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Food sovereignty: beyond food security

Prehranska suverenost: nadgradnja prehranske varnosti

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Abstract

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The present thesis addresses the shortcomings of the global food system, with a view to analyzing why the problem of hunger has not been solved, despite the numerous efforts made by the international community. It focuses on Africa, the continent most affected by hunger, and evaluates the consequences of the agricultural policies implemented during the three food regimes (the first one defined as liberal, the second one as state regulated and the third one as corporate). Based on the assumption that the current food system is established upon a food security approach, the thesis underlines the limitations of this concept, in order to subsequently examine the concept of food sovereignty that aims to address these limitations. The thesis further outlines the concept of food sovereignty linked to the notion of 'nation state', trade, the change of land ownership and the 'right to food'. The last part examines alternative policies proposed by food sovereignty based on case studies of two African countries - Angola and Mozambique, in order to assess whether food sovereignty could represent an alternative to the current food system.

Keywords: **f**ood sovereignty, food security, food regimes, Angola, Mozambique.

Povzetek

Prehranska suverenost: nadgradnja prehranske varnosti

Diplomsko delo obravnava pomanjkljivosti svetovnega prehranskega sistema. Kljub številnim prizadevanjem mednarodne skupnosti problem lakote še vedno ni rešen. V nalogi se osredotočam na Afriko, kjer je problem najočitnejši. Ocenil sem posledice različnih kmetijskih politik v okviru treh režimov (liberalni, regulirani in korporacijski). Ob predpostavki, da je trenutni prehrambni sistem vzpostavljen na osnovi pristopa varne preskrbe, v sami tezi izpostavim omejitve postavljenega koncepta z namenom boljšega razumevanja teoretičnega okvirja varne preskrbe. V nadaljevanju dela obravnavam koncept varne preskrbe hrane v povezavi s pojmi ‘'nacionalne države’', trgovine, menjave lastništva zemljišč in ‘pravice do hrane’. Zadnji del je namenjen alternativni politiki samopreskrbe s hrano v obliki študije primerov dveh afriških držav, Angole in Mozambika, z namenom oceniti, ali bi samooskrba s hrano predstavljala alternativo sedanjemu sistemu oskrbe s hrano.

Ključne besede: prehranska suverenost, prehranska varnost, prehranski režimi, Angola, Mozambik.

CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
CPLP	*Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa* (Community of Portuguese speaking Countries)
CONSAN-CPLP	*Conselho de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional da CPLP* (Council of Food and Nutritional Safety of CPLP).
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
EEC	European Economic Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FNLA	*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FRELIMO	*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Liberation Front of Mozambique)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IFAD	International Federation of Agricultural Producers
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MPLA	*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PALOP	*Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa* (Portuguese speaking African countries)
RENAMO	*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Mozambican National Resistance)
ROPPA	Network of Farmer's and Agricultural Producer's Organizations of West Africa
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nations

UNAC	*União Nacional de Camponeses de Moçambique* (National Union of Farmers of Mozambique)
UNACA	*Confederação das Associações de Camponeses e Cooperativas Agropecuárias de Angola* (Confederation of Associations of Farmers and Agricultural Cooperatives of Angola)
UNITA	*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
URAA	Uruguay Round Agreements Act
WTO	World Trade Organization

1 INTRODUCTION

In the 1990s the international community made particularly intense attempts to find a solution to poverty in rural areas. These attempts were reflected in the first Millennium Development Goal: "to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger" (Windfurt and Jonsén 2005, 3). However, despite the growing concern regarding poverty and despite the growing efforts to reduce it, 805 million people remain severely undernourished in the world (FAO 2014). Three quarters of them live in rural areas (FAO 2014). Sub-Saharan Africa is the most affected region, with 204 million undernourished people (Bain *et al.* 2013, 2). In the 1990s, we witnessed the 'exhaustion of the Green Revolution' – characterized by a large increase in food production through the use of pesticides, high yield crop varieties and new technologies (IFPRI 2002), and the emergence of the concept of food sovereignty as a challenge to the previous concept of food security (Barthwal-Datta 2014, 17).

Food sovereignty was outlined by the transnational farmers' federation *Via Campesina*. It refers to "the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through socially just and ecologically sensitive methods /…/ to participate in decision making and define their own food, agriculture, livestock and fisheries systems" (Declaration of Nyéléni 2007, 9). It is opposed to the concept of food security that "avoided discussing the social control of the food system" (Patel 2009, 666). Food sovereignty "recognized /…/ that the power politics of the food system needed very explicitly to feature in the discussion" (Patel 2009, 665). Hence, instead of focusing on ways to improve the efficiency of the existing food system, the concept of food sovereignty questions the system itself.

In this scope, food sovereignty is a broad concept that directs attention to the international 'framework' as set out by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Windfurt and Jonsén 2005). It questions the policies of these organizations concerning food, the way agriculture is organized and highlights the consequences of those policies on local people. It also sets the focus on the state, by examining which national policies could be oriented towards reducing rural poverty in combination with this international framework (*ibid.*).

The main driver that has led to this research is the fact that despite the efforts from the international community, the problem of hunger has not been solved and prevails.

The current sufficient availability of food, which is the consequence of the significant increase in food production and productivity in the last decades, could feed the planet (Dimitrakopoulos 2014, 331). However, this is not the case. Consequently, the causes cannot be merely associated to technical issues related to the food production capacity (Peterson 2009, 46). The issue rather is linked to the organization of the current global food system. The key question worthy of further research is the following: **What are the shortcomings of the current food system that lead to the perpetuation of hunger?**

In order to answer our research question, we need to understand the weaknesses in the current food system that prevent it from properly addressing poverty. For that purpose, we shall analyze the three food regimes that have been defined in order to assess their impacts on the global food system.

The first food regime occurred between 1870 and 1914 and is known as the 'colonial project' (Bernstein 2015, 3). The second food regime, from 1945 to 1973, was known as the 'development project', whereas the third food regime, still in place, started in 1973 and is defined as the 'globalization project' (*ibid.*).

The thesis aims further to evaluate in how far the current food system is based on a 'food security' approach. After analyzing the limitations of the global food system and of the food security concept, we will assess whether the concept of food sovereignty could represent a valid alternative. The duality between the two concepts, food sovereignty and food security, has a relevant role in the present thesis.

Since Africa is the continent which is most affected by hunger, the current thesis will focus on Angola and Mozambique as two case studies illustrating the present research.[1]

In addition to the introductory chapter and the conclusion, the thesis is composed of four main chapters. Chapter two thus examines the different food policies that have been implemented in Africa. The goal of the chapter is to analyze how the global food system has been shaped and which strategies the international community has used to tackle poverty. It considers how the three food regimes have influenced African policies on agriculture. The objective of this chapter is to understand where Africa stands now, taking into consideration the consequences of the three food regimes.

[1] We have selected these two countries because they illustrate well the consequences of the food regimes and food security strategies. For more information, please refer to chapter five.

Chapter three addresses the concept of food security. Its goal is to understand how food security is connected to a specific type of development policy, which strategies are followed by this development policy and their implications. In order to achieve this goal, we trace back the historical evolution of the concept of food security.

Chapter four analyzes the conceptual framework of food sovereignty. The objective of the chapter is to analyze the alternative strategies proposed by food sovereignty regarding agricultural policies and to compare them with the strategies addressed in chapter three. This chapter is divided into two parts. The aim of the first part is to set the context of the concept of food sovereignty in order to examine the solutions defined by it. For that purpose, we will analyze the historical background that has led to the 'depeasantization' (farmers i.e. 'peasants' separated from their means of production leading to a notable reduction of this social category of people), and the development of *Via Campesina*. In this part of the thesis, we seek to understand the core principles of food sovereignty in order to verify if they could be an alternative to the way the global food system is organized. In this chapter, consisting of four sections, we will first examine the concept of food sovereignty in order to assess how the national state as an actor can foster food sovereignty. We will then analyze alternative policies derived from the concept of food sovereignty, regarding the right to food, trade and agrarian reform (in sections two, three and four).

Chapters two, three and four will provide us with the tools to examine the situation in our two cases studies. For that purpose, we will focus on a literature review of secondary and primary sources (e.g. international conventions and other documents that have defined the terms and concepts used in the present thesis).

Actually, the goal of the fifth chapter is to examine how the conceptual framework (food regimes, food security and food sovereignty) can be applied to two concretes cases: Angola and Mozambique. Consequently, the objective of this chapter is to determine whether the solutions described in chapter four concerning trade, agrarian reform and state policies are applicable to those cases and if they are of benefit to the farmers.

We have split chapter five in two parts for that intent. In the first part, we substantiate our two cases and their relevance for analyzing the food regimes. A brief historical analysis of the agricultural policies followed by those states since colonial times until our days is carried out. The objective is to assess how the three food regimes have influenced those countries, based on a literature review. The second part is an

empirical section, which is aimed at specifically testing the policies supported by the food security and food sovereignty concepts. For that purpose, we have organized semi-structured interviews with a farmers' association from Mozambique: *União Nacional de Camponeses* (National Union of Farmers) - UNAC. As regards Angola, we have convened an interview with the trade representation of Angola in Lisbon.

2 FOOD REGIMES

The majority of African countries gained their independence during the 1960s. Regarding food policies, the objective of those countries after their independence was to reach national self-sufficiency (Goita 2010). Self-sufficiency is defined as the ability of a country to sustain its own need for food and is therefore dependent on two factors: production and consumption (Luan *et al.* 2013, 393). However, those countries faced many challenges, some of them inherited from their colonial experience.

To understand the policies promoted by the newly independent states in order to achieve self-sufficiency, it is important to understand the role of Africa in the global economy during colonial times. Already in the 15th century, the Portuguese established a triangular system. Manufactured products were exported from Europe to Africa, slaves from West Africa were sent to America and raw products (sugar, gold, silver, indigo, tobacco, etc.) were shipped from America to Europe (Nunn 2006). Africa was integrated in the global economy as a supplier of forced labor and it is estimated that between 1500 and 1860 around 12 million slaves left the continent for America (Angola being one of the countries most affected by this phenomenon) (*ibid.*, 5).[2]

The integration of Africa in the world economy increased in the 19th century when the mass consumption society emerged in Europe (Cotula 2009). Africa became the supplier of raw materials for the industrial production (*ibid.*). We also need to bear in mind that in 1885, during the conference of Berlin, the European powers divided the continent, "wishing, in a spirit of good and mutual accord, to regulate the conditions most favorable to the development of trade and civilization in certain regions of Africa" (Crawford 2002, 209). By the end of the century, the fully colonized continent played an important role in the globalizing industrial economy.

Hence, the goal of this chapter is to analyze the agricultural policies implemented by the African states since colonialism and to examine the consequences of those policies. For that, in the first part of the chapter we focus on the concept of 'food regimes' developed by Harriet Friedmann (1987) and determine how the global food system was shaped and its impact on Africa. According to Friedmann (1987), three food regimes have shaped the current global food system (see Annex A). We shall analyze the three of them in a chronological order, starting in the late 19th century with the first food

[2] From Angola and Congo alone, more than 5 million slaves were shipped to America (Ribeiro 2014, 1).

regime. It will be followed by the second food regime that emerged after the Second World War. Our chapter will conclude with the third and current food regime that started in 1973. The objective of this chapter is to assess the impact of the three food regimes on African countries.

According to Friedmann (1987, 258) a food regime is defined by "a particular pattern of specialization and trade in the world economy, a particular system of power including which government, which state, is dominant or hegemonic, particular kinds of farming systems and crops, which are leading the change and the dynamism of the system and modes of consumption". Thus, the food regime concept underlines the larger structural forces of the system, which define how we as consumers interact and are affected by this regime (Tower 2012). The food regime theory analyzes the different structures (political, cultural, economic, etc.) with the objective to explain the limited choices available to the individual consumer and producer. In that sense, it criticizes the neoliberal idea where consuming food is considered as an autonomous act, where the consumer has a freedom of choice (*ibid*., 1). This point is important in order to understand food sovereignty. By describing the current food system, both concepts (food regimes and food sovereignty) also allow to criticize it.

The food regime concept is part of the systems theories, in the sense that we comprehend "the food system as a self-organizing and self-perpetuating entity, subject to no single outside agent or force" (Tower 2012, 5). Food regimes provide "an alternative to the linear and deterministic narratives of agricultural change that presuppose the 'inevitability' of food industrialization (*ibid.*, 8).[3] This aspect is crucial to understand the policies implemented by African countries after their independence. The food regime theory is supported by post-Marxist approaches such as the critical social theory, the regulation theory, or the critical rural sociology which studies the transformation of rural society linked to the development of capitalism (Campbell and Dixon 2009, 263).

2.1 COLONIAL LEGACY AND THE FIRST FOOD REGIME

The first food regime was implemented under the British Empire in the 19th century (McMichael 2009, 141). It was characterized by free international trade between the

[3] A detailed analysis of food industrialization is available in section 2.2, which addresses the second food regime.

European colonial powers and the settler colonies under British hegemony (Fairbairn 2008, 5) (see Annex A). One of the aspects of this regime was the expansion of the supply of tropical products to metropolitan economies (McMichael 2009, 141). Many African colonies concentrated their exports into one single product (such as sugar, tobacco, coffee or tea). Examples of such concentration of monoculture for export purposes were "peanuts in Senegal and Gambia, cotton in Egypt and Uganda, coffee from Kenya and palm oil and cocoa products from the Gold Coast (Duiker and Spielvogel 2012, 998). Those countries were known as 'mono-economies', since they were centered on the production and export of a single product (Olugbenga and Karuri-Sebina 2013, 1). Such situation is problematic because a non-diversified economy based on a single product becomes very vulnerable to the market price fluctuations of this product.[4]

In order to sustain this economic model, the colonial system "brought two institutions to Africa: plantation agriculture and private property rights" (Hrituleac 2011, 15). By this "plantation agriculture required much more land than was utilized by the average African farmer /…/ on the other hand, private property rights replaced the communal ownership systems" (*ibid.*). Those changes in African agriculture turned the continent into a supplier of agricultural commodities under unfavorable terms that facilitated the extraction of value from the colonies for the benefit of the colonial powers (Cotula 2013, 21–40).

The first food regime started to malfunction with the worldwide rise of the 'nation-state' system, which entered in conflict with the colonial system (Fairbairn 2008, 6). After the Second World War, the British Empire collapsed and state regulation replaced free trade as the norm in food policies (*ibid.*).

Under the influence of the United States, a new food regime emerged. In the 1960s, for the first time the sovereignty of a state was legally based on the ability of being recognized officially by other sovereign states and on the right to self-determination, and no longer on the empirical proof or ability of governance (Soares de Oliveira 2009, 95). However, the new African states inherited structures that reduced their governance ability (Alemazung 2010, 65).

Colonial systems developed two different types of institutions, according to their own economic objectives. The first type could be defined as 'neo-European'

[4] A detailed analysis of such dependency on one singled product is provided in section 5.2 dealing with one of our case studies: Angola and its dependency on oil.

institutions, in the sense that they copied the model of European countries. In the colonies where it was implemented, economic and political institutions were put in place to protect the colonizers and encourage investment and private property (Acemoglu *et al.* 2005, 387). Examples are Australia, New Zealand and the United States, where the colonizers intended to settle (*ibid.*). The second type of institution was the 'extractive' one, in the sense that the main or sole goal was the transfer of resources from the colony to the colonial power (*ibid.*). This second type was present in Africa during colonial times. This model often persisted even after independence, as a number of African leaders extracted and exported the resources of their country abroad for their profit or for the profit of their own ethnic group (Soares de Oliveira 2009, 100). Such African states were characterized by weak state institutions, which in turn negatively affected the access to food of their population.

Another key point that had a negative impact in post-colonial Africa is the fact that when the countries became independent, they found themselves divided into a number of states whose borders had been determined by the Europeans powers (Bertocchi and Canova 2002, 1853). The new states had nothing in common with the areas that defined the tribal territories of the pre-colonial times. This represented a major difficulty in legitimizing the states created after independence.[5]

With the departure of the Europeans, we also observe the lack of qualified people in the administration sector (Mendonça 2004). African universities were practically non-existent and administrative jobs had been filled by Europeans that left when those countries became independent (Brito and Dacosta 1984, 22). This led to the collapse of the public administration system in the newly independent states. To overcome this vacuum, political leaders chose members of their party to administrate the country, thus creating a new elite that was not able to adequately carry out the administrative duties (*ibid.*).[6]

In that context, during the 1960s, African leaders called for food self-sufficiency. In those days African economies did benefit from the uninterrupted economic boom of the industrialized societies, which resulted in high prices of raw materials (Soares de Oliveira 2010, 100). Between 1960 and 1974, the average annual growth rate of gross

[5] This factor helps to explain the civil wars that occurred in Angola and Mozambique.

[6] An analysis related to local elites is detailed in chapter four, in which we examine the elite developed in Angola linked to the ruling party *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) - MPLA and likewise the elite formed in Mozambique linked to *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* ("National" Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) - FRELIMO.

domestic product (GDP) in sub-Saharan Africa was 5.3 %. Apart from the high prices of raw materials, another factor explaining such growth is the launching of ambitious governmental investment programs related to infrastructure (Estêvão 2005, 5). The construction of infrastructures had the consequence of facilitating the transport of food to urban areas and their subsequent trade.

2.2 FOOD AID AND THE SECOND FOOD REGIME: FROM 1945 TO 1973

During the period of post-independence, we need to set the context of the new food policies introduced by African states in the light of the second food regime that was emerging (see Annex A). In the context of the Cold war and the dismantling of the colonial empires, the worldwide dissemination of the nation-centered growth model arose, where national food-sufficiency was promoted (Fold and Larsen 2008, 51). In fact, in the second food regime, different tendencies can be observed: a nationally regulated type of capitalism, the 'urban bias' induced by industrialization policies and the aim to achieve self-sufficiency. These tendencies in the second food regime are not always consistent.

Opposed to free trade promoted by the first food regime, the new food regime was based on a nationally regulated sector, enforced through trade restrictions and farm supports (Pechlaner and Otero 2010, 183). This policy of subsidized agricultural products will be followed by the European Union (EU) with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that will make it hard for African products to compete globally.

However, it turned out that the majority of African politicians did not encourage agriculture, unless it would contribute to industrial development (Friedmann 1982, 37). The main idea was that agriculture "a backward, unproductive sector, was a provider of exploitable surplus, particulary of labor, which had to be transferred to the benefit of a modern industrial sector, the engine of growth" (Douillet 2012, 8). This strategy was known as the 'urban bias' in the post-independence policies. It entailed " macroeconomic, sectoral and trade policies that increasingly favored urban consumers at the expense of farms households, taxing exportable crops in order to develop industries and setting low prices to crops, principally food crops, in favor of urban consumers"(*ibid.*) In those days, the 'Lewis model' was very popular (Todaro and Smith 2009, 110). This model advocates that for its development and growth, a country

should move from an overpopulated rural sector to a highly productive modern industrial sector, with the gradual transfer of labor force from the subsistence sector (*ibid.*). The belief in this model has contributed in many developing countries to policies in favor of industrialization at the expense of agriculture.

After African states became independent, a rural exodus of the population towards the urban areas indeed took place, caused by poverty and hunger. This was largely due to the unfavorable policies towards agriculture. However, due to the absence of a dynamic industrial sector, those countries have not been able to integrate this labor force, thus increasing poverty also in the urban areas (Balié and Fouilleux 2008, 158).

In opposition to this tendency, some scholars such as Johnston and Mellor (1961) have argued that agriculture should be an 'engine of growth', rather than an obstacle to the development process (Self and Grabowski 2007, 399). They have reminded us that agricultural revolutions preceded industrialization, as it was the case in the United Kingdom during the 19th century (*ibid.*).

In this second food regime, the state assigned itself a central role in the development process (Baah 2003, 2). In the line of the ideas of Johnston and Mellor (1961) an approach that the new countries attempted to adopt was to diversify their mono-economies with a view to reaching self-sufficiency. At the beginning, this was achieved with the local purchases of goods, followed by the gradual move to intermediate goods and finally to capital goods (Babatunde 2012, 151). The justification for this approach was based on the examples of the United States, China or France "that took advantage from high levels of protectionism to develop manufacturing and technology "(*ibid.*). In this context, the state had a crucial role in protecting local industries and employment (Baah 2003, 2). The shift to modernization was moving from agriculture to industrial production. To understand the important role of the state, one has to recall that the ideas of Keynes were predominant at that time (Dibua 2006, 315).[7] Regarding the role of the state in agriculture, differences existed between the countries. In the former Portuguese and French colonies, the state played a major role, whereas in the former British colonies this role was assigned to the private sector (*ibid.*). This is important in order to analyze the structures inherited from colonialism. Despite those divergent ideas that

[7] The ideas of Keynes were developed after the Great Depression that took place in the 1930s in the United States. For Keynes, the state has a key role to play in the growth of the economy. In order to overcome a crisis, the state needs to increase government expenditures and lower taxes, in order to stimulate the demand (Jahan *et al.* 2014, 53).

called for more incentives from the state to develop the agriculture, the state as the key actor of development during the 1960s had marginalized agriculture.

In the context of the attempts to reach self-sufficiency, it should be underlined that in the 1960s, when the Cold War was at its pinnacle, many African states benefitted from extensive economic assistance from one of the superpowers, the United States (Soares de Oliveira 2010).

Therefore, the second food regime was marked by the predominance of the United States and was characterized by the transfer of United States' agricultural surpluses to the South in the form of food aid (Gimenéz and Shattuck 2011, 110). This was the method by which the United States gained African states within their sphere of influence during the Cold War; it was a 'geo-political weapon' (Geier 1995, 10). African leaders welcomed these food policies that helped their populations to have access to inexpensive food (Fold and Nylandsted Larsen 2008, 46). However, this raised a number of issues. First, it was a manner for the United States to circumvent their agricultural policy. Instead of subsidizing agricultural products like in Europe, they carried out large acquisitions intended for food aid, thereby guaranteeing the purchase of agricultural products from American farmers. Secondly, this solution of food aid was advantageous for African consumers in the short term. In the long term, however, it has caused prejudice to the development of the local production (Giménez and Shattuck 2011). Local producers in Africa hardly could sell their products when consumers had access to food aid.

The disregard to agriculture and the food aid from the United States turned many third world countries become dependent on cheap international wheat supplies (Friedmann 1993, 38). Therefore, the goal of national self-sufficiency hardly was achievable. Within two decades, those import policies created food dependency in countries that were mostly self-sufficient in food at the end of the Second World War (*ibid.*).

The second food regime did not help to diversify the economy, due to the intensification of agricultural specialization and its integration beyond national boundaries into the global economy mainly dominated by industrial capital (McMichael 2009, 281–295). An observable consequence is the industrialization of agro-food complexes (Lawrence and Burch 2009, 267–279).

Finally, it is worth mentioning that during the second food regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created. This agreement, established in

1947, regulates international trade, but until the 1990s agriculture was excluded from its areas of competence (Pritchard 2009, 298).

The initial objectives of GATT were "/…/ reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in the international commerce" (WTO 1947). However, regarding agriculture, GATT permitted the "continuation of quantitative import restrictions and export subsidies on agricultural products" (Lee 2007, 2). In that context, many developed countries adopted protectionist measures such as the CAP adopted by the EU (*ibid.*). Those protectionist measures have led to further marginalization of the African countries.[8]

2.2.1 THE GREEN REVOLUTION

A key point of the second food regime was the adoption of the 'green revolution' technologies (McMichael 2009, 141), characterized by large-scale increases in food production through the use of pesticides, high yield crop varieties and other technologies such as new farming irrigation methods (IFPRI 2002).

In the context of the Global South, the term 'green revolution' was specified during the 1960s, when the introduction of different varieties of wheat dramatically increased the yields in Northern Mexico. The main reason for the improvement of the production was the use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation methods that had replaced the old agricultural practices (Ressot 2000). The introduction of new varieties of plants helped to boost the production (Sebby 2010, 2). According to the scientist Norman Borlaug from the Consultative group on international agricultural research for maize and wheat improvement, plants should be "stocky, disease-resistant, fast-growing and highly responsive to fertilizer" (Hardin 2008, 471).

The green revolution affected agricultural production and productivity in the entire world, with the exception of Africa (Pingali 2012). In the case of this continent, it did not succeed. Some of the reasons for this failure were the lack of credit and the fact that the promoted technologies were not the most suitable in the specific context of Africa (Voortman 2013, 329.

However, the green revolution had also negative impacts, such as the concentration of land in the hands of a few farmers, and the replacement of family farms by large

[8] A detailed analysis of the consequences of this marginalization is in chapter 4 below.

plantations. Small farmers also did not have sufficient information on how to implement new technologies (Sebby 2010, 2), which turned such available technologies inefficient. Another issue was the erosion of soils caused by the use of chemical fertilizers (Rosset 2000, 6).[9] Vandana Shiva, an ecological activist, founder of the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, has summed up the consequences of the green revolution: "an ecological breakdown in nature and the political breakdown of society as consequence of a policy based on tearing apart both nature and society" (Sebby 2010, 12). One could argue that the green revolution has intensified the differences between social classes and even between countries.

2.3 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS AND THE THIRD FOOD REGIME

In the 1970s, some serious problems of post-colonial Africa started to appear. The turning point was the oil crisis of 1973 (Soares de Oliveira 2009, 9). The recession "in Western countries led to a decline in the external demand for Africa's primary product exports" (Parfitt and Riley 2011, 17).[10] In the early 1970s, the world stocks of food started to diminish, which would lead to the increase of the demand for cereals and in turn provoke a food crisis at a global scale (Sarmento 2008, 99).[11] In this decade, the international community developed the concept of 'food security' as a response to the new situation that prevailed in the food market (Shaw 2007). The objective of introducing and developing this new concept was to achieve sufficient food production to feed the planet.

During the 1970s, years of stagnation characterized the majority of African countries (Parffit and Riley 2011, 19). The oil price, the fluctuation of the American dollar and the debt increase accumulated by the African countries started to dismantle the nation-centered growth model (Fold and Larsen 2008, 64). The Chicago School of Economics replaced the ideas of Keynes for development (*ibid.*). This was favored by the rise of conservative governments in the United States (with Ronald Reagan) or in the United

[9] The soil erosion also occurred due to the monocultures or limited rotations of cultures (Osman 2014, 70).

[10] Between 1973 and 1982, the value of African exports decreased by 20 % (Hadjor 1987, 50). In 1983, for example, the price of cobalt decreased by 50 %, copper by 20 % and coffee by 20 % (*ibid.*). Ghana, dependent on cocoa, felt the crisis when the prices of this product decreased by 70 % between 1978 and 1983 (*ibid.*, 51).

[11] In 1972, due to adverse weather conditions, the world food production decreased for the first time in 20 years by 33 million tons, while an increase of 24 million tons would have been required to meet the needs of the global population (FAO 2009, 11).

Kingdom (with Margaret Thatcher). They proposed a neoliberal agenda in economic theory and politics (Todaro and Smith 2009, 126).

Consequently, the state was no longer considered as responsible for development. In order to achieve economic growth, developing countries rather required deregulation, privatization of the 'inefficient' public sector (Todaro and Smith 2009, 126). According to this theory, one of the key aspects of underdevelopment was the excessively high degree of state intervention (*ibid.*). Hence, the market became the agent for promoting economic growth, instead of the state.

Due to those changes in international economic policies, the second food regime ended and was replaced by a third food regime. This new regime has been known as the 'corporate food regime' (Gímenez and Shattuck 2011, 111). It is defined as a corporate regime in the sense that the organizing principles of it are the market, and no longer the empire or the state (McMichael 2009). This third (and current) food regime is thus characterized by an unprecedented market power, by the profits of monopolist food corporations, by the growing relation between food and fuel economies,[12] by a shrinking natural resource base, by the concentration of land ownership and by the growing resistance of social movements worldwide (Gimenéz and Shattuck 2011).

According to Giménez and Shattuck (2011, 119), this food regime is supported by Northern-dominated international finance and development institutions (e.g. IMF, WTO, World Bank), as well as the Cargill, Monsanto, ADM, Tyson, Carrefour, Tesco, WalMart), agricultural policies of the G-8 (US Farm Bill, EU's Common Agricultural Policy). We can see that those organizations are part of the 'Global North'; hence, they will follow food strategies that will benefit the consumers of the Global North at the expense of the Global South.

At the end of the 1970s, the debt accumulated by African states was suffocating them and leading those countries to bankruptcy (Soares de Oliveira 2009, 97). Consequently, those c0ountries had to request the assistance of the international institutions mentioned above, such as the World Bank or the IMF (a very similar situation to the one we are observing in 2015 with the economic crisis in Southern Europe).[13] But in the 1980s, neoliberal economists gained control over the international financial agencies (Todaro

[12] The relation between food and fuel economies refers to the current demand for 'biological' alternatives to fuel energy. Due to this fact, many farmers are forced to cultivate biofuels instead of food (Giménez and Shattuck 2011). For more information on this issue, please refer to section 4.3.

[13] Also known as 'Bretton Wood institutions', since both the IMF and the World Bank (itself derived from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) were established on the basis of the execution of the agreements of the Bretton Woods conference held in July 1944.

and Smith 2009, 127). These institutions imposed a series of measures known as structural adjustment programs, in particular on African states, as a prerequisite for granting credits. Those programs, aimed at 'restructuring' the economies of recipients of international loans, included several measures related to agriculture such as the liberalization of markets, the withdrawal of the government from agriculture, the elimination of subsidies and of national research programs in the global South (Gimenéz and Shattuck 2011). With such measures, state disinvestment in agriculture became even more acute in Africa. In order to sustain their economies, African governments adopted the structural adjustments programs,[14] imposed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank), and based on conditionality (Logan 2015). Conditionality means that in order to receive financial assistance, the governments need to adjust their economic policies to the criteria defined by the IMF and the World Bank (*ibid.*).

The consequences of the structural adjustment programs are the 'flooding' of local markets with imported subsidized food that prevents local agriculture to compete with it. Other measures are the cut of state subventions for small-scale agriculture, the privatization of state-owned banks with the consequence of more difficult access to credit loans for small farmers, the excessive promotion of exports, patents on genetic resources and the increase of expensive technologies to support genetic engineering (Rosset 2006).

These policies imposed by the adjustment programs had the impact of limiting the ability of the state to decide on its own food policies (Mazhar *et al.* 2007, 64). Hence, the state bound by those agreements served the interests of transnational corporations making a business out of food (*ibid.*). The structural programs reduced the ability of the governments of developing countries to provide even the most basic human rights to their population, one of them being the right to food (Villaroman 2009, 1). Those programs intended to solve the problem of debt, but they even increased it (Logan 2015). Consequently, state budget was largely used for the periodic repayment of external debt (Villamoran 2009, 1).

[14] At the beginning of 1980, structural adjustment programs were implemented in at least 36 African countries (Kingston *et al.* 2011, 117). Those programs turned out to be an economic failure, increasing the debt of African countries and leading to social consequences (Fatton 1992, 130). It is no coincidence that the 1980's were known as the 'lost decade' for Africa (Magstadt 2011, 550). With the exception of Ghana and Uganda, the structural adjustment programs were a fiasco (Heidhues and Obare 2011, 59).

The consequences of the structural adjustments programs were the control of exports of many African states by the Bretton Woods Institutions (Thomson 2010, 191). Foreign investment has been directed to mono-cultural economies (Logan 2015). Paradoxically, the policy of the structural adjustment programs represents a continuation of the colonial legacy.

In the 1990s, a major change occurred regarding the GATT. In the scope of the Uruguay Round in 1994, states discussed new rules for international trade, in particular the commercialization of agricultural products, intellectual property rights, scientific innovation and the use of genetic products (Vieira 2008, 134). This had the impact of treating food production in an identical way as other industries (Desmarais 2007, 49). At the same time, the Uruguay Round has brought the characteristics of neoliberal capitalism to agriculture (Vieira 2008, 134).

In the context of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) in 1995, the GATT was transformed into the WTO, which was created with the aim of implementing the GATT agreement (Vieira 2008, 134). It promoted a neoliberal agrarian policy, especially regarding three measures. The first one consisted of an increased access to the market through tariff reductions and an imposition of food imports for national consumption. The second measure consisted of a reduction of export subsidies. The third measure was aimed at reducing direct and indirect governmental agricultural support (Desmarais 2007, 49).

The third food regime has been in place for 40 years (see Annex A). It has entailed a further 'accumulation by dispossession',[15] manifested by a constant rise in food prices and by the emergence of food riots, particularly in Africa (McMichael 2009, 285).[16]

[15] For more information refer to section 4.1.1 on 'depeasantization'.

[16] An example of food riots is Egypt where the rise in bread prices led to protests in 2008. The same happened again in 2011 and led to the fall of Mubarak and the beginning of the so-called 'Arab Spring' in Egypt (Mahr 2011).

3 FOOD SECURITY

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the concept of food security that emerged during the third food regime. Since 1974, when food security was defined, it has become the international framework to address the global issue of hunger (Amir 2013, 1). This concept is not neutral and is linked to a neoliberal vision of the world (*ibid.*). The goal of this chapter is to clarify this concept in the scope of the implications of using a food security approach to address global poverty.

A discourse is defined as a set of beliefs that produces knowledge serving the interests of a particular group or class (Andersen and Maaka 2006, 166). The production of discourse serves to universalize and naturalize beliefs and ideas that are socially and historically constructed. Being the Food and Agriculture organization of the United Nations (FAO) a 'knowledge network' (Alcock 2009, 7). The aim of this chapter is to study the power relations behind the discourse of food security.

Taking into consideration that the 'discourse' of food security is dynamic and changing in relation to the wider political and cultural economies of food system dynamics across the world (Jarosz 2014, 168), the analysis in this chapter adopts a historical perspective.

Accordingly, we have identified three moments in time and each is discussed in a separate subchapter: the World Food Summit of 1974, when the 'food security' concept was defined for the first time; the shift of the concept, with the text *Poverty and Famine* published by Sen (1981); and the changes of 1996 with the Declaration of Rome on World Food Security. The objective of each subchapter is to understand why this discourse has changed over time and the consequences of those changes. To achieve this objective, we rely on a literature review and on the analysis of primary sources (on food security).

3.1 THE FIRST DEFINITION OF FOOD SECURITY AT THE WORLD FOOD SUMMIT OF 1974

Currently, they are more than 200 definitions of food security (Maxwell and Frankenberger 1992). However, the first definition of food security dates back to 1974, when the concept was specified during the World Food Security Conference in Rome (FAO 2006). The world food crisis of 1972 contributed to the emergence of this

concept. In that year, world food production declined for the first time in 20 years (Shaw 2007, 115). This was due to weather conditions that negatively affected the agricultural production in many parts of the world. The world cereal prices that had been stable since the Second World War increased by four times. Additionally, the oil crisis had the immediate effect of increasing the cost of fertilizer production and consumption, raising the prices of food even further (*ibid.*, 117).

Although the concept of food security was defined in 1974, the concerns of the international community about food availability dates back to the 1930s when Yugoslavia proposed a report to the League of Nations about food availability in representative countries of the world (Shaw 2007, 6).[17]

Since the World Food Summit of 1974, the FAO is promoting the concept of food security as a way to tackle poverty and hunger, being an organization dedicated to "collect, analyze, interpret, and disseminate information relating to nutrition, food and agriculture" (FAO 1945).[18] Hence, in promoting this concept, it is legitimizing a specific kind of discourse.

At the World Food Conference of 1974 in Rome, food security was defined as the "availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs, primarily cereals, so as to avoid acute food shortages in the event of widespread crop failures or natural disasters, to sustain a steady expansion of production and reduce fluctuations in production and prices" (FAO 1974).

This first definition of food security is problematic, in the sense that it blames nature as being responsible for food problems (Alcock 2009, 18). This definition has the effect of depoliticizing the issue of hunger, for example by avoiding mentioning "the policy of stock-reduction policy adopted by the US some years before /…/ or the crippling impact of the rocketing price of petroleum following the embargos and supply cuts by OPEC" (*ibid.*).

[17] In the early 1930s, Yugoslavia proposed that in view of the importance of food for health, information about the food position in representative countries in the world should be disseminated (Shaw 2007, 79). The Health division of the League of Nations accepted the proposal. It resulted in the report *Nutrition and Public Health* (Gibson 2012, 179), which is considered as the first introduction to the world food problem.

[18] FAO was the first specialized agency created by the United Nations (UN) in 1945 (Alcock 2009, 7). Its primary mandate included the mapping and eradication of world hunger (Uvin 1994, 74). In the same period, more precisely in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted, which recognized in its article 25 the right to food as a core element of an adequate standard of living (Maxwell and Frankeberger 1992, 6).

The concept of food security is linked almost exclusively to the agricultural production. In this context, it strengthens the argument of the chemical industry in defending the green revolution (Maluf *et al.* 2001, 1). To understand the importance of this revolution we need to stress that during the 1970s agricultural development policies were concerned with the problem of feeding a rapidly increasing world population. Maximizing agricultural yields was the key objective then (Conway and Barbier 1990, 11–12).

In the 1970s, the ideas of the economist Thomas Malthus were also very popular in helping to legitimize the green revolution (Butler 2009, 581).[19] In his book *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798), Malthus suggested that human population grew exponentially while food production grew at a linear rate (Elwell 2003). Hence, agriculture cannot follow the growth of population, and this will lead to famine. In order to avoid famine, productivity needs to increase in rural areas by applying the principles of green revolution. Green Revolution is in accordance with the first definition of food security and does not show a divergence with the ideas of the 1960s on self-sufficiency developed in the second food regime.

However, the distinction in this case is that while in the 1960s this could be achieved by food aid or by trade (Geier 1995, 9), in the 1970s it could be by "strengthening the production base of developing countries" (FAO 1974, para. 2). Agriculture, which had been neglected in the years after independence as an 'unproductive sector', gained more importance in the 1970s. The supply of food should not be ensured by imports, but by domestic production (Geier 1995, 11). This shift could be explained by the popularity of the 'dependency school' in the 1970s, which stated that the goal of greater national political and economic independence was incompatible with the growing dependence on food imports. Another factor explaining this change is that the Lewis model had failed to bring development to those countries (*ibid.*).[20] Notions of 'national stocks' and 'national reserves' had embedded the concept of food security (Altock 2009, 21). In this context, hunger is regarded merely as a 'supply problem', rather than a political one.

In this first definition of food security, it is interesting to note the role of developing countries that provide "the required financial, technical and material assistance" (FAO 1974, para. 9). Again, the problem of hunger is regarded as a technical one. In the first declaration defining food security, the FAO does not mention the practices of *dumping*,

[19] For more information on Green Revolution refer to section 2.2.1.
[20] The Lewis model was explained in section 2.2 related to the second food regime.

when developed countries provided subsidies to their agricultural products, making it hard for African products to compete with them (Daviron 2008, 62). With protectionist measures such as the CAP in the EU, the developed countries have ensured that many developing countries continue to be dependent on food imports (McMichael 2009).

3.2 THE 1980S: A NEW APPROACH TO FOOD SECURITY

In the 1980s, the concept of food security shifted from global and national food supplies towards a focus on access to food at household and individual levels (Maxwell 1992, 6). Consequently, the policy study of the World Bank *Poverty and Hunger* (1986) provided a different view of the concept of food security. It stated, "The world has ample food. The growth of global food production has been faster than the unprecedented population growth of the past forty years/…/. Yet many poor countries and hundreds of millions of poor people do not share this abundance. They suffer from a lack of food security, caused mainly by a lack of purchasing power" (World Bank 1986, 1) and 'food security' is defined here as "access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life" (*ibid.*). It is important to analyze this definition because it is still widely used (FAO 2009).

The difference with the first definition is that food security is no longer understood as a supply problem. The ideas of Malthus are no longer valid. Food insecurity is no longer a consequence of natural disaster, but is due to the inequality of income. The solution is no longer to strengthen the national supplies. The perspective is rather that "economic growth will ultimately provide most households with enough income to acquire enough food" (World Bank 1986, 5).

In this sense, the work of Amartya Sen *Poverty and Famine* (1981) is relevant. He gives more importance to the socio-economic conditions of people: "Starvation is a matter of some people not having enough food to eat and not a matter of there being not enough food to eat" (Sen 1981, 434). Consequently, "having enough food *per capita* at national level is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for food security" (Burchi and Muro 2012, 12).

Significantly, the new definition of food security is given by the World Bank and not by the FAO. This change is due to a broader conceptualization of food and it is linked to poverty, thus requiring 'experts' in social sciences, and not only in agriculture (Altock 2009, 27). In this specific case, the World Bank has taken the lead. In the context of the

1980s,[21] we observe a return to the theories of growth embodied by structural adjustment programs (Geier 1995, 18). Many African countries have subscribed to those programs supported by the IMF and the World Bank.

For the World Bank (1986, 5) "the loss of real income explains why famine occurs and who is hurt by them". Sufficient income becomes of paramount importance in order to prevent food insecurity. Consequently, the solution to hunger is economic growth that can be achieved by trade, production or supply (Alcock 2009, 30). The work of Sen, where famine is regarded as a purely "economic disaster" (Sen 1981, 162) has helped to depoliticize the concept of hunger.

The second definition of food security was linked to structural adjustments programs that were taking place in the 1980s. Those programs were aimed at addressing the technical failures of the economic system and to bringing about growth, increasing the 'purchasing power' of nations (Alcock 2009, 36).

This shift in the definition of food security is consistent with the change in the food regimes: it is the market that brings economic growth, no longer the state. For that reason, those countries needed to 'open up' their markets. However, this extended definition of food security likewise has the same limitations as the ones pointed out in the description of the third food regime.

3.3 FOOD SECURITY IN THE 1990S: INTRODUCTION OF NUTRITION

The third definition of food security, which is the current generally accepted one, was the one specified in 1996 in the Rome Declaration on World Food Security adopted by the FAO. It declares, "Food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels (is achieved) when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO 1996, para. 1). This definition takes a more multidisciplinary approach and we can note a combination between agriculture and health regarding food security (Simon 2009, 37).

The third definition of food security does not represent a clear cut with the past though. Food is presented again as a commodity, as expressed by economic access

[21] For more information on structural adjustment programs refer to section 2.3 about the third food regime.

(Altock 2009, 39). Food security has been reduced to purely monetary relations. Any other means by which people acquire and consume have been excluded (*ibid.*).

The novelty in this definition is the introduction of the 'safe and nutritious' notion (FAO 1996, para. 1). This has led to a shift from objective indicators of food availability to a subjective perception of it. For any individual, the nutritional requirement is a function of age, health, size, environment and behavior (Maxwell 1994, 4). This notion is problematic because "any views of 'desirable 'or 'optimal' food intakes for human individuals or groups can only be value judgements" (Pacey and Payne 1985, 70–71). The question arises on who decides what is 'safe and nutritious'. It implies "the inadequacy of food produced in some parts of the world, creating space for the development of improved seeds and breeds by bio-technological agri-business and their transfer to regions still plighted by underdeveloped and inefficient methods of farming" (Altock 2009, 39–40). In this context, this definition does not contemplate other agricultural practices.

A factor that can explain the use of this definition by international organizations nowadays is that in 1996 the Rome Plan of Action incorporated a development agenda in the food security paradigm (Altock 2009, 39).[22] Achieving world food security would require international action in, among others "poverty eradication/…/environmental protection/…/expanding production/…/population policies/…/family planning (FAO 1996).

Food security still is applied by a number of governments and international organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO in order to address the problem of hunger, as we have noticed with the 2008 food crisis (Schanbacher 2010). It is used as a tool to maintain the current *status quo*, by "avoided discussing the social control of the food system" (Patel 2009, 666). Consequently, hunger is depoliticized once again.

Food security considers the human being as a *homo economicus* guided by self-interest, who has to be understood as a rational being interacting through competition rather than cooperation and through consumerism rather than culturally sustainable relations (Schanbacher, 2010). Food thus is considered as an abstract commodity

[22] In the Rome Plan of Action of 1996, the heads of state that were present committed themselves to reducing by half the number of undernourished people: "to half their present level no later than 2015" (FAO 1996).

disconnected from its social aspect. This has an influence on how the problem of hunger is perceived and on the possible solutions to solve it.

The same has occurred with the Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000 by the UN. These consisted in eight targets with their own subset of objectives and indicators (Gabay 2012). We can argue that both the Millennium Development Goals and food security are depoliticized. Indeed, there is no structural analysis of poverty, only targets set to reduce it (Saith 2006). The vision promoted by the Millennium Development Goals is market oriented and reduces humanity to pure economic terms (Gabay 2012). Within its first goal to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, target 1.A of the Millennium Development Goals states, "Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day" (UN 2010). Consequently, the Millennium Development Goals associate poverty to income.

In this subchapter, we have observed that food security is linked to the neoliberal model of globalization (Gabay 2012). The core principles associated to this concept are liberalization, deregulation, privatization, etc. Therefore, it serves the interests of the current third food regime that we have studied in the first part of this chapter. It does not address the structural causes of poverty such as the lack of sovereignty or oppressive external factors (Cohrane 2015). Therefore, the problem of poverty is not tackled in its roots.

Food sovereignty, our theoretical framework, aims to address this gap and to recognize "that the power politics of the food system needed very explicitly to feature in the discussion" (Patel 2009, 665).

4 FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

The objective of this chapter is to investigate how the food sovereignty approach seeks to address the structural problems of the global food system and the shortcomings identified so far. The present chapter includes two parts. The first part sets the context and analyzes the effects of the integration of agriculture into the capitalist system that has started with the industrial revolution in the 19th century (Amir 2013, 15). It further examines the origin of the food sovereignty concept in 1996, related to the agrarian association *Via Campesina.* The aim of this section is to study the history of this organization and to determine its objectives. This will allow for a better understanding of the concept of food sovereignty addressed in the second part of this chapter.

In the second part, we analyze the core principles of food sovereignty. First, we consider the historical evolution of the concept of food sovereignty. We focus on the definition of food sovereignty linked to the national state. This provides us with the required tools to determine alternative policies that the national state could follow in order to guarantee food sovereignty. This allows us to study the solutions envisaged by the concept both at national and international level in order to implement food sovereignty. Afterwards we aim attention on how food sovereignty addresses the right to food and the implications of this conceptualization at state level and in the international community. The goal of this subchapter is to figure out how food sovereignty conceives food as a human right and the implications of this conception for the national state and the international society. We compare it with the notion of 'right to food' associated with 'food security'.

We follow the same strategy regarding trade. The objective of this section is to analyze the impact of external trade as promoted by the WTO on the farmers. With this goal in mind, we examine which policies regarding trade are contemplated by the concept of food sovereignty.

The last subchapter is dedicated to the agrarian reform. The strategies envisaged by food sovereignty concerning agrarian reform are compared with the strategies promoted by food security. This allows us to set the background that will be applied to our two case studies.

The primary method used for this chapter is a literature review including academic literature and declarations of *Via Campesina* defining food sovereignty.

4.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT

4 1.1 DEPEASANTIZATION

Food sovereignty aims at bringing back the farmers into the center of the discussion and restoring their ownership of the means of production (Patel 2009). In order to study this process of marginalization, we have drawn the concept of 'depeasantization' and 'primitive accumulation', the latter developed by Karl Marx (1867) that associates the development of capitalism with the decrease of farmers.

Depeasantization is defined as the process by which a number of people that had been involved in agriculture (farmers i.e. peasants) migrated to the urban areas (Araghi 1995, 338). This global depeasantization is expressed by two phenomena: 'deruralization', understood as a decline of the rural areas of the world, and 'over-urbanization', understood as a massive concentration of people in cities (*ibid.*). This process was evident when African countries reached their independence. Due to the third food regime, this process even increased. This had the consequence that for the first time in history, farmers became a minority also in developing countries (Hobsbawn 1992, 56).

Depeasantization goes further than 'deagrarization'. The latter only refers to the declining importance of agricultural activity, while depeasantization stresses the growing integration of farmers into capitalist agro-food systems (Araghi 1995, 338). In this scope, we note that post-independent African states followed a strategy of depeasantization, since they intended to integrate the surplus of farmers' workforce into the urban industrial sector (Todaro and Smith 2009, 110). Those strategies have led to the fact that peasantry, as a social class is disappearing (Hobson and Seabroke 2007, 120).

This process is in accordance with the development of capitalism, where the increase of its productive mechanisms is concentrated in urban areas (Vanden 1982, 99). It further is in accordance with the Communist Party Manifesto which states that "the bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the role of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life" (Marx and Engels 1848, 71). It entails the transformation of the rural space where capitalism replaces "irrational, old-fashioned methods of agriculture" with "scientific ones"

(Konstantinidis 2012, 15). This idea of modernization is not far from the concept of the green revolution.

The notion of 'primitive accumulation' is defined by Karl Marx as the process of separation of the producer from the means of production (Konstantinidis 2012, 15). Its consequence has been the breaking up of feudal class relations. It has given rise to a "capitalist class enjoying private ownership of the means of production facing a working class owning nothing but their labor power" (Katz 1993, 365). This process has accelerated the dissolution of the feudal states in Europe (Konstantinidis 2012, 17).

In medieval times, most rural people worked in common lands for the feudal lord (Githinji and Cullenberg 2003, 69). The economy was under the control of peasants, which had the possession of their own means of production, the necessary conditions for their work and the production of their means of subsistence (Katz 1993, 369). Thus, the medieval peasant was able to produce without the intervention of any ruling class, but this relationship was based on serfdom, a relationship of lordship and servitude and the producer was not free (*ibid.*). The peasants had traditional, rather than private rights. The latter only started to emerge during the 18th century (Perelman 2000, 14), when property became the absolute right; all other 'rights' gained by the peasants were rejected henceforth by the state (Foucault 1977, 85).

The privatization of land by the modern state had the consequence of expelling small independent producers (Konstantinidis 2012, 15).[23] This has led to a formal privatization of land and its consolidation in the hands of 'lords' that became agricultural capitalists (Githinji and Cullenberg 2003, 71). Consequently, two classes were formed: the workers and the capitalists (*ibid.*). The worker sold his labor power to the new class: the bourgeoisie (Coetzee and Roux 2003, 642). He was no longer the owner of his means of production.

In the United Kingdom, during the 18th century, new techniques were used such as drainage, stall-feeding or mechanical fertilizing, which had the impact of increasing the productivity (Marx 1867, 632–633). Those techniques favored the concentration of land in the hands of a few property owners (*ibid.*). In those lands that belonged to the capitalist class, a minimal wage was paid, with a view to allowing peasants to survive

[23] Commons refer to a system where the entire members have the right to use their land (Plessis 2011, 47). Global commons refer to facilities or resources that can be used in common by many countries and societies in the world simultaneously (Singh 2011, 2). Example of those resources are space, international waters, etc. (*ibid.*). Food and water could be considered as a global commodity, used in order to serve the interests of the human kind and not only of a few.

(Perelman 2000, 14). This had the consequence of liberating the peasants, in order to serve the industrial revolution that had started in the 18th century.

During the 18th century, the notion of modern state, with the associated idea of private property, "create a legal structure to abrogate these traditional rights" from the farmers (Tigar and Levy 1977). The consolidation of capitalism, linked to the industrialization, entailed the breakdown of the rural society (Vanden 1982, 99). Considering this, farmers remain one of the least understood sociopolitical actors; they have been neglected, considered as too traditional and an obstacle to the more progressive goal of modernization (*ibid.*).

4.1.2 ORIGINS OF *VIA CAMPESINA*

During the third food regime, we have observed the emergence of social movements opposed to the current food system and wishing to change it. Such resistance is exemplified by the transnational farmers association *Via Campesina* (Bernstein 2015, 16). In order to offer an alternative, they conceived the term 'food sovereignty' for the first time (Patel 2009, 665).

Via Campesina was founded in 1993. In that decade, a worldwide consolidation of the ideas of neo-liberalism could be observed following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Desmarais 2007). In the same period, when this model of neoliberal agriculture[24] was being pushed forward by GATT (and later the WTO), we can witness the development of movements seeking to offer an alternative, *Via Campesina* being one of them. In the 1990s, there were protests in resistance to the corporate control of natural resources and technology. Those included protests against large corporations such as McDonalds or against genetically modified organisms promoted by multinationals like Monsanto (Borras 2004, 3).[25]

We should stress that *Via Campesina* was not the first organization that had united farmers from all over the world. In 1946, the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAD) was founded by small and large farmers' associations, the majority of which from 'developed' countries (Borras 2004, 3). The IFAD was the dominant

[24] For more information refer to section 2.3 on the third food regime.

[25] Monsanto is a multinational company founded in 1901 that provides agriculture with chemical products. In 1986, 85–90 % of the global agricultural trade was controlled by five companies, with the Monsanto Corporation as the largest. They have the monopoly over the United States market; in 2004, they accounted for 85 % of all soy acreage (Schumacher 2010).

organization in the agricultural sector until the 1990s. Although they accepted some poor farmers' associations from 'developing countries', they were in favor of the neoliberal policies and regarded them as an opportunity for the majority of their members (*ibid.*).[26] *Via Campesina* counterbalanced this view.

The name of the organization, *Via Campesina*, refers to the strong presence of agrarian movements from Latin America. The name, [27] itself reflects the Latin character of the organization. It is meant as a continuation of the agrarian struggles of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s in Latin America (Vieira 2008, 136). The fight against the military dictatorships in the continent during the 1980s that tried to impose capitalism in the agriculture were at the background of the creation of *Via Campesina* (*ibid.*).[28] Behind the name, there is also the idea of bringing back the farmers (i.e. the peasants) to the center of discussions on the agricultural policies.

The Managua declaration signed in 1992 established the future common grounds for the establishment of *Via Campesina*. The location is not a coincidence, since Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, was involved in the Sandinista revolution,[29] which had a strong support from small farmers and which advocated for an agrarian revolution (Puig 1997, 72). The Managua declaration expressed the wish to construct a collective project to offer an alternative to neoliberalism. For that reason, it condemned the inclusion of agriculture in the GATT negotiations and the impact of the external debt on developing countries (Vieira 2008, 142).[30]

It is also important to underline the impact of European agrarian movements in the formation of *Via Campesina*. In countries like France or the Netherlands, the involvement of large farmers unions had contributed to the creation of organizations that were reflected in the CAP of the EU (Desmarais 2007). During the 1970s, farmers in Europe started to worry about environmental issues,[31] as well as with the

[26] Since 2010, the IFAD no longer exists.
[27] *Via Campesina* could be translated into English as Peasants' Way or Peasants' Path, thus seeking to integrate the farmers in the global decision-making process on agriculture.
[28] An example of such a military dictatorships is Chile, with general Pinochet imposing the Washington Consensus in the country.
[29] The Sandinista revolution lasted from 1979 to 1990 and had the consequence of putting an end to the dictatorship of Anastacio Somoza (supported by the United States). The main agrarian policies were the elimination of *latifundio*s (large privately owned land estates) with the distribution of land to small farmers, the diversification and intensification of the agricultural production (*Programa Histórico del FSLN* 1969, 4–5).
[30] External debt constitutes a major problem in Africa; repayment of the debt takes on a large part of the scarce budget that could be used in infrastructure or social programs (Haktanir 2003, 37).
[31] As agriculture had become more centralized and commercialized, farmers had started to use more pesticides and fertilizers (new products in the 1960s) in order to obtain fast growing crops (Ditomasso

concentration of agricultural production in large agro-business corporations (Vieira 2008, 140). Consequently, farmers' associations from Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland organized a first transnational meeting in 1981, which led to the European Farmers' coordination in 1985 (*ibid.*). This organization played an important role in the creation of *Via Campesina*.

In 1993, *Via Campesina* was formally founded in Mons (Belgium), at a gathering of 55 farmers' organizations from 35 countries. They agreed to follow the three basic principles (Mons Declaration 1993, 1):

1. The right of small farmers to a living (in the) countryside; this implies the full right of farmers to their own autonomous organizations and the recognition of their social importance in the definition and implementation of development in general, and rural development in particular.

2. The right to a diversified agriculture, which guarantees as a matter of priority, a supply of healthy, high quality food for all peoples in the world, based on a profound respect for the environment, for a balanced society and for effective access to land.

3. The right of every country to define its own agricultural policy according to the nation's interest and in *concertación* (an agreement pact) with the peasant and indigenous organizations, guaranteeing their real participation.

In these principles, we notice a preamble to the concept of food sovereignty that was developed by the organization in 1996. We can observe already some contrasts with the policies that have led to the marginalization of farmers, discussed in chapter one. The movement is committed to empower the farmers as we note in "recognition of their social importance" (Mons Declaration 1993, 1). The second principle can be regarded as an objection to the top-down agricultural system with the claim to the "right to diversified agriculture" (*ibid.*). The third principle implicitly embodies cultural traditions and practices increasingly marginalized by the current trends of economic globalization (Schanbacher 2010). If food security considers food as equal to other products and focuses on quantity, food sovereignty regards food as rights issue,[32] fundamentally different from other commodities (Trager 2015, 87).

In effect, the Mons Declaration challenges the forces of neoliberal economic globalization that intend to "homogenize and create one global economy and one global culture based on consumerism and the adoption of Western science and technology"

2015). The widespread use of those products resulted in health problems for humans, and in 1962, scientist Rachel Carson published a book titled *The Silent Spring*, which alerted about the negative effects of pesticides and fertilizers (*ibid.*).

[32] A detailed analysis of the right to food is addressed in section 4.2.2.

(Desmarais 2007, 24). Through it, *Via Campesina* struggles for inclusion and greater participation when defining a different world that will strive for a wider access to and the control over production resources for farming (*ibid.*).

In opposition to the high participation of farmers and associations from South America and Europe in the foundation of the *Via Campesina*, the presence of farmers' associations from Africa was minimal. This can be explained by the weak presence of farmers' associations in the continent, which is due to several factors.[33] Only in 2004, during the fourth conference of the organization in Itaici (Brazil), Africa was incorporated into the *Via Campesina* as its eighth region (Vieira 2008, 147).[34] At present, 15 African farmers' associations are associated with the organization (*Via Campesina* 2015), including one from Angola, the *União Nacional das Associações de Camponeses Angolanos* (Confederation of Associations of Farmers and Agricultural Cooperatives of Angola) - UNACA, and one from Mozambique, the UNAC.[35]

Two years after its foundation, the organization made its first public appearance in 1995, during the Global Assembly on Food Security in Quebec, which celebrated the 50 years of existence of FAO (Vieira 2008, 144). This presence induced a change, in the sense that for the first time small farmers got a voice "to explain how things really were in the countryside" (Desmarais 2007, 98).

4.2 CORE PRINCIPLES OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

4.2.1 DEFINITION OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

One year after the World Food Summit in 1996, *Via Campesina* expressed for the first time the idea of food sovereignty. This concept is considered as a "precondition for the existence of food security" (Patel 2009, 665). Indeed, the declaration of 1996 on 'the right to food and access to land' states (*Via Campesina* 1996, 1):

> Long-term food security depends on those who produce food and care for the natural environment. As the stewards of food producing resources we hold the following principles as the necessary foundation for achieving food security. /…/ Food is a basic

[33] These factors, discussed in more detail in chapter two, include colonialism, marginalization of agriculture in the 1960s, structural adjustment programs, etc. as well as social unrest and civil wars.
[34] Since the foundation of *Via Campesina*, the organization is divided into regions, based on geographical criteria that articulate their own strategy. Currently, it is divided into nine regions: Africa 1, Africa 2, North America, South America, Central America, Southeast and East Asia, South Asia, the Caribbean and Europe (Wittlesey 2014).
[35] In the fifth chapter, we will analyze both associations in more detail.

human right. This right can only be realized in a system where food sovereignty is guaranteed. Food sovereignty is the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity. We have the right to produce our own food in our own territory. Food sovereignty is a precondition to genuine food security.

With this first definition, the movement intended "recapture meanings of sovereignty and citizenship that have less to do with transnational capital and territorial states and more to do with 'popular self-rule'" (Agnew 2009, 445). In the current third food regime, nation-state sovereignty has been a cover-up for corporate power (Patel and McMichael 2009). It has served the interest of transnational organizations whose main goal is profit. These two types of actors, the African states reducing aid to agriculture and transnational companies supporting neoliberal globalization, had the effect of increasing the process of depeasantization (Clark 2015, 2).

To overcome this situation, a key role has been given to the state in the first definition of food sovereignty. It is a very state-centric vision: in order to achieve food sovereignty, the role of the state must be strengthened. However, during the third food regime that has started in the 1970s and has lead to structural adjustment programs, states have lost their autonomy. Consequently, they are regarded more as a constraint than as an enabling actor for food sovereignty (Clark 2015, 2). Nevertheless, the state still can be a protector of national agriculture against neoliberal policies (Otero 2012). Despite the weakness of the state in the third food regime, we need to stress that the state has remained an important actor. It still takes a number of decisions such as those on subsidies, regulation of genetically modified organisms or negotiations of international trade agreements (Clark 2015, 3). Consequently, despite the weakness of the state in the third food regime, it prevails as a key actor in implementing agricultural policies.

The associations linked to the promotion of food sovereignty criticize the effects that occurred during the third food regime, mainly the reduction of the authority of national governments in controlling their own land and resources and the food policies directed towards the external market (Windfuhr and Jonsén 2005).[36]

In the 2000s, another definition of food sovereignty has been established. It has gathered other actors that have defined food sovereignty based on the idea that "all countries and peoples have the right to develop their own agriculture" (Claeys 2015,

[36] For more information refer to section 5.1.2 related to the research findings on Mozambique.

19). In this scope, *Via Campesina* forms the idea of 'communitarian sovereignty' or 'citizenship sovereignty'. The concept of food sovereignty is no longer exclusively linked to the nation-state (Vieira 2007, 166). However, national governments continue to be important as we can observe, in particular as they "protect and regulate domestic agricultural production and trade in order to achieve sustainable development objectives" (Peoples Food Sovereignty 2002, 1). This idea of communitarian sovereignty is opposed to the idea of the modern state based on private property (Trauger 2015, 4).

At the Forum for Food Sovereignty in 2007 in Mali, the intention to move beyond the centrality of the state was invoked. The Nyéléni Declaration (2007, 16) states:

> Food Sovereignty is more than a right; in order to be able to apply policies that allow autonomy in food production it is necessary to have political conditions that exercise autonomy in all territorial spaces: countries, regions, cities and rural communities. Food sovereignty is only possible if it takes place at the same time as political sovereignty of people.

In this statement, we note that the "territorialization of space and national economies", which according to neoliberal theories defines a modern state (Trauger 2015, 7), is insufficient if there is no autonomy of the state. For that reason, food sovereignty requires specific arrangements in order to be in a position to effectively govern territory and space (Patel 2009, 668).

Hence, food sovereignty is define as "something that can exist beyond the state" (Clark 2015, 4). Sovereignty applied to food means "an autonomist and pluralist conception of multiple local sovereignties" (*ibid.*). In that context, it can be linked to the idea of decentralization, in opposition to the current centralized regime (Vieira 2007, 167). This third food regime centralizes the production of food and agricultural products in the hands of a few multinational companies. It also divides the world in areas of production of certain products, thus homogenizing production in specific parts of the world (*ibid.*). Food sovereignty by contrast calls for diversification, in the sense of "the right of communities to produce and retain control over local food systems" (Mazhar *et al.* 2007, 65).

The last definition presented in the Declaration of Nyéleni (2007) connects sovereignty with political ability. Sovereignty is associated with power relations and its exercise (Clark 2015, 4). For that reason, it is not exclusively connected to the nation-state if it does not have 'autonomy'. Food sovereignty calls for a communitarian 'self-

legislation' by citizens (Claeys 2012, 851). It promotes a collective right to the access, use and sharing of land (Trauger 2015, 7). It is in contrast with the privatization of the property, one of the central elements of the liberal democracies which facilitates the development of the capitalist economy. However, without state support, those local models hardly could expand in the context of a globalized world (Kay 2006, 474).

Indeed, some countries have adopted food sovereignty in their constitutions. Examples are Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela and Nepal (Lambek *et al.* 2014, 47). In Africa, Senegal and Mali have adopted food sovereignty policies (*ibid.*).

Despite the fact that food sovereignty aims at going beyond the state, the latter still is a key player to foster food sovereignty. For that reason, it should regulate "international (and domestic) trade in food commodities, to protecting and promoting small-scale farming, to 'scaling up' from the local to the national- and to subsidize both (small) farm incomes and consumer prices" (Bernstein 2014, 1054). The question that it raises is whether this is possible in the current food regime.[37]

4.2.2 THE RIGHT TO FOOD

In the Declaration of Nyéleni (2007), there is a central focus on rights, in particular the right to food. Therefore, the declaration assumes the human right to food as an extension of article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Despite this declaration, the *leitmotiv* that there still are 805 million undernourished people in the world (FAO 2014) remains. Those people are deprived of several human rights, the right to food being one of them. Food sovereignty extends the notion of the right to food, not only to access to food but also to "the right of democratic control over food and food producing resources" (Gimenéz and Shattuck 2011).

Taking into consideration that the right to food is a universal human right, the question that arises is who should have the duty or obligation to implement this right. It is worth underlining that there is no international force to impose human rights (Oberleitner 2012, 254). Their implementation remains a matter of the state (Patel 2009, 667).

Considering it is a human right, individuals can require the state to respect, fulfill and protect their needs regarding "appropriate access to sufficient food of an acceptable quality" (Windfuhr and Jonsén 2005, 19). The right to food also "provides for

[37] We seek answers to this question in chapter five.

individual entitlements and related state obligations, which are to be enshrined in national and international law" (*ibid.*).

In the same line of consideration, there should be a distinction between positive rights and negative rights. Positive rights refer to rights that require fulfillment or request the actions of others (people, government) in order to achieve them (Schanbacher 2010, 79). In contrast, negative rights define our freedom and our guarantee to be protected from harmful or objectionable actions (Selby 1987, 12). The right to food could be included in the first category. This is of particular relevance, since the movements associated with *Via Campesina* demand the state to fulfill the right to food by adopting agricultural policies in favor of small farmers.[38]

We should note that in terms of substance, there are two categories of rights. The first category being the civil and political rights,[39] while the second one concerns the economic, social and cultural rights (Schanbacher 2010, 82). The majority of the first category of rights could be defined as negative rights in the sense that they only require the abstention of the state in the life of an individual (*ibid.*).[40] On the other hand, the economic, social and cultural rights could be considered as positive rights. These latter are harder to implement since they require a state interpretation on how such rights should be conceived (Schanbacher 2010, 82). The right to food belongs to this latter category.

Importantly, the right to food is grounded in international law. The right to food is part (Art. 11) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Windfuhr and Jonsen 2005). During the Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993, the participating states agreed to the "primacy of human rights obligations above all other systems of law" (*ibid.*). However, we have to mention that economic, social and cultural rights are harder to implement because in many countries judges and courts do not have sufficient knowledge about those rights (*ibid.*).

Food security also defends the right to food, although it only considers it as an "economic right" while for food sovereignty it is a broader concept, regarded as an "economic, social and cultural right" (Windfurh and Jonsen 2005, 19). It is important to underline that food sovereignty further aims to move beyond the right to food. It advocates "the right to have rights" (Patel 2009, 663). In particular, this could be

[38] This will be illustrated in chapter five with our concrete examples: Angola and Mozambique.
[39] An example of a political and civil right is the right to express one's own opinion freely (freedom of expression).
[40] An exception is the right to vote.

expressed in the right to be part of the decision-making process regarding food production, the right to be protected against international trade dumping effects and the right to freely choose agricultural techniques (Trager 2015, 15).[41]

Another difference in relation to food security is that for food sovereignty, the right to food includes the right of access of small farmer communities, pastoralists and fishers to food producing resources (Windfurh and Jonsén 2005, 24). In this context, the approach brought forward by food sovereignty is of particular relevance in a rural perspective, where most of the poverty endures.

Food sovereignty applies the universalistic approach of human rights to condemn the current food system. It considers this system as illegitimate since it has been designed by a "handful of privileged people" (Patel 2009, 667). The right to conceive a food system should be a right of all, rather than just the few (*ibid.*). Therefore, the concept of food sovereignty calls for democratic and political action to replace policies that favor the powerful (Trager 2015, 112).

The emphasis on the 'right to people' instead of the 'right of people' redefines the notion of 'right to food' in the Nyéleni Declaration (2007) and the subsequent shift to the right to food as promoted by the United Nations. As a consequence, it considers that rights could be invoked collectively rather than individually (Trager 2015, 168).

Implementation of food sovereignty is more difficult in the context of the current model of human rights that tends to privilege negative rights (Shanbacher 2010, 83). In relation to this last point, the work of Pogge (2002) is of particular importance. He suggests that if we consider our current system as a global violation of human rights, in the sense that it perpetuates poverty, we, as responsible citizens, need to critically reflect on our actions (Schanbacher 2010, 85). The concept of food sovereignty is important because it challenges the idea of the *homo economicus* where humans are considered as rational and single-minded individuals that solely seek their own interests. Accordingly, natural resources are conceived as a form of capital and agricultural labor is perceived in terms of maximizing growth (*ibid.*, 101). However, Pogge (2002, 29) notes that this is not in accordance with reality.

In essence, as Pogge (2002) considers, the current food system has not helped in alleviating poverty. It further has created a perception of human nature radically different from the reality endured by hundreds of millions of people (Schanbacher 2010,

[41] For more information concerning agro-ecology refer to section 4.2.4 on agrarian reform.

102). Therefore, the neoliberal economic model that serves as the theoretical framework of the food security model fails to guarantee and protect basic human rights (*ibid.*). If the current food system is seen as a global violation of human rights, the state is not the only one to be accountable (Schanbacher 2010, 98). Food sovereignty calls upon distinct actors (individuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational companies) to conceive an alternative (*ibid.*).

Concerning the right to food, the concept of food regimes (Friedmann 1987) is relevant. The food crisis of 2008 has pointed out that the current third food regime is in a critical situation. It faces a global ecological, social and economic crisis (McMichael 2009). In the light of the theory of food regimes, such times of crisis can lead to the establishment of a new regime (Trager 2015, 17). Consequently, food sovereignty should not be perceived mainly as a resistance movement, but as possibly laying the foundation for a new food regime (*ibid.*).

In connection to the notion of rights, food sovereignty further could constitute an alternative to the current food system, based on an approach that would consider rights as collective, and where the international community would pay more attention to positive rights, with the right to food being understood not only through its 'economic' aspect but also through its 'cultural and social' aspects.

Food sovereignty is thus based on a plurality of discourse, in opposition to a homogenous vision of humanity promoted by international organizations. The consequences of such a different discourse on food security can be seen also in a human rights perspective on trade (Burnett and Murphy 2014).

4.2.3 AGRICULTURAL TRADE

Liberalization of agriculture has increased with the creation of the WTO in 1995 (Windfuhr and Jonsén 2005, 6). Consequently, movements associated with *Via Campesina* have been criticizing agricultural trade as conceived by the WTO. Given the occurrence of the concept of food sovereignty in 1996, shortly after the URAA, it is not surprising that the first discussions about food sovereignty were directed against free trade policies (Trager 2015, 17). In those days, the slogan of Via *Campesina* was "WTO out of Agriculture" (Burnett and Murphy 2013, 1066). Over time, the discourse of food sovereignty has evolved in order to encompass an alternative agricultural model, covering ecological, sociological and economic aspects (*ibid.*).

Food sovereignty does not reject trade explicitly. On the contrary, international trade remains an important factor in agriculture. If due to adverse weather conditions one region cannot produce, its needs can be supplemented by the surplus of another region (Burnett and Murphy 2013, 1074).

In fact, *Via Campesina* criticizes the way trade is organized and how it further marginalizes farmers (Burnett and Murphy 2014, 1066). It is important to understand that trade has evolved as well. Nowadays, it is less a matter of exchanging goods between two countries and more a question of 'global value chains' (*ibid.*).[42] This change in trade is of particular importance since the power and influence of transnational companies controlling these global value chains will increase.

The negative effects of trade have become even more persistent with the food crisis of 2008. As a result, the world felt more insecure regarding food supply than it had been in 1995 (*ibid.*). Hence, the discourse of food sovereignty was redirected towards the original criticism regarding trade. Over these last 20 years, in the context of food sovereignty, local markets exchange is prioritized over global trade, and small farmers are favored to big farms (*ibid.*). Further, "export-oriented trade with the interests of large, wealthy and expanding farms, while small farmers and peasants are displaced onto marginal lands with poor soil quality and difficult growing conditions" (Rosset 2006, 5). [43]

One of the main criticisms of *Via Campesina* and associated movements is related to the incoherence regarding trade liberalization. While developing countries had to open up their markets, their farmers had to compete with subsidized exports from industrialized countries (Windfuhr and Jonsen 2005, 6). Due to WTO rules, developing countries have not been allowed to use subsidies and have been required in addition to remove trade barriers, leaving almost no agricultural policy instrument available to the state (Burnett and Murphy 2014).

We need to bear in mind that for food sovereignty, agricultural trade liberalization is in accordance with the current third food regime. It follows the logic of structural adjustment programs that has limited the capability of the state in implementing food policies. Trade liberalization is applied in a way that favors certain large-scale

[42] The notion of 'global value chains' was developed by Michael Porter in 1985 in order to describe the control of different phases and activities related to a product by a single organization, such as its design, production, marketing, delivery and support (The Economist 2009). Applied to food, a single organization will control all the stages of production from the local producers to the final consumers.
[43] For more information refer to section 4.2.4 on agrarian reform.

producers that are able to take advantage of support programmes unregulated by the URAA. As far as the criticism regarding dumping is concerned, we can consider that such practice comes from the second food regime (1945–1973).[44] Dumping is still a major issue in Africa, because small farmers have to compete against imported agricultural products that are often sold worldwide at prices below their production cost (Windfuhr and Jonsen 2005, 28).

Producers from developing countries with limited or no access to governmental support structures such as credit, land, water, fertilizers or seeds, need to compete "with subsidized large-scale farmers from industrialized countries" (Windfuhr and Jonsen 2005, 7). Ending such practices is one of the core objectives of food sovereignty. Therefore, at national level, food sovereignty "calls for measures to protect local producers against unfair competition", whereas internationally, it encourages suppression of unfair subsidies (*ibid.*).

However, the latter has not been fulfilled. This was apparent in the Doha Round in 2001, where the meetings were not conclusive, since the EU, the United States, Brazil and India could not reach an agreement regarding trade liberalization in agriculture (Schanbacher 2010, 11).

In order to achieve fair trade, we need to examine the measures that would be required to implement it. According to the Network of Farmers and Agricultural Producers Organizations of West Africa (ROPPA), three pillars should be implemented (Burnett and Murphy 2014, 1069): to put an end to the dependence on import markets, to involve farmer organizations and to integrate production controls.

Considering that food sovereignty defends the democratic control of the food system, it rejects the WTO as a legitimate organization to regulate trade. For *Via Campesina*, this organization does not serve the public interest (Rosset 2006, 77). Instead of trade regulation, it promotes the removal of barriers. The WTO is therefore considered as a nondemocratic institution promoting neoliberal governance in agricultural production and trade (Burnett and Murphy 2014, 1070). For this movement, international trade is considered as an instrument of oppression. It puts "the South against the North, the peasant against the transnational grain trader, and local cultural preferences against global consumer culture, embodied by McDonald's and supermarkets such as Walmart and Carrefour" (*ibid.*, 1071).

[44] This point has been mentioned in section 2.2.

Food sovereignty calls for the production of food for local consumption. However, we should ask ourselves whether small farmers prefer to produce locally or if they want to produce for globalized markets. Or whether the production for globalized markets affects their right to food. Some authors seem to agree that small farmers wish to improve their economic bargaining power (Murphy 2012, 19).[45] Hence, small farmers feel neglected, without a say in the current food system, a situation that *Via Campesina* denounces.

One of the criticisms about the way trade is organized refers to its concentration in the hands of large private companies. For example, four companies control over 75–80 % of all cereal trade in international markets (Murphy 2012, 19). This criticism is in accordance with the principles of the concept of food sovereignty that promotes diversification instead of standardization of food.

Regarding the WTO, the organization itself faces its internal opposition, among others, in the form of the G33 group,[46] which despite its name consists of approximately 40 members from Africa and Asia (Smedshaug 2010, 267). One of the main goals of this group is to protect its own markets and simultaneously promote further exports (*ibid.*). It also aims at establishing a special safeguard mechanism for developing countries, in order to protect certain agricultural commodities from import liberalization (Khor 2008).

Another group is the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group,[47] composed of 78 countries with special trade agreements with the EU (Smedshaug 2010, 267). It is the largest regional group and it is of particular relevance for the present thesis since Angola and Mozambique are its members.

Both the G33 and the ACP have the ability to induce change within the system, in this case within the WTO. Such a change, in particular with the G33 group, could be a way to integrate the principles of food sovereignty in trade (Burnett and Murphy 2014, 1080). One of the proposals of the G33 is the reestablishment of grain reserves (which had been destroyed during the third food regime), creating a special safeguard mechanism (*ibid.*).[48] In 2008, the Doha Rounds failed, particularly due to a

[45] Economic bargaining power is understood as the capacity to have more negotiating power regarding agricultural policies (Murphy 2012, 19).
[46] Of which Mozambique is part.
[47] Angola and Mozambique have become members of the ACP in 1985, with the signature of the Lomé III Treaty (Ferreira 2004, 133).
[48] Special safeguard mechanism is a tool that allows developing countries to deal with import peaks or price decreases (WTO 2008).

disagreement between India and the United States regarding the special safeguard mechanism (Wolfe 2009, 517). The key issue was that the United States (and the EU) argued that the openness of markets was the best way to ensure food security, while India (and China) defended special safeguard mechanisms to protect their farmers precisely against the openness of markets (Couto 2008).

In order to achieve the 'right to food' promoted both by food sovereignty and food security, trade has to be reorganized. Food sovereignty calls for a strengthening of the farmers' market power (Magnan 2011, 129). Likewise, associating trade with state, *Via Campesina* (2003, 1) declares that "international trade is currently based on unsustainable production systems and is controlled by Transnational Corporations". Consequently, democratization of the state, in the sense that it would respect the will of the majority of its citizens, would be a way to ensure food sovereignty.

4.2.4 Land deals and Agrarian reform

A characteristic of the current third food regime is the change of land ownership in the developing countries, outlined by a number of important land deals. In reaction to these latter, movements associated with *Via Campesina* have called for agrarian reforms.

The term 'land grab' is associated to those who regard the change of land ownership as negative. Supporters of this practice rather prefer to regard it as development opportunity (Cotula *et al.* 2009). They consider that this process could foster development of countries by providing jobs, building infrastructures and turning agriculture more productive. 'Land grab' refers to a process in which foreign investors buy or lease vast territories of land for commercial purposes in developing countries (Praskova 2012, 2). Its opponents see it as practice that violates human rights, increases poverty, gender difference and is not friendly to environment (Land Matrix 2015).

About 70 % of land deals occur in Sub-Saharan countries (Twomey 2014), with the state having a role in the process of changing land ownership.[49] In 2009, the case of

[49] In the last chapter we will focus on this point in two countries: Angola and Mozambique

Madagascar raised the attention of the international community on land deals, and henceforth it became more aware of this issue (Shepard and Anuradha 2009, 3).[50]

The international community considers that land grab occurs in states where land governance and security of ownership are weak (Arezki *et al*. 2011). However, as we have noted in chapter one, we have to take into account the circumstances under which those countries became weak. States where land deals happen are described as disorganized, fragile or ungovernable, in the sense that the rule of law does not appear to apply to their entire territory (Wolford *et al.* 2013, 2). This is partially true, and we should not overlook other factors.[51] We should not be misled in portraying states as passive victims that need to sell their territory in order to have access to foreign capital (*ibid.*). In the cases of both Angola and Mozambique, it is important to examine the role of the *comprador class*, a national elite that serves the interests of foreign capital (Mitrović 2010, 5).

Inequality regarding access to land does not only exist among states, but also within states. This could be explained by the fact that the majority of African countries are multiethnic and in some cases, as we are going to see with Mozambique, inequality among ethnicities is largely present (Fairbairn 2013). In such cases, land deals can be used to redefine local authority, leading sometimes to conflicts between and even within communities (Wolford *et al.* 2013, 4).

In the way state is perceived and sovereignty achieved, land plays a paramount role. A constitutive element of the state is its territory, which has a concrete and physical manifestation in land, as well as an abstract and a symbolic meaning regarding a specific national space (Fernandes 2008). The issue of the change of land ownership therefore threatens the notion of the state based on territoriality (Wolford *et al.* 2013, 12).

Sovereignty is based on the ability of states to govern within their borders (Wolford *et al.* 2013, 12). Consequently, sovereignty is attributed to the state. Through it, the state has the authority and it defines the law concerning its own territory, in fact its own land. For that reason, land deals redefine the nature and meaning of sovereignty and sovereign power (*ibid.*).

[50] The government of Madagascar promised half of the country's arable land to a South-Korean company. Once this was reported, the population strongly protested, leading to the collapse of the government (Walt 2008).

[51] Those factors are described in the second chapter and include colonial legacy and the limitation of sovereignty.

In some cases, states have signed contracts with multinational companies for land rental for 99 years (Matavel *et al.* 2011). When the land is conceded to 'outsiders', the state has (or can have) some difficulty in maintaining its sovereignty: different actors affect decision-making processes that had been a matter of state competence before, including penal, juridical and legal actions (Wolford *et al.* 2013, 13). Land deals can be considered as part of transformation of sovereignty and authority, in the sense that both are extended to other 'non-state' actors (Margulis *et al.* 2013, 4). However, the latter have interests that are different from those of the state.

In some contexts, the state is forced to sell its land. In that case, it will facilitate those operations by arguing that the land is 'empty' or 'unused' (Margulis *et al.* 2013, 4).[52] Based on a definition of the state by Weber (1919), where "the state has the monopoly of the force", we can consider that in some current land deals, the state uses this force in order to impose those deals to reluctant farmers (*ibid.*). This process is in confrontation with the fragmentation of 'sovereignty' faced by the state in the current third food regime. It entails that the state does not have autonomy to implement agricultural policies.

With the view to analyzing land deals, the notion of authority needs to be fully understood. Authority can be defined as the "capacity to assume decision-making power in a given context" (Wolford *et al.* 2013, 15). Due to the weakness of the state and the increase of the power of multinational companies, there is a multitude of social organizations that also "claim authority through varying legal, social, cultural and economic practices" (*ibid.*). The movements associated with *Via Campesina* are one of those organizations.

For *Via Campesina*, land needs to be seen beyond the commodity that it represents. In this sense, "land is much more than a physical resource or the arena for state activity; land is life, stability, livelihood and social reproduction. Identities and subject positions are constituted through relationships on and with the land" (Wolford *et al.* 2013, 15). Denying their land to individuals is in a way challenging their identities. Consequently, the promotors of food sovereignty denounce these recent practices (LaFracesca 2013).

[52] The European colonial powers used the concept of 'vacant lands' in order to justify their takeover of African lands. The concept could be defined as lands without productive occupation and deemed empty and without owner. Therefore, in all the colonies, legislation vested ownership of vacant lands to the state or an institution representing it. In the case of the British Empire, it was 'the Crown' (Cotula 2013, 21–40)

The issue of land deals illustrates well the problematic issue of hunger. The solution for more 'productive' land that could lead to a decrease in poverty is more investment (Franco *et al.* 2013, 5). The chronic problem of hunger is portrayed as a crisis due to the lack of investment (*ibid.*). This discourse presents the issue of the change of land ownership as a win-win situation (Shepard *et al.* 2011, 36). However, many African states have sufficient resources to feed their populations (Goita 2010). The issue lies in the distinct "access to food for some sections of the population, as well as weak domestic markets for local produce" (*ibid.*).

Concerning agrarian reform, the movements associated with *Via Campesina* advocate for the 'right to land'. The right to land is understood as the right of indigenous people to their territories, the right of traditional fisher communities to their fishing areas, etc. (Windfuhr and Jonsen 2005). Food sovereignty is against the dominant model that did generate the food crisis of 2008. This model, still currently practiced, consists in industrial monocultures produced by agro-businesses (Rosset 2010). It is present in many developing countries.

This dominant model uses intensively pesticides and fertilizers promoted by the green revolution, with the consequence of damaging the soils (Rosset 1999). By contrast, the concept of food sovereignty envisages ecological practices for small farmers (Lee 2007, 7). One of the pillars of the movement is the concept of agro-ecology, which "refers to farming methods that are based on the application of principles (rather than recipes) which are drawn from biology" (Rosset *et al.* 2011, 163). Those principles "emphasize diversity, synergy, recycling and integration" (Altieri and Nicholls 2005, 10). They also prioritize social processes that value community involvement and empowerment (*ibid.*).

Family farmers and small-scale farmers typically produce food for local and national markets (Rosset 2010). The marginalization of the farmers in the current food system is due to their food production vocation, which is opposed to the export-oriented strategies promoted by the agro-business (*ibid.*). Therefore, food sovereignty promotes an agrarian reform that redistributes the land from the export business to the small farmers (*ibid.*).

The agrarian reform expressed by food sovereignty is inserted in the broad pillar of "access to productive resources" for the farmers (Windfuhr and Jonsen 2005, 11). The land should belong to those who cultivate it (*ibid.*). This reform is opposed to the one imposed by the World Bank, which stipulates privatization of land, ownership mapping, loan credits and land registries (Rosset 2010). All the measures described above are

justified by noting that most of the implemented land reforms have relied on expropriations and have helped to create a bureaucratic system (Deininger and Binswager 1999, 267). However, those market-based solutions have the effect of depoliticizing the current problem of landlessness, which can only be solved by a structural change that will focus on politics and not on the market (Rosset 2010). We have to stress that this 'reform' leaves the neoliberal model intact (Borras 2006).

These measures are in contrast with communal land ownership,[53] in force in many African states (Gyasi 1994, 391). In this context, food sovereignty requires an agrarian reform that goes beyond the distribution of land. It calls for a shift in the agricultural system that would benefit small farmers (Vieira 2008, 168). Taking in consideration that *Via Campesina* is increasingly associated with agrarian associations of Latin America, it will be against the *latifundios* (large rural estates).[54] In that continent, most of the land is concentrated in the hands of a few property owners (Schiavoni and Camacaro 2009, 138). In contrast, *Via Campesina* advocates for a change: land should not be considered as private property but rather as a common good, a patrimony of humanity (Vieira 2008, 171). In that vision of common good, the elements of grain and water are also present; they should represent the occasion to ensure the right to food and not the opportunity to do business (*ibid.*). The latter element is important because some argue that behind every land grab there is a water grab (Borras *et al.* 2011, 215).

The agrarian reform is a plea to go beyond the redistribution of land. It attempts to strengthen the recognition of farmers as a social group, in opposition with the international organizations that disregard their conventional practices (Veira 2008, 169). For that reason, it defends the traditional and cultural knowledge of small farmers (*ibid.*, 171) threatened by land deals.

[53] Communal land ownership is the system whereby land is collectively owned by an extended family, clan or community of ancestrally related people.
[54] *Latifundios* are large privately–owned land estates.

5 CASE STUDIES – MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA

The aim of this chapter is to study the relevance of the concept of food sovereignty for our two cases: Mozambique and Angola. More precisely, regarding possible solutions in relation to trade, agrarian reform, national development strategies and the role of international organizations. We first justify our two case studies in the section below.[55]

The chapter is composed of three parts. The first and second subchapters concern Mozambique and Angola respectively. The third subchapter is a comparison between the situations in the two countries.

Each of the two first subchapters starts with a section that aims to present an overview of the effect of the three food regimes on agriculture in Mozambique and Angola respectively, and to verify which food policies are currently applied in these countries. This allows us to determine the relevance of the policies envisaged by the movements linked to *Via Campesina* in the scope of food sovereignty. In these sections, we rely on a review of primary sources (National development strategies) and an analysis of secondary sources, with a particular focus on Portuguese speaking sources[56].

Subsequently, each subchapter dedicated to Mozambique and Angola is followed by a section on our research conclusions regarding each of the two countries. These sections are based on interviews with local actors, in which we assess the agricultural issues faced by those countries. The goal of these sections is to interpret the interviews in the light of our theoretical framework on food sovereignty.

In order to achieve this objective, we have set up semi-structured interviews. In the case of Mozambique, we have decided to convene an interview with the UNAC. We have chosen this association for two reasons. Firstly it is the largest farmers' association in Mozambique, with 86,000 individual members grouped into 2,200 associations (UNAC 2012). Secondly the organization is related to *Via Campesina* and its main purpose is to "Represent the peasants and their organisations to ensure their social, economic and cultural rights through strengthening the peasants' organisations and participating in shaping governmental public policies and development strategy, in

[55] The reason for having selected Mozambique and Angola are described by a detailed explanation of the selection criteria for the two case studies in the introductory section of chapter five below.
[56] Since it is the official language of both Mozambique and Angola, there is more information available in Portuguese.

order, to guarantee food sovereignty, while considering youth and gender equality" (UNAC 20012). In the interview, carried out via Skype, the aim was to verify how national policies promoted by the government, trade agreements and the change of land ownership have affected Mozambican farmers.

For the research finding regarding Angola, the initial goal was to organize an interview with the UNACA, a major farmers' association of Angola, also related to *Via Campesina*. However, this has not been possible.[57] Instead, we contacted the Angolan embassy in Lisbon, where we held an interview with Dr. Amadeu Leitão Nunes, the head of the commercial representation of Angola in Portugal. One of the main duties of the representation is to identify and promote new market opportunities for potentially exportable Angolan national products. The interview with a representative of the Angolan government is relevant for our research as governmental officials defend agricultural strategies of the country. Those strategies, based on the food security concept, are in opposition with the main ideas promoted by food sovereignty.

In the last subchapter, when comparing the situations in both countries, we have to bear in mind that representatives of NGOs can express opinions (case of Mozambique) that a governmental official cannot (case of Angola). NGOs are dependent on patronage and on the sponsors financing their operations, while diplomats typically are part of the national elite. Moreover, the latter will not divert from the discourse of international organizations since he does not intend to see his country being marginalized internationally.

The chapter concludes with ten possible solutions that could be implemented with a view to improving the agricultural conditions in both countries.

The cases of Angola and Mozambique have been chosen for five reasons, the first being geographical: they are in Africa, where the majority of rural poverty occurs. Paradoxically, both countries are in the southern part of Africa, which is the richest region of the continent (Machado 2012, 27).[58] Both countries are rich in terms of agriculture, although the state does not take full advantage from it. For example, in Mozambique only 12.5 % (4.5 million of hectares) of arable land is cultivated (Biacuna 2009, 2).

[57] After an initial exchange of emails, they have stopped answering us.

[58] This richness can lead to the 'natural resources curse', a phenomenon characterized by low economic development due to the misuse of the abundance of natural resources (Demissie 2015, 1). According to this notion, countries or regions experience worse economic and political development despite their wealth in resources, in comparison to countries that do not have such resources (*ibid.*).

Secondly, both countries illustrate well the consequences of the three food regimes in Africa. From the first food regime, due to the fact they were Portuguese colonies, they have inherited mono-economies. In Angola, it was based on coffee cultivation (Galli 1987, 142), whereas in the case of Mozambique it was cotton (Cotula 2013, 21). From the second food regime, we observe a dependency on food aid. Mozambique relies on World Food Aid since 1976 (World Food Aid 2006), particularly on Japan's aid since 1977 (Mercedes 2014). From the third food regime, we observe the cut of state subventions to agriculture due to the structural adjustment programs that were implemented in both countries.

The third reason to select these two countries is their membership in international institutions. Both are WTO members for some two decades: Mozambique since 1995, and Angola from 1996 (WTO 2015). Both belong to the category of 'least-developing countries' (*ibid.*). They are eligible to the 'duty free quota free' system,[59] established at the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005 (Ito 2013, 1). In addition, Angola and Mozambique are ACP members, and they negotiate their trade agreements in the context of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Sasson 2012, 15).[60] All these institutions have agricultural policies that affect both countries.

As former Portuguese colonies, both countries are also members of the *Comunidade dos Povos de Lingua Portuguesa* (Community of Portuguese speaking Countries) - CPLP,[61] an international organization that encompasses countries with Portuguese as their official language. This organization has a common strategy regarding food security, the *Conselho de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional da CPLP* (Council of Food and Nutritional Safety of CPLP) - CONSAN–CPLP. Its objective, among others, is to provide a strong common voice to negotiate trade agreements with international organizations that are present in those countries, such as the IMF, the World Bank or donor countries (ACTUAR 2012, 5).

The fourth criterion is the fact that those countries appear to illustrate well the problems faced by many African countries. They are heavily dependent on food imports

[59] 'Duty free quota free' refers to the fact that the WTO will remove all the quotas and tariffs on imports of the least developing countries. 'Duty free quota free' should apply to 100 % of the products, however United States delegates insist on 97 % of the products (Ancharaz and Laird 2013, 7).

[60] The SADC is formed by 15 African countries. Its main goal is to promote economic, political and security cooperation among its members.

[61] Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe and East-Timor.

to feed their population (Rakotoarisoa *et al.* 2011).[62] In Angola, for example, half of the food products are imported (CIA 2015). Another issue is that in both countries more than 80 % of the population is linked to agriculture. However, this sector represents less than 10 % of the GDP (*ibid.*). In addition, both countries have vast segments of population suffering from undernourishment:[63] in Angola 3.2 million persons and in Mozambique 6.9 million (FAO 2015).[64]

The fifth reason is that the governments of those countries use strategies of food security to address hunger. This can be observed with the National Development Plan 2012–2017 in Angola or with the National Development Strategy 2015–2035 in Mozambique, where a clear intention to improve the conditions of the farmers is enunciated in both cases. However, none of the strategies appears to be close to the ideas promoted by the concept of food sovereignty. The National Development Strategy for Mozambique stresses that "the transformation of the agricultural activity is the constitutive element for the strategy of industrialization. The incorporation of the rural population in the economic market and the increase of the productivity of farmers is the necessary condition for the increase of the domestic market" (*Estratégia Nacional de Desenvolvimento* 2015–2035 2015, para. 66). The Angolan National Development Plan refers to the "development of a competitive agriculture based on the reorientation of familiar agriculture towards the market and the revitalization of the business sector" (*Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento* 2013–2017 2013, para. 91).

The key differentiator between the two countries is mainly their economic situation that affects their policies related to food. In the case of Mozambique, the main objective is to assess whether food sovereignty is understood as "right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity" (Declaration of Nyéleni 2007, 1). We have to take into account external pressures, in particular the heavy dependency on international donors. No less

[62] This is a problematic issue in the sense that they are very exposed to global market food imports for the population. With a food crisis similar to the one that occurred in 2008, the right to food can be denied to various segments of the population. Another problem is that food imports will not allow to create a national market and to stimulate local agricultural production.

[63] According to FAO (2015) "undernourishment means that a person is not able to acquire enough food to meet the daily minimum dietary energy requirement, over a period of one year".

[64] In the case of Angola a decrease in undernourishment can be observed. In 1992, 6 million persons were undernourished, representing 63.5 % of the population, whereas it currently concerns 3.9 million persons, representing 14.2 % of the population (FAO 2015). In Mozambique, we also can witness a decrease in the number of undernourished people since 1992 (FAO 2015). The progress there can be explained by the end of the war and by a period of economic growth.

than 50 % of the national budget of Mozambique depends on foreign aid (Wittmeyer 2012, 16). Angola is not subject to such dependency, but the country is portrayed as an 'enclave economy', an expression that entails the export of primary products, usually extractive, generated in a small area (Leonard and Straus 2003, 68). In the case of Angola, "oil accounts for 95 % of its exports, 75 % of government revenue and 40 % of its GDP" (Deutsche Bank 2014).[65] This dependency on oil has led to a disregard of other resources of the county, namely in the agricultural sector. Taking in account those specificities, in this section we analyze the concept of food sovereignty in a country heavily dependent on foreign aid (Mozambique) and compare it with one strongly dependent on one single resource (Angola).

5.1 MOZAMBIQUE

5.1.1 AN OVERVIEW

The Portuguese colonized Mozambique in the 15th century on their way to India (Newitt 1995). During colonial times, the Portuguese coercively transformed small diverse land cultures into agricultural mono-economies. In the case of Mozambique, Portugal enforced the culture of cotton for the benefit of the lucrative Portuguese textile industry (Cotula 2013, 21).

The 'carnation revolution' in 1974 put an end to the *Estado Novo* (New State), the totalitarian Portuguese regime that had lasted for 50 years. In that context, the priorities of the first democratic government were the '3D's': Decolonization, Democratization and Development (Carneiro 2010, 224). Mozambique, one of the former colonies,[66] became independent on 25 June 1975. On that day, the FRELIMO a leftist party that had fought against the Portuguese, took control of the country and nationalized all the land (Wittmeyer 2012).

[65] Currently (October 2015) with the low price of the barrel of oil at around 45 American dollars, Angola critically requires to diversify its economy.

[66] While the majority of African countries became independent in the 1960s, the former Portuguese colonies only gained their independence in 1975. Those countries are Angola, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé e Principe, Mozambique and Cape Verde. Due to the intransigence of granting freedom to these countries, Portugal was involved in a war against independence movements. The war was known as the 'Overseas war' by the Portuguese and lasted from 1961 until 1974. African countries called this the 'War of liberation'. The war was more intense in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau (*História de Portugal* 2010).

After independence, small farmers have been marginalized, the argument being that support to small-scale agriculture would promote the development of personal production, and by that farmers could transform themselves into capitalists (Mosca 2011, 84). Importantly, many FRELIMO leaders "came from indigenous urban elite, called the *assimilados*"(Sumich and Honwana 2007).[67] This helps to explain their disregard towards rural areas. The leaders of FRELIMO have imposed collective agriculture production and farmers refusing it were relocated (*ibid.*).

The marginalization of small farmers and land occupation by the state are factors that explain the rural support that the rival group *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (National Mozambican Resistance) – RENAMO received (Mosca 2014, 8). The increased opposition between the two groups led to a civil war between 1972 and 1992, with one million deaths (Seibert 2003).

Once the war was over and with the signature of the Peace Agreement in 1994, the marginalization of farmers continued (Mosca 2014, 9). However, even before the war ended, in 1987, the country had entered into a structural readjustment program that did not benefit small farmers; there was rather an effort to integrate small farmers into the market, to increase their productivity and their production for exports (*ibid.*).

In 1995, after the first multi-party elections, the Land Law was issued. It is considered as one of the most progressive ones in Africa. It contains several concerns regarding the impact of land access of more vulnerable groups (Twomey 2014). It states (Art. 13(3), "The application for a title for the right of land use and benefit shall include a statement by the local administrative authorities, preceded by consultation with the respective communities, for the purpose of confirming that the area is free and has no occupants" (Frey 2004, 14). We can consider that the population has a say in the change of landownership, but a question remains as to whether and to what extend this happens in reality.[68] Although Mozambique has liberalized its economy in the 1990s, the land is still a state property and foreign companies can only rent it (the lease is called DUAT) and the concession lasts up to 99 years (Matavel e*t al.* 2011). However, with such a lengthy rent the state loses its sovereignty in deciding what should be cultivated in its lands and leaves this role to foreign companies.

[67] *Assimilados* were granted full legal equality with the Portuguese and preferential employment among the Mozambicans (Twomey 2014, 22).

[68] In our interview with UNAC, one of the goals was to verify if the voice of the local population is heard in the land deals.

Nowadays the government of Mozambique, aware of the potential of agriculture in the country, is trying to improve this sector. One of the strategies is the concession of land to foreign companies. However, between 2000 and 2010, only 4 % of the government budget went to agriculture (Mosca 2014, 11). This is in contradiction with the signature of the Maputo declaration in 2003 where member states of the African Union decided to reallocate 10 % of their budget to agriculture (African Union 2003, 1).

One of the new strategies with a view to improving agricultural production is the change of land ownership. In Africa, Mozambique is the third,[69] most affected country regarding the change of land ownership (Mosca 2014, 4). The majority of such land deals involve foreign companies and concern fertile lands close to water resources (Matavel *et al.* 2011, 19). According to the Land Law (1997, Art. 27), foreign investors have a responsibility towards the communities affected by the change of ownership (*ibid.*, 34).

The change of land ownership has a significant impact on farmers and on the way agriculture is addressed. It needs to be borne in mind that the land structure in Mozambique is dominated by small properties: 99.6 % of the agricultural establishments are constituted by farmers' families that control 95.2 % of the total cultivated area (Matavel *et al.* 2011, 9). The fact that the government wants to promote large land deals has the consequence of neglecting the way agriculture based on small properties is organized in the country.

5.1.2 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

We started our interview on the role of the state in the third food regime. Adriano (2015), an active member of the UNAC, considers that "the independence of the state has been somehow reduced during the 1990s with the structural adjustments programs, and with the idea of development that the international community wants to put forward". However, he stresses that "the state has some liberty in introducing a different type of policy that would benefit small farmers" (*ibid.*). Santos (2015), who coordinates the office of *Via Campesina* at the regional level, points out that "the discourse of guiltiness due to the external actors is not so much valid". It is a way to remove responsibility from the state.

[69] The first one is Ethiopia and the second one South Sudan (Mosca 2014, 4).

This vision underlines the fact that we should not regard the state as a passive victim of the policies of neoliberalism put in place during the third food regime. Despite external pressures, Adriano (2015) considers that "another model is possible, if we look at Asian states like Thailand. They faced the same pressures and managed to implement policies more favorable to the local farmers. It is a matter of political will".

Regarding the model followed by the government, Adriano (2015) emphasizes that "the largest projects in Mozambican agriculture, like PROSAVANA or the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition for Mozambique, have an important dependency on external financing tools to implement agro-business".[70] An example of this dependency on external actors for financing agro-business is the PROCANA project launched in 2009 by a South African company (*Borras et al.* 2011). The aim of the project was to transform 300,000 hectares of land in the Gaza province of Mozambique into a sugar cane monoculture for the production of ethanol. For that purpose, it had promised investing 500 billion dollars that would lead to the creation of 7,000 jobs (Pearce 2013, 246). However, invoking economic reasons, the PROCANA project was withdrawn without even informing the Mozambican government (*ibid.*, 254). Consequently, in order to implement a different agriculture strategy, foreign capital is not always reliable.

Likewise, the PROVASANA project also relies on foreign capital. It illustrates well the change of land ownership in Mozambique. The project encompasses the Nacala Corridor, covering an area of 106,600 square kilometers (larger than Iceland), where four million people make their living from fertile lands (ARC 2013). The aim of the project is to replicate the Brazilian success by transforming savannah into industrial mega-farms for soy bean (Wise 2010). The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition for Mozambique is based on an effort of the G8 to increase the productivity of agriculture through private investments (New Alliance 2014).[71] In the context of PROVASANA, the role of the *comprador* class is relevant (Mateus 2015). Its political will has been transferred to the national elite: "there is an interest of the political elite, which at the same time is the economic elite, in those large land deals. There is an alliance between the external pressure and those elites" (*ibid.*). In the case of the

[70] Agro-business relates to agricultural production and includes steps required to market an agricultural product: production, processing and distribution (Obst *et al.* 2007, 1)

[71] G8 includes the most industrialized countries of the world. Its members are the United States, Germany, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and Russia.

PROSAVANA project, corporations are exempt from paying taxes. Furthermore, a Mozambican company with close relations to the Presidency that invests in the project benefits from this tax exemption when investing in PROSAVANA (*Justiça Ambiental* 2013).

According to Santos (2015), these projects are "upside down" and favor a notion of trade that brings prejudice to the small farmers. "Instead of producing food for the country, food that would be nutritious and culturally appropriate, the mentality is that we are going to produce commodities for selling in the international market, to generate foreign exchange to buy food from outside" (*ibid.*). He stresses that "we have all this land, all this population that lives from the land and is ready to produce. A consciousness of the Mozambican state is required in order to use the potential that the country has" (*ibid.*).

Mozambique is a net importer of food. Rice imports from South Africa account for 75 % of the total consumption of this product (Biacuana 2009, 5). This entails the difficulty in developing local production in a country where agriculture concerns 80 % of the population (Matavel *et al.* 2011). The increase in food prices, as the one in 2008, is bound to have serious implications on Mozambican farmers where 34 % of the households face continual hunger (Biacuna 2009, 2). In this case, food sovereignty is regarded as a way to increase local production in order to limit the import.

Regarding this dependency on imports, and linked to the idea of the second food regime, where a number of African countries became dependent on food aid, Santos (2015) reminds us that "Mozambique became dependent on food aid and this still continues today, especially with Japan regarding rice". As noted, Japan has provided food aid to the country since 1977.[72] In 2012, the Japanese government signed an agreement to provide Mozambique with rice for an amount of 7.1 million American dollars.

Santos (2015) refers to the differentiation of products for export that were subject to measures of protection in the 1990s, when structural adjustment programs took place. Regarding sugar cane, "there were some protective measures that were influenced by the interests of European companies that exercised pressure. They imposed tariff barriers by setting a tax of 17 % on the importation of sugar" (*ibid.*). The cashew sector, which did not enjoy such protective measures, went bankrupt. It is important that before

[72] For more information refer to section 2.1.2 on the consequences of the second food regime.

the structural adjustment programs, cashew was Mozambique's largest agricultural export product until 1982. With over 11,000 workers, the cashew processing industry was the fourth largest employer in the country (Hanlon 2000, 29). The government protected this strategic sector until the structural adjustments programs demanded liberalization of this sector (*ibid.*). According to a study, in 2001, 90 % of the former cashew workers were unemployed (McMillan *et al.* 2003).

The concept of food sovereignty advocates for production aimed towards local consumption. In this context, Adriano (2015) denounces the pressures to which the local farmers of Mozambique are subject to, in order to produce for export. He gives the example of cotton "where there is the pressure of cultures by contracts. In said contracts, small farmers cultivate for enterprises that export raw material to Europe" (*ibid.*). Consequently, the farmers are forced to produce for export and not to ensure their own consumption (*ibid.*).

Santos (2015) is very critical as regards the agreements signed between the EU and Africa. Especially the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA),[73] between the EU and the SADC concluded in 2014. For him those agreements are a way by which "EU controls the markets. From here /Africa's/ raw materials come to Europe to be processed and the finished goods then come back here, so that we pay more" (*ibid.*). This idea is not far from the first food regime where we have observed the transformation of African economies at the end of the 19th century into mono-commodities producing tropical products for the colonial power.

Concerning dumping and its effects on small farmers, Adriano (2015) argues that the "most evident example comes from South Africa, at the level of vegetables that are introduced in our markets at very low prices and which receive incentives from the South African government and banks". This obviously restricts the development of local production, given that an existing type of product is inserted into the market at a lower price.

The policies analyzed in this interview benefit a small elite at the expense of rural populations. Having said this, sovereignty is not exclusively connected to the state. For Adriano (2015), "a state needs to respect the decision of its sovereign people". For that reason, food sovereignty is understood as "the central power of the people". For the

[73] Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland signed this agreement in 2014. However, Angola has not signed it. According to Nunes (2015), the country was not competitive enough.

UNAC, food sovereignty is understood as a struggle for a democratic control of resources and of the implemented policies. Thus, sovereignty is not exclusively linked to the state but also to the Mozambican people.

The idea of food sovereignty moving beyond the state expressed in the Nyléni Declaration (2007) does not appear relevant to the UNAC,[74] as Adriano (2015) underlines: "the state does not only enter in the process of taking sovereign decisions based on the will of the people, but also needs to have policies that support small farmers". In that sense, for UNAC, the state still is the key agent to achieve food sovereignty, despite the recognized fact that their independence is limited, due to the neoliberal policies imposed during the third food regime (Santos 2015).

At international level, Santos and Adriano (2015) express the wish "to integrate more participative policies of development, not only rural, but also at general level. And at the same time, more transparency and fight against corruption". Having mentioned this, we have to stress that Mozambique ranks at the 119th position out of 175 in the Corruption Perception Index of 2014 (Transparency International 2014). This corruption and the lack of control of multinational investors makes it possible to have policies that do not benefit the majority of Mozambicans, as it can be observed with the land law violation of 1997 (Adriano 2015).

Regarding the change of land ownership, investors are required to consult the population affected by those changes (Twomey 2014, 16). However, "when the consultation happens, a local political figure comes and signs the document without taking the majority of the farmers into consideration" (Adriano 2015). He further points out that "many ministers are involved in those deals, and consequently not respecting the law" (*ibid.*). In addition, we recall that in Mozambique, the government still owns all the land and therefore uses its authority to grant the land to multinationals using 'public interest' as an excuse (Cotula 2013).

The main challenge for implementation of food sovereignty in Africa is "the progression of the neoliberal capitalism with the continuous restructuration of the economies of our region" that "promote a vision of development based on foreign capital" (Santos 2015). He concludes by arguing that "at the international level, Africa is the last territory that was not conquered by capital, despite the fact that it was the first

[74] For more information about this point refer to section 4.2.1 on the definition of sovereignty.

being colonized" (*ibid.*). This view appears to be in contrast with the process of economic integration of Africa into the capitalist system in the 19th century.[75]

In our findings, we note that the change of land ownership is the ultimate method used for a further marginalization of farmers and a further decrease of the country's sovereignty. This is possible due to the complicity of the national elite that do not serve the interests of the vast majority of the population.

An organization like the UNAC faces many indirect challenges regarding implementation of food sovereignty, in particular due to structural problems. The difficulties include, as Santos (2015) states, "political problems including a lack of support. Social problems like poverty or diseases such as malaria or obviously affect the action of the farmers as a social group in the equation". The concept of food sovereignty as perceived by the UNAC thus appears to call for a broader democratization of the state of Mozambique. The state still is considered as the main guarantee for food sovereignty if it applies agricultural policies for the benefit of small farmers. Although Adriano (2015) does not deny external pressures, it is interesting to note that this discourse is as an 'excuse' for the elites of Mozambique not to implement policies more favorable to agricultures.

This is evident in the change of land ownership that leads to the marginalization of farmers with the expropriation of their land. In that sense, the concept of food sovereignty that goes beyond the economic value is essential, with a view to offering an alternative to the currently prevailing situation.

5.2 ANGOLA

5.2.1 AN OVERVIEW

As in Mozambique, the Portuguese arrived to Angola in the 15th century. The country was considered as the 'pearl of Africa' for the colonialists since it was the richest one in terms of resources (Kapuściński 2003). Angola soon was involved in the slave trade. It is estimated that in the 17th century, more than two million of Angolan slaves were sent to Brazil to work in farms (Sarmento 2008, 39). The Portuguese did not adventure themselves inside the country until the late 19th century; they stayed on the coast, using Luanda and Benguela as ports for the slave trade (Cotula 2013).

[75] For more information refer to section 2.1 regarding the first food regime.

In the coastal areas, the local population was the Bantu,[76] who based their agriculture on domestic production (Caregnato 2010, 4). Their two main products were cereals and tuberous plants, but with the arrival of the Portuguese, this changed and the majority of the Bantu was used for the slave trade (*ibid.*, 4 and 8). Consequently, in Angola the labor force was more exploited for slave trade than for its agricultural potential (Galli 1987, 142).

This situation changed in the 19th century, when Portugal penetrated more into the interior of the country. This change can be explained by three factors (Nascimento 2010, 2): firstly, independence of Brazil in 1822, which resulted in Portugal paying more attention to its African colonies. The second factor is the enactment of slave trade prohibition.[77] The third factor is the Berlin Conference that took place between 1884 and 1885, where the leaders of the European colonial powers divided Africa. At that conference, there was a shift of the criteria for the division of territory from 'historical right' to 'effective occupation of the territory' (*ibid.*). As a consequence, the Portuguese state materialized effective occupation of the land in order to ensure its possession over Angola.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the colonial administration encouraged the large scale production of a number of cultures: sugar, palm extracts, sisal and tea (Pain 2007, 23), all at large plantations. According to Galli (1987, 123), the main idea was that the farmers would provide cheap labor force. Like in Mozambique, the colonial administration also favored the culture of cotton for the benefit of the textile industry in Portugal (Pain 2007, 23).

In the 1960s, and more particularly in 1961 with the outbreak of war between the Portuguese and the liberation movements for independence, the market price of coffee went up. The colonial administration that had started to develop this culture in the 1940s promoted a more intensive production of coffee.[78] In 1961, Angola became the biggest

[76] The Bantu originate from further North in Africa, from the shores of the Niger River. Due to a shortage of food they migrated to the South of the continent, establishing themselves in the territory of the current Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola (Luansi 2003).

[77] In 1807, the British Crown decreed that slave trade was illegal. Portugal followed suit only in 1836 (Alexandre 1991, 294 and 305). Still, slave trade did not stop; between 1801 and 1867, 3.5 million Africans were sent to America (Hermann 2014, 3). Only in 1870, the slave trade was fully abolished (*ibid.*). This is no coincidence since at that time, economic integration of Africa into the world market and the 'restructuring of the labor force' occurred (*ibid.*). For more information refer to section 2.1 regarding the first food regime.

[78] One of the reasons that explains the production of coffee is that after the Second World War its price increased (Pain 2007, 37). This was in accordance with the strategy put in place by the Portuguese in the

exporter of Robusta coffee in the world (Galli 1987, 142). The Portuguese settlers, aware of the richness of Angolan soil for coffee culture, evicted local farmers from their lands, especially in the North of the country (Feio 1998, 75). This marginalization and eviction of the farmers is a factor that contributed to the support of this social class for the nationalist movements in the rural areas (Pain 2007, 16).[79]

After the 'carnation revolution' of 1974 in Portugal, the Alvor agreement was signed between the Portuguese government and the three nationalist movement (*ibid.*).[80] The agreement stipulated a distribution of power between the three movements until the declaration of independence, set for 11 November 1975 (Marques 2013). The three movements did not respect the agreement and fought against each other in order to obtain the largest possible control of the country. In that context, the 'race for Luanda', the capital city of Angola, took place (Pacheco 1999, 14). The MPLA won the race, and in the midst of a civil war, it declared the independence of the People's Republic of Angola at midnight on 11 November 1975 (Marques 2013) in the besieged city of Luanda.

The MPLA imposed a Marxist-Leninist doctrine in the state (Pain 2007, 56).[81] Accordingly, the MPLA pushed for the nationalization of the means of production, including in rural areas (Amaral 2004, 52). Consequently, the land has been nationalized (Foley 2007, 10). The marginalization of farmers even increased after independence, this time due to the political orientation of the MPLA (Pain 2007, 62). Colonial elites were replaced with African ones, but the latter had insufficient knowledge of the rural world (*ibid.*). Adding the effects of the civil war to this development, Angola transformed itself from a net exporter into a net importer of agricultural products for internal consumption (Cardoso 2004, 7). This additional marginalization of the farmers by the MPLA explains the support in rural areas to the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (National Union for the Total

1940s in its African colonies that favored the production of crops with a great potential for export and with low internal consumption; apart from coffee, another example is wheat (*ibid*., 25).

[79] The trigger of the colonial war in Angola occurred on 4 January 1961 when the Portuguese army executed 10,000 farmers from a cotton company that had demanded the end of forced labor (Pain 2007, 39). The marginalization of Angolans was even stronger in rural areas, which explains the rural support to all three nationalist movements (*ibid.*, 62).

[80] The three Angolan nationalist movements were the MPLA, the UNITA and the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) - FNLA.

[81] The same case occurred in Mozambique with FRELIMO.

Independence of Angola) - UNITA,[82] during the civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 2002 (Pain 2007, 49).[83]

Once the war was over, the government adopted the Land Law in 2004; it included an agrarian reform, with the objective of allowing the democratic, participative and sustainable development of the country (Pain 2007, 84). Importantly, in Angola, most land rights are under customary title and people do not have documents proving their rights,[84] But the Land Law did not recognize customary law, thus turning tenure rights unavailable for many Angolans (Foley 2007, 2). According to the law, the state can only expropriate land for specific public use (*ibid.*).[85] However, what is meant by specific public use remains vague and can be applied to expropriate land from farmers. Consequently, the law is not necessarily intended for the benefit of small farmers.

For Hall (2011, 197), Angola is currently one of the African countries that are most affected by the change of land ownership, linked to an increase of biofuel production. This change of land ownership is also associated to local elites (Clover 2005, 348). In the absence of legal ways for the farmers to stop the expropriation of their land, it is being privatized in order to serve the interests of the Angolan elite, instead of using the land to improve the life of Angolans, where half of the population lives in rural areas (FAO 2012, 19). Privatizing their land is a way to deny their work and marginalize even further the small base agriculture. One of the main beneficiaries of land expropriation appears to be the entourage of the president José Eduardo dos Santos in power since 1979 (Rocha 2015).

5.1.2 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

In relation to trade, Nunes (2015) reminds us that Angola is an "active member of the WTO since its beginning".[86] He considers that the WTO is important in order "to

[82] The same happened in Mozambique with RENAMO.
[83] During the civil war, the government of the MPLA controlled the coastal areas; UNITA controlled the interior of the territory, mainly in the center-south of the country. Until the 1990s, it was a typical Cold War conflict, with the United States and South Africa supporting the UNITA and the Soviet Union and Cuba supporting the MPLA. After the Cold War, one of the main reasons for which the conflict continued until 2002 (in Mozambique it ended in 1992) was the richness of the country. The MPLA was financing itself with oil, the UNITA with diamonds (Hodges 2002, 140).
[84] We need also to bear in mind that once the war ended, four million Angolans were internally displaced (Souza *et al.* 2011, 9).
[85] The Angolan land law has some parallels with the Mozambican one, where the local population must be given notice and be consulted if they are affected by such projects (Foley 2007, 11).
[86] Angola joined the WTO in 1996.

conquer markets" that enable to "put my products in your market" (*ibid.*). It is interesting to note the difference in arguments between the UNAC and the diplomat. Whereas the UNAC concentrates on the effort for domestic production[87], the diplomat focuses more on the agriculture as a means to ensure exports.

Before the civil war, Angola was a self-sufficient country for almost all food products. With the exception of wheat, the country was an important exporter of coffee, corn, banana, sugar, palm oil, beans and cassava (Pacheco *et al.* 2013, 312). Its agriculture was oriented towards the external market. As Nunes (2015) notes: "before, the products of exportation of Angola were agricultural products such as coffee, sisal and cotton, as well as products of the sea: fish and fish oil, and also wood". Angola was the third largest exporter of sisal in 1972 and the fourth of coffee in 1971 (Pain 2007, 48). All this changed "in 1973, after the first oil crisis" and with the war (Nunes 2015). This led to a transformation of an agricultural and rural Angola to a country dependent on a single product: oil (Pacheco *et al.* 2013, 312). With the important decrease in oil prices, the country is currently facing huge financial and consequently economic challenges (The Economist 2015).

Concerning oil, it has to be stressed that Angola is the second largest producer in Africa, after Nigeria (The Economist 2015). Two thirds of the Angolan oil production and reserves are located in the province of Cabinda, which has a strong separatist movement, the FLEC (Hodges 2002, 202).[88] We need to bear in mind that oil was under permanent control of the MPLA during the civil war, creating an elite that is still in power (*ibid.*). José Eduardo dos Santos, president of Angola since 1979, is the president with the second longest period in power in Africa, the first one being Teodoro Obiang from Equatorial Guinea (Almeida 2015). We can relate this point to the political problems that Africa faces when it needs to empower farmers, as expressed by Mateus (2015) in our interview. Moreover, corruption is widespread in Angola: currently the country is ranked at the 161th position out of 175 in the Corruption Perception Index of 2014 (Transparency International), even worse than Mozambique (119th position) (*ibid.*).

With regards to agricultural products, Nunes (2015) points out that "the main problem of African countries is that they produce the same goods, tropical products

[87] For more information refer to section 5.1.2

[88] In 2010, this separatist group came into the spotlight during the African Soccer Cup that took place in Angola, when they attacked the bus of the official Togo soccer team killing the driver and two players (Relea and Delgado 2010).

such as bananas". This originates from the first food regime. It is an issue, since "we have to compete with the other countries that cultivate the same products that we produce" (Nunes 2015). For that reason, they cooperate within the context of the SADC. As Nunes (2015) mentions, "we suggest the principle of complementarity: if Angola has a comparative advantage for some products, the other countries will not produce it". Again, there is the idea, linked to the 'comparative advantage', that farmers should produce for the market and not for themselves.

In the context of the SADC, the diplomat reminds us that Angola did not sign the EPA between the SADC and the EU: "we do not have the capability to sign an agreement like this. First, we need to have a capacity for developing ourselves in terms of human resources and national production, in order to be in a position later to sign an agreement in the scope of the EU and SADC" (Nunes 2015). In that sense, the government of Angola appears to be aware of the consequences that such an agreement on opening of markets is likely to have on small farmers.

Concerning the issue of dumping and the practices that a state should encourage in order to implement food sovereignty, Nunes (2015) confesses that "unfortunately, we do not have a law against dumping", adding that it is hard to fight against it "because we need to prove that dumping occurred, and for that an investigation is required". This aspect is linked to the institutional problems, already mentioned by Santos (2015).

Taking into consideration that Angola is part of the CPLP, Nunes (2015) stresses that "there is not a clear or common strategy of CPLP regarding trade". He further argues that "there should be consultation among those countries" (*ibid.*). However, we have to keep in mind the existence of the CONSAN-CPLP. Despite their common Portuguese colonial heritage, there is no clear common strategy in relation to trade. Since those countries face similar challenges in relation to trade, this constitutes a competitive weakness.

Referring to the change of land ownership, the diplomat considers that there is "some speculation but nothing concrete" and that probably "some concession of land has occurred" (Nunes 2015). In fact, due to the important decrease in the price of oil, the president of Angola has requested a loan from the government of China for an amount of 25 billion dollars. As part of the loan guarantee, the government of Angola has to deliver 500,000 hectares of arable land with water resources to China in the province of Kuando Kubango (Voz da América 2015). Therefore, we witness a potential loss of sovereignty, with China deciding on which products should be cultivated on the national

territory of Angola. It has to be added that such deals are not clear, due to their lack of transparency, and further investigation would be required.

Regarding the policies that should be implemented in order to achieve food sovereignty, Nunes (2015) informs us that the government has created the "bonded warehouse which acts as a reserve of the state". This 'bonded warehouse' will promote the stabilization of the prices and the regulation of the market (Portal de Angola 2015). However, we do not have a consistent feedback on whether this mechanism will be able to ensure food sovereignty.

As in Mozambique, the diplomat recognizes that "Angola has great potential and our water resources are immense" (Nunes 2015). It is important to mention that with a potential agricultural area of 58 million hectares, only 4.9 million hectares were used in 2009/2010 (Pacheco *et al.* 2013, 324). In Angola, 37 % of the population lives below the poverty threshold, and among them, 58 % correspond to rural population (*ibid.*). Due this fact the production for local consumption can be fulfilled, as the country does not need to be dependent on food imports for its own consumption and could take advantage of the richness of the land.

Our interview with Nunes (2015) seems to suggest that the Angolan government appears to be more conscious of the concept of food sovereignty than the government of Mozambique. This derives from the fact that Angola did not sign the EPA between the SADC and the EU, or by the creation of the 'bonded warehouse'. However, it needs to be stressed out that regarding Mozambique, we discussed the concept of food sovereignty with a farmers' association, and concerning Angola with a diplomat. In the case of the government of Angola, there is the idea of developing agriculture, but focused on the external market and overlooking the farmers, as we can see in the development program for 2013–2017.

Concerning the change of land ownership in Angola, there is a lack of information which prevented us from progressing in our investigation. In Angola, the oil boom created a *comprador* class, which had the effect of neglecting agriculture, as we have observed in the policies implemented after independence. In addition, we need to stress that during the civil war the center and the south of the country were under control of the UNITA. This has led to a marginalization of these areas once peace arrived, due to a centralization of power in Luanda. Having said that, we found out that the principles of food sovereignty should be put forward in Angola in order to solve the issue of poverty and the increasing marginalization of farmers, particularly in the country with such

natural richness as present in Angola, where the elite is holding back the development of the country.

5.3 A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES

Based on our research, we consider that the concept of food regimes describes well the situation that is occurring in both countries. In the case of Mozambique, regarding the change of land ownership, we can note some characteristics of the first food regime. An example is the use of the land for the cultivation of jatropha.[89] In 2009, the government issued the 'National Biofuels Policy and Strategy' according to which farmers from central and southern provinces were compelled to produce the single product of jatropha (Twomey 2014). This strategy is not far from the one imposed during the colonial times and inducing mono-economies. The only difference is that jatropha has replaced cotton. The production of this plant serves the interests of the EU that has set a target of 40 million tons-equivalent of biofuel consumption for the EU in 2020 (Grain 2012). Hence, instead of producing for local consumption, Africa is once again an exporter of raw products to serve the interests of Europe. These practices are institutionalized by free trade agreements within the third food regime, in particular by the EPA agreement that Mozambique has signed. The EPA agreement guarantees access to the EU markets to Mozambique without tariffs or maximum quotas (The Guardian 2013).

In the case of Angola, we note a certain degree of specialization in mono-economies, inherited from the first food regime, in order to serve the interests of Europe, mainly on tropical products (in particular banana) for EU markets (Nunes 2015). However, such pressure on monoculture is not as acute as in the case of Mozambique. Unlike Mozambique, Angola is not dependent on monocultures, but is heavily dependent on one single good: oil.

This illustrates well the difficulties that many African countries have faced after their independence, in particular their dependency on one single product, like coffee in Uganda (Kasozi 1994, 42). Currently, Angola faces difficult challenges, because the price of oil has fallen sharply (as of mid-2015, the price of oil has dropped to 45 American dollars). This dependency on oil is due to the government having neglected

[89] Jatropha is a plant used for biodiesel production

the requirement to diversify the economy and to develop other sectors. In this case, the government of Angola has disregarded agriculture even more than Mozambique.

In both countries, some characteristics of the second food regime can be observed, namely regarding food aid. In Mozambique, this is the case with Japanese rice, which increases dependency and prevents the development of local agriculture. In the case of Angola, economic aid from China has limited the sovereignty of the country. Still linked to the second food regime, both countries still are following policies based on the 'urban bias',[90] as we note in their development plans, where agricultural activity is the "constitutive element for the strategy of industrialization " (*Estratégia Nacional de Desenvolvimento 2015–2035* 2015, 77).

Regarding the third food regime, some of its characteristics are present in both countries. In the case of Mozambique, this is noted in the current change of land ownership, with the privatization of a common good, in this case land. Likewise, in Angola the private sector plays a key role; the government is more oriented towards an export strategy controlled by the private sector. In both countries, the consequence is that agriculture is used for the benefit of the business sector, hence neglecting the needs of the population. In both countries, the social importance of small farmers is not recognized in the definition of their development policies.

Our analysis has shown that there are a number of issues that should be addressed in order to improve the situation of small farmers. For this reason, we have defined ten measures that should be taken in order to improve the situation of agriculture.

First, more decentralization of both states.[91] The decision-making is concentrated in Luanda and Maputo (capital cities of Angola and Mozambique, respectively). Consequently, they are disconnected from the problems faced by rural areas.

Second, diversification of the economy. This is more urgent in the case of Angola, due to the high dependency on oil.

Third, more economic and infrastructural support to agriculture, where the majority of the population is active. A short-term solution would be to comply with the Maputo Agreement.[92]

[90] For more information refer to section 2.1.2 on the second food regime.
[91] The centralization of the state is a heritage of the colonial system as we have noted in section 2.1. on the first food regime.
[92] Ten percent of the budget allocated to agriculture.

Fourth, the government should make sure that land laws are respected and implemented. The case of Mozambique is more urgent, since the Land Law is constantly violated to serve private interests.

Fifth, better protection by the government of small farmers against the negative effects of trade liberalization. Especially in the case of Mozambique, which has signed the EPA.

Sixth, in both countries, democratization of the state is urgent, in the sense that it would defend its own population and not the interests of transnational companies.

Seventh, both governments should promote the production of food for local consumption, instead of considering first the production of food for external markets.

Eighth, awareness by the governments of both countries of their agricultural potential, in particular for local consumption, should be increased.

Ninth, integration of farmers in the decision-making process. This is more urgent in the case of Angola, where it seems that the largest farmers' association is strongly associated to the government and consequently will not defend the interests of the farmers.

Tenth, further integration and cooperation between both countries and within the countries of the region that face the same challenges (change of land ownership, dependency on imports, etc.).

6 CONCLUSION

Despite the efforts of the international community, the problem of hunger has not been solved yet. Quite on the contrary, it is increasing in Africa. This is mainly due to the fact that the solution for elimination of poverty is not correctly addressed. Poverty is considered as a technical failure requiring standardized solutions, such as growth and more productivity. It is perceived merely as an economic issue, even in the context of the Millennium Development Goals. Consequently, the recommended solutions consist of reforms with the objective of increasing productivity, such as the structural adjustement programs or the current change of land ownership that have the adverse effect of marginalizing vast segments of the population. Hence, the current system deprives farmers, the producers of food, of their means of production.

The main shortcoming of the current food system is its purely economic vision, illustrated by the concept of food security. This concept has the characteristic of regarding the human being as a *homo economicus*. Such conceptualization is rather problematic. Firstly, the solutions proposed to reduce poverty are misleading because as a starting point they consider that every human being is only seeking his own profit. It is a very individualistic vision of mankind. Secondly, they encourage the creation of a uniform discourse that hides specific interests. This can be observed in relation to land, which also is considered in purely economic terms to help legitimizing the current land reforms in Mozambique, with the discourse that the land deals raise productivity.

Related to this is another shortcoming of the current food system, namely the understanding of food as a mere commodity. This applies to land as well. As a consequence, the current system dissociates food from its social and cultural facets. This point is crucial since it favors the concentration of food production in the hands of a limited number of large multinational corporations, leading to a centralization of power in the hands of a few who seek profit.

The alternative to this global food system is its democratization, as the central idea of the concept of food sovereignty. Such democratization is conceivable at two levels: at the international level and within the states themselves. Food sovereignty could be achieved at the international level through the process of de-concentration of the decision-making process. For that purpose, trade should be reorganized for the benefit of the majority of countries and not only a few (or a few powerful actors within those

countries). Democratization should also be understood in the sense that free market solutions are not the only recipe for solving the issues of rural areas. Therefore, food sovereignty calls for a de-privatization of food. A global food system should be established that would benefit the population, rather than consist of a private enterprise making business out of a human right.

The concept of food sovereignty that we have examined in our thesis is closely associated to democracy. Food sovereignty means autonomy of the state in deciding which food policies should be implemented. In this context, it intends to strengthen the ability and the autonomy of the state in taking decisions according to the aspirations of the people. This was evident during the interview with the UNAC, where the national state is still the key actor promoting food sovereignty.

In our two case studies, food sovereignty as an approach to the current framework is highly required in both cases, as well as in the way the current food system is organized. Food sovereignty is even more required in Africa in general, since farmers are more vulnerable due to historical constraints, such as the ones that we have studied in the third food regime. In our two case studies, food sovereignty is understood as a driver for the democratization of the state, in the sense that it entails respecting the 'right to the people' and not serving the interests of an elite.

The core principles of food sovereignty perfectly fit into our two case studies, in particular the right of production for local consumption. This latter could be achievable in both countries, since their agricultural richness is immense. However, this potential is not exploited due the fact that the current elites are implementing misguided policies. In the case of Angola, the country has become extremely dependent on oil, neglecting other sectors of the economy. In the case of Mozambique, the disregard to agriculture is evident as well, where even the elites do not respect the Land Law, in order to serve their particular interests instead of the overall interests of the population.

The challenges to implement the principles of food sovereignty are not straightforward, due to the interests of the global food system that perpetuate a selfish vision of humanity. In order to promote change, food sovereignty offers a solution that encompasses cooperation, participation, diversification and decentralization. It can strengthen the position of farmers and empower them. Decentralization is vital in the global food system currently under the control of a few multinational companies, for example in the case of the market for seeds. We can also refer to our two concrete cases, where the state is very centralized and overlooks what it is happening in the rural areas.

To sum up, we consider that the principles of food sovereignty are urgently required in Africa, based on the analysis of our two case studies, where the majority of rural poverty persists and is inadequately addressed with alleged solutions that entail more problems than actual solutions. We are conscious that in Africa the concept of food sovereignty is hard to achieve due to political constraints. However, it is of the utmost importance, in particular with the current change of land ownership.

Food sovereignty is therefore above all about democratization, but such democratization in an unfair global food system, and in the context of corrupt national elites, is very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish.

Povzetek v slovenščini

V 90. letih prejšnjega stoletja je mednarodna skupnost z veliko intenzivnostjo skušala najti rešitev za odpravo revščine v ruralnih območjih sveta. Ti poskusi so bili del Milenijskih razvojnih ciljev za "izkoreninjenje skrajne revščine in lakote" (Windfurt and Jonsén 2005, 3). Kljub naraščajoči zaskrbljenosti in velikim naporom za odpravo revščine pa je danes na svetu še vedno 805 milijonov ljudi, ki so močno podhranjeni (FAO 214). Od tega jih tri četrtine živi na podeželju (FAO 214). Najhuje je prizadeta Podsaharska Afrika, kjer je podhranjenih več kot 200 milijonov ljudi.

Trenutna zadostna razpoložljivost hrane, ki je posledica znatnega povečanja proizvodnje in produktivnosti v zadnjih desetletjih, bi lahko nahranila vse ljudi na svetu (Dimitrakopoulos 2014, 331). A v realnosti temu ni tako, zato vzrokov ne moremo povezati zgolj s tehničnimi vprašanji o zmogljivosti proizvodnje hrane (Peterson 2009, 46). Ključno vprašanje, ki ga naslavlja magistrsko delo, je: **Kaj so pomanjkljivosti sedanjega sistema preskrbe s hrano, ki vodi v ohranjanje lakote?** Cilj magistrske naloge je tako razumeti, zakaj aktualni sistem preskrbe s hrano ni odpravil revščine - s posebnim poudarkom na Afriki.

Naloga je poleg uvoda in zaključka sestavljena na naslednji način: v drugem poglavju analiziramo tri prehranske režime, ki jih opredelimo, da bi ocenili njihov vpliv na globalni sistem preskrbe s hrano. V kolikšni meri trenutni sistem temelji na pristopu zagotavljanja prehranske varnosti, je namen tretjega poglavja. Po analizi omejitev globalnega sistema preskrbe s hrano in koncepta prehranske varnosti, v četrtem poglavju ocenjujemo, ali bi lahko koncept prehranske suverenosti predstavljal ustrezno alternativo. Pri tem uporabljamo analizo primarnih in sekundarnih virov.

Peto poglavje je namenjeno študijama primerov Angole in Mozambika. V tem delu naloge želimo preveriti politike, temelječe na konceptih prehranske varnosti in suverenosti, in ovrednotiti vpliv treh prehranskih režimov na primeru omenjenih držav. Poleg analize literature so pomemben del metodologije v tem delu tudi poglobljeni intervjuji s predstavniki Mozambiškega kmetijskega združenja in trgovskimi zastopniki iz Angole v Lizboni.

V zaključku magistrske naloge poudarjamo, da problem lakote ostaja nerešen. To je posledica nepravilnega naslavljanja revščine, saj je ta obravnavana kot tehnična napaka, ki zahteva standardizirane rešitve, kot sta višja rast in večja produktivnost. Glavna pomanjkljivost sedanjega svetovnega sistema je njegova izključno ekonomska vizija, ki

jo ilustrira koncept prehranske varnosti. Zato so predlagane rešitve povezane prav z višanjem produktivnosti, kot denimo sistem strukturnega prilagajanja ali pa aktualno spreminjanje lastništva zemljišč. Ta ima ima negativen učinek, saj marginalizira velik del prebivalstva, tako da sedanji sistem prikrajša kmete - proizvajalce hrane - za njihova proizvodna sredstva.

Ugotovitve naše raziskave kažejo, da bi lahko alternativo predstavljal koncept prehranske suverenosti. Da bi spodbudili spremembe, prehranska suverenost konceptualizira rešitve, ki zajemajo sodelovanje, diverzifikacijo in decentralizacijo. Ta načela prehranske suverenosti so nujno potrebna v Afriki, kjer ruralna območja še naprej ostajajo revna in kjer se reševanja revščine lotevajo na neustrezen način, in sicer z navideznimi rešitvami, ki prinašajo več težav kot rešitev.

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ANNEX: MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE FOOD REGIMES

	First Food Regime	Second Food Regime	Third Food Regime
Period	1870–1914	1945–1973	1973– current days
Actors	Empire (British Empire)	State (United States)	Market
Known as	Colonial project	Development project	Globalization project
Discourse	Free trade between? the colonies and the center of the empire	State-centered vision	Liberalization of the economy; agricultural modernization
Capital	British industrial capital	National agro-food industry	Corporate agro-business capital
Characteristics	Colonial exports of tropical products	Food aid to the newly independent countries	Structural adjustment programs to modernize agriculture
Techniques	Extension of cultivated areas in previous colonies	Green revolution	Cross-border privatization and investment
Social Movements	Not very present, mainly working class movements in Europe struggling for better conditions (Bernstein 2015)	Not very present, mainly in American farms, lobbying on government policy (Bernstein 2015)	*Via Campesina* associated with the idea of food sovereignty