

UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA

THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

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**Obravnavanje koncepta humanitarne intervencije
v mednarodnem tisku: primera Kosova in Libije**

**Addressing the concept of humanitarian intervention
within the international press:
The cases of Kosovo and Libya**

Master's Thesis

Ljubljana, 2015

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POVZETEK

Obravnavanje koncepta humanitarne intervencije v mednarodnem tisku: primera Kosova in Libije

Pričujoče magistrsko delo s področja novinarstva obravnava, kako je koncept humanitarne intervencije v mednarodnem tisku predstavljen, razvit, uveljavljen in kritiziran kot sprejemljiva tuja vojaška intervencija na primeru prispevkov in člankov o intervencijah v vojni na Kosovu (1998-1999) in državljanski vojni v Libiji (2011). Z boljšim poznavanjem pomenov, ki označujejo izraz *humanitarna intervencija* v prispevkih in člankih v medijih, je mogoče natančneje oceniti mehanizme prepričevanja, soočanja in napeljevanja v novinarskem diskurzu ter povezavo med novinarstvom, javnim mnenjem in oblikovanjem zunanje politike. Razumevanje trditev pri poročanju v mednarodnem tisku o tej temi se bo razvijalo s kritično analizo diskurza (KAD) in teoretskim okvirjem, ki razkriva strukture moči znotraj diskurza in jezika, s poudarkom na teorijah znakovnih in zunajznakovnih vidikov diskurza, ki jih zagovarjajo Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu in Teun A. van Dijk, ter na teoriji vpliva medijskega diskurza na javnost Maxwella McCombsa.

Ključne besede: Novinarstvo; Analiza diskurza; Humanitarna intervencija; Kosovo; Libija.

ABSTRACT

Addressing the concept of humanitarian intervention within the international press: The cases of Kosovo and Libya

This master thesis in Journalism Studies discusses how the concept of humanitarian intervention is exposed, built, sustained and criticized in the international press as an acceptable foreign military intervention, using as examples for analysis reports and articles written about the interventions that took place in the Kosovo War (1998-1999) and the Libyan Civil War (2011). Through the better understanding of the meanings that categorize the expression *humanitarian intervention* in reports and articles in the media, it is possible to have a more accurate assessment of the mechanisms of convincement, confrontation and seduction in the journalistic discourse, and the connections that can be made between journalism, public opinion and the shaping of foreign policy. The comprehension of the assertions within the reporting of this subject in the international press will be done through the criteria of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and the theoretical framework that reveals the power structures within discourse and language, with emphasis on the theories defended by Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and Teun A. van Dijk concerning the semiotic and extra-semiotic aspects of discourse, and by Maxwell McCombs concerning the influence of the media discourse in the public sphere.

Keywords: Journalism; Discourse analysis; Humanitarian intervention; Kosovo; Libya.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1) INTRODUCTION	5
2) THEORETICAL BACKGROUND	9
2.1) DISCURSIVE ELEMENTS, CONTEXT AND SYMBOLIC POWER	9
2.2) JOURNALISTIC FIELD, PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC SPHERE	15
2.3) GLOBAL JOURNALISM AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS	21
2.4) RESEARCH QUESTIONS	25
3) CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND	28
3.1) DEFINING <i>HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION</i>	28
3.2) INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO	33
3.3) INTERVENTION IN LIBYA	36
4) METHODOLOGY	39
5) RESULTS	42
5.1) REPORTS ON INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO	43
5.2) REPORTS ON INTERVENTION IN LIBYA	55
5.3) CORRELATIONS AND CONTRASTS	68
5.3.1) PROBLEMS	72
6) CONCLUSIONS	75
7) POVZETEK V SLOVENŠČINI	78
8) LITERATURE	84
8.1) CATALOG OF ANALYZED REPORTS	90

1 INTRODUCTION

The debate over the legitimacy of the concept of *humanitarian intervention*, including its objective definitions, collective understandings and fundamental controversies, finds in the news reports available within the international press a resonating apparatus and a fertile ground for the enactment of doubts and certainties, through which the sustentation of this concept can affect and mobilize public opinion and public policies in different directions on a global scale. The selection of sources, the contextualization of the conflicts prior, during and after the interventions, and the ethical and political argumentations taking place through many voices in the news result in diverse “discourse positions” (Jäger and Maier 2009), “macrostructures” and “macropropositions” (van Dijk 2009) that not only portrait this concept differently but also add meaning to it, influencing our perceptions of the causes, implications, scale and hostilities involved and, in the last instance, defining what actions could be taken to end or prevent humanitarian crises. One could ask why care at all about how journalistic reports described humanitarian interventions that took place over the past decades, since clearly there were conflicts in which hundreds of thousands of people were being killed, and that fact itself implied the need for an intervention to stop the killings, given there is a global consensus that *human rights* apply to all humans and it’s everyone’s duty to protect and fight for them. Considering the obvious real nature of the conflicts, the press would have fulfilled its job just by at least denouncing them to the world and making everyone aware of the ‘facts’. However, to be aware of the facts through press reports is to understand reality through the journalistic narrative and all the possible framings that can influence our comprehension of the happenings, for instance the definition and recognition of the ‘victims’ and the ‘victimizers’ in a conflict. It is essential for all journalists, social scientists and members of society to constantly deepen our knowledge of how this narrative is built, so that we can understand how we shape our views of the world and, consequently, the world itself.

This master thesis in Journalism Studies discusses how the concept of humanitarian intervention is exposed, built, sustained and criticized in the international press as an acceptable foreign military intervention, using as examples for analysis reports and articles written about the interventions that took place in the Kosovo War (1998-1999) and the Libyan Civil War (2011) within a specific and

limited time frame. Through the better understanding of the meanings that categorize the expression *humanitarian intervention* in reports and articles in the media, it is possible to have a more accurate assessment of the mechanisms of convincement, confrontation and seduction in the journalistic discourse, and the connections that can be made between journalism, public opinion and the shaping of foreign policy. The comprehension of the assertions within the reporting of this subject in the international press will be done through the criteria of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and the theoretical framework that reveals the power structures within discourse and language, with emphasis on the theories defended by Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and Teun A. van Dijk concerning the semiotic and extra-semiotic aspects of discourse, and by Maxwell McCombs concerning the influence of the media discourse in the public sphere.

Many studies have analyzed the journalistic discourse and its ability to shape and reshape public discourse. Karen Johnson-Cartee (2005) examined how the framing of events by the media affects our perceptions of reality in a political context. Ibrahim Shaw (2012) argued how the journalistic coverage of conflicts should be done towards better educating the public on the issues involved, especially human rights. Theorists that followed the CDA line of research have dissected the journalistic discourse in different ways, such as Teun A. van Dijk in “News as discourse” (1988). But this master thesis is one of the few studies so far that propose the focus on the sustentation of a specific concept – in this case the concept of humanitarian intervention – within the journalistic discourse and identifies its mechanisms of legitimization through Critical Discourse Analysis, while discussing the still underexplored connections between the fields of Journalism and International Relations.

In order to understand the discussions that might be present within the textual content of news reports related to our case, it is also essential to know how International Relations studies portrait the very concept of humanitarian intervention and its implications. Employed to justify the multilateral military interventions that took place in Kosovo and Libya, this concept is defined by International Relations’ discourse as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied” (Holzgreffe and Keohane 2003,

18). Another important principle was added to this ‘procedure’ in the last decade and is currently used as a conceptual justification for international engagement, the so-called *responsibility to protect*, or R2P, which defends that all countries “have primary responsibility for protecting their own citizens from human-made catastrophe, but when a state abdicates that responsibility – through either incapacity or ill-will – it shifts to the wider international community (...)” (Evans 2011, X).

When Slobodan Milošević’s Serbian security forces were accused of inflicting ethnic cleansing and genocide towards the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the state members from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that decided to take military action against the alleged oppressors claimed that a humanitarian intervention was necessary to prevent further escalation of violence. However, the presence of NATO in the Kosovo War through airstrikes in 1999 was carried out without formal authorization from the UN Security Council (Legault 2000, 64), raising questions over the legality of this intervention. During the Libyan Civil War in 2011, the justifications for intervening militarily in the African state were similar – plus the idea that all countries have the *responsibility to protect* the endangered. But the controversy in this case was whether the intentions of those who intervened were solely directed towards protecting civilians against disproportional attacks from Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime, or also towards *regime change* (International Herald Tribune 2011, 7 November).

Albert Legault reminds us that international law claims illegal any intervention in the internal affairs of a state, unless the members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council agree that these internal matters represent a “threat to international peace and security” (Legault 2000, 63). The definition of ‘threat’ is, of course, relative and mutable, which means that its significance depends on the political environment and the will of the countries involved. The lack of clear standards to define the conditions for humanitarian interventions and the lack of consensus among different institutions and social actors whether this procedure should be implemented at all generates a conflict of ideas that is fuelled by ethical debates over human rights, responsibility and sovereignty that also take place in the media whenever the issue is reported or analyzed, whether in direct or more subtle ways. This subject presents itself as a great opportunity for journalists and scholars to study how a concept can gain meaning in the public sphere, and how reality is also a product of discourse.

To get this research started, we will begin by presenting in the next chapter *Theoretical Background* the research questions that will guide this master thesis, as well as some of the existing theories around textual and contextual analysis in journalistic discourse and the discussions concerning the fields of Journalism, International Relations and Discourse Analysis that are most relevant to our goals. In the subsequent chapter *Contextual Background* we will pay attention specifically to the historical cases that will be studied, and how humanitarian interventions were carried out in Kosovo and Libya. In the following chapter *Methodology*, we will explain how this research was conducted and how the selection of the written material was determined – 41 journalistic texts were selected for discourse analysis. After that, the chapter *Results* finally presents the outcomes of this research, and the last chapter *Conclusions* will give final answers to our main research questions.

2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter presents this thesis' research questions and the main theoretical approaches that will be used to interpret the news reports referring to the humanitarian interventions chosen as study cases. It also exposes some of the most significant discussions that are relevant to our research within discourse analysis (using theories from van Dijk as the main reference); global journalism (referring to the works of Hafez, Gilboa, Gabay and Sheaffer); agenda-setting effects and public opinion (relating and contrasting theories from McCombs, Birks, Stephens, Lecheler and Vreese); and the specificities of the journalistic field and its symbolic power (resorting to the works of Foucault, Bourdieu and Schudson as main theoretical threads).

2.1 Discursive Elements, Context and Symbolic Power

In order to understand how an expression can carry specific and complex meanings within a discourse – in our case, the concept of *humanitarian intervention* within the journalistic discourse – or is able to possess a meaning that seems ‘bigger’ than the words within it, as well as to understand how this meaning can have a direct impact on our comprehension of reality – we have to be clear about what we mean as a ‘discourse’ using theoretical definitions that we have at hand in Social Sciences.

Foucault defines *discourse* as “the group of statements that belong to a single system of formation”, and the *statement* as a “modality” that allows groups of signs – phrases, expressions, sentences – to be “more than an organic, autonomous whole, closed in upon itself and capable of forming meaning of its own accord, but rather an element in a field of coexistence” (Foucault 1972, 107). This coexistence implies the linguistic rules that make possible an understanding of what is said or written, the rules of a specific discourse field in which the statement is located, and the context to which the sentences are directly related. This notion that discourse is determined by cognitive and social rules or constraints is similar to the approach given by van Dijk when discussing discourse analysis. According to van Dijk, the units of language that we may call discourse can be described as composed by two main dimensions: the textual dimensions – “the structures of discourse at various levels of description” (van

Dijk 1988, 24) – and the contextual dimensions – “the structural descriptions to various properties of the context, such as cognitive processes and representations or sociocultural factors” (van Dijk 1988, 24–25). Bourdieu stresses the importance of the contextual dimensions, claiming that grammar and linguistic properties define the meaning within discourse “only very partially: it is in relation to a market that the complete determination of the signification of discourse occurs” (Bourdieu 2003, 38), using the term ‘market’ to imply the existence of different discourse fields that compete among each other and within each other. Eco also points to this relationship between text, context and competition within communication and discourse, or between text and *extra-semiotic circumstances*:

To communicate means to concern oneself with extra-semiotic circumstances. The fact that they can frequently be translated into semiotic terms does not eliminate their continuous presence in the background of any phenomenon involving sign production. In other words, signification is confronted with (and communication takes place within) the framework of the global network of material, economic, biological and physical conditions then prevalent. (Eco 1979, 158)

The field of discourse analysis named *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA), defended by theorists such as Fairclough, van Dijk, Wodak, Jäger and Maier, implies taking a step further highlighting that discourses are not just reflections of reality, but material constructions that portrait the subjects or authors of discourse not as actors, but as products of such discourses (Jäger and Maier 2009). This approach impels us to understand discourse as a structure of assertions that defines reality while providing it different meanings through a communication and signification process intrinsically conditioned by sets of rules that are not inherent to our existence as it often seems, but were created with specific goals (grammar, ideology, cognitive effects, psychological needs, etc.). This notion doesn’t deny the logical fact that in order to have discourse there has to be a material subject uttering ideas and structuring them in systematic sets of knowledge, as well as another material being to interpret it; what it does is to point to the also logical fact that in order to acknowledge reality we have to immediately give meaning to it – otherwise everything we experience in the world would be incomprehensible – and that most of the meanings that we apply to aspects of reality

were not solely results of personal reflections, but also results of various directives that were taught to us for many different purposes – to facilitate understanding among individuals, to indoctrinate social behavior, to homogenize conditions for communication and research, and so on. For instance, the ocean as a large body of liquid water exists whether we exist or not, independent of whatever meaning or function we might apply to it, but the meanings that we apply to the ocean will define its existence within our view of reality and, therefore, will define reality as we know it.

This notion of discourse also doesn't dismiss the human capacity for critical thinking and ability to question rules and indoctrination, as well as to adapt to new situations that require new or modified significations; in fact this break of *habitus*¹ happens frequently, but is only possible through power struggles for the possession of meaning within discourse. This leads us to the question of who controls these sets of rules and the relations of power that come with these constraints, which we will come to in depth later on in this section of this thesis. First, it's important to understand other definitions that come with the notions of 'discourse' described previously, so that we can codify the structure of discourse and analyze the journalistic reports selected for this research in a systematic fashion concerning linguistic, cognitive and sociocultural aspects of discourse.

The Foucauldian definition of *statement* described earlier can be related to what van Dijk defines as *proposition*, one of the main elements of discourse, "the smallest, independent meaning constructs of language and thought" that may be "used to denote facts" (van Dijk 1988, 31), as in the case of news reports. According to van Dijk's CDA approach, these propositions are organized within discourse in 'sets' or *macrostructures* that are "expressed indirectly by longer stretches of talk or text" and carry within them global meanings or global propositions that van Dijk calls *macropropositions* (van Dijk 1988, 32). For instance, these macropropositions may be located within the journalistic discourse in the headlines of news reports, but not necessarily. The connection between propositions and macropropositions within discourse is done through "semantic mapping rules" called *macrorules* that "define the upshot, gist, most important information, and hence the theme or topic for each

¹ *Habitus* is Bourdieu's notion that "individuals' predispositions, assumptions, judgments, and behaviors are the result of a long term process of socialization, most importantly in the family, and secondarily, via primary, secondary and professional education." (McCombs, 2006, 3).

sequence of propositions of a text” (van Dijk 1988, 32). As van Dijk already demonstrated extensively through his analysis of several news reports, although these macrorules are indeed subjective, the step-by-step process of (1) deletion of irrelevant or ‘minor’ information, (2) generalization of subjects or facts and (3) construction of a textual topic are important mapping semantic rules that allow us to detect the propositions and macropropositions of a journalistic text, or the most important assertions of any text (van Dijk 1988).

Besides the identification of these elements in the composition of a discourse, other main aspects of a text have to be considered during the CDA inspired process of analysis, mainly:

- The *Style* chosen for the text: “the result of the choices made by the speaker among optional variations in discourse forms that may be used to express more or less the same thing” (van Dijk 1988, 27);
- *Rhetoric*: “deals with the persuasive dimension of language use” (van Dijk 1988, 28);
- The journalistic *Schemata*: the “overall organizational patterns, consisting (...) of a number of conventional categories, such as various forms of Opening and Closing a discourse, a Setting in story, or Headlines in news discourse” (van Dijk 1988, 26–27);
- The *sources* and *keywords* assessed during the reading of the text.

Perhaps it is necessary to address with more caution the rhetorical aspect of discourse, since the concept of rhetoric is widely misused. The *perlocutionary* effects or persuasion strategies in journalistic discourse go beyond the immediate use of comparisons, metaphors, irony or other figures of speech. Van Dijk argues that the strategies of persuasion in news discourse tend to follow the basic cognitive conditions of effective information processing, connected to the ideological preconditions of the journalistic discursive field. According to van Dijk (1988, 84–85), in order for a report to be ‘effective’ or ‘convincing’, it has to (1) “emphasize the factual nature of events” (van Dijk 1988, 84) by direct descriptions, using evidence from witnesses and credible sources, and indicating numbers that imply precision; (2) “build a strong relational structure for facts” (van Dijk 1988, 84) by mentioning previous causes and predicting future consequences for what is being reported, relating the facts to common references of the reader while using well-known

concepts, and organizing facts in narrative structures; (3) and “provide information that also has an attitudinal and emotional dimension” (van Dijk 1988, 84), since events are better memorized if they provoke stronger emotional reactions. Van Dijk also points out that the “truthfulness of events is enhanced when opinions of different backgrounds or ideologies are quoted about such events”, with more attention and credibility given to the ones that are ideologically closer to the imagined audience (van Dijk 1988, 84–85).

With these theoretical definitions and explanations in mind to guide us through discourse analysis of journalistic reports and articles, we can now reach a deeper approach towards the power struggles mentioned before within the journalistic discourse and how the relationship between text and context takes place in the journalistic schemata, alongside with its general rhetorical strategies of convincement and its nature as a material reality.

In consonance with Eco’s definition of communication, Bourdieu defends that relations of communication are always “power relations which, in form and content, depend on the material and symbolic power accumulated by the agents (or institutions) involved in these relations and which (...) can enable symbolic power to be accumulated” (Bourdieu 2003, 167). This notion partially explains why the journalistic discourse is taken as more valuable than other textual accounts of the facts and its essential impact in the construction of common sense. The public recognition of journalistic competence relies on the legitimization of its discourse through the use of productive methodologies and the exercise of ideological beliefs within its field – sets of presuppositions that organize journalistic action, or Bourdieu’s notion of *Doxa* (Benson and Neveu 2005a, 3) – intended to build an apparent neutrality within the journalistic discourse that is supposed to simply promote ‘information’ in the case of news reports and ‘debate’ or ‘clarification’ in the case of editorial, analytical or ‘opinion’ articles, exercising the symbolic power of the institution and field of knowledge to which the agent/journalist belongs.

Bourdieu argues that any social relation is a symbolic communicative interaction that implies cognition and recognition as well as the exchange of symbolic power, while the structures of the linguistic *market* impose themselves “as a system of specific sanctions and censorships” that manifest through “socially constructed dispositions of the linguistic habitus” and the “social capacity to use this competence adequately in a determinate situation” (Bourdieu 2003, 37). The source of symbolic

efficacy of a discourse lies in the relationship between the linguistic properties of discourse and the properties of the institution that authorizes someone to construct and emanate such discourse, as well as the cultural or political ‘credibility’ granted to the agent by social definitions of *competence*. In the struggle to impose the legitimate vision of reality, “agents possess power in proportion to their symbolic capital, i.e. in proportion to the recognition they receive from a group” (Bourdieu 2003, 106). Therefore, the act of *naming* – or building/endorsing concepts meant to explain or define aspects of reality, such as the concept of humanitarian intervention – can structure our perceptions of the facts within the social world depending also on the social function of the speaker/writer.

Foucault’s approach towards knowledge raises different questions concerning the power struggles provoked by and within the journalistic discourse. As Lounasmeri explains, when addressing knowledge in society, Foucault defends that “in every society there is a system of truth; a general politics of truth which defines knowledge as true or false. (...) In relation to this, Foucault speaks of discourses as tactical elements or accumulations in a field of power relations” (Lounasmeri 2006, 3). It is almost inevitable to think of journalism as one of these systems of truth, with its power to legitimize certain voices and ideas at the expense of others. As van Dijk points out, the very value of *newsworthiness* – what makes something worthy of being included as ‘news’ in the journalistic discourse – activates implicit and explicit collective *scripts* that appeal to our stereotypical knowledge of actions and events in social life, therefore promoting consonance and conformity with socially-shared values and attitudes:

News reports do not necessarily prescribe the concrete opinions of readers. Rather, they are the main form of public discourse that provides the general outline of social, political, cultural, and economic models of societal events, as well as the pervasively dominant knowledge and attitude structures that make such models intelligible. The structure of news reports at many levels conditions the readers to develop such interpretation frameworks rather than alternative ones, in which other goals, norms, values, and ideologies are used to provide counterinterpretations of news events. (van Dijk 1988, 182)

Concerning our research, in terms of discursive elements, context and symbolic power, we can now use the theoretical background exposed so far to synthesize our understanding of the use of the term humanitarian intervention within the journalistic discourse and its implications – which will be enhanced or refuted during the exposure of the results of this thesis. With the creation of this term, the traditional meaning of an intervention in the military sense as it is usually presented in news reports and political discourse shifted to a purpose that goes beyond the military and political purposes, an intervention that has now the specific goal to be humanitarian, that is, according to Holzgrefe's and Keohane's definition presented in our *Introduction*, to protect through the use of international 'force' the *human rights*² of endangered individuals within either oppressive or lenient political regimes.

This shift in meaning, or the addition of the military function as another possible form of humanitarian action in itself, could only be possible and accepted by common sense, this thesis argues, if the justifications for such a military operation in these terms were also legitimized by the journalistic discourse – a self-proclaimed and symbolically recognized 'system of truth' – using similar macropropositions throughout its reports and articles to endorse the international necessity or responsibility to protect and prevent, regardless of the controversies it might present through diverging voices within texts. The material reality of the journalistic discourse has to present *humanitarian intervention* as a viable concept in order for the readers to accept it as part of the symbolic status quo, even if it implies controversy. But the connection between the journalistic discourse's material reality and the readers' cognitive reception and reaction is still pending here in theoretical depth, so we shall address this connection more profoundly on the next section.

2.2 Journalistic Field, Public Opinion and Public Sphere

(...) the power of a discourse depends less on its intrinsic properties than on the mobilizing power it exercises – that is, at least to some

² *Human rights* is also a concept that has instigated debate regarding its definition – which rights are so fundamental that they deserve to be considered human rights, that is, the fundamental rights of every individual, regardless to which political or legal system they are connected through state citizenship or group ideology. This debate is extremely important and deserves extensive research, but is secondary to this thesis and, therefore, will not be addressed here to prevent us from losing focus.

extent, on the degree to which it is recognized by a numerous and powerful group that can recognize itself in it and whose interests it expresses (in a more or less transfigured and unrecognizable form). (Bourdieu 2003, 188)

We have already argued that the classification of facts as newsworthy within the journalistic discourse can influence our perceptions when it directs our attention and emotions towards specific issues in spite of others. But precisely why and how this influence is possible should now be the focus of our discussion.

McCombs' *Theory of Agenda-setting*³ defines the *agenda-setting* role of the news media as “their influence on the salience of an issue, an influence on whether any significant number of people really regards it as worthwhile to hold an opinion about the issue” (McCombs 2006, 2). After analyzing the journalistic coverage of elections and other major political events, McCombs came to the conclusion that the main strategic tool within the journalistic field that is able to provoke the *salience* of specific topics in public discourse has to do not only with the selection of the ‘most important’ news, but with the combination of a constant *repetition* of these topics in daily journalistic coverage and the *personal relevance* of such topics regarding the members of a perceived audience. Since receptors of media messages are not mere puppets of a specific form of discursive knowledge and will not simply assimilate any assumptions presented by news reports, the “frequency of coverage in the news media is part of the explanation for agenda-setting effects, but only in tandem with the psychological relevance of items on the media agenda to members of the public” (McCombs 2006, 59–60).

Regarding some topics as *obtrusive* – directly experienced by the audience – and *unobtrusive* – only encountered through the news discourse, such as meetings between prime ministers or the results of astrophysics research –, he defends that obtrusive issues can already be signified in many ways by the personal experience of individuals, requiring “a low need for any additional orientation, a circumstance that predicts low correlations between the media agenda and the public agenda” (McCombs 2006, 62), but for orientation concerning unobtrusive issues that cannot be sufficiently signified or grasped by common personal experience, the media discourse

³ The *Theory of Agenda-setting*, supported by McCombs, claims that the news media has the ability to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda, therefore having direct impact on public opinion and guiding the main issues of debate within public discourse (McCombs, 2006).

becomes “commonly the primary source of orientation, the source to which people turn to reduce their uncertainty” (McCombs 2006, 62). Following this logic, we can conclude that unobtrusive topics are “more likely to move from the media agenda to the public agenda” (McCombs 2006, 66), with the degree of media influence enhanced by the lack of knowledge or personal experience of the audience in relation to the issues addressed. Transposing this theory to our research, it is acceptable to place the concept of humanitarian intervention within the classification of unobtrusive topics, since the definition of this concept implies a procedure that is supposed to take place in ‘foreign’ unstable territories, out of the immediate personal reach of the majority of targeted readers. The process of decision-making involved in this procedure also occurs far from the reach of most individuals. With the discussion based on an unobtrusive topic, the journalistic discourse has better chances to influence public discourse in terms of endorsing or refuting the concept of humanitarian intervention, as well as its justifications or criticism. The salience of this topic becomes plausible, alongside its legitimization as a viable and palpable idea, in alignment with the activation of collective, stereotypical, emotionally charged cognitive images such as good and evil, tyranny and democracy, justice and genocide, freedom and oppression.

It is important, however, to differentiate the idea of salience from our definition of *sustentation*, cited previously in this thesis’ *Introduction*, since it is an important notion that should guide at least one of our main empirical questions. Surely the sustentation of a concept within the journalistic discourse depends on its salience in McCombs’ terms as its influence in public discourse becomes more effective and lasting, however this research argues that a concept is sustained within the journalistic discourse not only on the basis of prominence or insistence combined with personal relevance, but also and mainly on the basis of signification – in other words, a concept receives sustentation in the news discourse when meaning and intent are applied to it through a consistent pattern of macropropositions and discursive goals presented to the reader in implicit or explicit forms, enabling it to be consistently signified within the public sphere in a specific framing.

To better understand the connection between the journalistic discourse’s material reality and the readers’ cognitive reception, it is essential to address in more detail the correlation between journalism as a field of knowledge and the

contemporary notions of public discourse, which together are part of this theoretical social structure commonly referred to as public sphere.

Bourdieu defines a 'field' of knowledge as a configuration of forces "within which agents occupy positions that statistically determine the positions they take with respect to the field, these position-takings being aimed either at conserving or transforming the structure of relations of forces that is constitutive of the field" (Bourdieu, 2005, 30). Following Bourdieu's definition of field, Champagne contrasts this argument against journalism's alleged constant search for intellectual autonomy, claiming that there is "on the one hand, the strictly political requirements of press outlets (...); on the other, the increasingly strong relations which connect them to the real or imagined expectations of the public from which, in the last instance, they earn their living", condemning journalists to work under political and economic constraints (Champagne 2005, 50). Darras points to the idea of professional recognition within the journalistic field, which he believes is directly related to the journalist's proximity to "power, address book and the 'big interviews' that can be flourished against peers as well as bosses. (...) The 'top' politicians produce the authority and legitimacy of the 'top' interviewers, and vice versa" (Darras 2005, 167). We can maybe add to the ingredients of recognition the experience accumulated in the field as a confirmation of versatility and professionalism, specially if this experience is accompanied by hardships and risks – we can think of the professional recognition given to war correspondents, for instance. Schudson, however, in a less pessimistic view of the journalistic field, defends that the 'nonautonomous environment', the fact that journalists are "daily or weekly exposed to the disappointment and criticism of their sources (in the political field) and their public (whose disapproval may be demonstrated economically as readers cancel subscriptions or viewers change channels)" is precisely what keeps journalism capable of constant change and evolution (Schudson 2005, 219). Schudson also defies sociologists by saying that they "typically and unaccountably" forget about journalism's "dependence not on the state or the market but on the drama of events that neither state nor market nor journalists can fully or even approximately anticipate or control", events that are initially beyond the control of the "established power" (Schudson 2005, 219). Finally, Schudson defies Bourdieu directly by asking: "Does Bourdieu actually use the concept of field to genuinely break from deterministic thinking? Or is 'field' only a kind of screen for an underlying reductionism?" (Schudson 2005, 222).

Although this research agrees with Schudson's criticism towards Bourdieu's *Field Theory* applied to journalism, since this theory disregards the journalistic dependence on the 'drama of events', and with Schudson's argument that the constant disapproval of market and state can be forces of discourse change and adaptation, we cannot ignore the fact that every form of communication is replete with intentionality, including journalism. And even though "the facts and events gain meaning in the very moment that they are announced and, posteriorly, when borrowed by reception" (Becker 2005, translation) – which makes impossible and naïve the common claim that journalism simply 'manipulates' minds – this intentionality exists and has to be addressed.

One of the ways that we can discuss intentionality in journalism is through the analysis of *news framing*, or the framing of events, a concept that we only mentioned earlier. According to Lecheler and Vreese, a frame "can affect an individual by stressing certain aspects of reality and pushing others into the background – it has a selective function. In this way, certain issue attributes, judgments, and decisions are suggested" (Lecheler and Vreese 2012, 186). While conducting a survey experiment among a representative sample of citizens in the Netherlands, they tested the framing effects on opinion concerning the 2007 enlargement of the European Union, with Bulgaria and Romania as the newest members of the block. Defining as *belief importance* the personal weight given to particular considerations – in this case, the framing effect would not alter beliefs, but increase the weight given to certain beliefs – and as *belief content* the addition of new beliefs to an individual's set of ideas, Lecheler and Vreese concluded that "belief importance mattered a great deal (...). However, belief content was surprisingly influential (...)" (2012, 195). The results showed that "politically knowledgeable participants are framed to a greater extent via belief content" (Lecheler and Vreese 2012, 195–196), instead of via belief importance, contradicting expectations. Although other researches are needed to consider this result as an academic consensus – results may vary depending on the country and the local public approach towards the meaning and function of journalism, for instance –, this result has to be taken into consideration and is extremely relevant to this master thesis, since it proved possible at least among this selected sample of Dutch citizens that the introduction of new ideas and concepts is possible through their contact and interaction with journalistic discourse, in an even greater extent than it would be intuitively assumed.

After having an idea of why and how this intellectual influence occurs, we should now ask: what would be the intentions of this influence, if they are actually conscious and can be analyzed within a pattern? While explaining Fairclough's (2001) definition of discourse as social practice and a product of social interaction and struggle, Birks describes the intertextuality of the journalistic discourse as an evident site for the enactment of social relations, where common beliefs among journalists, sources and audience are presupposed – the imagined 'common sense' – and the opinions of people are simulated, suggesting a strong downside to the news discourse's pretension to be an echo chamber for the public:

Hegemonically, such notions of 'common-sense' can serve to reproduce existing power relations by encouraging people to see dominant values as their own, but the power of the newspaper in claiming to represent and speak for publics is furthermore perpetuated by reproducing a 'common sense' notion of citizens as powerless and passive. (Birks 2010, 54)

It is not impossible for mainstream journalistic discourse to be sympathetic towards structural political and social change, as well as to present macropropositions within news reports that actually encourage civic action, therefore to label journalists as 'perpetuators of the status quo', as Birks seems to imply, is viewed by this thesis as highly reductive. However, we should acknowledge that the journalistic discourse's attempt to present itself as a mirror of public opinion can indeed serve as a possible tool to direct the public discourse towards specific framings and, in the last instance, specific interests.

One of the best examples of this possibility is the use of polls and statistics to define public opinion within the journalistic discourse and to legitimize certain points of view at the expense of others. Stephens (2012) argues that public opinion – an imagined set of socially shared values within a population – and mass opinion – what is measured by polls – are two different things that don't really exist as objective, unambiguous phenomena, which would make the use of polls and statistics to present public opinion as very questionable resources of information. But Stephens also emphasizes that this ambiguity is "hardly the same as saying that they [public opinion and mass opinion] do not exist at all" (Stephens 2012, 222). The problem here is not whether these two concepts can actually be regarded as real phenomena, but the use

of polls and statistics also as framing structures that could influence the comprehension of reality while claiming to reflect the ‘will of the people’, or the will of the majority. Splichal also questioned throughout his academic works the use of polls and the idea of public opinion within the journalistic discourse or, in other words, the presentation by the news media of specific views and interests as the *public* interest through the use of questionnaires of selected samples of the population. Splichal calls for attention towards the struggle for public opinion within the journalistic discourse, or “for individuals who will embrace the expressed or published opinion as their own and/or will present it as their own opinion” (Splichal 2010, 9).

It seems too soon to discuss any further the alleged intentions of the journalistic discourse in influencing beliefs at this point in this research, since we need to first analyze the journalistic reports selected to come to any conclusion concerning these claims. The very question asked earlier in this discussion – what would be the intentions of this influence – might just be a rhetorical question, since it might be impossible to list a clear set of intentions that could be universally credited to the journalistic discourse, and in this case the question would only be a subterfuge for our own assumptions of what these intentions could be. So we should now move on to a relationship that in a way is one of the core discussions in this master thesis and the last issue that we must address: the relationship between the so-called international press and foreign policy making, a set of forces that are crucial to the definition of humanitarian intervention and its implications within public discourse.

2.3 Global Journalism and International Affairs

The existence of transnational media outlets with international correspondents and newsrooms allocated in different parts of the world has incited the idea of an international press or a ‘global journalism’, an extension of journalistic activities such as production, edition and distribution/broadcasting to beyond national territories (Hafez 2007; 2011). However, academic research approaches this concept as extremely problematic, since the transnationalization of media organizations does not necessarily result in intertextual contents capable of producing diverse propositions that interact with each other and trespass national agendas and predictable

representations (Hafez 2011), mostly failing to produce diverse dialogical news narratives and, therefore, hardly revealing itself as truly 'global'. Hafez points out that the "mainstream mass media around the world sometimes construct an identical media agenda, but they frame events according to their own home-grown narratives" (Hafez 2011, 486), showing that the exchange of information among internationally allocated journalists and newsrooms is "no guarantee for global intertextuality in news, for a growing awareness of the other's stories and perspectives or for more complexity in the mass media's world views" (Hafez 2011, 486). International news coverage as it is nowadays can be identified as highly focused on political issues and crises, with a reductionary approach that limits the world "to tiny bits of event-centered information" that lead to "enormous fragmentation, de-contextualization and a dangerous loss of complexity" (Hafez 2011, 485), with the rare efforts to broaden the scope of news mostly unable to present different framings with the same legitimization as the ones that are predominant within national or regional journalistic traditions. What exists in the current journalistic coverage of global affairs are, at best, "various zones of transnationality, a western, an American, a European, Muslim, Arab or whatever sphere, with different narratives, frames, master-frames of the same story and often completely divergent definitions of what Daniel Hallin called 'legitimate controversy'" (Hafez 2011, 486–487). The journalistic susceptibility to patriotism and nationally oriented agendas, allied to the journalists' own stereotypes and very often lack of qualification in international affairs, results in "peripheral spheres of news attention" and a likely excessive focus on Western matters (Hafez 2011, 485).

As Hafez points out, we can also associate the fragmentation of 'global journalism' into several national or regional agendas to the journalistic codes of ethics' general lack of attention towards issues that are essential to journalistic intertextuality in the contemporary globalized world, and understand why transnational media organizations composed by professionals with highly diverse backgrounds are still nowadays often "agents of patriotic emotions" and biases (Hafez 2011, 489). Another issue is the way journalists perceive the roles of their own profession, which varies depending on the journalistic tradition in each country, making it impossible to claim a "coherent global journalistic profession" (Gravengaard 2012, 1066). It is reasonable to argue that a coherent globally accepted media agenda is highly unlikely since different national sociopolitical and economic

contexts request different media ‘predilections’ for certain issues (Hafez 2011) such as terrorism and territorial disputes, but the scarce interaction between transnational journalistic discourses and the dialogical incapability that reduces the foreign framing to the position of ‘the biased other’ result often in the prioritization of framings coming from media organizations that have the biggest influence on the international media market.

Taking these paradigms into consideration, we have to keep in mind that this master thesis’ notion of ‘international press’ is not a naïve sense of a globally contextualized and interchangeable journalistic set of discourses present in ‘global’ newspapers, but solely a reference to the newspapers that are transnationally produced and internationally consumed, while still very much conditioned to national and regional biases and traditions.

Another important discussion concerning globalization and the consumption of transnationally produced journalistic discourse is the alleged media influence on foreign policy and its implications for international affairs and public opinion, and vice-versa – an essential discussion for this thesis’ analysis of the international news coverage of humanitarian interventions. The *CNN Effect* theory – initially “suggested and articulated by politicians and officials haunted by the Vietnam media myth [that negative CNN coverage of the Vietnam War partially caused the American defeat], the confusion of the post-Cold War era, and the communication revolution” (Gilboa 2002, 735) – defends that transnational media outlets, specially 24-hour television news channels, have the power to influence foreign policy during severe crisis through its constant exposition of the facts within specific framings and the exploitation of emotionally charged images and assertions. However, research suggests that this power of influence is limited, including in the case of foreign interventions, since it is notorious that “if a government wants to intervene, it may need global coverage of atrocities to justify its policy, but usually coverage alone is insufficient to impose intervention on policy makers” (Gilboa 2002, 735). In other words, the media influence in public discourse is not an immediate force of appropriation of political power. Or, as Hafez argues, “the media are able to influence foreign policy opinion only to the degree that they do not contradict core values that exist within populations (...)” (Hafez 2011, 489), suggesting that the news discourse can be at the same time defiant towards government policy and docile towards

political consensus, which would diminish its power of political influence in public policy.

So to what extent can the news discourse influence foreign policy, and vice-versa, including in the case of humanitarian interventions? Hafez skeptically believes that the media influence in this case is inversely proportional to the scope of the political crisis (Hafez 2011), contradicting the *CNN Effect* theory. On the other hand, Seo points to the possibility of news discourse as “an accelerant of foreign policy decision-making, demanding fast responses from politicians to feed their news cycle (...)” (Seo 2011, 471). As a form of two-ways agenda setting influence, “the lack of direct communications between parties in international negotiations would also increase the influence of the media in public affairs, since officials would use the media to deliver messages and test proposals to the parties involved” (Seo 2011, 471).

Also, Gabay and Sheaffer argue that media attention as a limited resource in the political communications arena implies competition for political discourse domination within two dimensions: the access to the media and the control of media framing, or the competition for “agenda building” and “frame building”, with the media content as “the dependent variable in both dimensions” (Gabay and Sheaffer 2009, 448). The competition for these two dimensions of media discourse implies the power struggle for dominance over “the promotion of a particular problem definition, identifying cause (attribution of responsibility), moral judgment, and endorsing remedies of improvements (treatment recommendation)” (Gabay and Sheaffer 2009, 449). The limited access of reporters to relevant information coming from politicians would also play a part in the political struggle for dominance over agenda and frame building within the journalistic coverage of international affairs, according to some of the journalists themselves, interviewed during Seo’s survey conducted among reporters who covered the ‘six-party talks’ on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions from 2003 to 2011 (Seo 2011).

Gilboa summarizes this discussion by depicting media discourse as both an actor and a tool in the political communications arena:

(...) global communication may participate in the policy process in different capacities from acting as a controlling actor to being a tool in the hands of leaders. The evidence (...) indicates that, although the CNN Effect, defined in terms of decision makers’ loss of control, has not been sufficiently validated, global communication

is increasingly becoming a source of rapid real-time information for policy makers; has accelerated the pace of diplomatic communication; and has focused world attention on crises in places such as Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo. The speed of global communication has applied pressure on policy makers and foreign policy experts to respond even faster to world events while also allowing them to send significant messages that, in turn, have affected the outcomes of these events (Gilboa 2002, 743).

With this discussion in mind, associated with the various definitions and theories exposed in this chapter so far, we can now say we've put together the theoretical background necessary to build the main research questions that will guide our investigation and provide the focus of this master thesis, which is to broaden our understanding of the sustentation of the concept of humanitarian intervention within what we might still call the 'international press' despite the academic controversies.

2.4 Research questions

After analyzing the mechanisms of news framing, agenda setting effects, newsworthiness and symbolic power, perhaps we might already come to the conclusion that one of the biggest myths concerning the journalistic discourse is the *objectivity* of its news reports – the complete absence of intentionality. It goes without saying that facts and events can be disclosed in many different ways depending on how they are approached, which means that there is no such thing as one single version of the truth, but many 'truths' that can be told, or many possible interpretations of the facts that can or cannot be equally plausible. But the conclusion that journalism is not fully objective and acts partially as a constructor of reality can sometimes lead some scholars and even journalists to the simplistic notion that journalism's main goal is to manipulate minds – as if it was possible for any kind of communication among human beings not to be replete with intentions and strategies of persuasion. Machado reminds us that, as 'closed' as a report may be, there's always enough room for ambiguity, and the same news report can be interpreted in many different ways (Machado 2003). Regarding the readers as puppets of the media is an

extremely perverse logic that disregards the human capability of critical thinking. Therefore, this master thesis does not nearly suggest that the journalistic discourse simply intends to ‘manipulate’ people into supporting humanitarian interventions. What it wants to prove is that a concept can gain meaning and strength – and, therefore, receive sustenance – in the public sphere when it is constantly pursued in the international press within specific framings. This leads us to this research’s first main empirical question:

RQ1: What are the mechanisms that sustain the concept of *humanitarian intervention* in the international press?

Discourses, according to CDA’s approach, are not merely expressions of social practice or just a reflection of reality, since they can at the same time serve particular ends and enable social reality itself. It means that discourse cannot be reduced to a reproduction or a distortion of reality: it is “a material reality of its own. (...) it is thus not the subject who makes the discourses, but the discourses that make the subject (...). The subject is of interest not as an actor, but as a product of discourses” (Jäger and Maier 2009, 37). On the other hand, since the subject is a product of discourse, it is also possible to affirm that if people pull back from that discourse, “this part of reality becomes meaningless (...). If the knowledge assigned to a particular part of reality changes, this part of reality turns into a different thing” (Jäger and Maier 2009, 40). Using this approach specifically towards journalistic discourse, this research intends to prove that it is possible to identify a pattern of *macropropositions* (van Dijk 2009) and discursive goals in reports and articles in the international press whenever humanitarian intervention is the main subject, and that this pattern offers sustentation to the very concept of humanitarian intervention, therefore enabling it to be signified within the public sphere. Through the analysis of the selected texts regarding the interventions in Kosovo and Libya, this master thesis believes it will be possible to detect important directive assertions and framings around the discursive constructions that were present in the reporting of these military operations, such as the profiling of the enemy and the victim within the conflicts; the massacre of civilians as justification for intervention; the necessity of post-conflict state building; the moral duty of the West to avoid genocide even through military means and the *responsibility to protect*; the alleged disrespect towards state

sovereignty; and other possible discursive claims. It is important to emphasize that this master thesis does not intend to make value judgments concerning any discursive construction found during research. It aims at revealing how these constructions take place in the journalistic discourse and how they serve as mechanisms that produce relevance and meaning for the concept of humanitarian intervention, while possibly reproducing existing power struggles both within this field of knowledge and among all actors involved in these interventions.

This research's second main empirical question has to do with the debates concerning the legitimacy of this concept:

RQ2: What are the predominant macropropositions found within the selected reports and articles?

By recognizing the different paradigms around the implementation of humanitarian interventions in the cases of Kosovo and Libya, and through the analysis of the international news reports and articles concerning this subject, this master thesis intends to expose how the journalistic discourse played an important role in the public justification and refutation of these interventions, using real happenings – or ‘facts’ – to produce ‘stories’ and ‘characters’ that construct specific argumentations capable of shaping our understanding of reality, exercising the preconceived notion of journalistic objectivity as a validation tool that gives credibility to the stories that are told. Although the idea of impartiality is already highly questioned by the public in general when it comes to journalistic discourse, the alleged constant pursuit of objectivity claimed by journalists – justified by professional procedures that are meant to give truthfulness to their speech, such as fact-checking, diversity of sources, use of independent data, and so on – confers a discursive strength that differentiates their reports from other textual accounts of the facts, therefore helping to sustain principles that define *reality* in different ways. This master thesis wants to know if those principles sustained in the journalistic texts selected constitute a pattern of predominant propositions and macropositions that can be identified and exposed through the method of Critical Discourse Analysis. The possible patterns found while answering this secondary research question will be used to answer the first and main one listed before.

3 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

To understand the essential historical accounts and main controversies behind the humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and Libya within the journalistic discourse, we have to first leave the theoretical discussions around cognitive and linguistic spheres aside for a moment and expose the fundamental aspects of these interventions' contextual backgrounds, as well as their known practical consequences depending on the case specified. Weiss is cited as a main reference for such reflections, with Chandler, DiPrizio, Kinsman and Lacher also cited as additional sources, as well as Spektor's piece for *Americas Quarterly* (2012) as an example of an alternative point of view on humanitarian interventions. Reports from *The New York Times*, Reuters and the BBC are cited as additional sources of event-related information.

3.1 Defining *Humanitarian Intervention*

Although the current ethical justification for humanitarian intervention lies mostly on the concept known as *responsibility to protect* (R2P)⁴, generated by an acclaimed report with the same name from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, references of foreign military interventions with humanitarian justifications can be found in international legal literature since the nineteenth century. According to Weiss (2012, 35), the first intervention taken as reference happened in Greece in 1827, where England, France and Russia intervened to stop Turkish forces from killing Greek insurgents. The second one, again according to Weiss (2012), took place around three decades later in Syria, where France intervened to protect Maronite Christians from persecution and mass murder, and other three military interventions by European countries were enforced in Crete and the Balkans from 1866 to 1908. Intervention in those periods was justified to prevent a state's abuse of its sovereignty by cruelty against nationals and non-nationals within its jurisdiction, and any state or group of states could take action and intervene militarily (Weiss 2012, 35–36). However, the humanitarian justification for these early cases of intervention is currently treated with skepticism

⁴ See Introduction, page 5.

and suspicion, with critics arguing that humanitarian principles were used for “paternalistic purposes” and for the exercise of power towards strategic goals (Weiss 2012, 36). The routine use of military interventions with the approval of the so-called international community to stop large-scale human tragedy is considered a development of the post-Cold War era, since during that time most states were reluctant towards collective military interference in fear of causing power imbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union, or of worsening their several international disputes (Weiss 2012).

The Charter of the United Nations currently determines that, while “all [UN] members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” (Charter of the United Nations, Art. 02), international military intervention is legal and justifiable if invoked by the UN Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security, according to chapter VII of the same charter – considered the main legal basis for humanitarian interventions. The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the Rome Statute (which was adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2002) broadened the possibility of international intervention within affairs that transposed local boundaries if perceived as threats to international peace and security. Finally, the UN also differentiates between this kind of intervention and *humanitarian assistance*, which is defined by the General Assembly in Resolution 46/182 as an action that must be provided with the consent of the affected country.

Weiss points out that the alleged prominence of humanitarian motives to justify military intervention without the consent of the targeted state can be observed in nine cases from the 1990s: Liberia, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor (Weiss 2012, 46). Although the application of humanitarian intervention in these different scenarios and subsequent discussions and determinations – such as the creation of the ICC – further specified and expanded the meanings of what constituted ‘threats to peace and security’ or ‘humanitarian motives’, these reflections and measures didn’t prevent severe discrepancies in form and ultimate results regarding these very cases of 1990s intervention, if you compare for instance, as Weiss does, the scope of the actions taken in East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone with the inaction concerning Rwanda’s genocide (Weiss 2012, 51). The Kosovo case is especially controversial and stands out from other humanitarian interventions, as we will analyze in the next pages, and the 2011 intervention in Libya

also fits the category of international military intervention on humanitarian grounds, as we will see further in this thesis' chapter.

According to the 2001 ICISS report, only genocide and large-scale forced territorial displacement of communities constitute humanitarian justification for international military intervention with humanitarian motives and goals, and “while the ethical humanitarian rationale need not to be exclusive or even foremost, it should be explicit and prominent” (Weiss 2012, 8) to justify such interventions. It goes without saying that claims behind humanitarian interventions are usually mixed among various legitimate interests from states that choose to intervene, but the protection of war victims can only be used as a valid motive for interventions, according to current legal and diplomatic understandings of such procedures, if the humanitarian rationale is prominent (Weiss 2012, 7).

Proceedings surrounding the implementation of humanitarian interventions have expanded in scope since the end of the twentieth century, including several post-conflict actions such as the promotion of democratic institutions, which leads to the necessity of long-term commitment by states willing to intervene (Weiss 2012). Another issue is the fundamental contradiction between military force and “the traditional humanitarian principles of independent, neutral, and impartial provision of relief to victims of conflict and natural disasters” (Weiss 2012, 91), which questions humanitarian intervention as a valid emergency policy. Weiss calls out the political conditionals behind the R2P concept and the alleged humanitarian imperative that seems to have appeared upon all countries since its assimilation:

Many would have us believe in the humanitarian ‘imperative’, the obligation to treat affected populations similarly and react to crises consistently; but such a notion flies in the face of politics, which consists of drawing lines as well as weighing options and available resources in order to make tough decisions about doing the greatest good or the least harm (Weiss 2012, 95).

A number of countries, such as China and Russia, have expressed several concerns over the possibility of the use of proclaimed humanitarian goals as excuses for the pursuit of illegitimate interests through humanitarian interventions, such as the appropriation of natural resources or the undermining of a state's sovereignty. Other countries, such as Brazil, understand that “if humanitarian interventions in the future

are loosely regulated and big power coalitions intervene as they please, then R2P will divide the international community between north and south, rich and poor, strong and weak” (Spektor 2012). Although clearer procedures and regulations for humanitarian interventions would indeed prevent the misuse of this operation, and geopolitical interests surely cannot be the main forces behind this kind of military intervention, the inviolability of state sovereignty has already been largely questioned when the protection of human rights is considered. While there is little agreement among human rights advocates on which rights can be considered universal human rights, “all [advocates] agree that state-based political rights are not enough on their own” (Chandler 2006, 95), and there is a growing consensus that human rights should “transcend and subordinate national governments” (Chandler 2006, 89). The ICISS report argues that:

State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect (ICISS 2001, XI).

Weiss explains that “the ICISS mandate was build on this emerging understanding of the problem of intervention and state sovereignty and to find new common ground, or political consensus, about military intervention to support humanitarian objectives” (Weiss 2012, 107), as well as to emphasize the necessity to take preventive actions against humanitarian crisis and to engage in post-intervention collaboration. The legal foundation for state sovereignty originates from the Treaties of Westphalia in the seventeenth century, however this concept has been shaped and limited by international legal and diplomatic developments, such as the already mentioned Chapter VII of the UN Charter that affirms that sovereignty cannot prevent the Security Council from taking diplomatic or military action against what it considers threats to international peace and security. Although state sovereignty has been crucial for the proper functioning of diplomatic relations for centuries, the scope of state action permitted by international law and the possibility “to decide and act without intrusion from other sovereign states (...) is not unlimited; it depends on developments in international law (including agreements made voluntarily) and in international relations” (Weiss 2012, 16–17).

Notwithstanding, it seems simplistic for this master thesis to imply, as Weiss does at a certain point, that developing countries that express high concerns about the proceedings of humanitarian interventions do so because they have a ‘Westphalian’ notion of sovereignty due to post-colonization *sequelae* (Weiss 2012, 106). This dismissive approach ignores the very nature of the Security Council as a non-inclusive board of permanent members and its conceptual disconnect to the increasing multipolarity of the current state of international affairs. The Security Council includes a selected small number of states to which the UN Charter grants power to decide whether or not international military interventions should take place, so concern from developing countries over possible misuse of this procedure is indeed understandable, this thesis argues. Obviously, we have to also take into consideration for case-by-case analysis of foreign policy decisions the possible so-called *realpolitik* illegitimate motives behind eventual governments that apply indiscriminate or unconditional opposition to any consideration for international action in the face of clear widespread human rights violations by state forces, whether to please political allies involved as targets of intervention or to deliberately undermine multilateral institutions.

The proceedings of humanitarian intervention are constantly under construction and scrutiny due to these controversies – which take place within the journalistic discourse as well –, however it is already possible at this point not only to define the current concept of humanitarian intervention, but also to present its practical goals. As we mentioned in our *Introduction*, humanitarian intervention can be defined as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied” (Holzgreffe and Keohane 2003, 18). Its main direct goals as a military procedure are, according to Weiss:

- “Compelling compliance”: peacekeeping and demobilization of soldiers, destruction of weapons, formation and training of new armed forces and other similar strategies to deflate conflict and weaken the forces considered perpetrators of the atrocities, while empowering the alleged victims and forces of reaction (Weiss 2012, 10);

- “Providing protection”: protecting civilians through humanitarian corridors, protection of aid-convoys, among other procedures to ensure assistance to conflict victims (Weiss 2012, 10).

Every case of intervention is unique due to the specificities involved in each conflict, as well as the developments within each military procedure and the specific understandings of the concept of humanitarian intervention at the time of its implementation. Since we picked two cases of intervention to analyze, it is crucial now to address their idiosyncrasies and to acknowledge the basic aspects of each humanitarian military operation. The historical aspects of both interventions will be exposed here with an introductory purpose, since this thesis is specifically targeted at the journalistic discourse produced concerning these interventions and so we should return to this focus shortly.

3.2 Intervention in Kosovo

The intervention in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999 represented the first time in NATO’s 50 years of existence that the council decided to wage war, which would turn out to be a bombing campaign of almost three months against Yugoslavia to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing in a territory that nowadays has its independence from Serbia only partially recognized (DiPrizio 2002; Weiss 2012).

Bordering Montenegro, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – and Serbia, if you consider Kosovo as an independent nation –, Kosovo was part of the Serbian state since the thirteenth century and was home to Serbia’s Orthodox Church for some time (DiPrizio 2002, 131), until it was conquered and occupied by the Ottoman Empire:

(...) in June 1389 Serbia lost the battle of Kosovo Polje against the invading Ottoman Empire, marking the beginning of the end of Serbia’s medieval state, which finally fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1459. Ottoman rule in Kosovo lasted until 1912, when Serbia regained control of the region from the ailing empire (DiPrizio 2002, 131).

Kosovo – which has Pristina as current capital – remained under dispute by different nations throughout World Wars I and II. In 1946, General Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia’s Communist leader, declared Kosovo an autonomous province of Serbia, granting Kosovar Albanians – which according to DiPrizio (2002) made up 90 percent of the region’s population of 2 million prior to the conflict that led to international military intervention in 1999 – legal protections and extensive control over their internal affairs, eventually leading the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 to grant Kosovo full autonomy, without the right to secede (DiPrizio 2002, 131–132).

After Tito’s death in 1980, ethnic tensions worsened among Yugoslav citizens, including in Kosovo. In April 1987, the Serbian League of Communists sent Serb politician Slobodan Milošević to Kosovo to try to calm down Serb activists who felt oppressed by the Kosovar local government – composed in its majority by ethnic Albanians. But as DiPrizio explains, what Milošević did instead was to portray himself as the protector of a victimized Serbian population while inflaming Serbian nationalism and starting to set the ground for an expansionist movement. He eventually became president of Serbia and abolished Kosovo’s autonomy, reducing it to an administrative region of the Serbian state. After Kosovo’s assembly was dissolved by Serbia in 1990, ethnic Albanian legislators created a parallel assembly and declared Kosovo’s independence through public referendum, which was only recognized by Albania (DiPrizio 2002, 132). In 1995, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started to orchestrate several low-level violent attacks against Serb police and state officials, which led to Serbian forces cracking down on the insurgents and carrying out raids against ethnic Albanians (DiPrizio 2002, 133). After more than 60 Serb policemen were killed by the KLA in 1998, the Serbian government sent an armed offensive that resulted in the murder of more than two thousand ethnic Albanians and the territorial displacement of 300.000 more (DiPrizio 2002, 133).

A few months after that, Milošević signed a cease-fire under threat of NATO air strikes, but the killing of ethnic Albanians by Serb forces didn’t stop. Both sides of the conflict met in Rambouillet, France, to sign a Western-authored peace agreement, however Milošević refused to accept the presence of foreign troops in Yugoslavia to provide security or the establishment of a democratic system of government in Kosovo, and in 1999 Serbian authorities drove thousands of Kosovar Albanians from

their villages, with some being executed and many houses burned during the military operation (DiPrizio 2002, 134).

NATO's air strikes in Yugoslavia started on the 24th of March 1999, killing up to two thousand people – mostly Serbs – and destroying significantly the country's infrastructure (DiPrizio 2002, 134). After around three months of air strikes, Serbia decided to accept NATO's demands. However, this military intervention was carried out without the official authorization of the UN Security Council (Legault 2000; DiPrizio 2002) and ignited a Serbian offensive that resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and the forced migration of more than a million ethnic Albanians, raising questions concerning the legality of this operation and its strategy:

Of course, much controversy surrounds what president Bill Clinton likes to call 'the first ever humanitarian war'. Did past events or likely future events in Kosovo justify such blatant transgression of Yugoslav sovereignty? Was the operation in accordance with international law? Did NATO's tactics – ruling out ground troops, a phased bombing plan, bombing from the relative safety of 15.000 feet, limiting collateral damage – extend the conflict and cause increased suffering for Kosovar Albanians? To what extent did NATO cause the massive displacement of Albanians? Did bombing win the war? (DiPrizio 2002, 130–131)

The debate concerning these aspects of NATO's operation goes on to this day, including within the journalistic discourse. What many specialists within the field of International Relations argue nowadays is that although there wasn't a legal authorization from the UN Security Council, "a combination of recent precedents of 'humanitarian intervention', a growing international concern for human rights and humanitarianism, and traditional *just war* rationale justified an intervention" in this case (DiPrizio 2002, 133–134). In other words, according to this line of thinking, the operation in Kosovo was supposedly illegal according to international law, but allegedly morally justified according theoretical precedents in international relations. While analyzing the journalistic texts selected for this research, we will try to see if these different aspects of the Kosovo intervention and divergent points of view surrounding it actually spilled into the writing of news reports – and if so, if there is any bias towards any specific framing of this military operation.

3.3 Intervention in Libya

The international military intervention that occurred in Libya in 2011, in contrary to the intervention in Kosovo in 1999, was officially authorized by the UN Security Council in an initiative that Weiss classifies as a “turning point in the post-9/11 intervention slump” and a possible “dawn of an era of R2P implementation” (Weiss 2012, 64). Not only the Security Council authorized all necessary measures against the Libyan government to stop its cracking down on protesters – such broad authorization by the UNSC against a member state was unprecedented in its history (Kinsman 2011) –, but also nine of the 22 members of the Arab League supported a no-fly zone over the North African nation (Weiss 2012, 64).

The current territory of Libya is a result of Italy’s colonization of three provinces with more than two hundred tribes and clans that were previously under Ottoman regency for more than three hundred years (Kinsman 2011, 82). Libya became an independent monarchy in 1951 after a brief period of UN post-war trusteeship, and in 1969 the then king of Libya, King Idris, was ousted by military officials who put Major Qaddafi in charge of the country, in what would turn out to be what Kinsman defined as an oil financed 42-year rule of fierce repression of the opposition and “personification of the state” (Kinsman 2011, 82–83).

Benghazi, which has been a historic center of dissent (Kinsman 2011), remained also the center of the revolt against Qaddafi during the Libyan civil war, and for that it was also a major target of government forces. After the killing of protesters that supported an activist arrested by the regime, dissent escalated fast and the rebels of Benghazi, called ‘Shabab’, took over the streets as well as police headquarters and local institutions (Kinsman 2011). Rebels began to organize the uprising and take over civic administration in what was the beginning of the Libyan Transitional Council, while insurrection was spreading as well as repression was increasing in other Libyan cities (Kinsman 2011).

Prior to the resolution that authorized military intervention in Libya, the UNSC imposed sanctions on Qaddafi and his inner circle of advisers, and called for an investigation from the International Criminal Court for war crimes by Qaddafi’s regime against Libyan civilians (The New York Times 2011, 26 February). According to Kinsman, after Qaddafi’s forces conquered back cities from the Libyan coast, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 authorizing intervention from the air to

defend civilians, and French aircraft quickly started taking down Libyan military targets, with the help of English and American missiles launched from the sea with the focus in the outskirts of Benghazi, as well as military forces from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and NATO – though the American role was allegedly more focused on aerial refueling and drone surveillance (Kinsman 2011). Ground war intensified towards the port city of Misrata, which also fell to the rebels, and ultimately anti-government fighters reached the capital Tripoli (Kinsman 2011). A month after the National Transitional Council was recognized by the United Nations as the legitimate representative institution of Libya, Qaddafi was captured by rebel forces and killed in the city of Sirte, after eight months of uprising (Reuters 2011, 20 October).

The removal of Qaddafi from power and the indirect consequence of his killing by rebels reignited controversies surrounding the implementation of humanitarian interventions and the concept of R2P:

(...) humanitarian intervention can backfire by escalating rebellion. This is because some substate groups believe that by violently provoking state retaliation, they can attract such intervention to help achieve their political objectives, including regime change. The resulting escalation, however, magnifies the threat to noncombatants before any potential intervention can protect them. Thus, the prospect of humanitarian intervention, which is intended to protect civilians, may instead imperil them via a moral hazard dynamic. To mitigate this pathology, it is essential to avoid intervening on humanitarian grounds in ways that reward rebels, unless the state is targeting noncombatants (Kuperman 2013, 2).

Until the writing of this thesis' chapter, events were still unfolding in relation to Libya's sociopolitical landscape after this war, with uncertainty concerning the role of militias and tribes in the post-Qaddafi era and the formation of functioning state institutions:

(...) Libya's political map has changed beyond recognition. Where before, few players and institutions seemed to matter outside the opaque informal networks and security apparatus centered around Muammar al-Qadhafi and his extended family, a multitude of actors has emerged to lead the revolution. With the regime's collapse,

power struggles among the heterogeneous coalition of revolutionary forces have intensified – including within the political leadership, the National Transitional Council (NTC). In addition, groups that were not part of the revolution are voicing their demands for a stake in the transitional process (Lacher 2011, 140).

Until the beginning of March 2015, Libya continued suffering from internal turmoil and political uncertainty. The UN Support Mission in Libya classified this moment as “a critical juncture” (UN News Centre 2015, 09 March) when dialogue between internal Libyan parties willing to negotiate solutions for the post-intervention crisis should be prioritized. An increasingly dangerous threat to Libya has been the destructive actions of the terrorist group called Islamic State (ISIS, or ISIL), which up until that date ceased important territories in Iraq and Syria and was suspected of promoting attacks on Libyan oil installations (The Wall Street Journal 2015, 08 March).

With the contextual background concerning our two study cases of Libya and Kosovo already sufficiently exposed, and the theoretical background necessary for our research discussed in length on the previous chapter, we should now turn back our focus to the discursive and journalistic aspects that are the driving forces behind this master thesis. After enlisting our methodological tools for research, we should finally address the results of the text analysis and see what conclusions can be reached based on our main empirical questions and interpretations of the journalistic texts.

4 METHODOLOGY

For investigating the concept of humanitarian intervention in the international press, this research chose to analyze written news reports from the daily newspaper *The New York Times* and articles from the weekly magazine *The Economist*, given their level of reach among international readers and their general recognition as credible news outlets. Also, their different profiles as a daily newspaper and a weekly magazine, respectively, give us the opportunity to explore both texts that are presented as news reports and texts that are presented as analytical journalistic articles, and the different aspects they carry in terms of discourse analysis within a specific and limited time frame.

The cases chosen for this study were the news reports and articles that have as central subject or one of the central subjects the humanitarian interventions that took place in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), since these interventions had at the same time similar justifications and completely different sociopolitical and historical contexts.

Concerning *The New York Times*, this thesis explored all news reports written about the interventions in Kosovo and Libya within the time frame of one week (seven days) for each conflict, starting from the day of the ‘official’ beginning of the humanitarian intervention applied in each case, and continuing six days after that. In the case of the Kosovo War, since NATO airstrikes started in March 24, 1999 (BBC 1999, 9 April), the time frame for analysis starts at this date and ends at March 30, 1999. In the case of the Libyan Civil War, the UN Security Council’s implementation of a no-fly zone over Libya started in March 19, 2011 (United Nations News Center 2011, 17 March), so the time frame for analysis starts at this date and ends at March 25, 2011.

Since for this newspaper we decided to focus on texts that can be identified as news reports, we left aside articles from the *Opinion* section, texts from opinion columnists such as in *Week in Review* and *News Analysis* sections, obituaries, letters or any other texts that don’t fit the category of news articles. Raw transcriptions of speeches will also be ignored, since they don’t constitute journalistic reports. Also, considering that this newspaper’s integration between print and online content was more intense during the recent intervention in Libya than during the intervention in Kosovo in the 1990s, this thesis only analyzed the texts that were part of the print

editions of this newspaper in both cases of intervention, excluding from analysis texts produced by *NYTimes.com* and focusing on only one specific media platform.

For *The Economist*, that produces analytical reports not necessarily classified as *hardnews*, we will analyze all written texts from the magazine in which the humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and Libya were the main subjects or one of the main subjects. The only exceptions left aside are the texts in the *Letters* section, texts within the *Politics this week* section – which only bring small phrases meant to summarize political happenings of the previous week –, texts within cartoons – including *KAL's cartoon* section – and book reviews. The articles selected from this magazine were published in the two subsequent editions distributed right after the day of the ‘official’ beginning of both humanitarian interventions – in Kosovo’s case, we analyzed articles from the editions of March 27, 1999 and April 3, 1999; in Libya’s case, articles were selected from the editions of March 19, 2011 and March 26, 2011. The editions chosen were the ones directed towards European subscribers, since this thesis was written in Ljubljana (Slovenia) in almost its totality.

In total, 41 texts were analyzed for this master thesis. Nine news reports from *The New York Times* that were part of its printed form and 10 articles from *The Economist* in its printed form were found concerning the intervention in Kosovo within the time frames selected. In relation to Libya, this research came across 13 news reports from *The New York Times* and 9 articles from *The Economist* that addressed the crisis and intervention in the African country within the selected time frames. The focus of this thesis is on the text itself and its narrative structures, therefore the graphic and esthetic aspects of these publications will not be analyzed in connection with the text.

The journalistic discourse present in the chosen reports and articles was dissected through the criteria of *themes*, *propositions*, *macropropositions*, *sources* and *keywords*. By analyzing the news reports by *theme*, we will expose the points of view chosen to describe both humanitarian interventions and how these operations were approached, taking into consideration specific textual characteristics such as *style* and *rhetoric* according to the methods of discourse analysis explained by Teun A. van Dijk. Revealing the *macropropositions* formed by these reports, on the other hand, will help us understand what the main goals of the authors were when reporting on the subject of humanitarian intervention. Like said before in our *Theoretical Background*, *propositions* are the smaller meaning constructs of thought within the text, while

macropropositions are the global meanings contained in *macrostructures* within the text. These *macropropositions* are crucial for discourse analysis, since they reveal signification and intent, the relationship between the author and his or her conclusions concerning the reported subject. The use of different *sources* within news reports and articles is of great importance to build a more contextualized journalistic text, therefore the sources used in the selected texts will also be singled out and contextualized in order to understand how information was gathered and facts were checked. And finally, the use of *keywords* in the construction of the journalistic discourse reveals not only possible hidden intentions or perceptions of the author, but also the author's strategy to influence or frame the subjectivity of his or her own semantic production. Following the Critical Discourse Analysis' theoretical framework, which is succinctly disclosed by Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak (2009, 96), these were the main steps taken during the composition of this master thesis:

- Consultation and explanation of preceding theoretical knowledge necessary for research;
- Collection of information and context regarding the specific events;
- Selection and dissection of data for analysis;
- Formulation of research questions;
- Testing of initial assumptions and results of case studies;
- Critique and conclusion proposed for further application.


Needless to say that the selection of journalistic texts for analysis based on whether the interventions in Kosovo or Libya are either the main or one of the main subjects within them is in itself subjective – the mere mentions of the words 'Kosovo' or Libya', for instance, are not alone reliable factors. However, this thesis' predominant use of van Dijk's CDA inspired methodology of text analysis within journalism (1988) guarantees a verifiable framework of both text selection and research that can serve as a solid, trustworthy reference for third party understanding and evaluation. The broader goal of this research is, after all, not only to endorse strategies that could potentially allow a more critical understanding of journalistic discourse and a better way to identify its purposes and implications, but also to expose and interpret the power struggles present within this specific form of discourse. This thesis also hopes to encourage more intertextuality between the fields of Journalism, Discourse Analysis and International Relations.

5 RESULTS

The analysis of the 41 journalistic texts and articles selected from *The New York Times* and *The Economist*⁵ was conducted using as inspiration the theoretical tools mentioned in the previous chapters and summarized on the diagram below (See Table 5.1), using van Dijk's sociocognitive approach towards Critical Discourse Analysis as main source of orientation, as well as the analytical steps he proposed in *News as discourse* (1988). The application of the semantic mapping rules that defined the most important information for each proposition and macroproposition within all chosen reports and articles resulted in topics that were raised and then condensed until they resulted in sentences as concise as possible without significant loss of textual meaning and essential information. This research did not reduce reports to the ultimate possibilities of macropropositions consisting of simplistic 'subject-verb-predicate' models because data regarding contextual and discursive assertions needed to be preserved for our analysis.

As mentioned before in this thesis, identification of propositions and macropropositions is indeed subjective and could vary slightly depending on each individual's reading of the texts, however the understanding of Dijk's *macrorules* enables us to reach results not only through CDA's theoretical framework but also through a specific approach that treats the information gathered in a way that is both reliable and consistent.

Table 5.1: Summary of analytical process



⁵ See full list of reports and articles in the catalog at page 90.

5.1 Reports on intervention in Kosovo

Macropropositions extracted from journalistic reports on the Kosovo War selected from *The New York Times* gathered a general focus on the four following aspects of this conflict (in order of importance or prominence):

- (1) Procedures of NATO's air strikes against Serbian forces;
- (2) Justifications for NATO's intervention;
- (3) Suffering of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo due to Yugoslav repression;
- (4) Possible causes for Serbian aggression towards Albanians.

The first noticeable problem of these texts is the lack of attention paid to the victims' personal takes on the attacks. The general deprivation of textual protagonism for the alleged victims of the conflict suggests a lack of journalistic presence in the field and a predominant use of 'official' sources – governments, multilateral organizations, military personnel in higher positions of hierarchy – to describe unfolding events. NATO and its allies play the role of main subjects within more than half of all macropropositions gathered from *The New York Times*. Regardless of whether it is advisable or not for a media outlet to send reporters into war zones to get first hand accounts of the conflict and face all possible dangers involved, this discursive monopoly of official voices can surely be detrimental to the full comprehension of the events by the readers, since the stories of the most vulnerable, as well as of the perceived attackers and violators of international law, are only told indirectly. This recurrent professional practice pushes the subject of intervention further away from the readers' cognitive reach, making it as *unobtrusive* as possible and harder to grasp fully without the signifying assistance coming from voices of authority.

Only one macroproposition extracted from NYT's reports has the refugees as its main semantic subject:

- *Refugees crossing Kosovo's border with Albania say thousands of ethnic Albanians were killed or ordered to flee, robbed and stripped of identity documents by Serbian policemen, suggesting Serbian campaign is methodic, organized and systematic*⁶.

⁶ Macroproposition extracted from text number 33 in our catalog of analyzed reports, starting at page 90.

This macroproposition portrays a predominant discursive goal present throughout the texts selected from the newspaper: not only a clear exposure of Serbian forces as the victimizers within the conflict and, in the last instance, the enemies of peace, but as participants whose actions of physical and psychological abuse towards Albanians were planned, systematic and brutal, therefore worthy of drastic containment, or worthy of an urgent and justified reaction. When associated with other reports that repeatedly described the conflict in consonance to this frame – in what could also be pointed as an example for McComb’s explanation of the repetition mechanism of prominence –, this assessment or rhetorical construction, regardless of its credibility and accuracy, leads to an intuitive sense of *urgency of engagement* specifically based on humanitarian grounds and values connected to the defense of human rights. Support for the humanitarian intent of NATO’s air strikes is widespread within almost all macropropositions, while questioning of its efficiency and legitimacy is rarely put on the ‘center’ of reports. The following macroproposition was gathered from a news report that displays a semantic subject questioning and even rejected this intent, in a scarce relativization of the roles of intervening forces within the conflict:

- Many Serbian-Americans are upset that Serbia is being bombed by the US, claiming Serbians are only fighting for their own land, condemning America for meddling in Serbia’s affairs and questioning the view of Albanians as victims⁷.

While one of the predominant framings is put to test with this macroproposition, the same report doesn’t present diverging voices to contest or counter the claims presented by Serbian-Americans, isolating this point of view from the discursive consensus and relegating it to the consequent enactment of ‘the biased other’ – Serbian-Americans defending ‘their own’ and defending Serbia’s sovereignty in spite of blatant signs of widespread human rights abuse, therefore there is no real need to put these claims into scrutiny. When an assessment of the facts that is radically divergent from the discursive consensus is presented this way, and other dissonant voices with less probable bias don’t get a chance to add valid points to the discussion, a report like this serves more the newspaper – as a supposed sign of

⁷ Text number 41 from Catalog at page 90.

neutrality and an ‘attention grabber’ – than the reader, since a real controversy is being avoided and any alternative or complementary conclusions and understandings of the facts are pushed to the background. Also, this report doesn’t address in specific terms why the semantic subject condemns America’s “meddling” in Serbian affairs, or what exactly the action of meddling refers to. Is it only the military intervention? Would America be welcomed to be actively involved in the conflict in other ways? Why is meddling a negative thing? How do Serbian-Americans see other nations meddling as well, since NATO is composed of representatives from other countries? Are there different standards in this sense?

Again in respect to the actions of NATO, this thesis found one particular macroproposition questioning the political coherence of NATO’s attacks against Yugoslavia more severely, with Balkan specialists saying that the comparison made by then US President Bill Clinton between the Kosovo War and World Wars I and II to justify intervention was misleading, and suggesting a misunderstanding about the events coming from NATO’s most influential member:

- Balkan specialists criticize Clinton’s historical analogies between world wars and conflict in Kosovo as misleading, but most approve bombing of Serbia as best way to protect innocent Kosovars from mounting military offensive⁸.

Even in this case of exposure of controversy, the bombing of Serbia with humanitarian claims is supported by the main subject “Balkan specialists”, while granting credibility to the claim that bombing the attackers is the best way to protect the victims. Here we can identify a discursive construction that associates what van Dijk could point out as a mechanism of convincement through the use of credible voices deemed as impartial – specialists – and what Bourdieu would probably define as an implicit declaration of *discursive competence* from voices of authority that mainly endorse the framing of events proposed by the body of texts within a specific news coverage. However, not all Balkan specialists interviewed for this piece shared similar views regarding the bombing of Serbia, and it shows both within parts of the text – specially when professor Richard Ulman, from Princeton, says that “Americans might reasonably say that, deplorable though the Serb behavior in Kosovo has been,

⁸ Text number 38 from Catalog at page 90.

we can't go around the world fixing these situations" (The New York Times 1999, 26 March) – and through the use of the word “most” in this case, which implies minor dissent. There is a noticeable effort from the author to generate debate about the intervention, and in fact this report stands out as the one that better displays diversity of opinion from all NYT's reports analyzed within our time frame. Still, we can also notice that this debate is placed within discourse as a secondary issue: (1) The report's title, “Historians Note Flaws in President's Speech” (The New York Times 1999, 26 March), emphasizes Clinton's alleged mistaken view of history, and not the possible mistakes regarding the operation itself; (2) Opposition to NATO's bombings is presented by a reduced number of sources and placed almost at the end of the text; (3) The main controversy within the text, exposed by its macroproposition – Clinton's historical analogies – involves issues that could be considered important to the interpretation of the rationale behind the American endorsement of NATO's intervention, but that could also be considered peripheral to the discussion concerning the very legitimacy and efficacy of this humanitarian intervention, since views that could actually add new ideas or assessments to the journalistic text, such as other possible military strategies besides the bombing of Serbian forces to solve this conflict, are neither exposed or questioned extensively.

Throughout news reports, strong language is applied to both the Serbian and the Albanian roles in the war in a constant display of *keywords* among propositions and macropropositions that incite an essential factor of information processing explained by van Dijk – emotional or attitudinal excitement – and reflect what McCombs would probably highlight as an attempt to give the reader a palpable notion of the horrors of armed conflict while engaging him/her on a more personal level. Also, the sense of urgency is endorsed by the use of such keywords and adds justification for the interventionist solution. Serbian forces are described as practicing “ethnic cleansing”, “repression”, “killings”, “genocide”, “crimes against humanity”, attempting “to carve out a Serb-only ethnic enclave”, while “innocent Kosovars” are displayed as being used as “human shields”, “ordered to flee”, “robbed”, “stripped of identity”, their villages burned (The New York Times 1999, 24-30 March).

There is little reflection within reports extracted from *The New York Times* about the Albanians' role in the conflict not only as victims but also as eventual contributors to escalation, such as through the actions of the KLA against Serbian forces and Serbian civilians (Human Rights Watch 1999; United Nations 1999). Of

course, we must stress that this well-defined, non-nuanced journalistic approach towards victims and aggressors can't be translated as a deliberately created antagonism: Serbian officials and fighters indeed controlled political and military power during Milošević's rule of Yugoslavia, and Serbian military and paramilitary forces were surely responsible for the highest forms of aggression within the conflict, including widespread genocide and ethnic cleansing, as DiPrizio (2002) already demonstrated. Also, some could argue that the violent actions of the KLA should be regarded not as attacks, but as acts of resistance, therefore to single out KLA's violent attacks as examples of escalation of violence is to actually 'blame the victims' of oppression. However, since these nuances are scarcely brought up from data and claims presented by reports within our time frame, the problem is that many readers could be left with unshakable certainties and emotional imagery ('good ethnicity' vs. 'bad ethnicity', 'good' vs. 'evil') that prevent a deeper, fuller understanding of this specific conflict and its willing and unwilling participants.

Nevertheless, macropropositions do seem to grow in complexity and meaning if the texts are taken into consideration in chronological order. While the first macroproposition could easily fit a traditional journalistic subtitle with a simplistic phrasal and semantic construction of cause and effect, the last macroproposition approaches the idea of intent, claiming that Serbia's persecution of ethnic Albanians was deliberately planned – with both discursive constructs using NATO as main source and subject:

(First, March 24) - NATO authorized air strikes against Serbia to stop aggression towards ethnic Albanians in Kosovo after failed peace agreement⁹.

(Last, March 30) - NATO claims that Serbia planned in advance ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo and wants to prevent the province from being autonomous¹⁰.

This brings to mind Lecheler and Vreese's discussion of *framing* within discourse as a journalistic *modus operandi* that not only stresses aspects of reality, but also suggests judgments and possible decisions or solutions concerning unfolding crisis, in one clear example of *display of intentionality* within this field of knowledge,

⁹ Text number 35 from Catalog at page 90.

¹⁰ Text number 40 from Catalog at page 90.

a discursive ‘presence’ that Schudson sometimes seems reluctant to recognize. It is not just a matter of increased newsgathering, occurrence of new happenings or better conflict assessment. NATO intensified bombings to prevent Kosovo from being shredded and restrained – this is the basic premise of the last macroproposition. Regardless of the accurateness of this claim, the claim is present, and plays a part within the common knowledge of this conflict, since different actors defended several interests in the Kosovo War and yet this was the displayed conclusion from one of the most respected newspapers in the world. *The New York Times* did choose ‘a side’ that both dismissed Serbia’s claims over Kosovo as illegitimate and stood next to the ethnicity that by far suffered the most in the conflict, which were the Kosovar Albanians. We should be able to acknowledge this without any complex or guilt, considering intentionality as innate to any form of communication. What needs to be discussed is the claim itself and not its inevitable existence.

Another interesting subtle example of news framing is presented by one of NYT’s macropropositions that explain the necessity of humanitarian intervention in the conflict:

- NATO bombs Serbia to stop killings and forced migration of ethnic Albanians, to damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo and to avoid reignited ethnic and religious wars in the Balkans¹¹.

The implicit idea that ethnic and religious tensions are forever dormant and waiting to explode at any moment in the Balkans is not new and enacts collective ‘Western’ scripts that define the history of the region as mainly marked by violence and implied ‘backwardness’ (Todorova 2009), while ignoring other possible factors within the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo that unfortunately could be seen in many other conflict zones throughout the world as well: (1) attempts to single out ‘enemies of national interests’ to keep a population politically united under the control of a few; (2) the use of nationalism and fear to whitewash and justify violence; (3) the clashing of values of sovereignty and self determination; (4) political nostalgia over ‘past glory’ of nations that lost territory and power over time; among other ideological sources of mass manipulation and induction of hatred. Needless to say that

¹¹ Text number 37 from Catalog at page 90.

ethnicity and religion played a determinant role in the Serbia-Kosovo war, however in this macroproposition NATO bombs serve to prevent “reignited” ethnic and religious hate, implying that there is an irreconcilable hatred that supposedly marks all cultures of all territories in the Balkans throughout time, in what this thesis sees as a display of stereotypical and generalizing notions of the region. Religion and ethnicity are not explained as determinant forces within the conflict, but presented as a Balkan *raison d’être*.

In the last instance, the overall focus of *The New York Times*’ coverage of the Kosovo War is consistent with its editorial preference for the traditional journalistic approach of reporting the facts and providing analysis through third party voices instead of its own – “Balkan specialists”, government officials, and other parties –, but the factual evidence in the analyzed cases came almost exclusively from official sources and disregarded the diversity of voices within the conflict, collaborating for a more uniform collective view of the Kosovo War in line with the argument for the need to intervene militarily on humanitarian grounds. We shall discuss this trend in more detail later on and relate it to the articles extracted from *The Economist* to get a bigger perspective and understand possible patterns within these two media organizations’ news coverage of the conflict.

The macropropositions composed from the news articles on the Kosovo War selected from *The Economist* carry at the same time more explicit pro-intervention positions and more controversy concerning the military operation and the actors involved, while the actual daily happenings in the field are apparently deemed as secondary, with textual focus given to the higher struggles for discursive dominance and operational leadership that took place among different nations and influential political actors. The predominance of NATO and its allies as main semantic subjects among these macropropositions is even stronger when compared to the ones extracted from *The New York Times* – exactly four fifths of them have these actors as main semantic subjects and sources, though this role is sometimes shared with other actors such as ‘Balkan observers’, Milošević and legal experts.

The general focus of the articles from the magazine is on the following aspects of the conflict (in order of importance or prominence):

- (1) Procedures of NATO’s air strikes against Serbian forces;
- (2) Political developments surrounding countries that led, endorsed, or criticized NATO’s actions, mainly the USA and Russia;

- (3) Intervention's possibilities of success or failure;
- (4) Suffering of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo due to Yugoslav repression.

The Economist demonstrates throughout its articles a similar preoccupation as *The New York Times* to provoke salience within its journalistic discourse of discussions surrounding NATO's strategies of military intervention. However, two macropropositions from the weekly magazine carry a claim that is not present in any of the macropropositions extracted from the daily newspaper within the same time frame – therefore, without much prominence within *NYT*'s reports: the notion that NATO's decision not to use ground forces in the conflict could lead to failure in protecting ethnic Albanians and ending the war:

- US' intentions to halt Serbian violence in Kosovo, force Yugoslavia into peace deal and uphold NATO's credibility may not be achieved because the American president is negligent towards consequences of an attack relying solely on air power¹².

- NATO's attack on Serbia may be the start of an admirable new trend to restrain thugs and despots and could put an end to the brutal treatment of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, but its decision not to use ground troops may lead to failure and instigate more violence and instability¹³.

Among all texts analyzed, the discursive goals presented by these two macropropositions carry some of the most direct affronts to NATO's military procedures during the implementation of Kosovo's humanitarian intervention, stating clearly that the air strikes might not put an end to the crisis in Kosovo and might even instigate more violence by directly contributing to instability. The first one also accuses the United States of being "negligent" towards what the author(s) seems to believe is the wrong strategy for solving the conflict. And yet, the actual will to intervene and the justifications for direct military participation in the war on humanitarian grounds are not questioned – on the contrary, intervention is explicitly endorsed as an "admirable" policy to restrain "thugs and despots" and implied as the only alternative to halt "Serbian violence" and end attacks against Albanians. The

¹² Text number 11 from Catalog at page 90.

¹³ Text number 14 from Catalog at page 90.

issue of NATO's credibility is raised as one of the reasons for making sure that the military operation reaches its goals, which suggests complementary motives driving the air strikes and the clear political will to present the interventionist approach as efficient and successful.

Another interesting aspect is the subtle variation or permeability between the roles of 'aggressor' and 'victim' within the magazine's texts when the possibility of Albanian revenge against Serbs is raised, and when it is suggested that NATO could be intensifying genocide and ethnic cleansing through its actions. Still, what the magazine questions with this variation is not the necessity to directly participate in the Kosovo war, but how to intervene using military force:

- NATO aircraft began bombing campaign against Yugoslavia with unclear purpose and legal justification, while Balkan observers claim that current strategy could either crumble Belgrade regime or encourage Albanian rebels to take revenge on Serb civilians.¹⁴

- NATO's air strikes to stop genocidal violence in Kosovo might just be promoting it because the number of refugees had risen since attacks began, indicating that Serb forces are practicing ethnic cleansing and about to start a systematic slaughter.¹⁵

The first macroproposition carries the discursive goal to scrutinize NATO's methodological coherence, suggesting the operation carries risk of becoming a 'double-edge sword', with the potential to both reduce Serbian attacks and encourage Albanian revenge – therefore, the result could be even more violence. There is also evident criticism directed towards what the author(s) sees as lack of clarity regarding NATO's purpose and legal justification for this intervention, which could stimulate reader's questioning of the operation's credibility altogether: (1) How can I support an international intervention with unclear goals? (2) How can I consider this operation legitimate if it could be deemed illegal? The mentioning of the legal aspect of this intervention shows that the magazine is aware of the fact that the operation was carried out without Security Council approval – therefore not in accordance with international law – and deems this information as important to mention. The

¹⁴ Text number 17 from Catalog at page 90.

¹⁵ Text number 18 from Catalog at page 90.

following macroproposition, which is from the same edition of the magazine (*The Economist* 1999, 25 March), abandons the ‘Albanian revenge’ argument and points towards a more immediate danger coming from the Serbian military and paramilitary, warning that Serb forces are prepared to start a “systematic slaughter” and accusing NATO’s operation of possibly “promoting” violence by escalating the crisis.

But editorial scrutiny is not reserved for NATO. Among countries that condemned military intervention in Kosovo, *The Economist* focuses greatly on Russia, presented by some of the selected texts as main international ally of Serbia in the Kosovo conflict:

*- Russia will face financial collapse and will not get money or respect from the West because of the country’s sentimental support for Serbia, its slow treatment of internal financial crisis and its alleged corruption*¹⁶.

This macroproposition presents the clear discursive goal to discredit Russia’s political participation in the conflict by gathering different *statements* that expose the country in negative ways and portray it as both misguided and ill-intended: (1) Russia will collapse financially; (2) Russia will not get money or respect from the West; (3) Russia’s support for Serbia is sentimental; (4) Russia doesn’t treat its financial crisis properly; (5) Russia is corrupt. These five consecutive claims highlight what is revealed by our textual analysis as one of the magazine’s main preoccupations concerning the Kosovo War within the first days of intervention – the political repercussions of international involvement in the conflict. In this particular stance, the West is put by the author(s) on a higher moral ground, with Western countries regarded as more credible and trustworthy. The statement that Russia’s support for Serbia is “sentimental” – or, in other words, irrational – is clarified at the beginning of the text: “it chiefly reflects a dislike of NATO’s growing influence, not any great interest in the nitty-gritty of Balkan politics” (*The Economist* 1999, 25 March), claims the article, which shows blatant distrust of Russia’s motivations for supporting Serbian claims over Kosovo.

The issue of Serbia’s sovereignty, which is a key factor of discussion in terms of Kosovo War analysis within the field of International Relations (DiPrizio 2002;

¹⁶ Text number 12 from Catalog at page 90.

Weiss 2012) and has been mentioned by most countries that opposed humanitarian intervention – including Russia – as a concept that should be respected, is rarely discussed or even raised by macropropositions observed in the articles published by *The Economist*. The text that addresses this issue more profoundly is “No place for them both: A bleak example of the proposition that history can become incurable” (The Economist 1999, 1 April), in which NATO’s bombings are portrayed as a result of the conflicting scenarios of Yugoslavia’s sovereign territory and Kosovo’s certain level of autonomy, the last one taken away by Milošević during his rule. This article presents the conflict as one that raises a clash between the principles of sovereignty and right to self-determination, as we can notice in the mentioned text’s two initial propositions:

- Kosovo falls between two basic but contradictory principles: it is internationally accepted as part of Serbia’s and Yugoslavia’s sovereign and inviolable territory, but also had its majority’s right to self-determination stolen;

- Kosovo became a republic in all but name due to a constitution reform in Serbia in the 70s, but after Yugoslavia’s Marshall Tito died the rumblings began again, with students in Kosovo advocating for total independence¹⁷.

We can see with these propositions and others extracted from the same article that the author is offering an explanation for how tensions escalated and ultimately resulted in NATO’s air strikes against Serbian forces, mentioning what he/she believes are the fundamental causes of Serbia and Kosovo’s conflict. Historical and political arguments are used to build a strong correlation between the facts reported through a comprehensive narrative structure that ultimately intends to help the reader become aware of the scenario that lead to war and international intervention – a discursive development that van Dijk claims to not just carry an informative function, but also to be an effective and convincing way to propose particular framings to the receiver (van Dijk 1988, 84). In this case, the author tries to convince the reader that one of the main reasons for the conflict is that Kosovo’s significant autonomy was stolen by the Yugoslav government, and so the only way to end it is to return it to the

¹⁷ Propositions extracted from text number 13 in our list of analyzed reports, starting at page 90.

Albanian majority in Kosovo, even against Serbia's will. This article is important because it focuses on the claim that the Kosovo War is not solely a result of ethnic and religious tensions – though these aspects are raised within the text – but also of conflicting, unresolved political scenarios kept dormant during Tito's rule.

Another important controversy exposed by *The Economist* is the questionable legality of the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. One of the macropropositions defines the intervention as a breach of international law but, at the same time, defends the operation as an acceptable legal misconduct:

- *Most legal experts claim NATO's bombing of Serbia to prevent humanitarian catastrophe is a breach of international law because it was not authorized by the Security Council and is not an act of self-defense, but agree that Serb forces' behavior in Kosovo is illegal and a threat to peace and security*¹⁸.

The claim that Serb forces' behavior in Kosovo is “a threat to peace and security” is perfectly aligned with the Security Council's official justification for military intervention within conflicts, as we explained before in our *Contextual Background*. What this article seems to imply with its propositions is that although NATO's air strikes were illegal, they were also the right thing to do in order to “prevent humanitarian catastrophe” – in other words, NATO was right in ignoring ‘legal barriers’ to do what was not only necessary, but also morally correct. The aspect of morality within the conduct of nations would become years after one of the bases for the R2P policy – the responsibility of nations to protect international peace and security –, which was used to justify the humanitarian intervention in Libya more than a decade after the Kosovo War.

It is important to remember that *The Economist* has a weekly time frame that enables it to look at factual developments with more depth – or with a bigger range of available information about facts and context – than daily newspapers such as *The New York Times*, so it is not a surprise that a less uniform discourse is found within its articles concerning the conflict – the opinions of representatives from several countries, organizations and other varied actors are displayed among propositions, for instance. However, the main semantic subjects of the magazine's macropropositions

¹⁸ Text number 19 from Catalog at page 90.

are also overwhelmingly the agents responsible for the military operation, with little attention paid to the ones that are directly affected by the intervention, willingly or unwillingly. Also, as expected, the need for humanitarian intervention is supported within the vast majority of macropropositions, suggesting a discursive uniformity between *The Economist* and *The New York Times* in this respect.

Due to *The Economist*'s editorial profile as a media that produces journalistic analytical articles instead of traditional news reports focused on daily developments, opinions and editorial alignments concerning the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo are more transparent and easily identifiable than in the reports from *The New York Times*, while the usage of strong language is arguably on the same level in both cases – NATO's attacks, as we've seen previously, are eventually labeled by the magazine as the possible start of an "admirable trend to restrain thugs and despots", and Serb's treatment of ethnic Albanians is defined as "brutal" and a "slaughter" (The Economist 1999, 25 March). The chronological progression of content among the magazine's macropropositions oscillates between addressing specific political controversies of the intervention and discussing the qualities and shortcomings of the military operation, while the need for caution during the interventionist procedure is exposed from the beginning. Concerning the framings presented and considering the articles' more straightforward presentation of opinion and analysis, we can safely say that there is a constant attempt to introduce *belief content* that suits the magazine's own vision of the crisis, taking advantage of the fact that the matter reported is an unobtrusive topic. A struggle for public opinion takes place within the journalistic discourse, in what Splichal (2010) would point out as the struggle for those who might be willing to adopt the opinion presented by the magazine as their own.

5.2 Reports on intervention in Libya

Macropropositions extracted from *The New York Times*' journalistic reports concerning the intervention in Libya show more analytical strength than macropropositions exposed from the daily newspaper's texts regarding Kosovo, with some of them questioning more directly the goals of intervention, pointing early on towards possible killing of civilians by the military operation, discussing its political implications, and even addressing how international companies may have financially

supported Qaddafi throughout the years with bribes and payoffs to his family and regime – an apparent diversion that actually suggests preoccupation to report on less obvious contextual aspects regarding not only the intervention but also Libyan internal politics. Even though there is more diversity of presented issues during the first days of reporting on this conflict, it is also possible in this case to enlist, in order of importance or prominence, topics that are predominant amongst all macropropositions, which are in many ways very similar to the predominant ones previously found on reports about the Kosovo intervention:

- (1) Political controversies surrounding operation, especially issues of leadership and international disagreements between governments;
- (2) Possibilities of success and failure of humanitarian intervention in Libya;
- (3) Goals of military operation;
- (4) Actions of Qaddafi's forces against rebels and civilians.

The New York Times presents intense questioning of Western motives in the implementation of the UN-sanctioned no-fly zone and military operation against Qaddafi's forces, which is gradually displayed along with a chronological semantic progression in context depth and critical stance within the newspaper's propositional constructs, starting from a political 'divisiveness' between European countries and the US regarding the intervention and moving on to possibilities of failure and errors, including the chance that the intervention could actually increase humanitarian crisis in Libya or have undisclosed goals, such as stated by the examples of macropropositions below:

(19 March 2011) - *France and Britain intend to take the lead in enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya to stop Qaddafi's forces, while other European countries and the US show divisiveness towards military operation*¹⁹.

(20 March 2011) - *American and European forces, supported by Arab countries, began air strikes against Libyan government to impose UN-sanctioned no-fly zone*

¹⁹ Macroproposition extracted from text number 26 in our list of analyzed reports, starting at page 90.

*and keep Qaddafi from using air power against rebels, but many worry that operation could lead to a divided Libya with no authority and Islamic extremist operations*²⁰.

(23 March 2011) - *China joined Russia and India in calls for immediate cease-fire and suggested coalition forces could bring about humanitarian disaster by exceeding the UN-mandated no-fly zone, while Chinese media called UN resolution a crime against humanity and a cover for West's hegemonic intentions*²¹.

The first example listed above cites the alleged main reason behind the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya – to stop Qaddafi’s forces – and a conflict of interests among countries concerning how to implement such operation, placing greater importance at the political implications of this intervention for the West rather than at the actual outcomes of foreign military force within Libyan territory. The second macroproposition, extracted from a report issued on the next day, presents a more complex and ambiguous scenario with a multitude of actors, clearly raising the possibility of strategic failure and even worsening of the crisis through the air strikes by resulting in a “divided Libya with no clear authority”. We can also see that the newspaper raises the possibility that this military intervention could open ground for “Islamic extremist operations” – with the term “Islamic extremist” meaning not only the belief and practice of Islam in its most conservative form, but also implicitly making an allusion to terrorism which arises from the use of the broad term “operations” in this particular case. The third macroproposition presents even stronger language in the voices of dissenting countries while trying to reproduce the tone of their representatives regarding how they see this humanitarian intervention in Libya – as a “crime against humanity” and a mere pretext for the West to enable its “hegemonic intentions”.

Support from Arab countries for direct military intervention in Libya repeatedly receives the spotlight among propositions and macropropositions observed in these reports, which seems to be an attempt to prove (or a belief that) this intervention is not solely a Western effort – an important factor of legitimization of this operation within public discourse as morally consistent with a global pursuit of peace and not simply an American and European initiative to intervene in foreign

²⁰ Text number 22 from Catalog at page 90.

²¹ Text number 24 from Catalog at page 90.

conflicts to endorse particular interests. The fact that the UN Security Council issued a resolution supporting the operation is also mentioned frequently and adds credibility to the humanitarian intervention. On the other hand, supportive Arab countries are also accused of hypocrisy by voices in another report for claiming to help fight repression against Libyans when in fact what they truly wanted, according to these voices, was to “deflect attention”:

- Political analysts say leaders across Arab world supported military intervention against Libyan government and pretended to fight repression against Libyans as a way to get rid of Qaddafi and deflect attention from their own citizens' call for democracy²².

Once again we see judgment display within a macroproposition coming from credible third party voices – political analysts – in an attempt to keep the journalistic discourse superficially exempt of intentionality, while actually giving powerful resonance to these voices – an entire report is dedicated to discussing their claims, something that would not happen if the author and the newspaper didn't think these accusations against the “Arab world” were not newsworthy enough to dominate the premise of an entire text. This use of subjects that imply special competence serves to try to convince readers of what aspects of geopolitics should be taken into consideration for the full comprehension of context in this case. Of course, this study cannot say or prove that this is done intentionally to ‘push’ specific framings towards readers more than it is a rhetorical exploitation of contradiction – non-democratic regimes supporting efforts against a non-democratic regime on the basis of fighting tyranny, an obvious and important inconsistency that draws attention – to instigate debate and scrutiny. What we can objectively say is that this macroproposition partly puts into question the role of promoters of this international operation and exposes what it believes to be undisclosed objectives or motives behind some of its participants, raising doubts about the whole intervention that we shall address later on.

Concerning the apparent diversity of main subjects among macropropositions, focus is sometimes given to political analysts, anti-intervention countries and private

²² Text number 27 from Catalog at page 90.

executives connected to Libya, for instance. As we demonstrated before, the newspaper places great importance in problems related to this intervention's procedural leadership and political issues related to its effectiveness, exposing internal divisions among countries responsible for the intervention and between countries against it. Still, more than two thirds of macropropositions extracted from *The New York Times* have either the US or its allies as main semantic subjects, and accounts from direct victims of this war are once again displayed with less prominence. Only one macroproposition had Tripoli civilians as the main subjects:

- *Tripoli residents offered disdain and impatience with Qaddafi and dismissed displays of support for the Libyan government as disingenuous*²³.

This lack of protagonism repeats a pattern observed among reports selected from *The New York Times* and *The Economist* on the Kosovo War and, as we previously explained in this chapter, reflects an apparent insufficient journalistic presence in the field as well as a common predominance of 'official' sources of information to acknowledge developing facts. Obviously, one has to also take into consideration difficulties intrinsic to the journalistic coverage of armed conflicts, such as finding sources willing to overcome fear of retaliation for talking to international correspondents, infrastructural problems, limited choices of translators, truncated information, as well as the reporter's own fear of death and an overall oppressive and dysfunctional climate.

It is also important to notice that the main information provided by this macroproposition is not the victims' direct experience with conflict and military intervention, but their "disdain" for Qaddafi and his supporters, as also suggested by the report's title – "Amid Rubble in Capital From Attacks, Hints of a Changed Atmosphere" (The New York Times 2011, 23 March). Only one character within the story talks about his direct experience with the ongoing conflict, at the second half of the report, by saying: "People are very afraid, honestly (...). They killed a lot of people in Tripoli, including one of my relatives. You have to be careful. They are watching right now." (The New York Times 2011, 23 March).

²³ Text number 23 from Catalog at page 90.

Meanwhile, alleged civilian Qaddafi advocates are reported only indirectly, also at the end of the text, when the journalist transcribes the opinion given by a tribal leader in a news conference broadcasted on state television: “Our main purpose is to stop the bloodshed (...). After that, everything is up for dialogue” (The New York Times 2011, 23 March). The reporter offers important hints within the text of his suspicion of these tribal leaders’ pacifist intentions and popularity, and why readers should suspect them as well:

- a) He diminishes the “peace march” to Benghazi organized by the leaders, calling it “really a bus ride” in what seems to be a sarcastic appositive;
- b) He calls our attention to the fact that above the conference room table there is a “towering portrait of a young Muammar el-Qaddafi”;
- c) He claims that the tribal leaders failed to acknowledge “any substantive disagreements” between the warring factions while calling for reconciliation at the same time;
- d) He specifically points out the fact that a “government translator” is intermediating the conference (The New York Times 2011, 23 March).

By using these reservations to describe the aforementioned tribal leaders, the reporter is inviting suspicion and suggesting that their intention is not really to support peace, but to instigate conformity to the current regime. This editorial decision to delegitimize – or at least be highly skeptical of – Qaddafi sympathizers’ intentions demonstrates a position taken by the reporter and, consequently, by the newspaper regarding the ‘sides’ involved in this conflict of interests, since Qaddafi denouncers are not treated within the text with the same level of quasi-sarcasm. Of course, we must acknowledge that this suspicious stance is a direct and almost inevitable intellectual reaction to the ruthlessness and widely documented repressive acts inflicted by Qaddafi’s armed forces upon opposition groups and civilians within dissenting regions of the country (Kinsman 2011). Besides going through a constant process of assembling and verifying facts, journalists are expected to serve as monitors to power, which in this case laid with Qaddafi’s authoritarian regime, its influential supporters and its higher military capacities. Nevertheless, this framing of events is certainly an important and fairly undisclosed expression of authorial intentionality and, ultimately, a contradiction to the principle of journalistic impartiality still defended with insistence by many newsrooms.

The roles of ‘attackers’ and ‘victims’ are well defined among the newspaper’s extracted macropropositions, with Qaddafi and his ‘forces’ as the former and ‘rebels’ as the latter. The definition of ‘rebels’ in this case is, however, rather abstract and generalizing since this role is simply given to those who fight Qaddafi’s regime and little specific mention is made of other motives, leadership profile, ideological aspects or more particular factors and characteristics of these armed opposition groups besides the common inevitable rejection of state violence. In Kosovo’s case, the motives coming from the armed groups behind the conflict between Belgrade and Pristina were discursively defined from the very beginning of the international humanitarian intervention in a very precise and explanatory manner both within articles from *The New York Times* and *The Economist*. They were reported as driven by a violent clash between ethnicities – Serbians vs. Albanians – and political values – sovereignty vs. right to self-determination –, with fundamental divisiveness derived both from the will of Kosovar Albanian militants to reach independence from Serbia and from the will of Serbian militants to reject Kosovo’s autonomy²⁴. However, in Libya’s case the opposition and the specific conflicting forces are much less identifiable or described in much less detail within the selected reports from the NYT. Since the factor of animosity is presented to be almost exclusively the will to drive Qaddafi away from power and to resist his violent clash on dissent, with other possible factors behind both this armed rebellion and the pro-government forces not stressed in more detail, readers are left in the dark about important variables of both the war and the humanitarian intervention. What do rebels plan to do after Qaddafi is deposed? What is their ideological goal? Do they wish to change the political system, and if yes which system should be put in place instead? Do they want the international community to participate in this process as well? Who should be ‘in charge’ of Libya and why, and for how long? Why Qaddafi supporters oppose change and support authoritarianism? What do they gain from maintaining the status quo? What is their view of the humanitarian intervention taking place in their country? Are ethnicity, religion or other forms of collective constructions of identity involved in this conflict at all? Although our time frame is certainly too early within the conflict for the

²⁴ Needless to say that other developments and happenings that unfolded during the entire Kosovo War have shaped memory and collective symbolic imagery regarding the conflict and its participants in a much more complex way, so this observation is related only to how motives driving this war were portrayed by our selected media and time frame.

newspaper to answer all these questions, the severity and complexity of the conflict begs for more detailed information from the beginning.

Interestingly, the growing narrative surrounding the terms “Arab spring”²⁵ and “Arab awakening” in journalistic texts, which referred to the Libyan Civil War and other contemporary uprisings in Arab countries in the context of an alleged common revolt against tyranny – at least during the first moments of these uprisings –, was not very much present within the selected NYT’s reports. In fact, these exact terms were not used at all in NYT’s examined reports on the Libyan conflict, and little effort was made in placing Libya within the region’s scenario of uprisings. *The Economist* magazine, on the other hand, used these terms more frequently, as we will discuss in more detail further on this chapter.

In relation to controversy surrounding NATO’s motives and *modus operandi* in this war, *The New York Times* focuses mainly on how the implementation of a no-fly zone in Libyan territory could result in more than just the protection of civilians, as it was stated in macropropositions cited before and is reinforced more clearly in the following one:

- *United States and allies shifted to ferocious airstrikes on Libya to interdict Qaddafi’s forces and to damage their war capability, but strikes put into question if no-fly zone is intervening directly in Libya’s civil war or simply protecting civilians*²⁶.

The mentioned action of “intervening directly” in Libya’s civil war refers to the possibility presented by the report that the operation might transcend its initial humanitarian claims and move towards *re-engineering* the internal conflict. In other words, this report presents the potential that NATO and its allies have to become in practice one more ‘fighter’ in this war, possibly reverting the unbalance of forces and provoking a subsequent inversion of violence that could lead to *regime change* instead of just providing a protective force for civilians. This ultimate political dilemma surrounding the humanitarian intervention implemented in Libya addresses the alleged ‘undisclosed goals’ behind the operation and its main supporters, as we

²⁵ The term “Arab spring”, which is equivalent in meaning to “Arab awakening”, was likely used for the first time in a major publication by *Foreign Policy* magazine (Foreign Policy, 2011, November 4) and repeated afterwards by all major journalistic publications as a referential and explanatory concept for the wave of popular turmoil, riots and internal conflicts in countries of the Arab League that started in Tunisia in 2010.

²⁶ Text number 21 from Catalog at page 90.

explained in our *Introduction*: are the bombings and the no-fly zone mainly aimed at protecting noncombatants and stopping State violence, or at supporting Qaddafi's paramilitary opposition in its violent resistance and power aspirations? Or both? This clarification is important if we consider the very definition of Humanitarian Intervention as a foreign military operation with the main goal to be humanitarian.

Considering that this time the questioning of humanitarian claims is done by the report itself and is not relegated to the voices of 'specialists' or 'biased others', this macroproposition carries the highest form of scrutiny among all reports analyzed so far, and is the only case in which the concept of humanitarian intervention is actually challenged directly by the author. We should single out this finding and move on to the analysis of articles from *The Economist*, to find out if this conceptual challenge can also be identified in journalistic texts from the weekly magazine, which displays opinions in a more undisclosed manner.

Macropropositions extracted from the journalistic articles of *The Economist* present the same tendency as *The New York Times* of basing factual information almost exclusively on governmental and institutional sources and referencing to the views of both rebels and supporters of Qaddafi's regime only superficially, while posing the West, NATO, America, European and Arab countries that supported the operation as the overwhelming majority of semantic subjects – the rebels are presented as subjects in only one macroproposition, and even in this case sharing semantic protagonism with Qaddafi, the West and regional powers. As in the case of *The New York Times*, macropropositions gathered from *The Economist* are based on well-defined roles of 'attackers' and 'victims' within this conflict, with Qaddafi and his forces as the former and rebels and civilians as the latter, for reasons we discussed previously in NYT's case. Anti-Qaddafi militants and pro-government armed forces are once again loosely profiled and their possible internal idiosyncrasies remain unclear throughout the texts. On the other hand, in line with the magazine's editorial endorsement of explicit displays of opinion, authors talk about several practical, political and moral aspects of this humanitarian intervention and conflict – especially in terms of objectives and procedure – which we will point out and discuss in the next paragraphs.

The focus of the magazine's macropropositions is notably on (in order of importance or prominence):

- (1) Doubts surrounding goals and strategies of the operation;

- (2) Political disagreements in regards to leadership and execution of the humanitarian intervention;
- (3) Moral duty of the West to intervene in the conflict;
- (4) Possibilities of success and failure of military operation.

Controversies regarding motives, goals and leadership of the humanitarian intervention receive the main spotlight within macropropositions and are associated with ethical questions surrounding international action in a way that is exceptional to this magazine in comparison to NYT's texts. The West is portrayed as politically and morally "conflicted", while the act of intervention itself is regarded as "good" and the "risks" are implied as worth taking:

- West is conflicted between doing good and steering clear, but it will betray its own values if it turns its back on Libya's rebels and doesn't rush in a no-fly zone, even though operation involves risks²⁷.

The example above implies that the West is divided between "doing good" – which, according to the article, means intervening to help civilians and rebels – and "steering clear" – which means avoiding direct contact with the conflict and possible practical and political consequences of that influence. The macroproposition also promptly claims that the first option should be prioritized in order to preserve Western moral coherence, and risks shouldn't be on the way of choosing an interventionist approach to help solve the conflict – a clear editorial defense of an international moral duty to protect people against governmental widespread atrocities (a duty that the magazine puts mostly on Western shoulders) and the necessity to engage militarily to save lives and restore peace in extreme situations – which are claims clearly inspired by the R2P concept as justification for humanitarian interventions, in association with the viability of legal Security Council intervention provided by chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, the idea of intervention defended in the text and reflected by its macroproposition stands clearly by the notion that to help civilians is to help the rebels shift the power balance in this conflict – the West must not "turn it's back on Libya's rebels" – which is something that goes beyond original R2P propositions. In

²⁷ Text number 4 from Catalog at page 90.

the last instance, this macroproposition defends that, above all risks, it should be a Western priority to intervene on behalf of Libyan dissent.

Two other macropropositions bluntly claim that, in fact, removing Qaddafi “remains American policy” and is an imperative for the “success of Western intervention in Libya”, adding parallel goals to the operation deemed necessary for its success, revealing questions we cited previously in terms of motives behind the intervention and reinforcing what, according to the field of International Relations, is one of the core problematics behind humanitarian interventions and R2P (Spektor 2012; Weiss 2012), specially in the case of the international handling of Libya’s 2011 uprisings (Kuperman 2013):

- Obama intervened militarily in Libya with Security Council authorization to prevent fall of rebel towns, making it harder for the US to maintain counter-narrative of peaceful democratic change and repair America’s relationship with Muslim world while removal of Qaddafi remains American policy²⁸.

- Success of Western intervention in Libya is not guaranteed and the country will not become a democracy any time soon, but no-fly zone is necessary to protect Libyan citizens, to stop Qaddafi’s regime and to keep momentum for peaceful change across Middle East²⁹.

Support for international military intervention to protect civilians remains strong within all macropropositions extracted from *The Economist*, but there seems to be a recurrent preoccupation with the specific possibility – or necessity – to promote *regime change* as a way to maintain peace in Libya as well as in the Middle East. None of the propositions or macropropositions gathered from the magazine considered that removing Qaddafi from power or having direct impact on the rebels’ capacity to fight against the Libyan government should ultimately be considered impeditive for intervening in Libya’s conflict, since the humanitarian rationale is allegedly prominent in this operation and regime change would just be a (pleasant) byproduct of military intervention. There is a slight difference in focus, we should stress, between the two macropropositions previously selected, since the first one

²⁸ Text number 2 from Catalog at page 90.

²⁹ Text number 9 from Catalog at page 90.

claims a contradiction in American foreign policy when voicing support for “peaceful democratic change” and pursuing the forceful removal of Qaddafi by armed rebels at the same time, while the second one defines regime change as an essential goal of the implementation of a no-fly zone over Libya. The first example cites regime change as an American political inconsistency, while the second example cites regime change as a desired byproduct of the no-fly zone procedure, therefore endorsing such outcome. Again, the controversy around R2P and regime change, an important matter of debate concerning the legitimacy and applicability of humanitarian interventions as they were defined within the field of International Relations (Weiss 2012; Kuperman 2013), especially since Libya’s case, remains largely untouched by the journalistic discourse, and forceful regime change is mostly treated as an inevitable consequence of protecting or reestablishing peace and security in unstable regions.

There is one macroproposition that discusses goals and motives behind the intervention in Libya, however indirectly, by addressing French leadership of the military operation and implying that it might not only carry humanitarian “conscience” but also “electoral purposes”, calling the readers’ attention to French internal matters and that country’s participation in the intervention:

- French intervention in Libya was a universally applauded turnaround in France’s policy on North Africa, but it is hard to disentangle Sarkozy’s zeal for military intervention in the name of a universal conscience from his electoral purposes³⁰.

This article doesn’t seem to affirm that Sarkozy’s electoral purposes should be used to actually question the credibility of French support for intervention in Libya, but it does emphasize the existence of parallel secondary motivations for international involvement in the conflict, regarding France’s internal affairs as examples of what Weiss would maybe define as “legitimate interests” from intervening states (Weiss 2012, 7–8). In other words, the magazine regards France’s commitment to this intervention as positive and deserving of universal applause, but singles out Sarkozy’s electoral purposes as one of the main explanations behind the build-up of French pro-interventionist momentum in North Africa and, therefore, as an important motivation behind its role in Libya’s crisis.

³⁰ Text number 5 from Catalog at page 90.

Speaking of North Africa, the terms “Arab spring” and “Arab awakening”, which we mentioned before when analyzing NYT’s reports, are fairly present in *The Economist*’s articles as discursive constructions that place the Libyan conflict within the context of revolts taking place in Arab League countries, suggesting that there is a common explanation for all these uprisings – a drastic rise in discontent with authoritarianism – that also adds value to the idea that intervening in favor of anti-Qaddafi movements in Libya is a legitimate aspect of this humanitarian intervention. In other words, international military action favoring Libyan dissent or pressuring autocrats for political change would allegedly be in accordance with a popular will to enact democratic institutions that could restore peace in the African nation. We can see this framing of events in the following extracts from three of the magazine’s journalistic texts within our time frame: “The Arab awakening is all about human dignity and the rights of ordinary people – values that the West lives by and seeks to promote.” (The Economist 2011, 17 March); “The Arab awakening has demanded rapid decisions about whether to support or abandon friendly autocrats such as Mr. Mubarak.” (The Economist 2011, 24 March); “The fast-spreading Arab spring has similarly upended many other givens in the region's politics. (...) Leaders have been compelled not merely to pay lip service to their peoples' demands, but to respond to them.” (The Economist 2011, 24 March).

Consistent and repetitive portrayals of goals, motivations and consequential scenarios observed in the magazine’s journalistic discourse seem to encounter only one evident exception, in which arguments give a slightly different framing to the political and moral constructs regarding the operation:

*- No-fly zone may not be enough to prevent Qaddafi’s forces from killing his own people, and it’s not clear if the operational goal is only to assure safety of rebel towns and hurt Qaddafi’s forces using air power, or if it’s also meant to kill the colonel and support regime change.*³¹

The implicit question posed by the author invites stronger scrutiny targeted specifically at the very explanation for this humanitarian intervention, highlighting an oscillation between the overall vigorous support from the magazine for intervention

³¹ Text number 3 from Catalog at page 90.

and a more pessimistic scenario of confusion and disillusionment, while also addressing directly the possibility of Qaddafi's assassination as an undisclosed or unofficial operational objective.

With the analysis of the selected texts from *The New York Times* and *The Economist* and a better understanding of the implications of the term 'Humanitarian Intervention' in the journalistic coverage of the wars in Kosovo and Libya, it is important now to compare results acquired from both media outlets to posteriorly reach our conclusions in relation to how the journalistic discourse initially interpreted the military operations in these two countries, so that we can answer our main research questions and reach a final assessment for this study.

5.3 Correlations and contrasts

The comparison between analyzed reports and articles concerning both selected cases of humanitarian intervention shows that the questioning of procedural aspects of the military operations and political controversies surrounding the international initiatives were alienated from the possibility of putting the actual interventionist approach through real scrutiny in the news discourse, and that support for the use of military means for humanitarian goals was widely endorsed by both media outlets selected – with more explicit rhetoric undoubtedly found within *The Economist* due to its nature as an analytical magazine and, therefore, expected to be explicitly opinionated and have more directed narratives. The texts seem to represent an overall alignment among their authors and sources with the contemporary Western understanding that human rights matter more than state sovereignty whenever the simultaneous abiding by these two principles becomes problematic, and with a collective recognition or realization that diplomatic tools are insufficient to stop or prevent widespread atrocities under certain extreme circumstances of repression, especially when there is a widely disproportional power imbalance between one social actor 'against' another and when the actor who retains the greater military power is the ruling political force.

This almost unanimous discursive endorsement of the use of international military action to protect civilians proves Hafez's theory that the transnationalization of media organizations doesn't necessarily result in diverse propositions or less

predictable representations of the facts (Hafez 2011) – a claim previously mentioned and explained in this thesis’ *Theoretical Background* in more detail. Also, the excessive spotlight given to Western governments’ views of the affairs – they overwhelmingly hold the role of fundamental sources and semantic subjects within most macropropositions acquired through discourse analysis – suggest not only a difficulty to trespass national agendas and to grant legitimacy to ‘non-official’ voices, but also a tendency to sideline diverging views of developments and an apparent unwillingness or inability to give victims of persecution the protagonist role in news reports.

Obviously, expressing diverging points of view regarding wars can bring up new problems. One might argue that it would be inconsistent of journalists, for instance, to not side with the interventionist forces in the cases of Kosovo and Libya, as those military operations were meant to stop and punish perpetrators of massacres. Indeed, journalists, this thesis believes, shouldn’t be indifferent to human suffering, regardless of nationality or political viewpoint. However, it is not impossible to assume that military forces might not be the best tools to achieve humanitarian goals, and someone who might defend an anti-interventionist angle of international affairs could not be immediately regarded as against the protection of civilians or human rights. We could also argue that the uniform pattern of macropropositions in favor of this form of international military engagement goes directly against the journalistic discourse’s professional methodology of ‘multisided’ coverage of the facts, since a specific solution for the conflict was chosen from the very beginning and defended throughout most macropropositions, implicitly or explicitly, and alternative views of this issue were either ignored or sidelined to the ‘fringes’ of journalistic texts and articles.

Considering the analysis of *themes* employed in those news reports, the narratives focused mainly on the description of the respective military operations and on the assessment of actions by perceived attackers in both conflict cases (Milošević’s and Qaddafi’s forces). As expected initially by this thesis, the relational dimension of the texts – or the ability to relate information to easily understandable references – mostly relied on: (1) the explanations of context in which the interventions took place, relating these conflicts to other wars, civil unrests and international interventions, (2) the emotionally charged language to describe the conflicts on the ground and (3) data concerning statistics such as the number of deaths, refugees and military units

employed. Also as expected, the *schemata* of each report and article was more variable from one media outlet to another, and less among the texts themselves within their respective mediums, suggesting a rigid form of text editing to conform the journalistic discourse with the writing guidelines of each news organization. *The New York Times* gave headlines and subtitles an informative function, while reports usually started with the traditional structure of journalistic leads and usually ended with quotes from characters, explanatory remarks about the conflicts or *kickers* that emphasized certain points within the text, following the inverted pyramid guideline of journalistic writing – more ‘relevant’ and ‘heavier’ information on top, and ‘less important’ or ‘older’ information at the bottom. *The Economist* used headlines and subtitles more freely, sometimes using irony, humor or enigmatic statements that had less of an informative function and more of a *teaser* effect, while the actual articles from the magazine didn’t necessarily follow the inverted pyramid structure of writing due to their analytical purpose. Among *keywords* extracted from the journalistic reports and articles of both outlets were strong adjectives and definitions concerning the conflict, such as ‘onslaught’, ‘moral outrage’, ‘unstable cocktail of minorities’, ‘calamity’ and ‘bloodshed’, suggesting a strong will from the authors to engage with the readers, mobilize their emotions and transmit the severity of actions on the ground – in spite of the apparent scarcity of actual field work. The *sources* used were mainly members of governments, international agencies, military institutions, diplomats and specialists in general. An essential finding to be mentioned is the impressive lack of clarity concerning sources used by *The Economist*, since the articles rarely mention how the statements and happenings presented were gathered and verified – where did all this information come from? Can the reader somehow verify that the magazine’s articles are based in multiple, trusted sources of information, or should the reader simply trust the anonymous authors and their unmentioned sources due to the magazine’s reputation as reliable?

We were able to come to three main conclusions concerning signification patterns that can be exposed from within and among those textual accounts of the facts related to the humanitarian interventions that took place in Kosovo and Libya:

A) The lack of journalistic presence in the field and the predominant use of official sources to gather information about the conflicts resulted in a form of discourse that could be, as Gilboa (2002) explains in our *Theoretical Background*, highly susceptible to becoming either a tool in the hands of leaders or a controlling

channel of what information gets to be widespread enough to influence public opinion and policy building, preventing real controversy to happen within discourse and unexpected interpretations of the facts to arise;

B) Also, the apparent difficulty to disrupt from national agendas or traditions favored a discursive construction that sidelined or dismissed diverging views of the facts as automatically biased and inaccurate, while the unwillingness or inability to give the direct targets of humanitarian interventions a protagonist role in news stories – specially the victims, since they are the ones that humanitarian interventions are meant to protect – seemed to go in direct contradiction to journalism’s latent potential to direct the spotlight to those who unjustly suffer during wars and conflicts;

C) The interventionist approach, or the idea that military means can serve humanitarian goals in international arenas, was endorsed implicitly or explicitly from the very first news report or article in both media outlets, collaborating to a general semantic recognition of humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and Libya as the only solutions, or the only valid solutions – in alignment with the assertion that the protection of peace is an international responsibility – presented by the majority of propositions within this form of discourse.

These conclusions lead us to the two main empirical questions that drove the whole of this research, starting from the second one: Is there a pattern of macropropositions within the analyzed texts, and could it direct the facts into specific semantic framings? As it is already clear by now, this thesis discovered that support for the *humanitarian intent* of both military interventions is widespread among macropropositions composed from the selected reports and articles, while there is little questioning about the legitimacy of ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a valid concept. With all the gathered evidence, it is safe to say that the uniform pattern of macropropositions in favor of this form of international military engagement exposes an overall pro-interventionist bias from the analyzed journalistic texts in spite of contextual differences between both conflicts. It is also important to acknowledge, however, that the information acquired through this research is insufficient to safely argue for what could be the actual *personal reasons* for that bias – if these could ever be formulated, considering each text has a different author and was written in diverse circumstances within specific editorial policies and using varied moral codes. What is important to emphasize is that the endorsement of the concept of humanitarian intervention is common to the analyzed discourse of both media outlets within our

selected time frames, as well as everything that it entangles – the necessity to intervene with military means; the possibility of restoring peace in unstable regions with international military action; the view of state sovereignty as something finite and subjugated to internationally defined limits; the role of international alliances in fighting for peace; human rights as an international responsibility.

We can also use our findings to answer our first and most important empirical question: What are the mechanisms that sustain the concept of humanitarian intervention within the selected news reports and articles? Considering our *sustentation* effect as a combination of McComb's (2006) theory of *salience* – selection, repetition and personal relevance – with the *signification* function of discourse – when meaning and intent is applied to a specific concept or discursive object –, we can affirm that the consistent pattern of macropropositions in favor of this procedure of international military intervention, repeated with very similar framings throughout the texts and aligned with a constant use of strong language to describe the conflicts – which helped to construct almost indisputable definitions of 'victims', 'aggressors' and 'saviors' within journalistic narratives –, provides the concept of humanitarian intervention a strong semantic sustenance and builds an emotional bridge between the enactment of the readers' personal beliefs and the consistent defense of humanitarian intervention – an *unobtrusive topic* – as an universal responsibility.

5.3.1 Problems

It is necessary to stress that CDA has never been and has never attempted to be or to provide one single or specific theory. Neither is one specific methodology characteristic of research in CDA. Quite the contrary; studies in CDA are multifarious, derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds, oriented towards different data and methodologies. Researchers in CDA also rely on a variety of grammatical approaches. (Wodak 2006, 2)

Critical Discourse Analysis theorists – mainly van Dijk, but also Wodak and Fairclough – have provided a useful theoretical framework for this research that

enabled extensive and detailed analysis of news articles collected within the scope of two major media outlets' editorial guidelines and authorial choices in relation to the contextual background of the 'events' we chose to address and the main theoretical bases of Journalism as a field of knowledge. Van Dijk's "News as Discourse" (1988), as it proposes a specific semantic approach towards the study of journalistic discourse, was specially useful and enabled us to reach important results on what we understand as the mechanisms of *sustentation* of a specific concept within this form of discourse – salience, signification, legitimization. We were able to demonstrate how news articles manage to apply meaning and intent to a concept and its premises through consistent patterns of macropropositions and discursive goals presented to the reader in implicit or explicit forms, enabling it to be repeatedly signified within the public sphere in a specific framing. We were also able to deepen connections between the fields of Journalism and International Relations, which are in many ways entangled in the build up of 'common sense' when the spotlight is given to unobtrusive topics in the press.

However, the very fact that an objectively verifiable CDA process of textual analysis is impossible due to variations of personal interpretation, as Wodak explains above and van Dijk agrees (EDISo 2013, 14 May), makes it ultimately impossible to present systematic and replicable results that stand the influence of diverse individual insights. CDA's goals to produce awareness in terms of power struggles within discourse and to expose specific cases of delusion (Wodak 2006, 3) remain essential for journalists, academics and readers to have a better assessment of how discourses shape our lives in term of collective understandings and public policies. But it would be counterproductive and insincere to ignore this field's limitations, as interdisciplinarity is too often needed during the analytical process not as a path towards new interconnected findings, but as a compensator for the procedural and theoretical gaps it entails.

CDA theorists often justify this problem by describing this field as a social science that is "engaged and committed" against oppression, as opposed to "dispassionate" and objective (Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak 2011, 358), however the restraints mentioned here need to be dealt with in the future in order to improve its use. It was our impression that Critical Discourse Analysis tended to often become restraining rather than liberating, which is rather contradictory for a field of knowledge whose main intent is to reveal and fight oppressive patterns within

discourse. Nevertheless, this study did not rely solely on the aforementioned scholars, as Bourdieu, Foucault, Hafez, McCombs, Schudson and others were equally important to our research and prevented our findings from becoming elusive and intangible.

6 CONCLUSIONS

This research was able to demonstrate how the concept of *humanitarian intervention* and its definition as an acceptable and positive international military operation received sustenance in news reports from two major press organizations during the first moments of journalistic coverage of interventions that took place in the Kosovo War (1998-1999) and the Libyan Civil War (2011), as well as why this legitimization is possible and how it can shape foreign policy and public discourse. Consistent patterns of macropropositions and discursive goals found in the texts signified the concept consistently in specific framings, using voices of authority and perlocutionary effects of journalism to bridge the unobtrusive topic of international military intervention with emotional imagery regarding humanitarianism, genocide, ethnic cleansing, state oppression and human rights. Readers are compelled to regard these military operations as ultimately having humanitarian goals, in spite of controversies related to regime change efforts and possible escalation of violence.

News articles obsessively reported on power struggles and inconsistencies among intervening leaderships, operational possibilities for military action and political repercussions of involvement, while poorly addressing developments on the ground from the perspective of the directly affected, and rejecting the possibility that the very concept of humanitarian intervention could be problematic – operations were endorsed by news reports from the beginning with little scrutiny and presented as only viable solutions. Intervening nations are portrayed as fulfilling their moral obligation and responsibility to protect international peace and security, while the use of diplomatic means for solution of conflict or traditional humanitarian action are discarded due to the severity and urgency of these humanitarian crises. The following main findings can be listed among our post-analysis results:

- a) General deprivation of semantic protagonism for people affected directly by the conflicts and overwhelming use of official sources to compose narrative and check facts;
- b) International – especially Western – duty to intervene and emergency of engagement appear as main discursive goals among reports and articles;

- c) Peripheral discussions added credibility to the journalistic discourse while not adding real controversy to the viability of humanitarian intervention as a concept;
- d) Generalizations, emotional keywords and stereotypical imagery regarding the ‘victims’, the ‘aggressors’ and the ‘saviors’;
- e) Repeated questioning of procedural aspects of military operations and political struggles surrounding the intervention;
- f) Overall support for use of military means for humanitarian goals, verifiable through the analyses of all macropropositions combined.

Public recognition of journalistic discourse as a societal system of truth based on professional methods of verification and the implicit denial of intentionality in this form of communication, as well as the journalistic function of legitimization of certain voices at the expense of others and the selective effort of newsworthiness, enabled the information and interpretation of facts presented by news reports on these interventions to have an impact on the discursive construction of these military operations within public discourse due to the unfamiliarity and ‘distance’ of most readers from the reported events. Readers depended mostly on journalistic texts to form opinions and were more susceptible to agenda-setting effects and belief content suggestion, as our theoretical analysis demonstrated and explained. The journalistic susceptibility to endorse institutional-backed information when covering unobtrusive topics such as these international interventions, combined with difficulties in overcoming regional agendas and restraints, contributed to a unified discourse that presented similar views and suggested similar solutions. As the act of naming can structure perceptions in the social world depending on the credibility of the speaker, this uniformity can be detrimental to some of the core functions of journalism as a profession and field of knowledge, which is to inform its readers, promote honest debate and resist unchallenged versions of the facts.

By addressing how the concept of humanitarian intervention was built and sustained in the selected texts, we were able to develop deeper assessment of the mechanisms of convincement, confrontation and seduction in the journalistic discourse, and engage with some of the existing connections between journalism, public opinion and international relations. Needless to say, further research is necessary to consolidate the findings of this master thesis, since it is impossible for a

single study to analyze all content produced by media organizations regarding international developments – there is still a lot to be explored. This research also intended to serve as a stimulus for more initiatives that strengthens the relationship between the fields of knowledge involved and to collaborate to the better understanding of journalism’s impact in our perception of reality and the shaping of public discourse.

7 POVZETEK V SLOVENŠČINI³²

Pričujoče magistrsko delo s področja novinarstva obravnava, kako je koncept humanitarne intervencije v mednarodnem tisku predstavljen, razvit, uveljavljen in kritiziran kot sprejemljiva tuja vojaška intervencija na primeru prispevkov in člankov o intervencijah v vojni na Kosovu (1998-1999) in državljanski vojni v Libiji (2011). Z boljšim poznavanjem pomenov, ki označujejo izraz *humanitarna intervencija* v prispevkih in člankih v medijih, je mogoče natančneje oceniti mehanizme prepričevanja, soočanja in napeljevanja v novinarskem diskurzu ter povezavo med novinarstvom, javnim mnenjem in oblikovanjem zunanje politike. Razumevanje trditev pri poročanju v mednarodnem tisku o tej temi se bo razvijalo s kritično analizo diskurza (KAD) in teoretskim okvirjem, ki razkriva strukture moči znotraj diskurza in jezika, s poudarkom na teorijah znakovnih in zunajznakovnih vidikov diskurza, ki jih zagovarjajo Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu in Teun A. van Dijk, ter na teoriji vpliva medijskega diskurza na javnost Maxwella McCombsa.

Raziskovalna vprašanja

RV1: Kateri mehanizmi uveljavljajo koncept *humanitarne intervencije* v mednarodnem tisku?

Po KAD diskurzi niso zgolj izrazi družbene prakse ali le odsev resničnosti, saj lahko hkrati služijo določenim ciljem in omogočajo družbeno resničnost samo. To pomeni, da diskurza ne moremo omejiti le na poustvarjanje ali izkrivljanje resničnosti: gre za »materialno resničnost samo po sebi. (...) Tako ni tema tista, ki ustvari diskurze temveč so diskurzi tisti, ki ustvarijo temo (...). Tema zanima ne kot dejavnik, ampak kot produkt diskurzov« (Jäger in Maier 2009, 37). Po drugi strani pa je na podlagi podmene da je tema produkt diskurza, mogoča tudi trditev, da če se ljudje odmaknejo od diskurza, »ta del resničnosti postane nesmiseln (...). Če se znanje, pripisano določenemu delu resničnosti spremeni, ta del resničnosti postane

³² This summary was translated from English to Slovene by Maja Žabota, univ. dipl. soc. kult. in hisp.

nekaj drugega« (Jäger in Maier 2009, 40). Z uporabo tega pristopa zlasti pri analizi novinarskega diskurza namerava pričujoča raziskava dokazati, da lahko v prispevkih in člankih mednarodnega tiska prepoznamo vzorec *makropropozicij* (van Dijk 2009) in diskurzivnih ciljev vselej, kadar je glavna tema mednarodna intervencija, ter da ta vzorec uveljavlja sam koncept humanitarne intervencije ter mu tako omogoča, da se pojavlja v javnosti. Z analizo izbranih besedil o intervencijah na Kosovu in v Libiji magistrsko delo predpostavlja, da je mogoče zaznati pomembne velebnе trditve in uokvirjanje v diskurzivnih konstrukcijah, prisotnih v poročanju o vojaških operacijah, kot so profiliranje sovražnika in žrtev v spopadih, poboji civilistov kot opravičilo za intervencijo, nujnost obnove države po spopadih, moralna dolžnost Zahoda izogniti se genocidu celo z vojaškimi sredstvi in *odgovornostjo zaščititi*, nespoštovanje državne suverenosti in druge možne diskurzivne trditve.

Pomembno je poudariti, da namen magistrskega dela ni podajanje vrednostnih sodb o kateri koli diskurzivni konstrukciji, ki je služila za gradivo raziskave. Delo namerava razkriti, kako se te konstrukcije v novinarskem diskurzu pojavijo in kako služijo kot mehanizmi, ki konceptu humanitarne intervencije pripisujejo pomembnost in smiselnost.

Drugo temeljno empirično vprašanje te raziskave se nanaša na razprave o legitimnosti naslednjega koncepta:

RV2: Katere makropropozicije prevladujejo v izbranih prispevkih in člankih?

S prepoznavanjem različnih paradigem pri izvedbi humanitarne intervencije na primerih Kosova in Libije in z analizo mednarodnih prispevkov in člankov na to temo želi pričujoče magistrsko delo izpostaviti, da je igral novinarski diskurz pomembno vlogo pri javnem upravičevanju in zavračanju intervencij z uporabo resničnih dogodkov ali »dejstev«, s katerimi je ustvaril »zgodbe« in »osebe«, ki ustvarjajo specifično argumentacijo, zmožno oblikovati naše razumevanje resničnosti z uporabo vnaprejšnjih predstav o novinarski objektivnosti kot potrditvenem orodju, ki povedanim zgodbam pridoda verodostojnost. Čeprav je ideja o nepristranskosti v javnosti v novinarskem diskurzu že močno vprašljiva, domnevno nenehno iskanje objektivnosti, za katerim stojijo novinarji – utemeljeno s strokovnimi postopki, ki naj bi njihovim besedam jamčili verodostojnost, kot so preverjanje dejstev, raznolikost

virov, uporaba neodvisnih podatkov in tako dalje – ustvarja diskurzivno moč, s katero lastne prispevke ločijo od drugih pisnih pričevanj o dejstvih, s katerimi tako pripomorejo k uveljavljanju načel, ki opisujejo *resničnost* na različne načine. V tej magistrski nalogi je posebno zanimanje posvečeno vprašanju, ali načela iz izbranih novinarskih besedil tvorijo vzorec prevladujočih propozicij in makropropozicij, ki jih lahko prepoznamo in izpostavimo z metodo kritične diskurzivne analize. Možni vzorci, ki se bodo pokazali pri odgovoru na drugo raziskovalno vprašanje, bodo v pomoč pri odgovoru na prvo temeljno vprašanje navedeno zgoraj.

Metodologija

Za raziskovanje koncepta humanitarne intervencije v mednarodnem tisku je raziskava izbrala analizo novinarskih prispevkov v dnevnem časopisu *The New York Times* in člankov v tedenski reviji *The Economist* zaradi njunega širokega dosega mednarodnih bralcev in njune splošne priznanosti kot verodostojnih virov novic. Poleg tega različna narava publikacij – prva je dnevni časopis, druga pa tedenska revija – omogoča raziskovanje različnih vrst besedil, ki so predstavljeni kot prispevki oziroma analitični članki ter njihove različne vidike v okviru analize diskurza. Za to raziskavo so bili izbrani prispevki in članki s poglavitno temo – ali eno od poglavitnih tem – humanitarnih intervencij, ki sta potekali na Kosovu (1999) in v Libiji (2011), saj so se pri obeh uporabljale podobne utemeljitve, čeprav sta imeli različno družbenopolitično in zgodovinsko ozadje. V celoti je bilo v nalogi analiziranih 41 prispevkov in člankov.

Iz časopisa *The New York Times* so bili v raziskavi zajeti vsi prispevki o intervencijah na Kosovu in v Libiji v časovnem okviru enega tedna; v obeh primerih od dneva »uradnega začetka« humanitarne intervencije ter šest dni po tem. V primeru vojne na Kosovu, v kateri so se Natovi letalski napadi začeli 24. marca 1999 (BBC, 9. april 1999), se časovni okvir analize tako prične na ta dan in konča 30. marca 1999. V primeru državljanske vojne v Libiji, v kateri je Varnostni svet Združenih narodov implementiral območje prepovedi letenja nad Libijo 19. marca 2011 (United Nations News Center, 17. marec 2011), se časovni okvir analize prične na ta dan in konča 25. marca 2011.

Iz revije *The Economist*, ki izdaja analitične prispevke, ki se ne uvrščajo nujno med lahkotne novice, so bila v raziskavi zajeta vsa pisana besedila, v katerih sta bili

humanitarni intervenciji na Kosovu in v Libiji glavna tema ali ena izmed glavnih tem. Izbrani članki iz te revije so bili objavljeni v izdajah takoj po »uradnem« začetku obeh humanitarnih intervencij – v primeru Kosova so bili analizirani članki v izdajah z dne 27. marca 1999 in 3. aprila 1999, v primeru Libije pa so bili izbrani članki iz izdaj z dne 19. marca 2011 in 26. marca 2011.

Sklepi

Analiza in primerjava vseh novinarskih prispevkov in člankov, izbranih iz časopisa *The New York Times* in revije *The Economist* v tem magistrskem delu, sta pripeljali do sklepov glede pomenskih vzorcev, ki so izpostavljeni v pisnih pričevanjih o dejstvih, povezanih s humanitarnimi intervencijami na Kosovu in v Libiji.

Pomanjkanje prisotnosti novinarjev na terenu in prevladujoča uporaba »uradnih« virov za zbiranje informacij o spopadih sta privedla do oblike diskurza, ki bi lahko bil, kot razloži Gilboa (2002), v *drugem poglavju* pričujoče naloge, dovzeten za sprevačanje v orodje v rokah vodij ali pa kot kanal za nadziranje tega, katere informacije bodo dovolj razširjene, da bodo vplivale na javno mnenje ter na postopek oblikovanja politik, s čemer se preprečita vnemanje polemik znotraj diskurza ter možnost pojavitve nepričakovanih interpretacij dejstev.

Prav tako se zdi, da daje očitna težavnost odcepitve od nacionalnih agend in tradicij ter od priznavanja legitimnosti »neuradnim« mnenjem prednost diskurzivnim konstrukcijam, ki ne upoštevajo ali celo zavračajo različna stališča glede dejstev kot samodejno pristranska ali napačna, medtem ko nepripravljenost ali nezmožnost, da bi dali pravim tarčam humanitarnih intervencij glavno vlogo v novinarskih prispevkih – predvsem pa žrtvam, saj so te tiste, ki naj bi jih intervencija zaščitila – v neposredno protislovje s tem, kar se zdi večini novinarjev, da počnejo, ko poročajo o vojnah in spopadih, in sicer da dajejo glas tistim, ki nepravilno trpijo.

Intervencionistični pristop oziroma ideja, da vojaška sredstva lahko služijo humanitarnim ciljem v mednarodni areni, v analiziranih novinarskih besedilih v tej magistrski nalogi ni bila zares natančno pretehtana z nasprotujočimi mnenji in trditvami, nasprotno, ta ideja je bila implicitno ali eksplicitno od prvega prispevka ali članka dalje sprejeta v obeh medijih, kar je prispevalo k splošnemu pomenskemu priznavanju humanitarne intervencije na Kosovu in v Libiji kot edini rešitvi ali edini tehni rešitvi, predstavljeni v večini trditev znotraj te oblike diskurza.

To nas pripelje do dveh temeljnih empiričnih vprašanj, ki sta vodila celotno raziskavo, začenši z drugim: ali v analiziranih besedilih obstaja vzorec makropropozicij in ali bi lahko ta vzorec vodil dejstva proti določenemu pomenskemu okviru? Po analizi vseh izbranih novinarskih besedil v delu se je izkazalo, da je podpora humanitarnega namena mednarodnih letalskih napadov širše prisotna v skoraj vseh povzetih makropropozicijah, medtem ko je zelo malo izpraševanja glede učinkovitosti in legitimnosti tega postopka in same *humanitarne intervencije* kot tehtnega koncepta. Enoten vzorec makropropozicij v prid tej obliki mednarodnega vojaškega posredovanja poleg tega, da je neposredno v nasprotju z novinarskim diskurzom samooklicane pristranskosti - saj je bila od vseh možnosti očitno večja naklonjenost dodeljena določeni rešitvi - v izbranih prispevkih in člankih prav tako razkrije splošno prointervencionistično pristranskost. Vseeno pa je pomembno priznati, da so informacije, zbrane v tej raziskavi, nezadostne, da bi se lahko z gotovostjo trdilo, kateri bi lahko bili dejanski razlogi za to pristranskost, če se bi jih sploh dalo navesti, saj je vsako besedilo delo različnega avtorja s svojim osebnim svetovnim nazorom, ki je nastalo v različnih okoliščinah znotraj različnih uredniških politik.

Izhajajoč iz tega zaključka je možno odgovoriti tudi na prvo poglobitno empirično vprašanje, in sicer kateri mehanizmi ohranjajo koncept *humanitarne intervencije* v izbranih mednarodnih prispevkih in člankih. Ob upoštevanju našega razumevanja učinka uveljavljanja pojavnosti kot kombinacije McCombove (200) teorije *poudarjenosti* - izbira, ponavljanje in osebna pomembnost – s *pomensko* vlogo diskurza - ko sta pomen in namen uporabljena v določenem konceptu ali diskurzivnem predmetu – je mogoče zatrditi, da dosleden vzorec makropropozicij v prid mednarodnemu vojaškemu posredovanju, ki se je v besedilih ponavljal v zelo podobnih okvirih in je bil usklajen s stalno rabo močnega jezika za opisovanje spopadov – kar je pripomoglo k ustvarjanju nespornih opredelitev »žrtev« in »napadalcev« v novinarskih pripovedih - konceptu humanitarne intervencije zagotavlja močno pomensko uveljavljanje pojavnosti in zgradi čustven most med ustvarjanjem bralčevih osebnih prepričanj ter doslednim zagovarjanjem humanitarnega posredovanja - *nedostopna tema* - kot univerzalne odgovornosti.

Ni treba posebej poudarjati, da je za utrditev sklepov pričujoče raziskave potrebna nadaljnja raziskava, še posebej zato, ker je bilo v tej mogoče analizirati zgolj

prispevke in članke dveh medijskih virov v prvih dneh humanitarne intervencije na Kosovu in v Libiji.

Pričujoče magistrsko delo želi spodbuditi nadaljnje raziskave, okrepiti odnos med novinarstvom, analizo diskurza in mednarodnimi odnosi ter prispevati k boljšemu razumevanju perlokucijskih učinkov novinarskega diskurza, kakor tudi njegovega vpliva na naše dojemanje sveta.

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