

UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE

Ines Kuburović

**JAVNA PODOBA VIŠKEGA PREDSTAVNIKA V TISKANIH
MEDIJAH V BIH**

**THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE IN BIH
PRINT MEDIA**

MAGISTRSKO DELO

Ljubljana, 2010

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POVZETEK

Od devetdesetih let 20. stoletja dalje je bila javna domena v Bosni in Hercegovini karakterizirana s propagando in sovražnim govorom, ki sta prispevala k polarizaciji političnega in družbenega prostora v BiH, kot tudi bosanskohercegovskih medijev. Ideološki kontekst, ki je prispeval k temu fenomenu, je bila uporaba nacionalizma v dnevnih političnih in družbenih diskurzih, kot tudi možnost manipuliranja etničnih skupin znotraj kompleksne večnacionalne in večetnične družbe, kot je BiH. V takšnem okolju je bilo pomembno orodje pri emocionalizaciji javne sfere v BiH medijski diskurz, ki je revitaliziral in zagovarjal določeno politično sliko(e) dejanskega stanja v BiH. S ciljem zožiti svoje raziskovanje, bo poudarek moje naloge slonel na uporabi metafor v bosanskohercegovskih tiskanih medijih v dveh časovnih obdobjih, in sicer pri poročanju tiskanih medijev o 10. obletnici Daytonskega mirovnega sporazuma in v odnosu do reformnih iniciativ visokega predstavnika, v obdobju od septembra 2007 do aprila 2008.

Uporaba metafor v dominantnih ideoloških predstavitevah je bil pogost element v kritičnih diskurzni študijah, saj metafore predstavljajo velik delež tistega, kar nekdo smatra za realnost. Tako bo ta teorija, ob upoštevanju dejstva, da kritična analiza diskurza raziskuje vlogo diskurzni struktur pri ustvarjanju družbenih neenakostih, skupaj s teorijo konceptualne integracije, osnova moje naloge. Podoba visokega predstavnika v tiskanih medijih bo opazovana skozi uporabo omenjenih teorij v šestih dnevni in štirih tedenskih časopisih z najvišjo naklado, izdanih v različnih delih BiH.

KLJUČNE BESEDE

kritična analiza diskurza, teorija konceptualne integracije, urad visokega predstavnika, Daytonski mirovni sporazum, policijska reforma

Public Image of the High Representative in BiH Print Media

SUMMARY

From 1990ies onwards, public domain in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been characterized by propaganda and hate speeches which have contributed to polarization of BiH political and social space, including BiH media. The ideological context which contributed to such a phenomenon has been use of nationalism in daily political and social discourse, as well as the possibility to manipulate ethnic communities within the complex multinational and multiethnic society such as BiH. In such a milieu, an important tool in emotionalisation of BiH public sphere has been media discourse, which has revitalized and advocated the specific political picture(s) of the status of facts in BiH. With the goal of narrowing down my research, the focus of my dissertation shall lie on the analysis of metaphor use in BiH print media in two time periods, namely in print media reporting on the 10th anniversary of Dayton Peace Agreement and in relation to the reform initiatives of the OHR High Representative in the period from September 2007 to April 2008.

Use of metaphors in dominant ideological representations has been a common element of critical discourse studies, since metaphors constitute a significant part of what one takes as reality. Thus, bearing in mind the fact that Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) explores the role of discourse structures in creating social inequality, this theory, together with Conceptual Blending Theory shall be the basis of my research. The print media image of the High Representative shall be observed through the application of the listed theories on six daily and four weekly newspapers issued in different parts of BiH, which have the highest print run in the country.

KEY WORDS

critical discourse analysis, conceptual blending theory, Office of the High Representative, Dayton Peace Agreement, police reform

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....	1
1 Historical and Political Context.....	4
1.1 Dissolution of ex Yugoslavia.....	4
1.2 Dayton Peace Accords	6
1.3 The Mandate of the Office of the High Representative in BiH	6
1.4 Political situation in BiH from 2006 onwards	8
2 Theoretical and Methodological Framework.....	11
2.1 CDA and use of metaphors	11
2.2 Three basic blending processes.....	12
2.3 Data Corpus	14
3 Analysis of BiH Print Media Reporting on 10th Dayton Anniversary and Reform Actions of the High Representative	20
3.1 10 th Anniversary of Dayton Peace Accords.....	20
3.1.1 Oslobođenje	20
3.1.2 Dnevni Avaz	25
3.1.3 Nezavisne Novine	28
3.1.4 Danas weekly	33
3.1.5 BH Dani	36
3.1.6 Slobodna Bosna	42
3.1.7 Novi Reporter.....	45
3.2. BiH print media response to the High Representative's reform initiatives in period from September 2007 to April 2008	50
3.2.1 BiH Police Force reform.....	51
3.2.2 Amendments to the Rulebook of the BiH Parliament Work Procedure	64
4 Discussion.....	69
5 Conclusion	77
6 References.....	79
7 Povzetek v slovenskem jeziku	88

Figures

2.1 The basic conceptual blending diagram (after Fauconnier & Turner, 2002).....	12
3.1.1 The conceptual blending network for the statement “There is only a façade of the BiH State left”	21
3.1.2 Conceptual blending network for interaction of “the crying circus” and “the leading entertainer in the circus arena”	22
3.1.3 Conceptual blending network for “NSK State Sarajevo”	24
3.1.4 Conceptual blending network for “bottleneck” and “obstacle”	25
3.1.5 Conceptual blending network for “a great leader” and “a peace builder”	26
3.1.6 Conceptual blending network for “a promised land”	29
3.1.7 Conceptual blending network for interaction of “nationalist narcotics dealers”, “private property” and “addicts”	31
3.1.8 Conceptual blending network for “idiots and barbarians”, “stuffing of own pockets” and “victims”	32
3.1.9 Conceptual blending network for “a trap” and “a lightning conductor”	35
3.1.10 Conceptual blending network for interaction of “to kidnap” and “criminals”	38
3.1.11 Conceptual blending network for interaction of “a chronic patient”, “a doctor” and “a therapy”	39
3.1.12 Conceptual blending network for “white maharaja”, “carpetbagger phony” and “private company”	44
3.1.13 Conceptual blending network of “Sarajevo white bears”, “terrorists” and “Ashdown led offence”	48
3.2.1 Conceptual integration blend of “huge anti-Serb coalition” and “insatiable Serb eater”	56
3.2.2 Conceptual blending network of “sword of revenge” and “servant”	57

Abbreviations and acronyms

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DFID	UK Department for International Development
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
HR	High Representative
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Party (<i>Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica</i>)
ICTY	International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
OHR	Office of the High Representative
PIC	Peace Implementation Council
RS	Republika Srpska
RSNA	Republika Srpska National Assembly
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreement
SDA	Democratic Action Party (<i>Stranka demokratske akcije</i>)
SDS	Serb Democratic Party (<i>Srpska demokratska stranka</i>)
SFOR	Stabilization Force of Bosnia and Herzegovina
SNSD	Independent Social Democrats Alliance (<i>Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata</i>)
UK	United Kingdom

Introduction

The public sphere domain in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990ies saw the process of “emotionalisation of the public sphere which means that there is no possibility to expect a full scale rational discussion as a precondition for the decision-making process (individual, group or social)” (Puhovski 2000, 48). As Puhovski further argues, public sphere emotionalisation “means that under the specific conditions of the emotionalized public sphere there is no methodological place for the crucial distinction between privacy and public life... where emotionalisation stands for a shortening, if not an avoiding, of the process of argumentation, for non-universalistic terms prevailing in the public debate” (ibid, 2000, 48). Characteristic of such an occurrence is the atmosphere created in a multi-ethnic society such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a leader, or a prominent political party, as the incarnation of authority, creates within an ethnic group a feeling of being special and different from the rest in a sense that the rules which apply to the others are not to be applied to the representatives of the leader’s ethnic community. Puhovski names this emotionalized irrationalization of the public sphere...where individuals are parts of a community of induced emotions” (ibid, 2000, 49). In the words of Pero Jurišin, “this has finally resulted in ‘the manifestation of the spirit of intolerance, as the most reliable barometer of one’s patriotism“, which is memorized in the words of *Večernji list* journalist Dunja Ujević: „If needed, I shall even lie for my country!“ In such a way, „nation-building qualities“ are preferred to professionalism, the national to the civil, and orthodoxy to truth” (Jurišin 2007).

Ten years from Dayton Peace Agreement, practices of such an approach in BiH print media are, among the rest, realized through the above mentioned “emotionalisation of the public sphere”, which I shall demonstrate via analysis of metaphor use in print media. Namely, I shall analyze the selected BiH print media with the intention of identifying and analyzing the metaphors used in the papers in two time periods, namely in reporting on the 10th anniversary of Dayton Peace Agreement and in relation to the reform initiatives of the OHR High Representative in the period from September 2007 to April 2008.

The theoretical basis of my thesis is Critical Discourse Analysis and Conceptual Blending Theory. In words of Christopher Hart (2007), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) explores the role of discourse structures in constituting social inequality. In the view of “emotionalisation of

the public sphere”, another tendency in the representation of discourse is the myth that “reality is transparent and can be “read” without mediation or interpretation”, which is, together with the myth that “media are a “mirror” to reality”, “a byproduct of the tendency for dominant ideological representations of reality to be naturalized as the only possible ways of seeing reality, which is consequently construed as transparent” (Fairclough 1995, 64). Such a discourse representation is directly linked to the use of metaphor, which, according to Charteris-Black (2004, 28) “is central to critical discourse analysis since it is concerned with forming a coherent view of reality”. Conceptual Blending Theory is a theory of cognition. According to this theory, elements and vital relations from diverse scenarios are “blended” in a subconscious process. This process is known as Conceptual Blending, and is assumed to be ubiquitous to everyday thought and language. In my research, Conceptual Blending Theory shall demonstrate ways in which this tool is applied in ideological uses of metaphors in BiH print media. The print media image of the High Representative shall be observed through the application of the listed theories on six daily and four weekly newspapers issued in different parts of BiH, which have the highest print run in the country. In the paper selection, I was governed by the fact that the BiH market has been divided along ethno-nationalist lines which results in the fact that specific papers primarily represent and report from the perspective of particular ethnic communities in BiH. I presuppose that leadership, house, lunacy and war domain metaphors are prevailing elements of emotionalisation of public image of the High Representative in BiH print media.

The first chapter of the dissertation provides the historical and political context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely an introduction to the political and social atmosphere in which the observed issue is analyzed, while the second chapter provides the theoretical and methodological framework of the study. The main section shall focus on the analysis of the public image of the High Representative in BiH print media as reflected through the metaphor use in the writings on the 10th anniversary of Dayton Peace Accords, and the print media response to the reform initiatives of the High Representative in the period from September 2007 to April 2008. In discussion chapter, I shall provide the summary of the metaphor analysis results, together with the interpretation of results in relation to the political directions of the observed print media. As second, I shall interpret results in relation to the joint

metaphors used, and, in the end, draw the conclusion on what these results tell us about the mandate and role of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1 Historical and Political Context

The public image of the High Representative in BiH print media may be properly observed only within the historical and social context in BiH in relation to the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the circumstances which led to the international community¹ engagement in BiH, namely the recognition of Bosnian independence in 1992, Dayton Peace Accords, and the establishment of the Office of the High Representative, the international community representative body in BiH.

1.1 Dissolution of ex Yugoslavia

“The former Yugoslavia became “the former Yugoslavia” when the peoples of its various constituent republics voted for separate nation-states, grounded on the sovereignty not on the polity of equal citizens, but rather of the nation, ethnically defined” (Hayden 1999, 26). The trauma and unsettled issues between the former Yugoslav republics were linked to the Second World War aspirations and the centrifugal currents in ex Yugoslavia, where “the balance of forces among the ethno-national political units could not be achieved due to unmitigated tensions among ‘the peoples’ in ethno-cultural sense (ethnos) and the peoples in political sense (demos)” (Pešić in Popov 1996, 9). While some of the countries opted only for the independent national state within its existing, republic borders (Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), others, like Serbia and Croatia, “led their nationalist politics in triadic configuration: separatism + unification (annexation of its own diaspora and the so called ethnic territories) + discrimination or exile of minorities which were “a disturbing factor” in the creation of national states” (ibid, 11-12). This political agenda at the time is crucial in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, since Bosnia had no single majority nation. According to the 1991 census, Bosnia’s population was 43.7% Muslim, 31.3% Serb, 17.3% Croat, and the remainder “Yugoslavs and others” (Neslužbeni rezultati popisa stanovništva BiH 1991. godine). The electoral law and revisions of the Bosnian Constitution passed prior to 1990 elections

¹ International community is a term which signifies the group of all subjects in international relations. The word “community” only suggests that the existence of common values is somewhat greater than in groups which are named “societies”. The general image assigned to this term is of the organized international community, where countries and other subjects do not work anarchically and independently, but via joint consultation and decision fora, consisting mainly of international organizations (Dimitrijević 1996, 687).

demonstrated a huge importance of ethno-national identity to the BiH population, and “the overwhelming concern that each group had of being dominated by the others” (Hayden 2005, 237). As a result of this, the 1990 elections brought about the absolute victory of the three nationalist parties which ensured absolute or relative majority in 104 out of 110 municipalities, winning 75 percent of all municipal mandates.² According to Pešić, this was “a typical example of “a prisoner dilemma” which logically shows that lack of cooperation leads to the worst choice for all the sides making a decision on future” (Pešić in Popov 1996,50). At this time period, the leading issue on the public agenda was whether Bosnia would be proclaimed an independent state, where “the Serb representatives used constitutional mechanism to prevent this event; the Muslims, supported by the Croats, violated the constitution to achieve it” (Hayden 2005, 238). Therefore, the act of recognition of BiH’s independence by the international community was far from carrying sufficient centripetal force to keep its political actors reach the settlement by peaceful means, and to prevent the upcoming bloodshed. Instead, as Hayden argues, proclamation of independence happened “not because “the people of Bosnia” wanted it, but rather precisely because so many of them did not...recognition was an attempt to proclaim a house divided to be a condominium; but too many of its residents preferred to destroy the structure rather than share it” (ibid, 239). However, in terms of the wider look on the international community’s engagement in ex Yugoslavia, it is important to note that:

The Yugoslav issue was the first rehearsal of the joint European foreign policy, i.e. the European Union foreign policy, which was enabled by the Maastricht Treaty, and that the potential devastating dimensions of the Yugoslav crisis, which could not be predicted from abroad, were fading in relation to the danger that the co-decision making and coordination in new foreign-policy area of the Union’s work would show itself as impossible, and, thus, disable the Union to set itself as an equal partner to the USA (Dimitrijević 1996, 700).

At the given time period, this specific political context was characterized by a noticeable difference in the stance of BiH Serbs, Croats and Muslims on the issue of whether the country could survive as an independent state. According to the 1991 survey in BiH, 78.14% of Serbs and 71.32% of Croats said no, while 61.33% of Muslims said that it could (Goati 1992, 113). As regards the international community role in the process, the results of this survey are also

² Democratic Action Party won almost 30 percent (1.888) of mandates, Serb Democratic Party cca 28 percent (1.801), and the Croat Democratic Party cca 17 percent (1.085) of the mandates. Around 20 percent of the mandates were won jointly by the League of Communists – Socio-Democratic Party and Alliance of Yugoslavian Reform Forces for Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the other parties won roughly 4 percent of posts in municipal assemblies.

relevant to the public image of the High Representative in BiH print media, particularly in terms of their fragmentation along the nationalist lines, present until today.

1.2 Dayton Peace Accords

Negotiations on the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Accords, were initiated following the unsuccessful previous peace efforts and arrangements in 1992-1995 period, the government military offensive against the Republika Srpska in June 1995 followed by the Serbs' shelling of Sarajevo main hospital and a series of civilian targets in the capital, and the NATO aircraft air strikes on the Bosnian Serb military in August and September 1995. During September and October 1995, many of the world powers (especially the USA and Russia), gathered in the Contact Group, applied intense pressure on the leaders of the Croat, Serb and Bosniak side to attend the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio. Paradoxically speaking, two of the three leaders gathered in Dayton were the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia Presidents, Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević, while Alija Izetbegović, the BiH President at the time, was the only BiH citizen of the three, who took part in the process on behalf of the Bosniak side.

The BiH Constitution was drafted at the peace conference in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995. As Carl Bildt, the Co-Chairman of the Dayton Peace Conference noted down, a first draft was provided by the Americans and subjected to some negotiations (1998, 136-139), but "no-one thought it wise to submit the constitution to any sort of parliamentary or other similar proceeding. It was to be a constitution by international decree" (ibid, 139). As Hayden writes: "The Constitution became effective when it was signed by the president of Serbia, the president of Croatia, and the leader of the Bosnian Muslims – thus by two leaders who were not even citizens of the putative Bosnian state" (Hayden 2005, 243).

1.3 The Mandate of the Office of the High Representative in BiH

Soon after the Accords were signed, it became clear that the central Bosnian government cannot function properly with the existing constitutional setup. Therefore, in December 1995, the international community nominated the Peace Implementation Council with the goal of overseeing the implementation of Dayton Accords, and a body in charge of the nomination of

the High Representative (HR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The mandate of the Office of the High Representative is formally defined in Annex 10 of Dayton Peace Accords, proclaiming this body the chief civilian peace implementation agency in BiH, whose goal is “to facilitate the Parties’ own efforts and to mobilize and coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspect of the peace settlement” (“The General Framework Agreement”). The political arbitry role of the High Representative has been primarily based on “close contact with the parties to the Agreement, to promote their full compliance with all civilian aspects of the Agreement” (“The Mandate of the OHR”, 2009). However, in December 1997, the Peace Implementation Council concluded that “An even more persistent approach on the part of the international community is required: the actions of the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina too often fall short of their words...and continued procrastination may even endanger the progress achieved so far” (“PIC – Summary of Bonn Conclusions” 1997). Thus, within this “more persistent approach”, the High Representative was granted “Bonn Powers”,³ which have regularly been a “thorn in the eye” of local political parties and the media, as well as a tool for radical actions by the HR. On the basis of these powers, the HR removed a series of elected officials from office, on the grounds that they “not only failed to show any commitment to the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, but also seriously and persistently obstructed its implementation” (HR Decisions: Removals and Suspensions, 1999). Dwelling on these authorities, a series of scholars criticized the Bonn powers for “not being congruent with any concept of constitutional democracy” (Hayden 2005, 247). As Matthew T. Parish noted in 2007:

There was a gross lack of due process in the exercise of these powers. The right to amend legislation, and to dismiss public officials, could be exercised without any prior reference to any affected party. Bosnia’s democratically elected parliaments did not have to be consulted. Where officials were removed, they did not have to be given any notice, or an opportunity to respond to the evidence against them. Indeed the evidence did not even have to exist. There was no possibility of appeal or review of a decision, even if one lost one’s job or

³ “Bonn Powers” were defined at the Peace Implementation Council meeting in Bonn on 9 and 10 December 1997, when the Council welcomed the High Representative’s intention to use his final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary, on the following issues: a) timing, location and chairmanship of meetings of the common institutions; b) interim measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will remain in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned; c) other measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout BiH and its Entities, as well as the smooth running of the common institutions. Such measures may include actions against persons holding public office or officials who are absent from meetings without good cause or who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implementation.

otherwise suffered direct and individual harm as a result. The scope of these decisions gradually and inexorably expanded (Parish 2007, 15).

Going back to the Accords themselves, Sabina P. Ramet well identified the main flaw of the Dayton Peace Accords:

Rather than representing the product of a soundly researched collective effort to engineer stability and lasting peace in the area, it represented, on the West's part, merely another in a continuing series of efforts to find not the most efficacious instrument whereby to achieve the stated goals of policy, but the "cheapest". But as political writers from Machiavelli to Brinton have recognized, the "cheap" solutions usually end up costing more (Ramet 2002, 277).

In such a situation, mainly on the OHR's initiative, the Accords were revised in a few segments, which included BiH Constitutional Court decision proclaiming all three BiH peoples constitutional on the whole BiH territory, the establishment of multiethnic governments in the Republic of Srpska and FBiH, the establishment of the proper State Government with nine ministries and further reform in this direction.

1.4 Political situation in BiH from 2006 onwards

However, in spite of all the Peace Accords revisions, the overlapping, malfunctioned, fragmented and overly expensive political apparatus in the country has been standing in the way of Bosnia's reform and its course to European integrations, which is well stated in a comprehensive Study of the Governance Structures in BiH, published in April 2007. A starting point of the study says the following:

Eleven years after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, the BiH state and its population are still hostage to a cumbersome governance structure, in which numerous levels of government, wielding both legislative and executive powers and served by thousands of civil servants, operate largely in isolation from each other. The system is cumbersome, inefficient, expensive, and constrained by the constitutional provisions designed to prevent common government at the state-level rather than to enable it (Foreign Policy Initiative BiH 2007).

In this period of political tensions from 2006 onwards, BiH has been significantly lagging behind its neighbors in terms of its integrations into EU and NATO Alliance. Majority of debate in the print media at the given time period revolved around the burning issue of needed amendments to the BiH Constitution and the conditions BiH must fulfill to sign Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. One of the main issues on the agenda, a Feasibility Study condition set before BiH, was BiH police reform in accordance with the EU

principles⁴. This agenda issue is related to Lord Paddy Ashdown, who took office as the High Representative/EU Special Representative for BiH in 2002. During his mandate, Ashdown declared the security sector reform as a priority. Since the Dayton Accords placed most of the competencies onto the two Entities, the State level government remained weak and with little authorities at hand. In terms of the police force structure, Republika Srpska, a more centralized entity, had a unified police body which was divided by regions, while the Federation police forces were divided into ten cantons, namely had eleven different and independent police forces. As Muehlmann writes:

This allowed for ethnically-composed policing elements which acted largely independently from each other and remained under the influence of their war-time political masters. There was an unhealthy political interference in operational policing – a legacy of the war and also of the country's Communist past. Despite the fact that the police played a key role in war-time atrocities, many police officers stayed in the newly created police forces, which therefore continued to employ both passive and active sympathizers of the support networks for persons indicted for war crimes. As a consequence, the tripartite system which emerged from the Dayton Agreement helped to protect criminal networks, which, in turn, were often linked to war criminals and parts of the political establishment (Muehlmann 2007, 38-39).

This last problem was most prominent in Republika Srpska, where, according to the 2005 report of the International Crisis Group, “police still act according to the will of their political masters, particularly when it comes to war crimes. They have not arrested a single one of the ICTY indictees in this entity” (International Crisis Group 2005). Therefore, due to the fact that the RS police forces have continued to employ war criminals, resist refugee return and refuse cooperation with ICTY, police reform initiatives have encountered most obstacles in this entity. Another important point to mention is that in post-war BiH, police forces came to represent statehood and an armed force. According to the Deputy High Representative, Raffi Gregorian, the police reform was conceptionally flawed, and a number of people felt that police was a proxy for constitutional change, that, if they, for example in Republic of Srpska agreed to transfer police competencies from entity to the state, that this would undermine the existence of the entity itself. So, what happened with police reform is a similar scenario to the one with the defense reform, where it came down to being a political issue, and not a technical one. Prior to the end of his mandate in Bosnia, the High Representative Paddy Ashdown was in most intense conflict with the RS entity, where his impatience with police reform implementation is directly related to the following context:

⁴ Three key EU policing principles are: a) state-level legislative and budgetary competencies; b) no political interference in operational policing, and c) the establishment of police zones based on professional rather than entity criteria.

The possible re-distribution of zones of influence beyond Dayton opened for all three main ethnic groups the possibility of extending their power base and the risk of losing their political influence and territorial control. Undoubtedly, the Bosniaks would have most to gain in a centralized structure with fewer police regions; fewer regions, with multiethnic constituencies, would ensure their control over most of them, simply by virtue of being the majority...For Serbs, such a scenario would be a nightmare, since even ten years after the war, many Serbs did not trust Bosnian institutions and dreamt of unification with Serbia or independence. In Serb minds, everything they had fought for in the Dayton Agreement was suddenly at risk. For them, centralization of policing meant the first decisive step towards unification with diminishing competencies for the Republika Srpska and was therefore entirely unacceptable (Muehlmann 2007, 53-54).

The mandate of the fourth High Representative, Dr Christian Schwarz-Schilling, from 1 February 2006 to 31 June 2007 was a first serious attempt to hand over as much responsibility to the local decision-making bodies, which, according to the situation in mid 2007, was far from satisfactory. At the same time period, the RS Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik continued with threats related to the RS independence referendum, and challenged the HR's authority on a few occasions. In the interview for the Croatian weekly *Globus* in January 2007, Dodik said the following: "I enjoy the support of a considerable number of people in the RS...If the High Representative wants me show him that I can gather 200.000 people here in Banja Luka, let him try, let him remove me, and we'll see what will happen. Does he want me to bring 50.000 Serbs down to protest in Sarajevo? If someone wants that line of reasoning, they'll get it" (Hudelst 2007). In such a politically tense environment, international community decided to nominate a new High Representative⁵ and introduce a series of radical steps to make up for the time lost on BiH's road towards the European integrations. However, the general elections in 2006 brought to power the parties which had highly divergent positions on the country's future governing arrangements, and, being the main local counterparts of the OHR, these parties observed its actions more through the prism of their political platforms and identities than through the strategic and joint country interest. This has resulted in high level of intolerance towards the specific reform steps introduced by the High Representative, Miroslav Lajčák, who engaged himself intensely on finally settling the police reform issue in BiH.

⁵ The Slovak High Representative, appointed on 2 July 2007, is Miroslav Lajčák, a diplomat who was Director-General for Political Affairs in the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs before becoming HR. He has extensive experience in Southeastern Europe where, before his appointment in BiH, he was best known for his role as mediator and personal representative of the EU HR for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, in Montenegro, in 2006.

2 Theoretical and Methodological Framework

2.1 CDA and use of metaphors

As noted in the introductory section, the theoretical basis of my thesis is Critical Discourse Analysis and Conceptual Blending Theory. In the paper titled *Discourse Representation in Media Discourse*, Fairclough discusses the vital social function of the media which is “to legitimize and reproduce existing asymmetrical power relationships by putting across the voices of the powerful as if they were the voices of “common sense” (Fairclough 1995, 63). Such a discourse representation is directly linked to the use of metaphor, which, according to Charteris-Black (2004, 28) “is central to critical discourse analysis since it is concerned with forming a coherent view of reality”. However, on the other hand, “metaphors are ideological, in so far as they “define in significant part what one takes as reality” (Chilton and Lakoff 1995, 56). In the socio-cognitive approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, discourse and social structure are mediated by social cognition. According to Van Dijk:

It is theoretically essential to understand that there is no other way to relate macrolevel notions such as group dominance and inequality with microlevel notions such as text, talk, meaning and understanding. Indeed, the crucial notion of reproduction, needed to explain how discourse plays a role in the reproduction of dominance, presupposes an account that relates discourse structures to social cognitions, and social cognitions to social structures (Van Dijk 1993, 280).

Along these lines, “cognitive linguistics have carried out a large quantity of studies on metaphor, an idealized cognitive model which results from performing a mapping across different domains” (Herrero Ruiz 2006, 2). In his book “Cognitive Dimensions of Social Science”, Turner writes the following:

Conceptual integration–blending–is a basic mental operation. It is at the very center of what it means to have a human mind. It plays a profound role in all areas of thought and action, including deciding, judging, reasoning, and inventing. Conceptual integration, in this view, is the basic cognitive operation, whereby a conceptual blend always has at least two conceptual influences, sometimes called its “contributors” or its “contributing spaces” (Turner, Chapter 1).


and continues by saying that:

The essence of conceptual integration is its creation of a new mental assembly, a blend, that is identical with neither of its influences and not merely a correspondence between them and usually not even an additive combination of some of their features, but is instead a third conceptual space, a child space, a blended space, with new meaning. This new meaning is “emergent” meaning, in the sense that it is not available in either of the

influencing spaces but instead emerges in the blended space by means of blending those influencing spaces (ibid, Chapter 1).

Metaphor is one particular kind of linguistic expression which prompts for the construction of a number of mental spaces. “In the case of metaphor, mental spaces constructed during discourse undergo a specific conceptual blending operation whereby they are manipulated in an integrated network, producing inferential structure” (Hart 2008, 7). In its simplest form, meaning is established via a *conceptual integration network* which consists of four linked *mental spaces*. Two of these mental spaces are *input spaces*, each containing information about a different aspect of knowledge or experience. Another of these spaces is a *generic space*, which contains elements common to both input spaces. The fourth space is the *blend*, which contains information selectively projected from both of the inputs which is usually compressed, fused together, or otherwise transformed to make it comprehensible at human scale. Here is the basic conceptual blending diagram:

Figure 2.1. The basic conceptual blending diagram (after Fauconnier & Turner, 2002)



2.2 Three basic blending processes

As conceived within the blending theory, blending involves three basic processes: “composition”, “completion” and “elaboration”. In the paper titled “Blending and Metaphor”, Grady et al. describe these three processes through the metaphor “This surgeon is a butcher”.

As the first process, “*composition*” refers to the projection of content from each of the inputs into the blended space, which sometimes involves the “fusion” of elements from the inputs, as when the blend contains only a single individual who is associated with the images of both input spaces, e.g. with the butcher from one space and the surgeon from the other” (Hart 2008, 4). The second process is described as follows:

Completion is the filling out of the pattern in the blend, evoked when structure projected from the input spaces matches information in long-term memory. For example, when we mentally project a butcher into an operating room, we end up introducing the notion of incompetence and/or malice into the scene as well, in order to make sense of the scene...In this way, the completion process is often a source of emergent content in the blend” (ibid).

As a third element:

Elaboration is the simulated mental performance of the event in the blend, which we may continue indefinitely. For instance, we might proceed from the image of a butcher carving a patient to the even more grotesque image of a butcher packaging the patient’s tissue as cold cuts. Once the connections to long term knowledge about operations and butchery have been made, we are able to imagine scenarios which unfold along various possible trajectories (ibid).

In terms of the metaphor analysis, particularly important is a notion of “selective projection”, which, according to Hart, “further contributes to the ideology of metaphor” (Hart 2008, 10). Namely, “where selective projection in conceptual blending networks is a pragmatic phenomenon, integration networks are constructed according to speakers’ communicative (and rhetorical) intentions. In other words, ideologically, speakers may choose to recruit particular structure in order to promote a certain perceived reality” (ibid, 11).⁶ Along these lines, a vital role in the creation of the blend is played by the third of the blending processes: *elaboration*, where “as a function of emergent structure in the blended space, metaphor is ‘cognitively real’...thus having absolute consequences for further cognitive processes: “blended spaces are sites for central cognitive work: reasoning..., drawing inferences..., and *developing emotions*” (italics mine) (Fauconnier and Turner 1996, 115 in Hart 2008, 11). This segment of emotion development shall be particularly important in the study of metaphors, since it shall demonstrate ways in which metaphors become the ideological tools for the creation of specific realities and evoking of particular emotions which potentially lead towards the emotionalisation of the public sphere in question. In discussing what makes a blend metaphoric, Grady et al. note a very interesting discussion in relation to the blending process

⁶ The “choice” that speakers make in selective projection need not necessarily be a conscious one but may be more intuitive, guided by a rhetorical or ideological intention.

specificities which contribute to the ideological tool application of metaphors, namely that “in metaphorical blends certain very salient aspects of input domain structure are prohibited from entering the blend, and some salient structure in the blended space is prevented from floating back to the inputs” (Grady et al 1999). That is, there is information from one of the inputs (the target) that must be ignored in the blend, e.g., in the example “The committee has kept me in the *dark* about this matter”, ignorance is not literally associated with darkness. An important feature of metaphorical fusion of counterparts, then, is that it involves overriding, and therefore not projecting, salient aspects of our knowledge of the target.

In the light of Critical Discourse Analysis and ideological use of metaphors, strategies particularly visible in discourse structures are *referential strategies*, which “are used in discourse to represent/construct social actors (participants) in a given scenario. Typically, this involves the construction and polarization of an in-group versus an out-group” (Hart 2008, 14). Such a strategy is achieved linguistically through categorization, and in the examples to follow, it shall be achieved through the use of metaphors. To the *referential strategy*, Hart adds an *evaluative strategy* “which is manifested in the negative representation of the out-group”, saying that apart from, e.g. the topoi of danger, number of displacement, “metaphor can also function as a standard argument realizing an *evaluative strategy* (ibid, 14). This is clearly visible in the example of right-wing discourse provided in Hart’s study, which shall serve as a model of the analysis to follow.

2.3 Data Corpus

The print media image of the High Representative shall be observed through the application of the listed theories on six daily and four weekly newspapers issued in different parts of BiH, which have the highest print run in the country. In the paper selection, I was governed by the fact that the BiH market has been divided along ethno-nationalist lines which results in the fact that specific papers primarily represent and report from the perspective of particular ethnic communities in BiH. In addition, the criteria used were readership and regional representation. Thus, the proposed papers are: *Oslobodjenje*, *Dnevni Avaz*, *Nezavisne Novine*, *Glas Srpske*, *Danas News Magazine*, *Dnevni list*, *BH Dani*, *Slobodna Bosna* and *Novi Reporter*.

Oslobodjenje is a daily newspaper with the longest tradition in BiH, world famous by its reporting in besieged Sarajevo. In terms of its political commitments, the paper regularly advocates stance of the BiH Socio-Democratic Party, together with supporting BiH's progress towards European integrations. However, it oftentimes addresses bitter criticism towards the inefficiencies of the High Representative's mandate in BiH. Since 2006, the majority owner of *Oslobodjenje* is *Sarajevska pivara* (Sarajevo Brewery), one of the oldest companies in BiH, which guarantees that "*Oslobodjenje* shall remain an independent, highly professional newspaper, open for dialog" (Two Respectable Companies Provide a Guarantee and Stability to *Oslobodjenje*).

Dnevni Avaz daily was launched in October 1995. Direct political support which the paper received from Alija Izetbegović, then the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of Democratic Action Party (SDA) is not a secret. In the interview for Sarajevo weekly magazine *Dani*, the owner of *Dnevni Avaz*, Fahrudin Radončić said:

I have to be honest – in order to create a huge Bosniak media system, Izetbegović gave me something which may not be measured by money: political support to the project, as well as his personal promotion of the paper, together with the promotion via SDA. If someone thinks that Izetbegović gave me one million in cash, I shall always say that he gave me one hundred million in political support (Pećanin 2007).

With such a political support, it did not take long before *Dnevni Avaz* imposed itself as the voice of the Bosniaks in BiH, defining and verbalizing their views via pro-Bosniak political rhetoric. According to its form of news, content presentation, and editorial complexity, the paper is the closest to a tabloid.⁷ The treatment of Dayton Peace Agreement anniversary in *Dnevni Avaz* has been mainly reduced to selective, informative news presentation and very little, or no research journalism. In spite of the fact that it is the paper with the highest print run in BiH (Media Plan 2000), this fact is less a result of its professional journalistic qualities, and more a direct consequence of the above mentioned political factors, as well as the economic and social influence of the *Avaz* owner, who, in the interview for *BH Dani*, on 30 March 2007, called himself "the Bosnian Donald Trump".

Nezavisne Novine daily was launched in 1998 in Banja Luka, with significant help of foreign donors, primarily US Government, and the initiative of the Republic of Srpska Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik. It was the first of the RS media which dared to criticize the political powers at

⁷ Tabloid originally means two things: small format and concentrically composed news and shorter texts with big titles, boxes and similar graphical-technical solutions, with lots of photographs. However, term «tabloid» has experienced a significant semantic move.

the time, and, as a result of this, Željko Kopanja, the founder and director of *Nezavisne Novine*, lost both legs when a bomb was set under his personal vehicle, on October 22nd 1999. This personal tragedy of Kopanja presented a direct, open attack on independent journalism, which did not stop the founder from advocating media freedom further on. Still, the paper's agenda has begun to change from 2005 onwards, with the visibly reduced criticism of the RS Government's work and the columns of its leading officials in the paper. A confirmation came after a very favorable RS Government offer in January 2008, where the RS daily paper *Glas Srpske*⁸ was sold to Željko Kopanja, with 10% share of *Integral Inžinjer*⁹, who offered only 1.2 million KMs for three *Glas* enterprises. According to the opinion of magazine *Dani*, this was a step which closed the circle of the RS media into "family-party-obeying-friendly-interest *integral* network" (Hadžović 2008).

Since March 2008, the majority owner of *Glas Srpske* is *Nezavisne Novine* consortium (*Glas Srpske sold to Nezavisne Novine*, 2008). According to Erjavec (2010), "in this regard, all of the *Glas Srpske* and *Nezavisne Novine* reporting may be observed as two sides of the same coin.

Dnevni List Mostar was published first time in October 2001, under the motto: "The first BiH newspaper in Croat Language". The slogan has changed into "Your Daily Newspaper", a commercial form targeting also the population not speaking the Croat language. The newspaper owner is National Holding d.o.o., which was also the publisher of the weekly *BH Danas*. The main interest of *Dnevni List* is still the interest of the Croat population in BiH, while, according to WordPress, *Dnevni List* today recognizes the framework of progress of the Croat population in BiH: If the situation improves for all -- guess: it shall improve for ALL!" (<http://sanela.info/ext/wp/sanela/linkovi/dnevni-list-mostar/>)

Weekly magazine *Danas* is published by National Holding d.o.o. seated in West Mostar.

The introductory page of the first issue of *Danas*, titled "The Croat Media and Jacques-Klein's Grandma"¹⁰ said that the reason for the establishment of *Danas* News Magazine "is based on the overall media inferiority of the Croat people in BiH. A need for a magazine of such a profile and content arose after SFOR¹¹ disintegrated a few Croat editorial boards, which resulted

⁸ The market value of *Glas Srpske* premises in Banja Luka city center was, in 2007, estimated at the value from 5 to 6 million KM.

⁹ An investment company close to the circles of Milorad Dodik and almost the only investor in RS.

¹⁰ Jacques Paul Klein was the OHR Principal Deputy High Representative from July 1997 to July 1999.

¹¹ Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

in a reduced range of Croat radio and TV stations at the Croat majority parts of BiH'. The paper ceased to be published in 2006.

Dani is a privately owned news magazine, launched in autumn 1992. It is owned by a private company belonging to Senad Pećanin, its editor-in-chief. The political focus of *Dani* is pretty leftist i.e. socio-democratic one, while the magazine prides in its independent editing policy, focus on civic and not national values. Although, according to Mark Thompson, supporters see the magazine as a beacon of professionalism, critics believe that the paper's owner set up *Dani* in a spirit of revenge against the government which sacked him, and that Pećanin team's reputation for editorial independence has been built at the expense of demoralizing the public (Thompson 1999, 245-246).

Slobodna Bosna is an investigative weekly newspaper based in Sarajevo, launched in autumn 1991. Its editor-in-chief, Senad Avdić, gathered, at that time, a team of young writers hungry for political scoops. In year 2000, it had an average circulation of 28.000 copies, making it the most widely read weekly news magazine in BiH. With plenty of research journalism, the magazine comments on the burning political topics, affairs related to BiH's war related past, and may be characterized as the leftist leaning periodical. The magazine editor-in-chief is the writer of some of the most brittle columns in BiH print media.

Reporter biweekly was formed at the beginning of 1997 in Banja Luka, and assumed a very critical stance towards the actions of the major part of the RS political establishment, and the OHR. This resulted in increasingly shrill attacks on the magazine's editorial policy by the authorities of Prime Minister Milorad Dodik. In 2003, Banja Luka edition of *Reporter* broke off from *the Reporter* publishing company in Belgrade, and founded "OG Press", continuing to publish the magazine as *Novi Reporter*. In spite of the above-mentioned clash between the magazine and the ruling RS authorities, the paper writing in 2005 did not indicate such a conflict. Instead, *Reporter* demonstrated a high level of agreement with and support to the RS Government's entity-protective politics, with unified writing in resistance to the constitutional changes directed towards the centralization of BiH institutions.

Although there is no reliable data on the circulation of most of the published papers, according to some assessments for 2001, "*Dnevni Avaz* has the highest circulation - approximately 40,000 copies - followed by *Oslobođenje* with 15,700 copies and *Jutarnje Novine* with a circulation of around 10,000 copies. *Nezavisne Novine* and *Glas Srpske* have some 7,500 and 7,200 copies

respectively”, (European Journalism Centre) In terms of the weeklies, “the circulation data is also based on assessments rather than exact information, as follows: *Slobodna Bosna* (circulation: 28,000), *Dani* (25,500) and *Novi Reporter* (10,000) (ibid). The data on circulation of most of the published papers is not publicly available since the papers’ management keeps the information “confidential” or overestimates it, holding the figures to be an indication of political power and a way to attract advertisers on a limited advertising market in BiH. Second reason why I chose the print media is various independent reports on the media freedom in Bosnia in Herzegovina, which, in 2007, marked a negative trend. In the report on the democratic development in Eastern Europe and Eurasia “Countries in Transition 2008”, prepared by the America NGO “Freedom House”, media freedom rating in BiH dropped from 4.00 to 4.25 (on the scale from 1 to 7, 1 being the best and 7 the worst rating). According to the *Freedom House*:

The developments in 2008 indicated that the public broadcasters were less willing to comply with demands of political power holders, while print media were much more open to biased reporting. In fact, it was sometimes difficult to identify who was controlling whom—did politicians control major print outlets by co-opting them in pushing their political agendas, or did the outlet owners have even greater influence over politicians, using these “alliances” to support their private interests? (Jelišić 2008)

According to the Media Sustainability Index Report 2008, the overall score for B&H declined noticeably from 2.90 in 2006 to 2.64 in 2008, where professional journalism showed the weakest performance.¹² In addition, the report panelists pointed out that two conglomerates control the biggest national dailies *Dnevni Avaz* and *Oslobođenje* and that the print media were the most cited for ethical violations. Thus, the analysis of the print media writing on the High Representative in BiH and the reaction to his reform initiatives may prove very symptomatic of the negative print media trends particularly demonstrated in 2007 and 2008. The corpus selected for the print media analysis is divided in two parts. The first part includes articles, namely interviews, research articles, press conference reports and columns related to the 10th anniversary of Dayton Peace Agreement, published in the second half of 2005. The second part of the corpus includes articles published in the time period from September 2007 to April 2008, namely those covering the reform initiatives introduced by the High Representative Miroslav Lajčak. The excerpts selected for analysis were primarily based on the occurrence of

¹² Some of the professional journalism indicators were the following: “Reporting is fair, objective and well resourced; Journalist follow recognized and accepted ethical standards; and journalists and editors do not practice self-censorship.”

the following phrases: “Dayton Peace Agreement”, “Office of the High Representative”, “Paddy Ashdown”, “International Community”, “High Representative”, “Constitutional Reform”, “Miroslav Lajčák”, “Police Reform”. The selection was narrowed down based on the article relevance to the topic in question, and the level of elaboration offered in the article. However, the later was not a decisive factor since various levels of elaboration in the selected articles demonstrate important difference in the approach by the individual print media. The analysis process shall run by articles, where each metaphor use shall be analyzed through the application of CDA and the conceptual blending theory. The final results of the analysis shall be presented in discussion, where I shall try to establish the results in relation to particular political directions of the print media, as well as joint metaphors used in these media. Since the topic of my thesis is the public image of the High Representative in BiH print media, I shall take a look at what these results tell us on the social picture of the High Representative and his political arbitrary role in BiH.

3 Analysis of BiH Print Media Reporting on 10th Dayton Anniversary and Reform Actions of the High Representative

The first chapter in the main section of the dissertation provides the analysis of the use of metaphors in the print media reporting on the 10th anniversary of Dayton Peace Accords. The results shall be presented by newspapers, whereby a concise picture shall be given of the application of metaphors in each paper, together with their stance on Dayton Peace Accords, and the role which is played by metaphors in the process of emotionalisation of public sphere in BiH.

The second chapter provides the analysis of the use of metaphors in the print media reporting on the reform actions of the High Representative in September 2007 to April 2008 period. The analysis shall be divided in two subsections, and shall include the following reform initiatives:

- BiH Police Force reform, and
- Amendments to the Rulebook of the BiH Parliament Work Procedure.

Results of each analysis shall be presented separately, and shall follow the time sequence, starting with the HR's police reform proposal in September 2007 to the adoption of the Police Reform Law in April 2008.


3.1 10th Anniversary of Dayton Peace Accords

3.1.1 Oslobođenje

In April 2005, in the column titled »A Crying Circus«, *Oslobođenje* journalist Mirko Šagolj uses a few strong visual metaphors from two domains differing from the primary topic of the given article, which is the political situation in BiH in 2005, and the role of Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative at the time, who was at the end of his mandate. The first domain is the house domain or semantic field where, referring to the 10th anniversary of Dayton Accords, the author quoted the former HR Deputy in BiH, Donald Hays, who said that there is only "a façade" of the Bosnian state which exists. This is a very stark and direct visual representation of the country, which, in the third, *elaboration* phase of the blending process may provide a simulated mental performance of an indefinite series of images. Along these lines, BiH is metaphorically


presented as a house which is supposed to provide warmth and roof over the heads of its inhabitants, namely the BiH citizens. However, what we see here is only “a façade” of the country, which means that it leaves its dwellers vulnerable to all kinds of outside influences, including rain, stark weather, storms....evoking in reader’s mind the imagery of cold, hunger, lack of security, warmth, and basic living utilities. Thus, the mental process leads readers to conclude that Bosnia has not been a good mother, but a mother who leaves its children to the mercy of the outside world and perils they have to face on a daily basis.

Figure 3.1.1 The conceptual blending network for the statement “There is only a façade of the BiH State left”



A second meaning implied in the same metaphor is lack of organization and structure which BiH suffers from, since it has only “the outside walls” and no consistent, secure, established system from the inside which any “secure house”, namely developed and democratic country has to have. The second domain is the circus domain, where BiH is metaphorically described as “the crying circus”. The notion of “circus” is very effective in discourse terms since, through the blending process, it evokes in reader’s imagination a set of visual images of a traveling group which, contrary to a notion of a stable state, conveys lack of stability and notion of change. In the same tone, the High Representative is described as “the leading entertainer in the circus arena”. The conceptual blending network shall work as follows:

Figure 3.1.2 Conceptual blending network for interaction of “the crying circus” and “the leading entertainer in the circus arena”



In other words, the meaning implied by the abovementioned metaphor of the High Representative is described in the following text:

The worst thing which could befall BiH until the next parliamentary elections would be to extend Paddy Ashdown's mandate...However, it seems no other person is crazy enough to overtake a responsibility for such a chaos in which Ashdown has brought BiH (Šagolj 2005).

Thus, a crucial blend of two metaphors which takes place in the same article is the one between “the crying circus” and “the leading entertainer in the circus arena”. The effectiveness of the given HR’s political engagement in BiH is undermined to the extent that it is equalized to the role of a circus entertainer, who is not even capable to entertain the audience, but, instead, makes them cry. Thus, his job is described as a total, “double” failure: failure of an HR and a failure of “an entertainer”. Thus, becoming “cognitively real”, the metaphor shall lead to the development of particular emotions drawn from the inferences contained in the given blending process.

Negative other-representation of the High Representative continues a few months later, in the article written after the High Representative’s farewell address before the UN Security Council. The article bears a significant title: “Trash is swiped under the carpet”, where:

The grandiloquence of the High Representative in front of the Security Council and assigning success to the Washington negotiations which have not even been held – are a proof that trash, even when it gets swiped under the carpet, remains in the house (Bakšić 2005).

The domain used here is “the house domain”, which, in this case, deals with the notion of the house interior. Namely, the used metaphor projects a familiar image of cleaning a house and swiping the house floors to the political actions of the HR. The particular discourse construction leads a reader to a conclusion that it is generally good and desirable to remove dirt from the house, not just lazily swipe it under the carpet and leave it there. However, the HR does not keep things clear and clean. Instead, his political actions serve only for his own promotion, and the whole political context in the country where he lives and works is just a backdrop for his own “glory”, while the HR does not care whether his professional credibility is a result of his fruitful work in managing “the house”, or a result of his professional negligence which is “hidden under the carpet”. In addition, such an action implies that an individual performing it hides undesirable facts from the public, and is, thus, a person with a murky and non credible character.


The *Oslobođenje* column from 20 November 2005 echoes a lamenting and nostalgic tone of the state of facts in BiH, where the whole concept of “BiH as a State” is an illusion, which never existed. The domain or semantic field out of which the metaphors are drawn is “the NSK State” domain¹³, which creates a very interesting metaphorical construction.

By annihilating the overestimated significance of the Dayton Peace Accords at the time, the author draws a parallel between the 10th Dayton Anniversary and the concert of the famous Slovenian band *Laibach* which took place in Sarajevo National Theater on 20th November 2005, on the eve of the signing of Dayton Accords. The established link is raised to the symbolic level, since the prominent philosophy of Laibach’s public engagement is “to create a Utopia, which shall last” (Ožegović 2007). In this regard, during the concert, Laibach and NSK group promoted NSK State Sarajevo, while, “during the course of the event, the premises of NSK State Sarajevo were visited by more than 5000 people” (NSK Država Sarajevo). Since Neue Slowenische Kunst or NSK state in time does not recognize the categories of fixed territory and the national border principle, and, as an ideal form of a state, is far from reality,

¹³ Neue Slowenische Kunst or NSK state in time does not recognize the categories of fixed territory and the national border principle, and presents an ideal form of a state. Neither formal government nor Central Committee does exist. There are only citizens, engineers, bureaucrats and executors, who deal with technical issues – virtually sustain Utopia. The State is founded on self-governance, independence, but also on active co-existence. It operates as a parasite within the existing systems and bodies. Besides the members of various NSK groups, citizenship may be obtained by people of different religions, races, nationalities and points of view. The passport is numbered and non-transferable, and its validity period is limited, while it may be renewed. Source: < <http://www.nacional.hr/clanak/31030/novi-cd-laibacha-ruga-se-nacionalnim-himnama> >

the columnist draws a parallel saying that Dayton BiH is NSK: “When I think twice, there is no difference between NSK State Sarajevo and Dayton BiH in which we live today. Both are pure illusion” (Kurtović 2005). In the conceptual blending network, the process could be described as follows:


Figure 3.1.3 Conceptual blending network for “NSK State Sarajevo”



Thus, the principles established in Dayton Peace Accords are as realistic as NSK state is, so that the completion phase of the blend introduces the notion that Dayton BiH is not a realized state, but rather a nostalgic projection of what the author would like it to be. At the level of emotion development, this fact may evoke sorrow and longing in the mind of the reader.

The *Oslobođenje* article from 15 February 2005 quotes the former Member of BiH Presidency and the former President of the Federation of BiH, Ejup Ganić. As a renowned academician, he was invited to take part in the Fifth World Summit on Efficient Leadership and Management of the Countries in Development which took place that same year, where Ganić stated that Dayton Agreement has become “the bottleneck” of BiH’s entry into European integrations, and “the obstacle” to this very process. The use of the obstacle domain, namely these two metaphors imply the interrupted flow of the European integrations processes in BiH, which inferred that the Accords have to be amended for the obstacle to be removed and for the situation to return to normality.

Figure 3.1.4 Conceptual blending network for “bottleneck” and “obstacle”



3.1.2 Dnevni Avaz

Dnevni Avaz was another advocate of constitutional changes in BiH, particularly voicing the message to establish a unified state with strong central government, which would, among the rest, imply the abolishment of the two entities. Along these lines, ample interviews were held with various foreign diplomats who advocated changes to Dayton Constitution, and whose role in the process, including Paddy Ashdown's, is placed into positive semantic context. In addition to this, the interview titles reflect the superordinate position of the foreign diplomats, out of which they issue orders and provide advice to BiH officials. Thus, in November 2005, *Avaz* cites the speech of the US State Secretary held at the festive lunch for 200 BiH officials which was hosted in Washington DC. In her address, Condoleezza Rice used a few metaphors from the “leadership” domain, where, as first, she called Paddy Ashdown “a great leader”, and called BiH not only “a passive user of aid” but “a peace builder all over the world”. As a shift from the metaphors used in *Oslobođenje*, the image of “a great leader” and BiH as “a peace builder in the world” constructs two mental spaces which create an idealized picture of BiH as a success story which is far from reality, namely creating a picture of a progressive country with a progressive leader.

countries. The emotional response such a domain may elicit with the reader is very strong and very negative.

Just two days later, *Avaz* published another interview with Ashdown, who, again in a dominant position, assumes a harsh tone towards BiH missing its opportunity to start the negotiations with European Union. Reason for such a reaction was that Republic of Srpska National Assembly decided not to accept the police reform measures based on three European principles, and, thus rejected “the way to Europe” (Numanović, 8 October, 2005). The author uses two domains, “the door” domain and “the dark province” domain, with a series of conceptual metaphors, where the RS shall remain behind the shut EU doors, and be secluded from the positive EU integrations processes. “The RSNA had in its hands the key for entry into Europe but it threw it off” (ibid). This metaphor leads us to conclude that the doors of Europe will remain closed for the RS and BiH, while this action has such an impact on the RS that “it is becoming the dark *vilaet* of Europe”. Where Republic of Srpska entity and the dark *vilaet*¹⁴ become fused, a part of knowledge in the conceptual frame for dark *vilaet* is that it is *terra deserta* or a spiritual desert, which was, according to some historical records, particularly believed to be true for Bosnia at the time of the Ottoman rule (Periša 2007). Thus, since blended spaces are sites for central cognitive work, this metaphor leads to the drawing of inference that a dark *vilaet* is not a place to visit, namely is a place which remains secluded from civilization, since only dark forces and evil spirits live in it. In addition to this, the *elaboration* phase of the blend enables one to imagine all kinds of scenarios which could unfold in the given blend. Such a topos of difference marks some social actors positive and some negative, all in terms of their position towards the European integrations process, and the steps taken or not taken on the European path for BiH.

In the article titled “Your country will finally be on the right course towards Europe” (*Avaz* 2005), *Avaz* translates the message of the UK Ambassador in BiH, where he uses the travel, namely voyage domain to explain the BiH's course in the EU integrations process. What Rycroft said is that the start of EU negotiations process with BiH shall be “the start of BiH's voyage towards Europe”. As Kai Mikonnen explained in her research paper, “The different stages of travel--departure, voyage, encounters on the road, and return--provide any story with


¹⁴ Pursuant to “The Dictionary of Foreign Words and Expressions” of Milan Vujaklija- a word “vilajet” (arabic *wilaya*, turkish *vilayet*) means: place of birth, countryside; county, province, a region headed by *valija* (in Turkey).

a temporal structure that raises certain expectations of things to happen” (Mikonnen 2007). The same is the case in this example. There are expectations and challenges which BiH must face in this transition process towards Europe, where “voyage” is directed to the point and a moment in time when BiH shall enter Europe, and reach its final destination.

3.1.3 *Nezavisne Novine*

On the 10th anniversary of Dayton Peace Agreement, *Nezavisne Novine* mainly relied on press conference reports, news agency reports, interviews based on question-answer form and “the forum”, i.e. one page devoted to readers’ opinions, where the prevailing authors were regular NN columnists and editors, and not the ordinary citizens, as one would expect. In the interview from 7th October 2005, Ashdown removes the negative legacy of the RS because of the fact that it adopted the police reform proposal. However, the domain used in the article is again “the policeman” domain, where the European Commission is “the policeman” who shall control further police reform processes, and, in case any blockades take place, shall demonstrate its dominance in the form of “no entry into EU” for BiH, “halt to the SAA negotiations with BiH” and “stoppage of the BiH accession process into the EU” (Čubro 2005). Such a rhetoric has a single common trait, that of the seclusion which BiH is to suffer if the police reform processes do not continue, whereby the European Commission is “the guardian” of BiH’s prosperity, in charge of regulation and control of the affairs in the country, where the accomplishment of European integrations reform tasks for BiH is presented as the maintenance of law and order, implying that such an agenda only is the proper contributor to the public welfare of BiH citizens, under the control of the European Commission. Along the same lines, *Nezavisne Novine* quoted Ashdown’s statement from the Geneva Conference on BiH which took place in 2005, where Ashdown expected that the SAA negotiations would make BiH a new country, namely “a promised land”. The use of the Biblical domain bears strong imagery of a better place, a place with novelty and fresh ideas, a place with a chance to start anew and populate the fertile, unpopulated land with prosperity, abundance and welfare for everyone. At the same time, through the blending process, such imagery gives birth to a series of emotions related to the positive associations of the European Union and the negotiations processes which lead towards the European “doors”.

Figure 3.1.6 Conceptual blending network for “a promised land”



This example also shows us that what tends to be perceived as common sense in the European discourse, in fact contains sediment and conventional metaphorical structures which have become so “naturalized” in daily political discourse in BiH that their deeper implications remain almost invisible to an ordinary reader, while the blending process, by its very nature, happens momentarily in the process itself.

Similar tone, contained in the *Nezavisne Novine* column from 21st November, is addressed to the local nationalist politicians, namely directly to the Serb Member of BiH Presidency, Nebojša Radmanović who still supports the fact that the concept of three members of BiH Presidency from three constituent peoples should remain in BiH. Trying to decipher and establish the cause for *status quo* in BiH political scene, the columnist uses the cattle domain, and the metaphor commonly used in BiH social discourse, namely that people are “an ugly herd, which you can pull in whichever direction you like and pull them for whatever part of the body you like” (Fetahagić 2005). This statement evokes the knowledge stored of a herd as a group of cattle of a single kind kept together for a specific purpose which have to be controlled, and may be ordered on how to behave and which direction to take. Further on in the text, the point becomes clear when the author claims that “if one talks to the people day after next that being homosexual is good, half of them would turn into gays” (ibid). Thus, BiH population is debased in individual terms and depicted only as a group free of any thought and ready to embrace any idea as ridiculous as it may seem, as long as it comes from the nationalist politician(s) in power.

One of the most favorable domains used in the general and *Nezavisne Novine* discourse of Paddy Ashdown in relation to the Dayton Agreement is the domain of voyage, where Ashdown's goal is to "set BiH on its way to Europe", pointing out that "the voyage ahead of us is very long" (Popović and Raduški 2005). As mentioned earlier, this metaphor raises expectations and challenges which BiH must face, where this metaphor is well applied to the BiH political context, and "voyage" course directed to the point in time when BiH shall enter European Union, and reach its final destination. In Ashdown's discourse on BiH, this domain is effectively combined with the metaphor of Europe as a house in which BiH does not dwell. In Ashdown's words, "Dayton Accords brought BiH in front of the European doors, at which stage Dayton loses its purpose" (Risojević 2005). Thus, the message is clear. BiH shall not enter the European house until the amendments to Dayton Accords, i.e. BiH Constitution shall take place. The house domain implies that Europe is a private dwelling, where the resident only permits certain individuals to enter the house or remain at the door, and BiH is one of the individuals who shall remain out, not deserving to cross the threshold. As Hart importantly notes, the blended space is not only the site of reasoning but also for developing emotions, a notion of BiH as an outsider, or an outcast in this case, may well elicit specific emotional responses which are directly linked to the experience of seclusion and ghettoisation of BiH citizens in the European arena.


Wednesday columns of Anton Kasipović, the RS Minister of Culture and Sports, consider the political leaders of all three nationalities in BiH equally responsible for the *status quo*. Relating to the failed Washington negotiations, Kasipović uses "narcotics" and "private property" domains, out of which he draws a series of metaphors to describe the abovementioned political leaders. In the column titled "Nationalist Narcotics Dealers", Kasipović's description of their political actions is the following:

Washington negotiators do not negotiate, but wage a war. Being arrogant in the Balkan way, humanely irresponsible and overbearing, once their stance is not accepted, party leaders leave meetings, conceiving that they may treat the rest of the world as they treat us (Kasipović 2005).

Picturesque metaphors which Kasipović uses to express incompetence and arrogance of the BiH politicians in power is that "BiH is their private property, while we, citizens, only live on it. All of us are in collective accommodation" (ibid). To round off the picture, the author states that "we are all addicts, ready for asylum and voluntary work" (ibid). The cohesive interaction of these three metaphors may produce a blending network as described in the figure below.

BiH, as the property of the “nationalist narcotics dealers”, is a closed entity, while all of the citizens, being addicts, are placed in collective accommodation, which suggests this could be a hospital or an immigration center for asylum seekers. The metaphor of “dealers” leads us to conceptualize the corrupt nature of the governing politicians’ morale and activities, who are primarily governed by their own financial interests, even if these interests and practices both physically and financially destroy the people to whom they distribute the “narcotics”. In addition, the imagery used implies that BiH citizens do not live in a proper home, but in a temporary lodging out of which they could be deported or removed at any time, drawing the inference that these are far from stable and satisfactory living conditions for a citizen of any country, including BiH.

Figure 3.1.7 Conceptual blending network for interaction of “nationalist narcotics dealers”, “private property” and “addicts”




Negative-other representation of BiH political leaders is also depicted in the column from 29th December, where the secondary domain used is “the idiot” domain, with BiH politicians are called “idiots” and “barbarians”. “At the end of 2005, it is obvious that visible progress has been achieved. Our barbarians have turned into idiots, and ten years after Dayton, we are the victims of idiotic politics of our leaders” (Simić 2005). Under the risk that it may sound too rough, Simić calls BiH citizens “the followers of idiotic policies” (ibid), while the author’s treasury of attributes for BiH, and particularly RS politicians is very rich. He calls them “bigwigs”, and their way of ruling as “stuffing of their own pockets” and “naked struggle for

power”. As a result of such a ruling, 2005 is assessed as “a gloomy year”, which, as author states, is also the achievement of Paddy Ashdown, “who has not made us happy this year either” (ibid). The given example creates a clear link between “the idiots” and “their idiotic policies”, which are suggested to be corruptive and hypocritical. According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, word “idiot” (Etymology: Middle English, from Anglo-French *ydiole*, from Latin *idiotus* ignorant person) is usually offensive, and means a person affected with extreme mental retardation, or a foolish, a stupid person.

Making citizens the followers of such politics, the author transfers to them at least a part of such characteristics, and makes them one of the factors responsible for the present situation – also referring to general social apathy and desperation. In addition to this, BiH citizens are also victims of the idiotic policies of their rulers, which implies their subordinate position in the ratio of forces. The adjective “gloomy” adds a final touch to the picture, projecting the images of darkness, dread, hopelessness and pessimism, which engulfed the country in 2005, and left just a tiny bit of hope that 2006 elections may bring some positive change in BiH political arena.

Figure 3.1.8 Conceptual blending network for “idiots and barbarians”, “stuffing of own pockets” and “victims”



3.1.4 Danas weekly

While political themes dominate the writing of the weekly magazine *Danas*, interview is a journalist genre used very commonly. Generally speaking, current political themes are dealt by providing sound context, while writing on constitutional changes in BiH is primarily based on interviews with and messages of the Croat politicians in BiH.

As a difference from *Dnevni Avaz* and *Nezavisne Novine*, *Danas* journalists do not refrain from placing harsh critique on the High Representative and his office, when it sides with or favors the current constitutional arrangement which is judged as unfavorable for the Croat population in BiH. In the article from 6th October, *Danas* publishes a daring statement of William Montgomery¹⁵, who diagnoses the political climate in BiH, and discloses a concerning superordinate approach of the international community towards the local political parties. Montgomery said that:

Almost certainly, less than half the BiH population advocates the existence of BiH or feels any loyalty towards the country...All of those living in the region know it is true, but they also know that it is such a blasphemy for the international community that a few people dare to say it loud. The elected BiH politicians who did so were removed from their posts...Others simply learned that it is simpler to repeat the key words which the international community wants to hear, rather than say what you really mean (Blažević 2005)

In November 2005, in the interview for *Danas*, Ivo Komšić, the ex Croat member of BiH Presidency who was involved in 1994 negotiations on internal organization of BiH, and the member of the Croat Peoples' Council Governing Board¹⁶ is openly against the establishment of the third, Croat entity, and provides several arguments to support his stance, saying that “the Croats need European living standards, and not the Middle Age standards of cultural isolationism and economic lethargy” (Blažević 2005). Thus, using the Middle Ages domain, the rhetorical intent of the speaker is to convey that he does not advocate seclusion and separation of BiH Croats within the borders of BiH, but suggests that only through life in multiethnic and multicultural community as BiH is, together with the other nationalities, the Croats will achieve their full rights, hereby named “the European living standards”. On the contrary, what the establishment of the third entity would create for Croats is metaphorically

¹⁵ US Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Bosnian Peace Implementation from January 1996 to September 1997.


⁴¹ BiH Croat Peoples' Council is a non-governmental organization particularly engaged in fight for equality and constituency of all peoples in BiH, and takes part in discussions of Croat political parties on BiH constitutional changes. HNV advocates entity abolishment and decentralized state organization which shall not harm the country's functionality and its accession into EU.

depicted as “the Middle age standards”, which, through the blending process, projects the imagery of “the Dark ages”.¹⁷ As described below, the term's more usual and pejorative sense is of a period of intellectual darkness and barbarity, which is implied in this case. Thus, it is clear that this is the period which the BiH Croats would end up in if they were to vote for the third entity option in the existing political arrangements in BiH.

As regards the failed negotiations in Washington in November 2005, *Danas* provides an exclusive interview with the Croat National Community Vice-president, Mate Bandur, who was involved in the negotiations. The bolded interview title posits USA as the protector of the BiH Croats' equality in BiH, which is implicitly endangered: “In Washington, USA guaranteed equality to BiH Croats” (Blažević 2005). Bandur is also against the introduction of the third entity, whereby, using “the trap” domain, he names this option as “a trap” set by the Serb side, which would cement the position of the RS Entity, and make the Croats “a lightning conductor” for success or failure of anyone and anything in BiH.”(ibid). In this context, there is an interaction taking place between these two metaphors, since the establishment of “a trap” would lead to “a lightning conductor” position of BiH Croats. Both of these metaphors convey vulnerability and the unfavorable position of the Croat population in BiH, and cunningness of Republic of Srpska Entity, which wants to sell its own political agenda as the Croat one, and thus confirm its political status in BiH. The blending network may be constructed as follows:

¹⁷ The concept of a Dark Age was created in the 1330s by the Italian scholar Petrarch (Francesco Petrarca), who regarded the centuries since the fall of Rome as “dark” compared to the light of classical antiquity. Later historians expanded the term to refer to the transitional period between Roman times and the High Middle Ages, including not only the lack of Latin literature, but also a lack of contemporary written history, general demographic decline, limited building activity and material cultural achievements in general. Popular culture has further expanded on the term as a vehicle to depict the Middle Ages as a time of backwardness, extending its pejorative use and expanding its scope (“Wikipedia”).

Figure 3.1.9 Conceptual blending network for “a trap” and “a lightning conductor”



Such rhetoric clearly presupposes an unfavorable position of BiH Croats in BiH political arena, while they yearn for topos of equality, i.e. “egalitarianism”, “sovereignty” and “constituency” on the whole BiH territory. One of the strongest analytical journalists in *Danas* was Pejo Gašparević, a prominent journalist, publicist and political commentator, who had a serious, analytical grip of the constitutional reform issue, and identified the main setbacks among the Croat politicians in BiH. On 20th February 2005, he writes that “the Croats in BiH, both with *their own goals*, and the carelessness of the international community, were brought to the situation of inevitable political steps which have to be taken for protection of their existence” (Gašparević 2005). In the same tone, “the current situation requires a *shake up of consciousness*” (ibid). The first italicized metaphor comes from the football domain, whereby our knowledge teaches us that besides the definition of “own goal” as a goal scored by a player accidentally playing the ball into his own team's net, own goal also means any action that results in disadvantage to the person who took it or to his or her associates. In terms of BiH Croats, this “own goal” may also be fatal for the destiny of the Croat community, which this community brought upon itself. This is also a paradox which well conveys the poor politics of the Croat political leaders in BiH and the criticality of the situation. In addition, activity of “a shake up of consciousness” implies vigorous action, namely “drastic rearrangement or reorganization” of the consciousness of the Croat leaders in BiH. While the verb “shake up” conveys thoroughness and urgency of the action, the lexis “consciousness” implies depth, and mental, personal level of one’s person, being defined as “the quality or state of being aware

especially of something within oneself, and the state of being characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, and thought” (Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary). Thus, the rhetorical intent of this metaphor suggests that the Croat community in BiH needs to reexamine its roots at the level of its existing social, cultural, and historical parameters, namely to reexamine its own identity in the BiH political and other relevant contexts.

Relating to the constitutional changes, another *Danas* journalist, Josip Blažević writes in November 2005 that these amendments will be “of cosmetic nature” (Blažević 2005). What this metaphor implies is that, from the point of view of the author, the constitutional changes advocated by the US administration would cement “the territorial exclusiveness of one nationality /read the BiH Serbs/, and the institutional domination of another one /read the Bosniaks/ in BiH. In such a situation, the ideological positioning of BiH Croats as losers has a strong effect on the ear and the mind of the reader. What it implies is that the political positioning of Croats shall be put at peril with such “cosmetic changes”. Such changes, at the level of mental projection, introduce the notion of professional superficiality and lack of serious, strategic approach on the part of individuals responsible for introduction of such historically important changes. Instead, those individuals play games in the process, and, moreover, play games with the political future of the Croat population in BiH. Pursuant to the *elaboration* stage in the blending theory, the simulated mental performance of the event may lead to a series of scenarios which could develop as a result of the action which is the subject of the blend, and which would be negative in the view of thorough constitutional changes which would guarantee equal position of BiH Croats in the country, but which are not in sight.

3.1.5 BH Dani


On the 10th anniversary of Dayton Peace Accords, *Dani* did not spare either the OHR and its High Representative (HR), or the BiH ruling nationalist parties of its brittle critique. In the very first sentence of the editor’s column titled “A chicken or an egg?” (Pećanin 2005), Pećanin uses the “chicken and egg” domain and plays with it to establish a higher semantic level link between the Bonn authorities of the High Representative and the survival of BiH. As Garner explained, “The seemingly tautological question of whether the domestic chicken (*Gallus domesticus*) or the egg (*Gallus prezygoticos*) first emerged in evolutionary history has often

been visited by many speakers. This enduring debate has manifested itself as a metaphor for a circumstance or a condition in which no clear causal or temporal ordering can be determined” (Garner 2003). The metaphor is used in the following context:

I still do not know which came first, the chicken or the egg, but I am sure that the reduction in the High Representative’s authorities before the cryingly needed substantial constitutional changes is the safest way of maintaining the *status quo* of agony – the status in which the European perspective of this country has been kidnapped by criminals and nationalists of the brotherly SDA-SDS-HDZ coalition (ibid).

The use of metaphors in the given domain strongly emphasizes the crucial point of the HR’s authorities in BiH. Namely, it implies that even if the answer to this seemingly tautological question of evolutionary nature still puzzles the minds of many, including the author himself, Pećanin is dead certain of one thing: BiH, with the present constitution, cannot survive without the High Representative’s rule of law. Moreover, this statement is strengthened with the use of the “criminal” domain, whereby BiH “is kidnapped by criminals and nationalists” (ibid). The verb kidnap, as defined in Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, means “to seize and detain or carry away by unlawful force or fraud and often with a demand for ransom”. Such a construction is an example of the topos of danger, where BiH as a country is a victim of “criminals”. Stored into one’s conceptual frame for criminals is that they have committed a serious offense and violated a law, namely committed an unlawful activity, while, in the context of BiH, such individuals have often committed, or have been involved in a series of offences. The use of noun “nationalists” next to criminals implies that these are the people of similar, dubious profiles whose activities have put at stake the progress of BiH. In addition, the concept of kidnapping implies ransom, and, in the case of BiH, the message is that all of the BiH citizens shall pay this ransom.

Figure 3.1.10 Conceptual blending network for interaction of “to kidnap” and “criminals”




In the same column, the editor uses a “patient” domain with a set of metaphors, which fit the overall picture of the problem raised in the text. Namely, “Dayton Constitution and the character of SDA-SDS-HDZ government have made of BiH *a heavy, chronic patient*: its life is not in danger, but it is not capable of living a normal life independently. The international community has taken over a role of *a doctor* who shall cure BiH and put it back on its feet” (ibid). In this blending network, emergent structure arises in the blended space in which the counter-part elements of BiH and a patient, and the international community and a doctor become fused. Since BiH is a chronic patient, the implications are that the healing process is to last very long, and, following this analogy, a series of scenarios could develop in the “healing” process. Apart from these potential scenarios, the author explains the state of facts in the country, using the same vehicle metaphors:

High Representative is in the role of the doctor in charge of curing a chronic patient. If recovery does not follow the expected trend and does not give the expected results, it does not mean that the patient should be left uncured: one should change either the doctor or the therapy. In our concrete case – the best would be to change both (ibid).

The rhetoric intent of such a discourse is very clear. The OHR and its political strategy in BiH is both inadequate and damaging to the process of recovery and the establishment of democratic processes in BiH, which is clearly visible in association of the given metaphors, and their selected features, with the political reality in BiH.

Figure 3.1.11 Conceptual blending network for interaction of “a chronic patient”, “a doctor” and “a therapy”



In the magazine section “Politics and life”, *Dani* published *Theses on BiH Future* which Žarko Papić¹⁸ presented on the Dayton conference in Geneva. In the third thesis, advocating the urgent reform of the OHR’s role and mandate, Papić uses “the Bermuda Triangle” domain and says that “the described ‘structural’ weaknesses of the Constitution, ethnically based political parties and the “protectorate” power of the OHR constitute the three points of “the Bermuda triangle” into which BiH is sinking” (Papić 2005). According to Wikipedia:

The Bermuda Triangle, also known as the Devil's Triangle, is a region in the western part of the North Atlantic Ocean in which a number of aircraft and surface vessels are alleged to have mysteriously disappeared and cannot be explained as human error, piracy, equipment failure, or natural disasters. Popular culture has attributed some of these disappearances to the paranormal, a suspension of the laws of physics, or activity by extraterrestrial being (Wikipedia).

The three elements listed in the article are directly related to the status of facts in BiH in 2005, namely point to the problematic arrangements established and defined in Dayton Accords. The author is of the opinion that three of the listed elements constituting this “Bermuda Triangle” are drowning BiH to the bottom of the ocean. The fatality of the metaphor projected into the blending process implies that, unless quick interventions take place, BiH, as a country, shall be irretrievably lost. Thus, the blending process produces the emergent structure in which the three elements create an ongoing event, or a process whereby the functioning of BiH as a state

¹⁸ Žarko Papić, PhD, is the Director of the Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues in BiH (IBHI), whose objectives, among the rest, are to identify opportunities for more efficient action by the international community and to make practical, action-oriented proposals that promote the well-being of people.

shall be possible only if the Constitution is reformed and the HR's role is transformed. If this change does not take place, BiH shall have slim chances of integrating into EU and stimulating its internal integration, because, in Papić's words: "Time is not an ally either to BiH or Europe" (ibid).

On the eve of the 10th Dayton Accords Anniversary, referring back to the political *status quo* in BiH from 1995 onwards, Ivan Lovrenović¹⁹ places Dayton into negative semantic context and uses the domain of lunacy. In the column titled "Ten dead years", Lovrenović discusses a visually powerful metaphor of Dayton which was introduced by the former OHR High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, which he considers "the strongest and the most impressive metaphor of the whole Dayton arrangement of BiH", namely that "Dayton is a lunatic shirt" (Lovrenović 2005). Lovrenović elaborates on the implication of such a metaphor as follows:

If Dayton is a lunatic shirt, than its bearer, BiH, is a *disturbed* structure (and, accordingly, the one who put the shirt on – the manager of the great international political *psihuska*²⁰). This, then, explains very well why the unreserved and absolute freeing of "the patient" is not recommended: What kind of monster could come into view if his shirt were to be totally untied and thrown off! (ibid)

Such a powerful structure conveys the rhetorical intentions which carry a paradox of BiH being named "a lunatic shirt" by those who, cynically, announced this "diagnosis" only after they completed their "very well paid Bosnian mandates" (ibid). Along these lines, the use of the given metaphors in the column, through the blending process, composes a strong simulated mental performance of the event in the blend, which may continue along a whole series of scenarios. In our case, these scenarios may potentially come out of "the freeing of the patient", and a fact of what would happen if the complete "monster", hiding behind the lunatic shirt, would come out. What if this creature started to attack everything and everyone in its surroundings? What if the physical state of the monster were so poor and desperate, that no one would be ready to deal with it or treat it in some way? This is what the underlying message conveys. The politicians would rather keep the asylum doors where "the lunatic" dwells firmly shut. Using the leadership domain, Lovrenović's column from May 2005 is full of brittle criticism towards Ashdown and his passing mandate in BiH, which is backed up by "lush" lexical choices. Using a series of ironic metaphors, Ashdown is called "the Bosnian Governor", "the new international master" and "the personification of the international top class,

¹⁹ A renowned Sarajevo writer, editor and journalist, one of the founders and editors of magazine *Dani*.

²⁰ Psychiatric prison

unmasked, primitive leadership” (ibid). In the column peak, a sign of equation is drawn between Ashdown and the term “a Balkan politician”, which bears heavy negative connotations, reflecting all of the dishonorable characteristics a politician may have. All of these metaphors demonstrate supremacy, combined with the negative images of leadership. In this tone, “Governor” is a term used to denote different meanings. According to the Croatian Language Portal, “a governor is the one who acts as the ruler of state administration in a province (e.g. in the Roman provinces), colonies etc” (Hrvatski jezični portal). This term was commonly used in the historical books describing the Bosnian rulers during the Ottoman era, and implies political supremacy of an individual over a region or a country. In the final column metaphor, Ashdown is called “the absolute champion of base cynicism and vulgar demagoguery” whose actions border with a political catastrophe (ibid). In the light of the print media analysis, important is the negative semantic context in which Lovrenović places Ashdown as regards his treatment of local media, i.e.

Those media which monitored his governance critically he proclaimed mendacious, and respectable commentators, with verified authorship integrity – barroom scribblers. In return, he quickly found pliant magazines and editorial offices, which showered him with interviews and statements every third day, and these treated him with distasteful and cheap titles of The Man of the Year and similar (ibid).

In terms of the paper’s criticism of the OHR, it matches the conclusions of Vojin Dimitrijević in his essay “Yugoslav Crisis and International Community” where he says that the reasons why the intervention of the organized international community in ex Yugoslavia may be considered unsuccessful are:

Lack of readiness, disunity and incapability of European institutions to understand the crisis and its real causes, looking at the conflict primarily as a collective inter-national dispute, gradual acceptance of nationalist arguments, support to the sides which verbally presented themselves as “pro-Western”, easy acceptance of the thesis on century long animosities of semi-wild Balkan peoples, overestimation of the role of religion, underestimation of the economic factors etc. (710)

As seen from the analysis so far, most of the listed problems were still symptomatic of the OHR mission in 2005.

3.1.6 Slobodna Bosna

By the end of 2005, *Slobodna Bosna* devoted somewhat less room to Dayton anniversary, but produced the same level of bitterness and criticism both towards the ruling parties in BiH and the OHR. In November 2005, in the column titled “Constitutional reforms from Brussels to Washington”, Avdić commented on a three day meeting of the strongest BiH political parties in Brussels, which, according to the author, was not fruitful in anyway. The leading domain used is the domain of “tribe”, where “the tragedy of this country is intrinsically related to bloodthirsty annihilation of human rights of its citizens” (Avdić 2005). This metaphor leads to a mental projection of BiH political leaders as bloodthirsty individuals, namely tribal men, who kill any hope of basic human rights for BiH citizens. As described in blending theory, the *elaboration* phase leads to the simulated mental performance of the event. Since BiH politicians in question treat BiH citizens as their victims and puppets, who are to be treated and played with at their own will, while the only thing these tribal men care about are how to shed more “blood”. The gravity of the metaphor in question is even higher since the issue discussed about is one of the basic foundations for humane, quality living of any individual, which, in BiH, is at the point of tragedy. In the same tone, pointing out the paradoxical situation in the country, Avdić writes that “maximum amount of democratic content should be “pumped into” the BiH state body, so that all of “the tribes” should feel equal, and not only those who belong “to the majority tribe” (ibid). Most popular Western metaphorical references of a tribe relate to the notion of “warfare and violence” which has been a subject of numerous anthropological studies. According to Jowhar, “The tribe in war is an altogether vicious animal. Tribal identity gains dominance over that of an individual’s self identity in situations of tribal conflict and competition” (Hiiraan Jowhar 2005). In terms of metaphor projections used in the studied text, and the potential characteristics of the behavior of national communities in BiH, the following tribal characteristics are important to note:

Tribes refer to their enemies as “cockroaches”, “our game”, “mad dogs”, “rats”, “savages”, “slaves” “traitors” etc. The dehumanization allows the tribal killers to circumvent the built-in human aversion to killing members of its own species. This is what would allow the tribal warrior to attack and kill all the men and women of a family, killing even the children and aborting those still unborn. The warrior avoids guilt because the enemy is not human, only vermin, dogs and traitors. “So what if I kill one more dog, the less of them the better this world is,” he will insist justified in his moral superiority. He can sleep peacefully at night (ibid).


Thus, Avdić implies that the national communities in BiH and their leaders follow the bloodthirsty, aggressive tribal philosophy which exclusively leads to conflict and bloodshed.

On the other hand, he suggests that BiH should rise above such a state of mind and actions, and cross the path between the “tribal philosophy” and “high protection of human rights” in BiH. Paddy Ashdown's mandate in BiH was evaluated in a series of *Slobodna Bosna* research articles, with ample arguments and metaphors which placed Ashdown in negative semantic context. Thus, on 29th December 2005, *Slobodna Bosna* uses “an Indian *maharaja* domain” and publishes an article titled “Paddy Ashdown: four-year reign of a white maharaja²¹”. The word *maharaja* is recontextualized to represent the High Representative who is above the law, as the final authority in power, and an autocrat who rules above BiH. In historical terms, the use of this title is related to the eve of independence in 1947, where India (including present day Pakistan) consisted of more than 600 princely kingdoms each with its own raja (if the king was Hindu) or nawab/sultan (if he was Muslim). The British directly ruled 1/3rd of India, the rest was ruled by the above mentioned princes. Thus, the word maharaja may be construed to be “prince” or in some cases “king” (as in Jammu and Kashmir), in spite of its literal translation as “great king”. Taking these implications into consideration, there is a double layer of sarcasm contained in the metaphor “white maharaja”, where Ashdown is the not only “a maharaja”, but “a white maharaja”, who exercises the authorities of a “great king” of BiH, by taking over the authorities historically associated with the Indian, and not the British dignitaries. In contrast to the royal results “a mahajara” is invited to produce, “the only visible result of Ashdown’s four-year mission in BiH is his villa on Jablanica lake” (Mulić 2005). In the same tone, the journalist calls Ashdown “carpetbagger²² snob or phony”, who came to BiH for his own ambitions and benefit. The adjective “carpetbagger” is used in Bosnian language exclusively in derogatory terms, and denotes someone who is cunning, sly and ready for all kinds of criminal activities to reach his/her goal, as well as a person schooled for diverse delusions and shams. Adding to this, the author writes that OHR is Ashdown's “private company”, which creates mental projections of Ashdown realizing his own, private interest in chairing the OHR, implying that the general, progressive interest of BiH as a country is not on his agenda.

²¹ The word Mahārāja (also spelled maharajah) is Sanskrit for “great king” or “high king”.

²² An outsider, especially a politician, who presumptuously seeks a position or success in a new locality.

Figure 3.1.12 Conceptual blending network for “white maharaja”, “carpetbagger phony” and “private company”



Placing emphasis on research journalism, *Slobodna Bosna* made some sensational claims on the presence of British Intelligence network in BiH, which was raised again upon Ashdown's departure. Hereby, the magazine uses a spy domain, where the short item of the article is titled “Capitulation of British Spies”. Ashdown's OHR staff is named by a series of metaphors such as: “a stray escort of British spies”, “OHR plums”, and some of them even “vagrant spy demons” and “dark spy figures” (Savić 2006). Further elaboration is given in the following excerpt:

With Paddy Ashdown's departure, the British spy (intelligence-counterintelligence) network installed circa four years ago has greatly dissolved. Since the BiH branch of the British secret service MI-6 started operating, our magazine warned about the fatal consequences it shall have on overall political, social and international circumstances in BiH. In the meantime, the media in neighboring countries (*Nacional* in Croatia, *Nedjeljni telegraf* in Serbia) used concrete examples to prove how on post-Yugoslav territory, the British spy network acts uniquely, synchronically and – with devastating consequences for each individual country (ibid).

All of the listed metaphors convey the meaning that there are undercover, spying activities of the OHR employees in BiH, which implies hostile intent in the process where confidential information is collected about the segments of BiH society of interest to the UK Intelligence Service. The metaphor of “vagrant spy demons” introduces the element of demonization into the blend, which is associated with dark, evil forces beyond the capacity of human comprehension, as well as sources of harm, distress and evil. Thus, through the process of reasoning...and developing emotions, such imagery may produce both fear and despise in the

mind of reader, as well as a conclusion that no good has come to BiH and its citizens from Ashdown and his OHR collaborators.

Backing up their evaluation of Ashdown's mandate in BiH, *Slobodna Bosna* published the results of public opinion poll conducted in November 2004 by IFIMES²³, including 1.466 people, where the Institute asked itself why majority of BiH citizens did not vote at 2004 local elections. The results showed that 27% of the examinees said that they did not vote because of the "protectorate role of the BiH High Representative", 21.4 % did not vote because of "the poor influence of the international community on BiH politics", which, at that point, was personified by Paddy Ashdown; 42.2% did not vote because of their "dissatisfaction with the nationalist parties", namely the closest collaborators of the HR. As the author concludes, "91.5% of the examinees boycotted local elections because of the catastrophic OHR politics in BiH, which, in 2004, was headed by Ashdown, 'the liberal'!" (Mulić 2005)

3.1.7 Novi Reporter

On Dayton Accords 10th anniversary, *Novi Reporter* resumed the role of the RS Entity defender, armed with a whole arsenal of words to argue with and verbally humiliate all of the political factors in BiH who sided with the proposal to abolish the entity level in BiH, be it Croat, Bosniak, Serb or OHR representatives. Judging from these articles, the paper may be classified as one of the three segments which Olivera Milosavljević listed in her discussion at the round table on "Echoes and Reactions" column in *Politika*, namely: "Elite as an authority, media as its transmission and public which, if it does not trust a dean, an academician, a poet, an actor or a writer, has no one to believe to" ("Vreme kada je narod govorio", 80). *Novi Reporter* separatist rhetoric in 2005 was backed up, among the rest, by the prominent Serb academic Milorad Ekmečić, who, in his text *Historical and strategic foundations of Republic of Srpska*²⁴ published in NR wrote that:

The leading worry of the Western states shall be not to allow the creation of a Muslim state in Bosnia, but they shall use all efforts to abuse such requests, which are always at their disposal like 'a loaded weapon' to open the instability wounds of the Serb people. In other words, each future crisis with Russia shall cause wavering at the Balkans, due to which the position of the Serb state or states shall be ever worse (Durmanović 2007).

²³ International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies with seat in Ljubljana, Slovenia.

²⁴ The author is the member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, and this work was presented at the scientific gathering titled "Republic of Srpska – 15 years of its survival and development", held in Banja Luka on 26th and 27th June 2007.

In such a tone, *Novi Reporter* editor-in chief introduces the Geneva Conference²⁵. Since the former High Representative in BiH, Wolfgang Petritsch, was the conference organizer, the author uses the coach domain, and sarcastically writes that this is just another chance for Petritsch to “stack more cash into his pockets on the basis of his earlier protectorate, disregarding the amount of load he shall place on a cranky coach pulled by a donkey embodied in each humble citizen of this unfortunate country” (Gajić, 29 June 2005). BiH is “a cranky coach”, and each obedient BiH citizen “a donkey”. These metaphors clearly demonstrate a rhetorical intention of placing BiH in subordinate, and the international community in superordinate position, implying that BiH is a stupid and obstinate entity, whose task is just to pull the load, as heavy as it may be. In terms of the Serb representatives at the conference, Mirko Pejanović²⁶ is named “the first among the equal Alija’s Serbs”.

The man who got famous as a poodle of the deceased Izetbegović will surely wholeheartedly advocate the interests of the deceased owner, if Pejanović has not already died mourning Izetbegović. Still, such an action is characteristic of Dobermans, and Pejanović never moved further from being a shifty poodle (Gajić, 29 June 2005).

By using “the dog domain”, namely the metaphors of “a poodle” and “a Doberman”, Pejanović’s humane and political character is debased, judging him to be “a shifty poodle”, namely a politician who changes his political directions easily, and is a pure servant of the Bosniak political agenda. A demonstration that the writing of Gajić is far from objective journalism is visible in the fact that he politicized the issue that Bojan Zulfikarpašić²⁷, one of the leading European and world jazz pianists, was invited to perform at the conference, saying that “the conference will be spiced up by the piano concert of Bojan Z, behind whose mysterious “Z” the surname Zulfikarpašić is hidden” (Gajić, 29 June 2005). The only reason for such an unfounded cynicism is the fact that Bojan’s surname is of Bosniak origin, although the acclaimed pianist was born and grew up in Belgrade.

²⁵ The international conference on future constitutional arrangements of BiH, organized by "Bosnia 2005" Association, which was held on October 20th and 21st, 2005.

²⁶ BiH politician and professor. In 1992-1995 period was the member of BiH Presidency. Currently, he is the President of the Serbian City Council.

²⁷ Born in Belgrade, Serbia, he started playing piano at the age of 5. In 1989, he received the Best Young Jazz Musician of Yugoslavia award. In the same year, he moved to France, and four years later, recorded the debut album with his Bojan Z Quartet. In 2002, he was granted the title of *Chevalier de l'ordre des Arts et des Lettres* by the French government and received the Prix Django Reinhardt for Musician of the Year from the French Académie du Jazz, and in 2005 was granted the European Jazz Prize as the Best European Jazz Musician. Bojan Zulfikarpašić is a regular guest of most prestigious world music festivals.

The relationship between the High Representative and the RS Government is metaphorically presented by using the master-servant domain, as follows:

The international community's relation towards "the semi-people" of RS is demonstrated on a daily basis. As soon as one of the RS servants tries to raise their head, they automatically face the almighty hand of Jeremy John Durham Ashdown. As any obeying serf, they feel its weight until they publicly apologize for any attempt of self-initiative. Darko Matijašević²⁸ felt it as well, and his apology to Ashdown reminded us of the most pathetic songs of Oliver Dragojević²⁹ (Gajić and Bižić 2005).

Such a metaphorical imagery and positioning of forces creates a series of mental spaces which enter into a conceptual integration framework. The RS people are named "semi-people", "servants", and "serfs", while Ashdown is "the almighty ruler" who punishes them for the smallest disobedience with his mighty hand. Thus, what we see in such use of metaphors is, again, the subordinate – superordinate relationship of forces, where Ashdown is constructed as the representative of the negative out-group, namely the master who denies his subjects basic human rights and dignity, while ruling as an autocrat. In the same text, the ex Deputy HR, Donald Haze is called the proven enemy of "the semi-people" (ibid). On the other hand, the SNSD³⁰ initiative to establish federal arrangement in BiH with three equal territorial units is welcomed with appraisal, where, through the mujahedeen domain, the Bosniak side is metaphorically linked to "the mujahedeens" – a term very actual after September 11th attack on World Trade Center.

Bosniaks simply do not want to see the positive side of this division, in which case the Bosniak federal unit might ask for reciprocity with Texas and...request that "the Texas rangers" are renamed into "Texas mujahedeens", where both formations would present fighters for justice: one for Allah's justice, and the other for the democratic justice, under the joint brotherly units commander, Chuck Norris (Gajić and Bižić 2005).

The input spaces fused in this blend lead to the joint negative representation of the out-group, embodied in the Bosniaks and the international community, named "Texas mujahedeens" and "Texas rangers", where a sarcastic link is made between the two groups, who would fight for each other's interest solely. In addition, there is a religious connotation made to ridicule both groups, who, supposedly, fight for "Allah's justice" and "democratic justice", the "democratic justice" here bearing the Islamic tone, which again emphasizes the unity of the out-groups. On the other hand, the RS is the in-group, "our" group, and a victim of the other two.

²⁸ An RS politician, in 2001 appointed the BiH Military Diplomatic Representative with the BiH Standing Mission to the European Union and Nato in Brussels.

²⁹ One of the greatest and most popular 20th century Croat composers and singers, well-known for his romantic ballads with Dalmatian-like motifs and melodies.


³⁰ Independent Socio-Democrats Alliance, presided by Milorad Dodik, the RS Prime Minister

Following the Geneva Conference, *Novi Reporter* uses “the bear” domain to depict the Bosniak politicians. The editor-in-chief’s column is titled “The white bears’ privileges” (Gajić 26 October 2005). The general knowledge of great white bears tells us that these bears rule the North, and with their thick, white coat are extremely resistant and adaptable to one of the Earth’s harshest environments and temperatures. What the article alludes to is the fact that the Bosniak politicians are like white polar bears, ultimately protected amidst the international community’s interventions in BiH. By using the war domain, the OHR’s initiatives on constitutional changes are described as “the offense led by the chief commander Paddy Ashdown” (ibid). Since war domain and related metaphors are still very dominant in BiH political and social discourse, such metaphors strongly resonate the reader’s mind and clearly depict the fact that the Bosniak political leaders are:

..like white bears, who are constantly overlooking facts, and accusing exclusively the Serb entity for the country’s perishing, so that, according to Sejfidin Tokić³¹, the RS entity could survive, but without its name, authorities and, if possible, with no Serbs in it (ibid).

This last sentence demonstrates high level of *Novi Reporter* intolerance towards the FBiH politicians, where, with clear rhetoric intent, these are made absolute enemies of the Republic of Srpska existence. The blend would look as follows:

Figure 3.1.13 Conceptual blending network of “Sarajevo white bears”, “terrorists” and “Ashdown led offence”



³¹ President of the BiH Union of Social Democrats.

As seen in the network, terrorism is another domain which is used as the point of alliance between the FBiH political parties and OHR. According to the article author, the condition for terrorist activities led by the Bosniak politicians would be if Milorad Dodik, SNSD President, gets chosen as the main EU integrations negotiator. His retrieval from the party would lead to the weakening of the Serb political position in BiH, and would enable “Ashdown's protected white Sarajevo bears to push for the polygamy laws (a segment of Islamic teaching particularly dear to Ashdown), and, free of stress, nurture terrorist cells in BiH without entities, which would give them more space for maneuver” (ibid). In times when references to terrorism all over the world have been so common, and have instilled fear of and repulsion towards Islam in the Western world, the same seems to be the intention of *Novi Reporter*. Through mental projections, metaphors of Bosniak politicians blowing themselves up for the higher cause of “Islam” and “bomb explosions in the name of Allah” may easily instill fear and rage in the minds of *Reporter* readers, thus stigmatizing the complete political arena in FBiH as aggressive and antagonistic towards the RS entity. In addition, what this notion implies is a need for urgent implementation of restrictive policies to prevent “the Bosniak terrorists” from “blowing up” the whole country.

At the end of 2005, *Novi Reporter* published a list of top ten faceless persons in 2005, with Ashdown winning the first place. Recalling *Slobodna Bosna* writing on Ashdown, *Reporter* is even richer in the use of unprofessional leadership domain describing Ashdown's physical ridicule over BiH, and RS in particular:

The number of basic human rights and laws which Ashdown broke during his reign exceeds those which Ida Amin Dada, Saddam Hussein, Adolf Hitler and Josip Broz broke together...His last year's indulging in ridicule over BiH, particularly the RS entity, has showed that former alchemists and present geneticists have been creatively-benevolent in their crazy researches, when compared to lobotomic endeavors which British-Indian cocktail with Irish auspices implemented on this territory. (Gajić, 28 December 2005)

It is the hegemonic interpretation of the High Representative's mandate, which filters all of the Representative's actions using the same mould of negative-other representation, with the victimized image of the RS. The use of “disability” domain from the end of 2005 reflects the same, bitter and critical approach to Ashdown's role in BiH constitutional reform processes:

The hinted constitutional changes shall fill all the advocates of BiH centralization process with impatience and thrill, since Jeremy John Durham Ashdown did not manage to meet their insatiable appetites. He was successful breaking the RS's back, but did not manage to confiscate its invalid chair (Bižić 2005).

Judging from the metaphor, Republic of Srpska is a disabled patient, tied to a wheelchair, but still fighting for his life and not willing to give in to the appetites of his master, namely the High Representative, and other supporters of the centralization processes in BiH.

3.2 BiH print media response to the High Representative's reform initiatives in period from September 2007 to April 2008

The period of political tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2006 onwards took place in the situation where, twelve years after the signing of Dayton Peace Accords, BiH was significantly lagging behind its neighbors in terms of its integrations into EU and NATO Alliance. Therefore, majority of debate in the print media at the given time period revolved around the burning issue of needed amendments to the BiH Constitution and the conditions BiH must fulfill to sign Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. One of the main issues on the agenda, a Feasibility Study condition set before BiH, was BiH police reform in accordance with the EU principles³². The general elections in 2006 brought to power the parties which had highly divergent positions on the country's future governing arrangements, and, being the main local counterparts of the OHR, these parties observed its actions more through the prism of their political platforms and identities than through the strategic and joint country interest. This has resulted in high level of intolerance towards the specific reform steps introduced by the High Representative, and, in conveying this intolerance, the parties in power used one of the most influential tools, the media. In this context, the second section of print media analysis shall focus on the phenomenon of intolerance in BiH print media as a response to the leading High Representative's reform initiatives introduced from September 2007 to April 2008, namely:

- BiH Police Force reform, and
- Amendments to the Rulebook of the BiH Parliament Work Procedure.

³² Three key EU policing principles are: a) state-level legislative and budgetary competencies; b) no political interference in operational policing, and c) the establishment of police zones based on professional rather than entity criteria.

3.2.1 BiH Police Force reform

As explained in the historical context provided in the thesis, work on BiH police reform started in 2005, with the publishing of Police Restructuring Report³³ of Martens³⁴, which, in three years following the report, did not manage to yield any significant reform results. At that point, according to Arnaut Damir, the arrival of Miroslav Lajčak as the new Head of OHR raised some hopes that the BiH Police Reform could finally take place (Arnaut 2007). In that regard, in September 2007, just two months after his appointment, Lajčak presented the Police Reform Agreement Proposal, which caused an outburst of print media reactions. The proposal mainly met first two European police reform principles, and, among the rest, proposed that BiH shall obtain competencies over the police related legislative and budget issues; that the potential for the interference of politics into the operational police functioning would be reduced; that police territorial organization would be harmonized with the territorial organization of the prosecution authorities on the whole BiH territory, and that there shall be single training, procurement and establishment of the Operational Center, and the single police database management. On the other hand, the Proposal left certain things undefined, which presented a stumbling stone to the BiH political parties in question.

On September 7th, *Slobodna Bosna* published an expert explanation on Silajdžić's refusal of OHR's police reform proposal, in which elaboration is given of why “the European Union turned police “reform” into a fluid concept which may be implemented in any way which Republic of Srpska agrees upon” (ibid). The elaboration of this statement lies, among the rest, in the statement that the Protocol, almost in none of its parts, represents the reform of the existing police structures in BiH, and fully diverges from all three EU principles. Since the process has been dragging for years without any visible result, the author uses the Potemkin village domain and claims that the epilogue of the process “starts being tinged with the Potemkin village” (ibid). According to etymological sources, the notion is derived from the Russian Minister Grigori *Potëmkin*, who supposedly built impressive fake villages along a route Catherine the Great was to travel in 1787. Figuratively speaking, the notion implies “an impressive façade or show designed to hide an undesirable fact or condition” (Merriam-

³³ This document set the foundations of the BiH Professional Police Forces, its main point of reference being the expertise and technical criteria, particularly in relation to budget, legislation and the operational police regions.

³⁴ Wilfred Martens was the Chair of the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) in BiH, in year 2005.

Webster Online). Part of knowledge stored in the conceptual frame for “Potemkin village” is knowledge of a conceived lie, a delusion, an effect of deceit, something which is non-existent in real terms. Thus, the police reform in BiH is pompously discussed and presented as a big success, while, in fact, the lack of true engagement in the process is hidden behind empty façades, with no houses behind them. Such imagery very successfully conveys the European treatment of the given topic, namely the article conclusion:

If the international community persists in such a derogation of the three European principles, the only principle which Europe shall stay faithful to is the one which, from time to time, has still been governing its policies since Munich in 1938 – appeasement to the argument of force (ibid).

Contrary to this stance, in the view of *Novi Reporter* weekly: “Police reform is a screen for the abolishment of the RS Police Forces” (Kunić 2007). The use of the screen domain, namely metaphors of “screen” and “cloak” in this context suggest a sneaky strategy directed towards the RS Entity, where something is being hidden under the pretention of police reform, namely the attempt to abolish the RS entity. Along these lines, there is a triangular relationship set among the RS Government, the High Representative and the advocates of unified Police Forces embodied in the Bosniak political structures. In this triangle, the use of war domain is back, where the RS and the OHR are under the attack of “the passionate storm troopers and the ideological propagators of the unitary BiH” (ibid). The metaphors used here create a mental picture of militarily oriented and aggressive Bosniak side, which, in its fundamentalist aggression, minds the fact that the HR does not use his “decapitation authorities” – read “Bonn powers”³⁵. Again, we see a clear ideological intent of bloody characterization of the Bosniak side, which would, most gladly, see the whole RS entity “decapitated”. Picturesquely enough, such a metaphor suggests brute force and lack of professional political ethics on the part of the Bosniak politicians, which, in one's conceptual frame, suggest that something should be done to protect the RS people, and reject the aggressive attack of the other side. Not only that, but in the given context, such an action on the RS side would be immediately justified.

Novi Reporter interviewee from 19th September was Petar Kunić, a Banja Luka Faculty of Law Professor, whose rhetoric intent is to clarify one fact: that the preservation of the RS police force is a guarantee to the protection of the integrity and political interests of the Serb population in BiH. Therefore, we are back to the idea of a sneaky strategy against the RS, which professor verbalizes as follows: “In Lajčak’s proposal, the word “mainly” is used very

³⁵ See page 55, footnote 3

meanly, which means that there can be exceptions...Thus, this is another *rhetorical prank* which may cost us dearly (*italics mine*)” (Durmanović, 19 September 2007). In this context, the word “prank” implies an illegal, dishonest action against someone, from whom the true state of facts is to be hidden, in order that the other side will realize their goals and interests. Thus, accepting Lajčak’s proposal would mean the betrayal of the Serb interests in BiH, which implies that actions need to be taken to prevent this from taking place, namely that the Serbs are not so naïve to fall into such a trap.

With partly stronger rhetorical tone, Kunić raises the survival of the RS police force to the level of “to be or not to be of the whole RS”. The use of literary domain, namely a reference to one of the most famous lines in the Western literary tradition greatly emphasizes the critical dimension of the situation, since, upon hearing this line, the readers from the RS entity conceptualize that if police reform goes the described way, their own existence and survival would be endangered, meaning that policies to prevent such a course of events are immediately justified. Using the violence domain, Kunić claims that the activities targeted towards “the devastation” of the RS shall continue, so that Serbs have to demonstrate their “persistence”. In his words: “If it means we have to endure for the next thirty years, than it shall be thirty years during which we shall not allow the RS Police Forces to be abolished” (*ibid*). Placing the RS Entity into object position, where it has to endure the fight against ‘its enemy’, the professor speaks on behalf of the whole RS, which provides an additional impetus and rhetorical force matching the ideological propaganda of *Novi Reporter*.

In the BiH media space, noticeably fragmented by the entity and nationalist formula, *Dnevni list*, a daily news magazine published in Mostar has been primarily the voice of the BiH Croats. On October 2nd, *Dnevni List* published a one-page article on Lajčak’s visit to the Republic of Croatia Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader. The article title, written in huge capital letters, is very suggestive, as follows: “Sanader and Lajčak: Croats must have full rights.” This strong rhetoric intent implies that Croats do not have full rights in BiH, which is why Sanader supports Lajčak’s engagement in BiH. In stating that “BiH must remain a whole”, Sanader “provides full support to Lajčak’s Police Reform Protocol, hoping that all the political sides in BiH shall accept it, since it is an issue BiH must solve *to make a crucial step towards Europe*” (Pušić 2007) (*italics mine*). Again we see the use of name “Europe” in metaphorical terms, namely a one-way movement metaphor in which “a political process is a journey which proceeds from a

departure point toward a goal/destination along a specific path” (Musloff 2004, 43). In our case, this journey is “Bosnia’s crucial step”, the goal is “Europe”, while a specific path is “the settlement of the Police Reform in accordance with the OHR Protocol”. Thus, since the path towards “Europe” is presented as a way to secure BiH Croats’ constituency and equal rights in BiH, it implies that readers of *Dnevni list* would support any actions taken towards the affirmation of Croats’ rights in the country.

On October 4th, Lajčak extended the deadline to reach police reform agreement until October 15th, on which day he was obliged to report to the EU institutions in Brussels. However, the abovementioned agreement was not reached and BiH missed the opportunity to possibly qualify for SAA. As a reaction to this, *Dnevni list* published a column with Lajčak’s photograph, titled “And now, sanctions!” The use of “miracle” metaphor and the rhetoric intent of the title implies a carrot-and-stick strategy, namely, the child-parent relationship metaphor (i.e. subordinate/superordinate relationship) in which BiH’s “disobedience”, i.e. non-fulfillment of the police reform agreement shall not remain unpunished. Lajčak’s statement quoted in the article is as follows:

Unfortunately, the miracle has not happened. Some form of readiness may have existed at the start, but we soon returned to what you call “a communication breakdown game”. Each side repeats their own stance, without readiness to listen to the others. We have no agreement, this being the decision of the political leaders who hold such way better for themselves. Besides, it is a message which BiH sends out to Europe, and the one I shall take with me to Brussels (Danas Informator 2007)

There are two important metaphors in this passage. Firstly, it is the word “miracle” which characterizes BiH political parties as inefficient and non-cooperative to such an extent that it takes a miracle for them to reach an agreement. As second, “a communication breakdown game” implies that BiH political leaders in power act as children, and are not willing to cooperate and negotiate in a multinational BiH political environment, where, according to Lajčak, consensus should be a road to take. Seeing the future of BiH in the European integrations process, the author sides with the High Representative and warns that BiH’s doors to Europe shall remain closed if its politicians continue to obstruct the reform processes. The “shut door” metaphor becomes fused with the political *status quo* in BiH. The conceptual frame for house, as we have seen in earlier text, is that “Europe” is a private dwelling, where the entry is permitted only by the resident. Thus, the Brussels policy makers have the right to refuse the entry to certain individuals, namely countries, in this case to BiH. Since the blended

space is also a site for developing emotions, such a fact may elicit a particular emotional response with the reader, who would, then, consequently side with any actions to be taken to change the situation for better, and get into the European premises. Around the same time period, under “the event of the week”, *Oslobođenje* published a column titled “Police reform, integration or isolation” (Zgodić 2007). The whole text is shaded with a tone of irony implying the subordinate position of the BiH political actors, who were betrayed by the international community. Thus, bitter irony reflects back to the international community’s inertia during the 1992-1995 aggression on BiH, which has continued in the form of *a colorful lie* of promises by the High Representative, a domain prevalently used in the article. This “colorful lie” is a metaphor of Dayton Accords, which is explained by the fact that the RS Entity still exists and is propagated by the latest OHR police reform proposal, while the promises in 1995 given to the Bosniak side were of a type that the RS is just “a temporary solution” (ibid). Thus, what the pro-Bosniak forces may expect is just “a moral and symbolic satisfaction”, like “a can of “icar fish” instead of a beefsteak, and an ideological “šećerlema”, which in Turkish means “a sweetie or a candy” (ibid). The food domain used here is very interesting and effective from the historical point of view. Cans of icar fish were distributed to the besieged citizens of Sarajevo within humanitarian aid packages during the 1992-1995 period, and served only to keep people from starving from hunger, while their nutritional value and quality of ingredients was very poor. Therefore, in the completion phase of the blend, such an association triggers a series of mental projections, where we end up introducing the notion of poor quality and deceit in the offered political solution. The same is the case with “ideological sweeties”, since *šećerleme* are cheap type of candied sweets, which again implies that the solution offered to the Bosniaks is inadequate and cheap. By characterizing OHR’s *modus operandi* in BiH, Zgodić uses the medicine domain, and concludes that:


The pro-Bosnian forces, whatever this term stands for, may only lament over former statements of the highest international officials how Entity police force survival is out of question, or to swallow another “bitter pill” of the same producer and the same Dayton name (Zgodić 2007).

In the second half of November, another *Oslobođenje* column uses a servant domain in its title: “the Servant of the People”. The servant in question is the RS Prime Minister, who is called so only ironically, while, in real terms, Dodik uses the RS people to shamelessly realize his own political goals and ambitions:

Dodik and his top leaders have explained it all to their people. That Sarajevo is Tehran; that Serbs do not belong to Bosnia; that the RS is only Serb; that there can be no Serb co-existence with Bosniaks and Croats; that the international community is a huge anti-Serb coalition, and that Miroslav Lajčak is an insatiable Serb eater etc (Mijović 2007).

This rhetorical sequence of facts effectively conveys a series of radical statements and two metaphors which, in *Oslobođenje*'s view, demonstrate the RS's isolationist politics towards the other entity and its antagonistic relation to OHR. The Islamic, Tehran domain, namely the metaphor that "Sarajevo is Tehran" has been commonly used by Dodik in many political interviews. Since the majority of Tehranis are the followers of Twelver Shia Islam, which is also the state religion, Dodik sends the message out that Sarajevo is an Islamic, fundamentalist city which has no room for Serbs or, for that matter, people of any other religious convictions. Besides, the author uses the cannibal domain, where Dodik names Lajčak a cannibal, who cannot have enough of Serbs. The images, namely conceptual knowledge projected via this metaphor is of a series of Hollywood movies with Anthony Hopkins in the role of Hannibal Lecter, primarily the famous "the Silence of the Lambs" (1991) and "the Hannibal" (2001).


Figure 3.2.1 Conceptual integration blend of "huge anti-Serb coalition" and "insatiable Serb eater"



This metaphor also serves for the realization of an evaluative strategy, namely polarization of Serbs as the in-group, and the international community as the out-group, the bad guys. In the blending process, Lajčak takes over the role of "the insatiable Serb eater", who attacks Serbs, tortures, kills and eats them, which may provoke a series of horrendous and cannibalistic representations in reader's mind.

A Banja Luka daily *Glas Srpske*, which has been very pronounced in advocating the Serb ethno-national interpretation framework, translates a uniform RS officials' message on police reform. A heavy tone of irony and cynicism is visible in *Glas Srpske* column titled "The Coveted Serbs", which presents an evaluation strategy manifested in the negative representation of the out-group, namely "the globalization world" consisting of "corrupt politicians, mega-smugglers, media magnates and worldly outlaws" (Marić 2008). Using the revenge domain, the author writes that the international community is a part of the same group, with its "sword of revenge", namely the HR Bonn powers, directed towards the Republic of Srpska Prime Minister. On the other hand, RS is characterized by the topos of justice, where "Serbs have no other choice but to bend their heads and accept the blame" (again the servant metaphor), and where "a man" becomes a synonym for a Serb, so that "a man /read a Serb/ is only left to restrain his/her rage and, at the same time, fight unreservedly for truth" (ibid). Drawing from the text, further ideological consequences of this construction can be observed:

Figure 3.2.2 Conceptual blending network of "sword of revenge" and "servant"



On the other hand, the corrupt aspects in all the leading segments of the Western world, including politics, economy and media, automatically create the positive aura around Serbs, and the "civilization" to which Serbs belong, and for which they shall fight, disregarding "the type and duration of fight". Again, as in the previous examples, the war rhetoric and the knowledge stored on the fight concept is activated, while this particular knowledge produces inferences that Serbs are ready and willing "to fight" and shed blood for the defense of their

rights. This reminds me of the chapter titled “Man as a RNational Animal”, in which Connor rephrases Chateaubriand’s statement³⁶ and writes that “people do not voluntarily die for things that are rational” (Connor 2006). Thus, raising the lexis “fight” to the symbolic level works in favor of the author’s rhetoric intent, namely that the RS population must unify in this struggle for the survival of the RS’s integrity and “the Serb civilization”.

On the eve of the BiH Parliament session where two Police Reform Law proposals were to be discussed, the political atmosphere is very tense. Criticism addressed towards the OHR is demonstrated in the *Oslobođenje* column from March 31st, 2008 which has a very suggestive title: “Europe, than what?” (Borić 2008). Analyzed through the prism of Lajčak’s police reform proposal, the author calls the proposal „antireform“, which clearly suggests it is against the BiH's progress on European integrations road. And the main culprit on the international side is the High Representative. The pressure created on the local politicians reaches the level of “either Europe or disaster”, which, using the disaster domain means that if Lajčak’s reform does not get adopted, BiH shall sink into irretrievable damage. The level of catastrophe also implies a “blackmail” set in front of the Bosniak politicians, who are proclaimed “brakemen”, since they have their own, and not Lajčak’s or Dodik’s opinion?” (ibid). The “brakemen” metaphor is placed in a paradoxical context where the reason for the Bosniak politicians to be named so is that they do not fall under Dodik’s or Lajčak’s pressures, so are, in other words, punished for their correct and sound political approach. In the same tone, Burić skillfully raises a series of questions which become negative representation of the OHR, where the same – “Europe or disaster” topos of urgency is called “isolation”. This suggests that BiH is kept in a prisoner type state, outside of mainstream European integrations processes, namely threatened with something which has already been a state of facts in the country for years. Thus, OHR is presented as hypocritical, having double standards, one for the Bosniak politicians and the other one for the RS. Just a few days earlier, on the eve of the adoption of Police Reform Laws, *Glas Srpske* published an article titled “Tihić mines the signing of agreement with EU” (Domazet and Radetić 2008), where the mining domain realizes an evaluative strategy with a topos of danger. Thus, Sulejman Tihić, and the SDA, are labeled “the enemies” of BiH entry into Europe, which urges for action on the RS part to stop them in these negative intentions,

³⁶ “Men don’t allow themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions” (Cited in Walter Sulzbach, *National Consciousness* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 62.

and choose the most proper instruments against this out-group. With the same tone, on April 4th, the RS Police Force Day celebration, *Glas Srpske* published an article where, among a series of complementary statements, the RS Prime Minister Dodik said that “the RS Police is untouchable and no one shall abolish it” (Tomašević 2008). What dominates the RS print media discourse both in general and particular terms is war domain which is present in the following example: “This time, again, we have not forgotten the policemen who have, during the war, *laid their lives into the foundations* of the RS” (ibid). This metaphor has a strong rhetorical intent, which, in the emotionalisation phase of the blending process, may activate a series of reader’s emotions and make the existence of the RS police force a historical fact and reality Serbs have to fight for, for the sake of “holiness” of the victims’ lives, which were incorporated into the freedom of Republika Srpska.

Along these lines, the leading two RS position parties³⁷ were visibly satisfied with the outcome of April 11th negotiations, and the signing of two crucial Police Force Laws in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly House of Peoples, since the RS Police Force was preserved and the laws have not given the newly established police bodies an authority over the Entity ones. In the same tone, on April 23rd, *Nezavisne Novine* daily published Milorad Dodik’s column in which he discusses the only feasible form of political negotiations in BiH. Throughout the article, he establishes a link between “the Sarajevo unitary circle”, namely “Sarajevo political bazaar/street politics” and the OHR. The “bazaar” domain implies a few things. As first, that the Bosniak method of negotiations resembles bargaining, where the Bosniak politicians bargain with the future of BiH and its political arrangements and rely on the OHR’s support in the process. As second, it implies that the Bosniak political circles have been reduced to Sarajevo Bosniak politicians who primarily advocate the SDA principles and agenda whose message to the RS citizens is the following: “Here you have nothing, and keep it well” (Dodik 2008). By speaking on behalf of the RS people, Dodik uses the imagery which leaves Serbs with empty hands, and, even worse, the “Bosniak state creators” try to make them fools, which, in the elaboration phase, may trigger counteraction on the part of readers, who, surely, do not want to be fooled, particularly on the nationalist basis. By using the combustion process metaphor, Dodik describes it picturesquely via a rhetorical question, where the answer surely rests with the Bosniak politicians:

³⁷ Independent Socio-Democrats Union and Democratic Progress Party.

Who still needs the Bosnian pot under the international community's pressure, for internal combustion of non-Bosniaks? Judging from nervousness of those who may not use the international community as their Unitarianism instrument any longer, it is clear who I'm talking about (ibid).

As a process, internal combustion relates to "designating, or pertaining to, any engine (called an Internal-combustion engine) in which the heat or pressure energy necessary to produce motion is developed in the engine cylinder, as by the explosion of a gas, and not in a separate chamber, as in a steam-engine boiler" ("Thinkexist"). In metaphorical terms, internal combustion is selectively projected into the image of Serbs being burnt down by the Bosniak gas, and all the possible scenarios which could develop along these lines. Since this is, frankly, a horror image, its goal is to evoke a series of emotional responses in the mind of RS readers, so to label both the Bosniaks and the OHR as the aggressors and enemies to the BiH Serbs.

On the eve of April 11th Parliamentary session, *BH Dani* published an article titled "Lajčak's European Offense" (Lovrenović, 11 April 2008) which again uses war domain and draws a parallel between the form of thinking and operating among BiH political parties and the OHR. It is striking to see common features between the two which the author establishes, in terms of their equal approach to police reform, which is translated into "the ominous formula of every totalitarianism: 'You are either with us, or against us'. 'The fact that *our* politicians use this formula is not unusual – we have a strong, immortal tradition. It is scandalous that the Europeans at temporary, civilizing work in Bosnia use the same formula" (ibid).

The lexical choice of "totalitarianism" which metaphorically describes the OHR's mandate in BiH carries a tone of irony with the implication that the Europeans have come to "civilize" Bosnians and Herzegovinians, and do so aggressively, via their own exclusive political agendas.

Two weeks earlier, the same journalist assessed the results of Lajčak's engagement up to and right prior to the April Parliament session. In characterizing Lajčak's work, and linking it to the characteristics of Ashdown's mandate, the author uses metaphors of "political balkanization and "bosnization" which imply "vulgar pragmatism and Machiavelism, cruel and cynical oppression of political and parliamentary life by forcing private-leadership conversations..." (Lovrenović, 11 April 2008). In addition to this, the author lists a series of facts which are the result of Lajčak's engagement "on the eve of fateful (for how many times, already?) decision making on police reform?" (ibid). Cynicism emphasized by trivialization of lexis "fateful" is matched to the metaphors listed further on: "denuded liderocracy, destroyed opposition, even

further ethnicization of political life in BiH, Dodik as the leading pro-European, Silajdžić as the quiet, voiceless and constructive partner, and Tihić – awful, Wahhabist³⁸ threat to BiH and its 'European way' (ibid). All of these metaphors create a blend, the message of which is that Lajčak's policies in BiH have not contributed to stabilization of democratization in the country, but have degraded the authorities given to the Parliamentary system of government via political talks which were channeled through private political meetings on Dodik's farm, and other private locations. In addition to these "juicy" metaphors, a final one of Lajčak's political engagement is particularly striking: "a swamp of unprincipledness – *balkanština*"³⁹ (ibid). It is interesting to note that already in 1921, *Chicago Daily News* correspondent, Paul Scott Mawrer, published a "true journalist book" in which he used the term balkanization in the following context:

In the region where races have been hopelessly entwined, numerous small states have been created, with more or less backward populations, states economically and financially weak, prone to intrigues, scared, envious towards their neighbors; these countries are constant subjects of machinations of great powers, but also of violence of their own population (Mowrer 1921, 34).

Translated into the BiH's ethnically diverse surrounding, phenomenon of balkanization, as used by Mowrer, is evident in *Nezavisne Novine* writing on the OHR's engagement in BiH. In March 2008, a renowned BiH academician and former politician Muhamed Filipović, wrote two columns using "hot-cold game" domain, where he claims that the OHR method is a so-called "carrot-and-stick approach" in which the OHR does not have a clear strategy in BiH. Instead,

Their method consists of occasional support and lack of support, scolding and praise, help and hindrance, i.e. it is synoptic and its purpose is to confuse people, to interrupt their train of thought and continuity in actions, and, thus, paralyze them in their potential actions (Filipović 2008).

This lack of international political strategy stems from Dayton itself which is metaphorically called "a typical Western pragmatic lie" (ibid). The domain used to recreate the imagery is of a coach-driver who drives where he is told, who is once scolded or threatened, then praised and stimulated, and then again punished all over again. The metaphorical presentation of this

³⁸ Today, Wahhabism is the dominant Islamic tradition on the Arabian peninsula, though its influence is minor in the rest of the Middle East. Because Osama bin Laden comes from Saudi Arabia and is Wahhabi himself, Wahhabi extremism and radical ideas of purity have obviously influenced him considerably. Adherents of Wahhabi Islam do not regard it as simply one school of thought out of many; rather it is the only path of true Islam — nothing else counts. ("About.com: Agnosticism/Atheism")

³⁹ According to K. Mitani, the word *balkanština* stands for uncivilized and discreditable behavior in public, cultural and political life, deemed as typical for the Balkans by the prejudice of the West and Central Europe.

superordinate-subordinate relationship in the third, *elaboration* phase of the brand simulates mental performance from an image of a carriage-driver who is scolded by his owner, to the mental torture and potential dismissal of the driver himself – read BiH. Filipović claims that “the High Representative’s methods prove the existence of such a relationship and power distribution in our country” (ibid).

On March 6th 2008, *Slobodna Bosna* published an interview with Željko Komšić, a BiH Presidency member, who, in reference to police reform as a condition for the signing of SAA, said that this is only a *pro forma* criterion, i.e. “a form needed to prove that the agreement between the political factors in BiH is still possible”. In Komšić’s words: “Currently, no one in Europe is interested into the substance of the agreement” (Šunj 2008). The stance of the BiH Presidency member is translated into two domains. The first is the good and bad child domain, where the bad child’s wishes are generally granted just to appease this child, while this is not the case with the good, obedient child. In this case Europe is the mother, while the Balkan countries are the children. And what does the mother do? It indulges its bad kids, in this case Republic of Srpska, while it scolds the good ones. In Komšić’s words:

A wicked child always gets and realizes his/her wishes much sooner than the good child. A reason for this is that parents do not have a way, energy, wishes, patience to pursue their principles...A fact that this wicked child will grow out into a bad person is not a subject of their present interest (ibid).

The second domain is the cake domain, where a piece of cake symbolizes police reform, while the whole cake is the future quality life of Bosnians and Herzegovinians. The imagery produced by this metaphor is that poor police reform proposal is a piece of cake on the table, which, if BiH gets it now, shall deprive the country of the whole cake in future. Instead, the BiH citizens would need a better quality cake at the moment, namely a relevant, thorough police reform which would be the foundation for sound, democratic reforms in future. These picturesque metaphors place OHR’s actions into the framework of negative Europe-representation, whose actions are governed by the principles at the cost of long-term interest of BiH.

On the other hand, in *Oslobođenje* Focus section from March 24th, the columnist recognizes the same hypocrisy and inconsistency in the OHR’s policy approach, but does not think that this Europe’s offer should be rejected. Instead, he uses the Christian and paternal domain and writes that we should not pretend to be “greater Catholics than the Pope?” (Dizdarević 2008), and

should, thus, accept the fact that EU gave up full implementation of the European principles. In the same tone: “Rejection of an open hand may only cause EU’s ill-temper towards BiH” (ibid), which suggests the projection of paternal parent's care for a child and his (EU's) open hand, where it would be both rude and improper to reject the offered assistance. Thus, the rhetorical intent of the column in relation to the perceived political reality in BiH is to persuade the readers that collaboration with EU should be established, while the projected aspects of EU in the studied blend are exclusively positive and beneficial to BiH.

Contrary to this, in view of *Novi Reporter*, Europe has nothing relevant and good to offer to BiH. A private visit of an American diplomat and the creator of Dayton Peace Agreement, Richard Holbrook to BiH is recontextualized into a charade in which no one (*read RS*) “gives a shit about Holbrook’s visit, and reforms of Police or Constitution” (Gajić 2008). Using the “Europe as a container” domain, the author writes sarcastically that “Europe has a lot to offer to BiH. From Hague justice to toxic waste, which it does not want in its own courtyard.” (ibid). This imagery of Europe through a series of metaphors creates mental spaces which enter into a conceptual integration network, where part of knowledge stored in the frame for “toxic waste” is that it is extremely poisonous and undesirable matter, which Europe does not want “in its own courtyard” – courtyard here implying a private property the entry into which is controlled. Thus, the ideological consequences of the blend may be that trash shall end up in BiH's courtyard, and far from the closed confines of Europe, which it wants to get rid of at any cost. Regarding the fact that the RS Prime Minister’s SNSD Party was fully satisfied with the final content of the adopted Police Reform Laws, it is not surprising to see that the tone of the *Glas Srpske* article published on April 16th is as follows: “BiH has opened the European doors” (Domazet 2008). This is an example of a spatial metaphor regularly used to depict the dictating tempo and conditions of OHR, which has an authority to open or close “the European doors” for BiH. Since, in *Glas Srpske* view, the adoption of Police Reform Laws is a step forward, the article juxtaposes the statement of the State Minister of Security from SDA party who declared that the Laws are “hybrid and present a compromise on unimportant things”, adding that the reform “presents a victory of the RS politics and politicians” (ibid). Thus, another implication realized through the door domain is that Bosniaks do not deserve to enter the EU doors, creating a polarization of an in-group versus an out-group, namely Serbs versus Bosniaks.

Thus, it is visible that there is a heavy polarization between the Federation and RS political parties and the media which took place in the course of police reform negotiations, and culminated upon the adoption of the Laws. Overall, the Federation print media criticized the High Representative mainly for lack of consistency and transparent political strategy leading to the strengthening of BiH State institutions, his abandonment of the European principles, and his role in cementing the legacies of the past war through the maintenance of the RS police forces in their given shape and size. On the other hand, the RS print media were very critical of the HR's police reform initiative up to the point of the adoption of the Laws, when their stance shifted for 180 degrees, namely to positive other representation of the HR directly linked to the preservation of the RS Police Forces in the Dayton established form. Along the lines of the referential strategies used in the metaphors quoted, in his book *Ethnonationalism: The quest for understanding*, Connor writes that:

The first fact of ethnicity is the application of systematic distinctions between insiders and outsiders, between us and them. From this principle, it follows that two or several groups who regard themselves as being distinctive may tend to become more similar and simultaneously *increasingly concerned with their distinctiveness* if their mutual contact increases (Connor 1994,18).

In this context, different lines of BiH print media writing, headed by the most radical writing of the RS print media, have had a vital share in establishing and redefining this distinctiveness of political principles behind the individual ethnic communities in BiH, and the political platforms at their forefront, while exact conclusions shall be made in the thesis conclusion.

3.2.2 Amendments to the Rulebook of the BiH Parliament Work Procedure

In the second half of 2007, political situation in the region was marked by the upcoming decision on the status of Kosovo. In terms of BiH, the main concern was the potential blockade on the political scene due to the eventual independence of Kosovo, which would be primarily provoked by the RS Entity, whose authorities already threatened with referendum and made forcible links between the future status of the RS and Kosovo. In this regard, a leading cause of worry was potential abuse of the voting procedures at the BiH Council of Ministers and the BiH Parliament. Namely, according to the Parliament Rulebook, the BiH Parliament enacts decisions by the majority vote of the present Parliamentarians, but under the condition that this majority contains one third of votes of the elected Parliamentarians from each Entity. This

principle is called “the entity voting”. Speaking concretely, at least five out of 19 Parliamentarians from the RS have to vote for a decision to be adopted. On the contrary, a decision would not be adopted even if all 38 Federation Parliamentarians voted pro. Therefore, on October 19th 2007, Lajčak made a decision in which he proposed the Parliament session quorum be established on the basis of the number of present Parliamentarians, so that the BiH Parliament may hold sessions and make decisions if the relative majority of Parliamentarians is present at the session, disregarding their national composition. This decision leaves the Serb, and, for that matter, the representatives of two other constituent peoples, with a possibility to prevent the adoption of all decisions they do not agree with, but under the condition they participate in decision making process. In words of Asim Metiljević:

Lajčak's intervention does not substantially harm the entity voting principle but only prevents its abuse, or, even more precisely, prevents the intentional and targeted blockage of BiH Parliament, with which some of the most prominent RS politicians, headed by Milorad Dodik, have not ceased to threaten (Metiljević 2007).

Nevertheless, Lajčak's decision created a clear split in BiH media space, where the RS print media, led by *Glas Srpske* and *Novi Reporter*, poured down heavy criticism on Lajčak and OHR, while the Federation media stood in defense of the abovementioned decisions.

A week after the enactment of Lajčak's decision, *Glas Srpske* published two articles in which the existence of Republic of Srpska is put at stake because of the given High Representative's decisions. The articles regularly use the war and religious domain, still very prevalent in BiH daily political and social discourse. The title of one of the articles is “Republic of Srpska, our shrine!” (*Glas Srpske* 2007), being a shout of protesters all over RS provoked by the HR's decisions. The same article uses war domain in the following statements: “Our fathers laid their lives for Republic of Srpska”, “Torture and measure imposition must stop”, “What have our fathers died for?”, “We must defend ourselves” (ibid). The prominent evaluative strategy and polarization is created, where a topos of danger implies that Lajčak's decision is a torture for RS, and deprives its population of basic human rights. Thus, as a response, Serbs must stand up, fight back, and save the dignity of their forefathers and war victims. In addition to this, RS is placed into subordinate position by being “humiliated”, “acted against”, “pushed to the wall”, victimized by “political aggression project” and is an object of “revenge due to failed police reform negotiations” (*Glas Srpske*, 26 October 2007)

Nezavisne Novine column published on November 1st, 2007 with the military and train domains. As first, Lajčak is “a soldier” for whom, contrary to emperors, it is not appropriate “to cut the Gordian knot”, but he does it anyway. Then, BiH is threatened to be thrown out of “various waiting rooms at the European platforms” (Labernik 2007). The first implication is that Lajčak is an ordinary bureaucrat who just follows the orders of his superordinates from Brussels, and, in addition to this, is an impertinent soldier who deserves to be punished (referring to the knowledge stored in conceptual framework for such a practice in the military), while the conceptual framework for “a waiting room on a train station” implies only selective projection of the image, namely instability and almost homelessness which BiH faces in trying to get onto one of the European 'trains' to take her to Europe, i.e. to brighter future.

The “negative other representation” of the OHR is very direct in *Nezavisne Novine* column of the RS Prime Minister, in whose view the OHR policies in BiH present a total annihilation of democratic system of government, with the use of “God” domain:

If the High Representative has legislative, executive and judiciary power, which even supersedes BiH, then we do not need either elections, courts, or citizens. A universal surrogate is the High Representative and his staff known as OHR. It comes out that all the BiH citizens are mutes in the everlasting movie titled: “I am your OHR and you shall have no other gods before me (Dodik 2007).

Reference to the first of the ten commandments of Christianity “I am your God and you shall not have any other gods before me”, is a bitter and ironic allusion to the Christian tradition incorporated in the Office of the High Representative, a body which behaves as the ultimate ruler, i.e. deity with supraordinary powers over the country, which Milorad Dodik does not recognize, either within or outside the confines of Dayton Peace Accords. In the observed time period, *Novi Reporter* weekly also uses the deity domain with a series of names assigned to Miroslav Lajčak, such as “the Self-Proclaimed King”, “the New Emperor in the Old Skies”, “a Bald Czar”, “the Latest BiH Monarch”, “the Illustrious Czar and Sultan”. While conceptual frames for the listed themes alludes to the “self-proclaimed” authorities of Lajčak's rule and the Europe's desire to make him have the final say in the BiH political arena, it goes without saying that all of these titles just mock Lajčak's authority in BiH, linked to his favorable attitude towards the Bosniaks, wherefrom comes the historical reference to the term “the illustrious Sultan”, which was used in the Ottoman period in BiH, and which the Bosniak political leaders would advocate. The same rhetoric intent is present in a column from October 31st, which uses the Islamic domain and is titled “Lajčaku Akbar” (Gajić, 31 October 2007) - a

clear allusion to the opening declaration of every Islamic prayer “Allahu Akbar”, meaning “God is the greatest”. Here it clearly alludes to HR's powers in BiH, and means “Lajčak is the greatest”. Such a traditional call is also associated with *mujahideen*⁴⁰, a term very negatively labeled in the West, particularly after 9/11, and a series of terrorist attacks which followed. It is associated with aggressive, fundamentalist practice of Islam, whereby individuals sacrifice their own lives for the higher religious goals, and, thus, fight against and kill the enemy. In BiH context, this knowledge for the conceptual frame of *mujahedeen* convenes a Serb ideological framework where the Bosniak side is shaded with the terrorist aura. In such a tone, both the OHR and the Bosniaks are metaphorically described as “the elite units with Islamic omen” (Gajić 2007). Bosniaks are the warriors starting “an offensive towards the RS entity”, with the mission to include the RS entity into the Islamic utopia of Alija Izetbegović. This process of “initiation” is metaphorically described as the rite of circumcision, to be performed “with blades in the hands of the Bosniaks, whereby the attack on the Serb genitalia reaches its highest peak” (ibid). The role of “czar Lajčak”, who, in author’s words, has not progressed beyond the Middle Ages, is “not to anger the Islamic countries, to satisfy the Islamic forces in BiH, and not to circumcise, but to hold the Serb genitalia during the rite” (ibid).

In the same edition, *Novi Reporter* published an interview with Emil Vlajki, a political philosopher and Banja Luka University professor, in which Vlajki uses the war domain, with characteristic evaluative strategy, i.e. positive-self representation of the RS and negative other representation of the Bosniak parties and the OHR. Looking at the regional situation, and the Kosovo issue, the interview is titled: “The whole region is on the verge of blazing into flame” (Bižić 2007), where amendments to the Parliamentary Rulebook are metaphorically called “smut and shame”, and solutions “which attack sound reasoning and human dignity”. In the context of Serb subordinate position, Vlajki says that:

On the whole ex-Yugoslav territory, Serbs have been *demonized* and oppressed for already a decade and a half”, while Lajčak, being an instrument of the USA and the West, wants to impose decisions which directly place RS into *the servant position* in relation to other two nationalities (ibid).

The message is that Serbs are presupposed to be the only victims of unfavorable historical and political circumstances in BiH, which is a clear distortion of historical facts, so that (in black-

⁴⁰ Arabic *mujāhidīn*, plural of *mujāhid*, literally, person who wages jihad: Islamic guerrilla fighters especially in the Middle East (Merriam-Webster Dictionary: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mujahedeen>)

and-white fashion), “geostrategic situation may turn towards heavy conflicts of unimaginable dimensions, in which the RS would be involved” (ibid).

Dnevni list, a Mostar published daily, takes a more balanced view of the issue at stake. In the political context in which Croats have been struggling for the realization of their rights defined in BiH Constitution, *Dnevni list* places the ruling Croat nationalist parties into the positive semantic context, where these parties advocate State level agreement on the Rulebook in question, and the OHR’s activities in this field. However, the paper also voices out the opinion of the Serb side, when, just three days later *Dnevni list* published an interview with the member of SNSD Executive Committee, titled “Lajčak creates “a small Ottoman Empire” (Bjelica 2007). The Ottoman domain used in the interview provides for positive Serb and Croat representation, in which these two nationalities have been unified by sense of endangerment from the side of OHR and the Bosniaks, with the threat to be outvoted by “the Bosniak conception of BiH”. Thus, looking at the interpretation frameworks used, the RS print media writing visibly fits Ernest Gellner’s definition of the concept of nationalism where:

Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of the political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalist *sentiment* is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. (Gellner 1978, 134)

Therefore, the application of exclusive ethno-national frameworks boils down to nothing else but the use of a well known ideological formula “us against them”, which, in the observed print media writings on two OHR reform initiatives can be all but progressive and productive.

4 Discussion

A look into the public image of the High Representative in BiH print media in relation to the use of metaphors in writing on the 10th anniversary of Dayton Peace Accords and the reform actions of the High Representative in September 2007 – April 2008 period discloses a series of important findings. In general terms, metaphors have demonstrated to be a commonly used instrument across all of the analyzed print media in their treatment of the High Representative. However, before getting to conclusions related to joint metaphors used across papers, I shall start with the look into individual print media in the light of their treatment of the High Representative and the application of particular domains in this regard.

In terms of the print media published on the territory of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the predominant domains in *Slobodna Bosna* and *BH Dani*, which are considered most leftist in their view of the current constitutional arrangements in BiH, set the subordinate – superordinate relationship both between State of BiH and OHR, and the local ruling politicians over BiH citizens. The predominant domains are the leadership domain, patient-doctor and lunacy domain, then visual domains (Bermuda triangle, Potemkin village), spy domain and tribe domain. Both *Dnevni list* and *Slobodna Bosna* use mother-child metaphor, while predominant domains in *Dnevni Avaz* are the leadership domain, door and house domain, policeman domain and voyage domain. *Oslobođenje* is another daily which also uses the house domain, while the other used domains are lie domain, and Christian and servant domain, which places Europe in paternal position. In terms of the RS media, in year 2005, *Nezavisne Novine* used domains similar to *Dnevni Avaz*, namely the policeman domain, herd domain, voyage and house domain, and narcotics domain. However, in 2007-2008 period, predominant domains were similar to the ones occurring in the other RS print media, i.e. war domain, master-servant, i.e. coach-driver domain, military domain and god domain. Apart from these, other domains used in *Glas Srpske* and *Novi Reporter* are revenge and violence domain, terrorism domain, religion domain and property domain.

Taking into consideration the leftist political direction of *Dani* and *Slobodna Bosna*, the domains used depict huge anomaly in political relations both among OHR and the local politicians, and between the local ruling parties in BiH. Strong visual metaphors reflect the fatality and hopelessness of the situation, where anomaly is depicted through the imagery of

Bermuda triangle and tribal relations describing the governing philosophy of the ruling nationalist parties in BiH, and characterize the fact that these parties have been split not only by nationalist domain, but are very aggressive in their behavior and led by base tribal principles of conduct. In addition, these two weeklies have been the bearers of research journalism, with well known columnists writing for their papers, which impacts the skillful use of the studied domains, and the overall paper quality. In terms of the stance reflected through the studied domains, ten years after Dayton, *Oslobodjenje* predominantly advocated BiH reforms towards the strengthening of State level institutions, judged Dayton Accords to be the obstacle of further progress and emphasized necessity for changes along the lines of the development of BiH State within the European integrations processes. In view of this daily, the international community in BiH, headed by the High Representative Paddy Ashdown, has had a significant share of failure and responsibility for the political situation in BiH. The impact of the HR and the international policies on Bosnia and Herzegovina are expressed through the metaphors of illusionary, non-existent BiH democratic state for which the responsibility is borne both by the inconsistent OHR policies and the leading destructive policies of local political leaders, primarily the Republic of Srpska politicians. In this tone, through “disaster” domain, *Oslobodjenje* journalists bitterly express a fact that Bosnia has no other choice but Europe or disaster, while the international community has double standards in its agenda, one for the Bosniak politicians, and the other one for the RS. Namely, its policies work at the cost of the Bosniaks, while the RS has been greatly favoured. When it comes to Lajčak's mandate, his reform initiatives are characterized as superficial and damaging primarily for the Bosniak population in BiH, and characterized as “colorful lies” and “drugs” which have to be swallowed by the FBiH Entity population.

On the other hand, the predominant *Avaz* discourse on Dayton Anniversary is bipolar. Positive semantic context is provided for the platforms of the OHR, namely to the transfer of competencies from the Entity to the State level, and the EU accession path for BiH. Since this means weakening of the Entity positions, which the RS side strongly opposes, this fact is clearly reflected in the used domains, where the paper takes over Ashdown's discourse on Republic of Srpska described as “the dark province” of the Balkans. In such a mode, *Dnevni Avaz* waves the OHR flag, while the quality of the OHR's engagement is in no way questioned or analyzed through research type journalism. A reason for this is the political direction of

Avaz, which is the Bosniak, namely SDA founded daily tabloid, so that, as long as the High Representative declaratively works on strengthening of the State institutions, he also works for the Bosniak interest in BiH. Even if such an approach may be effective in appeasing the Bosniak electorate body, it is far from quality journalism and does not demonstrate consistency in its professional approach.

As mentioned earlier, *Nezavisne Novine* discourse in 2005 may be characterized as balancing between different lines of argument, since the interviews with international community representatives which are related to the Dayton anniversary are complimentary to the European integrations processes, presented as commonsensical and normal, while, on the other hand, the daily columnists' discourse contains bitter criticism both of the local government representatives and the OHR, who is seen as pushing the country backwards, and described with a series of visually strong and brittle metaphors. Thus, “policeman”, “voyage” and “house” domains all advocate the dominating position of Europe on the political scene, and the process of transition which BiH must make, while its politicians are “nationalist narcotics dealers, idiots and barbarians”. Eventual attempts of *Nezavisne Novine* to maintain a breath of fresh air in the RS media have not been predominant, since, by year 2007, ethno-national approach has won the battle in the smaller entity. After change which took place in *Nezavisne Novine* ownership, and its closer links with Milorad Dodik, the critical stance of the paper has been significantly waning. This is also visible in the use of domains which seem to speak one voice with the other observed RS media. The war, religion, revenge, and terrorist domains all establish the endangered position of BiH Serbs in the country, and emphasize the Serbs' need to fight for their survival against the Islamic and mujahedeen Bosniak forces, which are ready to annihilate each and every Serb in BiH. However, what is at stake here is the primary wish of the RS Prime Minister to hide his criminal activities (about which many media and intellectuals in BiH talk and write), and his wish to stay in power. In interview for Sarajevo X portal, Dragomir Babić, the President of “National Front” NGO from Banja Luka said the following:

A big problem in the RS rests with the regime media, which absolutely protect Milorad Dodik's criminal activities, since he bribed them all under his control. These media satanize our every attempt to do something positive in the RS, and they try to portray us as betrayers. No wonder it is so, once you take a look at the management of these media, all of them are former staff of Radovan Karadžić (Sarajevo-X.com).

Along the same lines, Babić places harsh critique on Dodik and Kopanja, which also reflects the results of my research as far as the RS print media are concerned:

I was named a foreign mercenary by Željko Kopanja, *Nezavisne Novine* owner and Milorad Dodik. By two persons who have the least right to do so. Both of them were created by Americans. Kopanja was a semiskilled journalist, in constant state of drunkenness, hanging around the cheap bars waiting to get treated by a sip of brandy. And, as such, he was fine for Americans, who turned him into a media magnate who they are ashamed of now. (ibid)

Most visible in *Novi Reporter* is a servile stance towards the dominant political option in the RS and the fight for the ones' own "sheepfold", which reflects the phenomenon Hana Arendt named "the totalitarianism of small nations". As Nebojša Popov wrote:

The forms of totalitarianism which Arendt analyzes imply powerful society, strong industry and serious imperial plans. Our totalitarianisms contain some elements of all this, but not in a sufficient number to create stable hierarchy. That's why such a type of order is both dreadful and comic. (*Odjeci i reagovanja*, 69)

Thus, private courtyard and property domain used in *Novi Reporter* reflect the fact that Europe works against the RS interests, keeps its doors closed and keeps trash outside its borders, while the disabled patient domain places total blame for the current situation in the RS on the international community, namely OHR.

While *Danas* journalists prevailingly write on the BiH Croat position and political parties' perspective in relation to constitutional changes in BiH, they are absolutely synchronized in their advocacy of constitutional reforms in BiH leading to the abolishment of entity structure, which shall secure equal rights to BiH Croats who, in the paper's view, have been the "losers" of Dayton Peace Accords. However, through sound political columns, room was found for football domain such as "Croat's own goals", which makes Croats equally responsible for the situation they are in, namely for lack of their own political strategy which brought them in a position to become "traps" for the realization of political interests of either Bosniaks or Serbs. Looking at the analyzed print media, there are a series of joint metaphors characterizing their writing on the 10th Dayton Anniversary and Lajčak's reform initiatives. These are primarily used to characterize the relationship between OHR and local political elites, as well as the OHR mandate in BiH. In terms of this relationship, Europe is regularly presented as "a house", "a private property", "a courtyard", entry into which is guarded by firmly sealed "doors". Entry into the house depends on the fulfillment of EU integrations conditions, where Europe is also "the policeman" monitoring the process of fulfillment of conditions for BiH to cross the threshold of European doors. Another joint metaphor is of Europe as a mother who does not

treat all of its children equally, namely, in this case, neglects BiH, or makes a differentiation between the two entities. Emphasizing the dominant position of the OHR, majority of the media use the master-servant metaphor, where BiH is placed in subjected position, made to carry the entire load on its back. What this metaphor implies is that BiH is not in a position to negotiate, but to listen and abide to the European conditions and directions.

The FBiH media joint metaphor of Dayton is of a “colorful lie” and “a Western pragmatic lie” which does not provide for sustainable BiH political system, and should, thus, be subject to amendments directed towards the strengthening of BiH institutions. However, on the other hand, the RS media do not criticize Dayton in these terms, since any strengthening of State institutions implies reduction in RS authorities, which is not in the interest of the RS ruling politicians.

Joint metaphors across the studied media are of a chronic and disabled patient standing as a metaphor both for BiH as a state and the RS only. In addition, there are also uses of the leadership domain across the board, where majority of the media characterize Paddy Ashdown as primitive, incompetent leader, either collaborator of Bosniaks at the cost of BiH Serbs, or the one who works against the interest of BiH as a whole, even being called a spy and a ranger. In the same tone, BiH population is commonly depicted via one or another metaphor for grouping, such as “a herd”, “a tribe” or “a group of addicts”. This clearly implies a fact that ordinary people “are kidnapped” by politicians, as *Dani* writes, or act only as a mass, with no individual lines of thinking and reasoning. War domain also dominates the print media writing, being most emphasized in the RS media. It is both a sign of near war past and brutalities which country went through, and a sign that war rhetoric is still an active media tool in ensuring continued status quo and maintenance of fear among the BiH ethnic communities. This polarization in media space is primarily fed by the RS media which unanimously proclaim Bosniak politicians as Islamic terrorists, mujahedeens, aggressive people with no character and the enemies of BiH Serbs. In addition, the Bosniak are the allies of OHR, which is well depicted in NN column written by Milorad Dodik, where he uses the metaphor of 'internal combustion' of Serbs, which is jointly implemented by the other two factors. Particularly present in the RS print media after the amendments to BiH Parliament Rulebook were imposed by Miroslav Lajčák, is the god or deity metaphor used for OHR. In this way, OHR is mocked as the body behaving like the supreme ruler of BiH. In addition, according to the RS media, the

OHR has an approach that none of its actions should be questioned by the local counterparts in BiH, but be blindly obeyed like “the Ten Commandments” from the Bible Old Testament.

A cross-section analysis of metaphors used in the BiH print media demonstrates important facts on the public image of the High Representative in BiH. Overall, the image projected is that the High Representative's actions in the domain of police reform do not demonstrate a unique and strategic plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead, divergent currents which characterize the European Union policies towards the Balkan region countries reflect the fact that the High Representative uses his mandate in BiH primarily for advancing his own career, while the concrete political results of his work are not to be seen. In addition, the HR's position has been characterized by degradation from the first post-war High Representative Carl Bildt onwards, where this mandate has become ever more bureaucratic, with ever less authorities and ability to make vital decisions which would improve the situation in BiH political arena. While Paddy Ashdown came to Sarajevo with his military and political past which followed him throughout his BIH mandate, Miroslav Lajčak showed even less determination to avoid making compromises towards the ruling nationalist elite in BiH, and take BiH onto the European integrations road. Even when talking about *BH Dani* and *Slobodna Bosna*, which advocate more of a civic, overall approach to reform processes in BiH, their domains reflect a very unfavorable picture of the OHR, and the High Representative in particular. As seen through the given metaphors, the HR is an acting figure who lacks political vision, strategy and determination towards thorough improvement of political affairs in the country, while the HR more gladly sides with the dominant nationalistic voices of local politicians. Thus, continued application of 'the Dayton lunatic shirt' on the body of BiH seems to suit both the OHR and the local politicians in their maintenance of *status quo* in the country, out of the fear what the removal of this “shirt” would reveal.

An interesting thing to note is that the treatment of any of the two High Representatives by the local print media is closely linked to the reform actions implemented and the way these actions may affect particular nationalities in the country. The most distinctive is the form of intolerance towards the OHR which is coupled with the criticism of one Entity's Government towards the other, namely criticism of the Federation print media towards the RS political parties, and intolerance of the RS print media towards the Bosniak political parties, seated in Sarajevo. As a reaction to the reform steps of the High Representative, this criticism is shaped

through the prism of whether the observed decisions “side” with the Bosniak, Croat or the Serb political party platforms. Therefore, if, according to the RS leading political parties, HR’s actions endanger the ethno-national identity of the Serb ethnic community in BiH, this automatically implies that the High Representative is pro-Bosniak, working for “Islamized, centralized Bosnia and Herzegovina”, and its political advocates. On the other hand, HR’s reform actions directed towards the strengthening and greater efficiency of the State institutions are seen as favorable by the Federation media, which openly criticize the Republic of Srpska authorities and their sabotaging of Lajčak’s initiatives. In terms of the Police Reform negotiation outcome in April 2008, the situation is quite the opposite. Republic of Srpska political parties complemented the High Representative on the fact that the final reform proposal provided for continued existence of the RS Police Forces in their unchanged structure, and presented, in the view of the RS print media, a victory of the RS interests in BiH. Different picture is painted by the Federation independent weeklies *BH Dani* and *Slobodna Bosna*, which recognized in the OHR’s imposition of Police Reform the international community’s lack of strategic approach for BiH, and nothing more than its attempt to balance already heated up situation in the region, in relation to the unsettled status of Kosovo. In terms of pragmatic choices made, all of the print media were abundant in the use of metaphors, namely evaluation and referential strategies, whereby the described ratio of forces and political party agendas are dominantly described via analyzed metaphors. Thus, the set hypothesis has been defended, namely the analysis has shown that leadership, house, lunacy and war domain metaphors are a common instrument used in the emotionalisation of the public image of the High Representative in BiH print media. Moreover, judging from the fact that ethno-national dimension was a predominant factor in the local print media reactions to the OHR’s reform initiatives in BiH, we may agree with Benedict Anderson, who well said that “the “end of the era of nationalism” so long prophesized is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson 1991).

If we look back to the introductory section of this paper and the fact that the BiH print media are self-regulated through the BiH Press Council (which has been largely ineffectual in addressing hate speech and breaches of the ethics code), we may conclude that in BiH, and particularly pronounced in the uniform messages of the RS print media, an important question is that of the legitimate value (or lack of legitimate value) in the use of exclusive ethno-national interpretation

formulae in the examples analyzed above and the extent to which such frameworks dominate and restrict freedom of expression in BiH print media space.

In the light of conceptual blending theory, metaphors, which occur in discourse, can be more or less conventional, and, thus, conventionally, come to reflect the "entrenched conceptual blending networks" (Hart, 13). However, this process of entrenchment is also dependent on conventionality of usage, which means that, for such a claim, I would have to perform quantitative analysis across various discourse genres, including the analysis of the use of metaphors in BiH electronic media, which are both numerous, and characterized by specific and complex structure. Thus, in terms of the deficiencies of the performed research, a more comprehensive picture of the observed topic would have been grasped by extending the research on the other media, thus targeting greater percentage of population consuming the messages of both the print and electronic media in BiH on a daily basis.

5 Conclusion

As seen via metaphor analysis performed, the print media market in BiH has been characterized by the process of »emotionalisation«, which has been particularly present and employed from the 1990ies onwards, and has been a tool to influence and modify the thought processes, emotions, and, consequently, actions of the target audience. As mentioned in the introductory section, such a process in Bosnia and Herzegovina is reflected in a situation where a leader, or a prominent political party, as the incarnation of authority, creates within an ethnic group a feeling of being special and different from the rest in a sense that the rules which apply to the others are not to be applied to the representatives of the leader's ethnic community. Creation of such a split in BiH society is realized via different means, one of them being the print media. In accordance to Critical Discourse Analysis, discourse presentation targeted towards polarization of BiH print media, and consequently, BiH ethnic communities, is directly linked to the use of metaphors, where "metaphors are ideological, in so far as they "define in significant part what one takes as reality" (Chilton and Lakoff 1995, 56). Therefore, the research question in the dissertation was focused on the ideological uses of metaphors in BiH print media, as analyzed via Conceptual Blending Theory. Conceptual blending theory is considered one of the great breakthroughs in cognitive science, which brings forth a whole new picture of human thinking. According to this theory, elements and vital relations from diverse scenarios are "blended" in a subconscious process, which prompts for the construction of a number of mental spaces, and, in the third stage of the blending process, elaborates the emotionalisation processes occurring in specific use of metaphors in discourse.

In terms of the research methodology and data corpus used in the dissertation, the print media image of the High Representative was observed through the application of the listed theories on six daily and four weekly newspapers issued in different parts of BiH, while the criteria used were readership and regional representation. The time period observed was the 10th anniversary of Dayton Peace Accords and the reform initiatives of the OHR High Representative and in September 2007 to April 2008 period.

The key findings of the analysis are that metaphors from specific domains are prevailingly used elements in the analyzed print media in relation to the High Representative's mandate in BiH and his role in the European integrations processes. In terms of the print media published

on the FBiH territory, the key predominant domains are the leadership domain, house, patient-doctor and lunacy domain, policeman domain and voyage domain.

In terms of the RS media, there is a slight difference in time periods observed. Thus, in year 2005, *Nezavisne Novine* daily used domains similar to FBiH print media, while in 2007-2008 period, predominant domains in all of the RS print media were war, military and god domain. Apart from these, the domains used were revenge and violence domain, terrorism, religion and property domain. Emphasizing the dominant position of the OHR, majority of the media have used the master-servant metaphor, which places BiH in subjected position, made to follow the EU instructions and conditions on the European road.

The overall picture of the OHR, and particularly the High Representative, is very unfavorable. As seen through the given metaphors, the HR is an acting figure who lacks political vision, strategy and determination towards thorough improvement of political affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while, on the other hand, he plays the balancing role in BiH political arena, and commonly sides with the dominant nationalistic voices of local politicians.

In terms of print media polarization, one of the key findings is that the treatment of the High Representative by the local print media is closely linked to way in which the given reform actions of the HR may affect particular ethnic communities in the country, as seen and interpreted by the ruling politicians in each of the two Entities. Such a practice has shown that specific metaphors have been a common element in BiH print media, used to maintain and perpetuously “emotionalise” the public sphere in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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7 Povzetek v slovenskem jeziku

Uvod

Javna sfera v Bosni in Hercegovini, v devetdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja, je doživela proces "emocionalizacije javne sfere, kar pomeni, da ni možno pričakovati obširne racionalne diskusije kot predpogoj za proces sprejemanja odločitev (individualnih, skupinskih ali družbenih)" (Puhovski 2000, 48). Značilnost takšnega dogodka je atmosfera, ustvarjena v večetnični družbi kot je Bosna in Hercegovina, kjer vodja ali vodilna politična stranka, kot utelešenje oblasti, ustvarja znotraj etnične skupine občutek posebnosti in drugačnosti od ostalih, v smislu, da pravila, ki veljajo za ostale, ne veljajo za predstavnike etnične skupine omenjene vodje.

Deset let po Daytonskem mirovnem sporazumu, so primeri takšnega pristopa v BiH tiskanih medijih, med drugim, realizirani skozi zgoraj omenjeno "emocionalizacijo javne sfere", kar bom prikazala skozi analizo uporabljenih metafor v tiskanih medijih. Natančno povedano, osredotočila se bom na poročanje tiskanih medijev o 10. obletnici Daytonskega mirovnega sporazuma in o njihovem poročanju v odnosu na reformne iniciative urada visokega predstavnika, točneje visokega predstavnika, v obdobju od septembra 2007 do aprila 2008.

Teoretična osnova moje naloge sta kritična analiza diskurza in teorija konceptualne integracije. Po besedah Christopherja Harta (2007), kritična analiza diskurza raziskuje vlogo diskurznihih struktur v ustanavljanju socialnih neenakosti. V kontekstu "emocionalizacije javne sfere", je naslednja tendenca v prikazovanju diskurza mit, da je "resničnost transparentna in je lahko "brana" brez mediacije ali interpretacije", kar je "stranski proizvod tendence, da so dominantna ideološka prikazovanja realnosti naturalizirana kot edini način videnja realnosti, ki je posledično zgrajena kot transparentna" (Fairclough 1995, 64). Takšno prikazovanje diskurza je direktno povezano z uporabo metafor, ki je, po Charteris-Blacku (2004, 28), "osrednjega pomena za kritično analizo diskurza, saj se ukvarja s ustanavljanjem koherentnega pogleda na realnost". Teorija konceptualne integracije je kognitivna teorija. Po tej teoriji so elementi in ključni odnosi iz različnih scenarijev "zmešani" v podzavestni proces.

Proces je znan kot konceptualna integracija in se predstavlja, da je prisoten v vsakdanjih mislih in govoru. V moji raziskavi bo teorija konceptualne integracije prikazala, na kakšne načine je to orodje uporabljeno v ideoloških rabah metafor v bosanskohercegovskih tiskanih medijih.

Podoba visokega predstavnika v tiskanih medijih bo opazovana skozi uporabo omenjenih teorij v šestih dnevnikih in štirih tedenskih časopisih z najvišjo naklado, izdanih v različnih delih BiH. Pri izboru časopisov me je vodilo dejstvo da je trg BiH razdeljen po etnično-nacionalističnih črtah, kar je rezultat tega, da posamezni časopisi v prvi vrsti predstavljajo in poročajo z vidika posamezne etnične skupnosti v BiH. Hipoteza, ki jo bom testirala, je naslednja:

Predpostavljam, da so metafore iz domene vodstva, doma, norosti in vojne prevladujoče uporabljeni elementi emocionalizacije javne podobe visokega predstavnika v bosanskohercegovskih tiskanih medijih.

Prvo poglavje povzetka predstavlja zgodovinski in politični kontekst Bosne in Hercegovine, medtem ko drugo poglavje predstavlja osnovni teoretični in metodološki okvir študije. Glavni del naloge (v angleščini) predstavlja analizo javne podobe visokega predstavnika v bosanskohercegovskih tiskanih medijih, kot se odraža skozi uporabo metafor v določenih časovnih obdobjih.

V razpravi bom predstavila povzetek rezultatov analize metafor uporabljenih v tiskanih medijih, v odnosu do skupnih metafor, in naredila zaključek, kaj nam ti rezultati povedo o mandatu ter vlogi visokega predstavnika v Bosni in Hercegovini.

Zgodovinski in politični kontekst

Javno podobo visokega predstavnika v bosanskohercegovskih tiskanih medijih je možno ustrezno opazovati le znotraj zgodovinskega in družbenega konteksta v BiH, v odnosu na razpad bivše Jugoslavije in glede na okoliščine, ki so pripeljale do angažmaja mednarodne skupnosti v BiH. Pri tem mislim še posebej na priznanje neodvisnosti Bosne in Hercegovine leta 1992, Daytonski mirovni sporazum in ustanovitev urada visokega predstavnika, predstavniškega telesa mednarodne skupnosti v BiH.

Razpad bivše Jugoslavije

"Bivša Jugoslavija je postala "bivša Jugoslavija", ko so narodi njenih različnih konstitutivnih republik glasovali za ločene nacionalne države, zasnovane na suverenosti etnično definirane nacije, in ne na suverenosti države enakih državljanov" (Hayden 1999, 26). Volitve v Bosni in Hercegovini leta 1990 so prinesle absolutno zmago trem nacionalnim strankam, kar je, po Pešićevih besedah, "tipičen primer "zapornikove dileme", kar logično kaže na to, da

pomanjkanje sodelovanja vodi k najslabši izbiri za vse strani, ki sprejemajo odločitve za prihodnost" (Pešić v Popovu 1996, 50).

V tem obdobju je bila glavna zadeva v javnosti ta, ali bo Bosna razglašena kot neodvisna država, kjer so "srbski predstavniki uporabljali konstitutivni mehanizem, da bi preprečili ta dogodek; muslimani so, s pomočjo Hrvatov, kršili ustavo, da bi to dosegli" (Hayden 2005, 238). Torej, dejanje priznanja samostojnosti BiH s strani mednarodne skupnosti je bilo daleč od tega, da bi imelo zadostno centripetalno silo, ki bi njenim političnim akterjem omogočilo doseganje dogovora po mirni poti in s tem preprečilo prihajajoče prelivanje krvi. Namesto tega se je, kot pravi Hayden, razglasitev neodvisnosti zgodila "ne zato, ker je "bosanski narod" to želel, ampak prav zato, ker mnogi tega niso želeli ... Priznanje je bil poskus da bi razdeljeno hišo razglasili za kondominij, vendar je preveč njenih rezidentov raje želelo uničiti njeno strukturo kot jo deliti" (Hayden 2005, 239).

Daytonski mirovni sporazum

Pogajanja o splošnem okvirnem sporazumu za mir v Bosni in Hercegovini, tudi znanem kot Daytonski mirovni sporazum, so se začela po prejšnjih neuspešnih mirovnih naporih in aranžmajih, v obdobju od 1992 do 1995. Med septembrom in oktobrom 1995 se je veliko svetovnih sil zbralo v kontaktni skupini in uporabilo intenziven pritisk na vodje hrvaške, srbske in bošnjaške strani, da bi se udeležili pogajanj v Daytonu, Ohio.

Osnutek ustave BiH je bil narejen na mirovni konferenci v Daytonu, Ohio, v novembru 1995. Kot je zapisal Carl Bildt, sopredsedujoči na Daytonski mirovni konferenci, je bil prvi osnutek posredovan s strani Američanov in podvržen nekaterim pogajanjem (1998, 136-139), vendar "nihče ni menil, da je modro posredovati ustavo v kakršnikoli parlamentarni ali podoben postopek. Ustava naj bi bila po mednarodnem dekretu" (Bildt, 139). Kot je napisal Hayden: "Ustava je postala veljavna, ko je bila podpisana s strani predsednika Srbije, predsednika Hrvaške in vodje bošnjaških muslimana – torej, s strani dveh voditeljev, ki niti nista bila državljana domnevne bosanske države" (Hayden 2005, 243).

Mandat urada visokega predstavnika v BiH

Kmalu po tem, ko je bil sporazum podpisan, je postalo jasno, da osrednja bosanska vlada ne more delovati ustrezno z obstoječo ustavno ureditvijo. Zaradi tega je, decembra 1995, mednarodna skupnost imenovala Svet za uresničevanje miru, s ciljem nadziranja uresničevanja Daytonskega sporazuma, in telo, zadolženo za imenovanje visokega predstavnika za Bosno in Hercegovino. Mandat urada visokega predstavnika je uradno definiran v aneksu 10 Daytonskega mirovnega sporazuma. V njem je navedeno, da je to telo vodilna civilna agencija za uresničevanje miru v BiH, katere cilj je "pomagati stranem pri njihovih naporih in mobilizirati ter koordinirati aktivnosti organizacij in agencij, vključenih v civilni vidik mirovnega sporazuma" ("Splošni okvirni sporazum"). Vendar je Svet za ohranjanje miru decembra 1997 zaključil, da je "potreben še bolj vztrajen pristop s strani mednarodne skupnosti: aktivnosti oblasti v Bosni in Hercegovini so prepogosto osnovane samo na besedah ... in lahko celo ogrozijo že dosežen napredek" (PIC – Summary of Bonn Conclusions" 1997). Na ta način so bile visokemu predstavniku, znotraj tega "bolj vztrajnega pristopa", dodeljene Bonnske prednosti, ki so v osnovi zagotovile pravico in dolžnost visokemu predstavniku, da razreši vsakega predstavnika parlamentarne stranke, ki bi deloval v nasprotju z interesi mirovnega sporazuma. Prav iz tega razloga so bile Bonnske prednosti pogosto "trn v peti" lokalnih političnih strank in medijev, kot tudi orodje za radikalna dejanja visokega predstavnika.

Politična situacija v BiH od leta 2006 naprej

Kljub vsem popravkom mirovnega sporazuma, ki so se zgodili, je stal prepletajoči, okvarjeni, razdeljeni in predragi državni politični aparat v napoto reformam in približevanju Bosne in Hercegovine evropskim integracijam. V tem obdobju političnih napetostih od leta 2006 dalje, je BiH močno zaostajala za svojimi sosedi, v smislu integracij k EU in NATO zavezništvu. Večina debate v tiskanih medijih, v omenjenem obdobju, se je odvijala okoli žgočega vprašanja o potrebnih amandmajih ustave BiH, in pogojev, ki jih mora BiH izpolniti, da bi lahko podpisala Stabilizacijsko-pridružitveni sporazum z Evropsko unijo. Eden od glavnih pogojev, ki je bil postavljen BiH v študiji izvedljivosti, je bila policijska reforma v skladu z načeli EU.

Omenjeni pogoj je povezan z Lordom Paddyjem Ashdownom, ki je nastopil mandat visokega predstavnika/posebnega predstavnika EU za BiH. Med svojim mandatom je Ashdown oznanil reformo varnostnega sektorja za prioriteto.

Mandat četrtega visokega predstavnika dr. Christiana Schwarz-Schillinga, med 1. februarjem 2006 in 31. junijem 2007, je bil prvi resni poskus prenašanja čim večje odgovornosti na lokalna telesa odločanja, ki je bil, glede na situacijo sredi leta 2007, daleč od uspešnega. V tako napetem političnem okolju se je mednarodna skupnost odločila imenovati novega visokega predstavnika in predstaviti serijo radikalnih korakov, da bi nadoknadila čas, ki ga je BiH zapravila na poti k evropskim integracijam.

Teoretično metodološki okvir

Kot že omenjeno v uvodnem delu, sta teoretični osnovi moje naloge kritična analiza diskurza in teorija konceptualne integracije. V delu z naslovom *Discourse Representation in Media Discourse*, Fairclough razpravlja o ključni družbeni vlogi medijev, ki je "legitimizirati in reproducirati obstoječa asimetrična razmerja moči, s prenašanjem glasov močnih, kot da bi bili glasovi "zdravega razuma" (Fairclough 1995, 63). Takšna predstavitev diskurza je direktno povezana z uporabo metafor, ki je, po Charteris-Blacku (2004, 28), "osrednjega pomena za kritično analizo diskurza, saj se ukvarja s ustanavljanjem koherentnega pogleda na realnost".

Metafora je posebna oblika lingvističnega izražanja, ki napeljuje k izgradnji številnih mentalnih prostorov. "V primeru metafor gredo metalni prostori, zgrajeni med diskurzom, skozi posebno konceptualno integracijo, kjer so zmanipulirani v integrirano omrežje, ki proizvaja inferenčno strukturo" (Hart 2008, 7). V njeni preprosti obliki je pomen ustvarjen skozi *omrežje konceptualne integracije*, ki je sestavljeno iz štirih povezanih mentalnih prostorov. Dva od teh mentalnih prostorov sta vhodna prostora (*input spaces*), vsak od njiju vsebuje informacije o različnih vidikih znanja ali izkušenj. Tretji izmed teh prostorov je generični prostor (*generic space*), ki vsebuje elemente skupne obema vhodnima prostoroma. Četrty prostor je zmes (*blend*), ki vsebuje informacije, ki so selektivno projicirane iz obeh vhodnih prostorov, in so običajno stisnjene, združene skupaj ali drugače transformirane, da so razumljive v človeških okvirih.

Podoba visokega predstavnika v tiskanih medijih bo opazovana skozi uporabo omenjenih teorij v šestih dnevnikih in štirih tedenskih časopisih z najvišjo naklado, izdanih v različnih delih BiH.

Torej, uporabljena kriterija sta bila branost in regionalna zastopanost. Predlagani časopisi so: *Oslobođenje*, *Dnevni Avaz*, *Nezavisne Novine*, *Glas Srpske*, *Danas News Magazine*, *Dnevni list*, *BH Dani*, *Slobodna Bosna* in *Novi Reporter*.

Zbirka za analizo tiskanih medijev je razdeljena v dva dela. Prvi vsebuje intervjuje, raziskovalne članke, poročila s tiskovnih konferenc in kolumne, ki se nanašajo na 10. obletnico Daytonskega mirovnega sporazuma, objavljenih v drugi polovici leta 2005. Drugi del zbirke vsebuje članke, izdane v obdobju od septembra 2007 do aprila 2008, namreč članke, ki pokrivajo reformne iniciative visokega predstavnika Miroslava Lajčka. Izvlečki, izbrani za analizo, so bili primarno izbrani glede na pojav naslednjih fraz: "Daytonski mirovni sporazum", "urad visokega predstavnika", "Paddy Ashdown", "mednarodna skupnost", "visoki predstavnik", "ustavne reforme", "Miroslav Lajčak", "policajska reforma". Končni rezultati analize bodo predstavljeni v spodnjem povzetku razprave, kjer bom poskušala predstaviti rezultate glede na posamezne politične usmeritve tiskanih medijev, kot tudi glede na skupne uporabljene metafore v teh medijih. Glede na to, da je tema moje naloge javna podoba visokega predstavnika v bosanskohercegovskih tiskanih medijih, bom na kratko ugotovila, kaj nam ti rezultati povedo o družbeni sliki visokega predstavnika in njegove vloge političnega arbitra v BiH.

Razprava

Vpogled v javno podobo visokega predstavnika v bosanskohercegovskih tiskanih medijih, v odnosu do uporabe metafor pri pisanju o 10. obletnici Daytonskega mirovnega sporazuma in reformnih aktivnostih visokega predstavnika, v obdobju od septembra 2007 do aprila 2008, razkrije serijo pomembnih ugotovitev.

Ključna ugotovitev analize je, da so metafore iz posameznih domen, omenjenih v hipotezi, prevladujoči uporabljeni elementi v analiziranih tiskanih medijih, v odnosu do mandata visokega predstavnika v BiH in njegove vloge v procesu k Evropskim integracijam.

Obstaja serija skupnih metafor, ki karakterizirajo pisanje tiskanih medijev o 10. obletnici Daytonskega sporazuma in Lajčakovih reformnih iniciativah. Te so primarno uporabljene za karakterizacijo odnosa med uradom visokega predstavnika in lokalnimi političnimi elitami, kot tudi mandatom visokega predstavnika. Glede tega odnosa je Evropa redno predstavljena kot "hiša", "privatno posestvo", "dvorišče", vhod v katere varujejo močno zaprta "vrata". Vhod v

hišo je odvisen od izpolnitve integracijskih pogojev EU, kjer je Evropa tudi "policist", ki nadzoruje proces izpolnjevanja pogojev za vstop BiH čez prag evropskih vrat.

Naslednja skupna metafora predstavlja Evropo kot mater, ki ne obravnava vseh svojih otrok enako, namreč, v tem primeru zanemarija BiH, ali dela razliko med obema entitetama. Naglašujoč dominanten položaj OHR-a, večina medijev uporablja metaforo gospodar-sluga, kjer je BiH postavljena v podrejen položaj in mora nositi celotno breme na svojem hrbtu.

Uporabljena skupna metafora v raziskovanih medijih je kronični in nepokreten pacient, ki je metafora tako za BiH kot državo, kot samo za Republiko srbsko. Poleg tega je skupna tudi uporaba vodstvene domene, kjer večina medijev karakterizira Paddyja Ashdowna kot primitivnega, nesposobnega vodjo, ali kot kolaboratorja Bošnjakov na račun bosanskohercegovskih Srbov, ali pa kot tistega, ki deluje proti interesom BiH kot celote. Označuje se ga celo kot vohuna in paznika. V istem tonu je bosanskohercegovska populacija pogosto opisana z eno ali drugo metaforo za grupiranje, kot na primer "horda", "pleme" ali "skupina odvisnikov". Vojna domena prav tako dominira v pisanju tiskanih medijev, najbolj poudarjena v medijih Republike srbske. To je znamenje bližnje vojne preteklosti in surovosti, skozi katero je šla država, kot tudi znamenje, da je vojna retorika še vedno uporabljena kot aktivno medijsko orodje v zagotavljanju nadaljnega statusa quo in vzdrževanje strahu med bosanskohercegovskimi etničnimi skupnostmi.

Vojna, religija, maščevanje in teroristične domene v tiskanih medijih v Republiki srpski vzpostavljajo ogrožen položaj bosanskohercegovskih Srbov v državi ter poudarjajo potrebo Srbov po boju za preživetje proti islamskim bošnjaškim političnim silam, ki so pripravljene, da uničijo vsakega Srba v BiH. Še posebej prisotna v tiskanih medijih v Republiki srbski, potem ko je Miroslav Lajčak naložil amandmaje Poslovniku BiH parlamenta, je metafora "bog" ali "božanstvo" za urad visokega predstavnika. S tem je urad visokega predstavnika zasmehovan kot telo, ki se obnaša kot vrhovni poglavar v BiH.

Cross-section analiza metafor, uporabljenih v BiH tiskanih medijih, prikazuje pomembna dejstva o javni podobi visokega predstavnika v BiH. Gledano v celoti, projicirana podoba je takšna, da dejanja visokega predstavnika, v domeni policijske reforme, ne prikazujejo edinstvenega in strateškega načrta za Bosno in Hercegovino. Dodatno, položaj visokega predstavnika je bil okarakteriziran z degradacijo, ki se je začela s prvim povojnim visokim predstavnikom Carlom Bildtom, kjer je ta mandat postajal vedno bolj birokratski, brez

možnosti sprejemanja ključnih odločitev, ki bi izboljšale situacijo na bosanskohercegovski politični sceni.

Tudi, ko se govori o *BH Danih* in *Slobodni Bosni*, ki zagovarjata bolj državljanski in celoten pristop k reformnemu procesu v BiH, njune domene odražajo zelo nenaklonjeno sliko urada visokega predstavnika, še posebej samega visokega predstavnika. Gledano skozi metafore, je visoki predstavnik "marioneta", ki ji manjka politične vizije, strategije in odločnosti k obsežnim izboljšavam političnih zadev v državi. Torej, nadaljnja uporaba "Daytonske nore srajce" na telesu BiH, očitno ustreza tako uradu visokega predstavnika, kot tudi lokalnim politikom, in njunem vzdrževanju statusa quo v državi, saj bi odstranitev "srajce" lahko razkrila marsikatero "okostnjake v omarah".

Glede polarizacije tiskanih medijev, je eno od ključnih ugotovitev to, da je obravnavanje visokega predstavnika s strani lokalnih tiskanih medijev tesno povezana s tem, kako lahko zgoraj omenjene reforme vplivajo na posamezne etnične skupnosti v državi, kot jih vidijo in tolmačijo politiki na oblasti v obeh entitetah. Takšna praksa je pokazala, da so bile posamezne metafore pogost element v bosanskohercegovskih tiskanih medijih, uporabljene za vzdrževanje neprestane emocionalizacije razdeljene javne sfere v Bosni in Hercegovini.