UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE

Igor Aksentijević

Sekuritizacija in migracije: vpliv terorističnih napadov na emigracijske trende evropskih Judov (2001–2016)

Securitization and Migration: The Impact of Terrorist Attacks On The Emigration Trends Of European Jews (2001–2016)

Magistrsko delo

Ljubljana, 2018

UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE

Igor Aksentijević

Mentor: doc. dr. Marko Lovec

Sekuritizacija in migracije: vpliv terorističnih napadov na emigracijske trende evropskih Judov (2001–2016)

Securitization and Migration: The Impact of Terrorist Attacks On The Emigration Trends Of European Jews (2001–2016)

Magistrsko delo

Ljubljana, 2018

Sekuritizacija in migracije: vpliv terorističnih napadov na emigracijske trende evropskih Judov (2001–2016)

To magistrsko delo je poskus raziskovanja vpliva terorističnih napadov, izvedenih s strani radikalnih islamskih skupin, na emigracijske vzorce evropskih Judov med leti 2001 in 2016. Natančneje, delo se nanaša na razmerje med omenjenima fenomenoma v okviru mednarodnih odnosov, kjer varnost, percepcija in identiteta predstavljajo spremenljivke, ki predvidoma vplivajo na vedenje nadnacionalnih igralcev. Ob upoštevanju kontroverzne narave vzročnosti med konstruktivističnimi strokovnjaki, to magistrsko delo tudi poskuša osvetliti dodatne vplivne dejavnike, ki morebiti vodijo v judovsko emigracijo iz Evrope. V prvem delu magistrsko delo osvetli zgodovinski kontekst evropskega preganjanja Judov in tudi kratko zgodovino judovsko-muslimanskih odnosov. Slednje je ključno ob upoštevanju dejstva, da je analiza izvedena iz teoretičnih perspektiv konstruktivizma in sekuritizacije, ki opredeljujeta vpliva intersubjektivnosti in percepcije na vedenje nadnacionalnih igralcev. Razumevanje zgodovinskih dinamik pri teh fenomenih je še posebej pomembno, ker se je kot glavno metodološko orodje izbrala analiza diskurza – preučevanje govora in jezika. Glavni izsledek te študije kaže, da sicer obstaja močna povezava med pojavnostjo radikalnega islamskega terorizma in povečanjem Judovske emigracije iz Evrope, a da obstajajo tudi drugi vplivni faktorji, ki so pomembni za razumevanje mednarodnih migracij.

Ključne besede: islam in terorizem, judovska diaspora, mednarodne migracije, skupinska identiteta.

Securitization and Migration: The Impact of Terrorist Attacks on the Emigration Trends of European Jews (2001–2016)

This master's thesis is an attempt to investigate the effect of terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamic groups on the emigration patterns of European Jews in the period between 2001 and 2016. More precisely, it is concerned with the relationship between these two phenomena within the framework of international relations, when security, perception, and identity are the variables assumed to be affecting the behavior of transnational actors. Due to the controversial nature of causality among constructivist scholars, the thesis also seeks to gain insights into additional push and pull factors that might drive the Jewish emigration from Europe. Firstly, the thesis lays out the historical context of the European persecution of Jews, as well as a brief history of Jewish-Islamic relations. This is crucial, considering the fact that the analysis is conducted through the theoretical lenses of constructivism and securitization, both of which account for the impact that intersubjectivity and perception have on the behavior of international actors. Understanding the historical dynamics between the phenomena in question is particularly important because discourse analysis – the examination of speech and language – is employed as the driving methodological tool. The key findings of this research indicate that, while there seems to be a strong correlation between the occurrence of radical Islamic terrorism and the rise in the emigration of European Jews, there are other push and pull factors that render itself consequential when it comes to international migration.

Keywords: Islam and Terrorism, Jewish Diaspora, International Migration, Group Identity.

Table of Contents

Index of Tables

Index of Figures

List of Abbreviations

ANO	Abu Nidal Organization
CST	Community Security Trust
EUMC	European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia
IJO	Islamic Jihad Organization
IR	International Relations (discipline)
ISI	Islamic State of Iraq
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
JPR	Institute for Jewish Policy Research
MSC	Mujahidin Shura Council
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

1 Introduction

Much of the current debate within the international political arena revolves around security politics that result from radical Islamic terrorism[1] (Jackson, 2007, p. 394). Despite the fact that the probability of being killed as the result of a terrorist attack is lower in comparison to multiple other causes of death, the scaremongering propaganda of radical Islamic forces has led to growing fears, particularly among members of vulnerable social groups in Europe. Such fears are often reflected in Islamophobic remarks both by members of the civil society as well as their respective leadership (Beller, 2008, p. 5). That said, the leadership of certain social groups has raised concerns over the impact that the scare tactics of radical Islamic terrorist groups have on the life and security of their members. Persons who self-identify as members of the Jewish community in Europe are an example of one such group. In fact, the Wahhabi roots of Islamic Radicalism put a central emphasis on the targeting of Jews, who are seen as infidels within the ultraconservative religious movement. It is important to understand that the extreme branches of the Wahhabi doctrine, which inform radical Islamic terrorism, call for the assassination of all individuals who refuse to submit to their religious teaching (Allen, 2007, p. 47). For that reason, it seems plausible to suggest that there is a possibility that radical Islamic terrorist attacks in the period between 2001 and 2016 had an impact on the emigration trends of European Jews. At the same time, however, other factors influencing Jewish migration must be taken into consideration in order to get a better understanding of the relationship between the two phenomena.

This thesis has two main objectives:

> 1. To determine whether there is a correlation between terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic extremists and the change in the emigration trends of European Jews;

---

[1] Radical Islamic terrorism is a term used to describe any terrorist activity, violent propaganda campaign or form of militant oppression carried out by groups that self-identify as defenders of Islamic traditions such as Salafism, Wahhabism, and other ultraconservative political sects of Islam. It is important to understand that these terrorist groups target both Muslim and non-Muslim individuals (Hoffman, 1999, pp. 89–90). The annual report published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (2016, p. 64) found that at least four groups who identify with Islamic extremism were responsible for 74% of all terrorist casualties: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Boko Haram.

2.   To provide a thorough analysis of discourses behind the change in the emigration trends of European Jews in order to determine its relationship with radical Islamic terrorism.

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the underlying issue of the growing rate of Jewish emigration from Europe within the broader context of securitization. Furthermore, this study is an attempt to demonstrate that discursive politics have an impact on changes that take place within contemporary international relations. Extending the analysis beyond the traditional state-centered level in IR, this piece of work finds its relevance in demonstrating how non-state actors construct and mold social reality in international relations.

Prior studies on inter-religious animosity and annual reports on the life of Jewish minorities in Europe have identified a correlation between anti-Semitism and fears of Islamic extremism in Europe (Rosenfeld, 2015, p. 160; DellaPergola, 2015, p. 51; Staetsky, 2017, p. 15). The historical animosity between Jews and Muslims, as well as the anti-Semitic underpinnings of Wahhabi-inspired Islamic extremism raise concerns over the security of Jewish minorities living in Europe (Bouganim, 2003, p. 14). Furthermore, the securitization discourse surrounding radical Islamic terrorism affects the collective identity of Jewish minorities in Europe and shapes their perception of fear and security (Arnett, 2015). Due to the intricate nature of securitization, individuals belonging to the Jewish community in Europe reaffirm their own sense of belonging and collective identity by adopting a perception of what might hurt that identity, in this case Wahhabi-inspired Islamic extremism (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2013, pp. 25–26). In other words, the discursive politics of securitization influence their behavior in the international political arena. With that in mind, the main question of this research is stated as follows: **how did securitization following the terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic extremists impact the emigration trends of European Jews in the period between 2001 and 2016?** In order to examine the correlation between the two occurrences, the following hypotheses are to be tested:

1.   The rate of Jewish emigration from Europe tends to increase in the period following a terrorist attack carried out by Islamic extremists;

2.   The emigration of European Jews is influenced by push and pull forms of securitization.

Taken that this research is centered around interests and ideas that influence the behavior of actors in international relations, the main hypotheses are analyzed through the lens of constructivism. As observed in prior studies and research on the relationship between radical Islamic terrorism and persons belonging to different Jewish minority groups, social norms and historical experience play an important part when it comes to the dynamics between these two phenomena. As put forward by constructivist scholars, social interaction results from, and contributes to, the contextualization of ideas as well as the changes in the behavior of international actors. In other words, the meaning which actors ascribe to different phenomena tends to dictate their behavior in the international political arena. The theory of constructivism goes beyond the classical neorealist model of a state-centered international system by postulating that the structure of international relations is ideational rather than material (Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons, 2012, pp. 111–112). More specifically, the theory of securitization, which synthesizes constructivist and realist assumptions, will be used for the analysis. First introduced by theorists of the Copenhagen School, the theory of securitization is premised on the assumption that the behavior of actors in international relations is heavily influenced by discursive politics which seek to present something as an existential threat. That said, an issue can become securitized, and therefore influence the behavior of actors – in this case, the Jewish diaspora in Europe – only if audiences express consensual recognition of such conceptualization (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, 1998, p. 25).

This thesis begins with the constructivist assumption that international actors participate in the shaping and reproducing of their identity through speech acts that synchronously reflect and construct their perception. For that reason, the main methodological tool in the research is discourse analysis, which seeks to grasp the intention behind different forms of communication between international actors. Coupled with the premises of securitization, discourse analysis is employed to determine the importance that the transnational Jewish diaspora and radical Islamic groups place on the issue of security.

While establishing a highly probable causation between radical Islamic terrorist attacks and the rise in emigration among European Jews would require further data collection, such as surveys of Jewish emigrants from Europe, the thesis goes to great lengths to yield findings that

demonstrate how discourse, identity, and perception construct the fabric of contemporary international relations, which are not exclusively state-centered.

2 Theoretical and Methodological Framework

This section has the function of accounting for the broader theoretical and methodological framework used in the thesis. In this chapter, the main assumptions of the theory of constructivism will be explained in order to set the stage for further analysis. The behavior of actors in international relations will be put in the context of security through the lens of constructivism. Additionally, this section will delve into the specifics of securitization theory, which stands as a synthesis of constructivist and realist assumptions and can therefore be seen as an extension of the theory of constructivism. Constructivism will serve as the theoretical backbone of the thesis, while the theory of securitization can offer a more specific argumentative value to the issue of security in international relations. Both theories will be used to establish an explanatory framework around the subject matter, wherein they can strengthen the arguments put forth in the analysis.

Similarly, the chapter will account for methods used in the analysis and types of relevant data that will be part of it. The methodological part of this section will deal with discursive patterns and securitization aspects of migration and terrorism. The goal of this chapter is to lay out the theoretical and methodological framework in a way that will facilitate the understanding of prisms used to analyze the problem in question.

2.1 Constructivism as a Primary Lens

In its academic infancy, International Relations (IR) represented a discipline torn between the "great debates" of realism and idealism;[2] the latter eventually gave rise to liberalism[3] as a discrete theory of international relations. While both realism and liberalism attempt to make substantive claims about human nature and its influence on the behavior of actors in international relations, constructivism stands out by suggesting that many aspects of interstate interaction are

---

[2] The debate between realism and idealism dominated the realm of international relations theory in the first part of the twentieth century. The realist assumption that nation states are primarily concerned with their survival in an anarchic self-help system (Snyder, 2004, p. 55) was challenged by the idealist notion that states should incorporate their internal philosophy of wellbeing into their foreign policy goals (Hollis and Smith, 1990, p. 17). In other words, the proponents of realism hold that states cannot trust other states when it comes to their survival, while idealists suggest the exact opposite. In its essence, this debate is centered around the ways in which each side sees human nature and its impact on international relations.

[3] As a historical derivative of idealism, liberalism as a theory in international relations rests on the assumption that interstate cooperation through institutional means can reduce the probability of conflict (Shiraev, 2014, p. 73).

socially constructed. Social actions and processes are placed in context, wherein it is understood that social reality is the result of perceptual construct (Adler, 2013, p. 112). As put forward by Wendt (1992, p. 406), social structures are not given, but rather constructed through social practices. With that in mind, it seems fair to suggest that the neorealist and neoliberal analyses are somewhat incomplete, as they almost exclusively focus on material characteristics, while disregarding the importance of identities, interests and perception of actors involved (*ibid.,* p. 409). That is not to say that states cannot adjust their behavior according to the characteristics of an anarchic international system. However, such behavior should be seen as the result of states perceiving the system as such, rather than it being a fixed material reality (*ibid.,* p. 395). In order to analyze the behavior of actors in international relations through the lens of constructivism, it is important to understand its stance on the role of knowledge, perception and identity, as well as its ability to detach from the conventional state-centered approach to international relations.

While it certainly recognizes the importance of structures in international relations, the constructivist school of thought differs from neoliberalism and neorealism in that it is concerned with factors which shape and reinforce these structures. More importantly, constructivism rests on the assumption that the meanings ascribed to material variables by actors in international relations are, in fact, sometimes more influential than the material reality itself. Given the central role that interpretation and perception play in constructivist arguments, this school of thought can be seen as a social theory first and foremost (Adler, 2013, pp. 113–114). That is to say that structures have different meanings in different contexts; actors in international relations adjust their behavior according to their perception and interpretation of ideational structures, rather than there being a pre-programmed, immutable system which drives their actions. Behavior is influenced by both rational and irrational factors, which means that it is difficult making assumptions based on material factors alone. For that reason, it is important to take into account the concept of intersubjectivity[4] when analyzing actions and practices in international relations (Hopf, 1998, pp. 172–173).

---

[4] Intersubjectivity is a philosophical concept used for the analysis of differences in individual and collective actions. This idea is rooted in the assumption that one group of actors participates in social practices that are different from those of another group, which eventually results in different groups holding different beliefs, interpretations and perceptions about the same material substance (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 94). For instance, a state's decision to increase its military spending can be perceived by another state as either a threat or a safety measure, depending on the context as well as the relational factors at play.

Intersubjectivity is both a prerequisite and an essential characteristic of identity in international relations. Not only does intersubjective knowledge shape perception, but it also creates and reinforces the affirmation of identity. Actors in international relations need to have a sense of distinct identity in order to act accordingly, and vice versa. Only by understanding the characteristics of one's own identity can an actor identify its preferences and interests. That said, it must be acknowledged that identities are relational; they are subject to change, and depend on the context of perception (*ibid.,* p. 175). For example, if an actor perceives itself as militarily or economically weak, it will likely assume the role of a protégé, and will engage in practices that reinforce that identity (e.g. Tanzania seeking for and accepting development aid; Baaz, 2005, p. 96). Similarly, two actors engaged in a common activity might both assume the identity of a victim, as instructed by the reinforcement of their interests and preferences (e.g. both Israelis and Palestinians perceive themselves as victims in the conflict; Vollhardt, 2009, p. 137).

Hopf (1998) considers identity to be the most reliable variable in the assessment of predictability in international relations. While it might be true that identities are relational, certain practices and patterns of behavior create a sense of durability, which helps contextualize and evaluate them. In other words, actors in international relations rarely make their identity subject to radical change in a short period of time; the way of conduct must repeat in several cycles in order to contribute to identity affirmation (e.g. the Soviet Union continuously engaging in practices that reaffirm its role of a challenger to the unipolar domination of the United States during the Cold War; Herman, 1996, p. 176). Be that as it may, an actor does not have control over how others perceive its actions – this is the key point of understanding intersubjective structures.

A state might engage in practices with the intention of sending a certain message, but the nature of intersubjectivity could bring about a completely different signal interpretation by other actors involved. This can, once again, be illustrated with the example of Cold War rivalries. The military and technological capabilities of the Soviet Union did not cease to exist after its dissolution. As a matter of fact, the Russian Federation assumed the role of its legal successor, inheriting the Union's nuclear arsenal as well as its other powerful possessions. Nevertheless, the new state was not perceived as a threat to world peace, or a weighty challenger to American power, since its former socialist identity had vanished. Moreover, the United States and many other adversaries of the former Soviet Union helped the strengthening of Russia's economy,

despite its inheritance of nuclear weaponry and other mighty capabilities (Cox, 1994, p. 654). The question that remains is how does this approach to the role of perception and identity in international affairs translate to non-state actors.[5]

Constructivist scholars, such as Finnemore (1996, p. 7), make an important departure from classical theories of international relations, by expanding their analysis beyond the traditional state-centered level. Such a revised approach allows for the examination of international structures as ideational, as opposed to purely material. This is particularly valuable when it comes to making sense of actions by non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations and diaspora networks, and observing them within the broader context of international relations.

Non-state actors have existed since the emergence of nation-states, and have played different roles in different contexts (Colonomos, 2001, p. 76). In the period of the last half a century, non-state actors have become prominent players in the international political arena, and have therefore assumed an important position in IR literature. Intersubjective identity and perception are particularly important for non-state actors, as their interests and goals cannot always be confined within state-centered boundaries. Transnational ethnic diasporas are an example of one such actor. While their primary interest often lies in the relationship they have with a historical homeland[6] or territory perceived as belonging to them, ethnic diasporas operate on transnational levels, engaging in activities with self-identified members, and the governments in charge of what they perceived to be their 'historical' territory (Tölölyan, 1996, p. 5). The identity of transnational ethnic diasporas is deeply rooted in a sense of security, followed by the need to preserve ethnic, national, and religious collectivity. Due to its complex history and centrality in world politics, the transnational Jewish diaspora is generally considered one of the most well-known examples of such a group (Safran, 1991, p. 84).

By the same token, non-state terrorist organizations use violence as a tool to manipulate the perception of others, with the ultimate goal of creating a sense of fear, and inferiority among

---

[5] In IR literature, non-state actors are generally understood as entities that act somewhat autonomously from the structure or coordination of the state. With that in mind, it is important to understand that these actors can operate on levels below (i.e. terrorist organizations and diaspora networks) or above the state structure (e.g. supranational organizations). Both types often engage in transnational activities (Josselin and Wallace, 2001, p. 3).

[6] Historical territory or homeland is the conceptualization of a place about which a specific ethnic group retains collective memory and emotional connection through myths, ancestral stories, poems, ritualistic practices and other means of cultural reproduction. This is particularly relevant in the case of ethnic diasporas, whose self-identified members consider such a place their true home (Safran, 1991, p. 83).

their adversaries (Fortna, 2015, p. 520). It is important to understand that terrorist organizations often assume the identity of freedom fighters or, in most recent history, religious messengers, rejecting the notion that their goal is to terrorize (Ganor, 2010, p. 292). This is yet another example of intersubjectivity, as well as the complex conceptualization of identity that comes into play when we discuss the factors that influence the behavior of actors in international relations.

For that reason, the constructivist concept of intersubjectivity plays an important part in the analysis of the behavior of non-state actors, such as the transnational ethnic diasporas and terrorist organizations. The consideration of this concept is particularly important when it comes to studying security in international relations from a constructivist point of view. Whereas a (neo)realist identifies security as the ultimate goal of states in an alleged self-help system of anarchy, a constructivist dissects the very notion of security, raising a question about its relational nature. That is to say that security is not seen in mere military or economic terms, but rather observed as a social construct which takes different forms in different contexts (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996, p. 20). What could mean security for one party, might take on a whole different meaning for another. Therefore, the concept of security cannot be deconstructed and analyzed without taking into consideration its intersubjective nature. That is not to say that threats to security of a referent subject are nonexistent in empirical reality; it simply means that the analysis has to include an additional consideration of threats that are socially constructed in order to better understand the behavior of actors in international relations.

2.2 Securitization Theory

Security plays a central part in the premise of this thesis, making the concept that much more important for further analysis. There is a discrete school of thought within IR studies specifically dealing with the issue of security, which often combines realist and constructivist assumptions in its study of international relations. The Copenhagen School,[7] as it is commonly referred to, seeks to understand the concept of security by identifying the actors who assume authority over its

---

[7] The Copenhagen School refers to several authors of IR literature whose primary subject of interest is the study of security in international relations. The most prominent names associated with this school of thought are Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. The term was coined by Irish researcher Bill McSweeney, due to the fact that most of the names associated with this school worked at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. Even though the Copenhagen scholars have done research on many aspects of security, they remain most widely known for their conceptualization of the securitization theory (McSweeney, 1996, p. 83).

construction, perpetuation, and affirmation (Williams, 2003, p. 512). More importantly, the Copenhagen scholars of security are concerned with discursive politics whose initiators have the goal of "securitizing" different aspects of international relations (*ibid.,* p. 514). For that reason, they introduce a special term, "securitization", to refer to the social construction of security.

As put forward by Buzan *et al.* (1998, p. 21), in order to recognize the factors that make something an issue of security in international relations, it is important to look beyond the traditional realist interpretations. While it might be true that security is centered around the survival of actors in question, the process of identifying existential threats is not simple. In traditional relations between states, isolating something as an existential threat is used as a sufficient condition for the use of military force, or other means deemed necessary for the protection of own security. Similarly, representatives of terrorist organizations often cite security concerns as one of the primary reasons of their actions. That said, 'security' used in this context carries a slightly different meaning.

Take, for instance, Osama Bin Laden's [8] 1996 war declaration against the United States. In the manifesto, al-Qaeda's[9] founder claimed that the radical position held by his organization was, in fact, one of defense. More precisely, Bin Laden suggested that a number of different non-state forces would have to carry out a violent response to the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia,[10] as well as what was perceived as the West's exploitation of Arab resources and lands (Laden, 1996, p. 10; Burke, 2004, p. 19). Throughout the *fatwā,*[11] al-Qaeda's leader continuously

---

[8] Osama Bin Laden (*usāmah bin muḥammad bin 'awaḍ bin lādin*) was a Saudi Arabian leader of the radical Islamic terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, who claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist operations, including the September 11 attacks on the United States. Initially part of the insurgent forces against the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Bin Laden went on to declare a war against the United States in 1996, becoming one of the world's most wanted fugitives. In 2011, Bin Laden was found in a private residence in Pakistan and killed by U.S. special forces (Baker, Cooper, and Mazzetti, 2011).

[9] Al-Qaeda is a radical Islamist transnational organization founded by Osama Bin Laden and a number of other advocates of Salafist jihadism. The group is listed as a terrorist organization by major international organizations as well as many individual countries, including the United States, Russia, India, and others. The actions of Al-Qaeda are believed to have inspired different waves of jihadi extremists in the last few decades (Burke, 2004, p. 18).

[10] Bin Laden's opposition to the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia was largely due to the country's geographical ties to Islam's holiest mosques, Al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca and Al-Masjid an-Nabawi in Medina. According to the traditional Muslim belief, Prophet Muhammad's pilgrimage between the two places is considered to be the cornerstone of the Muslim religion (Lewis, 1998, p. 16).

[11] According to the Islamic faith, *fatwā* is a term used to describe a legal opinion that carries nonbinding, but nonetheless authoritative meaning. Any Muslim individual trained to interpret the Islamic law can issue a *fatwā* (Masud, Messick and Powers, 1996, p. 3).

referenced passages of the Quran[12] in order to justify future use of force in case the West refused to act according to the conditions laid out in the document. This is where the constructivist concept of intersubjective identity comes at play. While the actions of al-Qaeda are widely perceived by most Western countries as offensive in nature, the organization itself holds that the attacks are simply a response to Western "imperialist" practices carried out on Arab territories (Lewis, 1998, p. 14). This dichotomy in perception can serve as an example of securitization. On the one hand, we have powerful Western countries who identify al-Qaeda and other extremist organizations as an existential threat. On the other, radical Islamist groups claim that American values, as well as their presence on Arab soil, represent a threat to the survival of Islam (*ibid.,* p. 15).

As seen in the example above, the process of securitization concerns the identification of existential threats to security which materializes through speech and discursive politics. Such conceptualization of security serves as a valuable means of analyzing the behavior of actors in international relations (i.e. terrorist attacks or migration of ethnic diasporas). The question is, how does an issue become 'securitized' to the point that it propels players into action? As suggested by the Copenhagen security scholars, it is not enough that a discourse introduces something as an existential threat. An issue becomes securitized only in the event that a sizeable audience accepts it as such (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 25). That said, the early proponents of the securitization theory do not specify how big the audience must be, which leaves the notion of the process itself open to interpretation. While there is a difference between politicization and securitization, the lines are often blurry, as there are cases in which most parties agree on what the existential threat is. Be that as it may, it is important to recognize that the discerning of existential threats in international relations is, more often than not, relational and subject to perception (*ibid.*, pp. 21–22). Opposing sides might agree on the very existence of such threats, but how they are interpreted is heavily context-dependent.

Balzacq (2005, pp. 171–172) suggests that the theory of securitization allows for a more in-depth analysis of ideational structures centered around the issue of security. That said, he offers a revised version of the theory, by challenging the foundational assumption that discursive politics of securitization mainly occur within a previously established "rulebook" of speech. Instead,

---

[12] The Quran is the most important piece of writing in the religion of Islam ("Quran", n. d.).

securitization is understood as purely context-driven, dependent upon circumstances, and the psycho-cultural background of the participants. Furthermore, an important distinction is being made between a conventional speech act, and a strategic discourse used in securitization: while the former seeks to establish universal principles of communication regardless of context, the latter uses context-driven pragmatic tactics to achieve its goals.

Discursive politics, which represent a vital element of securitization in international relations, have the intent of reaching a target audience. The early advocates of the securitization theory do not, however, specify the criteria by which members of such audience could be identified. It is assumed, rather, that the discourse itself clearly indicates whom the messages are intended for. That said, Wæver (2003, pp. 11–12) postulates that the audience is not restricted to the populace of a single country, which indicates that different categories could apply when attempting to identify the audience (i.e. transnational religious groups, ethnic diasporas, or a group unified by a transnational ideology). Vuori (2008, p. 72) further develops the claim that securitizing actors – those who initiate the process of securitization – choose their audiences based on the function of their discourse. Once again, the conceptualization of audience in securitization is understood as context-dependent. If anything, whoever provides the securitizing actor with what they seek to accomplish through the process of securitization could be counted as part of that audience. Nevertheless, the role that the audience plays in securitization cannot be examined without understanding the principal goal of securitization: influencing the behavior of actors by securitizing an issue regardless of whether the threat exists in empirical reality.

Whether it be influencing the conduct of specific agencies, or a policy regarding security, the process of securitization seeks to achieve its objectives by signalizing that a certain issue has become an existential threat to its audience. Balzacq (2005, pp. 180–181), argues that securitization consists of false implications that might nevertheless materialize in objective reality due to the nature of the process itself (e.g. self-fulfilling prophecy). More precisely, when securitizing agents put forward claims about existential threats, these create space for further contextualization. In such cases, words and messages create, or shape, the context itself, which eventually results in action. Rhetorical insistence on security may not reflect objective reality, but has the potential of creating conditions for deeds. The scholars of securitization are particularly interested in the discourse's capability to propel audiences into action, without

necessarily being rooted in facts.

Rather than arguing against the assumptions put forward by the Copenhagen School, Balzacq (2005, p. 182) seeks to expand them. In addition to the internalist view of securitized discourse, the analysis develops to include an externalist aspect, too. It is suggested that the discursive language used in the process of securitization must have some kind of connection to external reality. Most commonly, securitized statements in international relations are put in the context of historical speculation, playing on the vulnerability of its audience(s). This means that the securitizing actor must carefully choose when to instigate the process of securitization in order to make it successful. The time must be critical enough for the audiences to accept, and internalize, the proposed identification of threats. Therefore, the theory of securitization is viable only if both an internalist and externalist view are taken into account.

As shown above, the main premises of the theory of securitization – as well as its respective revisions – can serve as a valuable analytical tool for investigating the way political discourse and language create, and shape, the questions of security and threat in international relations. More importantly, it can help us study the possible ways in which such conceptualization influences the behavior of actors in international relations. While premising their main arguments on the assumption that different aspects of reality in international relations are socially constructed, the advocates of the securitization theory do not shy away from acknowledging that factual existential threats do, in fact, exist 'out there'. This synthesis of neorealist and constructivist assumptions has the goal of offering a more comprehensive approach to the study of security in international relations. Furthermore, the theory of securitization delves into the specifics of what is considered to constitute this phenomenon, by identifying its main elements: rhetorical insistence through discursive politics, the identification of a target audience, and the contextual placement of security statements (*ibid.,* p. 192).

2.3 Research Methodology

This sub-section serves the purpose of presenting the methods that will be used in this research, as well laying out the overview of the research plan. The analysis will mostly rely on qualitative methods. Discourse analysis will be the main driving force of the methodology.

2.3.1 Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis represents a research method primarily used by constructivist, postmodernist, poststructuralist, and feminist scholars of IR. Although the use of the method varies among different schools of thought within the field, Milliken (1999, p. 225) suggests that there exists a common understanding of discourse analysis as a means of illustrating the interdependence of language and the social behavior of international actors. Simply put, scholars interested in the relationship between discourse and action seek to offer an explanation of behavior in international relations that takes into account the subjective understanding thereof. By taking that stance, such scholars argue that what international actors know about the world is not necessarily independent of their own perception (*ibid.,* pp. 226–227). Given that constructivism will be used as the primary lens of theoretical guidance, the employment of discourse analysis as a method of research seems fitting.

Naturally, discourse analysis originated as a tool of research in the field of linguistics. Whereas the earliest examples of discourse analysis can be traced back to the work of Austrian Romanist Leo Spitzer,[13] the method did not enter mainstream academic research until the 1950s. Moreover, discourse analysis is just as closely associated with semiotics[14] as is with linguistics. That said, Harris (1981, p. 107) develops the claim that the researcher who employs the method of discourse analysis does not necessarily need to know the exact interpreted meaning of the language used therein. The fact that attached meaning is always subjective should not prevent us from attempting to explore content as unbiased observers. There will always be gaps in our knowledge about objective reality, but that does not mean that it is impossible to gain valuable insights into certain aspects of a given discourse. Guided by constructivist assumptions about the intersubjective nature of perception, we can put different discourses in comparison and theorize about how they might be interpreted based on the psycho-cultural background of actors involved. By identifying the occurrence of patterns in a text, we can explore the subsurface of discourse,

---

[13] Leo Spitzer was an Austrian professor of Romance and Hispanic studies, commonly associated with the earliest known use of discourse analysis in his work concerning stylistics and philology. His primary research interests were centered around the reoccurrence of linguistic patterns as well as the psychological background thereof. Spitzer took on Marcel Proust's early hypotheses on linguistic patterns, and expanded them to include an analysis of the psychology of authors (Maingueneau, 2010, p. 149).

[14] Semiotics is the study of meaning-making, as well as the processes which constitute meanings behind different forms of communication. While primarily concerned with symbolism and signs in communication, semiotic studies also seek to gain insights into the anthropological aspects of communication (Caesar, 1999, p. 55).

and possibly discern the intent behind the language.

Exploring the underlying aspirations of a given discourse requires taking into consideration factors that go beyond linguistic style and grammatical patterns. Culture is a great example of a vital determinant in communication, as it represents the collective whole which influences every aspect of human behavior and interaction. As such, cultural and historical background must be put into the equation of discourse analysis, especially when it comes to political speech acts. As suggested by Harris (1981, pp. 108–109), studying discourses beyond descriptive linguistics calls for the employment of the constructivist approach, which observes language and behavior from a social and interpersonal point of view. With that in mind, it seems more beneficial to try to understand the discourse in its totality, rather than perceive its parts as carrying individual meanings. In other words, the analysis of patterns present throughout a given speech helps the researcher draw conclusions about the intent of the general message, which is subsequently put it in the context of socio-cultural and historical affairs. This is particularly important when analyzing political speech acts, as they always serve the purpose of sending a particular message to a specific group of people.

Political discourse has always been an important part of political interaction between actors in international relations. Some go as far as claiming that politics itself is the attempt to organize different aspects of human activity through discourse (Hague, Harrop, and Breslin, 1998, p. 3). That said, the philosophical and theoretical analysis thereof only entered the field of IR in the last decades of the twentieth century.

Many scholars involved in political discourse analysis build their assumptions on Chomsky's theory of transformational grammar, which puts emphasis on the relationship between spoken utterances and their conceptual meanings. Early attempts at political discourse analysis were centered around formal networks of communication between state actors, and were primarily concerned with how language used in speech acts affects the relationship between parties involved. With this in mind, Chilton (2004, p. 5) develops the claim that both original intent and the perception thereof determines the impact of a given political discourse. In other words, the analysis of political discourses must include contextualization, as different parties tend to have different interpretations of the same language. This is especially useful when analyzing the content laid out in political speech acts by non-state actors.

Partly as a result of the growing international influence of non-state actors, political discourse analysis went on to expand beyond the state-centric level. If we assume that aspects of reality in international relations are socially constructed, there is no compelling reason to restrict our analysis of language to that of state actors. That is not to say that all international actors use the same means when trying to convey a message. In fact, it only corroborates the notion that the analysis of those means must be contextualized.

As suggested by Chilton (2004, p. 138), each political discourse consists of a series of articulated statements, organized and distributed according to the hierarchy of their functions and power. In the analysis thereof, what matters is detecting the movement of these elements, which essentially form a unified message. Non-state actors, such as those generally referred to as terrorist organizations, oftentimes rely on the power of implication, deliberately leaving out explicit elaboration in certain parts of their political discourse. This serves as a kind of political defense mechanism, as it allows the perpetrators of terrorist attacks to attribute the perception of other actors to misinterpretation (Ganor, 2011, p. 262).

With that in mind, the method of discourse analysis will be used in the context of its relevance to IR, rather than linguistics. While the thesis will certainly go into the analysis of different elements in a given discourse, it will not delve into the specifics of morphology or syntax. When contextualized according to the objectives of this thesis, the discourse analysis will seek to demonstrate the importance of psycho-cultural, religious, and historical reproduction of meaning with regard to the dynamics between the transnational Jewish diaspora and radical Islamic terrorist groups. That is to say that discourse will be contextualized within the broader culturo-religious and socio-political framework for analytical purposes.

2.3.2 Research Plan

The research will be divided into four main stages, with a preceding examination of historical background data necessary for contextualization. Radical Islamic terrorism as an independent variable and Jewish emigration from Europe as a dependent one will be put in the context of the long history of Jewish migration across and away from Europe that is tied to ethno-religious

persecution, as well as the history of Jewish-Islamic relations that has been characterized by a series of ideological and territorial conflicts.

The first phase of the research will examine some of the most prominent discourses and speech acts employed by radical Islamic terrorist groups before and after 9/11. The second stage will include the analysis of discourses and speech acts of international organizations and leaders representing the transnational Jewish diaspora in Europe in the same period. More specifically, this section will look at four European countries with the highest rate of Jewish emigration in the last two decades. The third phase will be dedicated to the analysis of the linkages between terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic extremists and the emigration trends of European Jews over the course of the same period. The background data presented will be streamlined and put into analytical context. Lastly, the final stage of research will be dedicated to the analysis of the push and pull forms of securitization, which possibly influence the migration trends of European Jews to Israel.

The analysis will primarily depend on the use of qualitative data, collected through archival means. These include scientific journals, academic books, and primary documents. In addition, some quantitative data, such as statistical information, will be used in order to put the hypotheses and the objectives in the context of factual occurrences. This type of data will be necessary when determining the correlation between the terrorist attacks and the rates of Jewish emigration from Europe. Furthermore, both primary documents published by different networks of the Jewish diaspora in Europe and available speech acts by radical Islamist organizations[15] will be analyzed through the theoretical lenses of constructivism and securitization. This will serve the primary purpose of putting the quantitative data in context.

While the main question of the thesis is of practical nature, its underlying frame of reference is rather ideological. As previously noted in the overview of constructivism and securitization, analyzing the behavior of actors in international relations is incomplete without looking into the psycho-cultural factors that underlie the context. The reason behind investigating the correlation in question is the fact that members of the two selected groups have been involved in some form

---

[15] The selection method of primary documents was based on the available data regarding the representation of Jewish minority groups (e.g. institutions regarded as most influential within the European Jewish diaspora), as well as that directly funded and published by radical Islamic terrorist groups (i.e. speeches of its leaders or issues of its official propaganda magazines).

of conflict for centuries. There is a long ideological and historical animosity between individuals of Jewish and Islamic faith (Firestone, 1996, p. 88), and the ongoing trends in Jewish emigration from Europe are worthy of comparing to the occurrences of terrorist attacks carried out by members of radical Islamic groups. For that reason, analyzing the discourse coming from both sides will be necessary in order to make a case for the intersubjective nature of security.

Another key point to remember is that some of the sources, such as primary documents issued or published by either Jewish or Islamic authorities, will certainly be biased toward a particular view. Such sources should not be seen as a weakness, but rather a strength that adds credibility to the arguments about securitization. Recognizing occasional biases will be beneficial in the comparative analysis of pragmatic discourses and speech acts. That said, scientific journals and academic books will help place the radically opposing views in the context of a socially constructed reality.

3 Background Data

As already explained, this chapter serves the purpose of establishing the historical context of ethno-religious and cultural variables, the understanding whereof renders itself critical for the analysis. This will allow for a better understanding of the emigration trends of European Jews when put in the context of securitization following the September 11 terrorist attacks.[16] The first sub-section of this chapter will explore the history of the European persecution of Jews, while the second one will look into the difference in migration trends of European Jews before and after the September 11 attacks; this will set the stage for a more narrow analysis that will be carried out in the next chapter. In addition, the third sub-section will present the ideological and political anxiety that has characterized the history of Judeo-Islamic relations. Lastly, important and significant terrorist attacks that took place in this period will be examined in the final sub-section of the chapter, so that the correlation in question could be inspected later on. The empirical description of these occurrences is important, as it provides the reader with information that is necessary for understanding the contextualization of their correlation. With that in mind, the goal of this chapter is to provide background information and introduce data necessary for analyzing the correlation in question.

3.1 Brief History of the European Persecution of Jews

Since identity is an important component of this thesis, it is only fitting that this sub-chapter begin with the identification of its core group. Understanding the core elements of Jewish self-identification is essential to exploring the dynamics of such a historically challenged and delicate identity. While it is true that most ethno-religious minorities in Europe have experienced oppression, much of it does not seem to have been as long - or at least as well documented - as the one continuously carried out against individuals self-identifying as Jews or Jewish (Hilberg, 2003, p. 5). Due to the complex fluidity of ethno-religious identity, researchers should not

---

[16] The September 11 attacks represent a sequence of organized aggression carried out by the radical Islamic terrorist group Al-Qaeda. The event is commonly referred to as '9/11', after the date on which the attacks took place, September 11, 2001. Al-Qaeda terrorists managed to hijack four American passenger planes, strategically directing them into buildings they considered to be symbolic of America's military and socio-economic power: The Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon (The 9/11 Commission Report Executive Summary, 2004, p. 2). The September 11 terrorist attacks mark the deadliest and most impactful strike that took place on U.S. soil since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Murata, 2009, p. 222). A more detailed description of the event will be provided in the second sub-section of the chapter.

attempt to formulate restricting definitions of what makes a minority. With that in mind, this thesis will be guided by a set of self-defining elements that can be found among a number of different kinds of Jewish groups in Europe.

While most people think of Jews as individuals who observe the teachings and religious practices of Judaism, the scope of Jewish identity often exceeds such conventional impressions. Not only does Jewish personhood include cultural and religious connotations, but it also transcends into ethno-genealogical and political dimensions of self-identification. As opposed to the instruction of other Abrahamic religions, the holy texts of Judaism ascribe an ethnic dimension to Jewish identity. Traditional branches of Judaism, such as Orthodoxy, go by a very specific interpretation of Rabbinic texts,[17] which confers Jewish identity on children born to Jewish mothers. In other words, most traditional branches of Judaism consider children born to Jewish mothers to be Jewish themselves, regardless of their observance (Cohen, 2001, p. 5). That is not to say that Jewish identity does not exist outside its religious understructure. Studies centered around the self-perception of Jewish identity indicate that Jews around the world consider the identification with their group to be mainly a matter of cultural and ancestral factors, rather than being strictly religious (Sharon, 2014; Lipka, 2016).

A strong affiliation to the idea of a 'promised' kinstate separates Judaism from other Abrahamic religions. While both Christians and Muslims hold certain geographical places as important to their beliefs and religious cause, neither of the two have the establishment of a whole ethno-religious state as one of their guiding principles. By contrast, the idea of a promised land has always represented a matter of utmost importance in the religion of Judaism. The concept was first presented in the Tanakh[18] as a 'divine promise' to the descendants of Abraham, "On that day the Lord made a covenant with Abram and said, 'To your descendants I give this land, from the Wadi of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates— the land of the Kenites, Kenizzites, Kadmonites, Hittites, Perizzites, Rephaites, Amorites, Canaanites, Girgashites and Jebusites.'" (Genesis 15:18–21). Early Jewish scholars considered the descendants of Abraham to be the direct progeny of his son Isaac, whereas the mainstream Jewish commentary regards all Jews,

---

[17] Rabbinic texts have been at the core of mainstream practices of Judaism since the sixth century CE. Parting ways with the Babylonian tradition, Rabbinic Judaism takes into account both the written Torah and the oral interpretations thereof offered by authorized religious figures, commonly known as 'rabbis' (Neusner, 1999, p. vii).
[18] The Tanakh (the Hebrew Bible) is the most important piece of writing in the religion of Judaism, as well as the textual foundation of the Christian Old Testament ("Tanakh", n. d.).

including converts, as such (Epstein, 1994, p. 302). Religious references to the idea of a 'promised' Jewish land include terms such as the Land of Israel, the Land of Canaan, Palestine, and the Holy Land (Sand, 2012, p. 132). The emotional attachment of Jewish people to this concept, however, has intensified due to the continuous systemic oppression and persecution they faced for hundreds of years. For that reason, it is important to understand the ways in which such a long history of injustice has shaped the collective identity of Jews, as well as their strong affiliation to the kinstate of Israel.

Table 3. 1: Specific Dates in the History of the European Persecution of Jews

Year	Place	Event
167 BCE	Seleucid Empire[19]	The imposition of Hellenization,[20] whereby all Jewish practices were forbidden.
132 CE	Roman Empire	The expulsion of Jews from Jerusalem (Sand, 2009, p. 132).
1096	Rhineland	Thousands of Austrian Jews imprisoned, beheaded, and thrown into the sea (Chazan, 1987, p. 55).
1290	England	The expulsion of all English Jews (Roth, 1941, p. 151).
1300s	France	Thousands of French Jews expelled and massacred (Cohon, 1926, p. 209).
1349	Strasbourg	Hundreds of Jews burn to death in one of the first pogroms in European history (Cohn, 2007, p. 15).
1421	Austria	Massive imprisonment and immolation of Austrian Jews, as ordered by Albert II of Germany (Patai, 1996, p. 75).
1492	Spain	The Alhambra Decree leads to the expulsion of 100,000 Spanish Jews and the conversion of another 200,000 to Catholicism (Perez, 2007, p. 17).
1516	Venetian Republic	The beginnings of the formal segregation of Jewish communities into confined spaces, a practice which lasted until the 1780s (Debenedetti-Stow, 1992, p. 79).
1800s	Vatican	The Catholic Church defines the Jews as a distinct ethnic group, forbidding them from entering certain Catholic professions (Maryks, 2010, p. xv).

[19] The Seleucid Dynasty ruled the Hellenistic state in the period between 312 BCE and 63 CE. It was named after its founder, Seleucus, who expanded Babylonia to include eastern dominions previously conquered by Alexander the Great, and extended as far east as modern-day Turkmenistan (Jones, 2006, p. 174).

[20] Hellenization was the historical process of imposing Greek culture and language on people who lived in territories conquered or administered by some form of Greek authority. The impact of Hellenization is evident in its geographical legacy: it managed to reach territories as far west as the Mediterranean, and as far east as present-day Pakistan (Hornblower, 2008, p. 37).

1941–1945	Nazi Germany	The systemic and rigorously organized techno-ideological machinery of the Holocaust leads to the deaths of over six million Jews (Cesarani, 2016, p. 796).

While it might be true that the collective identity of Jews stems from the ideological premises of their religion, the long history of scapegoating and deep societal oppression has certainly shaped their perception and sense of self-identification. As highlighted in Table 3.1, the durability of persecution slowly became an essential element of Jewish collective identity. Despite the fact that each individual reserves the right to cultivate their own self-identity, it is difficult to imagine a Jew who does not recognize the historical experience of his or her group. This is simply due to the fact that the last two millennia of Jewish life in Europe represented a constant struggle for survival; there was barely a place in Europe where Jewish people were not subjected to torture, murder or exodus. There was no isolated Jewish community that was spared of such actions. It just so happens that the vast majority of Jews, everywhere in Europe, experienced similar treatment from the majority population or authorities of the time.

Knowing the history of the European persecution of Jews is essential to the understanding of their collective identity and widely held perceptions. Once again, each Jewish community is unique in its own right; some are purely religious, while others are united in the practicing of secular traditions. Nevertheless, they all share a common element of identity: a long history of persecution. Their historical experience in Europe left them scattered across the continent, which only added to the importance of their transnational diaspora network. The analysis that will be presented in the next chapter will heavily depend on the understanding of the history of Jews in Europe. This will be especially useful when examining intersubjectivity and perceptions through the theoretical lens of securitization.

3.2 Migration Trends of European Jews (1948–2015)

As was pointed out in the previous sub-section, the history of Jews in Europe has been one of continuous migration from state to state, in search for a place where their religious and cultural practices would be tolerated. Moreover, the ethnic dimension of traditional Jewish personhood

did not go in favor of those Jews who were non-observant, as they were targeted by oppressive regimes nonetheless. Such historical experience made many Jews believe that they would never be welcomed in other foreign countries. For that reason, a group of nineteenth-century Jewish intellectuals and thinkers began entertaining the idea of a Jewish-majority state. This concept was not novel, as its roots could be traced back to Biblical passages described in the previous sub-section. It was not, however, until the Zionist movement[21] that the proposition of a Jewish state began to take form. Worn out by a long history of European persecution, the transnational Jewish diaspora embraced the principles of Zionism by taking part in multiple waves of migration to the region of Palestine at the turn of the twentieth century (Taylor, 1971, p. 10). From that point on, the emigration of European Jews would have two primary destinations: Israel and the United States (DellaPergola, 2015, p. 20).

By the time the State of Israel was established, nearly 720,000 individuals self-identifying as Jews lived in what was then referred to as Mandatory Palestine;[22] most of them emigrated from Russia, Romania, Poland, and Germany in order to escape the pogroms. The 1950s saw the second large wave of Jewish immigration to Israel, although the vast majority came from North African and Asian countries (Lipshitz, 1998, pp. 1–2). Out of nearly 300,000 Jews who immigrated to Israel in that decade, only a third came from Europe. In the period between the 1960s and the 1980s, nearly 350,000 European Jews immigrated to Israel (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016). During those two periods, European Jewish migration to Israel accounted for

---

[21] Although the Jewish people have faced discrimination since their initial immigration to Europe at the turn of the first millennium, the idea of a Jewish state had not entered mainstream Jewish scholarship until the emergence of the Zionist movement in late nineteenth century. The Jews began to participate in the process of state-building around the same time the ideology of nationalism started to hold sway in Europe. As was the case with other nationalist movements, Zionism rested on the principles of discrete ethno-religious values, common history, shared territory, and culture. However, while Christians employed a narrower fragmentation along 'unique' ethno-cultural lines, the total population of Jewish people was so small that it made different communities unite under the idea of a one state for Jews of all nationalities. Theodor Herzl, one of the pioneers of modern Zionism, argued that the deep-rooted antisemitism of European societies had always stood in the way of Jews integrating therein. For that reason, Herzl called for the re-establishment of the ancient Jewish homeland, *Eretz Israel*, in the Middle-Eastern region of Palestine. The destructiveness of the Holocaust, which saw two-thirds of the Jewish population in Europe killed, strengthened the international support for the establishment of a Jewish state. After decades of activism, the event took place on May 14, 1948, when the State of Israel was established in Palestine (Motyl, 2001, pp. 604–605).

[22] Following the post-WWI disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the international community assigned the territories of Acrus, Southern Beirut Vilayet, Nablus, Southern Vilayet of Syria, and the Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem, to the United Kingdom as a mandate. The mandate was formalized by the Council of the League of Nations under the name 'Mandate for Palestine'. The idea was that certain parts of the defunct Ottoman Empire should be administered by powerful Western countries until they become self-sustaining (The Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. 22).

more than 60% of the global Jewish migration (Della Pergola, 2015, p. 28). While those numbers might appear high for a country with a relatively small population, it is a fact that the migration of European Jews in the period between the 1960s and the 1970s was much lower than in previous periods (see Table 3.2). Nevertheless, those trends began to change with the political, social and economic turmoil that took place within the former Soviet Union in the decades that followed.

Table 3. 2: Jewish Migration from Europe to Israel, 1952–1979

Years	Number of Jewish Immigrants from Europe
1952-1960	106,305
1961-1964	80,788
1965-1971	81,282
1972-1979	183,419

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2016).

The socio-economic crisis of the 1980s that had preceded the fall of the Soviet Union, propelled many Soviet Jews to flee the country. Table 3.3 reveals that there has been a gradual increase in the number of Soviet Jews immigrating to Israel and the United States from 1987 until 1990. In the decade that followed, the migration of Soviet Jews was generally lower, but relatively steady, particularly to Israel. Another 40,000 non-Soviet Jews migrated from Europe to Israel in the same decade. In general terms, the migration wave that brought more than 800,000 Jews to Israel was the second largest of its kind, after the one that took place during the first half of the twentieth century (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

Table 3. 3: Jewish Migration from the Former USSR to Israel and the United States, 1986–2000

Year	Israel	United States
1986	206	641
1987	2,072	3,811
1988	2,166	10,576
1989	12,172	36,738
1990	181,759	31,283
1991	145,605	34,715
1992	64,057	45,888
1993	69,132	35,581
1994	68,100	32,835
1995	64,489	21,693
1996	58,213	19,501
1997	54,591	14,531
1998	46,020	7,371
1999	66,848	6,309
2000	50,817	5,880

Source: Dietz, Lebok, and Polian (2002, p. 35).

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the migration of European Jews to Israel was generally on the decline. In the first five years, the number dropped to 61,000, whereas it sat well around 440,000 during the five years prior. By 2008, the total number of European Jews immigrating to Israel decreased even further, to around 35,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016). However, the trend of migration changed once again, as it started to go up in 2008 (see Table 3.4).

Table 3. 4: Immigration to Israel by Country of Origin, 2008-2016

Country of Origin (Europe)	Year of immigration							
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
France	1,562	1,557	1,775	1,619	1,653	2,904	6,547	6,628
Ukraine	305	1,602	1,752	2,051	2,048	1,917	5,739	6,886
Russian Federation	577	3,245	3,404	3,678	3,545	4,026	4,593	6,632
Italy	62	62	97	94	137	133	323	353
United Kingdom	505	708	632	485	569	403	486	623
Belgium	84	125	186	175	140	222	224	242
Hungary	54	90	87	128	110	148	122	81

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2016).

The trend of increased Jewish emigration from Europe after 2007 has been consistent across countries of different cultural, social, and economic circumstances. France faced the greatest increase in the number of Jewish emigrants, from around 1,500 in 2008 to more than 6,600 in 2015. This marked the first time France was the main country of origin for immigration to Israel since 1948. Although the number of Jewish emigrants from Ukraine and Russia was nowhere near that of the preceding decades, it remained high enough to place these two countries close to the top of the list, when it comes to Jewish emigration from Europe (DellaPergola, 2015, p. 30). Jewish emigration from Italy and Belgium more than tripled, while the already high rates in the United Kingdom remained stable (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

As previously discussed, the available evidence lends support to the claim that the emigration of European Jews has been on the rise since 2008. While both Israel and the United States continue to attract the largest number of European Jews, the former has almost always been in the lead, despite the tumultuous regional circumstances and an economic environment inferior to the latter (DellaPergola, 2015, p. 17). This thesis is an attempt to examine the different reasons that might serve as push and pull factors of the phenomenon in question. Conventional theoretical approaches to migration might list different factors according to the strength of their influence on a particular trend of migration. That will not be the approach of this study, as the behavior of actors in international relations is often influenced by a number of different factors at the same time, which have the capacity to serve as both push and pull variables. Nevertheless, one must have a hypothetical starting point. At this point, it seems fair to ask the following question: if we consider the fact that economic factors are often seen as the main driving force of migration, why do European Jews primarily choose to migrate to Israel instead of the United States?

Given that ideological and identity reasons have played an important part in the migration habits of European Jews since the establishment of their kinstate of Israel, it seems worthwhile comparing the phenomenon in question with another trend that has been on the rise in recent decades – terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamic extremists. How is this relevant? The historical and ideological conflict between Muslims and Jews can be traced back to the very beginnings of Islam in the seventh century (Laqueur, 2006, pp. 191–192). Therefore, it is important to understand the history of this conflict before analyzing the correlation between the

Jewish emigration from Europe, and the terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamic extremists on the same continent.

3.3 Brief History of Jewish-Islamic Relations

Ideological animosity between persons of Jewish and Islamic faith can be traced back to the religious scriptures themselves. Texts of all three Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) consist of passages that either condemn or execrate any form of religion other than the one laid out in the specific scripture (Firestone, 1996, p. 88). However, specific examples of either anti-Semitic and Islamophobic remarks can rarely be found in pre-modern Middle Eastern literature or historic texts. The earliest examples of such statements, which eventually led to the outbreak of violence, date back to the tenth and eleventh century. Major clashes between the two groups primarily took place in Muslim Spain (Perry and Schweitzer, 2002, pp. 267–268). Historical animosity was particularly exacerbated by the nineteenth century rise of modern Zionism, as well as the 1948 establishment of the State of Israel (*ibid.,* p. 178).

Table 3.5 shows that the patterns of discrimination against Jews in the medieval Islamic world were less frequent and less severe than those identified in medieval Christendom. As a matter of fact, much of the malevolence faced by Jewish people in medieval Spain came as a result of the intricate combination of Islamic and Catholic views. Influenced by the already well-established anti-Semitism of the European Christendom, the Muslim conquerors of the Iberian Peninsula began to adopt views about the Jews that were more antagonistic than ever before (Schweitzer and Perry, 2002, p. 267). After being welcomed to the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, European Jews enjoyed liberties which surpassed those they were granted during their time in the *dhimmis* (Masters, 2004, p. 11).[23]

---

[23] *Dhimmi* is an Arabic word which means 'protected person'. It has historically been used by Muslim authorities to refer to non-Muslim communities, and individuals who resided in Islamic countries. These mostly included Jews and Christians. While their political rights were generally restricted, dhimmis had some level of autonomy within their own communities (Newby, 2002, p. 52). In addition, they were obligated to pay the *jizya* tax, while being exempt from observing Muslim traditions or dietary instructions from the Quran (Ghazi, Kalin, and Kamali, 2013, pp. 240–241).

Table 3. 5: Important Dates in the History of the Judeo-Islamic Relations

Year/Period	Place	Event
Early Middle Ages	Middle East	Both the Jews and the Christians had the status of *dhimmis*, meaning that they belonged to isolated non-Muslim communities with minor political restrictions (Ye'or, 1996, pp. 73–74).
10th century	Islamic Egypt	Jews were persecuted by Islamic authorities (Schweitzer and Perry, 2002, p. 267).
1066	Granada and Cordoba	Over 4,000 Jews were massacred (Scheindlin, 1992, p. 192).
12th century	Muslim Spain	The anti-minority restrictions imposed by the Almohad dynasty[24] specifically targeted the Jews, by requiring them to either convert to Islam or face a death sentence (Kraemer, 2005, p. 13).
15th century	Ottoman Empire	The authorities granted the Jews with special protection, and generally encouraged the development of Jewish economic undertakings (Cohen, 2014, p. 3).
16th-18th century	Ottoman Empire	The emergence of the *millet*[25] system granted the Jewish communities a greater range of sociopolitical rights, economic freedoms, and religious autonomy. Unlike the *dhimmi* organizational structure, the *millet* system represented one of the precursors of modern religious pluralism (Sachedina, 2001, p. 96–97).
19th century	Ottoman Syria[26]	Ottoman Jews began establishing the first Zionist settlements, which led to the rise of antisemitism among the local Muslim population. Coupled with the rise of nationalism in the Arab world, the first Zionist settlement in Ottoman Syria triggered a severe deterioration of Jewish-Islamic relations, which are yet to be recovered (Morris, 2001, pp. 37–38).
1922	Mandatory Palestine	After the League of Nations approved the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the territory of present-day Israel and Palestine fell under the temporary control of the British Empire. The approval included a provision relating to the authorization of

---

[24] In the twelfth century, the struggle for power in southern Morocco gave birth to the Almohad movement. The group of insurgents took the Arabic name for 'monotheistic unity' with the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate. After their attempt at dethroning the Almoravid dynasty had proved successful, the Almohads quickly assumed the position of new Marrakesh rulers by declaring the territory a caliphate (Baadj, 2015, pp. 52–53). Unlike the previous Islamic leaders of Spain, the Almohads did not favor the concept of *dhimmis*. Since their religio-political ideology rested on the idea of a unified Islamic caliphate, the Almohads did not find the practice of other religions appropriate. Thus, they terminated the institution of *dhimmis,* required all non-Muslims to convert or otherwise face a death sentence (Scheindlin, 1992, p. 195).

[25] *Millet* is an Arabic word which translates into English as 'religious community' or 'nation'. In the Ottoman Empire, the term was used to describe the communities of non-Muslim religious minorities with some sociopolitical and judicial autonomy (Newby, 2002, pp. 149–150).

[26] In the period between the early 1500s and late 1910s, the term 'Syria' referred to the territory that stretched from the Mediterranean Sea to the Euphrates River, and from the Arabian Desert to the Taurus Mountains, including Palestine (Fisher, 2003, p. 1015).

		Jewish immigration into the territory of the Mandate (The Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. 22).
1936–1939	Mandatory Palestine	The power that the Jewish minority exerted over local affairs impelled the Palestinian Arabs to start a rebellion of regional proportions, which ended up hurting its very own constituency; the revolt took quite a toll on the Palestinian Arab population, as it is estimated that at least ten percent of the adult male population was either killed or imprisoned (Khalidi, 2007, p. 26).
1947	Palestine	The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) issued a recommendation for the partition of Palestine (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Report, Ch. VII). That same year, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that called for the termination of the British Mandate by August 1948, and proposed a subsequent partition of Palestine into two states, Jewish and Arab, while leaving the Jerusalem area under international control (Resolution Adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Part I).
1948	Palestine	The Palestinian Arab forces initiated a civil war as a sign of protesting the perceived colonialist nature of the UNSCOP decision on Palestine (Morris, 2008, p. 101). That same year, the Zionist leadership formally declared the establishment of the State of Israel (Stawson, 2010, p. 133). As soon as the State of Israel was declared, the Arab forces entered the territory, attacking Jewish defense forces, as well as their settlements (Tal, 2004, p. 158). Nevertheless, the Israeli forces managed to counter the invasion with the help of an international supply of arms, mainly coming from Europe. In the aftermath, the Israelis ended up expanding their territory beyond the borders proposed by the UN partition plan. At this point, Israel represented around 77 percent of former Mandatory Palestine (Beinin and Hajjar, 2014, p. 5).
1967	Israel	Syria, Egypt, and Jordan launched an attack on Israel, while blocking its exit to the Gulf of 'Aqaba. The Israeli government responded by destroying the forces of all the opponents involved in the attack. Furthermore, each of the three Arab states lost a part of their territory to the State of Israel: the Golan Heights (Syria), the West Bank (Jordan), the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula (Egypt). Although the Israeli government argued that the acquisition of the aforementioned territories was the result of its population's growing fears about regional security, the UN Security Council passed a number of resolutions calling it an act of illegal occupation (*ibid.,* p. 6).

The securitizing nature of contemporary Jewish-Islamic relations can be traced back to discourse put forward by the Arab League, an organization which represented Arab interests in Palestine shortly after the proposed division. These suggest that the Arab rejection of the UN partition plan was not based on the perceived unfairness thereof, but rather a strongly held belief that there was no such thing as a Jewish nation. In other words, the only hypothetical territorial arrangement acceptable to the Arabs was that of a one Palestinian Arab state. In their response to the UN proposal, the chief figures of the Arab League insisted that the Jews did not constitute a distinct people worthy of a legal entitlement to unified territorial existence. Simply put, the Palestinian Arab leadership of the time did not accept the coexistence of two nation-states, Jewish and Arab, in Palestine. In their view, the affirmation of Jewish national liberation meant the negation of the Arab one (Stawson, 2010, pp. 101–102).

It is evident from the data presented in Table 3.5 that the first Zionist settlements of the nineteenth century contributed to the growing ethno-religious tensions in the Arab world. For that reason, it is often referred to as the turning point in the relations between Jews and Muslims all over the world. Taking a middle-ground position, Kramer (1995) suggests that while the Zionist movement, and the subsequent establishment of the State of Israel contributed to the ideological conflict between Jews and Muslims, these occurrences cannot be considered the root causes thereof. The emergence of modern Zionism happened at the same time the Arab nationalist movement arose. With that in mind, Kramer (1995) puts forward the claim that the present-day Islamic antisemitism stems from the Arab adoption of European nationalist ideas.

The behavior of actors in international relations is influenced by a multitude of different factors, each carrying their own meaning to the specific group of participants. In like manner, the process of action-reaction does not work according to the principles of perfect linearity. This is particularly important when we speak of identities and perception, both of which were extensively discussed in the chapter dedicated to the theoretical framework. Putting intersubjectivity and perception into the equation makes the pinpointing of linear causality in relations between actors that much more difficult.

3.4 Radical Islamic Terrorism in Europe (1980–2015)

The concept of radical Islamic Terrorism was briefly described in the introductory chapter. While it is true that Islamist terrorist activities target both Muslim-majority, and non-Muslim-majority countries, the analysis in this thesis is centered around Europe, and will therefore place focus on those affecting the latter. With that in mind, this sub-section will account for the post-1970s rise of radical Islamic terrorism in Europe, and will provide an overview of the deadliest incidents caused by such actions in the period before and after the September 11 attacks. This information is crucial for understanding the main analysis that will be laid out in the succeeding chapter.

In the early days of post-WWII Europe, much of terrorist activity was ascribed to separatist and left-extremist groups from within the continent itself (Laqueur, 2001, p. x). That said, both of these types of activities were eventually thwarted within individual countries. On the other hand, terrorism carried out by radical Islamist groups continues to stand out due to the complex nature of its ideological background. Not only does such phenomenon carry deep religious implications, but it often tends to be sponsored or publicly justified by Islamic regimes in the Middle East (Pluchinsky, 1991, p. 67). Some authors have called into question what they perceive as the antagonizing of Islam when radical Islamic terrorism is discussed (Jackson, 2007, p. 365). Others, however, argue that a difference must be made between political discourse which has such intention, and scholarly research which seeks to describe and understand the phenomenon in question. Laqueur (2001, p. xi), for instance, points to the fact that the vast majority of post-1970s terrorist attacks have been carried out by fundamentalist groups who self-associate with Islam, and its tenets. As a matter of fact, not only do these groups link themselves to the religion of Islam, but they claim to be the only true interpreters thereof.

While some scholars are quick to disregard such statements as not representative of Islam, others argue that the intersubjective and fragmenting nature of religion makes it difficult to isolate any group as 'representative' of its principles (Renard, 2012, pp. 1–2). This is precisely the reason the theories of constructivism and securitization will be used in the main analysis. The concept of Islam-inspired terrorism is, indeed, worthy of problematizing. Be that as it may, this thesis will not delve into the depths of concept etymology or diagnostic deconstruction. For the purpose of this research, the term 'radical Islamic terrorism' will be used to describe terrorist activities

executed by individuals who self-associate with, and claim to be the religious messengers of Islamic scriptures.

According to the U.S. Department of State's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis expert Dennis Pluchinsky (1991, p. 67), radical Islamic terrorist groups were either found to be guilty of, or claimed responsibility for about 418 attacks on Europe in the period between 1980 and 1990. In fact, 62% of all terrorist attacks linked to fundamentalist Islamic groups took place in Western European countries. The results yielded by two independent studies provide confirmatory evidence for this notion. In addition, the data appears to suggest a rise in the number of attacks on Western Europe carried out by radical Islamic terrorists in the given period. It is estimated that about 42% of all radical Islamic terrorist attacks in Western Europe during the 1980s were actively sponsored or supported by states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The fact that nearly half of all terrorist attacks in the aforementioned period were state-sponsored touches on the area of regional security. That is to say that these were not just political movements of insurgency ascending from within the system. At the time, it was already evident that the attacks executed by radical Islamic groups could possibly affect the underlying ideological structure of Europe as a whole, not just its individual societies (*ibid.,* p. 69).

One of the earliest cases of terrorist activity linked to radical Islamic organizations in Europe was the 1985 bombing of the El Descanso restaurant in Madrid, Spain. The attack, which took the lives of 18 Spaniards, and injured 15 Americas, was linked to the Islamic Jihad Organization.[27] Just a few months prior to the El Descanso bombing, the group had claimed responsibility for an explosion at a Jewish film festival in Paris, France (Burns, 1985). In the same year, a Palestinian terrorist organization under the name of Abu Nidal[28] managed to carry

---

[27] The Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) was a radical Islamist guerilla group active in the period between 1983 and 1992. The organization took responsibility for a number of bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings of mainly diplomatic personnel from Europe and the United States (Levitt, 2013, p. 67). The self-declared 'Soldiers of Allah' who claimed to be following Quranic teachings, executed a number of terrorist incidents, which resulted in the death of hundreds of people (Wright, 2001, p. 73). In 2003, the *Anne Dammarell et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al* ruling established that the Islamic Jihad Organization was only an undercover name of another radical Islamic terrorist organization, Hezbollah.

[28] Following the establishment of Yasser Arafat's nationalist revolutionary party Fatah, Palestinian activist Sabri Khalil al-Banna joined the group, and took the name of Abu Nidal ('Father of the Struggle'). The State of Israel's 1967 occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula marked a turning point in Abu Nidal's activism with regard to the Palestinian cause (Worman, 2013, p. 59). Seale (1992, p. 67), suggests that this event pushed Abu Nidal toward radicalization, as he soon began to advocate for the use of violence and aggression against both Israeli and Western targets. However, Abu Nidal became disillusioned with the

out two major attacks over the span of just one month; the first one involved the hijacking of the EgyptAir Flight 648 to Malta, which led to the death of 60 people. The second one was a series of attacks which targeted civilians at the Leonardo da Vinci-Fiumicino Airport in Rome, Italy, and the Vienna International Airport in Austria. The events took the lives of 23 people (Seale, 1992, p. 238).

The Abu Nidal organization continued to conduct similar activities in Europe until the end of the decade. In 1988 alone, the radical Islamic group carried out bombings in both Greece and Cyprus, killing dozens, and wounding hundreds of people. Seale (1992, p. 266) puts forward the claim that these two operations were most probably ideologically driven; both Greece and Cyprus were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, making it difficult to identify the reasons behind the attacks. Several months later, however, an event of much greater proportions cast a shadow on Abu Nidal's bombings. On December 21, a Pan Am transatlantic flight from Frankfurt to Detroit via London, was hijacked and destroyed by a Libyan national, who was suspected to had been involved in terrorist causes for Palestinian statehood (Marquise, 2006, pp. 15–16). The CIA subsequently issued a statement, claiming that the available evidence pointed to the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution as the guilty party (CIA Pan Am 103: Analysis of Claims, Paragraph 4). The assault resulted in the death of 259 individuals on board, as well as some casualties on ground (Marquise, 2006, p. 4). In 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi took responsibility for the event, which eventually became known as the Lokerbie bombing, by paying compensation to the relatives of those who were killed in the bombing (Weaver, 2008).

The Lockerbie bombing was the last major Islamist terrorist attack on Europe prior to the September 11 attacks on the United States, which are often considered a turning point in the history of radical Islamic terrorism. A closer look at the data indicates that the number of attacks carried out by Islamist extremists has been on the rise since 9/11. Over the period of the last fifteen years, two Islamic extremist groups have been linked to the vast majority of terrorist activity in Europe: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Zelin, 2014, p. 1).

---

work of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which propelled him to part ways with its Fatah faction. After a series of terrorist attacks committed on behalf of Iraq, Abu Nidal decided to establish his own organization, the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) in 1974 (Worman, 2013, p. 63). It did not take long before Nidal's new organization became a synonym of radical Islamic terrorism, which it remained for the next couple of decades (*ibid.,* p. 61). It is estimated that ANO's activities resulted in the death of at least 300 people (Hudson and Majeska, 1999, p. 97).

After claiming responsibility for the September 11 attacks on the United States, Al-Qaeda became involved in at least three acts of religiously inspired terrorism in Western Europe. In 2004, individuals espousing radical Islamist principles initiated a series of coordinated explosions within the commuter train system in Madrid, Spain. With 191 civilian casualties and more than 2,000 non-fatal injuries, the Madrid train bombings remain one of the deadliest terrorist attacks carried out on European soil. Although initially regarded as a homegrown campaign, the data gathered by both Spanish national and international secret services determined that the attacks were organized by an international network of individuals united in a common Jihadist ideology.[29] As revealed in the criminal proceedings, the 2004 Madrid bombings were most probably planned in three strategic clusters, two of which stemmed from a previously established Al-Qaeda base of operations. All the perpetrators were nationals of Arab countries, most of them coming from Morocco (Reinares, 2009, p. 16).

The following year, a terrorist attack of similar nature took place in London, UK, when a network of Al-Qaeda inspired radical Islamists coordinated a series of suicide bombings in the city's subway and bus systems. The event resulted in the death of 52 people, while close to 800 suffered severe injuries to their bodies (Hussein and Bagguley, 2012, p. 715). This time, the perpetrators were British Muslims of Arab origin, whose ideological and strategic connection to Al-Qaeda operatives was confirmed through several British national and international investigation reports (Nelson and Khan, 2009; Robertson, Cruickshank, and Lister, 2012).

Over the course of the decade that followed, the ideological tensions between Western European countries and radical Islamists seemed to have been in limbo. This period saw the relative decline of Al-Qaeda, which was soon to be replaced by the Islamic State as the new face of radical Islamism (Zelin, 2014, p. 1). That said, the lines of such power succession are blurry, and therefore difficult to draw precisely. For instance, Al-Qaeda's subdivision operating from Saudi Arabia and Yemen claimed responsibility for the 2015 Île-de-France attacks, which killed 20 people, and caused non-fatal injuries to just as many others (Shoichet and Levs, 2015; Hinnant and Ganley, 2015). Known as the Charlie Hebdo attack, after the location of a satirical magazine

---

[29] In secular terms, the Arabic word *jihad* generally means a fight or a struggle (Wehr, 1976, p. 142). However, the term traces its origins back to the religious scriptures of Islam, the Quran in particular. Islamic religious and legal texts evidently conceptualize *jihad* as a martial battle against non-believers. In fact, military *jihad* is generally understood as a means of defense among modern Islamic scholars (Hallaq, 2009, pp. 334–335).

where the primary shooting took place, the event was also linked to the Islamic State, as one if its main perpetrators declared allegiance to the organization (Borger, 2015).

The ever-changing nature of the Islamic State makes it somewhat difficult to discern the exact moment of its founding. That said, the consensus view seems to be that the entity was established under the name The Organization of Monotheism and Jihad (*Jamāʿat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād)* by Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Weiss and Hassan, 2015, pg. 51). Following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, al-Zarqawi took the side Al-Qaeda, changing the name of his group to The Organization of Jihad's Base in Mesopotamia (*Tanẓīm Qāʿidat al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidayn*). Its affiliation to Bin Laden's infamous organization made al-Zarqawi's group become known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (*ibid.*, pg. 94). In the beginning of 2006, the organization once again reincarnated itself under the new name of Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC), which had a very short lifespan. The subsequent murder of its leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqaqi, allowed the organization to assume a broadened identity by adopting the name The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) (Fishman, 2008, p. 49). It was not, however, until 2013 that the group declared The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the acronym by which it remains most widely known to this day (Weiss and Hassan, 2015, p. 526).

Under its most recent reincarnation, ISIS went on to become the international paradigm of twenty-first-century radical Islamic terrorism. The organization has been at the center of several highly publicized terrorist attacks on Europe since 2014. The most well-known example was the November 2015 attack on Paris, France. Organized by French nationals of Arab origin who served as foreign fighters in Syria, the attacks were carried out in several flows, targeting a famous French stadium during a soccer match, and a number of cafes and restaurants (Brisard, 2015, p. 5). The result was a death toll of 137 (including the suicide of the perpetrators), in addition to 168 critical injuries (Fuller, 2015; Marcus, 2015). Soon after, ISIS claimed responsibility for the event, while several of its veteran fighters provided statements which corroborated this notion (Fisher, 2015; Cruickshank, 2015).

In like manner, ISIS organized or participated in coordinating a number of terrorist strikes throughout the year 2016. The first one took place in Brussels, Belgium, where suicide bombers unleashed different explosives at the Brussels Airport in Zaventem, and the city's metro station, mainly targeting Jews and Americans. With 35 casualties and 340 non-fatal injuries, this event

marked the deadliest terrorist attack in Belgium's history (Quivooij, 2016, p. 1). The investigation that followed determined that all of the perpetrators involved were part of the ISIS terror cell that helped organize the November 2015 Paris attacks (Jeffery, Levett, and Swann, 2016).

Later that year, ISIS coordinated a series of vehicle-ramming attacks in two different countries, all of which were carried out by Tunisian nationals. In July, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel intentionally ploughed a heavy cargo truck into crowds that were celebrating the French National Day in Nice, France. In doing so, Lahouaiej-Bouhlel managed to kill 86 civilians and bring the number of non-fatal injuries to 434 (Samuel, 2016). During the interrogations that followed, individuals close to Lahouaiej-Bouhlel claimed that he had become radicalized by ISIS in the month preceding the Nice attack. Furthermore, authorities involved in the investigation released several reports corroborating the notion that the perpetrator had been in contact with ISIS aficionados, with whom he had regularly shared videos of beheadings and similar extremist content (Chazan, Morgan, and Turner, 2016).

Similarly, Tunisian asylum seeker Anis Amri was instructed to navigate a truck into a Berlin Christmas market in December of that year, which led to the death of 12 people and the wounding of around 50 others (Smale, Pianigiani, and Gall, 2016; Simon, Ellis, and Pleitgen, 2016). Following the attack, ISIS released a video of the perpetrator taking an oath of allegiance to the organization, as well as the principles of global jihadism (Withnall, 2016).

While it is true that ISIS has claimed responsibility for the vast majority of terrorist attacks in the period after 2013, it is important to recognize the power of self-radicalization through the adoption of an extremist ideology. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, p. 416) define political radicalization as a process of ideological transition, which makes individuals dedicate themselves to intergroup conflict. In other words, it signifies a shift toward opinions, beliefs, and perceptions that rationalize the outbreak of intergroup violence, oftentimes through personal sacrifice (e.g. suicide bombers). The concept of self-radicalization becomes important when a shift toward ideological extremism translates into a change of behavior. What makes individuals opt for religiously inspired violence which sometimes calls for suicidal action? Addressing this question is particularly relevant to the topic of this thesis, as both seek to understand the reasons which affect the behavior of actors in international relations.

The concept of self-radicalization is comparable in complexity to the process of securitization; both are conceptualized around the notion of group security and survival. What is more, both securitization and self-radicalization depend upon the identification of existential threats. That said, it is important to realize that such threats primarily act as social constructs, rather than necessarily being rooted in empirical reality. This does not, however, prevent individuals or groups from partaking in radicalized acts, as they are emotionally attached to their newly-acquired beliefs and principles (*ibid.*). It should be noted that radicalization essentially affects smaller contingents of a generally broader ideological apparatus. This can be seen in both the cases of Al-Qaeda and ISIS; while the organizations generally participate in the coordination of terrorist attacks, recent trends indicate that self-radicalized individuals are capable of achieving jihadist and radical Islamist objectives independently (*ibid.,* p. 417).

By doing so, these individuals save the authorities in question money, time, and resource exertion. Therefore, they become highly regarded by the organization on the behalf of whose ideology they carry out the strikes. It is precisely the impact of self-radicalization that reflects the transnational power of ideological networks. However, a key point to remember is that, while it does concern individuals who act independently, self-radicalization always begins with some form of ideological alimentation from the source. In recent years, ISIS has been particularly successful at mobilizing self-radicalized sympathizers who eventually embark on the journey of martyrdom. Kirby (2007, p. 416) goes as far as claiming that this type of strategy has given rise to a new form of so-called 'self-starter' terrorism. The author further suggests that rapid advancements in the fields of information technology and digital media have helped ISIS overcome the practical obstacles that often decelerated the implementation of Al-Qaeda's agenda.

4 Analysis

4.1 Discourses and Speech Acts of Radical Islamic Terrorist Groups (1980–2017)

Given that this dissertation begins with the assumption that the emigration of European Jews might be influenced by the frequency of radical Islamic terrorism, it is important to deconstruct the discourses and speech acts of groups responsible for such activity on the continent. Under the guidance of the theory of constructivism, it is assumed that the reality in international relations is socially constructed. In other words, the objects of our analysis are governed by language and interpretation that can never be entirely objective, as investigative tools themselves are social artefacts. Such conceptualization allows for the notion that the behavior of actors is primarily influenced by their perception and subjective interests, rather than material reality (Adler, 2013, p. 113). This makes it possible to move away from the conventional state-centered level of analysis, as it is recognized that non-state actors and transnational agencies play an important part in the making, and shaping, of international relations (Finnemore, 1996, p. 7). Since the late 1970s, there has been a rapidly growing IR literature on international terrorist groups and transnational ethnic diasporas, which indicates that the influence of non-state actors on international affairs is becoming more acknowledged within the field (Risse-Kappen, 1995, p. 5). Correspondingly, the theory of securitization provides a set of valuable analytical tools for the examination of existential threats constructed through discursive politics (Balzacq, 2005, p. 172). In this case, the employment of the securitization theory can advance the examination of radical Islamist discourses that not only influence the behavior of their target audience, but might also affect the actions of the transnational Jewish diaspora in Europe.

It is difficult to understand the motivations behind radical Islamic terrorism, or the reasons why such actions might affect the decisions of the Jewish diaspora in Europe, without gaining insights into the ideological background thereof. Although deeply rooted in religion, radical Islamic terrorism has maintained an unfluctuating ethno-nationalist dimension since the 1980s. Much of the early terrorist activity perpetrated by Islamic extremists in Europe carried pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli connotations. The international community, presided by the U.S. and the European states, has long been perceived by many Arab states and organizations as a silent accomplice to Israeli actions in the occupied Palestinian territories. While the UN has repeatedly called for Israel to withdraw from the territories, the U.S. and some major European powers have been

relatively passive when it comes to pressuring Israel to abide by the principles of international public law (UN Resolution 446, Clause 1; Barghouti, 2015). In fact, most members of the infamous Abu Nidal Organization were Palestinian refugees who left the territories after Israel's occupation thereof in 1967 (Seale, 1992, p. 6).

Constructivist ideas about identities and interests in international relations render the hypothesis that Abu Nidal's uncompromised support for the Palestinian cause could have influenced the behavior of the Jewish diaspora in Europe. That said, Islamic extremists of the time seemed to have underutilized the power of discourse to convey their messages to the world. For that reason, the analysis in this sub-section will primarily be centered around discourses and political speeches put forward by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. While the subunit concerning Al-Qaeda will primarily focus on the speech acts of its most well-known leader Bin Laden, the part regarding the Islamic State will mostly rely on the issues of its propaganda magazine as primary sources of analysis.

4.1.1 Al-Qaeda

Owing to the technological advancements of the time, Al-Qaeda became the first international terrorist group to engage in the use of modern information technology with the goal of communicating its message to both its prospective allies, as well as its perceived adversaries. Soon after Osama Bin Laden had declared war against the West, his organization issued a public *fatwā* in collaboration with other radical Islamist groups, calling for the killing of American allies, with a particular emphasis on those of Jewish faith (World Islamic Front, 1998, Paragraph 5). The third paragraph of the document refers to the so-called 'Crusader-Zionist alliance', which reflects the intersubjective nature of relations between international actors. In this case, Jews and Americans are perceived as aggressors (the former for their establishment of the State of Israel, the latter for their military presence in Arab lands). The lens of constructivism brings about the assumption that the actions of the World Islamic Front are normatively and socially constructed. In other words, the document offers a closer insight into the perception strongly held by Bin Laden and his associates, who explicitly state that the American presence in Iraq, as well as their unequivocal support for Israel, are understood as religious statements against Islam (*ibid.*, Paragraph 4).

That is to say that such views arise from, and contribute to the reinforcement of structures in international relations that are ideational, rather than material. This is where the main assumptions of the theory of securitization come into play. As can be deduced from the document issued by Bin Laden and his affiliates, security plays a central part in the discourse employed. In its entirety, the *fatwā* in question takes on the form of securitized speech. The notion of a perceived war of the West against Islam is something that is continuously brought to the reader's attention. By doing so, the authors of the *fatwā* unveil what they see as an existential threat to their community of self-identified members: a supposed anti-Muslim alliance between Christians and Jews (*ibid.,* Paragraph 3).

As suggested by Harris (1981, pp. 107–108), the underlying structure of a given discourse presents itself through the identification of patterns. For instance, the assumption that Palestine, as well as the greater Middle East region, belongs to the adherents of Islam is heavily present throughout Bin Laden's *fatwā* against Jews and Americans issued by the World Islamic Front (1998). Such conceptualization of territorial claims is based on religious interpretation, and is reflected in the employment of terms such as 'the lands of Islam' in the third and the fifth paragraph, and 'Muslim countries' in the fourth paragraph (*ibid.*). These patterns illustrate what Adler (2013, p. 112) considered to be the result of perceptual construct: social reality in international relations represents the reinforcement of practices rooted in intersubjectivity, rather than material circumstances. When such understanding is applied to the context of the document in question, it seems fair to suggest that the views held by Al-Qaeda and its allies were not a mere reactionary description of factual conditions; this position rested on the assumptions which constituted their religious ideology.

Referring back to what was discussed in the sub-chapter dedicated to the theory of securitization, it must be remembered that the process of securitization is understood as context-driven. For that reason, understanding the psycho-cultural background of actors involved is a crucial step in the process of discourse analysis (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 171–172). Wright (2006, p. 332) and scholars alike have argued that the Islamist ideology of Qutbism is the original source of Al-Qaeda's political cause. Formulated in the second part of the twentieth century, Qutbism was advanced by the leading figure of Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb (Perry and Negrin, 2008, p. 23). Among other things, Qutb revived the medieval conspiracy theories surrounding the supposed plan of

Jewish elites to put individuals of other religious affiliations in debt. As a matter of fact, antisemitism represents a central tenet of Qutbism: anyone who does not ascribe to the religion of Islam is identified as an agent of the alleged Jewish cause for world domination. Moreover, the followers of Qutbism believe that the Jews are to blame for all historical misfortune faced by Muslims since the establishment of Islam (Zeidan, 2001, p. 37).

The reinforcement of such ideas is heavily present in all of Al-Qaeda's political discourses and speech acts. Although evident throughout the document, the implied context of intersubjective antisemitism in Bin Laden's statement is summarized toward the end of its third paragraph:

> Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula.

There seems to be no compelling reason to argue that the paragraph above is of ambiguous nature; it is clear that Bin Laden and his ideological affiliates are united in the belief that Americans have the goal of destabilizing the Arab Middle East in order to ensure the survival of Israel. Such a perception creates the conditions which have the potential of initiating the process of securitization on both sides. On the one hand, Muslim adherents of Al-Qaeda's political and religious ideology serve as the securitized audience which is prompted to identify the Jews as the primary threat to the continuance of Islam. Similarly, such political discourse shapes the perception and impacts the behavioral agenda of Jews all around the world. This is precisely what Balzacq (2011, p. 11) refers to when describing securitization: relations between international actors are driven by the understanding of textual concepts, as well as the knowledge acquired through previous interaction.

In the context of the theoretical framework of this thesis, it can be argued that *jihad* is commonly used as a driving force in securitizing discourses put forward by radical Islamic terrorist groups. While this concept is used in reference to all individuals who are perceived as infidels in Islam, militant jihadists often identify Jews as their primary target, due to the group's connection to their kinstate of Israel. During his 1999 interview with ABC News, Osama Bin Laden reiterated

that the World Islamic Front and Al-Qaeda consider Jews to be the principal reason for American presence in the Middle East. This interview gave the public a closer insight into the perception and interests of jihadists led by Bin Laden. In fact, the leader of Al-Qaeda expressed his hopes about the expelling of Jews from the greater Middle East area. In other words, the termination of the State of Israel and the expulsion of Jews from the region are put forward as ultimate jihadi goals (*ibid.*). Moreover, Bin Laden offers an outline of the perception held by his organization and its supporters: the Jews are identified as scapegoats for events that go well beyond the creation of Israel and its occupation of Palestinian territories. They are thought to be fostering a supposed alliance with Christians throughout the whole of Middle East, with the alleged goal of "enslaving the Muslims" (*ibid.*).

It can be deduced that such views inherently take the form of securitized discourse. As argued by Buzan *et al.* (1998, p. 27), security speech acts do not necessarily employ the use of the word 'security'; what makes a discourse securitized is the detection of a perceived existential threat which calls for urgent action. That is precisely the message conveyed through the patterns found in the discourse delivered by Bin Laden in form of an interview with ABC News in 1999: Jews, and the State of Israel in particular, are a threat to the existence of 'true' Islam, and therefore need to be confronted in any way possible. The methods of combating a perceived threat to Islam extend to the point of justifying murder, as such practice is justified among the adherents of the ideology of Salafi jihadism.

Understanding the doctrine of Salafism and Salafi jihadism puts the discourses of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State into context. As discussed in the chapter dedicated to the theoretical framework, securitization is generally conceptualized as context-driven. Therefore, identifying the main elements of jihadi ideologies gives insights into the psycholinguistic and cultural background of its adherents. While the consensus view seems to be that Al-Qaeda derives its ideological roots from Qutbism, most of its conceptual positions rest on the doctrine of Salafism. With its origins in eighteenth-century Arabia, the name of this ultra-conservative branch of Islam is derived from the Arabic word *salaf*, which translates into English as 'ancestors'. The terminology reflects the central tenet of the movement: a return to the religious practices of early Muslims (Lauziere, 2010, p. 373).

Some scholars argue that a distinction should be made between Salafism and Salafi jihad, since the former advocates for some form of jihad against unbelievers, while the latter is the militant implementation thereof. Be that as it may, accommodating for such distinctions does not add much to this analysis, as both Salafists and Salafi jihadists are united in their ideological mission. Although scholars and journalists use the words Wahhabism and Salafism interchangeably, those who self-identify as Salafi reject the former as a synonym (Roy, 1994, p. 199). With that in mind, this analysis will take into consideration the three ideological streams within Sunni Islam (Salafism, Salafi jihadism and Wahhabism), as all of them have had a profound impact on the formulation of radical Islamic principles, as well as the practical execution thereof.

The ideas that constitute the ideology of Salafism and Salafi jihadism permeate all the discourses put forward by Al-Qaeda both before and after the September 11 attacks. Whereas their earlier discourses appeared as religious *fatwās,* the post-9/11 speech acts were exhibited in form of written interviews, as well as video and audio recordings. In 2002, Bin Laden issued an online letter addressed to the American people, wherein he once again laid out the ideology of radical Islamic terrorism. In the letter, Bin Laden claims that radical Islamists perceive the 1948 establishment of the State of Israel as an occupation rooted in anti-Islamism. In fact, Al-Qaeda's leader insists that the country "must be erased" (Letter to the American People, Paragraph 6). He declares that the Muslims are the 'true' heirs of the region of Palestine, and that any means of removing Jews from that territory are justifiable (*ibid.,* Paragraph 7). Not only does Bin Laden advocate for the expulsion or murder of Jews in Israel, but he also asserts that "the blood pouring out of Palestine must be equally revenged" (*ibid.,* Paragraph 9).

Throughout the years, Bin Laden had continuously referred to a perceived 'Zionist-Crusader' alliance against Islam. This was the case in a 2004 video and 2006 audio recording, both of which were broadcast by Al Jazeera (BBC News, 2004; Faraj *et al.,* 2006). Similarly, his organization vowed to perpetuate military jihad against Israel and the Jews in a 2008 audiotape (Noueihed, 2008). Once again, a closer look at the data indicates that all discourses and speech acts put forth by Al-Qaeda were, in fact, of securitized nature. The available documents do not leave much room for subjective interpretation, as Al-Qaeda's leader makes sure to remove any ambiguities when it comes to the messages that the organization wants to convey.

As observed in the analysis of patterns which appear in the sources, the antagonism that radical Islamists feel toward Israel goes beyond the targeting of Jews themselves: any country or organization perceived as an aide to Israel is considered to be an existential threat to the survival of Islamic values. In addition, many of the messages released by Al-Qaeda were specifically addressed to the Jews and their alleged allies. When examined through the lens of constructivism, it is not difficult to see that the underlying aspirations of the terrorist organization in question are informed by cultural and religious values. As previously discussed, religion itself represents an aspect of human interaction and behavior which is not empirically observable or easily falsifiable. Understanding this is particularly important when investigating the reasons behind religiously-inspired practices of international actors. Al-Qaida's claims favoring a purely Muslim Middle East rest on religious texts which are characterized by the fact that they can be reinterpreted *ad infinitum*. For that reason, it is critical that the actions of such actors be understood as intersubjective and context-driven.

4.1.2 ISIS

Bunzel (2015, p. 7) suggests that, just like Al-Qaeda, ISIS as a political entity is primarily driven by the doctrine of Salafi jihadism. That said, the author develops the claim that ISIS ascribes to a more radical ideological conceptualization, while executing jihad more ruthlessly, and without compromise (*ibid.,* p. 9). One of the major differences between Al-Qaeda's brand of Sunni Islam and the one employed by ISIS lies in the fact that the former claims to be advocating for a defensive military jihad, whereas the latter candidly puts an emphasis on the offensive form thereof. This is evident in a 2007 speech given by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, one of the organization's earliest leaders. In the speech, Omar al-Baghdadi used a Mauritanian Wahhabi scholar as a reference for the justification of offensive jihad, "The end to which fighting the unbelievers leads is no idolater (*mushrik*) remaining in the world" (*ibid.,* p. 10). When put in the context of Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines, which consider the eradication of idolatry (*shirk*) as one of the ultimate goals of Islam, the sentiment expressed by Omar al-Baghdadi in his 2007 speech can be interpreted through the lens of the theory of securitization (Sirriyeh, 2007, p. 125).

Although overtly offensive in nature, the jihad espoused by the leadership of ISIS serves a purpose similar to that of Al-Qaeda's defensive jihad: both consider the perceived unbelievers to

be an existential threat to the survival of 'true' Islam. The only difference is that ISIS appears to be acting preemptively, in order to accomplish its mission more effectively. Unlike Al-Qaeda, which often cited Western and Jewish presence in the Middle East as the primary reasons of its terrorist activities, ISIS has been unapologetic in the pursuit of its goals: the jihadi interpretation of Islamic religious scriptures is reason enough to carry out militarist activities (Bunzel, 2015, p. 10).

Drawing parallels to his earlier speeches, Omar al-Baghdadi reiterated in December of 2007 that ISIS is dedicated to the cause of Wahhabi-inspired military jihad, even if such pursuit requires attacking the perceived unbelievers in their home territories. In this particular speech, the former leader of ISIS uses the word 'persecution' to refer to idolatry, meaning that any ideology which falls outside the doctrine of Wahhabism or Salafi jihadism is considered a 'persecution' against the values of 'true' Islam (*ibid.*). Haykel (2016, p. 75) agrees that Al-Qaeda and ISIS virtually have the same ideological roots, but points to the fact that the latter conceptualizes the execution of its mission way beyond the regional borders of the Middle East. In fact, the brand of jihadism embraced by ISIS and its followers seeks to establish a caliphate, a seventh-century Islamic concept of an imperial state with no borders (*ibid.,* p. 77). This is, perhaps, the most important characteristic that separates ISIS from Al-Qaeda: an offensive approach with no intentions of apologeticism.

Despite the fact that the majority of scholars and journalists alike tend to focus on the impact that the terrorist activity carried out by ISIS has on Western countries, it should be noted that individuals who culturally or religiously self-identify as Jews remain one of the primary targets thereof. As a matter of fact, political speech acts and discourses employed by the leadership of ISIS commonly characterize the Jews as scapegoats who are believed to represent one of the greatest dangers to the survival of Islam. Unlike Al-Qaida, Fernandez (2015, p. 6) asserts, ISIS has managed to create a very well developed network of official publications for the purpose of spreading their jihadi propaganda and buttressing recruitment. Such material abounds with examples of statements and views rooted in antisemitism, as well as a strong opposition to the existence of the State of Israel.

In his empirical assessment of radical Islamic propaganda, Skillicorn (2015, p. 64) suggests that Azan and Dabiq are the magazines with the highest levels of jihadi language intensity. The

author constructs a combined model of propaganda by putting several other factors into the equation: imaginative language, deceptive discourse, and gamification.[30] An exhaustive inspection of the jihadi terminology present in a number of ISIS publications indicates that Dabiq has the highest level of overall propaganda intensity, which makes it an important tool of the radical Islamic machinery (*ibid.,* p. 65).

The authors of Dabiq assertively promote antisemitism as one of the central tenets of the doctrine espoused by ISIS and its adherents. For instance, the first issue of the magazine refers to the Jews as key mobilizers of a perceived American and Russian camp against Islam. According to this issue, they are believed to be the benefactors of what ISIS considers 'the nations and religious of *kufr*' (The Return of Khilafah, p. 10).[31] The second issue of the magazine was published just a few weeks after the first one. Correspondingly, the themes of antisemitism and anti-Zionism run through much of the publication. The term 'Jews' is used in five different parts, all of which carry anti-Semitic connotations. The Forward section of the issue ends with a statement whereby the leadership of ISIS pledges to kill the Jews from the region of Palestine, who are referred to as 'barbaric' (The Flood, p. 4). A discrete segment of the issue is dedicated to the Arabic concept of *mubahala*, which derives its modern meaning from the Quran: the belief that God will curse those who lie. According to traditional Islamic doctrines, *mubahala* particularly refers to the religious dispute between Muslims and Christians over the significance of Jesus Christ (Leaman, 2006, p. 419). That said, this concept is applied to the Jews in the second issue of Dabiq (The Flood, p. 21).

In like manner, the third issue of Dabiq reaffirmed the group's conspiratory perception regarding the Jews, and the State of Israel. Published in September of 2014, the edition claimed that the protection of Israel represented the primary interest of U.S. President Barack Obama, despite his strained relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (The Call to Hijrah, p. 4; Dónzis, 2014). Such statements are followed by images of President Obama wearing a *kippah,* the traditional Jewish cap. Although the photos were taken at an event commemorating the

---

[30] As defined by Deterding *et al.* (2011, p. 10), gamification represents the application of principles which guide game-design to non-game contexts. For example, terrorist and extremist platforms use concepts such as reputation scores to build a support network for their ideology and practices (Brachman and Levine, 2011).

[31] According to most Islamic and Western secular scholars, *kufr* is an Arabic term used to describe the notion of not believing in a monotheistic God and the teachings of Prophet Mohammed as laid out in the religious texts of Islam. An individual 'found guilty' of such behavior is typically called *kafir* (Waldman, 1968, p. 447).

anniversary of the Holocaust, the authors of Dabiq present them as 'evidence' of America's purported obedience to the Jews (The Call to Hijrah, p. 36). Once again, this provides confirmatory evidence that the leadership of ISIS is greatly driven by intersubjective perception; personal interests and perceptions seem to have cast a shadow on the fact that the relationship between the U.S. and Israel was more tense during the Obama presidency than in previous years. It seems fair to suggest that the notion of securitization has played a notable part in such conduct: the Jews and its perceived allies continue to be seen as a threat to the continuance of 'proper' Islamic values.

The rest of Dabiq issues published in 2014 were no less explicit in their expression of antisemitism and anti-Zionism. For instance, the fourth edition of the magazine refers to the Jews in four different parts, the first being a statement reaffirming the perception about an alleged 'Zionist-Crusader' war against the Muslim world (The Failed Crusade, p. 9). In addition, the authors argue that the Quran instructs Muslims to combat the Jews in order to get closer to the path of Prophet Mohammed. Similarly, ISIS reiterates its belief in the threat that Abrahamic non-Muslims pose to the existence of Islam by claiming, "And never will the Jews or the Christians approve of you until you follow their religion". In other words, it is implied that the aforementioned religious groups must be fought so that the survival of Islam is secured (*ibid.*, p. 43). On top of that, another section of the issue refers to the Israeli military as 'the Roman military machine', once again implying to the purported alliance of Christian and Jewish forces (*ibid.*, p. 39). In the same fashion, the fifth issue of the magazine mentions the Jews in eight different parts, calling for their expulsion from the Arabian Peninsula (Remaining and Expanding, p. 25). At the same time, the authors of Dabiq used the opportunity to publicly congratulate those who 'terrify' the Jews, implying that such actions minimize the threat they represent to Islam (*ibid.*, p. 30).

A closer look at the data suggests that the content featured in the Dabiq magazine has gotten more radical in 2015 and 2016. Building on the legacy of its previous issues, a great number of sections in the edition published on May 21, 2015 are fixated on the need for a Muslim combat against the Jews. In fact, the term 'Jews' is mentioned more than twenty-seven times throughout the issue. It is revealed that ISIS perceives the establishment of the State of Israel to be an act of

British crusade, which supposedly allowed for the Jewish control of what is considered by the terrorist group to be territories belonging to Muslims (They Plot and Allah Plots, p. 18).

By the same token, the final two issues of Dabiq, published in 2016, refer to the Jews and their allies as 'disbelievers' (The Murtadd Brotherhood, p. 14; Break the Cross, p. 11). In the fourteenth edition of the magazine, the authors use the words of Egyptian imam Hassan al-Banna to explain their approach to the nature of Jewish-Islamic relations, "Our dispute with the Jews is not religious, because the Quran encouraged us to be friendly with them. Islam is a human law before being an ethnic law. The Quran praised the Jews…and when the Quran dealt with the matter of the Jews, it approached it from an economic and legal angle" (The Murtadd Brotherhood, p. 31). The fact that ISIS refers to these words as some sort of reasoning for their antagonistic views of the Jews seems to be contradictory to the anti-Semitic ideas expressed in the previous issues of Dabiq.

A careful analysis of discourses put forward in Dabiq suggests that the final issue of the magazine contains the highest number of securitized references to the Jews. As a matter of fact, the term 'Jews' is used more than thirty times, 'Israel' around seventeen, and 'Jewish' around six. Published on July 31, 2016, the final edition of Dabiq gives a closer insight into the ultimate cause of ISIS activities: a military clash between Muslims on one side, and Jews and their allies on the other. According to the beliefs of the authors, such combat was foreseen by Prophet Mohammed as "the bloodiest battle before the Hour" (Break the Cross, p. 13).[32] Such a formulation of goals provides confirmatory evidence that actors in international relations are guided by intersubjective perception and interests, an assumption put forward by constructivist scholars (Kratochwill, 1984, p. 317). Taking into consideration the ambiguity of propositions laid out in religious texts, as well as the fact that such material can hardly be the subject of scientific validation, it is clear that the actors referencing it are primarily driven by a subjective interpretation thereof. Moreover, it can be assumed that the content presented in Dabiq has the potential of initiating the process of a two-sided securitization; on the one hand, the followers of ISIS might be involved in the targeting of Jews due to their belief that this ethno-religious group

---

[32] The concept of *Yawm ad-Dīn* (Day of Judgement) represents one of the central tenets in the Quranic doctrine. Regardless of the school of thought or the denomination, most practicing Muslims believe that the humankind will undergo a final assessment before Allah (God), whereby 'the righteous' will be eternally separated from 'the wicked' (Newby, 2002, p. 214). Drawing comparisons to other Abrahamic religions, Islam ascribes to the idea of the resurrection of souls. The event is commonly referred to as *'al-sā'ah*, or the Hour (Taylor, 1968, p. 68).

represents a threat to the survival of Islam. On the other, individuals who self-identify as Jewish could easily be triggered by such discourse, which might consequently influence their behavior as a transnational diaspora in international relations.

After the Turkish Armed Forces had captured the Syrian town of Dabiq, ISIS decided to replace the magazine carrying its name with a publication called Rumiyah. Wright (2016) suggests that the geographical position of Dabiq had held a central place in the group's ideological propaganda; it is speculated that they saw the loss of Dabiq as potentially harmful to the legitimacy of their message, therefore opting for a replacement. The new name allegedly refers to a Hadithic prophecy, whereby Prophet Mohammed predicts that Muslims would capture Rome (*ibid.*). As for the content of the new magazine, the group continues to express its strong opposition to the Jews and the State of Israel. The second issue of Rumiyah, published on October 4, 2016, puts forward the claim that the American President George Bush admitted to be involved in a Jewish-Christian crusade against the Muslim world (Al-Muhajir, 2016, p. 19). Similarly, the third edition of the magazine characterizes the Jews as 'the enemies of Allah' whom ISIS perceives as investing wealth, weapons, and technology into a supposed war against Muslims (Al-Baghdadi, 2016, p. 5).

In addition to the interpretation of Quranic and Hadithic verses, the authors of Rumiyah continue to write a column titled *Just Terror*, which has the goal of mobilizing support for military jihad, as well as offer advice on how to carry out such actions effectively. For instance, the fifth number of the magazine uses the column to praise the 2016 arson attacks which destroyed over 700 Jewish homes in Palestine. According to the authors, arson attacks are considered to be one of the most efficient ways of "terrorizing an entire nation". The text then proceeds to give instructions on how arson cocktails are made (Rumiyah Issue 5, pp. 8–9). On top of that, it is suggested that the Quran justifies the killing and torturing of Jews as a form of punishment for 'their actions' (*ibid.,* p. 18).

There is evidence for the notion that the editorial propaganda employed by ISIS over the course of the last few years has been successful at creating self-radicalized jihadists. To illustrate, Moore (2017) reported that the ISIS suicide bombers who conducted a series of terrorist attacks on Brussels in 2016, had Hasidic and Orthodox Jews, as well as Israeli airline passengers, as their primary targets. Correspondingly, an ISIS-affiliated Telegram chat room published an

announcement in early 2017, calling for jihadi enthusiasts to 'terrorize' Jewish communities in Western countries (The Jerusalem Post, 2017). In June 2017, an adherent of ISIS ideology publicly expressed the will to behead Jews, which led to his imprisonment (The Jewish Chronicle, 2017).

Coupled with a history of perpetual persecution and mass pogroms, the psycho-cultural attachment of the transnational Jewish diaspora in Europe to their kinstate of Israel makes the questioning of its very existence a matter of securitization. The analysis of discourses and speech acts employed by radical Islamic terrorist groups offer valuable insights into the perception and goals of these actors. A constructivist assessment of primary documents and statements issued by Al-Qaeda and ISIS has provided confirmatory evidence for the notion that individuals self-identifying as Jewish, as well as the supporters of the State of Israel, are considered by these groups to be among the greatest enemies of Islam. As a matter of fact, the expressed belief in a purported Zionist-driven conspiracy against the Islamic world permeates both oral and written discourses of dominant radical Islamic terrorist organizations.

Guided by the constructivist assumption of a socially arranged international arena of relations, we have observed the employment of securitization by leaders of groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS throughout all of their discourse. That said, the analysis of this thesis requires the assessment of a two-sided securitization, as applied by both radical Islamic terrorist groups, and the representatives of the transnational Jewish diaspora in Europe.

4.2 Discourses and Speech Acts of International Organizations Representing the Transnational Jewish Diaspora in Europe (1996–2017)

The fact that the transnational Jewish diaspora in Europe is not representatively unified under a single international organization does not take away from the notion that it stands as a conceivable non-state actor in international relations. Shain and Wittes (2002, p. 170) argue that transnational ethnic diasporas represent one of the most relevant types of actors in international relations due to their potential of influencing elections, affecting the course of conflict within their homeland, as well as achieving other goals that align with their interests and perceptions. Although not formally coordinated, members of a particular transnational ethnic diaspora are connected through a sense of belonging to a homeland, common historical experience, as well as

a perception of unique traditions and customs (Sheffer, 2003, p. 51). In many cases, such individuals also tend to adopt a belief in a common enemy, typically embodied by another ethnic or religious group which is perceived as representing a threat to the existence of the first group (Collective, 2006, p. 470). With that in mind, it can be argued that securitization has the potential of representing one of the essential elements of group identification when it comes to transnational ethnic diasporas.

As previously observed, the analysis of discourses and speech acts put forward by radical Islamic terrorist groups suggests that both antisemitism and anti-Zionism lie at the very core of ideologies espoused by these organizations. Therefore, it seems fair to assume that such circumstances would serve as one of the push factors when it comes to the Jewish emigration from Europe. In order to explore the relationship between these two phenomena, it is important to examine the language utilized by organizations which represent the transnational Jewish diaspora on the continent. With that in mind, this subchapter will look into the discourses and speech acts of organizations representing the the Jewish diaspora in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Ukraine, and Russia. As seen in the previous chapter, these are the European countries with the largest increase in immigration to Israel in the last decade (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016). On top of that, the combined Jewish population of these two countries represents more than 60% of the total Jewish population in Europe (Jewish Virtual Library, 2016).

4.2.1 United Kingdom

According to the Jewish Virtual Library (2016), the United Kingdom is home to around 290,000 people who self-identify as Jews or persons of Jewish faith and culture, which makes it the second largest Jewish community in Europe, after the one in France. Contemporary Jewish affairs in Britain are generally documented by The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) in form of reports that analyze the attitudes of British Jews concerning issues of identity, politics, and life as a minority in Great Britain. Although its initial mission was centered around the social and political attitudes of American Jews, the activities of the JPR saw a change of course during the Cold War. In fact, the institution moved its headquarters to London in 1965, refocusing its research on British and European Jews.

Reports issued by the JPR before and after the 9/11 attacks suggest that British Jews have held onto negative views of Muslims and Arabs for the past two decades. A survey conducted by Miller, Schmool, and Lerman (1996, p. 5) found that a great proportion of Jews in Britain considered Arabs to be "behaving in a way that caused hostility towards them". The same attitudes toward Arabs had been expressed in a similar study just a few years earlier (*ibid.*). The fact that neither of the two surveys contained references to radical Islamic terrorism does not come as a surprise, since the term had not entered the mainstream until the September 11 attacks on the United States. Be that as it may, both reports show that British Jews had already had adverse views of Arabs and Muslims, considering them to be particularly hostile toward their community. When contextualized within the theoretical composition of securitization, such views gain a more prominent function; they stand as a subjective response to a perceived threat. Coupled with the previously examined discourses of radical Islamic terrorist groups, it is evident that the antagonistic perception of Arabs by British Jews constitutes the bigger picture of securitization through intersubjectivity. Following the main assumptions of the theory of securitization, it can be postulated that the anti-Arab sentiment among British Jews might be the result of both the tumultuous timeline of post-1940s Jewish-Islamic relations, as well as the broader historical sense of Jews as Europe's perpetual victims.

As put forward by Boyd (2013, p. 15) in a policy debate article for JPR, the position of Jews in Britain, and Europe as a whole, heavily depends on - and is influenced by - the dynamics within Europe's Muslim community. The author asserts that activities carried out by Islamic extremists in the period following the September 11 attacks led to increased concerns among British Jews, especially when it comes to the safety of their community (*ibid.*).

In response to the 2014 attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels, the director of JPR Jonathan Boyd spoke on behalf of the transnational Jewish diaspora in the European Union, arguing that radical Islamic hostility toward European Jews is a serious problem that needs to be taken seriously by European politicians. In his statement, Boyd asserted that JPR has observed a rise in anxiety among European Jews, following the terrorist activities conducted by radical Islamic extremists (JPR, 2014). Similarly, the communications director of the Community Security Trust (CST) - a Jewish charity with a mission of protecting British Jews from antisemitism - suggested that the terrorist activities executed by Jihadi extremists continue to pose a threat for the security

of Jews in Western Europe (Gardner, 2014). Both discourses have the potential of being seen as part of the process of securitization, as the actions of its audience have shown to be in correlation with what has been perceived an existential threat (e.g. the emigration of British Jews has been increasing in the period of rising terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamists).

In 2014, Staetsky and Boyd conducted a JPR-funded research project on the experiences of antisemitism in Britain. The study was based on a sample of 1,468 respondents who self-identified as Jews (*ibid.,* p. 9). More than a quarter of all respondents pointed out that they had experienced harassment by Muslims with extremist views, while about a third mentioned the same group when referring to physical violence. The authors, however, point to the fact that the responses were greatly based on the subjective perception of the respondents, rather than their certainty in factual reality. According to the report, Islamic extremism accounted for the greatest percentage of anti-Semitic incidents in the period between 2009 and 2014, as perceived by the respondents (*ibid.,* p. 22). More precisely, one in four victims of anti-Semitic violence perceived the perpetrator as being of Muslim extremist background (*ibid.,* p. 36).

The mainstream adoption of the term 'radical Islamic terrorism' seems to have allowed for a more precise designation of a perceived existential threat to the transnational Jewish diaspora in Europe. The studies conducted by the JPR, as well as the discourse put forward by its opinion leaders, suggest that individuals self-identifying as Jews in Britain have acquired a more refined perception of a security threat: the 'Arabs' of the 1990s became 'Muslim extremists' or 'radical Islamists' in the following decade. As this evidently correlates to the evolution of major pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian movements into dominant radical Islamic terrorist groups, it can be argued that the security perception of British Jews has been influenced by such developments.

4.2.2 France

With over 460,000 individuals self-identifying as Jews, France represents the country with the largest Jewish community in Europe, and the third largest in the world, after Israel and the United States (Jewish Virtual Library, 2016). The research regarding the social and political attitudes of French Jews does not have a long history. In fact, there is virtually no evidence to support the notion that Arabs or individuals of Muslim faith were identified as a security threat

by French Jews in the twentieth century. That said, the perception of security among French Jews in the last two decades has been mixed.

In the early 2000s, the chairman of France's largest Holocaust museum and the president of the Grand Synagogue in Paris, Éric de Rothschild, posited that the anti-Semitic remarks in France are mainly espoused by French Muslims who are, in his view, either jealous of the relatively affluent status of the Jews, or hold anti-Zionist and pro-Palestinian views (Krieger, 2006). Such securitized views of Muslims by the Jewish community in France resonate in opinion expressed by the general population in the country. In a study conducted by the Pew Research Center (2005, p. 18), 73% of respondents expressed concerns about Islamic extremism in France, while 78% supported the banning of Muslim headscarves due to extremism concerns (*ibid.,* p. 13). Some of those concerned about Islamic extremism cited the 2005 London bombings as a major reason (*ibid.,* pp. 20).

The data appears to suggest that the emigration of French Jews correlates to the rise of anti-Semitic incidents, mainly committed by individuals who self-identify with radical Islamic aspirations. This is especially evident in the period between 2007 and 2011, during which over 2,166 anti-Semitic incidents were recorded in France (Reuters, 2009; Libération, 2009; The Coordination Forum for Countering Anti-Semitism, 2011). Rabbi Salomon Malka, the representative of a large Sephardic community synagogue Berith Chalom, has linked the rise of antisemitism among French Muslims to the intensification of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially in the Gaza strip. What is more, Rabbi Malka argues that identity and self-perception is at the very core of these incidents, "Those who demonstrate against Jews, what is their feeling towards France?" he asked. "That's the question: Do they feel French or Muslim? The problem is not well understood, and we're afraid to look at it in its face" (Bohlen, 2014). On top of that, Malka puts forward the view often expressed by Jewish leaders alike, arguing that anti-Semitism is commonly disguised as anti-Zionism (*ibid.*). Such notion, however, is worthy of problematizing, as it plays into the premises of securitization.

Guided by Balzacq's theoretical layout of securitization, it seems fair to suggest that the discourse employed by Rabbi Malka takes on the form of securitized speech. By linking anti-Semitism to anti-Zionism, the representative of a large Jewish community in France implies that the hostile attitudes toward the State of Israel are, in fact, an inherent attack on Jews as a peoples.

When put in the context of increasing Jewish migration from France to Israel, such discourse distinctly becomes part of a larger process of securitization: Islamic terrorism is considered a threat to Jews, and their kinstate of Israel, where they eventually immigrate in order to ensure the survival of both. Observed through the lens of securitization, this represents an example of how the psycho-cultural background of securitized participants possibly affects their actions in international relations.

Rabbi Malka's views are somewhat corroborated by the findings of a 2014 study carried out by Siona, an organization representing the Sephardi Jewish community in France. The survey, which included a sample of 3,833 respondents, found that 74% of Jews in France were considering emigration, 29% of whom cited antisemitism as the primary cause. Furthermore, about 57% of participants in the study felt that Jews had no future in France due to the same reason. The vast majority of respondents, 93%, expressed their disappointment in the ability of the government to combat Islamic extremism (Mouvement Siona, 2014). Balzacq's (2011, p. 34) notion of an enabling audience necessary for the process of securitization is apparent. On the one hand, the representative of an influential Jewish organization puts forward a discourse which identifies radical Islam as a threat to the security of the French Jewish community. On the other, a study based on a sizeable sample of individuals self-identifying as Jews in France finds similar fears among the vast majority of its participants.

The Jewish Agency for Israel, an international organization with a mission of strengthening the relationship between the transnational Jewish diaspora and the State of Israel, has been particularly vocal about the security of French Jews. As a matter of fact, its president, Natan Sharansky, has continuously expressed concerns about the very survival of the Jewish community in France. In a 2016 letter to the Agency's board of directors, Sharansky suggests that French Jews feel uncomfortable and fearful due to a strong anti-Zionist sentiment within the Arab immigrant community. More precisely, the representative of the Jewish Agency develops the claim that many incoming immigrants to France are susceptible to antisemitism and are unwilling to adopt the country's democratic values (A Message from Natan Sharansky, Paragraph 6). Considering the fact that Islam is the most professed religion among France's immigrant groups, it is evident that Sharansky is referring to it.

The patterns present throughout the letter reveal the document's securitizing nature. Sharansky

argues that measures taken by the French government to ensure the security of its Jewish citizens are commendable, but impractical. The author propounds the view that the very necessity of soldiers outside Jewish kindergartens reflects the confined nature of Jewish life in the country (*ibid.*). Although not too explicit, the document as a whole reads as a securitizing manifesto; Sharansky continuously praises the efforts of the French government with regard to the protection of its Jewish citizens, while placing the blame of unsafety on incoming immigrants, the vast majority of which are Muslims. In other words, the written speech serves as a discourse of securitization, implicitly identifying Muslim immigrants as an existential threat to the survival of the Jewish diaspora in France. On top of that, the document specifically suggests that immigration to Israel represents a sound option to French Jews who feel unsafe in Europe (*ibid.,* Paragraph 8). This is clearly an example of strategic discourse, as described by Balzacq (2005, pp. 172), which, unlike a conventional speech act, employs a context-driven stratagem to achieve its goals (e.g. affect the behavior of actors in international relations).

The concerns expressed by Sharansky seem to parallel those expressed by French Jews in a 2015 survey conducted by The Foundation Jean Jaurès, a socialist think-thank in the country. The research was based on a sample of 724 individuals who self-identified as Jews, culturally, ethnically or religiously. Being the first authorized study of social, political and religious attitudes of French Jews, this survey represents the most reliable piece of complementary evidence in the case of France. The data yielded by this study provides strong evidence that Jews, on average, hold more antagonistic views of Islam and its followers than the general population of France. 51% of self-identified Jews, as opposed to the 63% of the general French population, agreed with the following statement, "There should be no confusion: Muslims live in France peacefully, and only the radical Islamists represent a threat" (*"Il ne faut pas faire d'amalgame, les musulmans vivent paisiblement en France et seuls des islamistes radicaux représentent une menace"*). Correspondingly, the Jewish bias against Islam was reflected in their response to the statement that followed, "Islam represents a threat" ("*L'Islam représente une menace*"); 40% of self-identified Jews, as opposed to the 32% of the general French population, agreed with that statement (Ifop pour la Fondation Jean Jaurès 2015, p. 32).

A closer look at the data indicates that French Jews have a strong sense of their position as a fragile minority group in the country. In response to the question regarding the groups which are

most often the target of racism in France, 63% of French Jews felt that anti-Semitic discrimination is the most prominent one (*ibid.*, p. 38). Similarly, when asked about the main perpetrators of anti-Semitic racism in France, 57% of French Jews identified the individuals of Muslim origin as such (*ibid.*, p. 47).

A special part of the study was dedicated to the fear of radical Islamic terrorism, as well as the threat that it potentially represents to the Jewish community in France. The opinions expressed in this section of the survey suggest that French Jews could be described as an exemplary audience of the process of securitization. When asked to specify the intensity of the security threat that arises from terrorist attacks carried out by jihadists in France, 87% of French Jews agreed that it was high (*ibid.*, p. 67).

Perhaps the most relevant finding for the analysis of this thesis comes from the section of the survey which deals with the emigration of French Jews. When asked, "What are the reasons you or your relatives immigrated to Israel?" (*Pour quelles raisons votre ou vos proche(s) est-il /sont-ils parti(s) vivre en Israël?)*, 61% of self-identified French Jews agreed with the close-ended statement, "Because, as Jews, we did not feel safer in France" (*Parce qu'en tant que juif, il(s) ne se sentai(en)t plus en sécurité* en France);[33] (*ibid.*, p. 98). Comparably, 52% of the respondents gave the same response when asked why they decided to immigrate to countries other than Israel (*ibid.*, p. 103). These results provide further evidence for the notion that there is a clear correlation between the fear of radical Islamic terrorism, and the motives for emigration within the Jewish community of France.

Coupled with the securitizing discourse speeches put forward by the representatives of the Jewish diaspora in France, the opinions expressed by French Jews in the 2015 study carried out by The Foundation Jean Jaurès seem to fit the theoretical framework of securitization. What is more, the case of France reveals the perplex dynamics of securitization between the discourse agents and their target audience. According to Balzacq (2011, p. 34), an interaction between international actors can be considered 'securitized' only if the audience acts as an enabler of the

---

[33] Other close-ended statements included the following: (a) "For family reasons, to join members of family settled in Israel" (*Pour des raisons familiales, pour rejoindre des membres de sa famille installés en Israël*), (b) "Attachment to Zionist ideas" (*Par attachement aux idées sionistes*), (c) "For religious reasons" (*Pour des raisons religieuses*), (d) "Because the economic situation is better in Israel than in France" (*Parce que la situation économique est meilleure en Israël qu'en France*), and (e) "Because the level of taxes is lower in Israel than in France" (*Parce que le niveau des impôts est moins élevé en Israël qu'en France*); (*ibid.*, p. 98).

discourse in question. Considering the fact that the analysis covered discourses and speech acts put forward by the representatives of the Jewish diaspora in France, it seems fair to suggest that its content meets the criteria outlined by Balzacq: a securitizing agent is empowered by a securitized audience. On top of that, the results yielded by the Jean Jaurès opinion survey clearly indicate that the Jewish diaspora in France generally perceives radical Islamic terrorism as a threat to its survival in the country.

4.2.3 Ukraine and Russian Federation

As observed in the chapter centered around the waves of Jewish emigration from Europe, Ukraine and Russia saw the highest number of its Jews fleeing after the 1989 fall of Communism in Eastern Europe (Jewish Virtual Library, 2016). Nevertheless, the two countries are still home to hundreds of thousands of individuals who self-identify as Jews. While Russia has witnessed a fair share of radical Islamic terrorist activity on its territory, Ukraine has mostly been spared such incidents. However, both countries have seen an increased rise in the emigration of its Jewish population in the last decade (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

According to a monitoring report put together by Likhachev (2014, p. 2), anti-Semitic violence in Ukraine peaked in 2005, after which it observably declined. When put in the context of increased Jewish emigration from the country, the two do not correlate. That said, discourses regarding the position of Jews as an ethno-religious minority in Ukraine, as well as their willingness to flee the country, have been varied. While at times securitizing in nature, such discourses in Ukraine have rarely identified radical Islamic terrorism as a threat to the survival of the Jewish community there. The absence of such terminology in the discourses of organizations representing the Ukrainian Jews could, perhaps, be attributed to the extremely rare occurrence of radical Islamic terrorism in the country. In fact, a great deal of securitizing discourses coming from Jewish organizations in Ukraine seem to correlate with the outbreak of the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution,[34] as well as the events that followed.

---

[34] In February 2014, a series of protests took place at the Independence Square in Kiev, Ukraine, due to President Viktor Yanukovych's unwillingness to sign an association agreement with the European Union, which he had previously endorsed. Having suddenly taken a pro-Russian stance, president Yanukovych proposed the signing of a multi-billion-dollar deal with the country (Diuk, 2014, p. 9). This led to the intensification of the demonstrations, which prompted President Yanukovych to flee to Russia, where he was offered a form of political asylum (Kendall, 2014). The reluctance of the Russian government to accept the newly established interim government, coupled with

In March 2014, the chief rabbi of Ukraine, Yaakov Dov Bleich, suggested that the anti-Semitic demonstrations in Crimea were part of Russian propaganda. He even went as far as comparing the incident to the 1930s Nazi strategy in Austria (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 2014). While Rabbi Bleich's discourse could certainly be characterized as securitizing, the existential threat identified in the speech is the Russian military in Crimea, rather than radical Islamic terrorism, as observed in the cases of Great Britain and France. That being said, there seems to be no compelling reason to believe that Rabbi Bleich had the intention of encouraging Jewish emigration from Ukraine. Quite the contrary, he expressed his faith in a diverse Ukraine, whose nationals need to make sure to drive the Russian forces out of Crimea (*ibid.*).

The response coming from the southeastern part of the country was even more reassuring. Shmuel Kaminezki, the principal rabbi of the Dnepropetrovsk region in Ukraine, asserted that individuals of Jewish faith, culture or ethnicity, do not have to fear for their security despite the ongoing political crisis. As an organizer of many traditional Jewish celebrations, he found that Ukrainian Jews continue to wear symbols of their ethno-religious identity in public with no fear of getting targeted, "My guests felt perfectly comfortable taking a walk in the middle of the night wearing *kipahs* and *tzitzit*; nobody bothered them" (Margolin, 2014). Rabbi Kaminezki did, however, acknowledge the presence of fear among the community's senior members, particularly those who had survived the Holocaust, "Many of the older people—World War II veterans and Holocaust survivors—they are very afraid of war because they have seen it before. We are trying to keep them calm and have professionals on hand to help them through this time" (*ibid.*). Nonetheless, he concluded the speech by maintaining that Ukrainian Jews of the Dnepropetrovsk are not afraid of anti-Semitism, but rather the impact that the Russian intervention in Crimea might have on the Ukrainian economy (*ibid.*).

On the other hand, the discourse advanced by the Jewish Agency of Ukraine in April 2014 explicitly urges the Ukrainian Jews to consider immigrating to Israel due to security reasons. As it turns out, the representatives of the Jewish Agency argue, incidents of anti-Semitic nature have been on the rise since the assassination attempt at Hennadiy Kernes, the mayor of Kharkiv with Jewish origin. Even though the number of incidents against individuals who self-identify as Jews

---

a strong opposition to the demonstrations, resulted in the outbreak of the Crimean crisis, wherein the Ukrainian territory of the same name was annexed by Russia. All of this has created a state of weighty sociopolitical instability in Ukraine and the neighboring region (Walker, 2014).

remains small compared to the 2005 peak, the speech of the Ukrainian branch of the Jewish Agency is filled with alarmist statements such as, "Chaos has become the norm", and, "The winds of war are blowing" (The Jewish Agency for Israel, 2014). In addition, the emissaries of the Jewish Agency point to the fact that Mayor Kernes himself was flown to Israel after the failed assassination attempt, with the goal of persuading other Ukrainian Jews to do the same. While there is no mention of radical Islamic terrorism, it seems fair to suggest that the Jewish Agency in Ukraine is a party to the process of securitization. On the one hand, a possible existential threat has been identified, and the audience is being persuaded to act accordingly. On the other, the audience seems to be engaging with the securitized discourse, as its collective behavior is directed toward emigration.

The concerns and fears of the Jewish Agency for Israel resonate in a 2014 speech given by Josef Zissels, the chairman of two important Jewish representative bodies: The Vaad Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine, and the World Jewish Congress. Unlike the spokespeople of the Jewish Agency, Zissel develops the claim that Ukrainian Jews are fleeing the country due to the overall political crisis, rather than anti-Semitism per se. Furthermore, Zissel points to the fact that Jews are not unique in their struggle to survive the ongoing socio-economic and political crisis in Ukraine, as the vast majority of the general population has been affected just as much. Lastly, he rejects the notion of encouraging mass Jewish emigration from the country (The Times of Israel, 2014). In this sense, his discourse resembles those of the chief rabbis in the country.

The response of the International Fellowship of Christians and Jews, an organization which has the goal of strengthening the support for the State of Israel, was multifaceted. While acknowledging that incidents of anti-Semitism in Ukraine have been decreasing since 2005, the organization's president Rabbi Yechiel Eckstein maintains that the desire of Ukrainian Jews to immigrate to Israel is understandable and to be supported. That is not to say that his 2016 speech does not carry securitizing connotations. Quite the contrary, Rabbi Eckstein suggests that the emigration of Ukrainian Jews must be supported, as it could make the difference between life and death (Arutz Sheva, 2016). Although he does not explicitly identify emigration as the only viable option for Ukrainian Jews, Rabbi Eckstein's discourse implies that staying in the country

during the conflict with Russia could possibly pose an existential threat to the Jewish diaspora there.

The proposition that the Jewish diaspora in Ukraine seems to be under threat is in line with the stance taken by Eduard Dolinsky, who serves as the executive director of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee. Dolinsky (2017) points to the anti-Semitic history of organizations that are glorified in present-day Ukraine, as well as the government officials who publicly espouse Judeophobic views. Namely, the author expresses worry about the population's overwhelming admiration for the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which actively supported and participated in the Holocaust during the 1940s. Furthermore, Dolinsky (2017) stresses the Ukrainian government's role in the whitewashing of the organization's image; a 2015 law categorizes the OUN as an organization of freedom fighters and makes the eliciting of any statement that might be interpreted as derogatory toward it a punishable crime. On top of that, certain members of the Ukrainian Parliament, most notably Nadia Savchenko, have publicly expressed support for conspiracy theories centered around the claim that individuals of Jewish origin assert control over the vast majority of global finance. While the discourse put forward by Dolinsky (2017) adds leverage to the claims of other representatives of the Ukrainian Jewish community, it does not carry a securitizing undertone, nor does it contain any mentions of radical Islamic terrorism.

Although Russia ranks third as the country where the largest percentage of immigrants to Israel comes from, there is insufficient research on the reasons behind such occurrence. With that in mind, our knowledge regarding the motives behind the increase in the rate of Jewish emigration from Russia is based on very limited data, thus making it difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the situation in question. Since the organizations representing the Jewish community in Russia have not made weighty statements expressing their fears about the survival thereof, the explanations regarding the steep rise in Jewish emigration from the country remain ambiguous and rely on subjective interpretations of a small number of influential Russian Jews.

In a 2014 interview with the Times of Israel, Ilya Agron - a Moscow-based businessman - develops the claim that President Putin's actions in Crimea has a lot to do with the increase in Jewish emigration. Masha Liberman – a prominent member of Moscow's startup scene – expresses the same concerns, adding that the Russian government's persistent ideological animosity toward the United States intensifies the willingness of Russian Jews to emigrate.

Another member of Moscow's high society, David Nazarov, concurs, claiming that he feels much safer in Israel than Russia, despite the former's hostile neighborhood (Segal, 2014). Correspondingly, Vladimir Jakovlev – one of Russia's most influential media figures before his immigration to Israel – attributes the rise in the rate of Jewish emigration from the country to the fear of unpredictable consequences that might result from Putin's policies. The belief in this assumption is mirrored in the response given by another prominent Jewish journalist from Russia, Mikhail Kaluzhsky, who suggests that his decision to leave the country was singlehandedly influenced by domestic politics. According to Zeyev Khanin, one of the representatives of Israel's Immigrant Absorption Ministry, all of the aforementioned individuals fit the archetype of the twenty-first century Jewish immigrant from Russia – a highly educated member of the country's intelligentsia (Super and Big, 2015).

While the views expressed by some influential Russian Jews reflect their own intersubjectivity and perception, there are two limitations that stand in the way of painting a more objective picture of the situation in question: (1) none of the aforementioned individuals holds a position that can be considered reflective of the collective thought within the Russian Jewish community, and (2) the small sample size increases the likelihood of error skewing. In other words, given that the findings concerning the situation in Russia are based on a limited number of individuals who do not serve as representatives of the Jewish community in the country, the results from the analysis should be treated with utmost caution.

The analysis of discourses employed by international organizations representing the transnational Jewish diaspora in Europe reveals that there is a correlation between the occurrence of radical Islamic terrorism and the increase in self-consciousness about collective security among European Jews. As reported above, surveys and polls in Britain and France – European countries with the highest rates of radical Islamic terrorism in the past two decades – suggest that a significant percentage of its Jews feel unsafe and fearful for the collective security of their community due to such occurrences. On the other hand, as noted above, there is virtually no mention of radical Islamic terrorism in the speech acts put forward by representatives of the Jewish community in Ukraine. While the lack of data on the opinions and attitudes of Russian Jews prevents us from drawing impartial conclusions about the reasons behind mass Jewish emigration from the country, the interviews with a handful of influential members of the

community do not include any mention of radical Islamic terrorism as a reason for emigration. With that in mind, it is important to compare the incidence of radical Islamic terrorist attacks with the emigration trends of European Jews in the last three decades in order to investigate whether the perceptional attitudes correlate to statistical data.

4.3 The Correlation Between Radical Islamic Terrorist Attacks and the Emigration of European Jews (1980–2015)

As previously reported, the emigration trends of European Jews have come about in different fluctuations. While it might be true that virtually all waves of migration were directed toward both Israel and the United States, the former took in a disproportionately higher percentage of European Jewish immigrants over the course of the last half a century. For that reason, the analysis primarily focuses on European Jewish immigration to Israel. When taking into consideration the total number of European Jewish immigrants to Israel in the period between 1950 and 2015, the data collected by the Jewish Virtual Library (2015) suggests that a peak was reached in the 1990s (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4. 1: Total Number of European Jewish Immigrants to Israel, 1950–2015


Source: Jewish Virtual Library (2015).

In comparison, Figure 4.2 reveals that terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamist groups in Europe were few and far between after the end of World War II. Overall, a peak was reached in the 1980s, but was soon followed by a sharp decrease. Be that as it may, the data provided by the

Global Terrorism Database (2016) suggests that there has been a gradual increase in the number of terrorist assaults perpetrated by Islamic extremists from the year 2000 onward.

Figure 4. 2: Total Number of Radical Islamic Terrorist Attacks in Europe, 1950–2015

Source: Global Terrorism Database (2016).

The available evidence seems to suggest that the long-term trends of Jewish emigration from Europe do not exactly correlate to the rate of terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic extremists on the continent. That said, the European Jewish migration to Israel did increase following a period of high terrorist activity attributed to radical Islamists. Either way, the research plan requires taking a closer look at the period between 2001 and 2015 in order to evaluate our first hypothesis in its entirety. In fact, Figure 4.3 indicates that the dynamics between the rate of European Jewish immigrants to Israel and the occurrence of radical Islamist terrorist attacks is correlational.

Figure 4. 3: Total Number of European Jewish Immigrants to Israel per Year and the Total Number of Radical Islamic Terrorist Attacks in Europe, 2001–2015

Sources: Jewish Virtual Library (2015); Global Terrorism Database (2016).

Returning to the first hypothesis posed at the beginning of this thesis, it is now possible to state that the rate of Jewish emigration from Europe generally tends to increase in the period following a terrorist attack carried out by Islamic extremists. As observed in Figure 4.3, this was especially true in year 2004, and the period between 2008 and 2015. Coupled with the findings yielded by discourse analysis presented in the previous subchapter, the statistical data provides confirmatory evidence for the first hypothesis of this research. Be that as it may, determining fixed causality between the two phenomena would be complex and difficult. In other words, a survey based on a sizeable sample of Jewish emigrants from Europe in the given period would be necessary in order to investigate that. Despite such limitations, this thesis could serve as the basis for further research on the dynamics between different non-state actors that are becoming more influential in international relations.

Looking at the data provided in Figure 4.3, scholars of international migration might point to the fact that the increase in the emigration of European Jews strongly correlates to the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis. In fact, the analysis of the impact of the economic crisis on international migration by Tilly (2011, p. 678) found that the former serves as a strong push factor for the latter. If we assume, however, that the global recession of 2008 represented an important factor in propelling the most recent trends of Jewish emigration from Europe, why did

Israel take precedence over the U.S. as the primary host country? The economic explanation falls short here, as a closer look at the data indicates that the economic prospects in the period between 2008 and 2015 fared better in the U.S. than Israel. According to the data yielded by annual OECD reports on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), not only did the U.S. experience a more stable growth in the given period than Israel, but it also managed to avoid the financial pitfalls in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. On the other hand, the economy of Israel took a tumble in 2014, when the overall GDP saw a 0.1% decrease. Despite the global recession, the GDP prospects of the U.S. in the period between 2008 and 2015 continued to outdo those of Israel, the European Union, and the European Economic Area as a whole (OECD, 2017).

Armed conflict and climate change - two other major factors that often serve as push factors of international migration – still do not explain why a disproportionate number of European Jewish migrants chooses Israel over the United States as their primary host country. Quite the contrary, Israel's scarcity of natural resources, limited space, high population growth, and hostile neighborhood would be expected to lose to the diversity of climate, stable population growth, peaceful neighborhood, and overabundance of resources found in the U.S. (Haran *et al.,* 2002, p. 119; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006, p. xxiii). While the global economic crisis and armed conflict might serve as push factors of European Jewish emigration, there seems to be an identity-based prism which drives the overwhelming majority of those migrants to Israel. Since constructivism and securitization serve as the guiding theories of this thesis, the following subchapter will explore the different push and pull factors of European Jewish immigration to Israel.

4.4 The Push and Pull Factors of European Jewish Immigration to Israel (2001–2016)

Over the course of the last two decades, the Jewish population in Europe has been steadily declining. There are three main factors that are identified as having the most impact on this trend: population aging, low birth rates, and emigration. It must be noted, however, that the former two are characteristic of the whole of Europe, meaning that they do not carry a uniquely Jewish specificity (Gallup, 2009, p. 14). Emigration, therefore, continues to represent an integral characteristic of the Jewish community in Europe.

According to Hopf (1998, p. 198), constructivism as a theory in IR offers a unique approach to analyzing the behavior of international actors by linking it to the psycho-cultural impact of

identity. Just as it is possible to deduce the causality between the collective philosophy of post-WWII Japanese antimilitarism and the internal opposition to Japan's military expenditures, it seems fair to suggest that the culturo-religious attachment of self-identified Jews to the State of Israel might be one of the factors that pulls immigrants from that social group to the country. Tilly (2011, p. 678), maintains that international migration cannot be explained through a simple market model. Although it might be true that low wages and unemployment serve as strong push factors of migration, the process itself is characterized by varied complexities, where social, cultural, and religious factors come at play. The author points to the fact that the paths of migration are generally either inaugurated or approved through recruitment by the host country. Above all, the dynamics of international migration are coordinated through political and social networks between the migrating group and the host country. Consequently, the psycho-cultural attachment of the migrating group to the host country tends to become stronger in the process (*ibid.*).

Research on international migration published in the last four decades seems to follow the push-pull model, which seeks to identify a combination of push factors that motivate people to emigrate and pull factors that attract them to a specific destination. Although it might be true that the vast majority of studies in the field focus on labor migration, recent analyses suggest that there is a growing scholarly interest in the reasons behind the continuance of an initiated wave of migration (Schoorl *et al.,* 2000, p. 3). The overview of factors that drive the European Jewish immigration to Israel will be organized according to this model.

As seen in subchapter 4.2, the analysis of discourses employed by representatives of the Jewish community in Europe suggests that economy and security stand out when it comes to the reasons that push European Jews to emigrate. Be that as it may, it has already been discussed why the economic model cannot offer a comprehensive explanation of the reasons that pull the European Jews to Israel. There are reasons to believe that a combination of identity, a sense of security, and Jewish-specific government programs is what attracts the European Jews to the State of Israel.

The perpetual, well-documented nature of Jewish migration adds to its distinctiveness among migrations of other social groups. For most of history, the main push factor of Jewish migration was the hostile attitude toward their ethno-religious identity. As described in previous sections,

individuals who self-identified as Jews have often held distinguished positions of economic influence and high level of academic training since the beginning of the period that is perceived within the community as life in the diaspora (Safran, 1991, pp. 83–84). In this regard, economic difficulties and low levels of education have rarely characterized the prototypical Jewish migrant within or from Europe. The consensus view seems to be that anti-Semitism has historically represented the single most impactful push factor of Jewish migration (Laqueur, 2006, pp. vii–viii). With that in mind, it seems evident that identity has played an integral part in the history of Jewish emigration from Europe.

As pointed out by Lebow (2008, p. 474), the concept of identity in international relations has the potential of serving as a basis for collective action. While constructivists understand identity as being incessantly fluid in nature, politicians tend to strive for the illusion of fixed singularity concerning different social groups (*ibid.*). Tölölyan (1996, p. 5) argues that the collective identity of transnational ethnic diasporas is directly derived from their psycho-cultural attachment to the perceived homeland. With that in mind, individuals who self-identify as Jews are expected to have some kind of an attachment to the State of Israel. A study of social and political attitudes among British Jews by Graham and Boyd (2010, p. 15) found that 87% self-identify as part of a global Jewish diaspora, while 90% consider Israel to be "the ancestral home of the Jewish people". Furthermore, at least 82% of British Jews feel that Israel is important to their Jewish identity (*ibid.,* p. 16). When asked whether diaspora Jews had a certain responsibility to support Israel, 77% of the respondents agreed. More importantly, an overwhelming majority of the participants in the study – more than 87%, that is – agree that Jews are obligated to ensure the survival of the State of Israel (*ibid.,* p. 17).

The fact that at least 95% of British Jews who participated in the survey had visited Israel at some point of their lives sits well with the assumption that diasporic identity is nurtured by maintaining a strong relationship with the perceived kinstate. This data substantiates previous findings in the literature. In regards to the issue of migration, a closer look at the data indicates that those with a stronger sense of religious Jewish identity tend to be more likely to consider immigrating to Israel (*ibid.,* p. 18). The findings yielded by this study are in line with the assumptions put forward by Tölölyan (1996, p. 28) regarding the attitudes and the collective behavior of transnational ethnic diasporas.

A 2015 study of attitudes among French Jews carried out by The Foundation Jean Jaurès found that individuals who self-identify as Jews tend to express more sympathy toward Israel than the general French population. This was reflected in their response to the following question, "Which side do you sympathize with in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians?" ("*Dans le conflit entre Israël et les Palestiniens, à qui vont vos sympathies?*"); 49% of self-identified Jews, as opposed to the 12% of the general French population, voiced their support for Israel (Ifop pour la Fondation Jean Jaurès, 2015, p. 63). When asked about the quality of life of French Jewish immigrants to Israel, 62% of the relatives of such individuals agreed that they had a happier life in Israel than in France (*ibid.,* p. 115). This implies that the foreign policy of France toward Israel and Palestine could possibly shape the collective identity of French Jews. In other words, the results yielded by this poll suggest that the dynamics between states and non-state actors have the potential of contributively constituting the socially constructed reality in international relations.

The basic premises of the constructivist theory on diasporic identity were mirrored in the annual surveys of the European Jewish leaders and opinion formers conducted by Gallup between 2008 and 2015. The psycho-cultural attachment to the State of Israel was evident in responses to the questions regarding the link between domestic anti-Semitism and actions of the Israeli government. The first survey, carried out in 2008, revealed that 78% of Jewish leaders and opinion formers in Europe agreed with the statement, "Events in Israel sometimes lead to an increase in anti-Semitism in my country" (Gallup, 2009, p. 46). Nearly 98% of the respondents thought that the destruction of the State of Israel would be a personal tragedy for them, while 79% believed that all Jews had a responsibility to support Israel. The strong relationship between the transnational Jewish diaspora in Europe and the State of Israel was further reflected in the fact that 72% of the participants considered themselves committed Zionists and 71% agreeing with the statement, "Israel is critical to sustaining Jewish life in Europe" (*ibid.,* p. 47).

Further evidence supporting the notion that European Jews consider their attachment to Israel an essential part of their ethno-cultural identity is found in Gallup's surveys that followed. The second survey of European Jewish leaders and opinion formers that took place in 2011, revealed that 78% of the respondents agreed with the notion that Israel was critical to sustaining Jewish life in Europe (Gallup, 2012, p. 22). Around the same percentage of the participants in the study

believed that all Jews had a responsibility to support Israel, despite the fact that nearly 50% was critical of certain actions of the Israeli government (*ibid.,* p. 23). Once again, it can be deduced that individuals who self-identify as Jews in Europe feel a strong connection to the State of Israel, which the majority of the community considers vital to their Jewish identity.

Continuing on this line, the results of the third survey of European Jewish leaders and opinion formers from 2016 were comparable to the previous studies performed by Gallup. In fact, some of the findings perfectly mirror the ones yielded in the 2011 poll. For instance, the support for the notion that Israel is integral to preserving Jewish life in Europe remains at a firm 79%. Similarly, the statement, "All Jews have a responsibility to support Israel", found affirmation among 77% of the respondents (Gallup, 2016, pp. 25–26).

Gallup's findings in the period between 2008 and 2016 indicate that the transnational Jewish diaspora in Europe falls under the category of diasporic, rather than purely ethnic communities. As suggested by Tölölyan (1996, p. 16), diasporic communities differ in that they operate on the basis of a well-established ideological network which has the purpose of strengthening the relationship between members of the diaspora and what is considered to be their ancestral homeland. On the other hand, ethnic communities affirm their collective identity through festivities and practices of culturo-culinary character without engaging in political efforts on behalf of the country of their ancestors (*ibid.,* p. 17). It is precisely the transnational diasporic character that makes the Jewish diaspora an influential non-state actor in international relations. As a matter of fact, Shain and Wittes (2002, pp. 177–178) posit that diasporic communities are an integral part of international relations, as they often contribute to the national interest of their originating country, but can also act independently to assert political power. For this reason, it is important to look into the pull appeal of Jewish-specific programs sponsored by the Israeli government that draw European Jewish migrants to the country.

As described in Chapter 3, the concept of migration has represented an essential part of Judaic culture for nearly two millennia. That said, a particular kind of Jewish migration, directed toward the perceived historical homeland of all Jews, has always held an elevated position within the diasporic community. In the mid-twentieth century, with the establishment of the modern State of Israel, the concept of *aliyah* has taken on a more formal structure, so much so that it has since

been an integral part of the so-called Law of Return.[35] While there are different ways of immigrating to Israel, the Law of Return has, so far, been the strongest link in the chain of migrations to the country.

It is not difficult to understand why Jewish migrants from all over the world see this law as appealing; not only does the Law grant Jews facilitated immigration to the country, but it also goes to great lengths to assist them in doing so. Furthermore, the Israeli government put in place a framework of legal and political mechanisms with the goal of assuring a full integration of Jewish immigrants to the country. To be specific, the State of Israel puts aside a considerable amount of its annual disposable budget to subsidize airfare tickets, basic income, accommodation, social, and health benefits for Jewish immigrants during the entire first year of their life in the country. On top of that, it provides intensive courses of Hebrew instruction, as well as professional training for the needs of the economy (Raijman, 2010, p. 90).

This is in part due to Israel's status as an 'ethnic democracy', a system of political institutions dominated by a single ethnic group that seeks to extend certain civil liberties to its minorities (Peled, 1992, p. 432). Consequently, suggests Smooha (1990, p. 395), the history of the modern State of Israel has been characterized by a form of political wavering rooted in the anxiety over collective identity. There is overwhelming evidence for the notion that Arab Muslims, which constitute at least 20% of present-day Israeli population, are compartmentalized within a socially, politically, and economically inferior stratum compared to the Jewish majority. Their path to citizenship, employment, and political participation in the system often faces discriminatory obstacles, in favor of the dominant Jewish constituency (Raijman, 2010, p. 89). Observed in the context of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the ethno-religious nature of Israeli laws – which give preference to diaspora Jews over Arab Muslims who are internal residents – is indicative of the importance that identity plays in international relations.

As such, the Law of Return is distinctively defined through the conceptualization of a particular

---

[35] Since the establishment of the State of Israel rests on the idea that Jews, following an extensive history of life in the diaspora, deserve to live in the land that is perceived within the culture as their ancestral homeland, the Law of Return has long represented a crucial element of such a political undertaking. According to this law, which is enshrined in the legal framework of the State of Israel, individuals who can provide evidence of ethnic Jewish ancestry – either through their mother or maternal grandmother – as well as those who have undergone a supervised Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform conversion to the religion, are granted the right to come to the country and get Israeli citizenship (Englard, 1987, pp. 194–195).

kind of identity, which reproduces itself according to the behavior of the international Jewish diaspora and, more importantly, the willingness of its members to partake in it. Where do we see the repercussions of this in international relations? Since the domestic affairs within the country are heavily influenced by the actions of its diaspora, its strong relationship with its transnational 'ethnic network' is what contributes to its security and political stability in the international arena. In other words, the historical experience of the State of Israel serves as a perfect example of diasporic achievement; it is reflective of how identity and security coalesce and influence the behavior of international actors. Moreover, we see the confluence of state and non-state actors, whose actions complement one another in constructing the social reality of international relations.

A closer look at the data presented in the previous two subchapters suggests that the fear of radical Islamic terrorism among members of the European Jewish community tends to be higher and more conspicuous in countries that have experienced terrorist attacks on their soil. What is more, while the animosity toward individuals of Arab or Muslim origin was palpable among British and French Jews, it was hardly mentioned by members of the Ukrainian or Russian Jewish communities. Once again, this is where the assumptions of the theory of securitization come at play.

In addition to the securitizing quality of speech acts, it is very important to make sense of the proposed meta-narratives of securitization. As Wilkinson (2011, p. 94) explains, a process can be identified as securitization only when the whole diapason of components involved is analyzed. In and of itself, securitization is contextually pragmatic; by assessing whether the collective sentiment of a group, government policy, and lawmaking correspond to the instructional enchiridion of the discourse, it is possible to generalize beyond the data and, thus, ascribe securitizing attributes to a phenomenon in question. Comparably, Huysmans (1998, p. 501) develops the claim that the deconstruction of the culturo-historical conditioning should be a required frame of reference when examining the fruition of securitization. Stritzel (2007, pp. 359–360), on the other hand, offers a broader structure of analysis by arguing that the complexity of securitized discourse can also involve past discourses, as they have the capacity of imbuing the securitizing actor and the audience with power.

As the analysis of discourses utilized by radical Islamic terrorist groups and representatives of

the transnational Jewish diaspora in Europe has shown, a two-sided securitization within the context of contemporary Jewish-Islamic relations has been part of the socially constructed reality of international relations for decades. Although tending to increase following a radical Islamic terrorist attack, the emigration rate of the European Jews appears to be affected by a myriad of push and pull factors that are not restricted to the conceived fear of the former, which is in line with the second hypothesis put forward in the thesis. These factors include, but are not limited to, the perception of collective identity and positioning as a historically disadvantaged minority on the continent, programs funded by the Israeli government which have the goal to facilitate Jewish immigration to Israel, as well as concerns regarding the security of the Jewish community in Europe. As seen in the cases of Ukraine and Russia – the two countries with the highest rates of European Jewish emigration in the past decade – radical Islamic terrorism was barely referred to in the speech acts employed by the representatives of the communities therefrom. Be that as it may, some of the results raise important questions about the reality of Jewish life in contemporary Europe. Moreover, they urge the reconceptualization of culturo-religious pluralism on the continent, the fragility of which threatens to thwart the integration of incoming minorities.

Cultural normativity which serves as the grounding of collective identity can often be more meaningful to a society than the formal legal foundation thereof. As such, it nurtures the possibility of sustaining a national atmosphere which prevents certain members of the society from ever gaining full integration. The beginning of the new millennium has seen a rapidly growing literature on the emergence of a new form of anti-Semitism in Europe; the proponents of this claim argue that such sentiment is reflected in the extreme anti-Zionist attitudes of contemporary leftism in Europe (Gerstenfeld, 2005, pp. 6–7), anti-American conspiracy theories about the purported Jewish control over global finance espoused by the far right (*ibid.,* p. 15), and the culturo-religious antagonism toward Jews embraced by radical Islamists (*ibid.,* p. 24).

As pointed out by Wistrich (1984), the tendency of radical European leftists to draw a parallel between Nazism and Zionism, equating the Holocaust to Israeli actions against the Palestinians, is indicative of a deeply ingrained anti-Semitic belief distributed among the proponents of the ideology in Europe. Wistrich (1984) argues that such views have been widely shared by the radical Left in both Western and Eastern Europe. Correspondingly, Fischel (2005) suggests that this form of anti-Semitism is, in fact, a novelty, as it represents a unique alignment of leftist

critics of the State of Israel, anti-Semites of the far right, and radicalized Arab Muslim immigrants who treat the State of Israel as a scapegoat for a variety of personal socio-economic problems. A report by Bergmann and Wetzel (2003, pp. 7) conducted on the behalf of The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) found that anti-Semitism among European leftists is often expressed in the context of pro-Palestinian efforts, wherein globalist and colonialist characteristics are ascribed to not only the State of Israel, but the transnational Jewish diaspora as well. Moreover, the authors found confirmatory evidence for the notion that the re-emergence of anti-Semitism in Europe is shepherded by a triumvirate of pro-Palestinian leftists, far-right anti-Semites, and radical Islamists (*ibid.,* p. 8).

Bauer, however, puts forward the claim that the twenty-first century anti-Semitism is the revival of traditional Judeophobic views deeply ingrained in the Euro-Christian culture. According to the renowned scholar of the Holocaust, there seems to be a pattern with regard to the resurgence of anti-Semitism in Europe, with its resurfacing being linked to a specific trigger. In the context of the 'new' anti-Semitism, Bauer suggests, the trigger is the current political situation in Israel (Tommer and Fleischer, 2007). This argument is in line with Gerstenfeld's (2005, p. 4) assumption that anti-Semitism can, at this point, be considered an integral part of European culture, as the phenomenon has permeated the ethno-religious and culturo-political dynamics of the last two millennia of European history. As discussed in Chapter 3, the historical persecution of Jews in Europe has been characterized by such virulent endurance that it has come to re-shape the identity landscape of the transnational Jewish diaspora and shape its collective perception of security.

Several authors, such as Finkelstein (2005, pp. 21–22), have expressed doubts about characterizing anti-Zionism as necessarily anti-Semitic. He argues that such efforts are an attempt to make the State of Israel immune to policy criticism and minimize the international political pressure faced by the country. Finkelstein goes as far as claiming that there has been no rise in ideological or practiced anti-Semitism at the turn of the twenty-first century (Goodman, 2006). Such assertions, however, do not hold up when compared to empirically derived data from various international organizations concerned with the violation of basic human rights. For instance, a report put together by The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014, p. 54) found anti-Semitism to be a persistent characteristic of Jewish life in the European Union in

the period between 2003 and 2013. The results of the survey conducted by the same agency provide confirmatory evidence for the notion that European Jews typically face higher rates of physical and verbal violence than the general European population (The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014, p. 42). Additionally, the findings of the survey reveal the adaptive nature of anti-Semitism, as the majority of the 5,847 respondents claimed that Internet anti-Semitism was one of their primary concerns (*ibid.*, p. 65).

A study carried out by Enstad (2017, p. 9), provides additional support for the claim that a new wave of European anti-Semitism has been prevalent in the period between 2005 and 2015. More precisely, the author found that that the vast majority of its perpetrators in Western Europe were individuals of Muslim background. On the contrary, the highest number of Judeophobic incidents in Russia were ascribed to the adherents of far-right ideologies (*ibid.,* p. 2). When put in the context of the discourse analysis employed in Chapter 4, it is evident that there is a strong correlation between the rate of anti-Semitic violence and the identified threats in securitized discourses. As it turns out, the fear of radical Islamic terrorism as well as the predominance of antagonism toward Arab Muslims was highest in the UK and France, countries with the highest incidence of anti-Semitic violence perpetrated by persons of Muslim background in the given period. Accordingly, the study found that the rate of anti-Semitic violence among the included countries was lowest in Russia, which correlates to the absence of fear from radical Islamism in the discourse reflected in a handful of interviews analyzed in Chapter 4 (*ibid.,* p. 9).

More importantly, the data yielded by this research is resonant of the theoretical premises of securitization. As advanced by Balzacq (2011, p. 26), the appeal of securitization lies in the notion that the target audience internalizes the cognizance of a threat identified in a discourse put forward by a securitizing agent. Only if the securitized collective recognizes a phenomenon as an existential or quasi-existential threat to its ideological, cultural, or physical survival, can the process of securitization take off. The conviction in the evidence of a threat is twofold; part of it is derived from actualities that take place in the arena of tangibility, while a significant part rests on the discourse employed by the agents of symbolic or political power structures. The functional power of a securitizing discourse is contingent upon the congruity between manifested evidence and the effectiveness of discursive dynamics.

Be that as it may, the results need to be interpreted with caution. While it can be argued that

radical Islamic terrorism has potentially been a contributing factor to the emigration trends of European Jews, it also must be noted that this particular kind of behavior of the transnational Jewish diaspora is influenced by a multitude of other components. As discussed in subchapter 3.2, Ukraine and Russia saw the highest rate of European Jewish emigration in the period between 2008 and 2015 after France, even though the analysis of discourses in Chapter 4 revealed there was little to no mention of radical Islamic terrorism within the Jewish community members of those countries (DellaPergola, 2015, p. 30). With that in mind, it can be restated that the juxtaposition of data, as well as the interpretation thereof, indicates that the behavior of the transnational Jewish diaspora in Europe is influenced by securitization, although the identified threat tends to vary between countries. What seems evident is that the element of collective identity permeates the push-pull model of migration in the case of European Jews: the vast majority opts for Israel as their host country, the territory perceived as a designated ancestral home of the Jews.

This brings us back to the ternary disposition of new anti-Semitism: the somewhat sporadic convergence of pro-Palestinian extreme leftists, the anti-Semitic branches of the far-right, and the Judeophobic adherents of radical Islam in Europe. As discussed earlier in this subchapter, the majority of European Jews consider their culturo-emotional attachment to the State of Israel an essential part of their Jewish identity, regardless of the intensity of their attachment to the religion of Judaism. Taking this into consideration, it is easy seeing how anti-Zionist stances across Europe might affect the security perception of individuals who self-identify as Jews on the continent. Put simply, if a diasporic subject feels a strong attachment to its perceived homeland, any ideological, political, or military attack on that land is expected to be considered by the diasporic subject as an attack on his or her very own identity. Although it might be true, as Raab (2002) asserts, that the criticism of Israel is distinct from anti-Semitism, a discernment must be made between the former and staunch anti-Zionism. The problem lies in the fact that the demarcations are not always clear. It must be noted that the critics of Israel operate on an ideological spectrum, which runs the gamut from critics who accept Israel's legitimacy as a state – yet disapprove of its actions in the occupied territories – to those who oppose the very existence thereof.

Collective perception is a complex abstraction which tends to be affected, at least partly, by the

developments in empirical reality, and discursive dynamics shaped by the culturo-historical context. Bunzl (2005, p. 499) compares the emergence of new anti-Semitism to the phenomenon of Islamophobia, arguing that both serve as normative projections of exclusion fostered by many European cultures. As a matter of fact, the author considers anti-Semitism to be the ideological predecessor of Islamophobia: the former was utilized to safeguard the mirage of ethnically pure nation-states, whereas the latter serves the purpose of securing the status of a unified Europe as a bastion of Christian cultural heritage. By extending the discussion beyond a simplistic model of Judeo-Islamic culturo-religious clashes, Bunzl (2005, p. 500), offers a new analytical framework for the examination of discursive securitization in present-day Europe. Social scientists and policymakers need to do much more than simply identify the anti-Semitic violence perpetrated by Muslim youth in Europe. The question, rather, should be, why does Europe continue to serve as fertile ground for exclusionary discourses against non-Christian cultures?

As much as the trends of migration within the European Jewish community reveal a lot about its collective identity, a relational deconstruction of a broader context uncovers a possibly more somber reality about the state of minority integration in present-day Europe. According to Wieseltier, most European countries still operate according to the model of nineteenth-century nationalism, whereby policies are designed with an ethnic/religious majority in mind. For that reason, European societies continue to struggle with its ever-changing demographics (The Atlantic, 2015). There are a number of examples in the legal framework of European countries that reflect the apparent willingness of its societies to maintain a certain sense of cultural purity. For instance, the concept of unconditional birthright citizenship is unheard of in the whole of Europe. In other words, citizenship on the continent is exclusively based on the *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) principle, meaning that citizenship is granted only to children whose parents are already legal citizens (Gilbertson, 2006).

Philosophically speaking, the embracing of such a strict conceptualization of citizenship not only hinders the integration of non-nationals, but greatly contributes to the social reproduction of confrontational minority-majority dynamics. Citizenship based solely on the precept of *jus sanguinis* prevents even the individuals born on the legal territory of a state from getting citizenship for long periods of time. In practice, this translates into societal and cultural alienation, as non-nationals grow up in an environment which does not formally accept them as

its legitimate constituency. Most legal systems deny non-nationals the right to vote or formally participate in political life. Simply put, the very axioms that make one a legitimate member of a society are not easily obtainable to those who happen to be born to non-national parents (*ibid.*).

Wieseltier develops the claim that European societies, as opposed to those of North America, have long fostered social differentiation based on ethno-religious identity. While segregation in America was mostly rooted in perceived racial differences, the discrimination in Europe has been premised on a meticulously narrow social construct of ethno-cultural identity; this means that a policy distinction has often been made between individuals with very similar physical characteristics and almost uniform cultural norms (The Atlantic, 2015). Another example of the feebleness of integrated pluralism in Europe is a series of legal repudiations of what are perceived as 'non-European values'. As of 2016, six European countries have introduced the legal prohibition of different forms of Islamic garment, while a few others, including Austria, have adopted bills that require all Muslim organizations to use German translations of their holy books, as well as ban the foreign funding thereof (Krasimirov, 2016; Reuters, 2015).

Despite the European Union efforts to foster an atmosphere of diversity, the continent's deeply rooted collective perception of itself as a white Christian entity continues to thwart the integration of social, ethnic, religious, and racial groups understood as 'the other'. Bunzl (2005, p. 506), points to the fact that the concurrent rise of anti-Semitism, Europe's apparent unwillingness to accept Islam as part of its supranational identity, Turkey as belonging to the geopolitical common space, and strict non-EU immigration laws are indicative of the fragility of pluralism on the continent.

5 Conclusion

This this has investigated the relationship between the occurrence of radical Islamic terrorism and the emigration trends of European Jews in the period before and after the September 11 attacks. The probability of an interconnection between the two phenomena was set as a starting point due to the political and culturo-religious anxiety that defined a significant part of Judeo-Islamic history. The findings of this study suggest that the correlation is linear: the rate of Jewish emigration from Europe tends to increase in the period following a terrorist attack carried out by radical Islamists. When put in the ideological and political context of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, a constructivist analysis of discourses put forward by the representatives of each group reinforces the importance of perception, identity, and intersubjectivity in the shaping of contemporary international relations. Furthermore, the evidence points toward the idea that the emigration trends of European Jews operate on a push-pull model, whereby their behavior in the international political arena is influenced by a number of different factors. These include, but are not limited to, the sense of belonging to a Jewish collective, aid programs of the Israeli government, and the perception of group security. That said, a thorough examination of a push-pull model indicates that the conceptualization of security tied to collective identity remains an important variable when it comes to the behavior of actors in international relations.

As revealed through the discourse analysis, the fear of radical Islamic terrorism among European Jews was mostly present in countries which had experienced it in the past. On the other hand, Jews from countries with little to no incidence of radical Islamic terrorism expressed more concerns about the rise of far-right extremists and their espousal of anti-Semitic convictions. While it is possible that the global financial crisis of 2007, it was demonstrated that Jewish-specific projects of the Israeli government prompted more European Jews to emigrate there than the United States, despite the indisputable economic and labor superiority of the latter. Moreover, the securitization implications of an identifiable threat to survival seemed to have been mitigated by the fact that individuals of Arab Muslim background had an inferior status in Israel. In other words, it can be argued that the apparent suppression of a perceived threat to survival – in this case, Arab Muslims – has been part of the reason why most European Jews opted for Israel instead of the United States as their host country amid migration.

Be that as it may, it should be noted that this work is not without its limitations. While the present study has been able to identify the correlation between the two phenomena in question, all the while putting it in the context of psycho-cultural normativity that underlies it, a more precise analysis would require the use of a sophisticated and resourceful apparatus (e.g. conducting a sizeable questionnaire among self-identifying Jews who migrated from Europe to Israel in the given period). That is not to say that the implications of this paper are necessarily feeble, but rather that they represent an important step toward our understanding of how identity and self-perception shape international relations. Correspondingly, these observations accommodate for non-traditional theoretical approaches in the field of IR - particularly those of constructivism and the securitization theory – by looking beyond the state-centered level of analysis.

While this thesis has no intention of offering policy prescriptions, it seems fair to put forward the view that identity of individuals who self-identify, or are perceived as, traditionally non-European, will remain at the forefront of the continent's perpetual struggle to embrace ethno-religious pluralism and accommodate for a more successful integration. That, however, might require the reconceptualization of Europe's philosophical foundation, whereby the centrality of Christian ethno-centric nation states becomes obsolete, in place of a truly pluralist society, modelled after the so-called immigrant countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

6 Daljši povzetek

Kljub dejstvu, da teroristični napadi predstavljajo zelo majhno nevarnost za veliko večino ljudi v Evropi, se zaradi velike medijske pozornosti ter propagande izvajane s strani radikalnih islamskih skupin povečuje strah med prebivalstvom. Slednje je še posebej izrazito znotraj ranljivih družbenih skupin kot so npr. judovske manjšine v Evropi. Ti strahovi se nato pogosto odražajo skozi islamofobne opazke izražene tako s strani civilne družbe, kot tudi njenih voditeljev. O problematiki zastraševanja in njenih posledicah na varnost in kvaliteto življenja so spregovorili tudi voditelji različnih judovskih skupin v Evropi. Znotraj ultrakonzervativne wahabitske struje islamskega radikalizma se napade na Jude dojema tudi kot osrednji cilj gibanja. Ob tem je pomembno poudariti, da je v ekstremnih strujah wahabitske doktrine, ki ima velik vpliv na islamski terorizem, zapovedano usmrtiti vse posameznike, ki se ne želijo podvreči njihovim verskim doktrinam. Zaradi teh dejstev se zdi razumno predlagati hipotezo, da obstaja vzročen vpliv med povečanjem radikalnega islamskega terorizma v Evropi med leti 2001 in 2016 ter povečanim izseljevanjem Judov iz Evrope. Sočasno pa je potrebno upoštevati tudi druge faktorje, ki bi lahko vplivali na te trende, da bo možen boljši uvid v morebitno povezavo omenjenima fenomenoma. To magistrsko delo ima dva glavna namena: 1) Ugotoviti, če obstaja korelacija med terorističnimi napadi povzročenimi s strani islamskih ekstremistov in spremembo v emigracijskih vzorcih evropskih Judov; ter 2) Narediti podrobno analizo diskurza o spremembi emigracijskih vzorcev evropskih Judov z namenom ugotoviti morebitne povezave z radikalnim islamskim terorizmom.

Glavni cilj dela je preučiti problem naraščajočega izseljevanja Judov iz Evrope v širšem kontekstu sekuritizacije. Dalje, ta študija poskuša demonstrirati, da ima diskurzivna politika vpliv na spremembe znotraj sedanjih mednarodnih odnosov. Z razširitvijo analize izven tradicionalnega državno-centričnega nivoja v mednarodnih odnosih, to delo najde svojo relevantnost v demonstraciji, kako ne-državni akterji ustvarjajo in ukalupljajo družbeno realnost v mednarodnih odnosih.

Predhodne študije o medverski sovražnosti in letna poročila o življenju judovskih manjšin v Evropi so našle korelacijo med antisemitizmom ter strahovi o islamskem ekstremizmu. Zgodovinska sovraštva med Judi in Muslimani ter antisemitske korenine wahabitske struje

islamskega radikalizma so vzroki za zaskrbljenost glede varnosti judovskih manjšin v Evropi. Ob upoštevanju navedenega, je glavno vprašanje tega magistrskega dela sledeče: kako je sekuritizacija, ki je sledila terorističnim napadom izvedenih s strani islamskih teroristov, vplivala na emigracijske trende evropskih Judov v obdobju med 2001 in 2016? Da bi lahko preučili korelacijo med tema dvema fenomenoma, je potrebno preveriti sledeči hipotezi: 1) Stopnja judovske emigracije iz Evrope se poveča v obdobju po terorističnih napadih izvedenih s strani islamskih ekstremistov; ter 2) Za emigracijo evropskih Judov so pomembni tudi vplivni faktorji sekuritizacije.

Glede na to, da se to magistrsko delo tiče predvsem interesov in idej, ki vplivajo na vedenje akterjev v mednarodnih odnosih, se bosta glavni hipotezi analizirali skozi lečo konstruktivizma. Kot so opazile že številne predhodne študije o odnosu med islamskim terorizmom ter ljudmi, ki pripadajo judovski manjšini, imajo izreden vpliv na ta odnos tudi družbene norme in širši zgodovinski kontekst. Konstruktivistični strokovnjaki poudarjajo, da je pomen, ki ga različni akterji pripisujejo nekemu fenomenu, ključnega pomena pri razumevanju njihovega vedenja na mednarodnem prizorišču. Magistrsko delo se začne s konstruktivistično predpostavko, da mednarodni akterji sodelujejo v oblikovanju in reprodukciji njihove lastne identitete skozi akte govora, ki sinhrono odraža in izgrajuje njihovo percepcijo. Glavno izbrano metodološko orodje je analiza diskurza, ki stremi k razumevanju namenov za različnimi oblikami komunikacije med mednarodnimi akterji. Skupaj s predpostavkami sekuritizacije, je analiza diskurza uporabljena za določitev pomembnosti, ki jo varnosti pripisujeta judovska diaspora in radikalne islamske skupine.

Izsledki študije kažejo, da je korelacija med emigracijo Judov ter pojavnostjo radikalnih islamističnih terorističnih napadov linearna. Stopnja izseljevanja Judov iz Evrope se poveča v obdobjih po omenjenih terorističnih napadih. Ko te izsledke postavimo v širši ideološki in politični kontekst arabsko-izraelskega konflikta, konstruktivistična analiza diskurza obeh strani poudari pomen percepcije, identitete in intersubjektivnosti pri oblikovanju sedanjih mednarodnih odnosov. Namen tega magistrskega dela sicer ni nudenje političnih strategij, a zdi se smiselno pripomniti, da bo identiteta posameznikov, ki se samo-identificirajo kot ne-Evropejci, postajala vedno pomembnejša pri evropskih naporih sprejemanja vedno večje versko-etnične pluralnosti. Slednje bo morebiti celo zahtevalo reformulacijo in rekonceptualizacijo filozofskih temeljev

Evrope, kjer se bo manjšala vloga krščanskih etno-centričnih nacionalnih držav in večala vloga pravih pluralističnih družb po vzoru t.i. »priseljenskih držav« kot so Združene države Amerike, Kanada, Avstralija in Nova Zelandija.

7 Sources

1. *ABC News*. (1999, January 2). World's Most Wanted Terrorist: An Interview with Osama Bin Laden. ABC: New York City.

2. Adler, E. (2013). Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates. W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (pp. 112–144). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

3. Al-Baghdadi, A. B. A. H. (2016). This is What Allah and His Messenger Promised Us. *Rumiyah 3*, (1): 4–9. Available from https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/rome-magazine-3.pdf

4. Al-Muhajir, A.H. (2016). Paths to Victory. *Rumiyah 2*, (1): 18–20. Available from http://clarionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Rumiyh-ISIS-Magazine-2nd-issue.pdf

5. Allen, C. (2007). *God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad, Cambridge*. MA: Da Capo Press.

6. *Anne Dammarell et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al.* (2003). 1:01-cv-02224-JDB, September. Available from https://web.archive.org/web/20051231142249/http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/01-2224.pdf

7. Arnett, G. (2015, February 5). Is There Really a Jewish Exodus from Western Europe? *The Guardian*. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/

8. *Arutz Sheva.* (2016, August 15). Amid Rising Tensions in Ukraine, Jews Seeking to Move to Israel. Available from http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/216443

9. Baadj, A. S. (2015). *Saladin, the Almohads and the Banū Ghāniya: The Contest for North Africa (12th and 13th Centuries).* Leiden, NLD: Brill.

10. Baaz, M. E. (2005). *The Paternalism of Partnership: A Postcolonial Reading of Identity in Development Aid.* London: Zed Books.

11. Baker, P., Cooper, C. and Mazzetti, M. (2011, May 1). Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says. *The New York Times.* Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.html

12. Balzacq, T. (2005). The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context. *European Journal of International Relations, 11* (2): 171–201.

13. Balzacq, T. (2011). *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve.* Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

14. *BBC News*. (2004, October 29). Excerpts: Bin Laden Video. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3966817.stm

15. Beinin, J., and Hajjar, L. (2014). *Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict.* Washington, DC: The Middle Eastern Research and Information Project.

16. Beller, S. (2008). Is Europe Good for the Jews? Jews and the Pluralist Tradition in Historical Perspective. JPR Policy Debate. Available from http://archive.jpr.org.uk/download?id=1482

17. Bergmann, W. and Wetzel, J. (2003). *Manifestations of Anti-Semitism in the European Union: Synthesis Report on Behalf of the EUMC European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.* Available from https://www.jugendpolitikineuropa.de/downloads/4-20-1949/eustudieantisem.pdf

18. Bin Laden, O. (1996). *Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.* Available from http://www.actmemphis.org/usama-bin-laden-1996-declaration-of-war-against-the-americans.pdf

19. Bin Laden, O. (2002). *Letter to the American People.* Available from https://scholarship.tricolib.brynmawr.edu/bitstream/handle/10066/4746/OBL20021124.pdf

20. Bohlen, C. (2014, July 28). Gaza Conflict Seen as Providing Cover for Anti-Semitic Attacks in France. *The New York Times.* Available from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/europe/gaza-conflict-seen-sparking-anti-semitic-attacks-in-france.html

21. Borger, J. (2015, January 11). Paris Gunman Amedy Coulibaly Declared Allegiance to Isis. *The Guardian.* Available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/11/paris-gunman-amedy-coulibaly-allegiance-isis

22. Bouganim, A. (2003). Jews in Europe. Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI). Available from http://www.bjpa.org/Publications/details.cfm?PublicationID=788

23. Boyd, J. (2013). Jewish Life in Europe: Impending Catastrophe, or Imminent Renaissance? *JPR Policy Debate.* Available from http://archive.jpr.org.uk/download?id=1491

24. Brachman, J. and Levine, A. (2011, April 13). The World of Holy Warcraft: How Al Qaeda is Using Online Game Theory to Recruit the Masses. *Foreign Policy.* Available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/13/the-world-of-holy-warcraft/

25. Brisard, J.C. (2015). The Paris Attacks and the Evolving Islamic State Threat to France. *CTC Sentinel 8*, (11): 5–9.

26. Bunzel, C. (2015). From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State. *The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, 19* (1): 1–42.

27. Bunzl, M. (2005). Between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New Europe. *American Ethnologist 32*, (4): 499–508.

28. Burke, J. (2004). Al Qaeda. *Foreign Policy, 142* (1): 18–20+22+24+26.

29. Burns, T. (1985, April 15). Spain Names Islamic Jihad in Bombing. *The Washington Post.* Available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/04/15/spain-names-islamic-jihad-in-bombing/2f18881b-a8b8-45ce-981a-da894e207a91/

30. Buzan, B., Wæver, O., and De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

31. Caesar, M. (1999). *Umberto Eco: Philosophy, Semiotics, and the Work of Fiction.* Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.

32. Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., and Simmons, B. A. (2012). *Handbook of International Relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

33. Cesarani, D. (2016). *Final Solution: The Fate of the Jews 1933-1949.* London: Macmillan.

34. Chazan, D., Morgan, T., and Turner, C. (2016, July 17). Bastille Day Terrorist Was Radicalized Within Months and Sent £84,000 to His Tunisian Family Days Before Attack. *The Telegraph.* Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/16/bastille-day-terrorist-was-radicalised-within-months-and-sent-84/

35. Chazan, R. (1987). *European Jewry and the First Crusade.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

36. Chilton, P. (2004). *Analyzing Political Discourse Theory and Practice.* Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

37. CIA. (1988). *Pan Am 103: Analysis of Claims.* Available from https://web.archive.org/web/20060201124253/http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000427163/0000427163_0002.gif

38. Cohen, J. P. (2014). *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

39. Cohen, S. J.D. (2001). The Matrilineal Principle in Historical Perspective. *Judaism, 34* (1): 5–13.

40. Cohn, S.K. (2007). The Black Death and the Burning of Jews. *Past & Present, 196* (1): 3–36.

41. Cohon, S. S. (1926). *Jewish Reference Book: B'nai B'rith Manual.* Washington D.C.: B'nai B'rith International.

42. Collective, C.A.S.E. (2006). Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto. *Security Dialogue, 37* (4): 443–487.

43. Colonomos, A. (2001). Non-state Actors as Moral Entrepreneurs: A Transnational Perspective on Ethics Networks. Josselin, D. and Wallace, W. (eds.), *Non-State Actors in World Politics* (pp. 76–92). London: Palgrave Publications.

44. Cox, M. (1994). The Necessary Partnership? The Clinton Presidency and Post-Soviet Russia. *International Affairs, 70* (4): 635–658.

45. Cruickshank, P. (2015, December 5). Senior European Official: ISIS Wants to Hit UK; Trail for Salah Abdeslam Is Cold. *CNN.* Available from http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/03/europe/salah-abdeslam-cold-trail-paris-attacks/

46. Dabiq. (2014a). *The Call to Hijrah*. Available from https://clarionproject.org/docs/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-3-the-call-to-hijrah.pdf

47. Dabiq. (2014b). *The Failed Crusade*. Available from https://clarionproject.org/docs/islamic-state-isis-magazine-Issue-4-the-failed-crusade.pdf

48. Dabiq. (2014c). *The Flood*. Available from https://clarionproject.org/docs/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-2-the-flood.pdf

49. Dabiq. (2014d). *The Return of Khilafah*. Available from http://www.ieproject.org/projects/dabiq1.pdf

50. Dabiq. (2015). *They Plot and Allah Plots*. Available from https://clarionproject.org/docs/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-issue+9-they-plot-and-allah-plots-sex-slavery.pdf

51. Dabiq. (2016a). *Break the Cross*. Available from http://clarionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/islamic-state-magazine-dabiq-fifteen-breaking-the-cross.pdf

52. Dabiq. (2016b). *The Murtadd Brotherhood*. Available from http://clarionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Dabiq-Issue-14.pdf

53. Debenedetti-Stow, S. (1992). The Etymology of "Ghetto": New Evidence from Rome. *Jewish History, 6* (1–2): 79–85.

54. DellaPergola, S. (2015). World Jewish Population, 2015. Dashefsky, A., DellaPergola, S., and Sheskin, I. (eds.), *Current Jewish Population Reports* (pp. 301–393). New York, NY: Berman Jewish DataBank.

55. Dietz, B., Lebok, U., and Polian, P. (2002). The Jewish Emigration from the Former Soviet Union to Germany. *International Migration, 40* (2): 29–47.

56. Diuk, N. (2014). EUROMAIDAN: Ukraine's Self-Organizing Revolution. *World Affairs, 176* (6): 9–16.

57. Dolinsky, E. (2017, April 11). What Ukraine's Jews Fear. *The New York Times.* Available from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/opinion/what-ukraines-jews-fear.html

58. Dónzis, A. (2014, March 3). Netanyahu on Obama's Critique: I Won't Give in to Pressure. *The Times of Israel.* Available from http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-palestinians-arent-doing-peace-dance-with-israel-and-us/

59. Englard, I. (1987). Law and Religion in Israel. *The American Journal of Comparative Law, 35* (1): 185–208.

60. Enstad, J. D. (2017). Antisemitic Violence in Europe, 2005-2015: Exposure and Perpetrators in France, UK, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Russia. *Center for Research on Extremism.* Available from http://www.hlsenteret.no/publikasjoner/digitale-hefter/antisemittisk-vold-i-europa_engelsk_endelig-versjon.pdf

61. Epstein, L. J. (1994). Why the Jewish People Should Welcome Converts. *Judaism, 43* (3): 302–312.

62. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. (2013). Discrimination and Hate Crime Against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism. Available from http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-discrimination-hate-crime-against-jews-eu-member-states-0_en.pdf

63. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. (2014). *Antisemitism Summary Overview of the Data Available in the European Union 2003–2013.* Vienna: Fundamental Rights Agency, European Union.

64. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. (2014). *Discrimination and Hate Crime Against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism.* Vienna: Fundamental Rights Agency, European Union.

65. Faraj, C., Nasr, O., Robertson, N., and Schuster, H. (2006, April 24). Purported Bin Laden Tape Denounces West's Response to Hamas. *CNN International*. Available from http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/04/23/binladen.tape/index.html

66. Fernandez, A. M. (2015). *Here to Stay and Growing: Combating ISIS Propaganda Networks*. Paper presented at the U.S.-Islamic World Forum organized by The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Washington D.C., USA.

67. Finkelstein, N. (2005). *Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

68. Finnemore, M. (1996). *National Interests in International Society.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

69. Firestone, R. (1996). *An Introduction to Islam for Jews.* Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society.

70. Fischel, J. R. (2005). The New Anti-Semitism. *The Virginia Quarterly Review, 81* (3). Available from http://www.vqronline.org/new-anti-semitism

71. Fisher, M. (2015, November 14). Here is ISIS's Statement Claiming Responsibility for the Paris Attacks. *Vox.* Available from https://www.vox.com/2015/11/14/9734794/isis-claim-paris-statement

72. Fisher, W.B. (2003). Syria - Physical and Social Geography. Lucy Dean (ed.), *The Middle East and North Africa* (pp. 1015–1016). Park Drive, UK: Taylor and Francis.

73. Fishman, B. (2008). Using the Mistakes of al Qaeda's Franchises to Undermine Its Strategies. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *618* (1): 46–54.

74. Fuller, J. (2015, November 30). Paris Attacks Death Toll Rises to 130. *New York Magazine.* Available from http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/11/paris-attacks-death-toll-rises-to-130.html

75. Gallup. (2009). *The European Jewish Leaders and Opinion Formers Survey: Analytical Report.* Available from http://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-eur110

76. Gallup. (2012). *The Second European Jewish Leaders and Opinion Formers, 2011*. Available from http://archive.jpr.org.uk/download?id=2633

77. Gallup. (2016). *The Third European Jewish Leaders and Opinion Formers, 2015*. Available from http://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-eur116

78. Ganor, B. (2010). Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter? *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal.* Park Drive, UK: Taylor and Francis.

79. Ganor, B. (2011). *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers.* Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

80. Gardner, M. (2014, June 2). Brussels Suspect - the Lessons. *CST*. Available from https://cst.org.uk/news/blog/2014/06/02/brussels-suspect-the-lessons

81. Resolution Adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question. (1947). Adopted by the UN General Assembly, A/RES/181(II), November 29. Available from http://undocs.org/A/RES/181(II)

82. Gerstenfeld, M. (2005). The Deep Roots of Anti-Semitism in European Society. *Jewish Political Studies Review, 17* (1): 3–46.

83. Ghazi, M., Kalin, I., and Kamali, M. H. (2013). *War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad*. Cambridge, UK: The Islamic Texts Society.

84. Gilbertson, Greta. (2006, January 1). Citizenship in a Globalized World. *Migration Policy Institute*. Available from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/citizenship-globalized-world/

85. Goodman, Amy. (2006, August 29). Finkelstein on DN! No New Antisemitism. Interview with Norman Finkelstein. New York City.

86. Graham, D. and Boyd, J. (2010). Committed, Concerned and Conciliatory: The Attitudes of Jews in Britain Towards Israel - Initial Findings from the 2010 Israel Survey. *JPR Report.* Available from http://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/Committed,%20concerned%20and%20conciliatory:%20The%20attitudes%20of%20Jews%20in%20Britain%20towards%20Israel.pdf

87. Hague, R., Harrop, M., and Breslin, S. (1998). *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction.* Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.

88. Hallaq, W. B. (2009). *Sharī'a: Theory, Practice, Transformations.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

89. Haran, M., Samuels, R., Gabbay, S., and Mingelgrin, U. (2002). Quality Indicators of the State of Chemical Pollution in Israel. *Israel Journal of Chemistry, 42* (1): 119–132.

90. Harris, S. Z. (1981). Discourse Analysis. Hiz, H. (ed.), *Papers on Syntax* (pp. 107–142). Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

91. Herman, R. G. (1996). Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War. Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (pp. 271–316). New York: Columbia University Press.

92. Hilberg, Raul. (2003). *The Destruction of the European Jews.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

93. Hinnant, L. and Ganley, E. (2015, January 10). French Security Forces Kill Gunmen to End Terror Rampage; 20 Dead in 3 Days of Violence. *Star Tribune*. Available from https://web.archive.org/web/20150112005126/http://www.startribune.com/world/288018961.html

94. Hoffman, B. (1999). Inside Terrorism, New York City, NY: Columbia University Press.

95. Hollis, M. and Smith, S. (1990). *Explaining and Understanding International Relations.* Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

96. Hopf, Ted. (1998). The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. *International Security, 23* (1): 171–200.

97. Hornblower, S. (2008). Greek Identity in the Archaic and Classical Periods. Zacharia, K. (ed.), *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity* (pp. 37–56). Surrey, UK: Ashgate Puglishing.

98. Hudson, R. A. and Majeska, M. (1999). *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

99. Hussein, Y. and Bagguley, P. (2012). Securitized Citizens: Islamophobia, Racism and the 7/7 London Bombings. *The Sociological Review, 60* (1): 715–734.

100. Huysmans, J. (1998). Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Agenda in Europe. *European Journal of International Relations, 4* (4): 479–505.

101. Ifop pour la Fondation Jean Jaurès. (2015). *Enquête auprès des juifs de France* [Survey of Jews in France]. Available from http://www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/883-1-document_file.pdf

102. Institute for Economics and Peace. (2016). *Global Terrorism Index 2016: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*. Available from http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf

103. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. (2016). *Immigrants, by Period of Immigration, Country of Birth and Last Country of Residence.* Available from http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnatonenew_site.htm

104. Jackson, R. (2007). Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse. *Government and Opposition*, *42* (3): 394–426.

105. Jeffery, S., Levett, C., and Swann, G. (2016, April 20). Paris and Brussels: The Links Between the Attackers. *The Guardian*. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2016/mar/24/paris-and-brussels-the-links-between-the-attackers

106. Jepperson, R. L., Wendt, A., and Katzenstein, P. J. (1996). Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security. Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (1–36). New York: Columbia University Press.

107. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency.* (2014, March 3). Ukraine Chief Rabbi Accuses Russians of Staging Anti-Semitic 'Provocations'. Available from https://www.jta.org/2014/03/03/news-opinion/world/ukraine-chief-rabbi-accuses-russians-of-staging-anti-semitic-provocations

108. Jewish Virtual Library. (2015). *Immigration to Israel: Total Immigration, by Continent per Year (1948 - Present).* Available from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-immigration-to-israel-by-continent-per-year

109. Jewish Virtual Library. (2016). *Vital Statistics: Jewish Population of the World (1882 - Present).* Available from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jewish-population-of-the-world

110. Jones, K. R. (2006). *Provincial Reactions to Roman Imperialism: The Aftermath of the Jewish Revolt, A.D. 66-70.* PhD Dissertation. Berkeley, CA: University of California.

111. Josselin, D. and Wallace, W. (2001). *Non-State Actors in World Politics.* London: Palgrave Publications.

112. JPR. (2014)*. European Jewish Digest May 2014.* Available from http://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/European_Jewish_Digest_May_2014.pdf

113. Kendall, B. (2014, February 27). Russia 'Grants Ukraine's Viktor Yanukovych Protection'. *BBC.* Available from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26367722

114. Khalidi, R. (2007). The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure. Rogan, E. L. and Shlaim, A. (eds.), *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (pp. 12–26). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

115. Kirby, A. (2007). The London Bombers as "Self-Starters": A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *30* (5): 415–428.

116. Kraemer, J. L. (2005). Moses Maimonides: An Intellectual Portrait. Seeskin, K. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides* (pp. 10–57). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

117. Kramer, M. (1995, October). *The Salience of Islamic Antisemitism.* Available from http://martinkramer.org/sandbox/reader/archives/the-salience-of-islamic-antisemitism/

118. Krasimirov, A. (2016, October 1). Bulgaria the Latest European Country to Ban the Burqa and Niqab In Public Places. *The Sydney Morning Herald.* Available from https://www.smh.com.au/world/bulgaria-the-latest-european-country-to-ban-the-burqa-and-niqab-in-public-places-20161001-grss9q.html

119.   Kratochwil, F. (1984). Errors Have Their Advantage. *International Organization*, 38 (2): 305–320.

120.   Krieger, H. L. (2006, June 15). Rothschild: France Not Anti-Semitic. *Jerusalem Post*. Available from http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-News/Rothschild-France-not-anti-Semitic

121.   Tanakh (n.d.). In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online.* Available from https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tanakh

122.   Laqueur, W. (2001). *A History of Terrorism*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

123.   Laqueur, W. (2006). *The Changing Face of Antisemitism: From Ancient Times to the Present Day*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

124.   Lauziere, H. (2010). The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *42* (3): 369–389.

125.   The Covenant of the League of Nations (Including Amendments Adopted to December, 1924). (1924). Adopted by the League of Nations in 1920, with additional amendments in 1924. Available from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art22

126.   Levitt, M. (2013). *Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

127.   Lewis, B. 1998. License to Kill: Usama Bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad. *Foreign Affairs*, *77* (6): 14–19.

128.   *Libération.* (2009, March 3). "L'antisémitisme est de retour", selon le président du Crif ["Anti-Semitism is Back", According to the President of CRIF]. Available from http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2009/03/03/l-antisemitisme-est-de-retour-selon-le-president-du-crif_457047

129.   Likhachev, V. (2014). *Anti-Semitism in Ukraine - 2014: Report Based on Monitoring Data.* Available from http://kantorcenter.tau.ac.il/sites/default/files/Antisemitism2014Ukraine_engl2.pdf

130.   Lipka, M. (2016, March 16). A Closer Look at Jewish Identity in Israel and the U.S. *Pew Research Center.* Available from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/16/a-closer-look-at-jewish-identity-in-israel-and-the-u-s/

131.   Lipshitz, G. (1998). *Country on the Move: Migration to and Within Israel, 1948-1995.* Berlin: Springer Science+Business Media.

132.   Maingueneau, D. (2010). Literature and Discourse Analysis. *Acta Linguistica Hafniensia, International Journal of Linguistics, 42* (1): 147–157.

133.   Marcus, M. B. (2015, November 19). Injuries from Paris Attacks Will Take Long to Heal. *CBS News.* Available from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/injuries-from-paris-attacks-will-take-long-to-heal/

134.   Margolin, D. (2014, April 27). In Dnepropetrovsk, a Stylish Passover Despite Ukraine's Rumblings. *Chabad.Org*. Available from http://www.chabad.org/news/article_cdo/aid/2565176/jewish/In-Dnepropetrovsk-a-Stylish-Passover-Despite-Ukraines-Rumblings.htm

135.   Marquise, R. A. (2006). *Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation.* New York, NY: Algora Publishing.

136.   Maryks, R. A. (2010). The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews: Jesuits of Jewish Ancestry and Purity-Of-Blood Laws in the Early Society of Jesus. *Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions, 146* (1): xv–271.

137.   Masters, B. (2004). *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

138.   Masud, M. K., Messick, B., and Powers, D. S. (1996). *Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas.* London: Harvard University Press.

139.   McCauley, C. and Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 20* (3): 415–433.

140.   McSweeney, B. (1996). Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School. *Review of International Studies, 22* (1): 81–93.

141.   Miller, S., Schmool, M., and Lerman, A. (1996). Social and Political Attitudes of British Jews: Some Key Findings of the JPR Report. *JPR Report.* Available from http://archive.jpr.org.uk/download?id=1443

142.   Milliken, J. (1999). The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods. *European Journal of International Relations, 5* (2): 225–254.

143.   Moore, J. (2017, January 24). Isis Suicide Bombers at Brussels Airport 'Targeted U.S. Airline, Jews'. *Newsweek.* Available from http://www.newsweek.com/isis-suicide-bombers-brussels-airport-targeted-us-airline-jews-547371

144.   Morris, B. (2001). *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001.* New York City, NY: Vintage Books.

145.   Morris, B. (2008). *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

146.   Motyl, A. J. (2001). *Encyclopedia of Nationalism: Leaders, Movements, and Concepts.* Cambridge, MA: Academic Press.

147.   Mouvement Siona. (2014). *Grand sondage SIONA - JFORUM sur l'antisémitisme en France en 2014* [Big survey SIONA – JFORUM on Anti-Semitism in France 2014]. Available from https://drive.google.com/open?id=1T4Novf-Gr_vpk_fXoPeoEpOfOX-u26fF

148.   Murata, T. (2009). The Impact of 9/11 on U.S. Relations in Asia. Morgan, M. J. (ed.), *The Impact of 9/11 on Politics and War: The Day that Changed Everything* (pp. 221–230). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

149.   National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004). *The 9/11 Commission Report Executive Summary.* Available from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/

150.   National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). *Global Terrorism Database.* Available from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

151.   Nelson, D. and Khan, E. (2009, January 22). Al-Qaeda Commander Linked to 2005 London Bombings Led Attacks on Nato Convoys. *The Telegraph.* Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/4313740/Al-Qaeda-commander-linked-to-2005-London-bombings-led-attacks-on-Nato-convoys.html

152.   Neusner, J. (1999). *The Four Stages of Rabbinic Judaism.* London, UK: Routledge.

153.   Newby, G. D. (2002). *A Concise Encyclopedia of Islam.* London: Oneworld Publications.

154.   Noueihed, L. (2008, May 16). Bin Laden Marks Israel Anniversary with Combat Vow. *Reuters.* Available from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-binladen-israel-idUSL16626117200805 16

155.   OECD. (2017). *Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Total, US dollars/capita, 2007 – 2016.* Database. Aggregate National Accounts, SNA. Paris. Available from https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domestic-product-gdp.htm

156.   Leaman, O. (2006). *The Qur'an: An Encyclopedia.* Abingdon: Routledge.

157.   Patai, R. (1996). *The Jews of Hungary: History, Culture, Psychology.* Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.

158.   Peled, Y. (1992). Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State. *The American Political Science Review, 86* (2): 432–443.

159.   Perez, J. (2007). *History of a Tragedy: The Expulsion of the Jews from Spain.* Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

160.   Perry, M., and Schweitzer, F. M. (2002). *Antisemitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the Present.* Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

161.   Perry, M., and Negrin, H. E. (2008). *The Theory and Practice of Islamic Terrorism: An Anthology.* Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

162.   Pew Research Center (2005). *Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics; Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics (17-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey).* Available from http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2005/07/Pew-Global-Attitudes-2005-Report-7-14-2005.pdf

163.   Pluchinsky, D. A. (1991). Middle Eastern Terrorism in Europe: Trends and Prospects. *Terrorism, 14* (2): 67–76.

164.   Portes, A. and Rumbaut, R. G. (2006). *Immigrant America: A Portrait.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

165.   Provisional Government of Israel. (1948). *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel,* adopted on May 14, 1948. Available from https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm

166.   Quivooij, R. (2016). The Brussels Attacks: Challenges of Unravelling Terrorist Networks. *RSIS Commentary, 67* (1): 1–4.

167.   Raab, E. (2002). Antisemitism, anti-Israelism, anti-Americanism. *Judaism: A Quarterly Journal of Jewish Life and Thought, 51* (4). Available from https://web.archive.org/web/20040925075334/http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0411/is_4_51/ai_106730943

168.   Raijman, R. (2010). Citizenship Status, Ethno-National Origin and Entitlement to Rights: Majority Attitudes towards Minorities and Immigrants in Israel. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36* (1): 87–106.

169.   Reinares, F. (2009). Jihadist Radicalization and the 2004 Madrid Bombing Network. *CTC Sentinel, 2* (11): 16–19.

170.   Renard, J. (2012). *Fighting Words: Religion, Violence, and the Interpretation of Sacred Texts.* Berkley, CA: University of California Press.

171.   *Reuters.* (2009, January 30). French Jews Ask Sarkozy to Help Curb Attacks. Available from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-jews-attacks/french-jews-ask-sarkozy-to-help-curb-attacks-idUSTRE50T57520090130

172.   *Reuters*. (2015, February 25). Austria: Law Tightens Rules for Muslims. Available from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/world/europe/austria-law-tightens-rules-for-muslims.html

173.   Risse-Kappen, T. (1995). *Bringing Transnational Relations Back in Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

174.   Robertson, N., Cruickshank, P., and Lister, T. (2012, April 30). Documents Give New Details on Al Qaeda's London Bombings. Available from http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents-london-bombings/?c=&page=0

175.   Rosenfeld, A. H. (2015). Deciphering the New Antisemitism, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

176.   Roth, C. (1941). *A History of the Jews in England.* Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

177.   Roy, O. (1994). *The Failure of Political Islam.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

178.   Rumiyah. (2017). *Issue 5*. Available from http://qb5cc3pam3y2ad0tm1zxuhho-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Rumiyah-ISIS-Magazine-5th-issue.pdf

179.   Sachedina, A. A. (2001). *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

180.   Safran, W. (1991). Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return. *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 1* (1): 83–99.

181.   Samuel, H. (2016, October 6). Nice Killer Visited Italy's 'Little Calais' As He Was Radicalized Over a Year Before July 14 Massacre. *The Telegraph*. Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/06/nice-killer-visited-italys-little-calais-as-he-was-radicalised-o/

182.   Sand, S. (2009). *The Invention of the Jewish People.* Brooklyn, NY: Verso Books.

183.   Sand, S. (2012). *The Invention of the Land of Israel: From Holy Land to Homeland.* Brooklyn, NY: Verso Books.

184.   Scheindlin, R. P. (1992). The Jews in Muslim Spain. Jayyusi, S. K., and Marin, M. (eds.), *The Legacy of Muslim Spain* (pp. 188–200). Leiden, NLD: Brill.

185.   Schoorl, J., Heering, L., Esveldt, I., Groenewold, G., and Van der Erf, R. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of International Migration: A Comparative Report.* Available from https://www.nidi.nl/shared/content/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf

186.   Seale, Patrick. (1992). *Abu Nidal - A Gun for Hire: The Secret Life of the World's Most Notorious Arab Terrorist.* New York, NY: Penguin Random House.

187.   Resolution 446. (1979). Adopted by the Security Council, S/RES/446, March 22. Available from http://undocs.org/S/RES/446(1979)

188.   Segal, A. Z. (2014, August 15). Uneasy About Future in Russia, 'Putin's Jews' Seek Quiet Exit. *The Times of Israel*. Available from https://www.timesofisrael.com/uneasy-about-future-in-russia-putins-jews-seek-quiet-exit/

189.   Shain, Y. and Wittes, T. C. (2002). Peace as a Three-Level Game: The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Resolution. Ambrosio, T. (ed.), *Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy* (pp. 169–197). Westport, CT: Praeger.

190.   Sharansky, N. (2016, July 12). A Message from Natan Sharansky [Letter sent to The Jewish Agency for Israel's Board of Directors]. Available from https://jewishheartnj.org/blog/a-message-from-natan-sharansky

191.   Sharon, J. (2014, September 17). Poll: Many Israelis See Jewish Identity as Being Self-Defined. *Jerusalem Post*. Available from http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Poll-Many-Israelis-see-Jewish-identity-as-being-self-defined-375551

192.   Sheffer, G. (2003). *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad,* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

193.   Shiraev, E. B. (2014). *International Relations*. New York, NY: Oxford University Presses.

194.   Shoichet, C. E. and Levs, J. (2015, January 21). Al Qaeda Branch Claims Charlie Hebdo Attack Was Years in the Making. *CNN*. Available from http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/14/europe/charlie-hebdo-france-attacks/

195.   Simon, D., Ellis, R., and Pleitgen, F. (2016, December 20). Berlin Christmas Market: 12 Dead, 48 Hospitalized in Truck Crash. *CNN*. Available from http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/19/europe/berlin-christmas-market-truck/index.html

196.   Quran. (n. d.). In *Encyclopædia Britannica Online.* Available from https://www.britannica.com/topic/Quran

197.   Sirriyeh, E. (2007). Wahhabis, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism. *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 16* (2): 123–132.

198.   Skillicorn, D. B. (2015). Empirical Assessment of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Taliban Propaganda. *IEEE Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI):* 61–66.

199.   Smale, A., Pianigiani, G., and Gall, C. (2016, December 22). Anis Amri, Suspect in the Berlin Truck Attack: What We Know. *The New York Times*. Available from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/world/europe/anis-amri-suspect-in-the-berlin-truck-attack-what-is-known.html?_r=0

200.   Smooha, Sammy. (1990). Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 13* (1): 389–413.

201.   Snyder, J. (2004). One World, Rival Theories. *Foreign Policy, 145* (1): 53–62.

202.   Staetsky, D. L. (2017). Are Jews Leaving Europe? JPR Report. Available from http://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/JPR.2017.Are_Jews_leaving_Europe.pdf

203. Staetsky, D. L., and Boyd, J. (2014). The Exceptional Case? Perceptions and Experiences of Antisemitism Among Jews in the United Kingdom. *JPR Report.* Available from http://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/Perceptions_and_experiences_of_antisemitism_among_Jews_in_UK.pdf

204. Stritzel, H. (2007). Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond. *European Journal of International Relations, 13* (3): 357–383.

205. Super, R. and Bigg, C. (2015, July 2). Jews Are Fleeing Russia Because of Putin. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. Available from https://www.rferl.org/a/jews-are-fleeing-/27107988.html

206. Tal, D. (2004). *War in Palestine 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy.* Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

207. Taylor, A. R. (1971). Vision and Intent in Zionist Thought. Abu-Lughod, I. (ed.), *The Transformation of Palestine Essays on the Origin and Development of Arab-Israeli Conflict* (pp. 10–11). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

208. Taylor, J. B. (1968). Some Aspects of Islamic Eschatology. *Religious Studies, 4* (1): 57–76.

209. *The Atlantic*. (2015, April 29). Should the Jews Leave Europe? Washington D.C. Available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TW38xni5PxE

210. *The British White Paper.* (1939). Available from http://www.alliedpowersholocaust.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/1939-May-White-Paper.pdf

211. The Coordination Forum for Countering Anti-Semitism. (2011). *The 2011 Annual Report on Antisemitism in France.*

212. *The Jerusalem Post.* (2017, March 2). Isis Fanatics Call on Supporters to 'Terrorize' Jewish People in the West. Available from http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/ISIS-Threat/ISIS-fanatics-call-on-supporters-to-terrorize-Jewish-people-in-the-West-482987

213. The Jewish Agency for Israel. (2014). *Violence in Ukraine Escalates: Update from The Jewish Agency in Ukraine.* Available from http://www.jewishagency.org/blog/1/article/13336

214. *The Jewish Chronicle.* (2017, June 2). Isis Fan Said He Would Behead Jews. Available from https://www.thejc.com/news/world/isis-fan-said-he-would-behead-jews-1.439419

215. *The Times of Israel.* (2014, May 17). Chaos in East Ukraine Drives Jewish Aliyah. Available from https://www.timesofisrael.com/chaos-in-east-ukraine-drives-jewish-aliyah/

216. Tilly, C. (2011). The Impact of the Economic Crisis on International Migration: A Review. *Work, Employment and Society, 25* (4): 675–692.

217. Tölölyan, K. (1996). Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment. *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 5* (1): 3–36.

218. Tommer, Y. and Fleischer, T. (2007, May 1). Hate's Revival: What's New About the "New Antisemitism"? Interview with Dina Porat, Robert Wistrich, and Yehuda Bauer. Melbourne.

219. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. (1947). *Report to the General Assembly*. Available from https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/c17b3a9d4bfb04c985257b28006e4ea6/07175de9fa2de563852568d3006e10f3?OpenDocument

220. Vollhardt, J. R. (2009). The Role of Victim Beliefs in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: Risk or Potential for Peace? *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 15* (2): 135–159.

221. Vuori, J. A. (2008). Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders. *European Journal of International Relations, 14* (1): 65–99.

222. Wæver, O. (2003). *Securitization: Taking Stock of a Research Program in Security Studies.* Paper presented to PIPES, University of Chicago, March, Chicago, USA.

223. Waldman, M. R. (1968). The Development of the Concept of Kufr in the Qur'ān. *Journal of the American Oriental Society, 88* (3): 442–455.

224. Walker, S. (2014, March 4). Russian Takeover of Crimea Will Not Descend into War, Says Vladimir Putin. *The Guardian*. Available from

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/ukraine-crisis-russian-troops-crimea-john-kerry-kiev

225.   Weaver, M. (2008, November 21). Families of Lockerbie Bombing Victims Receive Compensation from Libya. *The Guardian*. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/nov/21/lockerbie-libya

226.   Wehr, H. (1976). *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic.* Ithaca, NY: Spoken Language Services, Inc.

227.   Weiss, M. and Hassan, H. (2015). *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*. New York, NY: Regan Arts.

228.   Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization, 46* (2): 391–425.

229.   Wilkinson, C. 2011. The Limits of Securitization: From Meta-Narratives to Experiences of Security. In *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, ed. Thierry Balzacq, 94-116. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

230.   Williams, M. C. (2003). Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. *International Studies Quarterly, 47* (4): 511–531.

231.   Wistrich, R. (1984, December 10). *Anti-Zionism as an Expression of Anti-Semitism in Recent Years.* A lecture held at Study Circle on World Jewry in the home of the President of Israel, Israel.

232.   Withnall, A. (2016, December 23). Berlin Attack Suspect Anis Amri 'Recorded Video Pledging Allegiance to Isis. *The Independent*. Available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/berlin-christmas-market-attack-anis-amri-isis-video-pledged-allegiance-milan-suspect-a7492636.html

233.   World Islamic Front. (1998). *Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.* Available from https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm

234.   Worman, J. G. (2013). Abu Nidal: Chameleon of Change, A.K.A. Terrorism's Free Agent. *Global Security Studies, 4* (1): 57–69.

235.   Wright, L. (2006). *The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11.* New York, NY: Vintage Books.

236.   Wright, R. (2001). *Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam.* New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.

237. Wright, R. (2016, December 12). After the Islamic State. *The New Yorker*. Available from http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/12/after-the-islamic-state

238. Ye'or, B. (1996). *The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude.* Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, US.

239. Zehfuss, M. (2002). *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

240. Zeidan, D. (2001). The Islamic Fundamentalist View of Life as a Perennial Battle. *Middle East Review of International Affairs, 5* (4): 26–53.

241. Zelin, A. Y. (2014). The War Between ISIS and Al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement. *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20* (1): 1–11.