illogical". But in fact these actions were completely sound and logical even for the dictatorial regimes in West Africa.

Namely, the President of Gambia asked for military assistance from his Iranian allies which were happy to oblige. The Iranian containers with weapons ended in the port of Lagos, Nigeria whose authorities confiscated the weapons and made the story public. The weapons were intended for Gambia but they travelled illegally and their true beneficiary would be Senegalese rebels Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) (BBC, 2010). These rebels originate from the Casamance region, same as the Gambian President who is accused of helping and funding their struggle. Embarrassed by this incident, Gambian president Jammeh ceased all relations with Iran and several months later so did Senegal (BBC, 2010).

Nigeria in this instance showed its leadership in West Africa with masterful foreign policy. In one hand it defused the growing tensions between Senegal and Gambia by blaming Iran. Nigeria cemented its leadership in West Africa and ECOWAS presenting itself as a transparent country and the protector of the peace. Although a sizable amount of arms and drugs were found and Al-Quads operatives were arrested, Nigeria did not asked the UN

Security Council to intervene. According to STRATFOR, Nigeria likely will not use this incident as a card in the larger game against Iran unless Washington prods it to do so.

The case of illegal arms trade shows the true intention of Iran; policy towards Africa which is centred in inciting chaos and civil wars. The failure represents the lack of competence of the Iranian leadership and the lack of real African doctrine. Iran also relies on the large Shia Lebanese community in West Africa that dominates the diamond trade and allegedly funds the Hezbollah. Iran's pursuit for uranium did not end in Zimbabwe. In July 2006, Tanzanian authorities intercepted a shipment of uranium-238 bound for Iran that had originated from DRC (Wellman, 2009). This UN report shows that Iran is using every weak state in Africa to achieve its goals. The US foreign policy in DRC in supporting incompetent and corrupt dictators has backfired again with real consequences for the national security of the US.

In Somalia the Quds forces had a double involvement. In one hand they equipped the Union of the Islamic Courts and in return they imported Somali uranium. However, when the Somali pirates became mutual enemy of the US and Iran, these former foes became allies in patrolling the Horn of Africa. Iran was particularly interested in East African countries in the Horn of Africa, Gulf of Sidra and the Red Sea. Simultaneously, AFRICOM commander stated his intentions in 2012 that East Africa will be his priority. This hidden conflict is not new, as the war by proxy armies is continuing for more than a half a century. The geopolitical game of influence and power will continue while the actors and tactics are changing. Now it is Iran's turn to spread its influence in Africa and challenge the West.

In the East Africa, Iran's biggest traditional ally is Sudan. These bilateral relations were made of necessity for survival of two different dictatorial regimes. From the Western perspective the regimes of Iran and Sudan are identical and their alliance is natural. Although the ideology of the regimes is Islamic fundamentalism, the alliance of Sunni Arabs with Shia Persians is unorthodox. The international isolation, sanctions and their common enemy, the United States, has made this alliance possible. In 2006, Ayatollah Khamenei told the Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir that the Islamic Republic is ready to transfer this experience and technology of its nuclear scientists "to other friendly countries" (Suleiman, 2011). In return, Sudan praised the Iranian nuclear program as a great victory for the Islamic world. This creates not only a great problem for the US but a serious security concern for the region. If this alliance continues to grow the power balance in East Africa will be changed and regional wars will become unavoidable. Sudan is confronted on different issues with Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Egypt and this may escalate into a tragedy on a biblical scale.

Iran began to support Sudan when Omar al-Bashir took power in an Islamist inspired coup. Ayatollahs saw this coup as a wave of Islamic revolution and spared no expense to support it. Over one million tons of oil and 300 million US dollar worth arms have been sent by Iran in support of Bashir. Iran has also deployed two thousands of its Revolutionary Guards in Sudan, to train Sudanese army and loyal militias (Schanzer, 2008). Today the armed forces of Sudan are modelled and equipped like the paramilitary Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

Given the history, Sudan's Islamic Regime combined with Iranian truly represent an "axis of evil" that can turn the whole region into conflict. The US as world leader should intervene only with tougher sanctions on Sudan's regime and not to support any other proxy's in the region. The balance of power in East Africa can be restored only with the absence of foreign powers.

In east Africa, the regime in Iran is also active in Eritrea with supporting the regime of President Isaias Afwerki. Iranian spread of influence in Eritrea may have serious consequences for the US and its allies. Eritrea strategic position in eastern Africa and the

strait of Bab el-Mandab makes it a prime target for Iranian interests. In 2008 reports leaked that Iran is deploying troops and ballistic missiles in this strategic straight where an estimated 3, 2 bbl/d (barrels per day) of oil passes towards Europe and US (US Energy Information Administration, 2012). In return for its friendly relations with Iran, Eritrea was given economic aid in form of oil and infrastructure development projects. Although the US-Ethiopia relations are stranded, the US cannot afford the alliance between Iran and Eritrea.

The cases of Chinese and Iranian foreign policy in Africa were selected to show the difference between real strategic opponent to US interests and an economical competitor. While the Chinese involvement in the African continent is confounded in economic development, the Iranian policy is focused in direct confrontation of US interests. The Iranian doctrine in Africa aims at creating disorder and chaos in the territorial status quo of the continent. Although this threat is real, the African regimes have proven that they represent political quicksand for foreign powers. In a hypothetical cold war between Iran and US in the continent, only the African leaders would reap the benefits.

## 4. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA

United States foreign policy towards Africa has not been changed for the past 60 years. US presidents have changed their approach and tactics but the strategy has remained the same.

The main goals of this foreign policy are spreading of political and economic influence with an aim of creating friendly regimes that are easily controlled. History has shown that all these African client states have limits to their growth. In other words, the US policy is not allowing some African countries to become developed or economically independent. From historical retrospective African countries that have increased their regional power and became economically independent had either military coup or invasion as in the case of Zaire, South Africa and Libya.

The instruments of this foreign policy can be divided in three points:

1. Economical and Humanitarian Aid;
2. Military Assistance;
3. Aid by other means.

US Foreign aid to African countries is a relatively new phenomenon. In the first hundred years of the United States existence, aid to foreign countries was seen as unconstitutional and not the obligation of the federal government. But after the Second World War, approximately one trillion dollars of aid has been transferred from the developed countries to Africa, and the bulk of that aid originated from the US.

Foreign Aid previously worked well in the world. In the years following the Second World War, the US transferred over 13 billion dollars or around 100 billion dollars in today's terms in what was known as the Marshal Plan. War-ravaged Europe used this aid to heal its economy and prosper. The similar logic should have implied for Africa as well. But the Marshal Plan intervention was short, sharp and finite, unlike the never-ending aid in Africa that creates a sense of entitlement and dependency rather than encouragement for growth.

In the 1960's with the wave of anti-colonialism came a great optimism and a bright future for a unified and prosperous Africa. However, that dream turned out into a nightmare when African countries entered a phase of civil wars, starvation, genocides and even cannibalism. The main reason for the failure of aid in Africa can be located in the African regimes. In a study of World Bank it is founded that 85 % of aid flows were used for purposes other than those for which they were intended and very often diverted to unproductive projects (Moyo, 2009). Military rulers, rootless dictators combined with corrupted and incompetent bureaucracy have created Africa the biggest kleptocracy in the history of mankind. Between 1970 and 1998, when aid flows to Africa were at their peak, the poverty rate in Africa has risen from 11 % to a staggering 66 %. Foreign aid has helped make the poor into poorer and growth slower. Aid has become cultural commodity in which millions of people in the US march for it, aid concerts were organized and governments were judged by the aid they donated to Africa.

US Foreign Aid in its 60 years history has supported dictatorial and corrupted governments. With cheap loans provided directly by the US or indirectly through the IMF and World Bank, by the end of 1980, emerging-market countries debt was at least one trillion US dollars, with a massive cost of servicing the debt. From a development point of view this created an economic paradox. The interests of payments became so massive that it surpassed the foreign

aid that was going in these African countries. It created net reverse flow from poor countries to rich ones for an estimated 15 billion US dollars from the years from 1987 and 1989.

However, the African economies were not able to service their debts and series of uncontrollable defaults could have occurred. There are numerous cases where African autocratic regimes were granted loans which they later could not repay. Such was the case of the main US ally in central Africa, Zaire. As a result for of the unavoidable default of Zaire, Mobuto Sese Seko asked easier terms in servicing the 5 billion US dollars debt. Soon after that Mobuto leased Concorde for his daughter's million dollars wedding. When Mobutu was toppled he had a net worth of more than 5 billion US dollars. According to Transparency international, Nigerian president Sani Abacha also had the same amount of 5 billion US dollars on his private Swiss bank accounts.

Foreign aid also assisted the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie I, to hold his grip of power while the people starved. However, Haile Selassie was not the only African emperor that the US taxpayers funded. The Emperor of Central African Republic, Jean-Bédél Bokassa was coroneted in 1977 in a lavish ceremony that worth over \$22 million. This African leader later stated: "We ask the French for money. We get it, and then we waste it" (Alemazung, 2010).

During the Cold War even the most brutal and pathological dictators were backed either directly with US Foreign military and economic aid or covertly with black funds from intelligence agencies. Sergeant Samuel Doe was given 500 million dollars after his brutal assassination of the entire government that was leaning towards the communist bloc. Similar situation happened in Uganda, when Idi Amin took the reign of power from anti-Western government.

Among the present day African dictators is the Swaziland's king, Mswati the Third. His lavish lifestyle and personal wealth of over 200 million US dollars are well known in South Africa (Pendleton, et al., 2008). The controversy surrounding Msawati does not end in his corruption, human rights violations or polygamy with his thirteen wives. The scandalous part is that Swaziland is receiving financial, economic, humanitarian and even military aid form the US. The foreign aid to the kingdom of Swaziland has totalled at 318 million US dollars (USAID, 2011). With this assistance and international recognition the bizarre Swaziland regime has survived in the 21<sup>st</sup> century while the people are among the poorest in the world.

The corruption of African leaders and their lack of fiscal discipline were bolstered with Live Aid Concerts, where the common people were demanding end of poverty and hunger in Africa. In 2005, the President of Tanzania, Mkapa, euphorically stated: "Scandal that we are faced to choose between basic health and education for our people and repaying historic debt" (Moyo, 2009).

Unknown for the audience of the Live Aid Concert, the President Benjamin Mkapa was known in his country for his lavish spending. While Tanzania was receiving aid and defying from paying its obligations, the President bought private jet worth 15 million UK pounds and over 30 million for equipment for his air force (Burrows, 2003). Even in the more successful African countries like Zambia, the head of state was involved in embezzlement of \$80 million. During that time Zambia received \$1, 5 billion from the World Bank as part of High Indebted Poorest Country (HIPC) program (Moyo, 2009).

According to the World Bank from the \$526 billion that this financial institution has lent to African countries since 1946 at least 25 % or \$139 billion have been misused. This shows that foreign aid not only foster corruption in Africa it also breeds it. This constant stream of aid money is a way for corrupted and dictatorial regimes to stay in power. As the foreign aid

flows in from the US, the governments are not incentivised to help their people. All they need to do is to court and cater the foreign Western donors.

The slogan “No taxation without representation” that was crucial for the US revolution and state building has lost its meaning in the African aid model. The African people are not represented in their governments, while the people from the US are taxed in a form of aid to support the African kleptocratic regimes.

## **4.1 Economic and Humanitarian Development**

The US foreign policy in Africa for the past 60 years is centred on humanitarian and development assistance. Trillion of US dollars and millions of tons of food aid have been transferred to the continent. However, behind the humanitarian facade there are unintended or intended consequences for this action. This research will analyse the forms of US assistance in Africa, the food aid and the role of the IMF and World Bank where the US has dominant role.

### ***4.1.1 The consequences of development aid***

The United States has the dominant position in the IMF and World Bank. Its influence and interests has been demonstrated in the African continent numerous times. From promoting economic interests to pursuing foreign policy, the US has used all means for its advantage. The end result is the permanent underdevelopment of the continent and people trapped in poverty.

This thesis will analyse the monetary and fiscal implications of the foreign aid, as well as the failure of aid to promote economic development and growth.

#### ***4.1.1.1 US foreign aid and its consequences on the real exchange rate***

The basic idea of US foreign aid was that it would substitute savings in the underdeveloped countries with foreign capital, jump-start their economies and lift the people out of poverty (Taslim & Weliwita, 2000). Despite the good intentions this theory has been proven false by numerous economists and by the reality of the African economy.

In response of Africa’s social and humanitarian tragedy, the US and European countries intervened with increase of the aid. In the 1960 during the Kennedy administration, the economist Walt Rastow demanded the doubling of the aid towards Africa. In 1973, the president of the World Bank, McNamara demanded again doubling of the foreign aid. With the end of the Cold War, the foreign aid was increased and again doubled in 2001 with the start of the war on terror. In July 2005, at the G8 summit it was agreed that the aid levels would be doubled.

Parallel to this theory and the wave of independence of African countries an economical paradox was unravelling in the Netherlands. The newly found wealth in the Netherlands was proved to be more of a curse than a blessing and was labelled as the “Dutch Disease”.

The three very different events in the early 1960s, the wave of independence of African countries, foreign aid and the “Dutch Disease” would meet in a strange and rarely reported paradox.

Foreign aid has the same effects of the “Dutch Disease”. This phenomenon describes a situation where an inflow of foreign exchange in any form, such as earnings from oil or

foreign aid, puts upward pressure on the real exchange rate of the recipient country by stimulating more rapid domestic inflation (Tarp & Hjertholm, 2000).

According to IMF report, developing countries that rely on foreign capital are more prone to their currency strengthening (Hjertholm, et al., 1998). This in turn hurts African export since the products are not competitive in the global market. And again in order to cope with this situation African governments apply measures that hurt the real economy and slow the growth. Furthermore, with large inflows of foreign aid the African governments have expanded the public sector (Adam & Bevan, 2003). However, the foreign capital from private sector remittances does not trigger the “Dutch Disease”. Only the domestic consumption of foreign aid within the public, state sector ignites the “Dutch disease” effects that slow down growth and cause inflation (Rajan & Subramanian, 2005).

The foreign aid can have different effects on different African countries depending on their currency flexibility or whether the country’s currency is fixed by the central bank or it is flexible. In countries where the exchange rate is fixed the inflow of foreign aid that would be converted into the local currency would increase the country’s money supply. This will result into a pressure from the domestic demand and push up the domestic prices. This situation is in fact an appreciation of the real exchange rate or the currency would buy fewer real goods and services than before.

The second model implies where the countries have flexible exchange rates. In this case the increased supply of foreign currency provided through foreign aid would raise the value of the domestic currency. This in turn also creates an appreciation in the real exchange rate, but through the rise in the nominal exchange rate rather than domestic prices. In both cases the appreciation of the real exchange rate weakens the competitiveness of the African countries (Ebrahim-Zadeh, 2003).

According to economist Dambisa Moyo, US foreign aid creates inflation when a large influx of foreign currency gets in the impoverished African countries. Combined with even small scale corruption, this aid money can have the ripple effect in monetary stability of the African countries (Moyo, 2009). In order to prevent the rise of inflation, African countries in most cases raise the interest rates that transcends into less investment and fewer jobs. This in turn creates more poverty and more demand for aid.

This thesis has been studied decades ago as in the research of Seder van Wijnbergen in 1985. In that research of six Sub-Saharan countries it was confirmed that the increase in the volume of foreign aid can cause an appreciation on the real exchange rate (van Wijnbergen, 1987). Seven years later a study of Younger has shown that Ghana had experienced the Dutch Disease from the foreign aid (Younger, 1992). According to the research, Ghana had an increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA) from an annual average of 3 % of its GDP during 1981-1983 to 6 % of GDP during 1984-1987. This increase in aid resulted with severe macro-economic problems such as high inflation and appreciating to the real exchange rate.

In a World Bank report, “Assessing Aid” it is stated that the inflow of aid can have negative effects on the macroeconomic stability if it reaches a certain level. The report also stated that foreign aid is more effective when it is given to countries whose socio-economic policies are sound and productive (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998). In an IMF research of 2005 the finding has concluded that there is no positive relationship between foreign aid and growth. In contrary, aid slows down growth of labour intensive industries in developing countries. This effect is a result of the appreciation of the real exchange rate, similar as the effects of the “Dutch Disease” (Rajan & Subramanian, 2005).

The effects of foreign aid have been compared as a “resource curse” in the African economies. As the oil, diamonds or coltan have proven to be more of a curse than a blessing in the African countries, foreign aid shares some of the “resource curse characteristics”. The scarce, valuable commodities generate high income that has been later used to fund wars and corruption across Africa. The foreign aid model is similar with small modification since the foreign currency is being delivered directly as development aid to fund corrupt and autocratic regimes. The foreign aid creates volatility in government revenues that if poorly managed, leads to inflation. The rise of the foreign currency can also raise the real exchange rate which will undermine the competitiveness of the other sectors (Harford & Klein, 2005).

In the late nineties several analyses were conducted to ascertain the connection between the rising inflation in the undeveloped countries and the foreign aid or ODA (Official Development Assistance). Such was the empirical analysis of Adenauer and Vagassky in 1998. In their research of four African countries, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Togo were analysed. The research concluded that during the period when the four countries received large aid flows, their real exchange rates appreciated and the government’s deficits increased through higher wage bills. The rise of the real exchange rate in these countries hurts the export sector and their trade balance widened.

Using data from francophone West Africa, Adenauer and Vagassky found that an increase in aid inflows leads to a large real exchange rate appreciation, as predicted by the standard Dutch Disease model (Adenauer & Vagassky, 1998). Although the economics is sound in the analysis, the political motives and perspective are barely mentioned. This research will show the analysis of Adenauer and Vagassky with the political situation in the given countries in the given time frame. The analysis shows that foreign aid causes Dutch Disease and it was done for a purpose to keep the African countries undeveloped and dependent to aid.

#### *4.1.1.2 The case of Burkina Faso*

Burkina Faso is among the poorest countries in the world with over 46 % of its people living below the poverty line and unemployment of over 77% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). Foreign aid seems to be the only cure for this country’s economic and humanitarian problems. However, according to renowned economists, it was the aid that initiates the economic difficulties. In the case of Burkina Faso the “Dutch Disease” was caused by foreign aid.

While France, a former colonial power, had been principal donor, the United States has contributed 1,193 billion US dollars to Burkina Faso and most of it went into food aid and administrative costs (USAID, 2011).

The aid inflows in Upper Volta or later called Burkina Faso were substantial through the years after independence until 1986 when they peaked and were steadily increased in the 1990’s. During this surge of aid money the government increased its wage bill by 72 %. The motives for this aid increase were political since it coincided with the overthrow of the left-wing President Thomas Sankara. The assassinated president saw the foreign aid as a form of neo-colonialism, having understood the negative effects of Western aid. He was succeeded by his assassin, General Blaise Compaore who is still in power as of 2012. With a pro-Western leader, France and the US stepped in with the foreign aid. In order to firm his position President Compaore raised the wages of the governmental administration with the Western donation. Burkina Faso received aid in a form of a budget support that reached two thirds of the government expenditures (Djankov, et al., 2005).

In the small country of Burkina Faso this influx of capital had the effect of the “Dutch Disease”, where the local prices rose and the export plummeted. The negative trade balance



also supports the theory that Aid caused the “Dutch Disease” in Burkina Faso. The economy of this West African country could no longer compete on the international market as its real exchange rate rose.

The positive effects of aid are still not visible, as Burkina Faso is still one of the poorest countries in the world. The level of inflation cannot be correctly estimated, since the country is run by a corrupted and dictatorial regime for over a quarter of a century.

However, the biggest evidence of the inflation was seen in the riots of 2011. The causes for this uprising in Burkina Faso were motivated from the rise of the prices of food and commodities. The common people and soldiers realized that they could not survive with their small wages and increasing food prices. Even though Burkina Faso receives hundreds of millions US dollars annually in aid and its monetary policy is part of the CFA zone (French Community of Africa), the country experienced hidden inflation and social unrest.

This popular uprising that took the lives of 21 people ended exactly the same as twenty five years before when General Blaise Compaore took power. The members of the security apparatus were bailed out with generous western “budget aid” and the rest of the population were left to survive the invisible inflation.

#### *4.1.1.3 The case of Senegal*

The West African country of Senegal has been loyal US ally from its independence and for its loyalty it has been rewarded with development assistance for the past half a century.

Despite receiving foreign aid that is significantly above Sub-Saharan average during the 1980’s, Senegal dropped one level in the World Bank’s classification from a “lower middle income country” to a “low income country”.

The reason for the decline of the living standards and the decline in the export sector can be symptoms of a “Dutch Disease.” However, there are no significant natural resources such as oil or gas that could ignite the Dutch Disease. The influx of capital was done by the Foreign aid whose levels increased significantly during the 1983 -1986 with a 96, 3 % rise occurring in 1986. This increase for Official Development Assistance (ODA) was followed with rise of the wages at the government employees. In the 1980’s, wages and salaries were the dominate items from the government budgetary expenditures. This parallel increase in wages and aid could have triggered the Dutch Disease. As evidence the real effective exchange rate (REER) appreciated by 17, 8 index points.

Another drain of resources in Senegal was the Para-public enterprises. With the rise of the Foreign aid the government was able to increase the salaries of the workers. The jobs in the Para public enterprises were in fact part of the patronage system of the leading political party and the President Abdou Diouf. In the state owned companies the productivity fell from 70 % while the workers enjoyed at least 20 % higher salaries than those in the private sector. This situation was one of the reasons of the decline in the Senegalese export (Adenauer & Vagassky, 1998).

Even the IMF criticised the Para public enterprises but also acknowledged the fact that they were funded indirectly by foreign aid. The fungibility of aid in Senegal clearly points out to the Dutch Disease effects. Furthermore, in the years between 1986 and 1993 the trade gap averaged at more than \$290 million. This made Senegal even more dependent on foreign aid.

Although in the 1990's Senegal was in greater need of foreign aid, the international donor's implemented rigorous Structural Adjustment programs for further privatization and deindustrialization of Senegal.

The foreign aid in Senegal had the same effects of foreign controlled "Dutch Disease". Substitute for oil was the foreign aid, while substitute for the growing oil industry was the Senegalese byrocracy and Para public employees. The rise of the aid saw the rise of the real exchange rate and the basic commodities including food. The real casualties in this aid driven Dutch Disease were the common people of Senegal that were not employed by the state. The real economy of Senegal and the agriculture sector stagnated and declined.

Unlike The Netherlands, the Dutch Disease and the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in Senegal has caused massive unemployment and more than 50 % of the people living below the poverty line.

#### *4.1.1.4 The Case of Ivory Coast*

The former French colony of Ivory Coast has received vast amounts of aid since its independence. The US alone donated up to 715 million US dollars for economic and military assistance. Even with this massive assistance the country of Ivory Coast is one of the poorest and least secure countries in Africa. The cause of the aid generated inflation in the Ivory Coast is similar to the case of the Burkina Faso. Billions of US dollars in aid funds from France, US and other developed countries ended in the regime's corrupt administration.

The foreign aid funds were also channelled into the vast and inefficient Para-public sector which received amounts that accounted approximately 4 % of the country's GDP. The government also used the aid funds for large scale infrastructural projects which personified the countries corruption and autocratic rule. One of these large infrastructural projects was the Basilica of Our Lady of Peace of Yamoussoukro or the biggest church in the world. The basilica was built in the President's Félix Houphouet-Boigny hometown at the cost of \$300 million (The Economist, 2012). This autocratic president of the Ivory Coast, Félix Houphouet-Boigny, was also one of the wealthiest leaders in Africa with a net worth from 7 to 11 billion US dollars (Antoine 2007).

As in the previous cases, the foreign aid was used for the benefit of the elite on power and its patronage system. This transfer of wealth created the rise of the real exchange rate and created a quasi "Dutch disease".

The following tables illustrate the link between the foreign aid and its side effect combined as the Dutch Disease. The Table 4.1 shows the foreign aid per capita and Table 4.2 the scale of foreign aid as percentage of the Gross National Income (GNI).

Table 4.1: Foreign aid per capita (annual average; current US dollars)

	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-01
Benin	36,5	53,8	41,9	40,2
The Gambia	107,9	93,3	33,0	37,8
Mali	51,0	48,8	43,2	32,4
Tanzania	34,4	60,5	59,2	35,6
Rwanda	34,1	40,8	29,9	33,1
Uganda	20,2	39,2	35,1	35,6

Source: Wijnbergen (1987)

Table 4.2: Foreign Aid in percent of GNI (annual average)

	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-01
Benin	11,3 %	15,6 %	11,1 %	11,1 %
The Gambia	40,6 %	28,5 %	9,7 %	12,6 %
Mali	23,2 %	18,6 %	17,2 %	14,4 %
Tanzania	10,5 %	32,3 %	27,6 %	17,6 %
Rwanda	21,2 %	25,4 %	13,4 %	12,3 %
Uganda	6,0 %	20,1 %	11,8 %	14,1 %

Source: Wijnbergen (1987)

The high foreign aid as seen in Table 4.2 can be the catalyst for the “Dutch Disease”. The countries that serve as case studies are spread across the continent and are different by number of population and the size of the land area. One of the few things they have in common is the inflow of foreign aid.

The manifestations of the “Dutch Disease” can be visible in the following Table Table 4.3. The levels of inflation are different by country in certain periods of time, but most of them are in double digit and considered as high inflation.

Table 4.3: Inflation (GDP deflator, annual average percentage change)

	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-01
Benin	-0,8 %	8,1 %	6,8 %	3,2 %
Gambia	24,4 %	7,3 %	3,2 %	5,4 %
Mali	0,9 %	7,9 %	5,4 %	4,8 %
Tanzania	1,1 %	13,4 %	15,3 %	1,7 %
Rwanda	20,6 %	26,3 %	18,5 %	7,0 %
Uganda	148,8 %	30,5 %	5,0 %	6,6 %

Source: Wijnbergen (1987)

The Table 4.4 shows the decline in the external trade balance. With the rise of the real exchange rate the African economies have become uncompetitive on the international market. As a result their exports have fallen, production has stopped and the countries have become net importers.

Table 4.4: External trade balance (annual average; in percentage of GDP)

	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-01
Benin	-14,8 %	-12,5 %	-12,5 %	-12,9 %
The Gambia	-9,5 %	-13,6 %	-16,6 %	-15,7 %
Mali	-20,0 %	-17,1 %	-12,3 %	-11,3 %
Tanzania	-10,1 %	-21,1 %	-18,7 %	-16,3 %
Rwanda	/	-25,6 %	-13,5 %	-8,6 %
Uganda	-6,8 %	-13,3 %	-10,4 %	-13,4 %

Source: Wijnbergen (1987)

The rise of aid dependency has increased steadily across time. In the late 1970's only eight countries had aid to GNP ratios in excess of 20 %, by the first half of the 1990's 26 countries had aid ratios of 20 % or more with four countries having aid ratios greater than 50% (Lensink & White, 2001).

The foreign aid causes negative effects on the macroeconomic of the recipient country. The inflow of foreign capital raises consumer expenditure that results in appreciation of the real

exchange rate and shifts resources away from production of traded goods into production of non-traded goods (Fielding & Gibson, 2012).

The real misconception of the Western aid donors and particularly the US is that they forgot the basics of the real economy. The foreign currency given as aid represents medium of exchange, not a resource. The billions of US dollars if used unwisely will only inflate the real value of the real limited resources in Africa, which in turn will make African exports uncompetitive on the global market.

The problem of foreign aid-caused inflation has become one of the central points of the IMF. Governments in the African low-income countries are bound by an IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Under this arrangement the countries had to spend only 28 % of their Official Development Assistance (ODA) receipts in the period of 1999-2005. However, if the inflation rates in the recipient countries exceed 5 % they could spend only 15 %, as a precaution for increased inflator spiral. This IMF preventive measure is clear signal that aid-caused inflation is a serious problem that is having impact on African economics.

On a similar subject the Heritage Foundation stated: “Not only has US development aid been wasted, it has actually retarded economic development in the countries that receive it. Not one country receiving foreign aid has succeeded in developing sustained economic growth” (Crosswell, 1999).

#### ***4.1.2 Foreign aid and economic growth in Africa***

The overall theory behind the foreign aid was that it would boost economic development and alleviate people from poverty. Whether foreign aid has helped or harmed the economic growth has been greatly debated subject between development economists for over a half a century.

There are two competing theories on this subject. The first group of theories support the foreign aid and argue that it is necessary to fill the investment gap and this will in turn lift countries out of the poverty gap (Sachs, 2005).

On the other side, there is the scepticism of foreign aid, represented by Lord Bauer (2000), Colloer, Easterly (2001) and Moyo (2009), who argue that aid harms development and growth.

The research of Burnside and Dollar found that foreign aid has positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies but has little effect on countries that implement poor policies (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). The logical response to this research would be that all foreign aid be allocated to countries that are democratic and implement sound economic policies. However, through the past half a century and beyond the US has continued to support African kleptocratic dictators that implement bizarre economic measures.

On the other hand, the implementation on sound economic measures without foreign aid would be sufficient for the economic growth as proven in many countries in Asia. Given that logic Moyo concludes that if the foreign aid is the only way for a poor country to escape the poverty trap there would not be any rich developed country (Moyo, 2009). The economic development of an independent and sovereign country is and should be the responsibility of its people and government.

The foreign aid and the underdevelopment of the Third World are actually the two sides of the same coin. The billions of US dollars foreign aid are responsible of the moral hazard on


political and economic level in Africa. This aid has interfered in the preconditions of Burnside and Dollar of implementing good fiscal, monetary and trade policies (Burnside & Dollar, 2000).

As further evidence that foreign aid does not lead to economic growth and prosperity this research will also analyse the statistics from the World Bank. Although many variables contribute to a countries economic growth, this research focuses on the growth of GDP per capita in African countries and the US bilateral aid towards them in a time span of fifty years. The US bilateral aid is not the only assistance that the African countries are receiving. The bilateral assistance from the developed countries, the IMF and the World Bank in which the US has great influence contribute significant part in the total aid. Despite the trillions of US dollars the African countries show slower GDP growth per capita than before they received foreign aid.

Typical examples are the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia, countries that received enormous amounts of aid and yet show slower growth. Other anomalies are the cases of South Africa and Zimbabwe.


In 1970 during the Bush War, the unrecognized country of Rhodesia had its record GDP per capita growth of 18,6 %, as shown in the Figure 4.1 (The World Bank, 2012). Rhodesia during its brief existence was under severe economic sanctions and did not receive any foreign aid and yet managed to maintain macro-economic stability and modest growth.

Figure 4.1: GDP per capita growth of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe



Source: World Bank (2012)

Figure 4.2: US bilateral aid towards Zimbabwe




Source: World Bank (2012)

With the transformation into Zimbabwe the country started to receive substantial foreign aid as shown in the Figure 4.2. Zimbabwe is a clear example of the absurdity of US foreign aid as it is shown in the charts above. In 1992 when the US foreign aid raised to 100 million US dollars the Zimbabwean GDP per capita growth fell to -11,1 %. The same situation was repeated in 2003 and 2008 when the GDP per capita decreased at 17 % and 17, 5% respectively. Numerous measures taken by the Mugabe government resulted to the economical demise of the country, which ended with the greatest hyperinflation ever recorded in history. However bizarre were the actions of Mugabe three facts remain absolute. Firstly, Mugabe's rise to power was followed with heavy inflow of foreign aid, despite the genocide and other atrocities. Even after sanctions were imposed, US foreign aid freely flowed into Zimbabwe as shown by the World Bank in Figure 4.2. Secondly, there is the link between the rises of the flow of the foreign aid money with the fall of the Zimbabwean GDP per capita. The third point refers to the unrecognized state of Rhodesia which managed to achieve economic growth and highest growth per capita without the foreign aid and under siege of its neighbours.


The case of South Africa is somewhat similar to that of Zimbabwe. The economy of South Africa is the biggest economy on the continent. However, the political instability and the decade long Border War has crippled the economy during the 1970's and 1980's. As shown in Figure 4.3 below, the South African growth per capita in the 1965 was highest in its history with 6.5 % growth. Soon after the growth, it is periodically growing and decreasing. During this period the apartheid regime was under international sanctions and since 1965 it was waging the decades long Border War. Four years after the fall of Apartheid in 1998 the South African economy had a negative GDP growth per capita by -1, 8 % as shown in Figure 4.3. During this period the economic sanctions were lifted and the foreign aid was steadily increased to half a billion US dollars as seen in the Figure 4.4. Since 2007 the GDP per capita growth has been decreasing while it reached the bottom in 2009 to a negative growth at 2, 6 %.

Figure 4.3: GDP per capita growth in South Africa



Source: World Bank (2012)

Figure 4.4: US bilateral aid towards South Africa



Source: World Bank (2012)


Parallel to this slowing down of the growth there was persistent increase of foreign aid towards South Africa that peaked in 2008 with more than one billion US dollars as shown on Figure 4.4. The economic crash of 2008 can be a factor for the decline of growth in 2008, but the trend of slower growth occurred a year before. Another important economic trend in the South African economy is the increase of the unemployment rate whose official statistics are 23%, but in reality this number can rise up to 40% (The Economist, 2012). The unemployment figures just before the transition from Apartheid in 1994 were only 13%. By the end of the nineties the unemployment rate rose to 30%. After the end of the Apartheid the rise of unemployment was followed with the rise of crime and corruption in every level and rise of the foreign aid. Even the economic inequality increased from 0, 59 in Gini Coefficient to 0, 63 in 2009, making the South African Republic one of the most unequal countries in the world (Banerjee, et al., 2007).

The US political and economic support of the post-apartheid government has transformed South Africa into a de facto one party state with heavy corruption and slow growth. The ruling party, African National Congress (ANC) has also changed from a party that has fought for human rights to typical African corrupt ruling elite that is hampering real economic growth. The violation of human rights in South Africa can sum up with racial hatred, racial cleansing of the white farmers and the massacre of the miners in August 2012.




Another case study is the country of Zaire or later called Democratic Republic of Congo that has received massive amounts of aid funds. Despite the aid given for over fifty years through its history there is not any consistent and steady growth of the economy. Even with the increase of aid in the early nineties to more than a \$684 millions the decline of GDP growth per capita is evident on the chart till it bottom at -16,9 % in 1993, as shown in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6. Decade later in 2003 the aid funds surged at more than five billion US dollars but bought a slow growth of 2, 6 %.

Figure 4.5: GDP per capita growth in Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo



Source: World Bank (2012)

Figure 4.6: US bilateral aid towards Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo



Source: World Bank (2012)

The cases of Zimbabwe, South Africa and the DRC show that foreign aid cannot buy economic growth. The foreign aid has only encouraged the recipient regimes to take radical actions, and to delay reforms to enhance growth. The foreign support and aid has encouraged and embolden Mugabe’s reign of terror, it corrupted the ANC, and maintained the kleptocratic regime of Mobutu.

The US foreign aid in these and other African countries has inflated, corrupted and generally weakened the democratic institutions. Only a democratic system that originates from the people and works for the people can produce economic growth and prosperity. The aid model has created a gap between the government and the people where the term ”no taxation without representation” has no more meaning.

In a system where the government institutions are strong and legitimate, the citizens demand their rights and can punish the politicians by voting them out of power. However, when the institutions are weak and corrupted, politicians punish citizens that do not support them (Acemoglu, et al., 2004). The democratic order that is the foundation of economic growth has been eroded throughout the decades.

This lack of strong institutions has been noted by President Obama in his speech in Ghana: "Africa doesn't need strongmen; it needs strong institutions" (BBC, 2009). Despite the speech, the US has continued to support and fund various authoritarian and dictatorial regimes in Africa.

Table 4.5 below contains the African leaders that have committed serious human rights abuses in the past fifty years. Despite their crimes they have received billions of US taxpayer's money in a form of foreign aid. Although the sums are significant as they represent significant income for small African economies they do not represent the entire US support for the African dictators. The US has the dominant position in the international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Through these institutions the US policy makers funded indirectly numerous dictatorial regimes across Africa.

Table 4.5: List of African dictatorial leaders financed with US foreign aid

<b>Country</b>	<b>Authoritarian Leader</b>	<b>Years in power</b>	<b>US foreign aid</b>
Burkina Faso	<b>Blaise Compaoré</b>	1987- Present	<b>\$453.500.000,00</b>
Cameroon	<b>Paul Biya</b>	1982- Present	<b>\$481.400.000,00</b>
Gabon	<b>Omar Bongo</b>	1967 –2009	<b>\$50.050.000,00</b>
Ethiopia	<b>Meles Zenawi</b>	1995 –2012	<b>\$5.688.220.000,00</b>
Ethiopia	<b>Haile Selassie I</b>	1930 –1974	<b>\$239.870.000,00</b>
Ethiopia	<b>Mengistu Haile Mariam</b>	1975- 1991	<b>\$601.000.000,00</b>
Eritrea	<b>Isaias Afewerki</b>	1991- Present	<b>\$534.380.000,00</b>
Equatorial Guinea	<b>Teodoro Obiang</b>	1979- Present	<b>\$15.720.000,00</b>

<b>Country</b>	<b>Authoritarian Leader</b>	<b>Years in power</b>	<b>US foreign aid</b>
Egypt	<b>Hosni Mubarak</b>	1981 – 2011	<b>\$26.246.090.000,00</b>
Djibouti	<b>Ismail Omar Guelleh</b>	1999- Present	<b>\$72.770.000,00</b>
Republic of the Congo	<b>Denis Sassou Nguesso</b>	1979-1992 1997- Present	<b>\$114.390.000,00</b>
Central African Republic	<b>Jean-Bédél Bokassa</b>	1966 –1979	<b>\$4.590.000,00</b>
Central African Republic	<b>François Bozizé</b>	2003- 2013	<b>\$154.210.000,00</b>
Uganda	<b>Idi Amin</b>	1971 – 1979	<b>\$10.000.000.00</b>
Uganda	<b>Yoweri Museveni</b>	1986 - Present	<b>\$2.936.130.000,00</b>
Zimbabwe	<b>Robert Mugabe</b>	1980 - Present	<b>\$1.641.870.000,00</b>
Swaziland	<b>Mswati III</b>	1986 - Present	<b>\$196.030.000,00</b>
Swaziland	<b>Sobhuza II</b>	1968-1982	<b>\$37.230.000,00</b>
Libya	<b>Muammar Gaddafi</b>	1969 – 2011	<b>\$55.820.000,00</b>
Rwanda	<b>Paul Kagame</b>	2000 - Present	<b>\$832.630.000,00</b>
Rwanda	<b>Juvénal Habyarimana</b>	1973 – 1994	<b>\$414.000.000,00</b>
Sudan	<b>Omar al-Bashir</b>	1989 - Present	<b>\$5.954.440.000,00</b>

<b>Country</b>	<b>Authoritarian Leader</b>	<b>Years in power</b>	<b>US foreign aid</b>
Sudan	<b>Gaafar Nimeiry</b>	1969 – 1985	<b>\$931.000.000,00</b>
Somalia	<b>Siad Barre</b>	1969 – 1991	<b>\$632.000.000,00</b>
The Gambia	<b>Yahya Jammeh</b>	1994 - Present	<b>\$75.970.000,00</b>
Chad	<b>Idriss Déby</b>	1990 - Present	<b>\$725.690.000,00</b>
Tunisia	<b>Zine El Abidine Ben Ali</b>	1987 –2011	<b>\$6.635.980.000,00</b>
Mauritania	<b>Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya</b>	1984–2005	<b>\$211.990.000,00</b>
Liberia	<b>Samuel K. Doe</b>	1980 –1990	<b>\$474.000.000,00</b>
Guinea-Bissau	<b>João Bernardo Vieira</b>	1980-1984 2005-2009	<b>\$40.550.000.00</b>
Angola	<b>José Eduardo dos Santos</b>	1979–present	<b>\$1.000.650.000,00</b>
Kenya	<b>Daniel Arap Moi</b>	1978–2002	<b>\$1.174.410.000,00</b>
Seychelles	<b>Albert René</b>	1977–2004	<b>\$39.480.000,00</b>
Togo	<b>Gnassingbé Eyadéma</b>	1967–2005	<b>\$185.410.000,00</b>
Nigeria	<b>Yakubu Gowon</b>	1966- 1975	<b>\$268.540.000,00</b>
Nigeria	<b>Muhammadu Buhari</b>	1983-1985	<b>\$63.860.000,00</b>

Country	Authoritarian Leader	Years in power	US foreign aid
Nigeria	<b>Ibrahim Babangida</b>	1985-1993	<b>\$73.000.000,00</b>
Nigeria	<b>Sani Abacha</b>	1993-1998	<b>\$52.820.000,00</b>

Source: World Bank (2013)

The table (Table 4.5) above may represent the most conclusive evidence to the hypothesis that US foreign aid and the entire foreign policy towards Africa is oriented toward supporting and prolonging the African economic stagnation and underdevelopment. The support for dictatorial regimes that are destructive to their countries' economies and their neighbours supports this notion.

The ten million US dollars given to the government to Idi Amin cannot be interpreted other than assistance for Uganda's self-destruction. Even the Cold War logic of containing communism does not apply in Africa, as the US funded communist and socialist regimes which were in fact dictatorial in nature. Among them was the most brutal regime in Ethiopia and its leader Mengistu Haile Mariam. Despite the genocide committed in Ethiopia, US aid was sent to this regime that is estimated at over 600 million US dollars. Foreign aid was also given to the Marxist leader of Somalia, Siad Barre who waged war against its neighbour Ethiopia but also against its own people. The end result was two failed states in the 1990's that are still dependent on US aid and still in conflict with each other.

The regime of Congo-Brazzaville with its socialist and kleptocratic regime was also assisted with US taxpayer's money with an amount of over hundred million dollars according to the World Bank.

In the African aid model even the logic of the global war on terror does not apply. The US has funded and given assistance to the regime of Omar Al Bashir with close to six billion dollars. The United States have been the largest donor in eight out of ten years between 2000 and 2009 with 33,9% of the total aid provided (Poole, 2011).

Despite the billions of dollars donated, the regime of Omar al-Bashir has supported and even provided sanctuary to Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad (Wallechinsky, 2006). In the mid 1990's even Osama bin-Laden was known to be operating freely in Sudan (Coyne & Ryan, 2009).

In 1993 US placed Sudan on its lists of states which sponsored international terrorism, but that did not prevent \$21 million bilateral US aid. Even in 1998, when the US attacked Afghanistan and Sudan in Operation "Infinite Reach", the bilateral aid was more than \$13 million.

The regime of Bashir has been radical-Islamic since its beginnings in 1989. The regime is a combination of influences of the Iranian Islamic revolution and the more radical Taliban interpretations of Islam, making this one of the most brutal regimes in Africa.

The human rights violations are appalling even among the northern Arab population, where the penal code includes flogging, amputation and other forms of Sharia Law. Western art, music, and culture are also strictly forbidden. In 1995 the regime banned alcohol including all

medicines that contain alcohol, which resulted in epidemic of malaria (Wallechinsky, 2006). Bashir applied measures that led to the economic destruction of Sudan by confiscating land and forcing people into “protected villages”. The US policy makers’ continuously condemned Sudan’s human rights violations but in the same time they continued to send billions of dollars to the Sudanese government.

According to Coyne and Ryan research, the world’s worst dictators have received \$105 billion dollars in a form of Official Development Assistance (Coyne & Ryan, 2009). The foreign aid for the past half a century has become more of assistance to dictators to remain in power rather than an instrument to help the poor.

In a research of Alesina and Weder there was no evidence that foreign aid goes less to corrupt leaders. On a contrary, the more corrupted governments receive more foreign aid than less corrupted ones. According to the same research the Scandinavian countries give more to less corrupted governments, while the US gives more assistance to corrupted and autocratic regimes (Alesina & Weder, 1999).

Dictatorial aid recipient government do not have any incentive to achieve favourable economic results. On contrary, their inability to achieve economic growth is enhanced with their unwillingness for their country to grow prosperity. Easterly in his research argues that corrupted and dictatorial regimes want to keep their population poor and uneducated because they do not want critical intelligent mass to threaten their rule. In addition, if the poverty level declines so will the foreign aid from which the regimes benefit at most (Easterly, 2007).

This situation in Africa creates a moral hazard problem where recipient governments maintain the poverty level for their own personal gain. Brautigam and Knack analyse the existence of this moral hazard problem generated by the foreign aid (Brautigam & Knack, 2004).

These theories were previously supported by Friedman and Lord Bauer. According to their researches the recipient politicians would not distribute aid in an effective manner in order to maintain the socio-economic status quo and to keep the aid flowing. Bauer (2000) argues that the entire structure of foreign aid facilitates its failure. The funds will benefit the regime leaders and not the people.

These two points explain the “real African poverty trap” that is a combined result of dictatorial regimes, corruption and foreign aid. The “poverty trap” described by Jeffrey Sachs in the book “End of Poverty” is actually a continuation of a failed aid policies that are repeating for more than half a century. The following quotations symbolize the patterns of aid model repetition.

In 1949, 33rd US president President Harry S. Truman stated in his inaugural address: “More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery... For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people” (Peters & Woolley, 2012).

Sixty years later the same foreign aid model is still repeated with the 44<sup>th</sup> US President:

*“As the wealthiest nation on Earth, I believe the United States has a moral obligation to lead the fight against hunger and malnutrition, and to partner with others...We're rebuilding the United States Agency for International Development as the world's premier development agency...In short, we're making sure that the United States will be the global leader in international development in the 21st Century.”*

*-Barrack Obama, May 18, 2012-*

The history of US foreign aid has been repeating itself for more than sixty years. Presidents have changed, new development strategies have been implemented, but decades and trillions of dollars later the people in Africa are poorer, famines are more frequent and economic growth is slower.

The real problem is that the African Real GDP per capita falls for many years. In 1980 the average income per capita in Africa was almost four times higher than the Chinese. In 2011 the Chinese GDP per capita was more than three times higher. The reasons for this drastic change can be found in the rising African population and the slower growth rate (The Economist, 2011).

The democratically elected governments do not automatically solve all economic problems in the African countries. However, the more important question is not whether democracy performs perfectly in Africa, but rather does democratic government perform better than dictatorships. As a logical example there are the countries of Mauritius and Botswana.

The total US foreign aid towards Mauritius was minimal and represents only \$106 dollars over a time span of half a century. The growth of Mauritius GDP has averaged more than 5% a year since 1970 and the annual growth in per capita income has also been high. In the same period the average growth in Sub-Saharan Africa was 3, 2 %. The GDP per capita increased about seven fold between 1976 and 2008 from less than \$1000 to roughly 7000\$ (The World Bank, 2011). With stable institutions and democratic climate, Mauritius experienced steady growth, low inflation and increased employment. Mauritius per capita growth has been even higher than many oil exporting economies such as Angola and Nigeria.

The democratization process in several African countries has shown a pattern of increased economic rates. Ghana, Benin and Malawi have experienced increased economic growth after democratization in the nineties (Knutsen, 2010).

In contrast to the growth of the democratized countries, the African nations that were ruled by dictators had lower living standards and slower growth. Prominent examples are Mobutu's Zaire, Togo under Eyadema, Uganda under Idi Amin and Obote, Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, and Kenya under Arap-Moi (Knutsen, 2010). Apart from the brutality and corruption these leaders received foreign aid from international financial institution and the US as shown in Table. The result of this combination of brutal autocratic leaders, foreign aid and weak institutions resulted into prolonged economic stagnation and underdevelopment.

Autocratic leaders in Africa have undermined the basic foundation of economic development such as the right for property. This violation was first implemented by Zaire leader Mobutu, who under racist motivation turned foreign owned farms to the "sons of the country". These actions would ensure Mobutu reign and also make him the third richest man in the world. Similar actions were made in Uganda where Idi Amin expelled the entire Asian minority and confiscate their property. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century this tradition of racially motivated land grabbing and economical self-destruction was continued by Robert Mugabe.

Another great mismanagement of the African leaders is their fiscal and monetary policy. The lack of fiscal and monetary discipline in almost every African country can be result of numerous factors. Apart from ignorance and corruption, the printing of money by African central banks has been for the purpose of seigniorage for the regime, a way to reduce the government's real debt through increased inflation. In other words, the common people would pay the debts created by their leaders, a process that is gaining momentum in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

However, the international aid community is in part to blame for this situation for lending the funds in the first place and creating this financial “moral hazard”.

The dictatorial regimes funded with foreign aid not only maintained but enhanced the underdevelopment and the destruction of the government institutions. The autocratic leaders and the economic stagnation are actually two sides of the same coin, as one cannot exist without the other. Anything that is in between, such as: competent administration, bureaucracy and intelligence, has to be suppressed or eliminated because it can bring change to the regime. As a result Zaire’s public administration was in a state of an organized disorganization designed to maintain the status quo (Leslie 1988). Similarly, Nguema and later Obiang hunted the intellectual elite in Equatorial Guinea. Mugabe performed racial cleansing of the white minority to eliminate all critique and intelligent opposition.

The foreign aid in this process is used as catalysis to maintain the socio-political status quo. Aid alleviates famine and poverty to some level, but also maintains autocratic leaders to rule for decades.

The theory that foreign aid does not generate growth has been analysed by numerous development economists. Peter Boone’ research in 1995 found that aid does not significantly increase investment and growth, nor does it benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators.

Other research point out the fungibility of aid as the prime cause of the failure of economic growth (Chatterjee, et al., 2007). The research in 2000 analysed 67 countries in the time period of 1972-2000 and found strong evidence of the fungible of aid while no statistically significant link between foreign aid and economic growth.

Another group including Djankov, Montalvo and Querol (2006), Brautigam and Knack (2004), and Knack (2001) in their researches find that foreign aid worsens democracy, the quality of bureaucracy and increases corruption (Djankov, et al., 2006).

According to Easterly (2007) the billions of US dollars that flew into Africa produced a per capita growth that is close to zero. The top aid recipients from Africa that received more than 17% of their GDP in aid over 42 years also had near zero per capita growth (Easterley, 2007). However, among the first to analyze the missing link between foreign aid and growth was Peter Bauer. Lord Bauer research de-mystified the notion that developing countries can break out of the so called poverty trap only by receiving foreign aid from developed countries. Bauer’s research went even a step further by stating that development aid is not designed to rescue poor societies from poverty. The development aid was designed to keep countries in the underdeveloped status quo. Aid promotes dependence as it encourages the false ideas that emergency from poverty depends on external donation rather than on people’s own effort, motivational and actions. The government to government aid was contra productive to growth according to Bauer as it misallocates resources, increases the size and power of the government, leads to corruptions and erodes the civil society (Bauer, 2000).

In 1976, Bauer pointed out that any poor country where there are incentives to invest which are attractive does not need aid, while a poor country without incentives to invest will not have aid go into investment (Vasquez, 2007).

Peter Bauer refuted the popular notion that large amounts of capital were necessary for economic growth. For Peter Bauer the “Lack of money is not cause of poverty, it is poverty” and to have money is the “result of economic achievement, not its precondition” (Bauer, 1987).



The economic growth can be achieved with economic reforms, with “readiness to produce for the market instead of for subsistence and the pursuit of appropriate government policies” (Bauer, 1981).

In 1972, Bauer pointed out the development problem in many African countries. The development does not depend solely on the development on manufacturing while neglecting agriculture. Bauer criticized the economic theorists of aid that they are ignorant of the economic history and confuse correlation with causation with this quotation: “this argument for industrialisation, as somebody once said, is analogous to the suggestion that smoking expensive cigars will make people rich as it is rich people who smoke expensive cigars.” (Bauer, 1972)

In the early stages of development African countries neglected agriculture and focused on manufacturing. According to Bauer the neglect of agriculture was the greatest mistake that did not provide growth (Bauer 1972, 144-45). The radical agricultural land reforms and racial land grabbing in Zaire, Ghana, and Zimbabwe have proven Bauer’s point. On the other hand, countries that implemented sound economic policies and oriented in sectors that are competitive have provided strong economic growth. Such was the agriculture sector in Rhodesia, South Africa and Botswana.

The aid-generated “moral hazard” was further increased with the debt forgiveness programs such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). Economists that promoted this model argued that it would free up money that governments can spend on education, basic health services and social programs. However, one of the paradoxes of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) is that they became heavily indebted after two decades of partial debt relief and concessional lending (Easterly, 2002).

Although the development economists had a point on the political level this creates a situation where sovereign countries are under controlled default because of their inability and unwillingness to pay back the loans. The irresponsible policies that brought them to the state of economic stagnation are further increased by relieving them of their obligations to repay the debts. The notion that after the debt cancellation of the HIPC initiative, the African countries would be more responsible and reform their economies was proven as being wrong by the practices of Uganda, Burkina Faso, Mali, DRC, Gambia and Rwanda. The aid forgiveness “moral hazard” has been argued by Bauer who provides extensive examples of governments that are maintaining the corruption levels but continuing to receive aid and debt forgiveness at the same time.

Even the World Bank acknowledges that in the 2006 evaluation of the HIPC program, debt relief alone was not sufficient for debt sustainability in the poorest countries. With the HIPC initiative 18 countries had their debt levels reduced to half of their initial levels, but in 11 out of the 13 countries the debt situation has worsened. As a result, in 8 countries debt levels once again exceed HIPC threshold (Weiss, 2012).

The goals and terms used of the HIPC initiative to achieve “sustainable debt “were not appropriate for the African economic situation. These concepts are designed for middle – income countries that are suffering from heavy debt (Koeda, 2006). In the poor African countries that are under HIPC inactive, debt is not the crucial problem for lack of foreign investments and growth. Investors are more deterred from the political and economic instability, rather than debt of the country.

One of the crucial problems of the debt forgiveness initiatives such as HIPC and MDRI is the negative incentive that it creates at its beneficiaries. There is the incentive for countries not to

grow and maintain high level of debt in order to remain eligible for multilateral assistance and debt forgiveness. This kind of an approach penalizes good performing governments and rewards corrupt and incompetent regimes (Easterly, 2002).

The case of Zambia represents classic example of a country that was qualified for HIPC initiative. Zambia debts have accumulated for decades to a state where HIPC represents a cancelling of debt that could not be paid anyhow.

In the case of Zambia and other African countries the debt forgiveness would be good idea if it achieves the end goal - increased social-economic prosperity and end of foreign aid. In contrary, the HIPC initiative was followed with increase of foreign aid and more grants and loans. These aid forgiveness models that question all economic sanity represent borrowing treadmill that keeps African countries dependent on aid.

The HIPC and MDRI initiatives are actually not new as debt forgiveness aid programs. The debt forgiveness initiatives share the same patterns, as NGOs complain about the money that the African countries have to repay instead to build new schools or feed the hungry. Even mass media and celebrities are mobilized in the debt forgiveness programs. On the end there is debt forgiveness on a debt that could not be paid anyway, and in the same time the old African regimes are creating new debts and hoping for debt forgiveness.

Even the newest debt forgiveness initiative MDRI that supposed to clear all debts has been a continuation of the HIPC. The amount of debt relief provided by MDRI is small in comparison of the aid that is flowing in. In the fifteen African countries that are under the HIPC initiative, an interest of \$19 million was paid as a debt service in 2004. The same year, they received \$197 million as new World Bank aid or a total of \$946 million in total aid (Weiss, 2012).

As former World Bank economist William Easterly has documented, this debt forgiveness scheme has been repeating since the late 1970, and the result has been more debt. In the period from 1989 to 1997, 41 highly indebted countries were given \$33 billion of debt forgiveness. According to Easterly, the private credit to the heavily indebted poor countries has been replaced by foreign aid, while the loans from the international finance institutions were given on easier terms.

As a typical example of harmful effects of foreign aid and debt forgiveness is the central African country of Uganda. Corruption, aid dependency, inflation and dictatorial government are the results of a decade long foreign aid in Uganda. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century this African country has foreign budget support of nearly 50% of its total expenditures. This massive financial assistance has created effects of the “Dutch disease” in the Ugandan economy. Apart from inflation this financial assistance has eliminated the accountability of the Ugandan government to its people.

Foreign aid in Uganda finances primary education, basic health care and other basic governmental needs. Without this budget assistance Uganda would not be able to finance and maintain the state. The inflow of free money has created not only the biggest kleptocracy in Africa but also the most incompetent civil administration.

According to Ugandan revenue authority the tax collection amounts to about 12 % of the GDP. This percentage is even below the African average of 18-20 %. The reason for this is the fact that rich and politically connected people in Uganda do not pay taxes. While the US taxpayers are funding the healthcare and education infrastructure, Ugandan military spends more than 200 million US dollars every year. From this military budget about 20% is lost in corruption for paying Ugandan non-existing soldiers. Ugandan military spending culminated

in 2011 when it purchased a squadron of modern Russian fighter-bombers for a price of 740 million US dollars. The foreign budget assistance also goes to the massive public administration which is consisted with a record breaking 68 cabinet ministers, 73 presidential advisers and a stadium-sized parliament. Corruption in Uganda is endemic and is centred on the foreign aid. In a World Bank study by Titva Reinikka in 2004, it was reported that only 13% of the sizeable education budget reached the schools.

Table 4.6: Foreign Aid towards Uganda

<b>Gross Inflows of Foreign Aid before and after HIPC (adjusted for inflation)</b>			
<b>Inflows of Aid before HIPC</b>		<b>Inflows of Aid after HIPC</b>	
1991–92	US\$509m	1997–98	US\$842m
1992–93	US\$696m	1998–99	US\$795m
1993–94	US\$508m	1999–00	US\$700m
1994–95	US\$651m	2000–01	US\$666m
1995–96	US\$668m	2001–02	US\$849m
1996–97	US\$525m	2002–03	US\$847m

Source: Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, “Background to the Budget,” (1999–92 through 2002–03)

The Table 4.6 above illustrates the harmful effect of debt forgiveness. In the time span of six years before the HIPC initiative, the Uganda foreign aid was \$593 million per year. In the following years with the HIPC initiative the foreign aid increased to \$783 million per year or an increase of 32 %. After the debt forgiveness the international donors moved away from loans and towards grants. Despite all the effort of the international community the public debt increased.

The assistance towards Uganda culminated in the late nineties with the HIPC program. Despite the rampant corruption in all levels of government, serious human rights violations and genocidal war in the DRC, Uganda qualified to be HIPC program and received a debt relief. The actions by the international financial organizations were against any economical principals and beyond the basic common sense. From a political standpoint the debt forgiveness of a country with a dictatorial regime that has perpetuated gross human rights violations is beyond scandalous.

Uganda was one of the first countries to benefit this debt forgiveness program. When qualified, Uganda’s debt was 3, 2 billion US dollars, much of that was accumulated in the long civil war, political patronage and a costly war in Zaire. The HIPC initiative cleared off two thirds of this debt. According to the World Bank, Uganda deserved the debt relief because the government created good policy environment through macroeconomic policy reforms that led to impressive and sustainable economic growth rates over a decade. This explanation of the World Bank is completely illogical and economically unsound, because if the Ugandan government implemented good reforms that would led to growth, they could meet its obligations towards the creditors. In reality, the government of Museveni did not create the

necessary reforms and the economic growth was solely based on the rise of the prices of commodities and strategic minerals.

The case of Uganda is important for the precedent of moral hazard in economic and political sphere in Africa. The regime of Uganda was given substantial financial, humanitarian and military aid. When it failed to repay its obligations, the international finance community modelled the HIPC program, a charity for bankrupted African dictators to maintain their regimes.

Incidentally the HIPC initiative for Uganda was started during the Second war in the Congo, in which more than six million people were killed. Parallel to the military adventures in Congo and Sudan, the regime of Museveni indulged the political and military elite in the country. According to the Ugandan public review of the Ugandan ministry of finance in 2002 showed an increase of 16 % annually from 1998 on. The Ugandan military budget doubled from \$110 million to \$200 million in 2005. Even the President did not spare expenses on new luxury as he bought a presidential private jet for \$35 million (Mwenda, 2006).

This in turn leads to the political part of the moral hazard started by the HIPC program. The debt cancellation induces the African governments that they can borrow and spend money without paying the price for their actions. The conditions required for the debt forgiveness in HIPC and MDRI create situation where the poor performing regimes are rewarded.

All of the 33 African countries that are under HIPC initiative have bad human rights record. Uganda and Rwanda began their program while they were engaged in invasion in DRC. Ethiopia has also received aid, loans and debt forgiveness as it continued with its silent genocide in the Ogaden. The debt forgiveness can make a difference only if the conditionality includes the need for basic human rights.

Ultimately foreign aid does not create long-term economic growth, the basic condition for poverty alleviation. The long history of aid has proven this notion. The transfer of money from taxpayers in the US to the corrupted and authoritarian governments in Africa can only increase the aid dependence and corruption while maintaining the ruthless regimes in power. Even if the most recent growth rates, which are exceptionally high, are analysed, the other social and economic indicators are remaining, such as the level of inequality, poverty, unemployment and people that are starving.

The foreign aid as tool of the US foreign policy in Africa was designed to create and maintain the economic underdevelopment of the continent. This development aid acted as a catalyst for all corrupted and dictatorial regimes in Africa. The foreign aid funds also caused the silent "Dutch Disease" in the African economy and damaging their monetary and fiscal policies. The greatest economic paradox is that one of the richest in minerals continent is actually the poorest. This paradox and its connection with foreign aid were analyzed more recently by Moyo (2009) who compares aid to parasitic contagion. Moyo's biological metaphores maybe probably describe the side effects of foreign aid most properly. If an African economy and society is compared to a physiological organism, then the aid has an effect as the AIDS virus, constantly mutating and damaging the weak parts in the economy. As a result of the virus the most aid dependent countries have exhibited growth rates averaging -0,2 % annually (Moyo, 2009). Parallel to this statistics, Africa's real per capita income in 2009 was lower than in 1970. While the rest of the world enjoyed strong economic growth, the African aid dependent countries failed to develop and grow.

## 4.2 Humanitarian aid and the consequences of U.S. Food Aid to Africa

“He who feeds you, controls you”

-Thomas Sankara, President of Burkina Faso (Robin Shuffield, 2006)-

The critique of US Food Aid programs is started with a quote of the President of Burkina Faso. Thomas Sankara was a military leader, socialist, revolutionary and poorly educated for a head of state. However in the mid-eighties he understood the politics of foreign aid, the issues of dependency and permanent African underdevelopment. When he came into power, Upper Volta was among the poorest countries in the world with starving population that was depended on food hand-outs from Europe and the US. After three years of radical reforms, Sankara made his country self-sufficient in food production. Thomas Sankara was the greatest opponent of foreign aid and demanded dignity over charity. Burkina Faso's social experiment has shown that even the poorest people living in the harshest desert environments can survive, become food sufficient and prosper. Two decades later after Sankara's assassination, Burkina Faso is a corrupt African nation with a starving population depended on food aid.

The case of Burkina Faso is repeated throughout the continent as more countries have their populations starving and under the poverty trap. The most recent famines in the Horn of Africa and West African states of Mali and Niger are the evidence of the failed and counter-productive policy of US food aid.

For the past half a century the US has proven to be the most generous donator of food aid. For over a half a century, the US has sent over 106 million metric tons of food. This massive food aid provides 60% of the total world food aid (US Agency for International Development, 2004). However there are specific political goals behind this generosity and several unintended or intended consequences in delivering this massive food aid.

United States Food Aid programs are more complex than most people perceive. The humanitarian agencies that deliver food aid to help the starving African people represent only a part of the total food aid. The US Food Aid can be divided into three main parts: programme food aid, project food aid and emergency food aid. Although these parts seem different they have been cases where these programs supplement each other.

The Programme food aid is a programme of monetization of US food aid (Oxfam, 2005). The tons of food that are donated by the US are given to a recipient government that is reselling the food at below market price and uses the money to fund other projects or for settling their balance of payments. Usually, the food aid is monetized by the recipient government to provide funding for government activities that may have no connection to food security. In several occasions this capital generated from programme food aid has been used for military purposes. According to several researches this in kind food aid is the principle cause of growing corruption in the recipient countries (Nunn & Qian, 2011).

Programme Food Aid was till the 1990s the predominant form of food aid (Simmons, 2007). The name itself, Programme Food Aid is a contradictory and opposed to what the common people believe it is. This aid has no relations to food insecurity or famine but instead it represents a form of economic assistance. Other misconception in the public is fact that Programme Food Aid is given for free. Programme food aid is usually sold to recipient country through concessional financing and export credit quarantines (Mousseau & Mittal, 2005). The recipient African countries purchase food aid with money borrowed at lower than

market interest's rates. Programme food aid was crucial during the Cold War when millions of tonnes were given to client states that were strategically important. Massive food aid was given to South Vietnam and Indonesia in the 1960 and 1970s. In the same time frame hidden famines were underway in Africa. The famine in the Sahel region that lasted from 1968 to 1972 took more than million lives. This strategy was continued during the war on terror, where Iraq and Afghanistan began receiving massive food aid (Food trade and nutrition coalition, 2005). The US continues to be the only country that sells its food aid instead of giving it in a grant form (Oxfam, 2005).

The Project aid is similar programme with the exception that the receivers of the food are the private NGOs that are reselling the food to fund their activities and projects.

Project food aid is directed at specific programs within the recipient country. The food aid in most cases is monetized or sold in the recipient country at lower market prices. However, there are instances where the project food aid is used directly in a specific program as food for work and school feeding program. The Public Law 480 allows for private voluntary organizations to sell food aid in the recipient county or in the respected region, in an amount that is not less than 15 % of the aggregate amounts of all commodities distributed as non-emergence programs (Ho & Hanrahan, 2010). The funds acquired are used for the development projects and the salaries for the aid workers.

Project food aid represented 20 % of the total US food aid (Food trade and nutrition coalition, 2005). Although its share is relatively small compared to other programs, the project aid and its monetization has been heavily criticized in the past decade. Even the private voluntary organizations which are the principal benefactors of the project food aid are opposed of the monetization of food aid (CARE USA, 2006).


The third part is known as emergency or relief food aid. This type of food aid is provided in response to natural disasters or manmade catastrophes that in turn create acute food shortages. In contrast to the previous program and project food aid, the emergency food aid is being delivered for free to governments and non-governmental agencies that are responding to natural disaster or conflict.

Although this form of food aid receives the biggest media attention it is the smallest form in quantity over the history of US food aid (Nunn & Qian, 2011). Since the end of the Second World War, the US has donated food aid that is valued at more than 73 billion US dollars. One third of that food aid or 28 billion US dollars was provided as programme food aid on loans, while just under two thirds or 45 billion US dollars was given as grants as emergency and project food aid (Simmons, 2007).

However, in the past ten years, the emergency food aid or the Title II of the PL480 became the primary source of US food aid (Ho & Hanrahan, 2010). The reasons for this dramatic shift from Title I or program food aid to Title II are numerous. First is the decline in the surplus of agriculture commodities but more important are the critics that the US is receiving from the monetization of the Food Aid.


The rise of the emergency food aid can be seen on the following figures (Figure 4.7, Figure 4.8).

Figure 4.7: Distribution of PL 480, Food for Peace Program, FY 1992-2009



Source: USAID Congress Budget Justification (2010)

Figure 4.8: Food Aid Deliverise by Category



Source: USAID (2007)

Despite the enormous food aid and different programs given by the United States, the number of malnourished people is growing in even faster rate. In the period of 1996 and 2006 the number of chronically hungry people in poor countries has increased for 20 million people (Wahlberg, 2008). The number of 850 million people in 2006 has risen again and in 2012 is 925 million according to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Parallel to millions of hungry people, the level of poverty has grown exponentially. In the 1970 less than 10% of Sub Saharan African population lived in poverty while in the 21<sup>st</sup> century that number has grown to over 70 %. There has been progress in poverty reduction in Asia, but in Sub-Saharan Africa the number of people living below the poverty line has increased (FAO, IFAD, WFP, 2002).

The level of poverty and hunger is unseen in the history of the continent. The causes for this situation range from civil wars, droughts, dictatorial regimes and even global warming. All these reasons are valid. However, the role of massive food aid has rarely been mentioned as a possible cause for the dire situation in Africa.

The three models of US food aid, with their million tons of food impact on the small African economies on the short and long run, in the monetary sense and in the real economy. The emergency food aid distributed in a famine area will end or mitigate the effects of malnutrition but only in the short run. On the long period, the food aid creates dependency of the food aid and endangers the local and regional agriculture. The true nature of the food aid was best described by an Ugandan member of the Food Trade and Nutrition coalition: "Food Aid is a necessary evil; it should only be given for short periods to overcome disasters" (Food trade and nutrition coalition, 2005).

These are some of the side effects of the US food aid in Africa. Although the US food aid programs constitute small share of the total foreign aid, the effects are massive. The average annual spending on international food aid programs over the past decade is \$2,2 billion, while the total foreign aid budget in 2010 was \$52 billion (Ho & Hanrahan, 2010).

#### ***4.2.1 The negative effects of Food Aid***

##### *4.2.1.1 Food aid and food prices*

The million tons of food aid delivered in Africa have massive impact on the real economy. Under the basic economic principles the massive dumping of food aid can lower the local, national and even regional price of food.

The food aid can have different effects on the economy in regards of the price. First, it depends on the time variable or whether the in-kind food aid is being delivered before any famine as a program or project food aid. In this case the monetization of the food aid lowers the real price of food in the country and in the region depending of the scale of the delivered aid. In a case of famine or humanitarian crisis, the in-kind food aid is sent as Type II of P.L.480, also known as emergency aid. Evidence from all known famines in Africa has shown that the food aid is slowly delivered and the quantities are overestimated. This creates distortions in the regional African market as the price of food falls.

The US in-kind food has been criticized for the past two decades by the international humanitarian agencies and European donors. European solution to the food crisis in Africa is cash donations to the African governments and local or regional food donations paid by European taxpayers. This would solve the logistical problem of transporting thousands tons of food aid across the ocean and greatly reduce the time to deliver. However, cash donations that would buy local or regional food aid pose several problems and create paradox situation. How can food be purchased in a country or region that has shortages of basic food products? In a famine zone there is not any amount of money that can solve the food shortages. The food products are finite and in deficit. The aid funds would redistribute the already existing food in the region. This capital would have the same effect of Dutch disease and raise the price of food exponentially.

In the US in-kind food aid the price of food always falls on the local African market after food aid distribution in any form. First, with the monetization of the food aid, or the program and project aid, food commodities are flooded into the market. As a consequence of increased supply and low demand, the price of food falls. Second, the African households that have been receiving food aid may decrease demand for the local food producers. These households



may even resell the food aid to purchase other necessities or complements, driving down prices of the food aid commodity and its substitutes (Djankov, et al., 2006).

There are several researchers that find that the US food aid and especially the monetization of aid depress prices. Among these is the 1995 research where Merle Faminow analyses the in-kind food aid programs in Ethiopia (Faminow, 1995). Decade later Barret and Maxwell conclude that monetization of food aid has negative implication on local market prices (Barrett & Maxwell, 2005).

There are numerous instances where US food aid has lowered the price of food commodities. In the 1990's the donated yellow maize lowered the price of white and yellow maize. In Sierra Leone the food prices fell drastically, because the refugees from Liberia resold the food aid (Barrett, 2006). In Mozambique the price of yellow and white maize fell after large monetization of US food aid (Tschirley & Howard, 2003).

The use of US food aid in the international arena has not been limited in Africa. The consequences of the food aid can be summoned in the US food aid to Russia in the 1990's. The case of food aid to a traditional US opponent, Russia, is vital for the explanation for this hypothesis. Numerous economists, Russian officials and even EU diplomats agree that large amounts of food aid made things worse, by encouraging corruption and weakening Russia's own food industry. This was illustrated in the last days of the Soviet Union when food aid was sold below market prices (The Economist, 1998). The Russian case resulted with the financial and economic collapse in 1998. The similar situation has been repeating on a massive scale in most of the African countries for more than a half of a century.

According to economists in Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and empirical evidence the injecting food aid into a market will dampen and destabilize prices unless local markets are well integrated with regional and international markets. The farmers who produce and sell similar products may suffer losses by decreased demand (FAO, 2006).

For the aid agencies the fall of food prices is translated as a success, since more people can afford cheap food and hunger is eliminated. However, short term solution cause long term problems in the food production. Most affected in this situation are the local African farmers that cannot compete with the cheap or free food aid.

#### *4.2.1.2 Lower domestic food production*

One of the greatest unintended consequences of food aid is paradoxically lower food production in the targeted states. This consequence is in fact logical aftermath of the previous, the fall of food prices after massive food aid donations. The process of dumping surplus agriculture production for free or at lower market prices to poorer countries translates into a situation where farmers cannot compete and lose incentive to produce food.

The scientific researchers are divided on this subject. Some studies show that food aid has increased the food production while other researchers refuse this claim. In the middle there are the facts that show massive increasing of poverty, hunger and malnutrition in the time period when food aid was delivered. In the 1970 the share of the people that was living below the poverty level was close to 10 % and forty years later it has risen to 70 %. The number of people that are starving has also risen from 800 million in 1999 to 870 million in 2012 (FAO, WFP, IFAD, 2012).

From this bottom billion of people that are suffering from hunger, 80 % are living in the rural areas. Paradoxically the rural areas are the very place where food supposed to be produced. The situation with undernourished people is similar with undernourished children of whom

75% live in rural areas where they are engaged in small farming (Food trade and nutrition coalition, 2005). The logical question is how and why the low middle class that was the breadbasket disappeared.

According to FAO the percentage of undernourished people in the world is declining and the Millennium goals are achievable. Only in Africa the number of undernourished people is on the rise. As seen in the following Table 4.7 the number of undernourished people has risen from 170 million to 234 million.

Table 4.7: Undernourishment in Africa, 1990–92 to 2010–12

	<b>1990–92</b>	<b>1999–2001</b>	<b>2004–06</b>	<b>2007–09</b>	<b>2010–12</b>
<b>Africa</b>	175	205	210	220	239
<b>North Africa</b>	5	5	5	4	4
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	170	200	205	216	234

Source: FAO (2012)

This table also makes a difference between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the table there is great difference of the number of malnourishment in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. This poses another economical paradox: how is it possible for the countries of North Africa that have the worst desert climate to have only a fraction of the undernourished whereas the most fertile region of the continent has 234 million starving people. Accidentally, Sub-Saharan Africa is the bigger recipient of food aid.

The monetized food aid may have been in direct conflict with the first Millennium Development Goals (MDG) which states that by 2015 hunger and malnutrition should be cut by 50% from 800 million in 1999 to 400 million in 2015. However this number has in fact risen to 870 million in 2012 according to UN Food and Agriculture Organization report (FAO, WFP, IFAD, 2012).

The reason for this increase of poverty and hunger is because the people are caught in a rural poverty trap. Their only means of income for the rural Africans, the agriculture, has been severely damaged by the cheap subsidized food aid. In a 1979 a research of Maxwell and Singer found that food aid causes average and more volatile local market prices that discourage the food production in recipient countries (Barrett, 2002).

The price of food is the main reason for the decline of the food production in Africa. Although the world is seeing sharp increases of the price of food in 2008 and 2009, the African markets are isolated in certain periods of time. The reason for this disruption of the market prices and the decline in the food production can be found in the food aid.


Lowered prices usually hurt net sellers of food commodities and if food aid is continuous for several years it can create discentive for them to invest in their own agricultural production. The African farmers could lose their livelihoods due to low prices, rendering them dependent

on food aid. As a result the whole agriculture department in the targeted country can be devastated (Barrett, 2006).

Another more important reason for the decrease of food production in Africa can be found in the Structural Adjustments Programs (SAP). In order to be eligible for loans from the IMF and World Bank, African countries had to proceed with SAPs (Ismi, 2004). Among the requirements of the international financial institutions there was the need to end the agricultural subsidies. Although the US and most of the European countries have agricultural subsidies, there was need to end the African agricultural subsidies. For the irony to be even greater the US PL480 or food for peace has triple purpose, a humanitarian, strategic and more important - it is a subsidized export for agricultural surplus.

Typical example of decline of the food production in Africa and the increase of dependency of food aid is Ethiopia. This east African country has received more food aid than any other country in the world. This figure below (Figure 4.9) illustrates the scale of food dependency in Ethiopia through its history.

Figure 4.9: Ethiopia: wheat food aid and production




Source: Food and Agricultural Organization (2004)

Figure above shows the production of wheat and the food aid in Ethiopia in a time span of 32 years. The food aid began to play important role since the famine in 1984 and was at the average to 68,4 % of domestic production and in some years it exceeded domestic wheat production ( Kirwan & McMillan, 2007). According to UN demographics the population in 1970 was 30 million and to 2012 it has reached to 84 million. Meanwhile the production of basic food commodities has not kept pace with the booming population growth. The agriculture in Ethiopia remains highly underdeveloped and still relies of favourable rainfall.

The stagnation of Ethiopia's agricultural production is illustrated in the Figure 4.10 below which gives three different variables that were crucial for the Ethiopian food security.

Figure 4.10: Ethiopia: wheat production and food aid per capita



Source: Food and Agricultural Organization (2004)

Figure 4.10 shows the stagnation of the wheat sector in Ethiopia. The wheat production has remained relatively flat while the wheat food aid fluctuated. The result of this inconsistency of food aid has had a significant destabilizing effect on availability of wheat in Ethiopia (Kirwan & McMillan, 2007).

The food production in Ethiopia is not an isolated case. During the 1970's only the poorest African countries were net food importers. Nigeria and Uganda were food self-sufficient and even food exporters (FAO, IFAD, WFP, 2011). Ghana also used to be self-sufficient in rice production but the World Bank insisted that the agricultural subsidies had to stop and the markets had to be open. As a result, the rice production in Ghana crumbled while the US rice became the primary rice import. The reason for this import was the lower price of the subsidized US rice (Ismi, 2004).


The “Food for Work” (FFW) program has proven to be another distortion in the African agriculture and contribute in the decline in the domestic production. The FFW programs are more attractive that the work on African farmers because the FFW pays immediately and the return of labour are higher. In this case this FFW program takes productive inputs away from private production and creates distortion due to substitution effects. This US food program causes food dependency and decreases the agricultural productivity in the recipient country (Barrett, 2006).

The African least developed countries in the 21<sup>st</sup> century are still in the poverty trap. Even if they overcome their dependence of food aid they will became dependent on imports often from the original donor country. None the less this was the original idea of the PL 480 from the 1950's to promote US food exports through food aid. This food dependency is also detrimental to the country's economic development. In times of high food prices, the least developed countries may face balance of payments problems or become food insecure. The continued dependency on food aid or imports creates a vicious circle of permanent misery and underdevelopment. Food aid can cause stagnation in the agricultural sector hence increasing

rural poverty. Rural populations in Africa are most vulnerable of food insecurity, because aid agencies cannot reach them. The mass migrations into urban areas in search of better life or simply food aid will increase the urban poverty levels. This creates a situation of increase urban mega slums all across Africa, where people are completely dependent on food aid.

The link between food aid and food production in Africa was analyzed extensively by Easterly (2009). The following Figure 4.11 illustrates the stagnation and even decline in African food production. While countries in Asia were going through the green revolution in terms of increasing their food production, Africa agriculture was declining as seen on Figure 4.11.

Figure 4.11: Failure of food production in Africa relative to Green Revolution in Asia



Source: Easterly (2009)

The lack of success in African agriculture has been evidenced by numerous reports. According to the World Bank report only 40% of the agriculture projects in Africa are successful. This continues lack of growth in food production has created pessimism in donors, which have become more willing to contribute towards social projects that show greater success rate.

#### 4.2.1.3 Changed consumption patterns

According to UNHCR in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights the right to food must be “free from adverse substances and acceptable within a given culture”. However food aid has done the opposite. During the West African Sahel food crisis in the 1970 and 1980 the US responded with shipments of wheat and rice. This created a shift in the consumer demand from the local millet and sorghum to western wheat (Barrett, 2006).

Also in the Horn of Africa the pastoral population had to change its indigenous diet. This shift from a protein heavy to carbon hydrate heavy diet had unintended physiological consequences for the pastoral populations (Barrett & Maxwell, 2005).

In Somalia the starving population had to learn and adapt to wheat instead of the traditional and familiar rice based diet. In Uganda the local population were offended and refused the food aid of yellow maize which is considered to be food for pigs. For the people of Uganda the white maize is culturally accepted food (Food trade and nutrition coalition, 2005).

However, the situation in Kenya in 2000 illustrates the paradox of changing the consumption food patterns. In the midst of the starvation the prices of the local distilled alcohol fell considerably while the consumption level increased to alarming levels. The reasons were in the US food aid, whose grains were used not for hunger alleviation but for alcohol production. The reasons for this covered scandal can be found in the corrupt Kenyan government or in the incompetence of the humanitarian organization. Another answer is that the local population was not accustomed to consume that particular donated food aid (Barrett & Maxwell, 2005).

In the past two decades the US based corporations are pushing for the use of Genetically Modified (GM) food in Africa. The controversy is in the fact that they are using the US food aid programs as a backdoor in the African market. In 2002 several South African countries were facing starvation but they refused US food aid because it contained genetically modified food aid. The GM food represents the culmination of the forced change of consumption patterns in Africa. Entire food culture and a way of life that has existed for centuries are being substituted with pro-American genetically modified food.

#### *4.2.1.4 Natural resource overexploitation*

Recent research shows that food aid distributions have negative effects in the environment with changing the consumption patterns. In Kenya, food aid distribution centres have created great concentration of livestock that caused massive grazing and soil degradation. The food aid in these centres is mostly grain that requires more cooking, and thus more wood which stimulates local deforestation (McPeak, 2002).

#### *4.2.1.5 Distortion of NGO staffing and behaviour*

The humanitarian aid industry has grown to a big business, with an estimated 37.000 international NGOs with 300.000 employees that are competing for donation worth more than 11 billion US dollars annually (Stoddard, et al., 2009). The bigger part of these massive funds is provided by the governments while the rest is donated directly from the public. The humanitarian NGOs spend the aid funds until they saturate the “absorptive capacity” in a crisis zone. However, the aid industry has proven through the history to fund wars, feed rebels, soldiers and keep dictators in power (Polman, 2010).

The unintended consequences of the aid NGO industry are massive. Even though these organizations operate with budgets of millions of US dollars in conflict areas they are not being controlled or regulated. This creates a situation where the aid workers and humanitarian organization are not being held responsible for their failures and mistakes. The paradox is even greater when the aid organizations are writing their own reports on the scales of success.

Regardless of the humanitarian aspect of the aid industry, the employees in these NGOs are receiving salaries or other form of financial compensation. In order to stay in business they need two things, a crisis, whether it is natural or manmade, and willing donors. The crises are usually exaggerated in order for the aid workers to receive greater funds. The aid workers

usually are “taxed” with bribes by the beleaguered in the conflict zones and as a result the conflict is prolonged. In several instances the aid workers do not report the human rights abuses in the country they operate in fears of being deported.

The aid industry has become powerful lobby in Washington, influencing the public opinion for the African-Americans. As a result there are very few representatives in Congress that could object the demands of the NGOs. The power of the humanitarian NGOs culminated in 2012 when they lobbied for the US to engage in military conflict in Central Africa against the infamous LRA. This trend of lobbying in Congress and manipulation of the general public can have grave implication in the future.

The humanitarian organizations are crucial in the process of monetization of US food aid. The project food aid is monetization of US agricultural surplus in order to provide cash for the US-based NGOs such as CARE, World Vision and Catholic Relief Services. The basic idea from the 1980 seemed to have double positive impact, more cheap food in Africa and the humanitarian agencies would have more funds and capabilities. The side effects from project aid have been catastrophic for the African economies and that has been confirmed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). This UN body urged humanitarian organization to stop monetizing food aid because it is distorting local markets and production (FAO, 2006).

The humanitarian NGOs together with the US government and the agro-industry form the iron triangle that conducts the overall foreign policy in Africa (Provost, 2012).

The socio-political power of the NGOs have risen in the past few years to a degree that they are giving demands and setting conditions. In 2006 the oldest and biggest humanitarian NGO-Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) issued a white paper in which among the critics of US foreign aid stated that the organization would not operate with the monetization of food aid process. In the second point of the demand of CARE it stated that the organization will not proceed with monetization of food aid because it is not economical and demands a lot of effort. Instead, this NGO would accept the logical alternative, money, as a replacement in order to purchase the food locally.

This white paper, although short it is significant in three ways. The biggest and oldest humanitarian NGO confirms the thesis of the harmful effects of in-kind food aid. Second, it demonstrates the increased power of the NGOs in a way that they are dictating the aid policy, where this organization is demanding money instead the official US aid policy. The third component signalizes the possible shift of US food aid. In time when the price of food is increasing the US might follow the path of European countries by giving capital instead of food.

Another unintended consequence of the humanitarian NGO is the “brain drain” in Africa. The salaries in the humanitarian organizations are significantly higher than the private or the public sector. As a result the brightest students in the African countries are more incentivized to work for humanitarian organization instead for the real economy. This is one of the reasons for the downward spiral of the African economies and the growing percentage of poverty.

The humanitarian organizations compete for resources, projects and funds in Africa while they criticize the work of other aid agencies. This creates a negative perception of competing rather than cooperation. In the targeted countries this sends a message that it is unnecessary to cooperate or respect people with different opinions, while creating an environment in which differences are not tolerated. Aid workers are also seen to use the support systems and the aid agencies infrastructure for their own pleasure and recreation. This behaviour is seen by the local population as an act of impunity and inequality.

This notion of inequality is seen in the working environment of the NGOs. The foreign aid workers are paid higher than the local staff and are provided with luxuries than are beyond the reach of the local population. In time of crises the foreigners are first to be evacuated while the local employees are left behind (Lassiter, 2007). These actions downgrade the credibility of the aid agencies and create ethnic and racial hatred.

The ulterior motives of the humanitarian NGOs are demonstrated by the Bill Gates Foundation. This multibillion NGO has propagated the use of GM food in Africa. Nearly 80 % of Gates Foundation funded biotechnology in Kenya with over 100 million US dollars connected to Monsanto. The scandal is not only in the support of the GM food but also the fact that the Gates foundation bought shares from Monsanto in August 2010 (Zacune, 2011).

This revolving door between seemingly humanitarian organization and agricultural giant with the consent of the US government illustrates the previously mentioned humanitarian iron triangle. The goal and the purpose of this iron triangle are simply to exist and to give the perception of humanitarianism at home and abroad while profiting at the same time.

This system has persisted for decades while the scale of poverty and hunger has risen. The humanitarian organizations have grown and evolved to become part of the problem instead the solution. As Lord Bauer concludes, foreign aid and the Third World are the two faces of the same coin. Without the foreign aid and dependency the term Third World would not have existed.

#### *4.2.1.6 Disrupting International trade*

US food aid has repeatedly caused disruption in the international trade. The results have been catastrophic for African farmers and for the agricultural exporting sector.

Numerous researchers and development economists such as Berret, Mohapatra and Snyder (1999), Saran and Konandreas (1988) have proven that non-emergency food aid or combinations of program and project food aid, displace the commercial food trade. In a research in 1999, it was found that US food aid damages the commercial exports to 18 countries by 30% to 60%. The research finds that 1 kilogram of food aid displaces 0, 3 kilograms of imports (Barrett, et al., 1999).

One of the more famous examples of the disruptive nature of food aid is the case of the Guyanese rice trade to Jamaica. In this case two underdeveloped counties were engaged in a trade that could deliver them out of poverty. The rice exports from Guyana to Jamaica grew from 7,700 tonnes in 1994 to 57,700 tonnes in 1997. However this trade was ended when the US intensified its dumping of rice food aid to Jamaica (Oxfam, 2005). This resulted with the end of Guyanese export to Jamaica and further dependency to US food aid. The disruption of international trade caused by the US food aid programs can be summed up by a statement of the victims, the Guanine rice produces association with the statement:

“PL 480 [US food aid] was meant to boost food security... It was supposed to assist in the elimination of poverty, not in creating it. And we have seen a direct effect whereby in the very process of eliminating poverty [in one place], we have poverty being created in another region.”

-Dharankumar Seeraj, General Secretary of the Guyana Rice Producers' Association (Oxfam, 2002)-

The disruption of international trade in South America is only a small scale example of the real disruption in Africa. Millions of tons of US agriculture surplus have been dumped in



Africa for free or below the cost of production for over a half a century. If the humanitarian aspect is isolated the US program and project food aid would represent a clear form of predatory pricing.

An example of this predatory pricing has taken place in Cameroon where imported frozen chicken sent as monetized food aid completely wiped out the local chicken market. The ripple effect was felt even in neighbouring Nigeria. In this case the local underdeveloped African farmers had to compete with US subsidized food producing corporations that are using the food aid programs to dump their surplus. Under these conditions the ordinary Cameroonian farmer that had not been receiving subsidies cannot compete even in his local market. The case of Cameroon and Nigeria proves the thesis that in regions with well integrated agricultural markets the displacement of imports can transfer the balance of payment problem and poverty from one developing country to another (Oxfam, 2005).

The agriculture export sector in Africa is being faced with unfair competitor, that is highly subsidized and its commodities are delivered for free. Under such conditions the African agriculture cannot develop their agriculture export sector.

As a solution for negative effects of in kind food aid in international trade, financial assistance has been offered. These local and regional purchases of food aid will increase the overall demand for food in the area and may cause food prices to rise (FAO, 2006). Many of the African countries are underdeveloped and depend on agriculture exports. By displacing agricultural trade, the food aid deprives agriculture export of market opportunities.

#### *4.2.1.7 Disincentive for economic reforms*

US foreign aid including food aid has proven to have negative effect on reforms in the recipient countries in Africa. The constant supply of inexpensive food allows recipient governments to delay the implementation of policy reforms and even shift development resources away from agriculture sector (FAO, 2006). As a result, food shortages are regular and the country is in permanent need for aid (Barrett, 2006). The constant stream of funds and food aid mitigate the people's discontent for their governments in Africa. This in turn strengthens the position of the African regimes that have remained in power for decades.

As a genuine evidence for the disincentive nature for economic reforms caused by the US food and overall food aid, one should look into the greatest aid recipients in Africa. The US aid programs are present in almost every country in Africa, but if we follow the logic that greater aid causes greater impact the theory will hold. This research will analyze the economic situation of Ethiopia and Kenya and their lack of reforms. Both countries are great recipients of foreign aid and are considered as main US allies in East Africa.

Ethiopia is the key US ally in east Africa, and the country has received over 8,3 billion US dollars of aid since the early 1950's (USAID, 2011). Although Ethiopia is the seventh greatest recipient of US foreign aid, 44% of the Ethiopian people are malnourished and are dependent of food aid. The state of Ethiopian economy with its 50 % of unemployment, high levels of inflation and frequent famines can be described as catastrophic. Apart from these conventional economic indicators such as unemployment, inflation and starving population, the Ethiopian economy is actually growing in a record paste with double digit growth of GDP.

This economic paradox is actually the symptom of Ethiopian problems. The reason why Ethiopian economy has been praised for alleged reforms is because Ethiopia is US vital ally in east Africa.

The reason why Ethiopia has high levels of unemployment, inflation and famine in biblical scale can be found in its incompetent and authoritarian regime. The Ethiopian regime has been able to continue its bizarre economic and political policies without any reform simply because it had the economic backing of the US. This support has been manifested with billions of US dollars annually and millions of tons of food aid.

The US support for Ethiopian regime dates back from the early 1950's. In those years the US supported and funded the imperial regime of Haile Selassie which in term maintained some elements of the feudal system. The land in imperial Ethiopia was owned mainly by the aristocrats and the Orthodox Church, while the farmers had to provide up to 50 % of their crops as rent. The government provided less than 2 % for the agricultural development (USAID, 2011). This feudal system resulted in a famine that the imperial government tried to cover up by refusing food aid. As a consequence of these failed economic policies, millions of people starved and the government was violently replaced with even more brutal regime.

The US economic and military assistance was revived again with the pro-Western government of Meles Zenawi. In the same time while the aid was increasing both in funds and food the economic reforms were stagnant. The lack of pressure for reform has created a situation where a pro-Western African country has virtually no private sector, or private property laws and no patent laws (The Economist, 2007). According to IMF in 2005-06 the share of private investments in Ethiopia was only 11 % or unchanged since Meles Zenawi took power in 1990.

The fundamentals of a prosperous economy, the right of private property and land has been denied to the Ethiopian people. Under the Ethiopian constitution, the state owns all the land but citizens may lease land and are unable to mortgage, sell or own it (CIA, 2012). This lack of legal framework that allows people to own land is disincentive for farmers. The government can take the land from the farmer's whenever it chooses with no real court of justice. In short, Ethiopia under president Zenawi is a combination of the feudal system from Haile Selassie and the communist Derg regime with small modifications in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In Ethiopia, foreign banks are not allowed, which makes loans almost impossible for small and medium business. The telecommunication remains a state monopoly in a time when mobile phone industry has its renaissance across Africa (The Economist, 2007). According to Doing Business magazine Ethiopia is stagnant on the 163<sup>rd</sup> place in the world for starting business. The bureaucratic problems, corruption and the legal frameworks are only the symptoms of the problems of the Ethiopian economy. As a result the youth unemployment in Ethiopia is estimated as high as 70 %, and the overall unemployment is estimated at 50 %.

The lack of reforms in Ethiopia is personified by its usage of the 12 hour cycle, Julian calendar rather than Gregorian. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century the Ethiopian government is still not taking radical reforms to improve the economic situation, rather it relies on foreign aid donations.

The agricultural sector in Ethiopia is a special case of contradictory. Over 85 % of the population works in agriculture making it Africa's second biggest maize producer and big wheat producer as well. Agriculture is Ethiopia greatest export with 43 %, producing products that range from coffee to cotton. In the same time Ethiopia is one of the greatest recipients of food aid as seven million people are depending on international food (The Economist, 2007). With these conflicting economic indicators the Ethiopian economy is clearly one of the worst economic paradoxes in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The most recent issue in Ethiopian economy, with regards to the food security, is the land grabbing by foreign corporations and sovereign wealth funds. The process of land grabbing in Africa has been accelerating in the past several years. However this process has exploded in

Ethiopia, a country that has millions of people depended on food aid. In 2011, approximately 3,5 million hectares were allocated while the projected figure for 2015 is 7 million hectares or a territory of the size of the state of West Virginia (Lefort, 2011).

Kenya has also been a big recipient of US foreign aid including food aid. Since its independence, Kenya has received over six billions US dollars, while the number of Kenyans classified as poor grew from 29 % to 57 % from 1970 to 2000. The Human Development Index (HDI) ranked Kenya at 143<sup>rd</sup> position in 2009 out of 182 countries considered. The main reason for this is the fact that ten million people suffer from chronic food insecurity and around two million people rely on food assistance or 32 % of the entire population in Kenya is undernourished (FIAN, 2010).

The roots of Kenya's economic difficulties can be found from its first two presidents that ruled to 2002. Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, ruled the country as a confederation of opposing tribes. He gave the fertile central highlands to a tribe of which he belongs. The second president, Daniel Arap Moi, maintained the patronage system by redistributing public land to its supporters (FIAN, 2010). While this tribalism and corruption grew in Kenya the agricultural sector declined. Parallel to the growth of poverty the US annual foreign aid has doubled to 818 million US dollars and the costs of Kenyan corruption have reached to one billion US dollars. This amount of money is astronomical in a country where 23 % are living with a less than \$1 a day and pay 16 bribes a month or two in every three encounters with public officials. The corruption in Kenya has become endemic and resides in every level of the government. It is failed part of the international aid that has come in a form of billions of dollars and millions of tons food aid.

Numerous researches have shown that aid strengthens existing corruption in African countries and indirectly harm governance. The foreign aid creates distortion in the public sector; it creates a "renter state effect" and delays pressures for effective reform (Abuzeid, 2009). The destructive nature of corruption is second only to the AIDS epidemic that has virtually crippled the population. These problems combined with the corrupted and incompetent government have created an economic disaster for a significant part of the population in Kenya. The agriculture sector is heavily dependent on the regularity of the rainfall and crippled by corruption which makes the food products more expensive.

The economic situations in Kenya, Ethiopia and the failed state of Somalia were just waiting for the environmental conditions for a full blown disaster. The perfect storm happened during the famine of 2011. Drought, incompetent bureaucracies and corrupted African politicians were the main catalysts for this famine. This was the second time that the UN declared a famine in East Africa. In 1984 it blamed the Derg regime and in 2011 the blame fell to the militant Al-Shabaab organization.

The famine indicates the true nature of the African economies - a growth without reducing poverty and the billion US dollars lost in fake development that stalls real economic reforms. The 2011 famine ended the myth of Ethiopian and Kenyan economic growth and showed the weak points in their economies. One of the biggest paradoxes in the famine was the lack of US emergency aid. The US usually is the greatest donor in famine, but in this instance the US decided to give less in order the aid should not reach into terrorist's hands.

The cases of Ethiopia and Kenya were deliberately chosen to illustrate the consequences of US foreign aid. The lack of necessary economic reforms combined with the incompetent and corrupted politicians caused and sustained the famine in East Africa in 2011. The lack of reforms in Somalia were not analysed because it is a failed state, which relies entirely to foreign aid donations.

The East Africa famine of 2011 cannot be blamed simply on drought and the lack of international aid. The famine occurred in sovereign and internationally recognized countries which are independent for more than fifty years. The failure is solely in the political leadership in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. The lack of basic economic reforms and corruption boiled up the famine to a level that could have been prevented. The US role in this famine was indirect but crucial. In times when food aid was not necessary the US was too generous by dumping its agricultural surplus and thus delaying reforms. However when the food assistance was needed the most, the US failed to respond in fears to support terrorist organizations.

According to economist Irwin Seltzer the continued flow of aid infantilizes and debilitates its recipients while preventing the local economy from becoming self-sufficient. The aid system creates a situation where African politicians are begging for food aid across the world instead of creating institutions and promoting private-sector development. In order to maintain their grip on power African governments create cumbersome and inefficient public sector that is clouded with corruption.

The expectations of food assistance increase the risk taking among African politicians. This political “moral hazard” has been translated into the most bizarre political and economic measures (Lentz, et al., 2005). The African political elites have more freedom in taking measures while they are sure that the US will provide aid if they fail. As a result there numerous examples of political and economic paradoxes that is possible only in Africa. In countries ravaged by famine the government elites live in luxury and lease land to foreigners to grow crops for biofuel.

The indirect results of the aid model are growth of massive public sector instead of real economy and as James Shikwati notes “no wonder that in Africa the richest people are politicians, not entrepreneurs”. The real, long term and sustainable aid can come from the people in Africa, through their democratically elected leaders. The current aid model is simply postponing the needed structural reforms that are needed in the economy, political system and overall society in Africa. As Robert Calderas concludes: “Africans need breathing space much more that they need money” (Calderisi, 2007).

The half a century prolonged African Marshall Plan represents economic dependency and postponed reforms.

This part is finished with a quotation by 33<sup>th</sup> President of the United States. Although the idea was given for another time and continent it represents the true state of African regimes in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, regimes that are totalitarian in nature and sustained by the misery of their people and the constant need of foreign aid.

“The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want.”

-Harry S. Truman, March 3, 1947-

#### 4.2.1.8 US Food aid and conflicts in Africa

“Food is strength, and food is peace, and food is freedom, and food is a helping hand to people around the world whose good will and friendship we want,”

– John F. Kennedy (Schlesinger, 2002)-

President Kennedy probably never envisioned that food aid can be weaponized in the conflict zones in Africa. Ironically the “Food for Peace” program and other foreign aid programs have fuelled the longest and bloodiest wars in Africa.

The proverb “the road to hell is paved with good intentions” describes the connection between food aid and the conflicts in Africa. Although the link between Foreign Aid and the conflicts in this continent is hard even to imagine there are two un-disputable facts. The countries in Africa are the biggest recipients of foreign aid and especially food aid. The second fact is that African countries have the biggest number of civil wars, military coups in comparison to other parts of the world combined. In the time period of 1946 to 2002 approximately 1.37 million battle-related deaths occurred in 47 civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. The number of civilian casualties can be counted in millions. For example the wars in Congo were estimated to six million and the Rwandan genocide counted up to 800,000 deaths.

Numerous researches have concluded that food aid is the fuel that prolongs the wars in Africa. Humanitarian and food aid is usually transported in territories that are with limited control of the recipient government. According to Linda Polman over 80 % of aid can be stolen on the route to the recipients. Even when it reaches the assigned destination it is usually appropriated or taxed by armed groups or militias. This humanitarian food aid is then used to fund the conflict and prolong the wars (Polman, 2010).

This humanitarian aid transformed into fuel for war was seen in Somalia in the early nineties. According to foreign correspondent Jane Perlez as much as 80 % of food aid shipments were looted, stolen or used as protection money. This stolen humanitarian aid was then traded for arms in neighbouring Ethiopia (Perlez, 1992).

In the African conflicts the food aid is only a part of the problem that inflames the conflicts. The transportation vehicles, trucks and pick-ups that were used by the humanitarian organizations are the main target for militias and armed groups. These expansive vehicles give the warring parties new capabilities in terms of mobility. As a result the African conflicts are spread in a greater territory. According to Dr. Alastair Finlan, these vehicles act as a “force multiplier”. Ironically, the name armed trucks or technicals originally came from the humanitarian organizations. The official and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations in Somalia in the early 1990’s had no protections for their staff. In respond of the increase instability and chaos, the NGO’s paid local armed vigilantes to be their own protective militia. The funds used for this humanitarian militia were called “technical assistant grants” (Somaiya, 2010). These funds, provided by generous people of the US and Europe, were distributed by the humanitarian organization to form the first Somali militia. The funds bought weapons, ammunition and salary for the militia and their vehicles came to be known as “technical”. With the technical assistant grants, the humanitarian organizations began the formation of the Somali militias that ruled the country for two decades.

The mismanagement of the food aid in Somalia was even reported by the UN Security Council in 2010. According to the report, the humanitarian resources have been diverted to military uses and handful of Somali mercenaries for aid agencies have formed a cartel and became important power brokers.

Other African rebel militias have managed to weaponize the food aid in the conflict areas. In eastern Zaire during the first Congo war, the leaders of the Hema ethnic group permitted the arrival of international aid organization only if they agreed to give nothing to their enemies (Nunn & Qian, 2011).

During the Nigerian civil war the rebel leader Odumegwu Ojukwu allowed aid to enter his controlled area only if they carry arms and ammunition. The shipments of humanitarian aid allowed Ojukwu to feed and equip his rebel army. Numerous researchers suggest that the shipment of aid sent by the humanitarian NGOs prolonged the conflict by giving hope to the rebel leader (Polman and Waters, 2010, pp. 115-119) (Polman, 2010). This forced starvation as a military strategy is not new in the African conflicts; it has been practiced by rebel movements and by sovereign countries.

Rebel militias in Africa do not have the monopoly on stealing the humanitarian aid. The greater part of food and other aid is being stolen and abused by the African governments. In the early nineties, the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda was accused of stealing of food aid and the shipments of food aid were cancelled (Uvin, 1998, p 90).

The plunder of the humanitarian aid continued after the Rwandan Genocide. In the Hutu refugee camps, the Interhamwe militias “taxed” the civilians for the food aid. With this aid they managed to regroup and rebuild their army. Then the Hutu militia was able to carry out raids into Rwanda (Terry, 2002). The case of Rwanda and DRC in the 90’s is just one of the examples where the US food aid has been used to fund, maintain and prolong a conflict. The refugee’s camps in many other African conflicts have been used as protective cover. When the opposing force attacked that would be an attack against the whole aid system. In Ethiopia, the food aid is still used as a political weapon by the ruling party. Same methods were used in Zimbabwe where the people had to show ZANU-PF membership card before being given food aid (Nunn & Qian, 2012).

The people from the opposition parties in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Chad, DRC, were and still are forced into starvation. Foreign food aid has become a terror weapon in the hands of the African ruling elites. With the control and distribution of the food aid they subject and control their populations. The NGO humanitarian organizations have become their accomplices. If the humanitarian workers object and spread the truth of the distribution of food aid, they would be evicted from the country (Terry, 2002).

Food aid can have negative effects in African governments in terms of fungibility of aid. Food aid income allows recipient governments to increase military spending while the basic needs of the people will be serviced by the donor community. With the security apparatus well-funded African regimes successfully end any discontent and rebellion (de Ree & Nillesen, 2006).

In the Sudanese civil war food aid exacerbated the conflict in several ways. The humanitarian assistance was stolen or diverted to the benefit of the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The other unintended consequences of the food aid was the legitimizing the rebel movement by the NGOs organizations through the aid negotiations. Although in the Sudanese civil war atrocities were committed by all parties, the aid organizations managed to portray the SPLA in more positive light.

However, the SPLA was not the only army that benefited from the food aid. The government in Khartoum found ways to profit from the massive influx of food aid whether from stealing the food aid for its troops or by speculating with foreign currency exchange rate. The aid agencies allowed the government army to build up strategic bases of support of the south as a means to resettle refugees according its strategy (Lassiter, 2007). The government of Khartoum also managed to profit from the humanitarian aid, by redistributing the food to its citizens while in the same time exporting its locally produced food. As a result, Sudan exported up to millions of tons of sorghum in 1995 (Smock, 1996).

The humanitarian triangle has created a situation where the minority groups can create or allow a humanitarian disaster while raising the level of violence. In Darfur the rebels allowed the Sudanese militias, the Janjaweed, to massacre the civilian population. The strategy of the rebels was to allow genocide to take place so that the US would intervene similarly as in Kosovo (Belloni, 2005). The similar situation was taking place in South Sudan with the rebel SPLA.

In Uganda the reverse situation was taking place as the UPDF was seeking military assistance to fight the Lord's Resistance Army. The conflict could end decades ago, with a decisive victory of the Ugandan army, but that would also mean the end of the US military and financial aid.

The US humanitarian intervention in the African conflicts has proven many times to have disastrous unintended or intended consequences. The conflicts and civil wars have been sustained, prolonged and intensified with US humanitarian aid. The food aid has become the oxygen in African conflicts. Without the aid, the African warlords and politicians would more likely find compromise and end the conflict. These cases for peace and compromise without foreign intervention have been seen in Somaliland and Katanga. Although thousands of miles apart and in different time periods, both provinces seceded from chaos to organize and sustain functional, civilized and democratic state while the rest of the region plummeted into anarchy.

#### ***4.2.2 U.S. goals for Food Aid***

For the past fifty years the US has been the most generous country in terms of donated food aid. However this massive aid is not unconditional. The US has several goals to achieve when is donating its food aid. This research will show some of these goals and the effects that it has on the African economy.

Apart from the humanitarian facade the entire Public Law 480 (PL480) has the purpose of disposing US agriculture surplus to foreign client states. The advantages for this law are numerous, and they range from support for domestic agricultural producers to promoting US foreign policy.

##### *4.2.2.1 Dumping agriculture surplus*

US food aid programs were designed in the 1950's as a method of disposing government held surplus stocks. These stocks had the function of price stabilization in domestic agriculture and also to support the US farmers (Oxfam, 2005).

The nature of the PL 480, the Agricultural Trade and Development Act of 1954, can be seen in the speech of President Eisenhower:

“We recommended that the burdensome stocks which had already accumulated be liquidated over a period of time, through disposal programs that would create new markets for United States products, and assist friendly countries.”

- Dwight D. Eisenhower, July 10, 1954- (Peters & Woolley, 2012).

The speech is bluntly clear and direct in describing the true goals of this bill. The subsidized US agriculture was showing increased surpluses while there was no market for it. The solution came with the bill that would save the farmers, improve US image in the World and promote new markets.

The bill from 1954 was the logical response to the enormous agricultural surpluses at the time. The reserves in grain threatened the prices in commodity and cost the taxpayers millions of dollars a day for storage. As a result, the American Farm Bureau proposed a solution to create a foreign market in countries with food deficit. The bill was rebranded during the Kennedy administration into Food for Peace. The humanitarian aspect of donating food was to be the main point and goal of the bill.

However by 1961, the agricultural surplus had reached crisis proportions. The prices were far below the loan rates on non-recourse crop loans and farmers forfeited their stored crops rather than repay their loans. The cost to the governments of storing a bushel of forfeited grain exceeded its value (Olson, 2001).

However, the dumping of the agriculture surplus is more than a process; it has become a goal of its own. It maintains US agricultural dominance and creates dependency in the Third World countries. Over time the African countries have been transformed from food exporters to food aid recipients. The evidence of this notion of dumping agricultural surplus is in the statistics of food production in the US and the food aid given abroad. The statistics indicate that food aid is supply-driven rather than demand-oriented. This means that in years of good harvests the US agricultural surplus creates bigger food aid and in years of droughts and low harvests the aid declines. In a research from Nunn and Qianit it was found that the amounts of food aid that Africa received from large donors such as US and EU is correlated with the level of surpluses in the donor countries. The research also found that a typical food aid response is correlated with production shortfalls that happened two years before and donors continue to give food regardless of whether the recipient – an African country - still needs the food aid or not (Nunn & Qian, 2011).

As an example for the US food dumping in Africa there is the 2002 famine in Southern Africa. Before this humanitarian crisis, US genetically modified maize was rejected in European countries. The maize export was significantly reduced leaving the multinational companies with large surplus of maize. Conveniently the US tried to dump the genetically modified maize to the starving African nations. At first the African countries refused to accept the food aid, but after political pressure they graciously accepted. This incident highlights the less humanitarian goals of the US food aid programs.

In the same famine of 2002, Malawi was estimated to suffer a 600.000 tonne food deficit. This food demand was met by the international community plus additional 200.000 tonnes. Instead of food deficit, this small African country was drowned with food aid. This humanitarian aid had negative impact as the large food surpluses transformed into low prices. The estimated loss to the fledgling Malawi economy was estimated to 15 million US dollars, which is significant amount for this small African country.

These and other instances show that donating food aid has the same effects as dumping products on world market of below cost price products. The US food aid programs represent



subsidized export for surplus of other highly subsidized agriculture sector. By legislation even the shipping and logistics industry is subsidized in the process of food aid dumping.

The former World Bank President James Wolfensohn in 2002 stated: "these subsidies are crippling Africa's chance to export its way out of poverty". This public outcry of the former World Bank president is result of the 350 billion agricultural subsidies given by the richest nations. This amount is seven times bigger than all the aid to Africa (Kristof, 2002).

Throughout the half a century of US food aid existence there was a direct correspondence between food aid and food surpluses. This means that food aid is mostly available when global prices are low and there is a large surplus of food commodities. However, this is period when food aid is not needed urgently. Instead, the food aid is monetized as program or project food aid. The African governments and NGOs will have the necessary fund for development, but the local agriculture will not be able to compete with the subsidized food aid. This situation later is transformed with lower domestic food production.


The real problems with this type of food aid come clear in times of global food price increases. Lower harvests, droughts, wars, biofuels productions and other variables made food commodities more scarce and in turn more expensive. In this scenario there is not enough food to feed seven billion people. The cuts are usually in the bottom billion that have been receiving program and project food aid.

Between 1970 and 1974, when the price of food and cereals in particular rose, food aid volumes fell by half. In times when the food is more expensive and more people are starving the donor countries provide less (Shapouri et al., 2004).

The supply-driven food aid was proven in 1999, when after good harvests large surplus of agricultural goods were produced. As a result of the quantities of food aid increased by 79% compared to the previous year. The greater part was consisted of program food aid or the millions of tons of food were bought by African governments with loans below the market price (Wahlberg, 2008). In the 1999, the major food recipients were Rwanda and Uganda, countries that were engaged in major war in Congo. This example explicitly shows that donors respond primary to domestic interest to sell and dump surplus or to enhance foreign interests. The needs for the poor and the hungry were not in the primary concern for the Western donors.

The supply-driven US food aid can be shown on the following figure (Figure 4.12) that shows the US donations in Ethiopia and the US prices of wheat.

Figure 4.12: Ethiopia: wheat food aid and the US price of wheat




Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (2004)

The figure above confirms that food aid deliveries are primarily driven by supply or the US price of wheat. In years when the price of wheat was higher the quantities of wheat food aid were lower as seen in the years 1989 and 1995 to 1997. Also when there was surplus of wheat the food aid was increased as seen in the 1987, 1991, 1999 and 2000. This inconsistency of food aid availability and delivery has deterred investment in the Ethiopian wheat sector. As a result from this situation Ethiopia is still dependent on food aid as it was in 1984 (Kirwan & McMillan, 2007). The situation is confirmed with the famine of 2011.

The following figure (Figure 4.13), representing relationship between cereal food aid, prices and stocks in the period 1990-2002, confirms the thesis that the US food aid is supply-driven with goals to dispose its agricultural surpluses.

Figure 4.13: Relationship between cereal food aid, prices and stocks 1990-2002



Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (2003)

Figure 4.13 illustrates how, when and in what quantities the US food aid is donated. The graphic shows only the cereal food aid in the time period of 1990 to 2002. In the time period of 1993 the stocks were in large quantities resulting from a good harvest. As a consequence, the prices of cereals were low and the agricultural industry had to dispose its surplus. As seen on the figure, the cereal food aid has risen. According to Figure 4.13 few years later in 1995/6 the price of cereals has risen and as a consequence the quantities of food aid have fallen dramatically. This figure of a decade long time interval shows the cyclical nature of US food aid.

The programmes of food aid are driven by the price of food and the excess surplus that has to be disposed (OECD, 2005). The supply-driven US food aid can be further proven by its nature. The programs are completely in-kind food donated in contrast to EU aid programs which are in financial form. The European countries used to follow the same method of food aid, but after understanding the distortion of the markets they decided to donate money and provide local or regional purchases.

The harmful effects of dumping food surplus in the underdeveloped countries have been acknowledged by renowned economists, former World Bank President and even a former US president. The basic idea, that the food aid can heal the problem of hunger and allows the underdeveloped countries to grow, has simply failed.

These following quotations from former President Clinton were made in 2010 as a response to the side effects of US food aid to Haiti. Hence, the President admitted the mistakes of the food aid with regards to Africa:

*“Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy, until the last year or so when we started rethinking it, that we rich countries that produce a lot of food should sell it to poor countries and relieve them of the burden of producing their own food, so, thank goodness, they can leap directly into the industrial era. It has not worked. It may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake.”*

*“...they really believed for twenty years that if you moved agricultural production there and then facilitated its introduction into poorer places, you would free those places to get aid to skip agricultural development and go straight into an industrial era.*

*And it’s failed everywhere it’s been tried. And you just can’t take the food chain out of production. And it also undermines a lot of the culture, the fabric of life, the sense of self-determination. And I have been involved for several years in agricultural products, principally in Rwanda, Malawi, other places in Africa, and now increasingly in Latin America, and I see this.”*

*-President Bill Clinton (Goodman & González, 2010).*

These quotations from the former President Clinton represent the confession for the harmful effects of US food aid programs. The apology of the President in April 2010 came more than a half a century later. Apart from the humanitarian nature of the food aid and the emotional apology of the President, three important points remain. The US foreign and food aid is still maintained in Africa and the process of monetizing and dumping food surplus is continuing. Food aid is reforming and rebranding but the original idea remains. Second, the African countries are more dependent on food aid than ever. The PL480 title II has become the biggest part in the whole food aid. Reason for this is the increased number of people in need of emergency food aid. Third, the original PL 480 bill has become a victim of its own success. The Food Aid has managed not only to slow down the growth of the Third World but also to impoverish the richest in resources continent on the planet.

The monetization of food aid is done exclusively by the United States and has been under great criticism abroad and inside the US. The food aid that is monetized or sold in the local African markets is competing with the local food production. This has the same effect as the dumping of other commodities or products below the cost prices in the local markets. If the humanitarian factor is isolated it represents a classical example of predatory pricing. More important is that this dumping is done with heavy state subsidies by the richest country in the world in contrast to the least developed countries in Africa.

The paradox of this semi-humanitarian Ponzi scheme comes in the security field. The impoverished African countries are fertile ground for extremist and terrorists. From the coasts of Somalia through the deserts of Sahel and Azawad to the delta regions of Nigeria, militants are opposing the economic order and US interests. The US cannot contain these movements as it cannot feed all the starving people in Africa.

This is the true aftermath of the predatory pricing and dumping of agriculture surpluses for the last 50 years.

#### *4.2.2.2 Pursuing foreign policy goals with food aid*

US foreign aid with all its virtues and flaws has a strategic goal for the policymakers in Washington. Humanitarian aid, budget support, IMF loans and other foreign aid packages, represent the soft pressure for the African regimes. One of the most controversial uses of the “Food for Peace” program is the use of the food aid in pursuing US foreign policy goals.

The Secretary of Agriculture in the Reagan administration, John Block told reporters: “I believe food is the greatest weapon we have for keeping the peace in the world.” (Shepard, 1985). The former Secretary of Agriculture envisioned the US shipping agricultural surpluses to hungry nations in return for more stability in the world. However Secretary Block was only following the tradition of his predecessors, who used the food aid for pursuing foreign policy goals. In 1974, Secretary for agriculture Earl Bultz stated: “food is a weapon; it is now one of our principal tools in our negotiation kit” (Shepard, 1985).

The comments of the former secretary of agriculture show the overall US foreign policy in Africa. The countries in Africa have experienced frequent famines and many countries have substantial population undernourished. In this fundamental weakness of the African states and societies the US policymakers have seen opportunity to pursue their foreign policy goals and influence the continent.

In its early years the PL480 was used extensively containing the spread of communism through dumping large amounts of agricultural surpluses. This thesis was confirmed publically by US senator Humphrey in 1953 with the statement: “wise statesmanship and real leadership can convert these food surpluses into a great asset for checking communist aggression” (Barrett & Maxwell, 2005).

In 1961 Congress passed the foreign assistance which created the USAID and the Peace Corps. However these actions of the Kennedy administration were only facade of the same continuing policy of using food aid to achieve foreign policy goals. In 1963 President Kennedy stated: “these [aid] programs are clearly in our national self-interest, and have proven to be a vital tool in our efforts to hold back communism in Europe and now also in Asia and elsewhere” (Levin, 2006).

The first criticism of this practice was first seen in the later stages of the Vietnam War. In those years when the threat of famine was spreading across Africa, more than half of the total aid was shipped to Vietnam and Cambodia. More than 80% of the Title 1 Food aid was used

for the war effort in Vietnam (Massa, 1986). Several members of Congress did oppose the inappropriate use of food aid when there were shortages in other parts of the world. The case of Nigerian Civil War represents evidence that the US food aid is used as foreign policy tool rather than for humanitarian purposes. In a time when the people in Biafra were starved to death by the Nigerian federal troops, the US food aid was diverted for monetization in South East Asia. The lack of US humanitarian intervention in Biafra lies in the US foreign policy at that time. Nigeria had enormous oil reserves and the disintegration of the country was not in the US best interest. Furthermore the US was engaged in the Vietnam War and could not cope with another conflict.

In 1979-1978, President Carter used the promise of massive US food aid as an enticement to achieve an Israeli-Egyptian peace accord. The levels of food aid increased sharply after Anwar Sadat signed the Sinai Peace agreement and Camp David Accords (Shepard, 1985). Similarly, in Nigeria after the civil war, as this West African country became one of the main suppliers of oil to US, the rice food aid was increased.

The use of food aid for achieving foreign policy goals has brought more harm to US reputation than advantage in its foreign policy. This outdated policy from the early years of the Cold War is still being used in Africa, as in the case of Ethiopia, Kenya and Libya. The only foreign policy in which the US could lead in Africa is by holding the moral high ground and diverts food aid to the hungry instead to its allies.

The foreign aid including the humanitarian assistance has been used by the US policymakers in the UN Security Council (UNSC). The African leaders can be used for supporting US policy in the UN, since their vote is equal as any other. The vote in the UN Security Council is even more important and deserves special attention. Numerous studies have shown that African countries that have served in the UN Security Council have received more aid through the IMF or directly by the US. Typical developing country that is serving in the UNSC can anticipate additional \$ 16 million from the US and one million USD from the UN. During important votes, these numbers rise up to \$45 million from the US and \$8 million from the UN (Kuzienko & Werker, 2004).

This research will show several of these incidents where IMF loan packages are linked to UNSC votes. These examples indicated that this political and economic trade exists and it is conducted by unlikely partners. The US government has used its special status in the IMF to gain support in crucial voting in the UN Security Council.

The case of Zimbabwe and its IMF loan is one of the cases. In 1992 Zimbabwe was serving its two year term in the UN Security Council, where it supported every US resolution against the Iraqi regime (Dreher, et al., 2009). When Zimbabwe failed to support just one resolution against Iraq, Mugabe was threatened by the IMF with new conditions regarding its loan. As a result the Zimbabwean regime supported eleven Security Council resolutions against Iraq. During that time massive human rights violations were taking place in Zimbabwe as Robert Mugabe consolidated his power and exterminated any remaining opposition. The Bush administration used one African dictator and its UNSC vote to topple another Middle Eastern dictator. In return Mugabe was rewarded with IMF loan that maintain his grip on power. However, Zimbabwean interests in voting in the UNSC were not solely guided by material gains in a form of IMF loans. The fear of reprisal has also played a deciding role. The case of Yemen is clear evidence that there is severe punishment in the course of vital UN voting. In 1990, Yemen voted against the invasion of Iraq, a move that infuriated the US officials. The US Secretary of State, Baker even passed a note to the ambassador from Yemen, stating: "This is the most expensive vote you have ever cast" (Dreher & Vreeland, 2011). As a result

of this voting the US cut all of its 70 million dollars of aid and Yemen was not granted an IMF arrangement for six years.

Similar case is the small country of Gabon which from its independence in 1960 till 1977 never qualified for IMF loan. Everything changed in 1978 when it served in the UN Security Council for the first time. Identical is the case of Tanzania, country that did not have any IMF arrangement for 14 years. In 1975 Tanzania served in the UNSC and it supported the US goals through the Arab oil embargo. For its support Tanzania was rewarded with IMF loans and arrangements. Overall non-permanent members of the UNSC enjoy a 59% increase of total aid from the US and an 8 % increase in total development aid from the UN.

The United States and its G7 allies control the lion's share of the IMF and their loan allocation is guided strictly political. The African countries are used as pawns in this global game of power and politics. Their seat in the UNSC is only symbolic since they have no chance to raise their voice in fear of economic repression.

The United States also holds the control of the other part of the Breton Woods structure, the World Bank. The funds of these institutions have been also used by the US to control the African countries and their votes in the UN.

The first decolonized African country Ghana, received its funds from the World Bank during its UNSC term. From 1964 to 1985, Ghana received in an average of 1,5 new World Bank projects per year. When Ghana was elected to serve in the UNSC in 1986, the number of new projects elevated to 8 projects (Dreher, et al., 2009). The similar situation can be found in Zaire, US main ally in central Africa. During the period of 1960 to 1981, Zaire received between 0 and 3 projects each year, with an average of 1,2 per year. In 1982 and 1983 when it was elected to serve in the UNSC, the number of World Bank projects raised to six and four respectively (Dreher, et al., 2009). Algeria received an average one World Bank project from its independence to 1987. The situation changed in 1988 when Algeria served in the UNSC and the number of approved World Bank projects raised to five.

This trading for Security Council votes has always done behind the scenes. The benefit from this secret diplomacy is twofold. The US foreign policies have been able to promote their interests throughout the world, while the African autocratic regimes are given legitimacy and assistance. The African countries and the US prefer to conceal their trading arguments to escape public condemnation (Dreher, et al., 2009). In order to conceal their actions the reward package is given through international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank.

One of the worst kept secrets in international politics is the buying of votes in the United Nations Security Council. The actions from these political deals have never been made public, and they are instantly regarded as conspiracy theories. Not even the most renowned opponents of foreign aid dare to mention the link between the IMF and World Bank loans to the vote of the Security Council. The trade of votes with humanitarian assistance damages both the reputation of the US humanitarian programs and the UN Security Council.

#### *4.2.2.3 Expanding to new markets and the benefit to US economy*

In the mid 1950's the US faced with massive agricultural surplus and few export markets. In the President's speech of the signing the PL480 bill it clearly states that the sole purpose is the expansion of US exports to foreign countries (Peters & Woolley, 2012):

“The Agricultural Trade and Development Act is well designed for its purpose of providing a means whereby surplus agricultural commodities in excess of the usual marketing's of such

commodities may be sold. It will lay the basis for a permanent expansion of our exports of agricultural products, with lasting benefits to ourselves and peoples in other lands.”

- Dwight D. Eisenhower-July 10, 1954-

US food aid has an important role to play in promoting US commodities and expanding to new markets. Without the food aid it would be nearly impossible for the US to export food commodities in Africa. The reason for this is in the different cultural diet, tastes and preferences for the Africans and Americans. US law PL480 or commonly known as “Food for Peace” is partly designated to bridge these gaps and provide the new export markets.

The US efficient and developed agriculture combined with the farming and export subsidies has managed to assert itself as a main exporter of food in the underdeveloped countries. These African countries have the quality land, labour and skills to produce food to feed their population and even export food. However, the African governments are more conveniently accepting US food aid programs and thus sacrificing their own agriculture sectors and their rural populations.

In an official USAID report of 2002, it is stated that in the allocation of food aid the countries must demonstrate the potential to become commercial market for US agricultural commodities (USAID, 2002). According to USAID, from the 50 largest customers for agriculture goods, 43 are former recipients of US food aid. For the US policymakers food aid leads to trade from which American farmers would benefit.

The food aid was also vital in the acceptance of the genetically modified crops in Africa. For over two decades, millions of tons of unreported genetically modified crops have been consumed and seeded in almost all of the countries in Africa. There had been protests for spreading genetically modified GM crops and eliminating local traditional crops that have existed for millenniums. The new GM food demands specific fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides that are made solely in the US. In this case the genetically modified food indirectly promotes the US chemical corporations to the African market.

The P.L.480 food aid has massive positive impact on the US economy. Contrary to the public notion that food aid benefits the US farmers, the reality is that few corporations are making profits, while expanding into the African markets. Two-thirds of all the food aid comes from only three multinational corporations. These three corporations: ADM, Cargill and Bunge are among the most politically influential entities that dominated the global grain trade (Provost & Lawrence, 2012). Even in the shipping industry, four major companies, Wilson Logistics, BKA Logistics, Fettec & Donalby and Panalpina, handle 84 % of US food aid. Behind this food aid monopoly there is a legislative that demands that 75 % of all food aid to be transported by US flagged ships. The reasons for this date back to Cold War era when the Congress wanted to aid the civilian maritime fleet so it would be able to act as naval reserve component. However, in 1994 the Government Accounting Office GAO noted that the Pentagon no longer sees any purpose of the food carrying ships to serve as marine reserve (Mendelowitz, 1994).

According to a research of Barrett and Maxwell (2005, p.166-168) only 47 % of the total value of the food aid is actually food. The rest 53 % is accounted for transportation and administrative costs (Barrett & Maxwell, 2005).

According to American Centre for Progress the US would save up to 200 million US dollars annually if it buys local or regional food for humanitarian purpose (Norris & Veillette, 2011). In the same time food deliveries to famine areas would be more efficient. According to the same research this corporate welfare costs two thirds of the total food aid donated by the US.

In contrast to the European model of food aid, the US P.L.480 is 60 % more expensive. In some instances the federal government was unable to buy the most suitable agricultural commodities because the US flagged ships were not operating at that port.

With the farm subsidies and the guaranteed government bailout in a case of a surplus, US corporate welfare has created international food monopoly. With the US taxpayers backing, these companies dominate African agriculture market. While the US food aid saves countless lives in mass starvations, in the same time these corporations continue to suppress the local agriculture.

This model of subsidized humanitarian agriculture has proven to be too costly for the US taxpayers and uneconomical for the realities of the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In 2012 the US is facing with increasing fiscal deficit, growing need of humanitarian assistance and rise in the food prices. Under these circumstances the current US food aid model is unsustainable and contra productive.

### **4.3 Military Assistance**

The US foreign assistance has two main components: economic and military. If the economic aid had negative effects on the African economies, the military aid has proven disastrous for the whole continent. The cases of the armies of Nigeria, DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia with their total disregard for human rights represent just the tip of the iceberg. The US Africa Command is training and equipping not only selective African militaries but military alliances and their combined forces, such as Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).

US military aid is consisted in three main programs, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs. Through these programs billions of US dollars taxpayer's money has been transferred to Africa's worst dictatorial regimes in a form of arms and military training. This military aid represents the most controversial component in US foreign assistance and yet is hardly mentioned by development economists. If aid creates monetary instability and harms economic growth according to economists, the military aid should have some impact. These billions of dollars should either promote stability and democracy or fuel conflicts. From historical retrospective the military aid had proven to be the support for the latter. In fiscal year 2003 alone, the United States transferred weaponry to 18 of the 25 countries that were involved in active conflicts (Berrigan, et al., 2005).

Through the Foreign Military Financing Program, billions of US dollars' worth military hardware has been transferred to Africa, making it the biggest military aid program. As an example, the FMF program doubled from \$12 million in fiscal year 2000 to \$24 million in fiscal year 2006, while the number of country recipients has grown from one to nine (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2011). This program provides grants and loans to countries to purchase weapons and defence equipment made in the US. Table 4.8 indicates the Foreign Military Financing in Africa by Fiscal year.



Table 4.8: Foreign Military Financing in Sub-Saharan Africa by Fiscal Year in million US

Fiscal Years (FY)	Foreign Military Financing in Sub-Saharan Africa
2006	15,840
2007	14,820
2008	6,757
2009	8,255
2010	18,793
2011	23,790

Source: US Department of Defence (2012)

Other important program is IMET or International Military Education and Training, which works more or less as a student exchange program. Soldiers and military officers from African militaries were sent to US most prestigious military academies, at the expense of US taxpayers (Cope, 1995). This military aid has been rising steadily from \$8,1 million in 2000 to \$11 million in 2006 while the number of countries participants has risen from 36 to 47. The theories of this military aid are that militaries would become more professionalized and contribute in the stability of the whole region. But in reality, the program has proven to be one of the greatest strategic mistakes of US foreign policy. This research shows the true nature of the militaries of Liberia, Nigeria, DRC, Egypt, Rwanda and Uganda. The soldiers, officers and even the commanders in chief and today's presidents have all been participant of US military training and education, with courtesy of the US taxpayers. More recent example in the Republic of Mali illustrates the effects of IMET program when it backfires.

On 22<sup>nd</sup> March 2012, officers and soldiers of the armed forces of Mali overthrew the civilian government. This is not new in the history of this impoverished and war-thorn republic, since the President Amadou Toumani Toure first came into power by a military coup. What is new is the indirect involvement of the US. Captain Sanogo and his fellow officers were behind the coup, but their training does not come from African county but from Virginia, Georgia and Arizona and was paid by the American taxpayers, program run by the AFRICOM (Whitlock, 2012). Although the rebel Captain was thought of the merits of a democratic government and his role as a professional soldier, Sanogo toppled the government. In this situation Obama's "African solutions for African problems" turns out more to American military training for African problems. Instead of solving the economic and security problems in Mali, the Obama's administration has created a new military rule in Africa. While the military coup was taking place, the Islamic radicals and Tuareg nationalists occupied a territory bigger than France. This unrecognized country of Azawad is a radical Islamic emirate, comparable only to Afghanistan during the Taliban rule. The human rights violations in Azawad are appalling as Sharia law is practiced (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Azawad is more than separatist region, it is the result of the paradox of US foreign policy and the inability for the policymakers to contain the new threats that are emerging from Africa. From April 2012 till 2013, Azawad was a safe haven for Al-Qaeda extremists from all over the world and yet it was barely mentioned in the US 2012 Presidential campaign. The

Obama administration has simply transferred this problem to the West African ECOWAS community and its former colonial master France.

This economic and political entity with its military component Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) represents the “unholy alliance” in West Africa. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is group of fifteen countries that have long history of human rights abuses. Even the military wing ECOMOG has committed massive human rights violations in its previous engagements in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone (Tuck, 2000). During these peacekeeping operations, the US military provided logistic and financial support (Burgess, 2008).

With the Malian rebellion threatening the status quo, the US policy makers will once again use the “unholy alliance” of ECOWAS (Howe, 2001). Coincidentally with the planned invasion of ECOMOG, there are reports of vast oil and mineral reserves in Azawad (Simba Energy, 2011).

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century ECOMOG represents the modern US variant of the British King's African Rifles regiments. It represents desperate attempt to control vast territory with overstretched military resources. In the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the US will probably repeat the mistakes of the British Empire. Proxy forces such as King's African Rifles and ECOWAS can bring only devastation and chaos. Another parallel is that they produce radical leadership material. The King's African Rifles regiments produced Idi Amin from their ranks while ECOWAS with the training of AFRICOM produced Captain Sanogo.

The US regional proxy forces are concentrated in every part of the continent. However the biggest danger for the US security and interests may come from the African Union Peace and Security Council. Paradoxically the US is the African Union greatest supporter, both financially and politically. US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, even stated: “In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, solving our greatest challenges cannot be the work only of individuals or individual nations. These challenges require communities of nations and peoples working together in alliances, partnerships, and institutions like the African Union” (US Department of State, 2011). The composition of the Peace and Security Council is reason enough for a great concern. The following table (Table 4.9) shows the members of the African Union Peace and Security Council that are elected for three and two year term (African Union, 2010).

Table 4.9: African Union Peace and Security Council

<b>Members of the African Union Peace and Security Council elected for a term of two years.</b>	<b>Members of the African Union Peace and Security Council elected for a term of three years.</b>
Republic of Cameroon – Central Africa	Equatorial Guinea – Central Africa
Republic of Mali – West Africa	Republic of Kenya – East Africa
Republic of Guinea - West Africa	Libya– North Africa
Republic of Angola – Southern Africa	Republic of Zimbabwe – Southern Africa
The Kingdom of Lesotho – Southern Africa	Federal Republic of Nigeria – West Africa
Republic of Mauritania – North Africa	
North Africa: The Arab Republic of Egypt	
Republic of Djibouti – East Africa	
The Republic of the Congo – Central Africa	
East Africa: The United Republic of Tanzania	

Source: African Union (2013)

This council of the African Union was modelled after the UN Security Council but the similarity is only skin deep. The Peace and Security Council, according to its protocol, represents a collective security or a military alliance that responds in a conflict and crisis situation in Africa (AU, 2002). This Security Council has the power to intervene in the African continent with five multinational African brigades that constitute the African Standby Force. These brigades that are strategically divided in their own geographical parts of the continent have been trained, equipped and funded by the US Africa Command.

From the economic perspective, the existence of these AU brigades is a logical measure for peacekeeping operations. However, given the history of human rights abuses in these countries and the peacekeeping operations such as ECOMOG, the support of the standing African army is questionable. The comparison between the African Union and its ASF with the European Union and its collective security is in the same time unrealistic and dangerous. Unlike the EU, the African Union is collective of autocratic and dictatorial regimes that have committed the worst human rights abuses, while their armed forces are their primary tool to rule by striking fear and terror in the population. The element of danger in regional politics comes with the unifying of these regimes in one organization. The collective security

organizations such as ECOMOG and AMISOM can be only compared with the unholy alliance of the reactionary regimes in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe.

The war crimes of ECOMOG in Liberia, Ivory Coast and the human rights violations by AMISOM can be precursor of the events to come in Mali, DRC or the Central African Republic. In 2013, the AU Peace and Security Council is composed of Africa's worst dictatorial rulers. Among the heads of states that comprise the Council are Robert Mugabe, Teodoro Obiang, José Eduardo dos Santos, Paul Biya, Yahya Jammeh, Denis Sassou Nguesso and Mohamed Morsi. Most of these heads of states are on power for several decades and with their actions have become a brand for modern African dictators. The same heads of states with their corruptive nature and complete disregard for human rights are set to solve the complex security and humanitarian situations in Mali, Darfur, Somalia, DRC and Central African Republic. The combined efforts of African dictators with the growing insecurity in Africa can result in a perfect storm in 2013. The above-mentioned African heads of states are unable or unwilling to promote peace and rule of law in their own countries and it cannot be expected that they will engage in peace building in foreign lands. Zimbabwe and Angola were engaged in military operations in the Second Congo War but their commitments were for the Mugabe's and Santos personal enrichment. Decades later the same two leaders, clear from their crimes, are responsible for the security of the African continent with the full backing of the US. The other leaders in the Peace and Security Council have been involved in massive corruption scandals and are involved in human rights violations.

These regional and pan-African security organizations cannot be in US or African best interests. The Peace and Security Council role and goal is in a direct contradiction with its name. It is an "unholy alliance" of autocratic leaders that are responsible to keep the territorial, social and political status quo while maintaining the African dependence to the Western countries.

The support for this AU military alliance of dictatorial heads of states such as Obiang, Mugabe, Biya and Santos cannot have any rational explanation other than it was intended to cause chaos, conflict and permanent underdevelopment.

#### **4.4 Aid by other means**

The US has a full set of methods for bringing unfriendly leaders to heel. These measure ranges from diplomatic pressure to economic sanctions, trade embargoes and even support for local political factions. If these measures do not give the results, the intelligence community takes over from the diplomats. The African countries have had more assassinations, military coups and civil wars than the rest of the world combined. Many of these regime changes were instigated, funded or backed by the US government. The actions of the CIA and Special Actions Division are clouded with secrecy and their acts were never publically disclosed. But after the assassinations, coups or civil war, US friendly regimes always appeared victorious. In most cases this friendly regimes are actually military juntas but over time they have evolved into respectable world leaders. This research shows some the cases of US-backed regime change in Africa. In the heart of Africa the US covert regime change tactic was initiated since the early 1960's. The cases of US-backed regime change in Liberia, Somalia, Congo, Uganda, Rwanda and more recent case of Libya show a striking resemblance.

However, the regime change is only the start of US involvement in African countries. The client states are heavily subsidized in economic and military aid as shown above. The third component of aid concentrates on the political support that the African dictators are receiving from US Presidents, Congress and even news media. This in turn has created the longest

serving heads of states that rule with total disregard for human rights and dignity. US President Barack Obama stated at a conference in Ghana that Africa does not need strong leaders, it needs strong institutions. Apart of the rhetoric, Obama's change was only in tactic while the overall strategy remains the same. This research has shown some of the Africa's leaders, their human rights record and connections with the United States.

Among the other "big men" of Africa who do not intent to surrender their powers is Josse Eduardo Do Santos of Angola who is in power since 1979. Although he came to power with Soviet and Cuban support today he rules with iron fist and US backing. Angola's vast oil reserves made the US turn blind eye on Angola's corruption and human rights abuses. The small country of Djibouti has family dynasty that has ruled for 30 years. US political support comes after AFRICOM established its major base in this country.

The cost of this political aid and support for Africa's regimes are far greater than the billions spent on humanitarian and military aid. The United States is a revolutionary country, born in pursuit for freedom from tyranny and oppression. Three hundred years later the US is funding and politically supporting the most brutal and tyrannical regimes in Africa. The damage to US image in the international stage is greater than any economical or strategic gain in Africa.

As of 2013 the US public debt has exceeded \$16 trillion, or over 105% of US GDP (US National Debt Clock, 2013). The magnitude of the debt is a major reason for re-considering the US Foreign Aid, including economic and military assistance. The economic aid has created more poverty in the past 60 years, and has created an aid addicted countries. The military aid has created more instability, as African countries have more military coups and civil wars than the rest of the world combined. With a cost of over one trillion constant US dollars given to African countries in the period of 1946 to 2010, US foreign policy of Africa has failed to achieve its goals. The political aid and support for dictatorial African regime has a cost that is impossible to estimate.

The following table (Table 4.10) form the Congressional Research Service shows the billions of US dollars of US taxpayer's money that was given to the African regimes in the period from 1945 to 2010.

Table 4.10: US Foreign assistance by country in millions of US dollars, 1945-2010

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>ECONOMIC AID</b>	<b>MILITARY AID</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
1. Algeria	269,8	9,2	278,9
2. Egypt	30.514,4	39.529,7	70.044,1
3. Libya	291,3	18,1	309,4
4. Morocco	3.284,8	1.074,4	4.359,2
5. Tunisia	1.325,4	865,8	2.191,2
7. Angola	1.486,8	5,6	1492,4
8. Benin	934,7	9,2	943,9
9. Botswana	1.105,2	51,6	1.156,8

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>ECONOMIC AID</b>	<b>MILITARY AID</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
10. Burkina Faso	1.191,3	2,1	1.193,5
11. Burundi	718,4	4,1	722,5
12. Cameroon	571,5	36,7	608,3
13. Cape Verde	328,1	6,5	334,6
14. Central African Republic	262,5	3,7	266,2
15. Chad	1.152,0	77,4	1.229,5
16. Comoros	20,8	3,5	24,2
17. Congo (Brazzaville)	146,3	2,8	149,1
18. DR Congo	3.019,1	325,6	3.344,8
19. Ivory Coast	708,4	7,5	715,9
20. Djibouti	157,1	52,4	209,6
21. Equatorial Guinea	20,4	1,1	21,6
22. Eritrea	607,3	11,4	618,6
23. Ethiopia	7.989,2	320,1	8.309,3
24. Gabon	76,3	20,8	97,1
25. The Gambia	231,3	3,9	235,2
26. Ghana	2.656,9	32,3	2.689,3
27. Guinea	1.064,6	18,9	1.083,5
28. Guinea-Bissau	146,7	4,7	151,4
29. Kenya	5.584,8	254,4	5.839,1
30. Lesotho	859,8	2,2	861,9
31. Liberia	2.563,8	471,6	3.035,4
32. Madagascar	1.100,7	8,3	1.109,0
33. Malawi	1.714,8	12,2	1.727,0
34. Mali	2.040,4	13,8	2.054,2

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>ECONOMIC AID</b>	<b>MILITARY AID</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
35. Mauritania	360,9	3,8	364,7
36. Mauritius	103,2	2,8	106,0
37. Mozambique	3.834,5	7,3	3.841,8
38. Namibia	1.065,2	7,3	1.072,5
39. Niger	968,5	24,0	992,5
40. Nigeria	3.263,3	50,1	3.313,4
41. Rwanda	1.872,8	16,2	1.889,0
42. Sao Tome & Principe	21,2	4,8	26,0
43. Senegal	2.197,5	88,8	2.286,3
44. Seychelles	40,9	6,9	47,8
45. Sierra Leone	739,6	11,3	751,0
46. Somalia	1.884,7	929,9	2.814,6
47. South Africa	3.894,1	34,6	3.928,7
48. Sudan	8.509,8	1.475,5	9.985,3
49. Swaziland	314,9	3,1	318,0
50. Tanzania	3.605,3	7,3	3.612,6
51. Togo	266,2	2,6	268,8
52. Uganda	3.743,0	64,1	3.807,1
53. Zambia	2.560,5	5,3	2.565,8
54. Zimbabwe	1.855,4	6,5	1.861,9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>115.246,4</b>	<b>46.013,8</b>	<b>161.260,5</b>

Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (2011)

The bilateral and multilateral relation between the US and African countries should benefit to all the people. African countries and people should be liberated from all kind of US assistance and influence. Only then they can live up to their full potential and prosper. In a globalized economy in the 21 century there cannot be winners and losers. The mineral wealth and energy supplies in Africa are finite and becoming ever scarcer. But this fact should not be a reason

for competition and cold war between the US and China, but an opportunity for cooperation. Cold war with proxy African powers represents the least logical and uneconomical way for settling differences.



## 5. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research was to analyse the foreign policy of the United States in the African continent through a historical retrospective and a case study of selected African countries. These African nations show the scale of US involvement in shaping their leadership, politics and even economics. The pattern of US economic and military support for the brutal regimes leads to the conclusion that this is a policy for promoting permanent underdevelopment. The creation of major US allies in every corner in Africa and the strategic deployment of US military forces confirms this theory. In the same time US officials have instigated military clashes as in the cases of Somalia, Uganda and DRC. The US government has also turned a blind eye in numerous genocides on the continent, even though the US is state signatory of the genocide convention.

The research has analysed how the US lost its moral high ground through support for dictators and indifference for genocides. From Mobutu Sese Seko to Hosni Mubarak, US-backed regimes rained havoc not only in their countries but everywhere in the continent. Billions US dollars of US taxpayer's money have been given to the African regimes disguised as aid. Without this massive financial backing, the African regimes would fall and their conflicts would cease. The aid and the demand for the African minerals and oil are reason and fuel for the genocidal African wars. The US economic and military aid delivered from the USAID and AFRICOM are not the solution but they are the cause for the African problem and only their termination will end the dictatorial regimes, corruption and civil wars.

In the middle of the African conflicts and economic underdevelopment are the three paradoxes of US neocolonial foreign policy. These paradoxes will come to haunt the US in the form of security treats of various extremist organization, possible new cold war and permanent underdevelopment of a starving continent. The extremist organizations that are present in Mali, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Somalia and Congo are only the tip of the iceberg in an impoverished continent with a large young population. The US with all its allies will not be able to contain all these security treats that are growing exponentially. Whether the threats come from terrorist organizations in Libya, Mali and Algeria or by pirates in Nigeria and Somalia, the global effects of these extremists are massive.

The second threat of US neocolonialism will come from the millions of starving Africans that are living under the world's most corrupt and dictatorial regimes. Over the past fifty years the US supported authoritarian regimes across Africa in order to influence the politics and economics of the continent. However, these regimes are brutal as they are corrupt and incompetent to provide for the basic needs of their people. The massive foreign aid that the US is providing to these regimes will not suffice the growing needs for the Africans. As the US is facing its own "fiscal cliff" and reducing its foreign aid, the African countries are slowing their economic growth. These combined factors may transform into massive social unrest that can culminate in Sub-Saharan African spring.

However, the greatest unintended consequence for US foreign policy comes in a form of a new cold war with P.R. China over Africa's resources. The thesis also analysed the Cold War that did not end in Africa, but only changed its shape and competitors. The Great Powers are concentrating their power and expanding their influence in the new great game while the prize remains the great mineral wealth of Africa. In these silent conflict old competitors, enemies and allies are confronting US hegemony, while African countries and armies are mere pawns in a perpetual proxy war.

Democracy cannot be exported with supporting dictatorial leaders and former genocidal rebels cannot become professional soldiers with US military training. Real prosperous African economy cannot exist with hand-outs and debt forgiveness. True democracy must be demanded by the people while the repressive old regimes are being dismantled like in the Arab spring and the American Revolution.

## 6. POVZETEK

ZDA imajo kompleksne dvostranske odnose s 36 afrikanjskimi državami in s številnimi večstranskimi področnimi organizacijami v Afriki. Sredi tega labirinta moči in politike, obstaja preprost ponavljajoči se vzorec zunanje politike ZDA, ki me je pripeljal do moje raziskovalno vprašanje. Čeprav je uradna politika ZDA do Afrike usmerjena na podporo demokratije in stabilnosti, namen tega raziskovanja je analiza dejanskih motivov in ciljev z uporabo pripravljalnega preiskovalnega, kvalitativnega raziskovanja. Ključno vprašanje tega raziskovanja je povezano s tem, če je zunanja politika ZDA do Afrike namenjena spodbujanju demokratije, stabilnosti in razvoja, ali za promoviranje večnega konflikta in nerazvitosti. Zato je analiza zunanje politike ZDA do Afrike ključna za razumevanje politične in socialno gospodarske krize, ki je bila persistentna v tej temačni celini preteklega polstoletja. Glavni namen te disertacije je pojasnjevanje motivov in ciljev ZDA glede na Afriko preko teorije odvisnosti in teorije svetovnega sistema. Konbinirana metodološka prizma teh dveh teorij pojasnjuje permanentno nerazvitost afrikanjskih držav, nenehne konflikte ter njihovo gospodarsko odvisnost od ZDA. Za razliko od teorije modernizacije, s katero se promovira pomoč pri razvoju, teorija odvisnosti kaže na vzročnike nerazvitosti, ZDA in razvite države kot glavni vzrok nerazvitosti tretjega sveta. Teorija odvisnosti je prvotno bila oblikovana in vizualizirana, da bi razložila nerazvitost v Južni Ameriki. Ta teorija je vseeno popolno kompatibilna v Afriki, kjer so vse 50 države odvisne od ZDA glede na humanitarno pomoč, razvojni capital ter politične legitimnosti. Pomen te disertacije izhaja iz pomanjkanja analiz zunanje politike ZDA v Afriki, kjer so temeljni principi teorije odvisnosti vzeti kot hipoteza. Znana so številna raziskovanja o neo-kolonialnem vplivu ZDA v različnih delih Afrike. Prav tako, obstajajo številne študije renomiranih ekonomistov za razvoj, ki kažejo na škodljive učinke pomoči ZDA Afriki. Vendar malo je raziskovalcev, ki raziskujejo povezavo med neo-kolonialno zunanjo politiko, tujo pomočjo in afrikanjsko neskončno nerazvitostjo. Ta disertacija analizira shemo zunanje politike ZDA, ki se ponavlja po afrikanjskih državah, njene razloge ter njene posledice. Ta shema se lahko pogleda v prvem poglavju, ki vsebuje študije o primerih 12 afrikanjskih držav, ki se razlikujejo v svoji ozemeljski velikosti, številu prebivalcev in v svoji geo-strateški pomembnosti za ZDA. Te države so analizirane v zgodovinski retrospektivi, ki izkazuje vpletenost ZDA v vzdrževanju gospodarske stagnacije in nerazvitosti. Zadnjih nekaj let je Severna Afrika doživela hudo socio-politično preobrazbo znano kot "Arabska pomlad" kjer so ZDA odigrale ključno vlogo. Tudi Podsaharska Afrika je preživela svoj del oboroženega konflikta, nasilja in nestabilnosti. Istočasno stemi dogodki sta se prisotnost in vpliv ZDA v tej regiji povečala. Ta disertacija analizira razloge za konflikte, povezave interesov ZDA, iz katerih pa izhajajo odgovori, ki razlagajo permanentno nerazvitost celine. Študije primerov analizirajo povezavo zunanje politike ZDA s politično elito afrikanjskih držav, njihovo gospodarsko razvitost ter celovito politično stabilnost. Z namenom vzdrževanja nerazvitosti, ZDA so podpirale in financirale najbrutalneje in korumpirane režime v Afriki. Te študije primerov analizirajo tudi politično zatiranje, človekove pravice in korumpiranost v vseh 12 afrikanjskih državah.

Glede na Liberijo, vpliv ZDA je najdaljši, z začetkom v 19. stoletju. Liberija je več kot revna država v Afriki, ki predstavlja vizijo o zunanji politiki ZDA do Afrike. To je prvo veliko prizadevanje črne celine, ki se je začelo kot projekt za otesaje črnega prebivalstva v ZDA in je potem prešlo v znanjo politiko ZDA v Afriki. Za razliko od Evropejcev, ki so ustvarili kolonije in jih neposredno upravljali, pristop na ZDA je bil drugačen. Ustvarjalci zunanje politike v ZDA bi vladali za zavesami, dokler bi se diktatorskimi afrikanjski režimi vzpenjali in

padali, njihove države pa bi ostale nerazvite. Primer Liberije ponazarja zunanjo politiko ZDA v skrajnostih. Podpora in financiranje diktatorskega režima Samuela Doe iz ZDA predstavljata ena največjih napak v zunanji politiki ZDA. Ustvarjalci politike v ZDA so podpirali brutalni režim in je pomoč po določenem časovnem obdobju bila zmanjšana, država pa zapuščena poti za samouničenje. Posledice teh odločitev so privedle do genocida, državljanske vojne ter propadle države. Vpletenost ZDA se lahko opazi tudi v najštevilnejši afrikanski državi, Nigeriji. V tem primeru so interesi ZDA bili predstavljeni s kombinacijo neintervencije in posredne podpore številnih avtorskih režimov. ZDA ni intervenirala v genocidu v Biafri v času državljanske vojne v Nigeriji, niti ni sankcionirala stalne kršitve čkivekovih pravic, ki so se nadaljevale vse do 21. stoletja. Razlog za to neaktivnost so velike reserve nafte v delti reke Niger. V čistem machiavellijevem stilu so ZDA podprele, opremile ter financirale številne vojaške hunte. V zameno so naftne kompanije iz ZDA privilegirane uporabljati nigerijsko nafto, ne upoštevajoč okolje in lokalno prebivalstvo. Enaki vzorec neokolonialnega vpliva je bil ponovljen tudi v Libiji. Vendar v tej državi, bogata z nafto, vpletenost ZDA je kulminirala s popolno vojaško intervencijo, ki je rezultirala z množičnimi civilnimi žrtvami, rasnim in etničnim čiščenjem ter ostalimi številnimi kršitvami človekovih pravic. Vpletenost ZDA v Libiji se lahko spremlja od zgodnjih začetkov po Drugi svetovni vojni. Podpora ZDA korumpiranemu režimu kralja Idriza je povzročila odpor libijskega ljudstva proti zahodnemu neo-kolonializmu. Ta upor je rezultiral z bizarnim Gadafijevim režimom, ki je vladal z Libijo naslednjih 42 let. Kot v primeru kralja Idriza, tako je tudi režim Muamera Gadafija bil legitimiziran in podprt s strani ZDA v zadnjih letih njegovega vladanja. Vendar, kot pri vseh afrikanskih režimih, podpora ZDA je trajala samo v določenem časovnem obdobju. Končni cilj zunanje politike ZDA do Libije je nerazvitost preko stalnega konflikta. V Libiji je ta konflikt s časom spremenil svojo obliko od plemenskega konflikta v versko sektaški, dokler je glavna cilj vojne sama vojna. Z vpletenostjo v ta konflikt, Obamova vlada ni upoštevala pravnih in političnih posledic te vojne pustolovščine. Ta konflikt predstavlja precedens v mednarodnem pravu z jasno kršitvijo resolucije 1973 OZN s strani ZDA, to je neposredno podpiranje rasnega in etničnega čiščenja in sprememba režima z eliminacijo vodje suverene države. Tudi koristi ZDA v Libiji so bile velike, od naftnih koncesij do nevtralizacije grožnje hegemonije dolarja, ki je bil pod neposredno grožnjo predloženega libijskega zlatega dinarja. Pravi paradoks intervencije ZDA je prišel eno leto kasneje, z umorom veleposlanika ZDA in porastom islamističnih skrajnežov po Severni Afriki. Nenadna sprememba režimov v Libiji se je pokazala kot Obamova Lernejska hidra. Smrt starega diktatorja je nakazala porast nekaj terorističnih gibanj in organizacij v več severno afrikanskih državah, resno grožnjo, ki se ne more kontrolirati.

Prava zunanja politika ZDA do Afrike se lahko opazi tudi v Somaliji. ZDA so podpirale vodjo Siad Barre v času Ogadenske vojne, kot tudi različne paravojaške organizacije, ki so 90-tih združili državo. Bushova uprava je s političnim pritiskom celo začela etiopsko invazijo na Somalijo z namenom zatiranja islamskih sodišč. Gibanje islamskih sodišč se je pokazalo kot edino organizacijo, ki lahko vzdrži red in mir v Somaliji po državljanski vojni. Nasprotni učinek etiopske invazije se kazal, ko so se islamska sodišča spremenila v radikalno islamistično gibanje, Al-Sabaab, povezano z Al-Kaedo. Vpletenost ZDA v Somaliji se lahko razume le kot organizirana dezorganizacija cele nacije in področja. Paradoks te politike vsiljavanja konflikta in nerazvitosti se je odrazila v obliki piratstva in terorističnih organizacij v Somaliji, ki so v neposrednem nasprotju z interesi ZDA.

Glede na Etiopijo, ZDA so podpirale režim cesarja Haile Selassie, 21. stoletja pa avtorski režim Melesa Zenawija. Režim Zenawija je bil vpleten v resno kršitev človekovih pravic, v genocid plemena Anuak ter v trajno skrivno vojno na področju Ogaden. Kljub vsem tem zločinom, ta režim je bil največji prejemnik pomoči in kapitala ZDA. Razlog za to pa je

dejstvo, da je Etiopija ključni zaveznik ZDA v Vzhodni Afriki. Etiopska vojska je bila izkoriščana kot pri nadomestnih vojnah (Proxy vojne) ZDA v Somaliji in je področje vzdrževala v trajnem stanju nesigurnosti in nerazvitosti. Glede na Egipt, vpliv ZDA se lahko primerja z več kot 70 milijard dolarjev v obliki vojne pomoči. Ta množična pomoč je spremenila celotno ravnotežje moči v tem področju in je ustvarila egiptski vojno–industrijski kompleks, ki predstavlja država v državi. Vseeno je največja negativna posledica bila ustvarjanje cele korumpirane elite vodene od Mubarakovega diktatorskega režima. S politično legitimnostjo in vojno pomočjo, ZDA so vzdrževale kleptokratski in diktatorski režim več desetletij, s tem pa je direktno odgovorna za padec državnega sistema in anarhijo, ki je sledila. Ustvarjalci politike v ZDA so bili v možnosti pomagati egiptskemu gospodarstvu z drugačnim namenom milijardih dolarjev, ki so bile uporabljene za vojno opremo in s tem preprečiti gospodarski zlom in anarhijo v Egiptu. Toda končna cilj ZDA je vedno bila nerazvit, vendar vojno močni Egipt. Paradoks desetletne zunanje politike do Egipta priđe v obliki oblasti islamističnega bratstva, fundamentalistično islamistično gibanje, ki neposredno nasprotuje interesov ZDA v tem področju.

Politikata ZDA za obstoj nerazvitosti Afrike se lahko opazi tudi v majhnih državah, kot je Ekvatorialna Gvineja. Državo s 700 000 prebivalcev in velikimi rezervami nafte in plina so lahko preoblikovale v ena najrazvitih držav v svetu. Vendar pa v Ekvatorialni Gvineji več kot tri desetletja vlada brutalni in kleptokratski režim. Kljub velikim rezervam nafte in hudim kršitvam človekovih pravic, ZDA še vedno zagotavljajo gospodarsko in vojaško pomoč. Ustvarjalci politike v ZDA iz obeh strank nadaljujejo dajati legitimnost in podporo Obiangovem režimu. Celo je tudi zasebno vojaško podjetje iz ZDA zadolženo za zaščito režima. Obiang je več kot le še enega avtoritarnega vodje v Afriki – on je, po nekaj nevladnih organizacijah, najbrutalnejši diktator v Afriki. Stopnja zločinov, ki so bili storjeni ob tem režimu v kombinaciji s podporo ZDA je verjetno eden najbolj prepričljivih dokazov o teoriji odvisnosti v Afriki.

Osrednja Afrika je prav tako pod močnim vplivom ZDA s podporo avtokratskih režimov Ruande, Ugande ter Demokratske Republike Kongo. ZDA so podpirale, financirale in usposabljalne režime Ugande in Ruande od njihovih začetkov, ko sta bila le uporniška gibanja v Osrednji Afriki. Ta pomoč še do danes ni ustavljena, temveč ravno nasprotno, ima eksponencialni porast. V časovnem obdobju dveh desetletij sta bila režima Ugande in Ruande vključena v množične kršitve človekovih pravic v svojih državah in v regiji. Vojska Ugande je udeležena v sistematično uničenje plemen Alcoli in Kamajoras, hkrati pa se borijo v namišljeni vojni proti LRA (Gospodove Odporniške Vojske). Po poročilu OZN, režim Ruande je odgovoren za organizacijo, financiranje in oborožitev številnih paravojaških organizacij v vzhodnem Kongu z namenom oropati naravne resurse v tem območju. Predsednik Kagame je nekdanji uporniški vodja, ki se je boril proti genocidu v Ruandi, je prav tako sam storil genocid v maščevanju proti plemenu Hutu. Ti dve diktatorski vodji sta združili sile proti zelo večjem sosedu Zair. Ta konflikt ponazarja načrte ZDA za Afriko, neskončne vojne afrikanskih diktatorjev, ki se vodijo s primitivnim orožjem in z vojaki-otroci. Prva vojna v Kongu se je preobrazila v še bolj krvavo vojno, ki so je vodili nekdanji zaveznici in dodatni diktatorji iz Angole in Zimbabvea, s čem je postala prva celinska vojna v Afriki. Druga vojna v Kongu je najmanj medijski zajeta vojna, katerega bilanca je v več kot 6 milijonov mrtvih in uničena infrastruktura. Vse do danes je status quo nerazvitosti, konflikta in zatiranja bilo vzdrževano s strani vodij Kabila iz Konga, Kagame iz Ruande, Museveni iz Ugande ter Mugabe iz Zimbabvea. Zraven te balansne moči so ZDA vzdrževale svoj sistem vojaške in razvojne pomoči, kot tudi programe za oprostiteva dolgov, namesto obsodbe za zločine in sankcij.

Te študije primerov kažejo, da je zunanja politika ZDA v Afriki imuna logiki hladne vojne in vojne proti terorizmu. Da bi vzdržale nerazvitost celine, ZDA so podprle socialistične vodje, paravojaške formacije ter celo radikalne islamistične skupine. Občasno so uradni zastopniki ZDA sprožili, stimulirali in celo sodelovali v vojne konflikte povsod po celini.

Podpora ZDA afrikanskih avtokratskih vodij in vzdrževanje gospodarske odvisnosti in nerazvitosti ustvarja paradokso situacijo v katerem nove naraščajoče sile kot je Kitajska, lahko profitirajo. Drugo poglavje zajema vpletenost kitajskega in iranskega vpliva v Afriki. Namen tega poglavja je preučiti, ali z zunanjo politiko ZDA do Afrike lahko izbruhne nova hladna vojna z Kitajsko za omejene naravne resurse. Drugi cilj, ki se nanaša na Iran, je analiza islamističnega vpliva v Afriki. Iranski prodor v Afriko je neposredna posledica zunanje politike ZDA v celini. Vse dokler ustvarjalci politike ZDA nadaljujejo politiko vzdrževanja afrikanskih korumpiranih režimov in nerazvitosti, Iran izkorišča vrzel moči, da bi dosegal svoje cilje. Pomen analize zunanje politike ZDA do Afrike presega afrikanske konflikte in ekonomsko stagnacijo. Implementirana politika edine super sile najrevnejše celine lahko ima hude posledice za ves svet.

Poleg 12 držav iz študij primerov, tretje poglavje vsebuje tudi analizo zunanje pomoči ZDA do vseh afrikanskih držav. Cilj tega poglavja je preučevanje vseh namernih in nenamernih posledic zunanje pomoči ZDA. Velik poudarek je stavljen na makroekonomske implikacije pomoči ZDA v fragmentiranih afrikanskih ekonomijah. Tretje poglavje analizira monetarne in fiskalne implikacije pomoči ZDA, kot tudi neuspeh, da pomoč ZDA spodbudi gospodarski razvoj in rast. Posledice tuje pomoči za dejanski devizni tečaj so verjetno najpomembnejši vidik, ki dokazuje teorija odvisnosti. Tretje poglavje povzema raziskovanja in dokaze uglednih razvojnih ekonomistov, ki trdijo, da zunanja pomoč ima enake učinke kot "Holandska bolezen". Ta fenomen razlaga, da takšna situacija, kjer veliki priliv tujih deviz katerekoli oblike, kot so prejemki od nafte ali tuje pomoči, izvaja zgornji pritisk na dejanski devizni tečaj v državi prejemalki s spodbujanjem zelo hitre domače inflacije. Trije zelo različni dogodki v zgodnjih 1960 tih, in sicer val neodvisnosti v afrikanskih državah, tuja pomoč in "holandskata bolezen" bo se srečali v čudovitem in komaj znanem paradoksu. Uporabljaajoč podatke o frankofonski zahodni Afriki, Adenauer in Vagasky sta prišla do utrditve, da povečanje tuje pomoči pripelje do porasta dejanskega deviznega tečaja, enako kot je predvideno v standardnem modelu "holandske bolezn". S porastom dejanskega deviznega tečaja so afrikanske ekonomije postale nekonkurenčne na mednarodnem trgu. Kot rezultat tega, njihov izvoz se je zmanjšal, proizvodnja je ustavljena, države pa so postale neto uvoznice. Tretje poglavje vključuje trije študije primerov iz Burkina Fasa, Obale slonove kosti in Senegala. Analiza potrjuje tezo, da države, ki predhodno ni bile prejemnice tuje pomoči, niso imele nobenih učinkov "holandske bolezn". Države, ki pa so bile največje prejemnice tuje pomoči so pokazale različne negativne posledice v svoji makroekonomski stabilnosti. Tuja pomoč lahko ima različne učinke na različnih afrikanskih državah odvisno od fleksibilnosti njihove nacionalne valute, oziroma od tega, če je nacionalnata valuta fiksirana s centralno banko ali je fleksibilna. V državah kjer je devizni tečaj fiksiran, priliv tuje pomoči, ki je lahko preoblikovana v lokalno valuto, bi povečal ponudbo denarja v tej državi. To bo rezultiralo s pritiskom domačega povpraševanja in zvišjanjem domačih cen. Tako stanje je pravzaprav porast dejanskega deviznega tečaja oziroma valutata bi imela manj dejanskega blaga in storitev kot prej.

Drugi model nakaže, da imajo države fleksibilni devizni tečaj. V tem primeru, povečana količina tuje valute omogočene preko tuje pomoči bo omogočala povečanje cene domače valute. Kot posledica tega se ustvarja porast dejanskega deviznega tečaja, vendar preko porasta nominalnega deviznega tečaja namesto domačih cen. V obeh primerih porast

dejanskega deviznega tečaja zmanjšuje konkurenčnost afriških držav. Največja zabloda zahodnih donatorjev pomoči, zlasti pa glede na ZDA je to, da so one pozabile temelje realne ekonomije. Tuja valuta, ki je dana kot pomoč predstavlja sredstvo za izmenjavo, ne pa resurs. Če se milijarde dolarjev ne uporabljajo razumno, to bo samo zvišilo vrednost dejansko omejenih resursov v Afriki in s tem bo afriški izvoz neskladen na globalnem trgu.

Od tu izhaja tudi ključno vprašanje, ali tuja pomoč omogoča trajnostni razvoj Afrike. Dokaz, da tuja pomoč ne povzroča ekonomskega razvoja in uspeha je analiza statistike Svetovne Banke. Analiza je usmerjena na porast BDP na prebivalca afriških držav in na dvostransko pomoč do njih v časovnem obdobju 50 let. Po statistiki Svetovne Banke, ekonomska rast Rodezije je stabilna, čeprav je država bila pod hudimi ekonomskimi sankcijami in ni prejela nobene tuje pomoči. S preobrazbo države, stanje v Zimbabveu se je popolno spremenilo. S povečano razvojno in humanitarno pomočjo so se zmanjšal porast BDP na prebivalca. Leta 1992, ko je pomoč ZDA znašala 100 mil dolarjev, BDP na prebivalca se je zmanjšal za -11,1 %.

Enako stanje se odraža tudi v največji ekonomiji na celini, Južna Afrika. Od 2007. Leta je BDP na prebivalca Južne Afrike v prostem padcu od 2,6 %, hkrati pa ekonomska pomoč znaša več kot ena milijarda dolarjev. Drugi pomembni gospodarski trend Južno Afriške ekonomije je rast nezaposlenosti, ki uradno znaša 23 %, dejansko pa znaša 40%. Kot primerjava vzamemo tudi dejstvo, da nezaposlenost v Južni Afriki v času apartheida je bila le 13 %, država pa ni prejela nobene ekonomske pomoči. Edina rast v Južni Afriki je bila stopnja kriminalitete in korupcije, kot tudi stopnja ekonomske neenakosti. Z Ginijevim koeficientom 0,63 Južna Afrika je ena socialno najbolj enakih držav v svetu.

Drugi od najskrajnejših primerov škodljivega učinka ekonomske pomoči je Zair ali sedanja D.R. Kongo. Analize Zimbabvea, Južne Afrike in Konga pokažejo, da se s tujo pomočjo ne more kupiti ekonomske rasti. Ekonomska in humanitarna pomoč samo opogumljata režime prejemnike pomoči, da naredijo radikalna dejanja in odložijo reforme, ki bo proizvedle ekonomsko rast. Pomoč ZDA vzdržuje in opogumlja režim Mugabe, podkupljuje Afriški Nacionalni Kongres Južne Afrike ter je vzdrževala kleptokratski režim Mobutu v Zairu.

Teorija odvisnosti oziroma vzdrževanja afriške nerazvitosti je podkrepljena s tablico 3.7. v kateri je prikazana tuja pomoč do afriških avtokratskih režimov. Milionske svote niso prispevale k ekonomski rasti ali izboljšanju življenjskega standarda držav prejemnic. Zato pa so diktatorji kot Paul Biya, Zenawi, Isaias Afewerki, Obiang, Mubarak, Idi Amin, Mugabe pridobili stotine milijone dolarjev, da bi utrdili svojo oblast. Ekonomska pomoč tem režimom, med katerimi je tudi Idi Amin ne more biti interpretirana drugačno kot pomoč državam za njihovo samouničenje.

Po Ester lee-ju (2007) milijarde dolarjev, ki so prešle v Afriko, so na prebivalca ustvarile rast, ki je blizu nule. Največje prejemnice ekonomske pomoči, ki so prejele več kot 17 % njihovega BDP-a čez 42 let so prav tako imele rast v znesku nule na prebivalca. Med prvimi ekonomisti, ki so analizirali manjkajočo povezavo med tujo pomočjo in ekonomsko rastjo, je bil Peter Bauer. Lord Bauer je demistificiral teorijo, da razvite države se lahko otresajo takoimenovane pasti revščine le s prejetjem tuje pomoči od razvitih držav. Njegova raziskovanja so odšla še korak dlje, predvsem s teorijo, da pomoč za razvoj ni oblikovana za reševanje revnih družb od revščine. Pomoč za razvoj je namenjena obdržanju držav v statusu quo nerazvitosti. Ekonomska pomoč povzroča odvisnost, hkrati pa spodbuja lažno idejo, da je izhod iz nerazvitosti odvisen od zunanjih denarnih podpor. Ekonomska pomoč države do države je kontraproduktivna za rast, ker premika resurse, povečuje obseg in moč izvršilne oblasti, pelje k korupciji ter spodkopa civilno družbo. Po Baueru, tuja pomoč in nerazvitost

tretjega sveta sta pravzaprav dve strani istega kovanca. Milijarde dolarjev v ekonomski pomoči so odgovorni za moralni hazard na politični in gospodarski ravni v Afriki. Po Dambisi Mojo, pomoč ZDA je dobre vlade v Afriki pretvorila v slabe, slabe pa v slabše (Mojo,2009).

Med ostalimi kritikami o ekonski pomoči je tudi ta, da so afriške vlade zanemarile kmetijstvo in so se usmerile na industrijsko proizvodnjo (Bauer,1972). Od tu izhaja analiza humanitarne pomoči ZDA v Afriki. V Tretjem poglavju so bile analizirane negativne posledice pomoči vo hrani in zmanjšana kmetijska proizvodnja v Afriki.

Pomoč v hrani s strani ZDA se lahko deli na trije glavni deli: programska pomoč v hrani, pomoč vo hrani po projektu ter nujna pomoč v hrani ali humanitarna pomoč.

Prvi del je program za monetizacijo pomoči v hrani (Oksfam, 2005). Tone hrane, ki so donirane s strani ZDA so dane državi prejemnici, ki hrano preprodajajo po ceni, ki je pod tržno ceno in kapital uporabljajo za druge projekte in aktivnosti, ki nimajo nobenih stikov z prehrano prebivalstva. Glede na več nevladnih organizacij, ta vrsta pomoči je glavni razlog za povečano korupcijo v državah prejemnicah.

Poleg enormne pomoči v hrani in različnih programov ZDA, število podhranjenih se je povečalo s pospešenim tempom. V obdobju od 1996 do 2006 se je število kronično lačnih ljudi v revnih državah povečalo za 20 milijonov ljudi. Število od 850 milijonov v letu 2006 se je 2012 spet povečalo na 925 milijonov, po podatkih FAO. Paralelno z milijoni lačnimi ljudmi, tudi stopnja siromaštva eksponentno se povečuje. Leta 1970 manj kot 10% podsaharskega afriškega prebivalstva je živelo v revščini, v 21. stoletju pa se je to število povečalo na 70 %.

Humanitarna pomoč ima nekaj neželenih posledic za Afriko, med katerimi je tudi zmanjšanje cene hrane. Obstajajo več raziskovanj, ki so pokazala, da humanitarna pomoč ZDA in zlasti monetarizacija pomoči zmanjšuje ceno hrane. Med njimi je raziskovanje Feminonj (1995) v Etiopiji in Berreta in Maxwella v 2005.

Vendar največja negativna posledica pomoči v hrani je paradoksalno zmanjšana proizvodnja hrane v afriških državah. To je pravzaprav logična posledica padca cen hrane. Postopek deponiranja (odlaganja) suficita kmetijskih pridelkov pod tržno ceno v afriških državah se odraža v situaciji kjer kmeti niso konkurenčni in izgubijo spodbudo za proizvodnjo.

Od milijard ljudi, ki stradajo, 80 % živijo v ruralnih sredinah. Paradoksalno, ruralne sredine so kraji kjer bi hrana morala biti proizvedena.

Tablica 4.7. prikazuje razliko med podhranjenim prebivalstvom v Severni Afriki in Podsaharski Afiki. Tablica kaže na še eden ekonomski paradoks v katerem države Severne Afike z najhujim puščavskim podnebjem je samo del podhranjenih ljudi, dokler v najplodnejši državi na celini je 234 milijonov podhranjenih ljudi. Slučajno so države Podsaharske Afrike največje prejemnice humanitarne pomoči.

Pomoč v hrani od ZDA ima tudi druge neželjene učinke, med katerimi najpomembnejša je prekinitev mednarodne trgovije in sprememba dietalnih navad afriškega prebivalstva.

Stalni priliv poceni hrane je državam prejemnicam omogočil prelaganje implementacije ekonomskih reform in premeščanje resursov za razvoj kmetijstva. Kot posledico tega, pomanjkanje hrane je redni pojav tudi v državah, ki imajo stalno potrebo po humanitarni pomoči (Berret 2006). Ta priliv hrane zmanjšuje odpor ljudi proti oblasti ter okrepi avtorske režime.

Takšni primer je Etiopija, država, ki je prejela več kot 8,3 milijard dolarjev. Čeprav je Etiopija sedma največja prejemnica pomči ZDA, vseeno je 44 % podhranjenih ljudi, ki so odvisni od



humanitarne pomoči. Ekonomija Etiopije trpi za visoko inflacijo in nezapolenostjo od 50%. Vendar ekonomija Etiopije pravzaprav ima rekordno dvoštevlično rast.

Ekonomska in humanitarna pomoč ZDA sta obdrževali režim Zenawija, ključnega zaveznika ZDA v regiji. Hkrati pa je ta pomoč prelagala tudi ekonomske reforme. Kot posledico, v Etiopiji ni pravega zasebnega sektorja ali zakona o zaščiti zasebne lastnine. Temelji prosperitetnega gospodarstva, pravica do zasebne lastnine so ljudem v Etiopiji bili prepovedani. Po Ustavi Etiopije, država je lastnik zemljišča, ljudi pa ga lahko vzamejo v najem, vendar ga ne morejo posedovati ali prodajati. V Etiopiji so tuje banke prepovedane, telekomunikacijski sektor pa je državni monopol. Birokratske težave, korupcija in pomanjkanje zakonskih okvirov so le simptomi problemov Etiopskega gospodarstva. Kot posledica, nezaposlenosti mladih v Etiopiji znaša rekordnih 70 %.

Kmetijski sektor je posebna vrsta kontradiktornosti. Več kot 85 % prebivalstva dela v kmetijskem sektorju in predstavlja drugi največji afriški proizvajalec koruze in pšenice. Kmetijstvo v Etiopiji je največja izvozna gran, dokler istočasno 7 milijonov ljudi so odvisni od humanitarne pomoči. S temi kontradiktornimi ekonomskimi kazalci je Etiopija ena največjih ekonomskih paradoksov. Kenija je prav tako prejemnica velike ekonomske in humanitarne pomoči s strani ZDA. Od svoje neodvisnosti Kenija je prejela več kot 6 milijard dolarjev, dokler število ljudi, ki živijo na pragu revščine se je povečalo od 29 % na 57%. Glede na indeks človekovega razvojnega indeksa, Kenija je na 143. mestu med 182 državami. Glavni razlog za to so deset milijonov ljudi v Keniji, ki trpejo za kroničnim pomanjkanjem hrane.

Viri ekonomskih težav se lahko najdejo pri dveh predsednikih Kenije, ki sta vladala desetletji. Prvi predsednik Kenije, Jomo Kenyatta, je vladal z državo kot konfederacijo nasprotnih plemen. On je najplodnejše zemljišče dal ljudem svojega plemena. Drugi predsednik, Daniel arap Moi, je sistem obdrževal na podaništvu z redistribucijo javnega zemljišča svojimi privrženci. Z rastjo korupcije in plemenske ureditve, kmetijski sektor Kenije neprekinjeno slabi. Druga vzporednica je dejstvo, da s povečano pomočjo s strani ZDA z 818 milijonov dolarjev, so stroški korupcije v Keniji dosegle ena milijarda dolarjev. Številna raziskovanja so pokazala, da ekonomska in humanitarna pomoč ZDA krepi korupcijo v Afriki in spodkopata inštitucije.

Ekonomska stanja v Keniji, Etiopiji in Somaliji so samo pričakovala naravne priložnosti za katastrofo bibličnih razsežnosti. Popolno neurje se je zgodilo z množično lakoto v 2011. Suša, nekompetentna birokratija in korumpirani politiki so bili glavni pobudniki množične lakote.

Masovna lakota v letu 2011 je obelodanila dejansko stanje ekonomij afriških držav, rast brez zmanjšanja revščine in nezaposlenosti, dokler so milijarde dolarjev izgubljene v lažnem razvoju, ki prelaga prave ekonomske reforme. Lakota iz 2011 prav tako je razkrila hitro ekonomsko rasti Etiopije in Kenije.

Ta množična lakota se ne more prepisati samo suši in pomanjkanju mednarodne pomoči. Masovna lakota se je zgodila v suverih in mednarodno priznatih državah, ki so neodvisne več kot 50 let. Neuspeh se najde v političnem vodstvu v Somaliji, Etiopiji, Keniji ter Džibuti kot tudi v njihovih podpornikih, ZDA in zahodne države.

Vloga ZDA je posredna, vendar ključna. V času, ko je pomoč v hrani ni bila nujna, ZDA so bile precej radodarne z deponiranjem svojega kmetijskega suficita. Ampak, ko je pomoč v hrani bila najnujnejša, ZDA niso reagirale, ker so se bale, da humanitarna pomoč ne pride v roke teroristov.

Deponiranje kmetijskega suficita ZDA v Afriki je postalo več kot humanitarna gesta, temveč cilj zase. To obdržuje dominacijo ZDA v kmetijski proizvodnji in ustvarja odvisnost tretjega

sveta. S časom so se afriške države preobrazile od izvozniki hrane v uvozniki hrane. Dokaz za deponiranje suficita kmetijskih pridelkov s strani ZDA so tudi statistike, ki pokažejo strategijo utemeljeno na ponudbi namesto na realnem povpraševanju. Deponiranje kmetijskega suficita s strani ZDA pomaga edino proizvajalcem v ZDA, dokler kmetijski sektor v Afrika ostaja nekonkurenčen.

Za razliko od drugih raziskovanj avtorjev, ki so kritični do Tuje pomoči (Mojo 2009, Ester Lee 2006), ta disertacija vključuje tudi vojaško pomoč ZDA in njeno vpletenost v demokratske procese v Afriki. Vojaška pomoč moti ravnotežje moči v regiji, povečuje nesigurnost in tveganje za konfliktom, hkrati pa posredno pomaga pri kršitvi človekovih pravic.

Tretje poglavje se končuje z pomočjo, ki se ne more merjati v valuti, vseeno pa ima največji vpliv. Ta pomoč je predstavljena v diplomatski in politični podpori, ki legitimizira afriške vodje na svetovni sceni. Poleg množičnih kršitev človekovih pravic, ZDA nadaljujejo svoje prijateljske odnose s temi državami. Politična legitimnost, ki ZDA daje afriškim državam, kombinirana z ekonomsko pomočjo potrjuje teorijo odvisnosti. Diktatorski režimi so se skozi zgodovino pokazali kot destruktivni za ekonomije svojih držav in se je pokazalo, da le-ti obdržujejo nerazvitost.

Med afriškimi konflikti in neprekinjeno ekonomsko nerazvitostjo so trije paradoksi neokolonialne politike ZDA. Ti paradoksi proganjajo ZDA v obliki varnostnih tveganj glede na številne skrajne organizacije, mogočo novo hladno vojno ter trajno nerazvitost revne celine. Skrajne organizacije, ki so prisotne v Maliju, Libiji, Nigeriji, Somaliji ter Kongu so le vrh ledene gore na tej revni celini z največjim mladim prebivalstvom. Grožnje so medsebojno povezane – od državljanske vojne v Libiji, preko skrajnih gibanj v Nigeriji in Maliju do piratstva v Somaliji. ZDA in njene zaveznike ne bo mogli kontrolirati (omejiti) te varnostne rizike, ki se eksponentno povečujejo.

Vendar največja grožnja, ki izhaja iz neo-kolonializma so milioni sestradani Afričani, ki živijo v najbolj korumpiranih diktatorskih režimih neposredno podprli s strani ZDA. Ti režimi so se pokazali tako brutalni kot nekompetentni, da bi zagotovili najosnovnejše potrebe svojim ljudem. Množična pomoč, ki ZDA pošljejo tem režimom ne bo zadostna, da bi zadovoljila povečane potrebe afriških narodov. V času, ko se ZDA soočujejo s svojo fiskalno jamo in zmanjšajo ekonomsko in humanitarno pomoč, afriške države kažejo prave pomanjkljivosti njihovih ekonomij. Ti kombinirani dejavniki se lahko preobrazijo v masovne socialne nemire, ki lahko kulminirajo v Podsaharsko Afriško pomlad. Posledice takega scenarija v času svetovne gospodarske krize bi bile katastrofalne, in ne le za Afriko, temveč tudi za ZDA.

## 7. LITERATURE:

- Abdelhadi, Magdi. 2012. Egypt's army in control of vast business empire. BBC, 23 June. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18548659> (1. July 2012).
- Abdelrhem, Isam Mohamed, Khalim Rashid and Amiruddin Ismail. 2008. *Integrated Groundwater Management for Great Man-Made River Project in Libya*. European Journal of Scientific Research. Available at: [http://www.eurojournals.com/ejsr\\_22\\_4\\_11.pdf](http://www.eurojournals.com/ejsr_22_4_11.pdf) (14. March 2012).
- Abuzeid, Farah. 2009. *Foreign Aid and the Big Push Theory: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa*. Stanford Journal of International Relations. Stanford Journal of International Relations. Available at: [http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/pdf/Aid\\_11.1.pdf](http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/pdf/Aid_11.1.pdf) (22. October 2012).
- Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier. 2006. *Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule*. Journal of the European Economic Association.
- Adam, Christopher S. and David L. Bevan. *Aid, Public Expenditure and Dutch Disease*. Oxford: Department of Economics, University of Oxford, UK, 2003. Available at: <http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/13627/1/2003-02text.pdf> (8. November 2012).
- Adenauer, Isabell and Laurence Vagassky. 1998. Aid and the real exchange rate: Dutch disease effects in African countries. *Intereconomics*. Available at: <http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/40232/1/32465006X.pdf> (16. November 2012).
- Administration of George W. Bush. 2006. *Remarks Following Discussions With President Paul Kagame of Rwanda and an Exchange With Reporters*. Washington D.C., Authenticated US Government Information:1046-1048. Available at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2006-book1/pdf/PPP-2006-book1-doc-pg1046.pdf> (19. May 2012).
- Africa News Service. 2005. Meles Nominated for This Year's Crystal Eagle International Leadership Award. *Africa News Service*. Available at: <http://business.highbeam.com/3548/article-1G1-136488850/meles-nominated-year-crystal-eagle-international-leadership> (4. April 2012).
- African Union. 2010. Database of Press Releases related to Africa, *APO-OPA Database*. Available at: <http://appablog.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/14th-au-summit-election-of-members-of-peace-and-security-council-of-the-african-union/> (19. January 2013).

African Union. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union . Available at: [http://www.africa-union.org/rule\\_prot/PROTOCOL-%20PEACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20COUNCIL%20OF%20THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/rule_prot/PROTOCOL-%20PEACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20COUNCIL%20OF%20THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION.pdf) (24. April. 2013).

Al Jazeera. 2011. Libya rebels eye Brega oil installations. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/08/201181215510690602.html> (28. March 2012).

Al Jazeera. 2009. War and Peacekeepers, The problems facing the UN blue berets as they try to bring peace to DR Congo. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/general/2009/03/200939123045906575.html> (18. May 2012).

Al Jazeera. 2007. "Gambia's faith in miracle cures." Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2007/05/200852518371536606.html> (22. May 2012).

Al Jazeera. 2011. Could Gaddafi flee to Zimbabwe? Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2011/08/201182435517932502.html> (18. January 2012).

Al Jazeera. 2011. DR Congo: Africa's sleeping giant? Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/africa-states-independence/2010/10/2010104111239448417.html> (16. May 2012).

Alemazung, Joy Asongazoh Asongazoh. 2010. Post-Colonial Colonialism: An Analysis of International Factors and Actors Marring African Socio-Economic and Political Development. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, vol.3, no.10:62-84. Available at: <http://www.jpanafrican.com/docs/vol3no10/3.10Post-Colonial.pdf> (19. September 2012).

Alesina, Alberto and Beatrice Weder. 1999. Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid? Cambridge: NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH. Available at: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7108.pdf> (12. October 2012).

Amin Samir. 1969. *The Class Struggle in Africa*. Cambridge: Africa Research Group.

Amnesty International. 2006. Dead on Time – Arms Transportation, Brokering and the Threat to Human Rights. AI Index: ACT 30/008/2006:1-118. Available at: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/008/2006/en/ca2bf8eb-d434-11dd-8743-d305bea2b2c7/act300082006en.pdf> (19. December 2012).

- Andersson, Hilary. 2008 "China 'is fuelling war in Darfur'." *BBC* ,13. July. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7503428.stm> (9. July 2012).
- Andersson, Hilary. 2004. Secrets of Zimbabwe camps exposed." *BBC* ,6. March. Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from\\_our\\_own\\_correspondent/3537511.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3537511.stm) (9. June 2012).
- Arndt, H. W. . *Economic Development: The History of an Idea*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer, 1978), pp. 219-222. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40402095?uid=3739256&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21102171334611> (9. November 2012).
- Ashford, Lori S. 2007. Africa's Youthful Population: Risk or Opportunity? Population Reference Bureau. Available at: <http://www.prb.org/pdf07/africayouth.pdf> (6. December 2012).
- Asuni, Judith Burdin. 2011. Blood Oil in the NigerDelta. United States Institute of Peace. Available at: [http://www.usip.org/files/blood\\_oil\\_nigerdelta.pdf](http://www.usip.org/files/blood_oil_nigerdelta.pdf) (19. March 2012).
- Axelrod, Matthew Craig. 2011. Aid as Leverage? Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship. The Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania . Available at: <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Axelrod.pdf> (26. October 2012).
- Baker, Russ. 2011 .Is General Khalifa Hifter The CIA's Man In Libya? *Business Insider*,22April. Available at: <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-cias-man-in-libya-2011-4> (22. April 2012).
- Bamfo, Napoleon A. 2009. Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006: Motives and lessons learned. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 4(2), pp. 055-065. Available at: <http://www.academicjournals.org/ajpsir/pdf/pdf2010/February/Bamfo.pdf> (29. April 2012).
- Banerjee, Abhijit, et al. 2007. Why Has Unemployment Risen in the New South Africa? Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research. Available at: [http://www.nber.org/papers/w13167.pdf?new\\_window=1](http://www.nber.org/papers/w13167.pdf?new_window=1) (25. September 2012).

- Barnes, Cedric. 2007. The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu Islamic Courts. Chatham House, AFP BP 07/02:1-9. Available at: <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bpsomalia0407.pdf> (9. May 2012).
- Barrett, Christopher B. and Daniel G. Maxwell. 2005. *Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting Its Role*. Ed. Paul Mosley. New York: Routledge.
- Barrett, Christopher B. Food Aid's Intended and Unintended Consequences. 2006. Agricultural and Development Economics Division, The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ESA Working Paper No. 06-05 Available at: [http://dyson.cornell.edu/faculty\\_sites/cbb2/Papers/MixedEffectsv2Mar2006.pdf](http://dyson.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/cbb2/Papers/MixedEffectsv2Mar2006.pdf) (29. November 2012).
- Barrett, Christopher B. 2002. Food Aid Effectiveness: It's The Targeting, Stupid!. World Food Programme Policy Service, Strategy and Policy Division. Available at: [http://dyson.cornell.edu/faculty\\_sites/cbb2/Papers/WFPpaperDec2002.pdf](http://dyson.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/cbb2/Papers/WFPpaperDec2002.pdf) (9. September 2012).
- Barrett, Christopher B., Sandeep Mohapatra and Donald L. Snyder. 1999. The Dynamic Effects of U.S. Food Aid on Recipient Country Agriculture. Utah State University: *Economic Research Institute Study Papers*. Available at: <http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1107&context=eri> (16. October 2012).
- Bazan, Elizabeth B. 2002. Assassination Ban and E.O. 12333: A Brief Summary. *CRS Report for Congress*. Available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21037.pdf> (24. April 2012).
- BBC. 2000. Mugabe's costly Congo venture. *BBC News*, 25 July. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/611898.stm>. (28. May 2012).
- BBC. 2001. Congo's Coltan rush. *BBC News*, 1 August. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1468772.stm> (14. February 2012).
- BBC. 2001. Nigeria's trigger happy police. *BBC News*, 11 May. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1322017.stm> (22. March 2012).
- BBC. 2002. Mugabe: The Price of Silence. *BBC News* 10 March. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/1844779.stm> (19. May 2012).

- BBC. 2005. Rice names 'outposts of tyranny'. *BBC*, 19 January. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4186241.stm> (8. January 2012).
- BBC. 2006. British Invitation to Mugabe's Butcher. *BBC News, Panorama*. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/1861719.stm> (6. May 2012).
- BBC. 2006. Congolese flee renegade general. *BBC News*, 23 September. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7009442.stm> (7. March 2012).
- BBC. 2007. China to build Nigerian railway. *BBC News*, 31 October. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6101736.stm> (15. July 2012).
- BBC. 2007. US Somali air strikes 'kill many'. *BBC News*, 9 January. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6243459.stm> (6. February 2012).
- BBC. 2008. Foreign troops 'drawn into Congo'. *BBC News*, 13 November. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7726690.stm> (23. March 2012).
- BBC. 2008. UN 'accuses Rwanda and DR Congo'. *BBC News*, 11 December. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7776309.stm> (6. April 2012).
- BBC. 2009. Nigerian troops shell Islamists *BBC News*, 28 July. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8172437.stm> (19. January 2012).
- BBC. 2009. Obama speaks of hopes for Africa. *BBC News*, 11 July. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8145762.stm> (4. August 2012).
- BBC. 2012. *Obama: Egypt is not US ally, nor an enemy*. *BBC News*, 13 September. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19584265> (19. September 2012).
- BBC. 2010. Gambia cuts ties with Iran and orders diplomats to go." *BBC* 23 November. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11819143> (19. July 2012).
- BBC. 2010. Senegal recalls Tehran ambassador over arms shipment. *BBC*, 15 December. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11998752>. (14. July 2012).

- BBC. 2011. Ethiopia 'using aid as weapon of oppression'. *BBC Newsnight*, 5 August, Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/9556288.stm>(11. March 2012).
- BBC. 2011. Gambia President Yahya Jammeh: Critics 'can go to hell'." *BBC News* 12 December. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16144116>. (29. May 2012).
- BBC. 2011.Libya: Gaddafi regime's US-UK spy links revealed." *BBC News* 4 September Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14774533> ( 12. January 2012).
- BBC. 2012.Puntland profile. *BBC News*,11 September.Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14114727>. (1. April 2012).
- Belloni, Roberto. 2005. *Is Humanitarianism Part of the Problem?Nine Theses*. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Available at: <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/belloni.pdf> (9. January 2013).
- Beresford, David. 2008. Chinese ship carries arms cargo to Mugabe regime. *The Guardian*, 18 April. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/18/china.armstrade> (1. July 2012).
- Bergen, Peter. 2012 Drone is Obama's weapon of choice. *CNN*,19 September. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/05/opinion/bergen-obama-drone/index.html> (1. September 2012).
- Berrigan, Frida , William D. Hartung and Leslie Heffel.2005. Report: U.S. Weapons at War 2005. Promoting Freedom or Fueling Conflict? U.S. Military Aid and Arms Transfers Since September 11. World Policy Institute Special Report Available at: <http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/wawjune2005.html> (15. January 2013).
- Bevan, James . *Crisis in Karamoja Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda's Most Deprived Region*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 21:1-81. Available at: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP21-Karamoja.pdf> (9. February 2012).



- Blomberg, Brock and J. Lawrence Broz. 2006. The Political Economy of IMF Voting Power. *San Diego: University of California.* Available at: [http://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/IPES/papers/broz\\_blomberg\\_F1030\\_1.pdf](http://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/IPES/papers/broz_blomberg_F1030_1.pdf) (9. February 2013).
- Bowden, Anna. 2010. The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy. One Earth Future Working Paper. Available at: [http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/documents\\_old/The\\_Economic\\_Cost\\_of\\_Piracy\\_Full\\_Report.pdf](http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/documents_old/The_Economic_Cost_of_Piracy_Full_Report.pdf) (14. January 2012).
- Brautigam, Deborah A. and Stephen Knack. 2004. *Foreign Aid, Institutions and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Chicago: The University of Chicago, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 52, 2; Research Library Core:255-281. Available at: <http://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/upload/Foreign-Aid-Institutions-and-Governance-in-SubSaharan-Africa.pdf>. (19. January 2013).
- Bretton, Henry. 1973. *Power and Politics in Africa.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.
- Bright, Nancee Oku. 2002. *America's stepchild. Global connections.* PBS. Available at: <http://www.der.org/films/liberia-americas-stepchild.html> (1. February 2012).
- Burgess, Stephen. 2008. *The African Standby Force, Sub-regional Commands, and African Militaries.* US Air War College. Available at: <http://www.au.af.mil/awc/africom/documents/BurgessSubregionalCommands.pdf> (9. February 2012).
- Burnside, Craig and David Dollar. 2000. *Aid, Policies, and Growth.* The American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 3 (Jun., 2004), pp. 774-780. Available at: [http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/corsi/739/lezioni/easterly\\_etalaer04.pdf](http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/corsi/739/lezioni/easterly_etalaer04.pdf) (14. January 2013).
- Burrows, Gideon. 2003. "We sell arms to Saddam's friends." *The Guardian*, 9 September. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/sep/09/armstrade.uk> (16. January 2013).
- Calderisi, Robert. 2007. *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- CARE USA. 2006. White Paper on Food Aid Policy. Available at: [http://www.care.org/newsroom/publications/whitepapers/food\\_aid\\_whitepaper.pdf](http://www.care.org/newsroom/publications/whitepapers/food_aid_whitepaper.pdf). (19. October 2012).

CBS. 2011. NATO bombs let rebels fight on Qaddafi's turf. CBS News, 28 March. Available at: <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/03/28/501364/main20047864.shtml> (16. February 2012).

CCJPZ. 1999. Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980-1988. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Legal Resources Foundation. Available at: <http://www.sokwanele.com/pdfs/BTS.pdf> (9. May 2012).

Central Intelligence Agency. 2012. *CIA - The World Factbook*.. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uv.html>. (3. August 2012).

Chatterjee, Santanu, Paola Giuliano and Ilker Kaya. 2007. *Where Has All the Money Gone? Foreign Aid and the Quest for Growth*. Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor. Available at: [http://www.cid.harvard.edu/neudc07/docs/neudc07\\_s5\\_p15\\_chatterjee.pdf](http://www.cid.harvard.edu/neudc07/docs/neudc07_s5_p15_chatterjee.pdf) (3. September 2012).

Chigora, Percyslage and Dorothy Goredema. 2011. Zimbabwe –Iran Relations in the 21st Century. Available at: [http://www.jsd-africa.com/Jsd/Vol13No4\\_Summer2011\\_B/PDF/Zimbabwe-Iran%20Relations%20in%20the%2021st%20Century1.pdf](http://www.jsd-africa.com/Jsd/Vol13No4_Summer2011_B/PDF/Zimbabwe-Iran%20Relations%20in%20the%2021st%20Century1.pdf) (1. July 2012).

Chothia, Farouk. 2011. What does Gaddafi's death mean for Africa? *BBC News*, 21 October. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15392189> (17. March 2012).

Christopher, Olgiati. 2009. *Once upon a coup*. PBS documentary. Available at: <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/once-upon-a-coup/credits/5479/> (6. March 2012).

CIA. 2012. *CIA World Factbook, Libya*. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html> (9. March 2012).

Clayton, Anthony. 1999. *Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa Since 1950*. London: UCL Press Limited.

- CNN. 2011. Americans slain by captors on hijacked yacht; pirates killed, arrested. *CNN* 23 February. Available at: [http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-22/world/somalia.us.yacht\\_1\\_maersk-alabama-somali-coast-somali-pirates?\\_s=PM:WORLD](http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-22/world/somalia.us.yacht_1_maersk-alabama-somali-coast-somali-pirates?_s=PM:WORLD) (2. April 2012).
- Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 2, FOREIGN OPERATIONS. *FOREIGN OPERATIONS*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2011. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137936.pdf>. (13. September 2012).
- Control Risks Group. 2012. A New Frontier: Oil and Gas in East Africa. Control Risks Group Limited. Available at: [http://www.controlrisks.com/Oversized%20assets/east\\_africa\\_whitepaper\\_LR\\_web.pdf](http://www.controlrisks.com/Oversized%20assets/east_africa_whitepaper_LR_web.pdf) (18. May 2012).
- Cook, Nicolas. 2010. *Liberia's Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33185.pdf> (9. January 2012).
- Cope, John A. 1995. *International Military Education and Training An Assessment*. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies. Available at: [mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/23524/.../mcnair44.pdf](http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/23524/.../mcnair44.pdf) (19. December 2012).
- Coyne, Christopher J. and Matt E. Ryan. 2008. *With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies? Aiding the World's Worst Dictators*. Merkatus Center: George Mason University. Available at: [http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\\_14\\_01\\_2\\_coyne.pdf](http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_14_01_2_coyne.pdf) (14. December 2012).
- Crosswell, Michael. 1999. *The Development Record and The Effectiveness of Foreign Aid*. Available at: <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Praxis/Archives/~//media/Fletcher/Microsites/praxis/xv/Crosswell.pdf> (6. September 2012).
- Dagne, Ted. 2010. *The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments*. *Congressional Research Service*. Available at: [http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40108\\_20101207.pdf](http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40108_20101207.pdf) (9. April 2012).
- Daily Observer. 2008. No room for gays in The Gambia. *Daily Observer*, 19 May. Available at: <http://observer.gm/africa/gambia/article/2008/5/19/no-room-for-gays-in-gambia> (7. June 2012).

- Daly, Corbett B. 2011. Clinton on Qaddafi: "We came, we saw, he died". *CBS News*, 20 October. Available at: [http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544\\_162-20123348-503544/clinton-on-qaddafi-we-came-we-saw-he-died/](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20123348-503544/clinton-on-qaddafi-we-came-we-saw-he-died/) (19. January 2012).
- Darwish, Adel. 2009. Muammar Gaddafi accuses Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah of lying at Arab summit. *The Telegraph*, 30 March. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/qatar/5079290/Muammar-Gaddafi-accuses-Saudi-Arabias-King-Abdullah-of-lying-at-Arab-summit.html> (4. February 2012).
- Davidson, Paul. 1982. *International Money and the Real World*. London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
- De Ree, Joppe and Eleonora Nillesen. 2006. Aiding Violence or Peace? The Impact of Foreign Aid on the Risk of Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Development Economics* 88 (2009) 301–313. Available at: [http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/90684/diwpublikation\\_de\\_enillesen.pdf](http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/90684/diwpublikation_de_enillesen.pdf) (11. January 2013).
- DeYoung, Karen and Greg Miller. 2011. In Libya, CIA is gathering intelligence on rebels. *The Washington Post*, 30 March. Available at: [http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-03-30/world/35260312\\_1\\_musa-kusa-ras-lanuf-airstrikes-and-missile-attacks](http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-03-30/world/35260312_1_musa-kusa-ras-lanuf-airstrikes-and-missile-attacks) (2. February 2012).
- Djankov, Simeon, Jose G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2005. *The curse of aid*. Available at: <http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/1014/870.pdf?sequence=1> (9. May 2012).
- Djankov, Simeon, Jose G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2006. Does Foreign Aid Help? *Cato Journal*, Vol. 26, No. 1. Available at: [http://www.relooney.fatcow.com/00\\_New\\_544.pdf](http://www.relooney.fatcow.com/00_New_544.pdf) (1. December 2012).
- Doherty, Max 2007. "Karamoja, Uganda's Cattle War". International Affairs Forum.
- Dollar, David and Lant Pritchett. 1998. *Assessing Aid What Works, What Doesn't, and Why*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Inc.

- Douglas, Oronto, et al. Oil and Militancy in the Niger Delta Terrorist Threat or Another Colombia? Washington DC: The United States Institute of Peace, 2004. Available at: <http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/WP/4-DouglasVonOkonta.pdf> (4. April 2012).
- Dreher, Axel and James Raymond Vreeland. 2011. Buying Votes and International Organizations. ISSN: 1439-2305:1-38. Available at: [www.uni-goettingen.de/de/document/download/...pdf/123\\_Dreher.pdf](http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/document/download/...pdf/123_Dreher.pdf)(25. January 2012).
- Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James R. Vreeland. 2009. Development aid and international politics: does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? Bond University ePublications@bond. Available at: <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=gdc> (3. February 2013).
- Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Raymond Vreeland . 2009. Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council. Available at: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292109000312>.(15. February 2013).
- Easterly, William . *How Did Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Become Heavily Indebted? Reviewing Two Decades of Debt Relief*. Center for Global Development, Institute for International Economics,. Washington, DC: Elsevier Science Ltd, 2002. Available at: [http://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/35\\_easterly\\_howdidheavilyindebtedpoorcountriesbecomeheavilyindebted\\_prp.pdf](http://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/35_easterly_howdidheavilyindebtedpoorcountriesbecomeheavilyindebted_prp.pdf).(19. January 2013).
- Easterly, William. 2007. *Are aid agencies improving?* New York: New York University, Economic Policy pp. 633–678. Available at: [http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/information/data/business/aid\\_agencies%20.pdf](http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/information/data/business/aid_agencies%20.pdf)(19. September 2012).
- Ebrahim-Zadeh, Christine. 2003. Dutch Disease: Too much wealth managed unwisely. *Finance & Development-a quarterly magazine of the IMF*. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/03/eBra.htm>.(24. September 2012).
- Economist Intelligence Unit. 2012. Economist Intelligence Unit-Gambia. *The Economist* Available at: <http://country.eiu.com/Gambia>.(17. June 2012).
- EIA. 2012. U.S. Energy Information Administration-Nigeria. Available at: <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=NI>.(6. March 2012).

- El-Fadel, M., et al. 2003. The Nile River Basin: A Case Study in Surface Water Conflict Resolution. *Nat. Resour. Life Sci. Educ.* 32:107–117. Available at: <https://www.agronomy.org/files/jnrlse/issues/2003/e02-15.pdf>.(11. May 2012).
- Eppel, Shari. 2008. *Matabeleland: Its Struggle for National Legitimacy, and the Relevance of this in the 2008 Election* . Berlin: Heinrich Böll Foundation. Available at: [http://www.boell.de/downloads/matabeleland\\_eppel\\_englisch.pdf](http://www.boell.de/downloads/matabeleland_eppel_englisch.pdf)(9. April 2012).
- Expose Uganda's Genocide. 2012. *Dr. Adam Branch: The Legacy of Forced Displacement in Northern Uganda*. Available at: <http://exposeugandasgenocide.blogspot.com/2008/08/dr-adam-branch-on-n-uganda-internment.html>.(8. March 2012).
- Fadera, Hatab. 2012.US appreciates Jammeh's role in Bissau, Mali crises. *Daily Observer*,11 May. Available at: <http://observer.gm/africa/gambia/article/us-appreciates-jammehs-role-in-bissau-mali-crises>.(22. June 2012).
- Faminow, Merle D. 1995. Issues in valuing food aid: The cash or in-kind controversy. Available at:<http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfpoli/v20y1995i1p3-10.html>">Issues in valuing food aid: The cash or in-kind controversy</A></B>.(17. February 2013).
- FAO,IFAD,WFP. 2002. *Reducing Poverty and Hunger, The Critical Role of Financing For Food, Agriculture and Rural Development*. Paper Prepared for the International Conference on Financing for Development. Available at: <http://www.ifad.org/events/monterrey/e/jointe.pdf>(9. January 2013).
- FAO,WFP,IFAD. 2012. *The State of Food Insecurity in the World*. Rome: FAO,WFP,IFAD. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3027e/i3027e.pdf>(2. February 2013).
- FAO. 2006. *The state of food and agriculture*.FAO Agricultural Series No.37. Available at: <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/a0800e/a0800e.pdf>(19. August 2012).
- FAO. 2011. *The State of Food Insecurity in the World, How does international price volatility affect domestic economies and food security?* Rome: FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2330e/i2330e.pdf> (29. August 2012).

- FIAN. 2010. Land grabbing in Kenya and Mozambique, a report on two research missions – and a human rights analysis of land grabbing. FIAN International Secretariat. Available at: [http://www.inkota.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Themen\\_Kampagnen/Ernaehrung\\_und\\_Landwirtschaft/Land\\_Grabbing/Land\\_grabbing\\_in\\_Kenya\\_and\\_Mozambique\\_FIAN\\_EN.pdf](http://www.inkota.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Themen_Kampagnen/Ernaehrung_und_Landwirtschaft/Land_Grabbing/Land_grabbing_in_Kenya_and_Mozambique_FIAN_EN.pdf). (9. September 2012).
- Fielding, David and Fred Gibson. 2012. *Aid and Dutch Disease in in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Helsinki: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Working Paper No. 2012/26. Available at: [http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2012/en\\_GB/wp2012-026/](http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2012/en_GB/wp2012-026/) (19. October 2012).
- Fite, Brandon. 2012. U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: [http://csis.org/files/publication/120404\\_Iran\\_Chapter\\_XIII-Peripheral\\_States-Revised.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf) (19. July 2012).
- Fitzsimmons, Scott . 2009. *Culture Clash: The Influence of Behavioural Norms on Military Performance in Asymmetrical Conflicts*. Calgary : Department of Political Science University of Calgary, Innovations Journal of Politics Volume 8, pp:99-142. Available at: <http://www.ucalgary.ca/innovations/files/innovations/Fitzsimmons%20Culture%20Clash.pdf>. (19. December 2012).
- Food trade and nutrition coalition. 2005. Dumping Food Aid: Trade or Aid? (subsidized) Food Aid in kind: what is in it for the WTO. Food trade and nutrition coalition. Available at: [http://www.wto.org/english/forums\\_e/ngo\\_e/posp47\\_dumping\\_food\\_aid\\_e.pdf](http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/posp47_dumping_food_aid_e.pdf) (16. October 2012).
- Frank, Andre Gunder. 1978. *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Freedom Newspaper. 2010 “Jammeh Accuses Britain of Stealing From Gambians.” *Freedom Newspaper*. Available at: <http://www.freedomnewspaper.com/Homepage/tabid/36/mid/367/newsid367/5444/Breaking-News-Gambia-JAMMEH-ACCUSES-BRITAIN-OF-STEALING-FROM-GAMBIAN-VISA-APPLICANTS-/Default.aspx>. (11. June 2012).
- Galtung, John. 1971. A Structural theory of Imperialism. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 8, No 2, 81-117. Available at: <http://bev.berkeley.edu/ipe/readings/galtung.pdf>. (15. January 2012).

- Garamone, Jim. 2011. Panetta Discusses First Week as Defense Secretary. *U.S. Department of Defence*. Available at: <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64602> (12. February 2012).
- Gaub, Florence. . 2011. Libya in Limbo: How to Fill the Security Vacuum. NATO Research Report. Available at: [http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/current\\_news.php?icode=309](http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php?icode=309). (19. March 2012).
- Gbadolite, Adam Zagorin. 2001. Leaving Fire in His Wake. *Time Magazine*, 24 June . Available at: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,161061,00.html> (22. March 2012).
- Gelie, Philippe. 2011. Exclusive: French Military in Libya Arming Tribal Insurgents South of Tripoli. *Le figaro*, 29 June. Available at: <http://www.worldcrunch.com/exclusive-french-military-libya-arming-tribal-insurgents-south-tripoli/world-affairs/exclusive-french-military-in-libya-arming-tribal-insurgents-south-of-tripoli/c1s3382/#.UYPhRrWSDfs>. (21. March 2012).
- Genocide Watch. 2004. “Today is the Day of Killing Anuaks”. A Genocide Watch and Survivors’ Rights International Field Report. Available at: [http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/CampaignDoc\\_Today\\_is\\_the\\_Day\\_of\\_Killing\\_Anuaks.pdf](http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/CampaignDoc_Today_is_the_Day_of_Killing_Anuaks.pdf). (19. May 2012).
- Genocide Watch. 2012. *Genocide Watch-Ethiopia*. Available at: <http://www.genocidewatch.org/ethiopia.html> (17. April 2012).
- Gersony, Robert. 1997. *The Anguish of Northern Uganda Results of a Field-Based Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda*. USAID Mission, Kampala Available at: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACC245.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACC245.pdf). (11. April 2012).
- Gertler, Jerimiah. 2011. “Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya), Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, R41725 pp: 1-29. Available at: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159790.pdf> (14. April 2012).
- Gettleman, Jeffrey and Eric Schmitt . 2009. U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels. *The New York Times*, 6 February. Available at: [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/africa/07congo.html?\\_r=3&scp=2&sq=uganda&st=cse&](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/africa/07congo.html?_r=3&scp=2&sq=uganda&st=cse&). (17. May 2012).



- Gilligan, Andrew. 2011. Gaddafi's ghost town after the loyalists retreat. *The Telegraph*, 11 September. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8754375/Gaddafi-ghost-town-after-the-loyalists-retreat.html>. (1. February 2012).
- Goodman, Amy and Juan González. 2010. *Democracy now*. Available at: [http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/1/clinton\\_rice](http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/1/clinton_rice). (5. December 2012).
- Harford, Tim and Michael Klein. 2005. *Aid and the Resource Curse*. Washington, DC: The World Bank, Public Policy Journal, Available at: [http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/291harford\\_klein.pdf](http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/291harford_klein.pdf). (17. April 2013).
- Harford, Tim and Michael Klein. 2005. Aid and the Resource Curse. How Can Aid Be Designed to Preserve Institutions? The World Bank Group, Note number 291. Available at: [http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/291harford\\_klein.pdf](http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/291harford_klein.pdf) (17. April 2012).
- Hassan, Hamdy A. 2011. Civil Society in Egypt under the Mubarak Regime. *Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences* Volume 2, No. 2.2 Quarter II. Available at: <http://onlineresearchjournals.com/aajoss/art/61.pdf>. (21. May 2012).
- Hellstrom, Jerker. 2009. "China's emerging role in Africa." Available at: <https://community.apan.org/apcn/m/apcnmedia/23311/download.aspx>. (4. August 2012).
- Hill, Geoff. *Battle For Zimbabwe: The Final Countdown*. London: Struik Publishers, 2005.
- Hjertholm, Peter, Jytte Laursen and Howard White. 1998. *Macroeconomic Issues in Foreign Aid*. Copenhagen: Department of Economics University of Copenhagen. Available at: <http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2000/0005.pdf/>. (5. December 2012).
- Ho, Melissa D. and Charles E. Hanrahan. 2010. *International Food Aid Programs: Background and Issues*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. Available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41072.pdf>. (7. December 2012).
- Hogg, Chris. 2011. "China banks lend more than World Bank - report." *BBC*, 18 January. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12212936>. (7. August 2012).

- Horvath, Julius and Richard Grabowski . 1999. Core and Periphery in The World Economy: An Empirical Assessment of The Integration of The Developing Countries Into The World Economy. *International Economic Journal* 35 Volume 13, Number 4. Available at: [http://147.46.167.195/~kiea/IEJ/vol13\\_4/w3.pdf](http://147.46.167.195/~kiea/IEJ/vol13_4/w3.pdf).(4. October 2012).
- Howe, Herbert M. 2001.*Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Human Rights Watch. 1997. "WHAT KABILA IS HIDING Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo." Human Rights Watch, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A) pp:1-60. Available at: [http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/congo1097\\_web.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/congo1097_web.pdf).(17. February 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 1999. "The Price of Oil Corporate Responsibility & Human Rights Violations In Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities." Human Rights Watch, ISBN: 1-56432-225-4,pp:1-183. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/nigeria0199.pdf>.(1. March 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2005. "Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region." Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia0305.pdf>(8. March 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2009. "Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo." Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0709web.pdf>(1. April 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2009. "Well Oiled,Oil and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea." Human Rights Watch,ISBN: 1-56432-516-4,pp:1-102. Available at: [http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bhr0709web\\_0.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bhr0709web_0.pdf) .(17. January 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2011. "Uganda: Reject Anti-Homosexuality Bill."Human Rights Watch.Available at:<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/10/uganda-reject-anti-homosexuality-bill>(7. April 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2011. "US: End CIA Drone Attacks." Human Rights Watch.Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/19/us-end-cia-drone-attacks>(17. June 2012).

- Human Rights Watch. 2012. "Mali: War Crimes by Northern Rebels." Human Rights Watch. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/30/mali-war-crimes-northern-rebels>(7. August 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2010. Harsh War, Harsh Peace, Abuses by al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government, and AMISOM in Somalia. Available at: [http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0410webwcover\\_0.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0410webwcover_0.pdf)(9. April 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2007. Early to War, Child Soldiers in the Chad Conflict . Human Rights Watch, Volume 19, No. 9(A) pp:1-41. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0707/chad0707webwcover.pdf>(5. June 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2008. "Collective Punishment War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali Regional State." Human Rights Watch, ISBN:1-56432-322-6, pp:1-130. Available at: [http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia0608\\_1.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia0608_1.pdf) (17. April 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2009. "'We will Crush You', The Restriction of Political Space in The Democratic Republic of Congo". Human Rights Watch, ISBN: 1-56432-405-2 pp:1-96. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc1108web.pdf>( 17. April 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2010. "Ethiopia: Government Repression Undermines Poll." Human Rights Watch Available at:<http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/05/24/ethiopia-government-repression-undermines-poll>(8. May 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2010. "Development without Freedom How Aid Underwrites Repression in Ethiopia." Human Rights Watch, ISBN: 1-56432-697-7, pp:1-101. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia1010webwcover.pdf>(4. April 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2012. "Death of a Dictator, Bloody Vengeance in Sirte." Human Rights Watch, ISBN: 1-56432-952-6, pp:1-53. Available at: [http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya1012webwcover\\_0\\_0.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya1012webwcover_0_0.pdf)(5. June 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. 2012. Unacknowledged Deaths Civilian Casualties in NATO's Air Campaign in Libya." Human Rights Watch, ISBN: 1-56432-888-0. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0512webwcover.pdf>(17. August 2012).

- Human Rights Watch. 2010. *Harsh War, Harsh Peace Abuses by Al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM in Somalia*. Human Rights Watch, ISBN: 1-56432-621-7 Available at: [http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0410webwcover\\_0.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0410webwcover_0.pdf)(1. July 2012).
- Hurst, Cindy. 2007. "China's Global Quest for Energy." Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. Available at: <http://www.iags.org/chinasquest0107.pdf>(7. July 2012).
- ICEC. 2012. *International Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents*. Available at: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law/index.jsp>(4. May 2012).
- ICRC. 2011. *International Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents*. Available at: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/375-590006> (9. June 2012).
- Idun-Arkurst, Isaac and James Laing. 2011. *The Impact of the Chinese Presence in Africa*. Available at: [http://www.davidandassociates.co.uk/davidandblog/newwork/China\\_in\\_Africa\\_5.pdf](http://www.davidandassociates.co.uk/davidandblog/newwork/China_in_Africa_5.pdf) (26. July 2012).
- Intech. 2008. "Coal shortage has China living on the edge." *Intech*, 6 March. Available at: [http://www.isa.org/Template.cfm?Section=InTech\\_Home1&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=68134](http://www.isa.org/Template.cfm?Section=InTech_Home1&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=68134)(29. July 2012).
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2009. "Iran's activity in North East Africa, the gateway to the Middle East and the African continent." Available at: [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF\\_09\\_197\\_2.pdf](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_09_197_2.pdf)(16. July 2012).
- International Court of Justice. 2005. *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda) (Request for Provisional Measures)*. Available at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=51&case=116&>(17. May 2012).
- International Crisis Group. 2005. *ZIMBABWE'S OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA: THE TIPPING POINT?* Africa Report N°97 -- 17 August 2005 . Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/Zimbabwes%20Operation%20Murambatsvina%20The%20Tipping%20Point.pdf>(9. April 2012).

- International Crisis Group. 2011. "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya." Middle East/North Africa Report N°107 – 6 June 2011. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/107%20-%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20V%20-%20Making%20Sense%20of%20Libya.pdf>(4. April 2012).
- International Crisis Group. 2012. Uganda: No Resolution to Growing Tensions." Africa Report N°187 – 5 April 2012. Available through: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/187-uganda-no-resolution-to-growing-tensions.pdf>(6. February 2012).
- Ismi, Asad. 2004. Impoverishing a Continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa. Africa Practice Report. Available at: [http://www.davidandassociates.co.uk/davidandblog/newwork/China\\_in\\_Africa\\_5.pdf](http://www.davidandassociates.co.uk/davidandblog/newwork/China_in_Africa_5.pdf)(17. January 2013).
- Johnson, Dominic . 2003. "Shifting Sands: Oil exploration in the Rift Valley and the Congo conflict." A Pole Institute Report. Available at: <http://www.pole-institute.org/documents/heritage05.pdf>(7. April 2012).
- Johwa, Wilson. 2004. Zimbabwe/DRC: The war that might not have been. *The Norwegian Council for Africa* . Available at: <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/5990.html>(5. May 2012).
- Kameri-Mbote, Patricia. 2007. Water, Conflict, and Cooperation: Lessons from the Nile River Basin. *Navigating Peace, No 4* . Available at: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NavigatingPeaceIssuePKM.pdf>(7. February 2012).
- Karam, Antonios E. 1976. *The Meaning of Dependence*. Volume 14, Issue 3, pages 201–211.
- Kelley, Michael. 2012. Leaked Stratfor Emails: The US Government Sent Blackwater Veteran To Fight With Rebels In Libya And Syria. *Business Insider*. Available at: <http://www.businessinsider.com/leaked-stratfor-emails-us-government-sent-blackwater-veteran-to-fight-with-rebels-in-libya-and-syria-2012-3>(3. April 2012).
- Kirwan, Barrett E. and Margaret McMillan. 2007. Food Aid and Poverty. Available at: <http://www.tufts.edu/~mmcmilla/papers/FoodAidPoverty.pdf>(17. March 2013).

- Kissinger, Henry. 2001. *Does America need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*. New York: Simon and Schuster, Rockefeller Center.
- Knutsen, Carl Henrik. 2010. *Africa's Growth Tragedy Revisited: Weak States, Strong Rulers*. Oslo: Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO. Available at: <http://political-economy-breakfast.wikischolars.columbia.edu/file/view/AFRICAGROWTH.pdf>(6. March 2013).
- Koeda, Junko. 2006. A Debt Overhang Model for Low-Income Countries: Implications for Debt Relief. IMF Working Paper, WP/06/224. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06224.pdf>(5. April 2012).
- Kristof, Nicholas D. 2002. Farm Subsidies That Kill. *The New York Times*, 5 July. Available through: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/05/opinion/farm-subsidies-that-kill.html>(17. January 2013).
- Kuzienko, Iliyana L and Eric Werker . 2004. How Much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy*. Available at: <http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/06-029.pdf>(1. March 2013).
- Lassiter, Randi L.S. 2007. How Aid Negatively Impacts Conflict: The Moral and Practical Dilemmas Faced by Humanitarian Organizations. *The Monitor*:50-60. Available at: <http://web.wm.edu/so/monitor/issues/13-1/5-lassiter.pdf>(7. April 2013).
- Laverty, Dane. 2011. What the Hell Is Happening in Somalia? *Time and Seasons online Journal* . Available at: <http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2011/08/what-the-hell-is-happening-in-somalia-part-1/>(1. April 2012).
- Lee, John. 2012. China's Geostrategic Search for oil. *The Washington Quarterly*, 35:3 pp: 75-92. Available at: <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerLee.pdf>(5. May 2012).
- Leeson, T. Peter. 2007. "Better off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 35 (2007) 689–710. Available at: <http://usu.kochscholars.usu.edu/files/2012/11/Better-Off-Stateless.pdf>(5. February 2012).
- Lefort, René. 2011. *Open Democracy*. Available at: <http://www.opendemocracy.net/ren%C3%A9-lefort/great-ethiopian-land-grab-feudalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change>(1. April 2012).

- Lensink, Robert and Howard White. "Are There Negative Returns to Aid?,"2001. *The Journal of Development Studies*, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 37(6), pages 42-65. Available at:<http://som.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/reports/1995-1999/themeE/1999/99E60/99e60.pdf>(8. May 2012).
- Lentz, Erin C., Christopher B. Barrett and John Hoddinott. 2005. *Food Aid and Dependency: Implications for Emergency Food Security Assessments*. World Food Programme, Emergency Needs Assessment Branch. Available at: [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1142287](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1142287)(6. December 2012).
- Levin, Yuval. 2006. *American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions*. Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. Available at: <http://www.israeleconomy.org/strat11/strategic11.pdf>(17. February 2013).
- Lohman, Charles M. and Robert I. MacPherson. 1983. "Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat." Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Available at: <http://www.rhodesia.nl/Rhodesia%20Tactical%20Victory.pdf>(17. January 2012).
- Macalister, Terry. 2010. US military warns oil output may dip causing massive shortages by 2015. *The Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/apr/11/peak-oil-production-supply>(2. April 2013).
- Mark, Clyde R. 2002. "Egypt-United States Relations." Congressional Research Service, Order Code IB93087. Available at:<http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/crs/19440.pdf>(7. May 2012).
- Massa, Jean M. 1986. *Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act: Public Law 480*. An Agricultural Law Research Article. Available at: [http://nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/bibarticles/massa\\_trade.pdf](http://nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/bibarticles/massa_trade.pdf) (6. January 2013).
- McPeak, John. 2002. "Fuelwood Gathering and Use in Northern Kenya." Department of Public Administration. Available at: [http://dyson.cornell.edu/special\\_programs/AFSNRM/Parima/Papers/M\\_fuelwood.pdf](http://dyson.cornell.edu/special_programs/AFSNRM/Parima/Papers/M_fuelwood.pdf) (5. April 2013).
- McPherson, J.H.T. 2004 . *History of Liberia*. Blackmask books, Available at: <http://www.fullbooks.com/History-of-Liberia.html>(7. January 2012).

- Meldrum, Andrew .2003. "Living in fear of Mugabe's green bombers." *The Guardian*,19 February. Available at: [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/19/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum\(5](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/19/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum(5). April 2012).
- Mende, Claudia. 2012.Revolutions aren't led by polite people. *Qantara* . Available through: <http://en.qantara.de/Revolutions-arent-led-bypolitepeople/19213c20288i0p/index.html> (7. June 2012).
- Mendelowitz, Allan I. 1994. "Cargo Preference Requirements Objectives Not Met When Applied to Food Aid Programs. GAO. Available at: [http://gao.justia.com/agency-for-international-development/1994/9/cargo-preference-requirements-t-ggd-94-212/T-GGD-94-212-full-report.pdf\(9](http://gao.justia.com/agency-for-international-development/1994/9/cargo-preference-requirements-t-ggd-94-212/T-GGD-94-212-full-report.pdf(9). August 2012).
- Mizuno, Nobohiro and Ryosuke Okazawa. 2009. *Colonial Experince and Postcolonial Underdevelopment in Africa*. Kyoto: Kyoto University, Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 405-419. Available at:[http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP672.pdf\(7](http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP672.pdf(7). December 2012).
- Mokhefi, Mansouria. 2011.Gaddafi's regime in relation to the Libyan tribes. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. Available at: [www.aljazeera.net/mritems/streams/2011/3/20/1\\_1049205\\_1\\_51.pdf\(27](http://www.aljazeera.net/mritems/streams/2011/3/20/1_1049205_1_51.pdf(27). May 2012).
- Mousseau, Frederic and Anuradha Mittal. 2005. Food Aid or Food Sovereignty? Ending World Hunger in Our Time. The Oakland Institute. Available at: <http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/fasr.pdf> (8. July 2012).
- Moyo, Dambisa. 2009. *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Moyo, Dambisa. 2009. Why Foreign Aid Is Hurting Africa. Available at: [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123758895999200083.html\(3](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123758895999200083.html(3). September 2012).
- Mwenda, Andrew. 2006. Foreign Aid and the Weakening of Democratic Accountability in Uganda.CATO Institute,Foreign Policy Briefing No.88:1-9. Available at: [http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb88.pdf\(17](http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb88.pdf(17). December 2012).
- NATO. "NATO and Libya,Operational Media Update,For 13 AUGUST." 2011.Available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_71994.htm\(8](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71994.htm(8). April 2012).



- Ndow, Musa and Hatab Fadera . 2010. Gambia: 'Democracy of Exploitation Will Never Happen in This Country'. *All Africa*, 26 July. Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201007270096.html> (17. June 2012).
- Nixon, Ron . U.S. 2011. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings. *The New York Times*, 14 April. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html?pagewanted=all> (6. May 2012).
- Nkrumah, Kwame. 1965. *Neo-Colonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism*. London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd.
- Nkunda, Laurent . *Warlord or liberator? NBC's Ann Curry asks General Laurent Nkunda about his part in the ongoing war in Eastern Congo*. Ann Curry. NBC, 4 June 2009. Available at: <http://www.nbcnews.com/video/dateline/26431545#26431545> (1. April 2012).
- Norris, John and Connie Veillette. 2011. Five Steps to Make Our Aid More Effective and Save More Than \$2 Billion. Available at: [http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/05/pdf/foreign\\_aid\\_brief.pdf](http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/05/pdf/foreign_aid_brief.pdf) (4. February 2013).
- Nossiter, Adam. 2009. *Witch Hunts and Foul Potions Heighten Fear of Leader in Gambia*. New York: The New York Times, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/world/africa/21gambia.html?pagewanted=all> (17. June 2012).
- Ntale, Samson. 2010. ICC to investigate Ugandan army. *CNN*, 3 June. Available at: [http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-03/world/uganda.army.icc\\_1\\_ugandan-army-luis-moreno-ocampo-war-crimes?\\_s=PM:WORLD](http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-03/world/uganda.army.icc_1_ugandan-army-luis-moreno-ocampo-war-crimes?_s=PM:WORLD) (7. June 2012).
- Nunn, Nathan and Nancy Qian. 2011. *Aiding Conflict: The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Food Aid on Civil War*. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 17794:1-48. Available at: [http://www.nber.org/papers/w17794.pdf?new\\_window=1](http://www.nber.org/papers/w17794.pdf?new_window=1) (7. January 2013).
- Nunn, Nathan and Nancy Qian. 2012. *Aiding Conflict: The Impact of U.S. Food Aid on Civil War*. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 17794. Available at: [http://www.nber.org/papers/w17794.pdf?new\\_window=1](http://www.nber.org/papers/w17794.pdf?new_window=1) (3. April 2013).

- Ockerman, Herbert W. , Lazarus Adua and Lopa Basu. 2010. "Equatorial Guinea Perspectives on the United States: The Significance of American Missionary Activities and Internal Equatoguinean Politics." Ohio State University. Available at: <https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/45281/equatoguinean.pdf?sequence=1>(6. May 2012).
- OECD. 2005. *The Development Effectiveness of Food Aid, DOES TYING MATTER?*.ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Available at:<http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3043.pdf> (5. April 2013).
- Ohiorhenuan, John F.1976.*Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism*. New York, Available at: <http://economics.mit.edu/files/4462> (5. December 2012).
- Olson, Allen H. 2001. Federal Farm Programs – Past, Present and Future—Will We Learn from our Mistakes? University of Arkansas School of Law, An Agricultural Law Research Article, Vol. 6:1-29.
- Oluwarotimi, Abiodun. 2011. Nigeria: U.S. Donates War Ship to Navy Today. *All Africa*, 13 May. Available through:<http://allafrica.com/stories/201105130322.html>(8. April 2012).
- Omoruyi, Omo. 2010. The Origin of Nigeria: God of Justice Not Associated With an Unjust Political Order.Appeal to President Obasanjo not to rewrite Nigerian History.Rework Nigeria.Available through:[http://reworknigeria.blogspot.com/2010/01/origin-of-nigeria-god-of-justice-not\\_25.html](http://reworknigeria.blogspot.com/2010/01/origin-of-nigeria-god-of-justice-not_25.html) (2. February 2012).
- Oxfam. 2002. *Rigged Rules and Double Standards*. Available at: <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/rigged-rules-and-double-standards-trade-globalisation-and-the-fight-against-pov-112391>(5. April 2013).
- Oxfam. 2005. "Food aid or hidden dumping? Separating wheat from chaff." Oxfam Briefing Paper.March,2005. Available at: [http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp71\\_food\\_aid.pdf](http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp71_food_aid.pdf)(5. January 2013).
- Pal, Go. 2011.*Gaddafi Up-Close*.Blomington: Madan Syal.
- Patel, Avni . 2011. Where's Mubarak's Money? Ask 'Front Man' Hussein Salem. *ABC news*,1 March. Available at:<http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/mubaraks-money-front-man-hussein-salem/story?id=12985639#.UNHtq28meyE> (9. June 2012).

- Pellerin, Cheryl. 2011. Obama Sends U.S. Forces to Help in Central Africa. *U.S. Department of Defence*.
- Pelofsky, Jeremy . 2011. "Al Shabaab recruited dozens of Americans: U.S. report." *Reuters*, 27 July. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/us-usa-security-somalia-idUSTRE76Q58M20110727> (7. January 2012).
- Pendleton, D., et al. 2008. The Top 15 Wealthiest Royals. *Forbes* Available at: [http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/20/worlds-richest-royals-biz-richroyals08-cz\\_ts\\_0820royalintro.html](http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/20/worlds-richest-royals-biz-richroyals08-cz_ts_0820royalintro.html) (9. August 2012).
- Perkins, John. 2004. *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man*. New York: Plume Book.
- Perlez, Jane . 1992. Somalia Aid Workers Split on Troops. *The New York Times*, 27 November. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/27/world/somalia-aid-workers-split-on-troops.html> (5. June 2012).
- Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 2012. Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Statement by the President Upon Signing the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. The American Presidency Project. Available at: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=24605> (5. May 2012).
- Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 2012. Harry S. Truman, 19 - Inaugural Address. *The American Presidency Project*. Available at: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13282> (9. June 2012).
- Ploch, Lauren, et al. 2011. *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R40528:1-43. Available at: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/162745.pdf> (8. June 2012).
- Polman, Linda. 2010. *The Crisis Caravan: What's Wrong with Humanitarian Aid*. New York: Metropolitan Books
- Polman, Linda. 2010. *War Games: The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times*. London: Penguin Books

- Poole, Lydia. 2011. *Sudan Aid Factsheet 1995-2009, Trends in Overseas Development Assistance*. Wells, Somerset, United Kingdom: Development Initiatives, Available at: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Sudan-Aid-Factsheet-2011.pdf> (6. April 2012).
- Poplin, Jason T. 2011. Nigeria, U.S. Conclude Joint Maritime Training Exercise *U.S. Africa Command*. Available at: <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1671>. (8. June 2012).
- Prince, Rob. 2011. U.S. Gets Ethiopia to Invade Somalia. *Z magazine* Available at: <http://www.zcommunications.org/u-s-gets-ethiopia-to-invade-somalia-by-rob-prince>. (17. April 2012).
- Provost, Claire and Felicity Lawrence. 2012. US food aid programme criticised as 'corporate welfare' for grain giants. *The Guardian*, 18 July. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/jul/18/us-multinationals-control-food-aid> (17. April 2012).
- Provost, Claire. 2012. "US food aid: the special interests blocking reform." *The Guardian*, 19 July. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/jul/19/us-food-aid-special-interests-reform> (17. April 2012).
- Prunier, Gérard. 2009. *From genocide to continental war: the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa*. London: HURST C. & Company PUBLISHERS Limited.
- Rajan, Raghuram G. and Arvind Subramanian . 2005. Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show? IMF Working Paper WP/05/127:1-48. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05127.pdf> (8. October 2012).
- Rasmussen, Anders Fogh. 2011. *Monthly press briefing by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen* 6 July. Available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/photos\\_76125.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/photos_76125.htm) (17. May 2012).
- Real Clear Politics. 2012. Senator Ron Paul on Foreign Aid. Available at: [http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2011/10/18/ron\\_paul\\_foreign\\_aid\\_takes\\_money\\_from\\_poor\\_in\\_us\\_given\\_to\\_rich.html](http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2011/10/18/ron_paul_foreign_aid_takes_money_from_poor_in_us_given_to_rich.html) (17. December 2012).
- Reid, Timothy B. 2006. Killing them Softly: Has Foreign Aid to Rwanda and Uganda Contributed to The Humanitarian Tragedy in The DRC? . *Africa Policy Journal*, Spring 2006, Vol. 1:74-94. Available at: [http://www.friendsofthecongo.org/pdf/killing\\_softly.pdf](http://www.friendsofthecongo.org/pdf/killing_softly.pdf) (5. April 2012).

- Reuters. 2010. "Obama condemns Uganda anti-gay bill as "odious"." *Reuters*, 4 February. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/04/us-uganda-gays-obama-idUSTRE6134EZ20100204> (15. May 2012).
- Rinehard, Britta . 2011. "Clan Structure in Somalia." Civil-Military Fusion Centre, Anti-Piracy Thematic Report. Available at: [https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/Piracy/Documents/CFC%20Anti-Piracy%20Thematic%20Reports/CFC\\_Anti-Piracy\\_Report\\_Clans%20in%20Somalia\\_Aug\\_2011.pdf](https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/Piracy/Documents/CFC%20Anti-Piracy%20Thematic%20Reports/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Clans%20in%20Somalia_Aug_2011.pdf) (9. October 2012).
- Robin, Shuffield. 2006. Thomas Sankara: The Upright Man. California Newsreel. Available at: <http://worldcinemadirectory.co.uk/component/film/?id=1362> (8. April 2012).
- Robinson, Joan . 1962. *Economic Philosophy*. Cambridge: Doubleday & Company.
- Rostow, Walt Whitman . 1960. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), Chapter 2, "The Five Stages of Growth, A Summary," pp.4-16. Available at: <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/rostow.htm> (9. December 2012).
- Sachs, Jeffrey. 2005. *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Santos, Theotonio Dos. 1995. The Structure of Dependence . American Economic Association. Available at: [http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic925740.files/Week%202/Dos%20Santos\\_Structure.pdf](http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic925740.files/Week%202/Dos%20Santos_Structure.pdf) (6. October 2012).
- Schanzer, Jonathan. 2008. A Deadly Love Triangle Why Iran and Hamas adore Darfur's genocidal dictator. *The Weekly Standard*, 6 August. Available at: <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/401vcvba.asp> (6. April 2012).
- Schmidt, Christopher. 2010. "Into the Heart of Darkness: Cosmopolitanism vs. Realism in the Democratic Republic of Congo." The Ohio State University. Available at: [https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/45480/Christopher\\_Schmidt\\_Thesis.pdf?sequence=1](https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/45480/Christopher_Schmidt_Thesis.pdf?sequence=1) (5. September 2012).
- Schwab, Peter. 2001. *Africa, a Continent Self-Destructs*. New York: Palgrave.

Selby, Angus. 2005. Losing the Plot: The Strategic Dismantling of White Farming in Zimbabwe 2000-2005. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS143, Working Paper Number 143:1-46. Available at: <http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps143.pdf> (17. June 2012).

Sens, Allen. 2012. The Dependency Theory. University of British Columbia. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JN6LIMY2ApQ> (2. February 2013)

Shapouri, Shahla, Stacey Rosen and Birgit Meade. 2004. The U.S. Role in the Food Aid Picture. American Agricultural Economics Association Available at: <http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/20265/1/sp04sh06.pdf> (6. December 2012).

Sharp, Jeremy M. 2011. "Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations." Congressional Research Service 7-5700, RL33003, pp:1-22. Available at: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155979.pdf> (5. June 2012).

Sharp, Jeremy M. 2012. *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf> (14. June 2012).

Shepard, Jack . 1985. "Ethiopia: The Use of food as an instrument of US Foreign Policy." Issue: A Journal of Opinion Vol. 14, (1985), pp. 4-9. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1262530> (9. April 2012).

Simba Energy. 2011. *Simba Energy updates operations in Mali, Liberia, Kenya and Gulf of Guinea*. Available at: <http://www.energy-pedia.com/news/general/simba-energy-updates-operations-in-mali-liberia-kenya-and-gulf-of-guinea> (26. August 2012).

Simmons, Emmy B. 2007. *Reconsidering Food Aid: The Dialogue Continues*. Washington, DC: Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa, Available at: <http://www.partnership-africa.org/sites/default/files/ReconsideringFoodAidfinalfeb12.pdf> (4. October 2012).

Smith, David. 2012. Paul Kagame's Rwanda: African success story or authoritarian state? *The Guardian*, 10 October. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/10/paul-kagame-rwanda-success-authoritarian> (25. April 2012).

Smock, David R. 1996. *Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa*. Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.

- Smoltczyk, Alexander. 2006. Rich in Oil, Poor in Human Rights Torture and Poverty in Equatorial Guinea. *Der Spiegel* Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/rich-in-oil-poor-in-human-rights-torture-and-poverty-in-equatorial-guinea-a-434691.html> (29. May 2012).
- SOA Watch. 2012. *SOA Watch*. 2012. Available at: <http://www.soaw.org/about-us/faq>( 24. October 2012).
- Somaiya, Ravi. 2010. Guerrilla Trucks, Why rebels and insurgent groups the world over love the Toyota Hilux pickup as much as their AK-47s. *The Daily Beast*, 14 October. Available at: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/10/14/why-rebel-groups-love-the-toyota-hilux.html>(29. November 2012).
- Stoddard, Abby, Adele Harmer and Victoria DiDomenico. 2009. Providing aid in insecure environments: 2009 Update Trends in violence against aid workers and the operational response. Available at: <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4243.pdf>(5. December 2012).
- Suberu, Rotimi T. 2001. *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria*. Washington DC:US Institute of Peace Press.
- Suter, Christian. 1989. *Long Waves in the International Financial System: Debt-Default Cycles of Sovereign Borrowers*. Review (Fernand Braudel Center)Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter, 1989), pp. 1-49. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40241115?uid=3739256&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21102167854151>(4. September 2012).
- Swain, Jo. 2011. *Hundreds of Zimbabwe pilots, retired army fly to Libya*.The ZimDiaspora,27 February. Available through: [http://www.zimdiaspora.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=5130:hundreds-of-zimbabwe-pilots-retired-army-fly-to-libya&catid=38:travel-tips&Itemid=18](http://www.zimdiaspora.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5130:hundreds-of-zimbabwe-pilots-retired-army-fly-to-libya&catid=38:travel-tips&Itemid=18)(17. February 2012).
- Sweezy, Paul and Paul A. Baran. 1966. *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order*. New York: Monthly Review.
- Tadros, Sherine. 2012. Egypt military's economic empire. *ALJezeera*,15 February. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/02/2012215195912519142.html> ( 17. January 2012).

- Taguem Fah, Gilbert L. 2010. Dealing with Africom: The Political Economy of Anger and Protest. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, vol.3, no.6:81-93. Available at: <http://www.jpanafrican.com/docs/vol3no6/3.5DealingwithAfricom.pdf>(4. April 2012).
- Tarnoff, Curt and Marian Leonardo Lawson. 2011. "Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy." Congressional Research Service, R40213,pp:1-34. Available at: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/124970.pdf> (9. April 2012).
- Tarp, Finn and Peter Hjertholm. 2000 . *Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future*. New York: Taylor & Francis Group.
- Taslim, M.A. and A. Weliwita. The Inverse Relation between Saving and Aid:An Alternative Explanation. *Journal of Economic Development*, Volume 25, Number 11 June 2000. Available at: <http://www.jed.or.kr/full-text/25-1/taslim.PDF>(16. November 2012).
- Terry, Fiona. 2002.*Condemned to repeat?:The Paradox of Humanitarian Action*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- The Economist. 1998. "Food to Russia, But will it help?"Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/176009>(5. December 2012).
- The Economist. 2001. "Laurent Desiré Kabila, failed "liberator"of Congo, died on January 17th, aged 62." Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/481974> (17. January 2012).
- The Economist. 2002. "Zimbabwe,From Breadbasket to Basket Case." Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/1201137>(9. November 2012).
- The Economist. 2007. "A brittle Western Ally in the Horn of Africa, While things are getting better in much of Africa, Ethiopia risks getting left behind." Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/10062658>(9. January 2013).
- The Economist. 2007. "Get the gangsters out of the food chain,New commodities exchanges may help feed more of the starving." Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/9304411>(4. April 2012).
- The Economist. 2008. "Rwanda, A flawed hero." Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/11959125>(5. July 2012).



- The Economist. 2011. "A more hopeful continent. The lion kings?Africa is now one of the world's fastest-growing regions." Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/17853324> (4. November 2012).
- The Economist. 2012. "Better late than never,Africa's largest and most grandiose church gets a new neighbour." Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/21556985>(4. April 2012).
- The Economist. 2012. "Cry, the beloved country, South Africa is sliding downhill while much of the rest of the continent is clawing its way up." Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21564846-south-africa-sliding-downhill-while-much-rest-continent-clawing-its-way-up>(5. November 2012).
- The Guardian. 2011. "UN security council resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya – full text." Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/17/un-security-council-resolution>(17. January 2012).
- The Independent.2007. "Ethiopia's 'own Darfur' as villagers flee government-backed violence." Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ethiopia-own-darfur-as-villagers-flee-governmentbacked-violence-394904.html> (8. May 2012).
- The International Court of Justice. 2005. "Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda)." Available at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf> (6. August 2012).
- The Sydney Morning Herald. "Libya's Gadhafi hurls insults at Saudi king." *The Sydney Morning Herald* (2009). Available at: <http://www.smh.com.au/world/libyas-gadhafi-hurls-insults-at-saudi-king-20090331-9h8z.html> (17. January 2012).
- The World Bank. 2011.*Yes Africa Can SUCCESS STORIES FROM A DYNAMIC CONTINENT*. PUNAM CHUHAN-POLE AND MANKA ANGWAFO. Washington DC : The World Bank,2011. Available at: [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/258643-1271798012256/YAC\\_Consolidated\\_Web.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/258643-1271798012256/YAC_Consolidated_Web.pdf) (12. April 2012).
- The World Bank. *World DataBank(Beta)*. 2012. Available at: [http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/VariableSelection/SelectVariables.aspx?source=World%20Development%20Indicators%20and%20Global%20Development%20Finance#S\\_U](http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/VariableSelection/SelectVariables.aspx?source=World%20Development%20Indicators%20and%20Global%20Development%20Finance#S_U)(17. April 2012).

The Zimbabwe Mail. 2011. "Zimbabwean troops fighting for Gaddafi risk being killed as US mulls air strikes." Available at: <http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/index.php?news=7572> (29. April 2012).

Tibaijuka, Anna Kajumulo. 2005. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe. UN Report. Available at: <http://ww2.unhabitat.org/documents/ZimbabweReport.pdf> (24. May 2012).

Time Magazine. 1979. "Equatorial Guinea: Despot's Fall." Available through: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,947351,00.html>(4. February 2012).

Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 2009. "Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Liberia, Final Report. VOLUME I: FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS" Available at: <http://trcofliberia.org/resources/reports/final/trc-final-report-volume-1-full.pdf>(11. April 2012).

Tschirley, David and Julie Howard. 2003. Title II Food Aid and Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a Principled Argument for When, and When Not, to Monetize. MSU International Development Working Paper No. 81:1-31. Available at: <http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/54572/2/idwp81.pdf>(22. December 2012).

Tuck, Christopher. 2000. "Every Car Or Moving Object Gone" The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia. African Studies Quarterly | Volume 4, Issue 1:1-16. Available at: <http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.pdf>(6. April 2012).

U.N.Security Council. 2008. *Resolution 1856 (2008) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6055th meeting, on 22 December 2008* . New York: U.N. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/tehis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4961deff1a>(4. May 2012).

U.N.Security Council. 2009. *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1897 (2009)*. New York: U.N. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/publisher,UNSC,,4cd13a712,0.html>(9. April 2012).

U.S. Agency for International Development. 2004. *Celebrating Food for Peace 1954-2004 Bringing Hope to the Hungry*. Available at: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDABZ818.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABZ818.pdf)(5. February 2012).

U.S. Census Bureau. 2012. "Table 1299. U.S. Foreign Economic and Military Aid by Major Recipient Country: 2001 to 2009." Available at:

<http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1299.pdf>(17. November 2012).

U.S. Department of State. 2001. *The Gambia-Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/799.htm> (17. June 2012).

U.S. Department of State. 2012. *U.S. Department of State,U.S. Relations With The Gambia*. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5459.htm> (11. April 2012).

U.S. Department of State. 2012. *U.S. Department of State,U.S. Relations With Uganda*. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm> (23. March 2012).

U.S. Department of State. 2012.*U.S. Department of State-Background Notes-U.S. Relations With Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm>(17. March 2012).

U.S. Department of State. 2012.*U.S. Department of State-Backround Notes,U.S. Relations With Equatorial Guinea*. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7221.htm> (26. January 2012).

U.S. National Debt Clock. *U.S. National Debt Clock.org*. 2013. 2013. Available at: <http://www.usdebtclock.org/>(1. december 2012).

U.S.Department Of State. 2012. *Ethiopia Country Specific Information*. 2012. Available at: [http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis\\_pa\\_tw/cis/cis\\_1113.html#safety](http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1113.html#safety) (18. May 2012).

U.S.Energy Information Administration. 2012. “World Oil Transit Chokepoints.” Available at:[http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/World\\_Oil\\_Transit\\_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf](http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf)(17. May 2012).

UN. Security Council.2011. “Resolution 1973 (2011) ,Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on 17 March 2011 .” 2011. Available at: [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2011\\_03/20110927\\_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf)(27. April 2012).

UN, MONUSCO.2010. “FINAL REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING MISSIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS JOINT HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE INTO THE MASS RAPES AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY A COALITION OF ARMED GROUPS ALONG THE KIBUA-MPOFI AXIS IN WALIKALE TERRITORY, NORTH KIVU FROM 30 JULY TO 2 AUGUST 2010.” Available at:

[http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/BCNUDHRapportViolsMassifsKibuaMpofi\\_en.\(9.October2012\).](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/BCNUDHRapportViolsMassifsKibuaMpofi_en.(9.October2012).)

UN. 2012. "Letter dated 27 June 2012 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea. Available at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202012%20545.pdf> (13. January 2012).

UNMIL. 2006. "Human rights in Liberia's Rubber Plantations:Tapping into the future." Available at: <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/ilrf/liberiarubberUNreport.pdf>(22. March 2012).

U.S. Department of State. 2011. *Remarks at African Union.* Available at: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/06/166028.htm>(6. May 2012).

U.S. Department of State. 2011. *Background notes, North Africa.* US Department of State, Available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn>(2. November 2012).

U.S. Department of State.2012. *Background Notes : Zimbabwe.* Available at: <http://sharing.govdelivery.com/bulletins/GD/USSTATEBPA-1403B9>(17. April 2012).

USAID.2002. *U.S. INTERNATIONAL FOOD ASSISTANCE REPORT 2002* . Washington, D.C. : United States Agency for International Development , 2002. Available at: [http://transition.usaid.gov/our\\_work/humanitarian\\_assistance/ffp/usintlfoodrpt2002.pdf](http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/ffp/usintlfoodrpt2002.pdf) f(6. September 2012).

USAID.2011. "USAID COUNTRY PROFILE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERNANCE." Available at: [http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/full-reports/USAID\\_Land\\_Tenure\\_Mali\\_Profile.pdf](http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/full-reports/USAID_Land_Tenure_Mali_Profile.pdf)(2. April 2012).

USAID.2011. *U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS JULY 1, 1945 – SEPTEMBER 30, 2010.* Washington, 2011. Available at: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNADX500.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADX500.pdf) (7. October 2012).

Uvin, Peter. 1998.*Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda.* West Hartford: Kumarian Press.

- Van Wijnbergen, Sweder .1987. *Fiscal Deficits, Exchange Rate Crises and Inflation*. Cambridge: NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, The Review of Economic Studies Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp. 81-92 1987. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2298046?uid=3739256&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21102168728211>(7. December 2012).
- Vernengo, Matias .2004. *Technology, Finance and Dependency:Latin American Radical Political Economy in Retrospect*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah. Available at: [http://www.academia.edu/887053/Technology\\_finance\\_and\\_dependency\\_Latin\\_American\\_radical\\_political\\_economy\\_in\\_retrospect](http://www.academia.edu/887053/Technology_finance_and_dependency_Latin_American_radical_political_economy_in_retrospect) (7. April 2012).
- Wahlberg,Katarina.2008. Food Aid for the Hungry?.Global Policy Forum Available at: [http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/GPF\\_foodaidforthehungry.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/GPF_foodaidforthehungry.pdf) (17. November 2012).
- Walker, Andrew. 2012. “What Is Boko Haram?” United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 308. Available at:<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR308.pdf>(29. May 2012).
- Wallechinsky, David . 2006. *Tyrants: The World's 20 Worst Living Dictators*. New York:HarperCollins Publishers.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2004.*World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Durham:Duke University Press.
- Wang, Marian. 2011. Everything You Need To Know About The \$2 Billion That America Gives To Egypt Each Year. *Business Insider*,1February. Available at: [http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-02-01/news/30014847\\_1\\_military-assistance-military-aid-foreign-aid](http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-02-01/news/30014847_1_military-assistance-military-aid-foreign-aid)(17. March 2012).
- Weinraub, BERNARD. 1986. Reagan Prepared to Strike if Libya is Tied to Terror.” *The New York Times*,10 April. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/10/us/reagan-prepared-to-strike-if-libya-is-tied-to-terror.html>(11. April 2012).
- Weiss, Martin A. 2012 . The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. Congressional Research Service, RS22534:1-6. Available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22534.pdf>(8. December 2012).
- Weiss, Martin A. 2011 . *International Monetary Fund: Background and Issues for Congress*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service. Available at: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/174242.pdf> (6. June 2012).

- Wellman, Ariel Farrar. *Iran Tracker*. 2012. Available at: <http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/dr-congo-iran-foreign-relations>(27. July 2012).
- Whewell , Tim . 2008 “China to seal \$9bn DR Congo deal.” *BBC*, 14 April. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/7343060.stm>(7. July 2012).
- Whitlock, Craig . 2012.“Leader of Mali military coup trained in U.S.” *The Washington Post* 23 March. Available at:[http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/leader-of-mali-military-coup-trained-in-us/2012/03/23/gIQAS7Q6WS\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/leader-of-mali-military-coup-trained-in-us/2012/03/23/gIQAS7Q6WS_story.html)(1. October 2012).
- Wikileaks. 2006. “Meeting with US assistant secretary of state for African affairs.” Available at: <http://wikileaks-press.org:81/file/frazer-somalia-memo-2006.pdf>.(22. November 2012).
- Wikileaks. 2012. *Wikileaks Press*, Stratfor sources reveal Egypt contingency plans for Nile river. Available at: <http://wikileaks-press.org/stratfor-sources-reveal-egypt-sudan-contingency-plans-to-secure-nile-water-resources/>(7. June 2012).
- World Bank. 2005. “Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics .Available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf> (17. April 2012).
- World Bank. 2006. “Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Country Economic Report.” World Bank Report No. 30295-LY . Available at: [http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/08/14/000160016\\_20060814091949/Rendered/PDF/30295.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/08/14/000160016_20060814091949/Rendered/PDF/30295.pdf)(16. February 2012).
- Yager, Thomas R., et al. 2007. *The Mineral Industries of Africa*. U.S. Geological survey minerals Yearbook. Available at: <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2007/myb3-sum-2007-africa.pdf> (8. May 2012).
- Yeisley, Mark O. 2011.*Bipolarity, Proxy Wars, and the Rise of China*. Strategic Studies Quarterly:75-91. Available at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/winter/yeisley.pdf>(2. December 2012).

- Younger, Stephen D. 1992. *Aid and the Dutch disease: Macroeconomic management when everybody loves you*. World Development, Vol. 20, No. 11, pp. 1587-1597, November 1992. Available at: <http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v20y1992i11p1587-1597.html> (5. February 2012).
- Zacune, Joseph. 2011. *Who Benefits From GM Crops? An Industry Built on Myths*. Friends of the Earth International, Issue 121:1-26. Available at: [http://stopogm.net/webfm\\_send/586](http://stopogm.net/webfm_send/586) (17. December 2012).
- Zakaria, Fareed. 2009. *Zakaria: Africa's biggest success story*. CNN 17 July. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/07/17/zakaria.rwanda/> (9. April 2012).
- Zenawi, Meles. 2005. *HARDtalk interview with Meles Zenawi* Stephen Sackur .BBC, 4 July. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/4649373.stm> (15. June 2012).
- Zenko, Mihac. 2011. *Libya: NATO Selectively Enforcing No-Fly-Zone*. *Council of Foreign Relations*. Available at: <http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2011/07/18/libya-nato-selectively-enforcing-no-fly-zone/> (11. April 2012).