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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BY UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY (USIA) AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Magistrsko delo

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"To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; credible we must be truthful".

(Edward R. Murrow, 1908-1965)

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PREFACE

The longer I work at the Embassy of the United States in Ljubljana, the more I am fascinated with the field of public diplomacy. I have been in the position of Program Assistant in the Public Affairs Office for six years now, and, having been with The Embassy so long as a Foreign Service National, I can confirm the proverb "I know that I don't know anything".

Ultimately one realizes that public diplomacy actually surrounds us. It seems like it is part of everyone's character and as such also the substance of each and every single government. The only difference is how is it handled and the degree to which people take advantage of it.

The United States are definitely the cradle of public diplomacy and I can safely say, without any statistical data for a proof that a bulk of the books and articles come from this country, simultaneously, debates around contemporary public diplomacy are dominated by the US experience.

I would like to thank my colleagues from the Public Affairs Section at the United States Embassy in Ljubljana for sharing their experiences and insights from their long-term engagement in the public diplomacy, specifically: Breda Popovic, Information Resources Director, who provided me with many informational sources for my thesis, Ivanka Ponikvar, Cultural Affairs Specialist, for sharing the exchange programs databases and Lojzka Iskra, Information Assistant, for her long-term observations. Each has been serving for the United States Government for fifteen years or more. I had the opportunity to assemble ongoing first-hand experience and helpful documents from previous Public Affairs Officer, Robert J. Post and I also appreciate the valuable information provided by senior Foreign Service Officer, Robert J. Callahan, who served in Iraq as Public Diplomacy officer and visited Slovenia to present the “public diplomacy art” to Slovene counterparts. This thesis would not exist without much appreciated input from Slovenian participants in

the exchange programs. I should not forget my mentor, Professor Cornell William Clayton and Professor Bogomil Ferfila. Last, but not least, I would also like to thank Julia Charles, a Fulbright student, who edited the text and made it “readable” and to Alenka Flander who was saving draft copies on her computer "just in case"...

1. RESEARCH RELEVANCE OF SUGGESTED TOPIC: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BY USIA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This master's thesis analyzes whether American public diplomacy successfully adapted to the changed world situation after 9-11, as well as the impact it has had on Slovene views of the United States since that time.
To further clarify, a sub-question can be posed: is it practically impossible to expect public diplomacy to be fully successful during certain political periods? Before addressing these questions, it is necessary to present the roots and development of public diplomacy in the United States. Thus, the first part of the thesis will focus on origins, development and terminology used. Terminology and the content of the programs of American public diplomacy are fundamental to understanding the research questions. **Section I** will explain and define public diplomacy, contrasting it with other forms of diplomacy, and its relationship to foreign policy generally.
Section II will provide a brief history of US public diplomatic efforts and programs. It explains changes to American diplomacy after 9/11, and provides evidence indicating that they were not successful at changing international attitudes about American policies on the war on terrorism and on Iraq specifically. Reorganization and consolidation of United States Information Agency and its activities into the State Department's system in 1999 were both a curse and a blessing. On one hand, the loss of USIA's independence brought a loss of influence, but on the other, becoming part of the State Department protected it. "After the Cold War ended, USIA became a target for Congressional budget-cutters, and in 1999 it ceased to exist as an independent agency. It was rolled into the State Department, where it had a much lower profile." (Seib 2006:3) On the positive side, reorganization meant, at least in theory, integrating public diplomacy more closely into the system of overall diplomacy.
September 11's the fatal terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, along with increasing terrorist threats, have also elicited changes in American public diplomacy. Special programs have been developed for

Muslim populations all over the world. Despite these programs, public polls results show extreme anti-Americanism. The reputation of the United States is at one of its lowest points in history (see Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005, 2006 and 2007). Why so? Is it because of the war in Iraq or is it because of the style of the current President, George W. Bush? Perhaps public diplomacy in its current forms cannot cope with contemporary global challenges. The public diplomacy of the United States of America has certainly changed, yet the question remains whether it has done so in the right direction and adequately? When formulating public policy, does the United States take into consideration enough the impact of degree globalization and intensive interaction between the politics and culture?

Moreover the question of the coordination and cooperation between different actors must be considered – both within the State Department itself and between various departments and governmental agencies (for example Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency), as each plays its own role regarding their individual programs and projects.

Finally **Section III** turns to empirical discussion of public diplomacy, focusing on measuring the level of public diplomatic activities and measuring whether such programs succeed in meeting their goals in the case of US-Slovene relations. It provides evidence that they are in general successful in leading to a more favorable impression of the U.S. Probably the most challenging question would be how to weigh the impact of public diplomacy. If the central aims of public diplomacy are to present the country and communicate its governmental policies, and to influence public attitudes about those policies, how can one then measure the success and efficiency of public diplomacy programs? For example, how can one find out if an undertaking such as the International Visitors Program is successful? Such considerations should ask not only if the program itself was successful, but also whether the U.S. foreign policy goals benefited from it.

While I do not have data that allows to directly address whether public diplomacy programs in Slovenia make Slovenes any more receptive or supportive of U.S. foreign policy goals in Iraq, the results from the opinion poll provides the evidence that they have been effective at building trust in the U.S.

generally, and make Slovenes more sophisticated in being able to distinguish specific American policies (such as Bush's war in Iraq) and indicate the desirability of a close relationship with the U.S. generally.

1.1. Methods Used

This thesis is based on a review of relevant literature, secondary sources (such as public opinion polls and government reports), and original data gathered from a survey conducted by the author. To assess the impact of American public diplomacy programs in general, this study relies upon survey research by several institutions, such as Pew Research Center, Gallup, Zogby, as well as research by Slovene institutions and U.S. government agencies. In assessing the impact of public diplomacy programs in Slovenia, this study relies upon informal discussions with public affairs officers and section colleagues from the Embassy of the United States in Ljubljana and a survey of individuals that participated in the International Visitors Leadership Program and Slovenes that received a Fulbright Scholarship or participated in the Ron Brown or the Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Programs. The study employs a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques.
The empirical part indicates the impact and effects of the public diplomacy by the Embassy of the United States of America in Ljubljana and gages the feelings about United States foreign policy.

The specific questions examined are the following:

1. What has been the relationship between propaganda and public diplomacy in American foreign policy?
2. How was U.S. public diplomacy transformed after 9/11?
3. How have U.S. public diplomacy efforts since 9/11 affected international attitudes regarding the U.S. and American policy?
4. How successful have public diplomacy programs in Slovenia been, and how might they be more effective in the future?

The responses to these questions yields answers to the central question: “How did the State Department's public diplomacy programs and policies change after 09/11, and how are certain programs performing?" Measurement of the performance will be based on Slovenia as a case study.

Generally speaking, this study concludes that public diplomacy strategies adjusted effectively to post 9-11 conditions, but as always, some questions remain unanswered and there are areas that need improvement. In particular to achieve better results, it would make sense to include public diplomacy at the very start of political process and before the final policy decisions are made; although, that would not necessarily guarantee the success of the foreign policy goals. On the other hand, public diplomacy would have to be a more prominent part of American foreign policy and have the requisite means and tools to disseminate knowledge to other actors and key players. More authority should be devolved of those involved with the day to day interaction and communication with local populations. Arguably, it is those in the field – the employees in the public diplomacy sections within the Embassies – who are the most knowledgeable about the culture, values and norms, religion and traditions of a certain country and it would be worthwhile to include them more in the policy-making process of the Administration. Measurement of the public diplomacy success is another topic that this thesis deals with. Public opinion polls are part of the public diplomacy success evaluation. If public opinions indicate certain foreign policy not being likable, then public diplomacy is to blame for, as its key target audience is the public. As explained, it is not as simple as that. Public diplomacy is just one among the foreign policy activities. It targets a variety of groups, with a variety of programs. As it affects values and norms, it is very hard to measure it; especially in a short-term period. A certain foreign policy can be successful in one country, but not in another. It can be legitimate domestically, but not necessarily abroad. When foreign policy is popular and likeable, public diplomacy has an easy job and it is called successful. If that it is not the case, public diplomacy is often seen as a failure, as for example in Iraq.

2. WHAT IS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

The term “public diplomacy” is widely used but ill-defined. Indeed, there is no clearly agreed-upon definition of what constitutes public diplomacy. The meaning of the term has changed over time and connotes different things in different settings and cultures. For example, how the term is used in American academic discourse certainly differs from how it is often used by practitioners of diplomacy – and even this academic usage differs in German or French academic discourse. Moreover, the introduction of new communication technologies such as web chat- lines, electronic journals, and e-mail have dramatically expanded the modes of public diplomacy in recent years. The public diplomacy timeline can be measured in months, years or even decades to achieve success.

The word diplomacy, originally of Greek roots, was increasingly used by the French to refer to the work of negotiator on behalf of the sovereign. The first foreign ministry, or governmental agencies specifically charged with carrying out diplomatic policy was created in France in 1626. However “public diplomacy” is a special species of diplomacy.

According to Cull (2006), the earliest known English use of the term was in 1856 by the *London Times*. In a lead article criticizing U.S. President Franklin Pierce, the *Times* used the term as a synonym for civility in the conduct of foreign affairs. For the most part, however, the term was rarely used prior to 1965. More common was the term “open diplomacy” which was generally used to discuss the issue of negotiations under the examination of the public. It was actually first used by President Woodrow Wilson, who called for public consideration of treaties in 1918. In his letter to Secretary of State Lansing he explained what he meant by “open diplomacy”: “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, are requisite to a lasting peace and that from now on the processes of diplomacy must be always in the open” (Wilson 1918). The shift to “public diplomacy,” Cull argues, was a response by the U.S. government to the propaganda wars with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The United States Information Agency, Cull argues, needed an “alternative to the anodyne

term information or malignant term “propaganda”: a fresh turn of phrase upon which it could build new and benign meanings” (Cull 2006)

The term was given its first systematic definition in 1965 by Edmund A. Gullion, who served as Dean of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy at Tufts University. Public diplomacy, Gullion argued, deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses: dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as well as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communication. “Central to public diplomacy is the transnational flow of information and ideas” (Gullion 1965).

The following year, the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy was established. One of its earlier brochures described public diplomacy as:

> *"Public diplomacy ... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications."* (Murrow Center 1966)

But what is public diplomacy with regard to **traditional, standard diplomacy?** Standard diplomacy means the ways in which governments and their leaders communicate with each other at the highest level. It actually means government-to-government activities. In traditional diplomacy, U.S. Embassy officials represent the U.S. government in a host country primarily by maintaining relations and conducting official U.S. government business with the officials of the host government. Public diplomacy differs from traditional diplomacy in that it deals not only with governments but primarily with non-

governmental individuals and organizations, various groups and political parties. In this sense the government is no longer the sole implementer of diplomacy. This difference is summarized by Alan K. Henrikson, associate professor of diplomatic history, at the Fletcher School, Tufts University who thoroughly defines the entities of the public diplomacy. Public diplomacy may be defined, simply, as

> *" the conduct of international relations by governments through public communications media and through dealings with a wide range of nongovernmental entities (political parties, corporations, trade associations, labor unions, educational institutions, religious organizations, and ethnic groups, and so on including influential individuals) for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments."* (Henrikson 2005)

Furthermore, rather than a centralized message, public diplomacy activities often present many differing views as represented by private American individuals and organizations in addition to official U.S. governmental views (USIA Alumni Association 2002). Public diplomacy focuses on the ways in which a country (or multi-lateral organizations such as the United Nations), acting deliberately or inadvertently, through both official and private individuals and institutions, communicates with citizens in other societies. Effective public diplomacy must be regarded as a two-way street. It involves not only shaping the message(s) that a country wishes to present abroad, but also analyzing and understanding the ways that the message is interpreted by diverse societies and developing the tools of listening and conversation as well as the tools of persuasion (USC Center on Public Diplomacy 2006).

In addition, public diplomacy is based on open processes of communication; on public addresses and open public interactions of citizens from one nation with those of another. Traditional diplomacy, on the other hand, often is exclusive and secret. The themes and issues of traditional diplomacy in general relate to the behavior and policies of the government, whereas the themes and issues of public diplomacy relate to the attitudes and behaviors of the publics.

Signitzer and Coombs define public diplomacy as, “the way in which both, Government and private individuals and groups, influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions” (Signitzer and Coombs in Glassgold 2004:11). In this definition, public diplomacy can include a large variety of activities and processes. The authors go further, dividing public diplomacy into tough-minded and tender-minded wings. The intention of the tough-minded school is to influence the foreign public’s attitudes by convincing and using propaganda in its vitiated meaning, so that political dis-informing counts more than cultural programs. As a means of communication, quick media, such as radio, television and newspapers are used. The tender-minded school advocates that informational and cultural programs should avoid current foreign policy goals and concentrate on achieving long-term national aims. The goal, according to this school, is mutual understanding. In order to achieve it, the media used are movies, exhibitions, language training, exchanges which feature life style, political and economic integration and understanding. They stand for credibility and preciseness of information. According to Signitzer and Coombs, the most efficient is the combination of the two. They subsequently divided public diplomacy into political communication, conducted by the State Department and Embassies, and cultural relations, implemented by semi-autonomous programs, for example those executed by USIA (See Signitzer and Coombs in Kos 2002:41).

TOUGH-MINDED: To influence the positions Quick Media	PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	TENDER-MINDED: Mutual understanding Slow Media
	IN COMMON: To explain policies To picture the society	CULTURAL COMMUNICATION: -Cultural Diplomacy (cultural cooperation) -Cultural Relations (cultural agreements)
POLITICAL INFORMATION		

Table 2:1: Public Diplomacy Scheme by Signitzer and Coombs (Signitzer and Coombs in Kos 2002:41)

Even a brief review of U.S. government documents and reports demonstrates how broadly the term “public diplomacy” has been used in American policy. The US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy defines it as:

> *“informing, engaging and influencing foreign publics so that they may, in turn, encourage their governments to support key U.S. policies. It involves building mutual understanding and fostering more-favorable attitudes toward the U.S. so that other peoples near and far are more likely to shake our hands than to squeeze them”* (US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 2005:2).

The so-called Djerejian Report from 2003 prepared by the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World aimed at establishing new directions for U.S. public diplomacy targeting Muslims. According to it public diplomacy “is the promotion of the national interest by informing, engaging, and influencing people around the world. Public

diplomacy helped win the Cold War, and it has the potential to help win the war on terror" (US Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World 2003:3)

The United States Government Accountability Office in its *2007 Report on U.S. Public Diplomacy* says the key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and influence overseas audiences: "Public diplomacy is carried out through a wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print, broadcast, and electronic media; and other means" (US General Accounting Office 2007: 4). In 2003 the report included mention of the need "to reach out beyond foreign governments, to promote better appreciation of the United States abroad, greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics and sustained access and influence in important sectors of foreign societies" (US General Accounting Office 2003:4).

According to the State Department's *Dictionary of International Relations Terms*, public diplomacy refers to "government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television" (U.S. Department of State 1987:85). The United States Information Agency, which was in the business of public diplomacy for more than forty years, defines it as follows: Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad (USIA).

Moreover, there is a growing trend in the United States to link public diplomacy to the idea of "soft power" in American foreign policy. According to Nye, soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals. It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will. Both hard and soft powers are important in the war on terrorism, but attraction is much cheaper than coercion, and an asset that needs to be nourished. Attraction depends on credibility. Soft power grows out of American culture and policies. (Nye 2003)

In order to clarify the actual meaning of the public diplomacy it is also useful to put it into broader perspective and compare it with other similar terms most frequently used, such as propaganda and public affairs. To this day, there is no consensus as to the differences between public diplomacy and propaganda.

In English, **"propaganda"** was originally a neutral term used to describe the dissemination of information in favor of any given cause. It derives from Latin "propagare," meaning “to propagate.” According to Dictionary definitions, the word is synonymous with to spread, to disseminate, to publicize, to transmit, to promulgate, to broadcast, to proliferate and to circulate (U.S. Department of State 1987:85).

It originates from the Latin Congregatio de propaganda fide (Congregation for the Propagation of Faith) established by Catholic Church in 1622 during the Counter-Reformation. This Congregation was part of the Church’s Counter-Reformation movement. Propaganda was often associated with negative modulation or connotations, even untruth. (See Severin and Tankard 1997:110)

Many countries see it as a natural and widely accepted characteristic of social and political processes. Although in some cultures it is seen as neutral or even positive, most of the developed world sees it more negatively. In addition to this, its connotations have varied over time. In the United States, the term carries the most threatening connotation: propaganda is a dishonest means of communication not to be trusted, serving secret motives. It is regarded as intentionally misleading communication that is factually incorrect, biased in terms of argument and provocative in sentiment. There is widespread antagonism to anything identified as propaganda and it is this prejudice that has caused the virtual disappearance of the word from official discussions about communications in the United States (See Encyclopedia Americana 1996:656). The word propaganda is never used in explaining and disseminating the State Department’s public diplomacy. Even in informal discussions you will rarely hear it to describe information disseminated by the U.S. – no matter what means are being used.

In Western countries, the term acquired its overall negative meaning in the 20th Century. The main reason for that was because Germany under Hitler, as well as the Soviet Union, each explicitly used propaganda to promote Fascism and Communism throughout all forms of public expression. The rise of Nazis to power in Germany through the propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels provides the evidence of propaganda success in Hitler's Germany. As these ideologies were hostile to Western liberal societies, and the negative feelings toward them became projected into the word propaganda itself.

Propaganda is neutrally defined as a systematic form of purposeful persuasion that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target audiences for ideological, political or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages (which may or may not be factual) via mass and direct media channels. A propaganda organization employs propagandists who engage in propagandism—the applied creation and distribution of such forms of persuasion. (Nelson 1996: 176) Encyclopedia Americana defines propaganda as

> *"…any systematic attempt to influence opinion on a wide scale primarily by symbolic means. It is a form of communication that seeks to promote or discourage attitudes as a means of advancing or injuring an organization, an individual or a cause. Propaganda proceeds by deliberate plan for calculated effects. It usually addresses a mass audience through mass media, or special audiences and media that provide access to mass opinion."* (Encyclopedia Americana 1996: 656)

What, however, does a manipulation of various symbols mean? As Vreg puts it:

> *"Political propaganda is the method of the communication, with which the communicators or groups consciously, intentionally, planed and organized shape propagandistic projects and messages (symbols and idelogemes) with which they shape and control the opinions and positions of targeted audience and/or influence the change of their position."* (Vreg in Kos 2002:34)

The term propaganda refers to the use of communication messages to extol specific beliefs and expectations. Propagandists often rely on disinformation to

discredit their opposition (See Baran and Davis 2003:71). According to David Welch, one of the editors of *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present*, propaganda is “the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly” (Welch in Melissen 2005: 20). Definitions as such detach public diplomacy from propaganda. Many foreign policy activities contain elements of both public diplomacy and propaganda and it may therefore be preferable to look at the two concepts as a continuum. A broad category such as propaganda simply cannot capture the contemporary diversity in relations between diplomatic practitioners and increasingly assertive foreign publics.

Propaganda is no more misleading in any measurable sense than most other forms of communication. Its ultimate purpose is to influence the symbolic systems of individuals and/or groups at which the propaganda is aimed. And those systems will define what is true and what is false to maintain or inculcate faith. The postulates of propaganda are credibility and acceptance, not truth; the purposes of propaganda are various and depend on each individual and/or collective motives, usually controlled by the governments, as they hold dominant influence in reigning symbol systems. Usually this is connected to further division of propaganda into white (dissemination of just positive ideas), grey (transmission of ideas that might be right or false) or black (deliberate dissemination of lies and untruths). Propaganda mainly operates through processes of public communication and seeks either to become the news or to influence it. In order to be successful it must be shaped to exploit a trend of events or it has to stimulate one. As described in *Encyclopedia Americana*: “By implication, suggestion, and repetition as well as by direct statement, propaganda seeks to fix or divert attention, to influence the interpretation of forces and events, and by maintaining or altering opinion, to affect behavior-whether action or inaction” (1996:658).

Public diplomacy is similar to propaganda that it tries to persuade people what to think. However, it is fundamentally different in the sense that public diplomacy also listens to what people have to say.

A category such as propaganda cannot capture the contemporary diversity in relation between diplomats and assertive foreign publics. Propaganda is seen as a one-way street, not as a dialogue. Modern public diplomacy is a two-way street – it is a persuasion by means of a dialogue that is based on a liberal notion of communication with foreign publics. As Melissen emphasizes: …"public diplomacy is similar to propaganda in that it tries to persuade people what to think, but it is fundamentally different from it in the sense that public diplomacy also listens to what people have to say" (Melissen 2005:22). Propaganda thrives in non-democratic countries, where the access to media can be controlled and limited, thus curtailing diversity of opinion. Such societies usually do not have the tradition of questioning the government and politics. However, there are fewer and fewer such societies, as the globalization of democracy robbed many countries of conditions conducive to propaganda. In the short term, it is still possible to achieve good effect by using propaganda, but this may not hold in the longer run.

Public Affairs is a term used by government agencies and increasingly used as a synonym for public relations. Public relations is seen as management of communication, both internally and externally (Theaker in Newman and Vercic 2001:2) The Planning Group for Integration of USIA into the Department of State distinguishes Public Affairs from Public Diplomacy as follows:

> *"Public Affairs is the provision of information to the public, press and other institutions concerning the goals, policies and activities of the U.S. Government. Public affairs seek to foster understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens and other groups and institutions, and domestic and international media. However, the thrust of public affairs is to inform the domestic audience."* (Planning Group for Integration of USIA into the Department of State 1997)

Public Affairs is aimed at a domestic audience, and in principal it deals mainly with media and is essentially reactive. Public diplomacy, on the other hand, is pro-active. Effective public diplomacy is not just about providing information; it is also about developing relationships. The Planning Group for integration of the United States Information Agency into the Department of State distinguishes public diplomacy and public affairs in the following manner "The

thrust of public affairs is to inform the domestic audience . . . [whereas] public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign audiences." (RAND 2004:4)

In spite of this, separating public affairs from public diplomacy in the realities of global relationships and interconnectivity is almost impossible. The tasks of public diplomacy and public affairs are converging more than ever. New technologies enabling information to be directed at a domestic audience often reaches foreign publics (and, of course, vice versa). Both public affairs and public diplomacy are directly affected by globalization and wide spread communication channels.

Public affairs is strongly connected also to **lobbying.** Lobbying is, according to *Encyclopedia Americana*, "an effort to influence public policy and government with information and persuasion." (1996:761). As such, some regular diplomatic activities could be labeled lobbying.[1]

Public diplomacy, by contrast, should be about building relationships, starting by understanding other countries, their needs, values, culture and people, and then looking for areas to create a common cause (Leonard 2002:50).

In order to move beyond mere propaganda, one must understand the target audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting the message out, it is about a result, and in order to get the result, one must acknowledge that the

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[1] There is a persistent belief that this tradition began during the administration of President Ulysses S. Grant, who served as president between 1869 and 1877. Grant enjoyed his cigars in the lobby of the nearby Willard Hotel. Having been spotted there often, politicians and others wanting political favors began to frequent him during this time of repose. The term originates in the United Kingdom from approaches made to Members of Parliament in the lobbies of the House of Commons. Usage of the word in this sense in the United States occurred well before the Grant Administration; the practice itself is much older. According to the United States Senate, lobbying is the practice of trying to persuade legislators to propose, pass, or defeat legislation or to change existing laws. A lobbyist may work for a group, organization, or industry, and presents information on legislative proposals to support his or her clients' interests (U.S. Senate, 2007).

listener's views matter as much as the message. To confront the hostility toward Western culture, we must engage people emotionally (to move beyond intellectual forms of communication) and provide their own relevance to the public concerned (finding a niche diplomacy).

The lines between propaganda, public diplomacy, lobbying and even psychological operations blur in crisis and war. When public diplomacy is overtly linked to official outcomes of national governments, it tends to connote more negative interpretations and is frequently seen as mere propaganda. Public diplomacy is then perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a set of mostly mass communication techniques that: use emotional appeals over rational facts to change attitudes; conceal information that does not favor the sender; and spread messages promoting a certain ideology such as the social, economic, or military goals of the state. American sociologist and propaganda scholar, Leonard Doob, argues the same – what separates propaganda from other forms of communication (education) is the power of suggestion. (See Doob in Snow 2005:229).

3. THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

3.1 Committee on Public Information

Public Diplomacy became an official part of the U.S. foreign policy when President Woodrow Wilson created The Committee on Public Information during World War by Executive order 2594 in April 1917. George Creel served as the first chairman, and the group's major goal was to gain support from the American public for U.S. intervention in the war. The Committee's main tools were posters and pamphlets trying to increase patriotism, recruit men to army service, and persuade the general public to support the war cause. The Committee used various media types, including movies, to get the message out. The Committee disbanded in 1919.

In the 1930s U.S. Congress passed a series of laws known as the Neutrality Act, which re-established isolationism as American policy. They served as a mechanism to avoid interference in foreign conflicts, especially those of Europe. Pursuance of this policy was also the reason for the lack of a public diplomacy aimed at foreign publics. The raise of Nazism and turmoil in Europe led to various amendments to the Neutrality Act. Those changes allowed for the establishments of various institutions, such as the Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific Cooperation and the Division for Cultural Cooperation within the Department of State. The Division for Cultural Cooperation was already established in 1938, by President Franklin Roosevelt. It had a very specific goal: to act in Latin America in order to prevent German cultural imperialism and to avert efforts of Nazism subversion.

In December 1941, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and the United States declared war, those Acts became irrelevant. This point also marked a watershed in American policy leading to a new internationalism highlighted with Marshall Plan in 1947. After the start of World War II in Europe, President

Franklin Roosevelt established several agencies to counter the effects of Axis[2] Propaganda. In 1941, the International Visitors Leadership Program was established within the Department of State. It aimed at bringing foreign leaders to the United States to exchange views and ideas and to promote mutual understanding through communication at the personal and professional levels. In this still existing program, over 4.400 visitors from around the world participate yearly. During the sixty years of the program, hundreds of former participants have risen to important positions; over 200 current and former chief of states and heads of government were part of the program (Former Slovenian president, Janez Drnovsek and current European Commissioner Janez Potocnik are just a few).

Another public diplomacy medium was Voice of America, launched by the United States Federal Government on February 24, 1942. Claiming to provide a source of reliable news, it was organized into various language services and broadcast to all areas of the world. Its priority was reaching audiences in occupied countries, first Germany and Italy, and later broadened its target audience to communist countries in Europe and Asia. Its mission today is to broadcast accurate, balanced, and comprehensive news and information to an international audience. Currently, it broadcasts in forty-five languages.

3.2 Office of War Information

Upon the U.S. government's decision to become more involved in the fight against fascism, the White House created the Office of War Information (OWI) under President Roosevelt. The Voice of America program became part of this Office and its overseas units became the U.S. Information Service (USIS). The OWI was established by Executive Order 9182 on June 13, 1942, to consolidate the functions of the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of

[2] By Axis, President Roosevelt addressed Germany and Japan.

Government Reports, and the division of information of the Office for Emergency Management. The Foreign Intelligence Service, Outpost, Publication, and Pictorial Branches of the Office of the Coordinator of Information were also transferred to the OWI. Prior to his role as a CBS newsman, Elmer Davis served as its first director.

The Office of War Information had two goals: to implement information programs within the United States; and conduct programs overseas. OWI produced posters, radio series and newsreels. Republicans in Congress were not too enthusiastic by the operations and activities aimed at U.S. citizens. The result was a drastic decrease in the Office's budget and as a consequence, the OWI was redirected overseas in 1944. Oversight of the OWI was given to the State Department, but the Department was constrained due to a lack of human resources and strategy; most employees had little or no experience in media operations abroad. The Office created its own media channels and products to reach foreign audiences. By 1945, OWI had 39 transmitters worldwide and was broadcasted in 40 languages.

Another important radio tool was the Armed Forces Network (AFN); U.S. military radio stations that followed the troops abroad. In addition to being an important tool for troops moral, AFN stations attracted foreign audiences. Later, OWI also benefited from cooperative arrangements with U.S. commercial media organizations. They even agreed to voluntary guidelines for reporting on military movements, war production activities, and other sensitive subjects. Such cooperation expanded into active collaboration with OWI and its wartime operations. U.S. media demonstrated strong support for the war effort. The Office was particularly interested in expanding its distribution of U.S. newspapers and magazines abroad. Such was the case when it assisted the editors of *Reader's Digest* in launching their first international editions in Sweden and Latin America. American book publishers became direct beneficiaries of OWI program, as the US government indirectly promoted and distributed their books. The Office also collaborated with Hollywood producers, however it was limited to suggesting ways in which a movie could deliver stronger "win-the-war messages" (for example the well-known Casablanca in

1942 and Tender Comrade in 1943, and it never directly attempted to censor films.

OWI's mission was based on the Atlantic Charter signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill; it emphasized the need to give foreign audiences a credible description of the United States at war, as well as its post-war aims. By 1943, pressures had intensified to redirect the Office's operations toward tactical, psychological warfare operations supporting the invasions. When the war escalated, President Roosevelt issued an executive order placing OWI under military command. The Office's focus on political operations was subordinated to tactical military operations. As the war progressed, OWI continued to set up operational posts abroad. The first and largest was in London, representing also the major OWI production center of materials for European audiences. After the invasion of Europe in 1944, additional posts were set up across France.

Another foundation stone for U.S. public diplomacy was government's German Exchange of Persons program between 1946 and 1954. 13,354 persons participated in this program. It demonstrated the effort to introduce the Allies' point of view to people of the defeated nations of Germany and, later, Japan. Activities included cultural and educational exchanges, publishing, libraries, cultural centers, schools and universities. Over 800 Americans were sent to Germany and over 1.000 Germans were invited to the United States. Some say the benefits of this program are still present today.

In May 1945 Japan surrendered and OWI's central focus shifted from the Pacific arena, The Office closed in just one month. President Truman transferred the remaining Office of War Information to the Department of State's Offices of International Cultural Affairs and the International Press and Publication Division. But what OWI created was the pattern for U.S. presence overseas in the area of information activities.

Another successful post-war program in Germany was an extensive network of so called *Amerika Haüser* (American Houses) - small cultural centers that incorporated libraries, lecture rooms and English teaching facilities.

Both the exchange program and America Houses were the beginning of similar programs later managed by the United States Information Agency and implemented all over the world.

The foundation for public diplomacy activities in the past and present as well, are the following Acts:

- **The Fulbright Act** of 1946 and later **Fulbright-Hayes**, from 1961 on (known also as the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act). The Fulbright Act of 1946, named for its founder, Senator J.William Fulbright of Arkansas, legislated the exchange of students, researchers and academia. It was the predecessor of many other exchange efforts, including exchanges of youths, teachers, professionals, and artists, and was designed to increase the knowledge and understanding of other societies while enriching the lives of the participants. The Fulbright Program currently operates in more than 150 countries. Over 300.000 students, scholars, professionals, teachers and administrators from the U.S. and other countries have participated in the program to date.

- **The Smith Mundt Act** of 1948 (known as the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act). Representative Karl Mundt and Senator Alexander Smith also sponsored another act to promote better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations. It established ideological operations as a permanent part of the U.S. foreign policy and gave permanent status to the Department of State's overseas information and cultural programs. Thus, a two-way communication issue was already addressed through the act's language:

> *"The objectives of this Act are to enable the Government of the United States to correct the misunderstandings about the United States in other countries, which constituted obstacles to peace, and to promote mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States and other countries, which is one of the essential foundations of peace."*

(Snow 2005:227)

4. AMERICAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DURING THE COLD WAR

After the Second World War, the State Department and public diplomacy activity also benefited from the Marshall Plan, as the Plan had a huge budget for publicity campaigns.[3] At the beginning of the 1950s, the State Department adjusted its activities to address the rising threat of communism and Cold War. Countering Soviet propaganda became the new focus of the State Department's overseas programs, as reiterated in President Truman's **Campaign of Truth**:

> *"Our task is to present the truth to millions of people who are uninformed or misinformed or unconvinced. Our task is to reach them in their daily lives, as they work and learn. We must be alert, ingenious, and diligent in reaching peoples of other countries, whatever their educational and cultural backgrounds may be. Our task is to show them that freedom is the way to economic and social advancement, the way to political independence, the way to strength, happiness, and peace. This task is not separate and distinct from other elements of our foreign policy. It is a necessary part of all we are doing to build a peaceful world. It is as important as armed strength or economic aid. The Marshall plan, military aid, point 4--these and other programs depend for their success on the understanding and support of our own citizens and those of other countries.*
>
> *We must make ourselves known as we really are--not as Communist propaganda pictures us. We must pool our efforts with those of other free peoples in a sustained, intensified program to promote the cause of*

[3] The U.S. Congress approved Marshall's long-sighted proposal in 1948, and by 1952 the United States had channeled some $13 billion in economic aid and technical assistance to 16 European countries. It was an American-Europe joint project.

freedom against the propaganda of slavery. We must make ourselves heard round the world in a great ***campaign of truth***.”(Truman 1950)

His speech resulted in an increased budget for overseas programs. As part of the efforts, VOA was given funds to expand from 23 to 46 languages. The overseas division became International Information Administration and by 1952 it had expanded its activities to 88 countries.

4.1 United States Information Agency (USIA)

On August 3, 1953, based on the Smith Mundt Act, President Eisenhower created the United States Information Agency as a separate entity. The move toward the creation of an independent agency to handle U.S. information programs had begun already in 1949, when the Hoover Commission’s report on foreign affairs recommended that the foreign information programs should be moved out of the Department of State. This action was supported by the creation of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, created with a mission to recommend changes in information and educational exchange programs, and urged the creation of an independent agency. The new agency was based on recommendations from the President’s Committee on International Information Activities (the so-called Jackson Committee) and the U.S. Senate’s Special Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs (the so-called Hickenlooper Committee). The new agency encompassed all the information programs, including VOA (which was the largest component), that were previously in the Department of State. Only the educational exchange programs remained at State. For many years, United States Information Services (USIS) posts were the only American presence in certain parts of the world. Under the reorganization plan the new U.S. Information Agency would be subject to policy guidance from the State Department.

When established, the Agency was faced the threat of Senator John McCarthy. Senator McCarthy was chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations and believed the overseas programs were controlled by leftists who were trying to undermine U.S. policy.

Initially he was strongly supported by Congress, as Republicans held a majority in both chambers of Congress. Another obstacle to a broader successful implementation was Senator Fulbright's refusal to permit exchange programs to become part of USIA. It remained so until 1978, when, during the Carter Administration, those programs were placed under the same roof. Theodore Streibert was appointed as the first USIA director (1953-1956). He reported to the President through the National Security Council and received complete, day-to-day guidance on U.S. foreign policy from the Secretary of State. On October 22, 1953, President Eisenhower issued a directive defining the USIA mission.

> *"The mission of USIA was to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the U.S. national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans, their institutions, and their counterparts abroad. Specifically, USIA worked:*
> *- To explain and advocate U.S. policies in terms that is credible and meaningful in foreign cultures;*
> *- To provide information about the official policies of the United States, and about the people, values, and institutions which shape those policies;*
> *- To bring the benefits of international engagement to American citizens and institutions by helping them build strong long-term relationships with their counterparts overseas;*
> *- To advise the President and other policymakers on the ways in which foreign attitudes will have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of U.S. policies."* (USIA Alumni Association, 2002)

Streibert visited many USIS posts abroad. These visits convinced him that basic decisions regarding program activities in individual countries should be primarily vested in the overseas missions - the embassies and consulates or other representative offices.

Unfortunately Republicans in the Senate saw USIA as a prime candidate for budget cuts. A few months after its establishment, Congress cut USIA's appropriation by 36%. Staff was decreased by one quarter and the USIA was forced to close down 38 posts. When it came to the reorganization of the

foreign policy structure, USIA's role was tied to the White House plans for reconstruction of the National Security Council. But many State Department officials were unwilling to give weight to opinions held by those living abroad or to USIA proposals as to how to build those factors into the foreign policy decisions. The first assessment of the USIA's operation indicated exactly this as its number one recommendation: "to strengthen the agency's ability to influence foreign policy decision-making in the early stages of its formation." (Dizard 2004:69) Some of the most successful USIA activities in the Eisenhower administration included: exhibits depicting American everyday life, the first U.S. – Soviet cultural exchange agreement, and the expansion of its programs to Asia and Africa. President Eisenhower gave a special push for people-to-people diplomacy. Although USIA's role in national security policymaking was still insecure, its influence on policy decisions at the Embassy level increased; more and more Ambassadors recognized the value of USIS resources.

The so-called **Murrow years** (1961-1964) were a period when overseas programs were successfully promoted and Foreign Service Officers became proud of their role in public diplomacy. When John F. Kennedy entered the White House, he faced an agenda filled with foreign policy matters. Fortunately for the Agency, the President's advisers agreed that the USIA should remain an independent agency. In 1961, President Kennedy appointed Edward R. Murrow, the veteran CBS news correspondent, as the new USIA director. He was welcomed by both the general public and by his professional colleagues. He knew the media business and was experienced in news and communications.

In January 1963, the Kennedy Administration issued a new presidential statement regarding USIA, changing its mission significantly: "to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in other nations" (Kennedy 1963). His memo articulated the recognition that information alone was not enough and that the USIA must employ persuasion to affect foreign public attitudes. The President also saw that policymaking needed to consider foreign attitudes and understanding these became part of the USIA's public diplomacy function. That was easy for Murrow, as he saw

the need to take an aggressive role in advising the White House on the importance of including overseas public opinion in making foreign policy decisions. Murrow was granted a direct telephone line to the president's office and his access to the president gave USIA a direct role in foreign policymaking.

In 1961, the **Fulbright-Hays Act** was passed. It consolidated various educational and cultural exchange activities. This act also ultimately authorized other cultural and sport exchanges and U.S. representation in international festivals and exhibitions, exchange and translation of books and educational materials, establishment and operation of cultural and educational centers to promote mutual understanding and foster the support for American studies abroad. Its mission included the aims of increasing:

> *"…mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange; to strengthen the ties which unite Americans with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world."* (Snow 2005:228)

The biggest test of Murrow's relationship with the White House occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It served as an excellent example of how the overseas information programs could provide operational support in a major crisis. Radio and communication satellites played a major role in addressing the public and achieving public support. The USIA expanded its activities in Asia and Africa by spreading libraries and by the implementation of an extensive book translation program. The first Foreign Press Center to help foreign media cover US issues was established in New York. Such centers now exist also in Washington D.C. and Los Angeles.

The project that stood out at that time was USIA's coverage of the Kennedy assassination. USIA funded a documentary movie *"John F. Kennedy: Years of Lightening, Days of Drums*." It was the most widely praised documentary ever produced and distributed by the Agency. It also meant a one-time exception to the no-domestic distribution rule[4].

During the Murrow years the USIA budget appropriations fluctuated, although the overall trend was increasing. Ed Murrow remained USIA director also after Lyndon Johnson became a president, until Murrow passed away in 1965 from lung cancer.

During the second half of the 1960s the USIA experienced major turmoil as it came to play an increasingly larger role in the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. USIS Saigon was transferred into a Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office with a mandate to coordinate all psychological operations in the war. Increasingly, this office became a surrogate propaganda ministry for the South Vietnamese government. This position was also one of the reasons for the resignation of Carl Rowan, who succeeded Murrow as director of the USIA. He was replaced by Leonard H. Marks, whose most lasting contribution was his focus on the role of advanced communications technologies and his achievement of having USIA's career officers integrated into the career foreign service.

One of the outcomes of this period was the recognition that short-range solutions designed to influence overseas attitudes rarely worked. USIA realized that any significant change in the foreign attitudes would require steady, long-term efforts.

In the 1970[s], the US Information Agency was at the peak of its power. It had established its place within the foreign policy community. Bilateral negotiations with Moscow and the Helsinki Accord led to steady progress in disseminating information and increasing cultural contacts with the Soviet Union. Interaction,

[4] Congressional restriction against distribution of USIA's material in U.S.

sometimes limited, with the Soviet Union and China set the agenda for the Agency's role in the U.S. global strategy.

The USIA's role of "presenting a full and fair picture of the United States to the foreign audience" was put to test during the Watergate Affair in 1974. USIA provided straightforward information about the event and was later recognized as a credible source.

Another important project from that period was the Apollo space program and the landing on the Moon. USIA managed a wide variety of other media programs as well. The Wireless File was a daily news transmission of official U.S. government statements and other background information and materials to Embassies. Wireless File News was also translated and channeled to local media. At a certain point, USIA became the biggest international publisher of books, magazines and other printed materials and a large producer of documentary films.

By 1970, USIA had established posts in over 150 countries and the average capital-city USIS staff generally consisted of four to six officers(Dizzard 2004:157). By 1980, the Agency had reached the highest level of its influence within U.S. foreign policy world. There was a redirection of U.S. public diplomacy during President Carter's administration. Besides renaming USIA to the U.S. International Communication Agency (USCIA), the reorganization introduced two major changes:

1. All public diplomacy activities were consolidated to one agency (transfer of the exchange programs that were previously implemented by the State Department)
2. Introduction of mutuality in public diplomacy; informing as well as learning.

President Carter outlined the main tasks and characteristics of the USCIA in the Reorganization plan No. 2 of 1977:

> *"The purpose of this reorganization is to broaden our informational, educational and cultural intercourse with the world, since this is the major means by which our government can inform others about our country, and inform ourselves about the rest of the world. The new Agency for International Communication will play a central role in building these two-way bridges of understanding between our people*

and the other peoples of the world. Only by knowing and understanding each other's experiences can we find common ground on which we can examine and resolve our differences. The new agency will have two distinct but related goals:

- To tell the world about our society and policies--in particular our commitment to cultural diversity and individual liberty.

- To tell ourselves about the world, so as to enrich our own culture as well as to give us the understanding to deal effectively with problems among nations.

As the world becomes more and more interdependent, such mutual understanding becomes increasingly vital. The aim of this reorganization, therefore, is a more effective dialogue among peoples of the earth. Americans--mostly immigrants or the descendants of immigrants--are particularly well suited to enter into such an undertaking. We have already learned much from those who have brought differing values, perspectives and experiences to our shores. And we must continue to learn.

Thus the new agency will lay heavy emphasis on listening to others, so as to learn something of their motivations and aspirations, their histories and cultures.

The new agency's activities must be straightforward, open, candid, balanced, and representative. They will not be given over to the advancement of the views of any one group, any one party or any one Administration. The agency must not operate in a covert, manipulative or propagandistic way." (Carter 1977)

In 1982, President Ronald Reagan returned the old name of the United States Information Agency. In addition, he used the agency aggressively in the broader propaganda conflict with the Soviet Union. He also nearly doubled the agency's budget. (its annual budget reached nearly one billion dollars by the end of the decade). The main medium used to convey his message was television. The role of educational and cultural programs and exchanges was diminished. The USIA director of most of the eight years of the Reagan administration was Charles Z. Wick. At first he also opposed exchange

programs, but later, when convinced of their positive effects, he became a strong advocate for them. By the time Wick resigned in 1989 as USIA's longest serving director, the agency's annual budget was 882 million US dollars (almost double of that in 1981) (Dizard 2004:200). And Wick spent more time visiting overseas USIS posts than any previous director.

In 1983, a Special Planning Group was established by President Reagan, and USIA, together with the Department of Defense, joined it. This group developed a variety of initiatives to promote the international information agenda. When USIA became part of this Special Planning Group, *New York Times* columnist William Safire noted that USIA's role shifted from independent speaker to policy participant in ideological warfare. (Dizard 2004:201).

In 1983, WorldNet was created. This broadcast medium delivered signals to U.S. embassies for redistribution via satellites. Its interactive live interviews proved to be a significant addition to USIA media resources. USIA's activities slowly spread also to East European countries and Soviet Union. A US-Soviet cultural agreement was signed at Reagan - Gorbachov meeting in 1985 and led to a significant increase in academic exchanges between the two countries. As a consequence, a VOA news bureau opened in Moscow. Later on, the commercial and open exchanges of information, people and ideas began. USIA sponsored the Information USA Exhibit that toured nine Soviet cities in 1988. By 1995, Russia and Eastern Europe became the leading geographic regions for U.S. government exchange programs.

5. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MOVING TO STATE DEPARTMENT

As the Cold War ended and the rivalry between the U.S. and a former Soviet Union disappeared, USIA had to reposition. Its place in the new world order was heavily debated. New information technologies, the internet, communication satellites required a new set of programs, while others ceased to exist. As a result, USIA faced more and more congressional opponents who advocated cutting its budget and employees. In 1995, the first bill to abolish the agency was introduced in Congress. Its advocates argued that the Cold War was over and USIA is not needed anymore, but the Agency survived until the Clinton Administration in 1997, when it was finally decided to consolidate it into the State Department. The decision from 1998 to abolish the agency resulted less as a deliberately reached judgment than as part of a political compromise between President Clinton and North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms. In exchange, Senator Helms would tone down his opposition to the President's foreign policy initiatives, such as funding of overseas abortion clinics, the chemical warfare treaty, and payment of past dues to the United Nations. The reorganization plan transferred all USIA operations to the State Department except the Voice of America. VOA became part of the independent Broadcasting Board of Governors, where it was joined by Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia and Radio Marti.

The State Department got a new bureau, headed by the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The new arrangement was introduced on October 1, 1999. USIS posts were slowly closed and the overseas public diplomacy offices were integrated into embassies. I would like to underline two milestones that stood out after the consolidation, but characterized the work. After the 2000 Presidential elections, the Bush administration waited for nine months before naming the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. This delay in nominating an official for this position definitely had an impact on lowering the importance and priority of the bureau within the government. The second was the attack on September 11, 2001 and consequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These events shifted the mission of the bureau and of public diplomacy significantly. New kinds of threats called

for new approaches to gain overseas support (primarily among Muslim populations).

5.1. Public Diplomacy After 09/11

September 11, 2001 and the actions that followed changed U.S. foreign policy and altered the public diplomacy sector. The terrorist threat called for new approaches to win overseas support for U.S. policies. Although we are talking about the global effort, its primary focus has been with respect to Muslim nations. The Public diplomacy campaign got off with a bad start when President Bush, in his address describing his campaign against terrorism, called for a crusade against terrorists. [5] Later on, a heavy emphasis was placed on picturing the successful integration of millions of Muslims into the American society. The activities of other agencies and departments complicated the State Department's efforts to organize a credible public diplomacy response (Dizzard 2004).

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was using its own covert resources to influence public opinion in the Middle East. The Department of Defense established the Office of Strategic Influence with the purpose of informing foreign civilian audiences about the U.S. military operations and included dissemination of false and untrue information. Due to leaks into the public about its core mission, it was already abolished by February 2002. The most important change was the administration's decision to be directly involved in public diplomacy strategy. A special White House task force was formed to coordinate overseas efforts to deal with the terrorist threat; the Office of Global Communications and a 24-hour Coalition Information Center were set-up in Washington, London and Islamabad. (Beehner, 2005)

At the State Department, public diplomacy was strengthened as a result of an increased budget. Funds were redirected to program aimed at influencing the

[5] "This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while." were President's Bush words when addressing press on September 16, 2001 on the South Lawn. Term crusade war is almost a synonym for religious wars against all other religions, especially Muslims that lasted from 11th to 13th Century.

attitudes of foreign audiences beyond elites. Strategic audience became youth, religious leaders and educators. Priority regions, especially Middle East and South Asia received 25 % of all Department of State funding for the exchanges (themes such as: religious tolerance, ethnic diversity, the value of independent media, capacity building of non-governmental organizations, the importance of civil society and governance and free elections became a priority).

The initial push after 09/11 was coordinating the anti-terror message (from 2001 to 2004 more than 3.000 articles on terrorism were published in the daily Washington File. The Washington File is compilation of official policy texts, transcripts and other information on US foreign policy made by State Department). In December 2001, the fact book The *Network of Terrorism* was published and translated into 36 languages. It was the most widely distributed document ever produced by the State Department. One of the first public diplomacy campaigns targeting Muslim population in the Middle East was Shared Values Initiative, launched in the fall of 2001 at a cost of 15 million US dollars. It consisted of numerous communication elements; the most visible were five TV spots – a series of mini documentaries capturing the lives of American Muslims (journalist, school teacher, scientist, rescue worker and a baker store owner). Those spots describing their professional and personal lives depicted the value of free speech, education, public service, promotion of entrepreneurship, science and technology. Many governments refused to air them in the belief they were American propaganda. The program ended before the Iraqi invasion started, when test audiences said the documentaries did not actually speak about the main issues that divide the West and the Muslim world.

Another program, called CultureConnect, was launched; this program selected American people that achieved prominence in literature, performing arts, sports and other areas who serve as cultural ambassadors to non-elite youth. In 2002, the State Department also launched a youth-oriented magazine in Arabic. In July 2003, the first copy of *HI*, a lifestyle magazine, was published and distributed in Middle East countries, including Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and others. It was distributed in 18 countries with 55.000 copies,

although officials said 95% were given away for free and just 2.500 copies were actually sold (U.S. Department of State, 2005). It ceased to exist in 2005. To understand what kinds of activities are targeted at the Middle East, the following section is devoted to descriptions of various initiatives and programs that encompass Middle Eastern countries. At this point, I would also like to emphasize the role of another US Government agency – USAID which provides economic and humanitarian assistance. The State Department and USAID frequently work together in less developed countries and funds for certain projects often come from both agencies.

Middle East Partnership Initiative

The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was established by former Secretary Powell on December 12, 2002. Its mission is to create educational opportunities at a grassroots level, to promote economic opportunities and to help foster private sector development. The broad aim is to strengthen civil society and the rule of law throughout the Middle East region. The initiative is a partnership and works closely with governments in the Arab world, academic institutions, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations. Approximately 250 million US dollars were already devoted to this program. MEPI is divided into four pillars:

- Political Pillar seeks to strengthen democratic practices, electoral systems, to support an expanded public space where individuals can express the opinions and take part in the political process, to strengthen the role of free and independent media in society and to promote the rule of law, effective government and judiciary.
- Economic Pillar promotes the mobilization of foreign direct and domestic investment and facilitates revenue and employment growth of micro-enterprises and SMEs, to advance job creation in the private sector.
- Education Pillar seeks to expand access to basic and post secondary education for all, but especially for females, to improve the quality of basic and post-secondary education including teacher training, curriculum and digital preparedness. It also promotes development of better employability.

- Women's Empowerment Pillar is mainly concentrated on the inclusion of women in judiciary systems and to promote entrepreneurship among women. Its goals include supporting the elimination of arbitrary legal systems and providing women with the skills and tools required to help build strong judicial institutions, increase the level of women's participation in building democratic pluralistic societies, assist local reformers in the struggle for women's rights and to provide the access and opportunity to women in an effort to enhance the marketable skills, economic independence and increase the power of the private sector in building a democratic society.

The Administration committed $29 million for pilot education, economic, and political reform projects in 2002. In the 2003 fiscal year they funded $100 million in programs, and awarded $89.5 million with 2004fiscal year funds. In the 2005 fiscal year, Congress provided MEPI with $74.4 million.

Middle East Entrepreneur Training in the United States (MEET U.S.) This program includes: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen, and the Palestinian Territories. In fiscal year 2005, $3,970,000 was allocated to the program. This program is actually training of Middle East entrepreneurs in the U.S. and includes the following activities:

- delivery of ICT and business services seminars,
- provision of business development training and mentoring of entrepreneurs at Centers of Entrepreneurial Excellence in Bahrain and Morocco,
- a businesswomen's summit for over 200 women from the region,
- establishment of a network of businesswomen's hubs and speaker bureaus and
- delivery of resource mobilization training to civil society and non-governmental organization managers from the region.

Legal and Business Internship Program (LaBIP) It includes the following Middle East countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen, the Palestinian Territories. $2,160,000 was devoted for this program in 2005

fiscal year. The program brings approximately 40 Middle Eastern women from the business and legal professions to the United States to participate in a month-long law or business program on a graduate level, followed by a five-month internship at U.S. legal or business institutions.

G-8 OECD Governance and Investment for Development Initiative. Targeting Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen, and the Palestinian Territories, in 2005 fiscal year, this program was worth $500,000. The project improves public governance and investment with a view to promote economic development, job creation and human and social development. It is comprised of two initiatives:

- modernizing public governance and
- mobilizing investment for development.

Both initiatives are assisted by working groups of influential leaders in order to identify and analyze barriers to reforms and develop strategies for overcoming obstacles. The working groups then develop national action plans and strategic frameworks to implement the plans.

Student Leaders Study of the United States Institutes**.** Targeting Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Palestinian Territories, Iraq, Georgetown University, University of Delaware, Benedictine University Montana. 2005 Fiscal year: $2,500,000. The program supports intensive six-week training sessions hosted by U.S. universities for highly motivated students from the Middle East. By taking part in this program, they are exposed to American culture and values and are able to gain knowledge in leadership, problem-solving, entrepreneurial skills, and civic rights and responsibilities. (U.S. Department of State 2007)

The Partnership for Learning (P4L). An exchange program for youth and those with the influence in the society from the Arab and Muslim world to build long-term, sustainable relationships. The ultimate goal is the establishment of close and sustained partnerships between the nations and the provision of quality education and opportunities in life for youth to prevent them from desolation and hate. Since 2002, to 2004 ECA has dedicated over 40 million US dollars

to this initiative. With this funding, the US Department of State initiated its first-ever sponsored high school program with the Arab and Muslim world. This is a new undergraduate program specifically targeted at non-elite, gifted young women and men from Arab world who would otherwise have no opportunity for foreign study or first-hand exposure to the United States.

Other Programs. Fulbright programs were re-launched in Afghanistan and Iraq. Sister Cities International Partners for Peace Initiative between Iraq and U.S. was launched. Private partners were included in several initiatives; the most eloquent example of private partnership was when the Iraqi National Symphony played at the Kennedy Center in New York City.

Broadcasting targeted to the Muslim population, Arabic speakers and the Middle East in general includes the following two radio and one TV stations:

Radio Sawa

Radio Sawa tries to communicate with the youthful population of Arabic-speakers in the Middle East by providing up-to-date news, information and entertainment on FM and medium wave radio stations throughout the region. The effort is assisted by Radio Sawa's website. Radio Sawa, a 24-hour, seven day a week Arabic-language network, began broadcasting on March 23, 2002. The network is a service of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. and is publicly funded by the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the U.S. Congress. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office Radio Sawa is reaching 51% of targeted listeners. (GAO 2003:11). In 2002 it had a budget of 35 million US Dollars and was reaching approximately 250 million listeners (Seib: 2004).

Alhurra TV

Alhurra (in Arabic it means “The Free One”) is a commercial and free of charge Arabic language satellite television network for the Middle East; it is devoted primarily to news and information. In addition to reporting on regional and international events, the channel broadcasts discussion programs, current affairs and features on a variety of subjects including health, entertainment, sports, fashion, and science and technology. It was meant to engage in a war of ideas and to tackle with distorted information by being more flexible, intense

and competitive. It is financed in the same manner as Radio Sawa. When it began broadcasting in 2004, Al-Hurra had a budget of 62 million US dollars.

Radio Farda

Radio Farda broadcasts to Iran. It was established in 2002.Most of its air time is devoted to music. It includes news and information in a short version, since the target population is less than 30 years old.

6. WORKING WITH OTHERS

Even in the past, when USIA existed, its operations overlapped the activities of many domestic private and public organizations, each with its own particular message aimed at audiences abroad. Private U.S. media companies were also involved in finding new markets towards overseas. U.S. media institutions generally maintained an arms-length relationship with USIA through the post-war years. They feared government involvement in the media and were afraid that the government would curtail their freedom in operations. The agency's overseas media programs could also mean competition to them and their products. But, at the same time, media companies cooperated with USIA, as it helped them promote overseas expansion of their products through trade fairs and other programs (for example, book translation program) and in this manner opened borders for them.

USIA was just one among many federal agencies trying to influence foreign audiences. Other agencies and departments also had budgets, staffs and resources for reaching peoples abroad, sometimes even larger then USIA. Three agencies that most directly affected USIA operations in the past were the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and, of course, the Department of State. USIA's relations with each of theses agencies involved sets of policies and operations that were sometimes cooperative and sometimes controversial. The Defense Department had a special impact on the information agency's overseas operations. During the Cold War, it ran the largest federal program for bringing foreign visitors to the U.S. In 1963, the Pentagon made public its funding of travel grants for approximately 180.000 visitors (military and civilian) during the previous 15-year period. (Dizzard

2004) And, as previously mentioned, they also had their own global radio and TV broadcast - the Armed Forces Network (AFN) for troops stationed abroad. The AFN attracted a large audience of other foreign listeners and had considerable impact on local audiences abroad. By the 1960s, AFN claimed an audience of over 20 million Europeans. The most active collaboration between USIA and Defense Department took place in the so-called "community relations programs." Those programs sought to improve the relations between U.S. military and local citizens. USIA's support and cooperation with Defense Department in planning and carrying out the community relations projects was particularly strong in Europe. In some cases the cooperation involved psychological warfare operations; various persuasion techniques. The connection has its roots in World War II, when the Office of War Information became directly involved in tactical projects with the U.S. Armed Forces. After USIA was created, the involvement in Defense Department psychological operations decreased significantly. The Agency openly opposed the military's plans to extend their psychological operations to civilian audiences. The example of the most intensive cooperation in psychological operations between the two institutions took place during the Vietnam War, but was often lacking adequate coordination between the military and the civil agencies. However, indications that the Defense Department would like to extend its psyops influence to civilian audiences still emerge from time to time. Such was the case in 2002, when the plans to establish the Office of Strategic Influence were revealed. Among the new office's activities were plans to mount a disinformation campaign and to feed false reports to the civilian press (both foreign and domestic). The public's strong opposition to the Office following a leak of the plans caused authorities to cancel the program's establishment.

The USIA had a complex relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency. The main reason was that the CIA operated overseas information and cultural programs that were similar to those implemented by the USIA. One main distinction was that CIA operated its ideological programs through surrogate organizations and could disclaim any connection with its covert operations. In general, there was relatively little day-to-day contact between the two

agencies. USIA officials often did not know about CIA operations in detail or even did not about them at all.

The biggest overlap between these two was in the mass-media. The CIA operated a covert network of media projects abroad that at times paralleled with USIA's public programs. It included newspapers, books and subsidizing American and foreign journalists and their publications to report news that was distorted and factually based. Although the precise costs of the CIA's covert media operations throughout the Cold War will probably never be known, it was most certainly much larger than USIA's media budget (Dizard 2004). One mass media outlet where USIA and CIA operations overlapped the most was in radio broadcasting (Voice of America versus Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation; the last two became independent from CIA and later joined VOA under the Board of International Broadcasting group). Both agencies tripped each other up on numerous occasions in their efforts to inform and influence foreign audiences.

When the USIA still existed separately from the Department of State, it followed State Department policy guidelines. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Agency and the Department was not always easy, based on different bureaucratic culture. The State Department's responsibilities in overseeing USIA's activities focused on two policy areas: public media operations and cultural relations. Policy guidance issues were raised several times in USIA – State Department relationship. But by and large they developed good working-level relations. Weakness in this arrangement was a general lack of coordination at higher policy levels. What made the USIA so different from other agencies, and especially from the State Department, was that it could not operate domestically.

7. CURRENT STATUS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: CHALLENGES AND ISSUES

The scope of public diplomacy was dramatically reduced at the end of the Cold War. On top of that, USIA merged with State Department. In 1994, the Cato Institute argued that public diplomacy was largely irrelevant to the current challenges facing the United States. (The Cato Institute 1994:308) Budgets were drastically cut, as were other resources; staff cuts were among the most obvious. Between 1989 and 1999, the USIA budget decreased by 10%. By the time it was taken over by the State Department, USIA had only 6,715 employees (compared to 12,000 at its peak in the mid-1960s). The annual number of academic and cultural exchanges also dropped from 45,000 in 1995 to 29,000 in 2001 (Nye 2004). It had a 1 billion USD budget at the height of the Cold War. Currently annual US public diplomacy expenditures stands at 1.4 billion USD, an amount comparable to other much smaller countries and even to marketing budgets of individual companies (Reilly 2007).

The events of September 11 brought the issue of public diplomacy, its impact, and what can actually be expected from it, to the front pages of newspapers and returned it to the list of important foreign policy activities. Nevertheless, even in 2003, reports, such as the Djereijan report, published two years after the terrorist attack, noted the lack of public diplomacy capabilities. The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy told Congress that:

“The United States today lacks the capabilities in public diplomacy to meet the national security threat emanating from political instability, economic deprivation, and extremism, especially in the Arab and Muslim world.” (Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 2003:13)

We cannot say that ineffective public diplomacy was the direct cause of the terrorist attacks. But many believed that the U.S. had done a poor job in monitoring Middle Eastern opinions and responding to the emergence of potentially threatening attitudes. David Morey, chairman of the Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, pointed out that terrorist attacks against the United States made clear that America's national security cannot rest on

favorable geography, military strength and economic power alone. The U.S. safety depends on long-term processes to shape an international environment that builds credibility and trust (Independent Task Force 2003).

It is still not clear however, what can actually be expected from public diplomacy. The answer to this question is necessary for evaluating the success of public diplomacy. If public opinion polls indicate declining support for U.S. foreign policy, has public diplomacy been unsuccessful? Some would argue this is a case.

They believe that if U.S. policies are not acceptable to others it is because “the selling of those policies” was not effective enough. But public diplomacy cannot convert unacceptable policies into acceptable policies. To a certain extent, as David Newsome, former U.S. Ambassador and Undersecretary of State acknowledges, responsibility must be assigned also to those who oversell public diplomacy as a magic remedy for a variety of foreign affairs problems. In the past, USIA directors have exaggerated the effectiveness of public diplomacy programs because they believed it necessary in order to convince Congress to approve more resources for the agency. It is very optimistic and also unrealistic that the goal of public diplomacy would be 100% support or acceptance of U.S. policies by foreign publics (Tuch 1990).

Because it is a human activity in nature, its effectiveness cannot be easily quantified. Statistics and raw data can be offered, for example to analyze how many pro-American articles appeared in overseas media or how many foreign grantees became influential members of their government or how many favorable responses were obtained from visitors to cultural event. (Brown 2002 and Glassgold 2004). But that does not necessary means we affected their opinions on, for example U.S. foreign policy. Although the definitional formulation has varied, the central component was that governments utilize public media and social channels to influence the attitudes and actions of other governments (See Alan K. Henrikson 2006:9). Public diplomacy does not conceal poor policies or weak politics (Gregory in McKenna, 2007).

Because there is no agreement regarding how to measure the impact of public diplomacy, public opinion is often used as the standard. The problem with using public opinion to measure the effect of public diplomacy is that it is

impossible to isolate the influence of other variables on broad public opinion. But public diplomacy experts have not been able to offer alternative, independent benchmarks of effectiveness. For example, the report from the Government Accountability Office found that posts in the region were operating without guidance on how to implement the strategic framework established by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)[6] is more direct. In its evaluation of eight informational, cultural and foreign broadcasting programs, it described public diplomacy as "not performing — results not demonstrated" (White House, The Office of Management and Budget 2005). The OMB stressed that the programs have had difficulty measuring their impact, if they have been evaluated at all. The report emphasized that only a few of the State Department public diplomacy programs link budget to performance, and that there is no broadly accepted U.S. government public diplomacy strategy or measure of effectiveness. (Johnson 2006).[7] Television reporter Edward R. Murrow, most well-known of the agency's directors, famously told a congressional committee that "no cash register rang when someone overseas changed his or her opinion as a result of a USIA program." The larger impacts can truly only be seen over extended periods of time. In the past, the agency had a large research operation to track overseas public opinion and the impact of USIA operations in particular. When polling focused on specific short-term opinion trends, it was often only helpful as a measure of local attitudes (Dizard 2006).

It is beyond dispute that the most successful period of American public diplomacy was during the Cold War when U.S. policy tried to influence attitudes in the Soviet Union. In 1955, an agreement between U.S. and Soviet

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[6] The Office that oversees federal agencies activites, especially on effectiveness of the programs implementation; budgetary, regulatory and legislative issues.

[7] The latest attempt is just accepted and released Public Diplomacy Strategy in 2007

Union was signed and in July 1956, *Amerika Illustrated*, a monthly magazine published in Russian, was distributed for the first time in the Soviet Union as uncensored information and the first cultural activity by the United States. The objective was to present informative articles and photos that would help readers understand the diversity and the complexity of the American society. It was conditioned by the publication and distribution of the *Soviet Life* in the U.S. in return. *Amerika Illustrated* was so popular that it sold out immediately, copies passed from one hand to another and even a black market for this magazine developed. On the other hand, *Soviet Life* never became very popular in the United States. (Tuch 1993)

On January 27, 1958, the first US – USSR Cultural Exchange Agreement was signed and the implementation of public diplomacy in the Soviet Union increased radically. It provided for exchanges in science, technology, and students. Exhibitions, sports, research and publications of all kinds were also included in the Agreement. The accord was titled "Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical, and Educational Fields". It was commonly called the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement, named after its two chief negotiators, William S.B.Lacy, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant on East-West Exchanges, and Georgi Z. Zarubin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States. The initial agreement was concluded for a two-year period but it was periodically renegotiated and renewed. During détente in the 1970s its time specification was extended to three years. The final agreement in the series was signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev at the1985 Geneva Summit. Signed for the period of six years, this renewal included a clause for the agreement's termination, although it was no longer needed, as US-USSR relations continued to improve.

New, for the U.S. government as well, was the establishment of a partnership with the private sector in funding and carrying out exchanges under the agreement. Many of the activities under the cultural agreement were the responsibility of the private sector: science and technology, radio and television, motion pictures, publishing, education, arts, sports and tourism. In

many projects, federal government participation was only marginal. In the Soviet Union, by contrast, all of the activities were governmental.

U.S. objectives, as stated in a National Security Council directive (NSC 5607), included:

> *"broadening and deepening relations with the Soviet Union by expanding contacts between people and institutions, involving people in joint activities and developing habits of cooperation with the United States, ending Soviet isolation by giving the Soviet Union a broader view of the world, and improving U.S. understanding of the Soviet Union through access to its institutions and people. This included obtaining the benefits of long-range cooperation in culture, education, science and technology"* (National Security Council, 1956).

The cultural agreement and the exchanges conducted within its framework enjoyed broad public and Congressional support. Exchanges were a barometer of U.S.-Soviet relations. When relations between the two powers were good, exchanges flourished and expanded; when relations soured, the exchanges suffered. During the worst years of the Vietnam War, the Soviets cut back on several exchanges. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Administration suspended high-visibility cultural exchanges such as exhibitions, performing arts, high-level delegations, and U.S. participation in the Moscow Olympics of 1980, as well as much of the cooperation in science and technology. Scholarly exchanges, however, continued, although from time to time at reduced levels. (Richmond 2003) In the fall of the same year, 1980, the first group of 21 American graduate students arrived in Moscow and Leningrad. It was somehow agreed they would maintain distance from US Embassy personnel in order to prevent Russian authorities from thinking they were part of the American government. The graduate student exchanges were up-graded with exchanges of writers, composers and artists. Perhaps most popular were the "traveling American exhibits"; well-known for the famous Nixon-Khrushchev kitchen debate. They were constructed in a manner to depict day-to-day lives of Americans and U.S. society in general.

Public diplomacy is about the message and the medium. For public diplomacy to succeed, it must be guided by accepted doctrine and a long-term strategy

that also defines the place of public diplomacy within the foreign policy establishment. This is important because successful public diplomacy relies on proactive outreach, which sometimes clashes with the bureaucratic cultures in other agencies (Johnson and others 2005). Public diplomacy can be successful only if it is part of carefully crafted foreign policy. Barry Fulton research professor at George Washington University and director of Public Diplomacy Institute argues, that public diplomacy is not and should not be considered as camouflage for public policy. Public diplomacy is describing policy, but it does not improve on it, change it or present it wrongly (Nye 2003). The process of USIA joining the State Department did not take into account that the USIA's mission differed in some aspects from that of the Department of State and other foreign policy agencies (Tuch 1990). Being absorbed into a larger bureaucracy led to reduced dynamism and accomplishments. Its efforts were less cohesive and less effective (Seib 2004). And the absence of a true integration of public diplomacy with traditional diplomacy continues. Dizard contends that what is necessary is not a return to the programs of USIA era, because the new communication environment created by the Internet and other transnational resources is too multidimensional for such an approach. The challenge for the current world is setting the policies and actions that respect the integrity of the world's many cultures. The information age enabled influential voices to be present in every part of the world (Dizard 2006). According to Campbell and Flourny, when USIA was folded into the State Department in 1999, advocates argued that consolidation would place public diplomacy closer to policymaking. But in practice, integration was difficult, and public diplomacy officers became part of a bureaucracy with dense rules and procedures. "The State Department's culture devalues diplomacy because they believe that making and executing policy are more substantive endeavors." (Cambell and Flourny in Glassgold 2004:63) In addition, public diplomacy efforts are often seen as a waste of time to political appointees because their votes do not come from overseas.

Both sides are to be blamed for the failure to integrate public diplomacy more effectively. Public diplomacy was not able to promote its strengths within

traditional diplomacy on one hand, and on the other, the State Department just was not aware of the opportunities public diplomacy could offer.
In the post 9/11 world, it has become all too evident that under-valued public diplomacy sectors lost momentum and were not adequate the task. All sides agree that something must be done. In recent years the issue has been investigated by numerous organizations: U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the Congressionally-mandated Djerejian Report, the Heritage Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the USIA Alumni Association. Each of the studies noted or implied that public diplomacy within the Department of State has serious systematic problems.
To mention a few of the most serious: misunderstanding of the nature of public diplomacy *vis-à-vis* public affairs and traditional diplomacy; no true integration within the State Department and no central authority over public diplomacy; a lack of guidance; insufficient funding for public diplomacy programs and lack of human resources is next; the State Department fails to attract experienced, higher-level employees; and staff already employed as Foreign Service Officers are not motivated and lack in-depth training in the art of public diplomacy, in language, and in the culture of a the countries they serve in.

7.1 Misunderstanding of the Nature of Public Diplomacy *vis-à-vis* Public Affairs and Conduct of Traditional Diplomacy in the "New World Order."

By maintaining an on-going international dialogue, public diplomacy assures continued linkages between the United States and other countries, even when government-to-government relations and traditional diplomacy are interrupted. Public diplomacy helps traditional diplomacy by creating opportunities for person-to-person contacts that can under gird official ties; it also helps human interaction continue when formal negotiations are suspended. Public diplomacy creates complex, multi-dimensional, long-lasting attitudes about the United States that counterbalance simplified images (Brown 2002). In an interdependent world foreign policy cannot be isolated from other interactions and external factors (Manheim 1994). The assumption that certain country standards are the best and should be adopted by anyone is countered by Joseph Nye's logic that the arrogance, indifference to the opinions of others,

and narrow approach to national interests are a definite way to undermine soft power (Nye 2003). Persuasiveness succeeds by empathy and concern for the interests of others (Fremman 2006).

Traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy often conflict. Public diplomacy's main task is to present an accurate picture by considering that shared understandings may not overcome deeper disagreement on interests. In this time of globally capable information societies, it is necessary to recognize that there are multiple publics whose opinions can affect someone's capacity to achieve a goal. The communication revolution has made traditional diplomacy even more public. The variety of actors in international affairs now includes NGOs, businesses, lobbyists, journalists and bloggers and other "internet freaks". In the era of mass communications and electronic transmission, the public matters (Hoffman 2002).

Effective public diplomacy requires dialogue and an engagement at the level of ideas, not just images. A precondition for effective public diplomacy is the willingness to engage in global politics even when those politics maybe disputed by some. Global public attention must be earned by trustworthiness and relevance (Oglesby 2006).

One cannot "call in" public diplomacy when needed. Public diplomacy officers require the authority to advise other sections and to do so legitimately. As Edward R. Murrow put it, "If they want me in on the crash landings, I'd better damn well be in on the take-offs." (Murrow 1961). An effective foreign policy must be based on an understanding of how that policy will be perceived abroad. Public diplomats listen to their audiences as well as address them; it is about two-way communication. Without public diplomacy's active engagement and input, the formulation of foreign policy is at a serious disadvantage. No amount of selling the message through traditional diplomacy can make up for an inconsistent message because it has not had public diplomacy input (Kiehl 2005). The communication process that underlies the conduct of public diplomacy is best maintained as a dialogue, a two-way relationship. Such relationship suggests informing, understanding, and persuading (Tuch 1990).

Public diplomacy is not just public affairs directed abroad. Engaging with foreign societies is different from top-down, one-directional communication

that is aimed at publics abroad and it requires a different mindset (Melissen 2005). The United States cannot confront current threats without the cooperation of other countries. When U.S. policies loose their legitimacy in the eyes of others and distrust grows, U.S. strength in international affairs is generally reduced. Public diplomacy cannot be effective if the United States policies are not consistent with the broader democratic message they want to spread.

The conduct of public diplomacy places high priority on easy and inviting access to the public to attract them in American libraries and centers. Anything that alters the ease of access to cultural and information centers and removes public diplomacy officers from being close to their public contacts can affect public diplomacy's essential mission of communication with target audiences (Tuch 1990). Security issues, which of course should be seriously taken into account, and the protection of Embassy's premises limit that essential factor of public diplomacy – being open and publicly accessible to a wider public. The premise of the traditional view is that the purpose of diplomacy, including public diplomacy, is to affect policies and actions of other states and to make U.S. policies likeable to other countries. Public diplomacy is thus to be differentiated from the rest of diplomacy in one basic issue: its aim is to create a foundation of trust and enduring structures (Henrikson 2006). Public diplomacy is one of soft power's key instruments. It is true that we cannot isolate soft power issues from the hard power, as hard power and soft power are inextricably linked. As Nye argued, countries that are likely to be more attractive in postmodern international relations are those that help to frame issues, whose culture and ideas are closer to prevailing international norms, and whose credibility abroad is reinforced by their values and policies (Nye in Melissen 2005). It has become increasingly difficult to see how traditional diplomacy could be effective without giving enough attention to the public diplomacy (Tuch 1993). The communication revolution has enabled citizens to obtain information on what is going on in other countries as fast as, or even faster, than governments. The information now available to large publics has turned public opinion into an increasingly important factor in international relations. The democratization of information access has turned citizens into

active participants in international politics. The interlocutors of today's Foreign Service Officers are not necessarily their counterparts, but a wide variety of people targeted by various mechanisms. Information directed at a domestic audience often also reaches foreign publics, or the other way around. It is not unusual that the information is not received in the manner in which it was intended, as people tend to be pre-determinated by their own cultural context. A key element of public diplomacy is the building of personal and institutional relationships and dialogues with foreign audiences by focusing on values. In order to be successful, public diplomacy needs to identify target audiences in each country and/or region, and tailor strategies and methods to reach those audiences in a variety of different ways. Linguistic barriers and cultural shades obviously hinder the effectiveness of generic “one size fits all” public diplomacy efforts, and specialized knowledge is required to develop a better, more detailed understanding of audiences. A good example for this is the Muslim world. Muslim countries are exceptionally heterogeneous in terms of history, wealth, culture, religious composition, attitudes, etc. It is thus difficult to target such an audience with merely one program. (Brookings Institute 2004)

But to emphasize, public diplomacy should, of course, not be developed regardless of a country's foreign policy, and ideally it should be in tune with medium-term objectives and long-term aims.

7.2 No True Integration within the State Department or a Generally Accepted Public Diplomacy Strategy

Public diplomacy has not been at the table with other elements of the U.S. government during debates of policy initiatives for many years. Even when it was present, the participation and its voice were not equal to that of other policy-makers. It remained inconsistent and often reactive, rather than integrated from the start. A few years ago, the information sharing and coordination on public diplomacy existed only at the working level meetings (Public Diplomacy Council 2005). True integration was present only at the mission level. Things changed for better during the last two years. Each geographical desk is assisted by a public diplomacy officer. The current

challenge is how to strategically coordinate all of the key players involved in order to prevent duplication.

Recommendations emerging from a number of studies call for changes, including rescuing public diplomacy programs from their scattered locations within the Department of State. According to some reports, efforts must be more cohesive and streamlined and public diplomacy officials should be given more autonomy and authority to act independently (Seib 2004).

Unfortunately, communication at the Department of State remains in disarray, and interagency coordination still suffers. The White House and Congress must give the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs adequate authority and better resources. On September 23, 2004, Congress approved the creation of the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R/PPR). Its task is to provide sustainable strategic planning and performance measurement capability for public diplomacy programs. By providing information to the Under Secretary, The Office enables better advising on the allocation of public diplomacy resources and provides realistic measurement of public diplomacy's effectiveness. It also coordinates interagency public diplomacy activities, a shift towards more coherent overall public diplomacy efforts.

From the height of the Cold War to 9/11, public diplomacy has yet to see a domestic constituency. The 1948 Smith–Mundt Act, which prohibited domestic use of materials produced for overseas missions, ensured that few Americans knew their nation’s public diplomacy efforts. Public diplomacy has only now become better known because Americans realized that U.S. policies are often misunderstood. More and more experts actually call for the abolishment of the provision in Smith-Mundt Act that prohibits targeting domestic audience. The rational behind these voices is also the fact that globalization factors made such prohibition impossible.

Instead of one agency speaking to the world, various entities including the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) compete to have their voices heard. Public diplomacy functions are spread across many bureaus in the U.S. Department of State. With so many agencies engaged in

international communications, guidance and tactics must originate from one voice. There are even some who believe that the U.S. needs a central U.S. government institution within which policy, people and budget can be consistently organized with a multi-faced strategy. Ideas for a new USIA-like organization that would be able to articulate American ideals to the world and counter hostile propaganda are circulating. Such an agency, proponents claim, should be independent from the State Department, Defense Department and the CIA (Reilly 2007).

Nye cannot give enough praise to the importance of developing an integrated grand strategy that combines “hard” military power with “soft” attractive power into “smart” power. To date, there is no such integrated strategy for combining hard and soft power. Many instruments of soft power are scattered around the government. There is no overarching strategy or common budget that would present such a step toward integration.

If we look to the past, the USIA’s most obvious failure, despite its best efforts, was its inability to establish itself firmly as a strong influence in the formation of key foreign policy decisions. The agency’s influence on policy was strongest at the embassy level. In the past, skilled ambassadors listened to their USIS staff and observed local public attitudes when making policy recommendations to the State Department. This still occurs, but public diplomacy concerns tend to get weakened in the mix of other interests. There is no standard solution for this problem, as the strength of the public diplomacy also depends on the nature of public diplomacy officers. Some succeed in positioning strongly in the overall decision-making process and some do not. If anything, diplomacy is more complex than ever today. The answer does not lie in resurrecting old USIA practices - changes in global information and cultural patterns would not allow that anymore - no one can deny that public diplomacy role was the most effective in the USIA period (Dizard 2006).

Today's communication interactivity transformed public diplomacy into a process. Public diplomacy has become more about participation rather than simply presentation (Vickers 2005). Joint research should be used to assess the effectiveness of all public diplomacy efforts. At present, each agency conducts its own polling, planning, and evaluation efforts. Research and broad

planning should be more centralized and results more accessible to all involved actors. Some benchmarks and parameters should be set in order to compare the results. More recently developed national public diplomacy and strategic communication strategy is an essential first step (Dale 2007).

A Task Force report suggested the establishment of a Corporation for Public Diplomacy - a non-governmental body that would be responsible for US public diplomacy programs through different means. It could attract people from a variety of backgrounds, who otherwise would not desire to work directly for the U.S. government. Private sector participation in public diplomacy could mean that certain projects would be better accepted than if they were implemented by government alone. An expanded private sector role could also provide more money through private donations and income from private sources. The messengers could vary, depending on the audience. The establishing of different strategic alliances with foreign universities, private corporations and independent media would be easier (Peterson 2004).

The Public Diplomacy Council suggests that the public diplomacy adviser should have the authority to oversee the development of strategic public diplomacy priorities, to advise the president and other policymakers on foreign public opinion and what communications strategies to be used respectively. It would also make sense to merge all U.S international broadcasting into a single multimedia global broadcaster that would maintain the principles laid down in the VOA Charter and journalistic code. Such an entity would reduce overlap and competition among current U.S. government-funded broadcasters. It would also mean better allocation of resources in programming and transmission. U.S. international broadcasting should be also integrated more closely with other public diplomacy programs (Public Diplomacy Council 2005).

Public diplomacy initiatives require strategic direction. More experienced Foreign Service public affairs officers are needed to engage with publics, to meet the people and listen to what they have to say, and incorporate this information into an effective public diplomacy strategy. Public diplomacy presents the link between U.S. policies and how people understand its purpose (Hagel 2004).

Right now it sometimes happens that public diplomacy is even less public and less diplomatic (Holtzman 2003). According to the U.S.- based think tank RAND, in some cases and situations, effectiveness may be maximized by focusing the public diplomacy effort on the constituency while ignoring actual or potential opposition by the adversary; as there are too many players to target them all (RAND 2004). And above all, it is necessary not to forget country's traditional allies. Good relations should constantly nourished in order to continuously prepare the ground for eventual crisis outbursts. While allies and friends may disagree and hold different opinions, such differences should not be seen as hostile, but rather accepted as disagreements. Adelman asserts that in its grandest sense, public diplomacy is preventive diplomacy, because it can help prevent ally countries from drifting away, and the peoples of adversary countries from losing all touch with democratic values (Adelman in Glassgold 2004).

7.3 Insufficient Funding for Public Diplomacy Programs; Including Human Resources

At its height during the Cold War twenty years ago, the public diplomacy programs of the United States had budgets of approximately $1 billion. According to Edward Djerejian, former ambassador and chairman of a 2003 report entitled "Changing Minds, Winning Peace", the State Department spends approximately $600 million on public diplomacy programs worldwide, and the Broadcasting Board of Governors spends another $540 million. These amounts together present less than three tenths of one percent of the annual Defense Department budget.

Today, U.S. Government public diplomacy programs are a small portion of that amount. Funding for exchange programs, including the Fulbright and International Visitor Programs have remained stagnant since the end of the Cold War. That presents a reduction of more than 40 percent in real dollars. Support for libraries, cultural programs and similar efforts was cut drastically or in some cases eliminated entirely. In addition, the number of public diplomacy Foreign Service Officers overseas was also drastically reduced, on average, from a staff of ten to twenty. (Public Diplomacy Council 2005)

The combined cost of the State Department's public diplomacy programs and U.S. international broadcasting totals approximately 4% of the nation's international affairs budget. (Beehner 2005). From 1993 to 2001, funding for the State Department’s educational and cultural exchange programs fell more than 33 percent; from $349 million to $232 million (adjusted for inflation). Only about five million US dollars of the public diplomacy amount is spent on public opinion polling aiming to increase understanding of foreign views. The entire budget for public diplomacy (broadcasting, information, and exchange programs) in 2005 was $1.2 billion. The budget has been slowly increasing over the last few years; for example from 2002 when 497 million USD was devoted for public diplomacy to 762 million US dollars in 2007. However, such slow increases are not adequate for countering the challenges currently facing the U.S. In 2002, only 25 million dollars was spent to target Arab and Muslim world, but in 2003 that amount was increased to 150 million US dollars (Snow 2005). The US government spends 450 times more on hard military power than on soft power (Nye 2005). At this point, it is necessary to reiterate that the right public diplomacy administered beforehand can prevent far more costly operations later.

It is essential that America recruit the most talented and dedicated people to the field of public diplomacy. Between 1991, when 2,500 public diplomacy officers were employed, and 2002, the number was cut in half and technology began to replace human-to-human contact (Kane Finn 2002). Before the new career officers go abroad and become managers of public diplomacy they need some knowledge in the discipline – theoretical, historical, conceptual background and some practical experience (Tuch 1990). To list just a few: knowledge of journalism practice, writing and editing, public affairs practice and process within the State Department, knowledge of higher education institutions, familiarity with the broad range of culture, communication and media law and ethics, behavioral science principles, including communication models, research techniques including polls, media trend studies and focus groups and, above all, the ability to define a communication problem and design plans to address it. It is even more important that they are linguistically trained at a professional level of the assigned country, and in the complexity of

its culture. President Bush launched the National Security Language Initiative to fight the language deficit. Under this program, Department of State appropriates $27 million to develop the language skills of Foreign Service Officers. Some even suggest public affairs officers should be dedicated to a certain region and that they stay there for several years. It would be better if an officer served in Middle East for fifteen years, knowing the cultural varieties and language, instead of being transferred to Africa after three years and then to Europe or Russia for the next three (Callahan 2006). The other mission employees, including chief of missions, should be not only aware of public diplomacy's existence, but also trained in the benefits and importance of this profession. A Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps has been suggested in order to recruit prestigious private sector experts from relevant professions for short-term assignments. Retired public diplomacy officers could be also invited into this body to share their experience and valuable knowledge gained by serving overseas. Calls for establishment of a Public Diplomacy Training Institute, independent of the government, that could draw on the best talent and techniques from the U.S., are also part of the effort to underline the specific needs of the public diplomacy. Public diplomacy should also draw the attention of all undersecretaries within the Department of State. It is not the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, it is also regional undersecretaries who should be more aware of the value of public diplomacy when better integrated into overall foreign policy.

Public Affairs Officers as heads of USIS posts were able to design their own programs and even decide how much of Washington-produced material they would use. The choice of which diplomatic tools are best is always situation and country specific. That is why public diplomacy officers at each post need the freedom to decide what is most suitable for their targeted audience. Public Affairs Officers could protect the budget from the pressures of others needs and priorities of diplomatic missions. It is fair to say that public diplomacy would not have come so far as it has or accomplished as much as it has, if it had not been lodged in a separate agency. Once USIA’s proactive communicators and creative personnel were pushed into a bureaucracy that values secrecy and a deliberative clearance process, they lost their

presidential connection and strong leadership. Its independent culture clashed with the consensus-driven State Department. The key for future success is the culture of State Department. Officers trained to listen, report and analyze, will have to learn to discuss, to relate to others on a personal level, and to persuade. It is a question of whether a Public Affairs Officer will be encouraged or able to offer advice when appropriate (See Bardos 2001:434-437).

A report by the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, one year after the reorganization, says,

> *"The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy finds that the consolidation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in the State Department has to date produced a mixed record. For former USIA employees, the transition has meant a very difficult adjustment; while moving to the State Department has afforded former USIA employees unprecedented career opportunities, it has also required them to conform to the procedures of a Department that is overly centralized and hierarchical. The Commission finds the morale among the Department's 'new' employees is worryingly low, but morale is a major problem throughout the entire Department, not just among former USIA employees."* (United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 2000:3)

Americans employed and working in public diplomacy are assisted by the local nationals. Foreign national employees have to be treated with the same trust and respect as their American colleagues. Much of the work of public diplomacy depends on the dedication, experience, expertise and contribution of Foreign Service Nationals have institutional memory. They have established links with a variety of publics and are in their positions for several years. U.S. officers constantly change. Turnaround is every three to four years, but locally-employed staff stay at embassies for twenty or more years and know the public very well; one should not forget the advantage of their involvement. Officers should not feel less competent in asking locals for advice or having them at the decision table. Unfortunately much of the information is confidential and can only be access by American employees. But what is the

rational for such secrecy? Locally employed staff are also security checked and obliged to secrecy. They most surely have the interest to serve the institution that employs them.

7.4 The Importance of Research

Public diplomacy requires respect for several sciences and as it is primarily social science, the research is among the most important. Congressman Henry Hyde noted years ago that the perceptions of foreign publics have domestic consequences (Hyde 2002). Mark Helmke, public diplomacy advisor to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, also emphasized that "U.S. must listen and respond to the framework of foreign publics i.e. values, norms, religions and politics. We must acknowledge and respect the differences. Opinion can be a measure, as can be a source of the information and consequently power". (Helmke 2003).

Strengthening public opinion research is vital to shape and explain policy. Public opinion is important for developing response capability in order to correct misinformation on policies as quickly as possible. Fisher asserts that since we live in an era of increasing interdependence, a high priority should be placed on accurate understanding. Recent studies of foreign policy decision-making indicated that national choices are too often based on an unacceptable degree of misperceptions. Decision-makers and publics too often reinforce the other's inaccurate interpretation of events (Fisher in Glassgold 2004). Hansen emphasizes the importance of social science research in detecting foreign public opinion and their attitudes and gaining knowledge about audiences' reactions to messages. He contends that the greater investigation into these areas of research, the greater success of the programs. Understanding a specific culture is essential to success in communication with other people. Unless messages are adapted to local interests, audiences tend to distort them and understand them in the framework of their culture, not necessarily in line of the messenger (See Hansen in Glassgold 2004:69). Hansen emphasizes we must understand local cultures in order to tailor the messages to that specific culture (Hansen in Glassgold 2004).

Edward P. Djereijan and his committee concluded that 80% of the perception of the U.S. among foreign publics was determined by policy orientation and how U.S. values are accepted. The other 20% could be affected by public diplomacy efforts (Kessler and Wright 2005). According to Independent Task Force, the U.S. government spends only five to ten million U.S. dollars annually on foreign public opinion polling (U.S. businesses, for example, spend $6 billion). Washington should allocate additional money for researches whose results would have to be integrated in formulating programs, their monitoring and evaluation in order to test their effectiveness (Independent Task Force 2003).

7.5 New Emphases and New Technologies

Conditions in technology and the infrastructure of communications have radically changed. This creates a huge new potential, but it could also lead to communicative anarchy. When people are overwhelmed with the volume of information confronting them, they can have difficulty deciding what to focus on. Attention, rather than information, becomes the key resource. Reputation and reliability of information become even more important than in the past and political struggles are now fought over the creation and destruction of credibility.

The proliferation of 24/7 media outlets and information technologies makes public diplomacy more complicated. One way to respond is to make sure that complete, up-to-date copies of important speeches and documents are available and brought to target groups. Foreign media reporting can be wrong or based on unverified sources. So it is important to cultivate relationships with local editors and journalists and provide them with full texts of official statements (Brown 2002). Alvin Snyder, a fellow at the University of Southern California's Center on Public Diplomacy discovered the U.S. government's website is the sixth most visited site in the world. US public diplomacy is successful in some aspects of information communication use, such as the use of list-serves, e-mails and websites, as well as digital video conferencing. But there are still some outlets, for example use of pod-casts, chat rooms and

other types of online conversations that currently under-utilized. (Snyder in Ross 2003).

Joseph Nye describes the new power situation in the manner of a three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar, with the U.S. in the lead. On the middle chessboard, economic power is multi-polar, with several players: the U.S., Europe, Japan, and China. On this board, other countries often balance American power. The bottom chessboard is the area of transnational relations that go beyond government control. This includes different actors: everyone with a computer and internet connection can become a player. Such an example could be the connections in the war on terrorism between military actions on the top board, where the U.S. removed an Iraqi dictator, but simultaneously increased the ability of Al Qaeda to gain new recruits on the bottom transnational board. On this bottom board, power is widely dispersed. Many of the real challenges are actually coming from the lower transnational board. Today's information revolution and globalization are transforming and shrinking the world. The information revolution is creating virtual communities and networks that cross national borders. Technology has been taking power away from governments and redirecting it to individuals and groups. As globalization cuts distances, events in some far way places have much greater impact on individual's lives. Today's growing global networks of interdependence are changing international agendas (Nye 2004b). Technological advances have led to an information explosion and publics have become more sensitized to propaganda. In traditional politics, the world is defined by those who win militarily or economically, but in this information age it is about whose story wins. Governments try to enhance their own credibility and weaken that of their opponents (Nye 2005). The U.S. has more power and resources in comparison to other countries, but in the sense of control over other countries' behavior, it has less power. Strategic power is not so highly concentrated anymore (Nye 2004a). Geographical barriers no longer provide easy protection from global competition. Tremendous declines in computing, communication, and transport costs have democratized technology. The state will not be replaced, but it will have to share the establishment of policies with

more actors. According to Nye, the U.S. does not have strategy for how to relate with non-official authorities of soft power (Nye 2006b). Some of today's most virulent threats come from ideologies and non-state actors active domestically and internationally. A blogger reaches more people than did the BBC and the Voice of America few decades ago. Misrepresentations are circulated quickly and silence is filled by alternative ideas. To succeed in this current environment, diplomacy requires extreme flexibility and especially rapid response. That means public diplomacy will have to take a pro-active approach. It will have to increase the use of modern technology and new means of conveying the message.

7.6. From Branding to Transformational Diplomacy

This section describes different public diplomacy strategies introduced after the consolidation of the USIA into the State Department. When **Charlotte Beers** came to the position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, soon after 09/11, she introduced **"Branding of the USA"** strategy. This strategy derived from her experiences in a previous position, as a well-respected advertising professional, most know for branding Uncle Ben's rice. She had no previous State Department experience and came directly from the private sector. Her major assignment was to "sell America and its war on terrorism". One of her first products was the Shared Values Campaign. She had a bad start, as TV spots were criticized in those countries where they were broadcasted and some countries refused to allow them on local TV stations. In general, polls were showing a decline in U.S. support in the period of her tenure. Limited use of skills and practices from the corporate sector - in particular from the disciplines of public relations and marketing - could be useful in public diplomacy, but only to some extent, as branding is characterized usually by one-way messages and does not take into account mutual communication.

She was succeeded by **Margaret De B. Tutwiler** who served overseas in the past and was well acquainted with the public diplomacy outreach. In her short tenure, she emphasized more active listening on the part of the U.S. Government, including listening to the officers overseas and expanding the

discussion about the American values and policies to publics outside traditional elites. In her confirmation hearing in front of the Senate Foreign relations Committee she said:

> *"In addition, we need to do a much better job of listening. I have served in two Administrations in Washington and one from overseas. As much as we would like to think Washington knows best, we have to be honest and admit we do not necessarily always have all the answers. Our government officials out on the front lines do have good solid ideas, which further understanding and nurture our country's image. We should be more active in soliciting, and more open to receiving, their suggestions. We should more carefully listen to people in other countries and be more sensitive to explaining ourselves in ways that resonate in their communities."* (Tutwelier 2003)

In 2005, **Karen Hughes** became Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. She had worked for George W. Bush from 1990s on, first as a director of the communication office when he was Governor of Texas and then when he became president of the United States as his counselor. Her three-point strategic vision included the following crucial issues: the communication of a positive vision of hope, based on a belief in freedom and opportunity for all (fundamental rights, rule of law, etc.), isolation and marginalization of violent extremists, to foster a sense of common interest and purpose between Americans and others. She developed the so-called **"4E's"** tactics: Engage, Exchange, Educate, and Empower.

By engage she wanted to more vigorously advocate the ideas. Engage also meant to articulate U.S. government positions more rapidly. She emphasized exchange programs and the value of building long-term relationships with decision-makers and opinion-makers (academia, media, and youth leaders). She also targeted domestic constituencies. She urged the need for life-long learning, including learning about different cultures and countries. Empowerment stands for the creation of partnerships with individuals and groups. In order to achieve these goals, she pursued three initiatives: 1.) integrating policy and public diplomacy at the State Department, 2.) establishing the position of Deputy Assistance Secretaries for Public

Diplomacy in the regional bureaus in order to present the public diplomacy side in the policies, 3.) interagency strategic communication process was re-launched, where senior level policy and public diplomacy and public affairs officials from different agencies discuss communications strategies. Karen Hughes also introduced a new strategic initiative of searching for partnerships with the private sector. The first such action was the Private Sector Summit on Public Diplomacy, which was held from January 9-10, 2007 in Washington D.C. The Summit was organized by Department of State and the PR Coalition, a partnership of 17 major U.S.-based organizations dealing with corporate public relations. It brought together 160 top public relations professionals and State Department leaders who engaged in a dialogue on how the private sector could become more involved in and supportive of U.S. public diplomacy (Private Sector Summit 2005).

At the beginning of 2006, **Secretary of State Rice** introduced **"Transformational Diplomacy"**. Part of this effort is also the so-called transformational public diplomacy. Transformational public diplomacy foresees an increase in program funding (especially for exchanges), better internal governmental communication and unified information sent to the world. A Rapid Response Center was created. It prepares daily early morning summaries of news around the world, and adds official U.S. government responses and messages. Those are sent to Cabinet Secretaries, Ambassadors, public diplomacy and information officers and military leaders overseas. Another project of transformational diplomacy is "an echo chamber," on State Department Intranet, where statements are posted in order to unify the department's message on key issues of world concern. Regional hubs were established in Dubai, Brussels and London with the primary task of getting officials on television and in media generally, to advocate U.S. values and policies. Ambassadors and Foreign Service Officers are expected to give interviews on variety of policies without advance approval. Public diplomacy strengthened also in human resources. A new deputy assistant secretary for public diplomacy now works in each bureau, reporting to the assistant secretary and to undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs.

Enhancing new partnership with private sector, non-governmental sector and enhancing use of technology is not the question any more. The challenge is how to use them all at their best.

8. CURRENT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PROGRAMS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Within the Department of State, a unit called Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes from July 2005 until mid-December 2007 is divided into three major bureaus: Bureau of Public Affairs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and Bureau of International Information Programs. An additional three offices also included and/or closely related to Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Section are: Office of Private Sector Outreach, Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.

Bureau of Public Affairs (PA)

The Bureau of Public Affairs carries out the Secretary's directive to help Americans understand the foreign affairs. The Bureau is led by Assistant Secretary who also serves as Department spokesman. Public Affairs Bureau follows the State Department's mission to inform the American people and address their concerns. This Bureau comments back to the policy makers. Activities of Bureau of Public Affairs which include:

- Strategic and tactical planning to advance the Administration's foreign policy goals.
- Press briefings for domestic and foreign media.
- Media outreach, meaning appearance of key Department officials in variety of media on all levels.
- Managing the State Department's web site *www.america.gov*. This internet site is dedicated to the most recent information about U.S. foreign policy and the United States in general.
- Organization of events with speakers to address general public, mostly related to U.S. foreign policy.
- Production of audio-visual products for general public, media, Department bureaus and offices, including the Secretary of State.

- Historical studies on U.S. diplomacy and foreign affairs matters.

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State fosters mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries around the world by implementing exchange and cultural programs. The major programs implemented by this Bureau, just to name a few, are: The Fulbright Program, International Visitors Leadership Program, Ron Brown Fellowships Program, Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowships Program, Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship Program, different undergraduate programs, high school and youth programs, different cultural programs, such as Jazz Ambassadors or Art in Embassies, International Cultural Property Protection, English language Teaching & Learning, Sports Diplomacy, Alumni programs, not to mention programs for U.S. citizens and different special initiatives, such as the Edward R. Murrow Journalism Program and others. It also promotes study in the U.S. and provides information to Americans on studying abroad.

Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP)

The State Department's Bureau of International Information Programs engages international audiences on issues of foreign policy, society and values to help create an environment receptive to U.S. policies. It communicates with foreign opinion and decision makers and other publics through a wide range of print and electronic outreach materials published in English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Persian, Russian, and Spanish. It also provides information outreach support to U.S. embassies and consulates in more than 140 countries worldwide. This Bureau implements U.S. Speaker Program that brings American experts (guest speaker not affiliated to the government), not in a certain topic overseas for few days and coordinates Information Resource Centers, information sources overseas on U.S.-related issues for local scholars, politicians, different professionals and academia.

Besides the-above mentioned bureaus that are within the State Department, there is also an independent agency, **Broadcasting Board of Governors** (BBG), which is responsible for the international broadcasting sponsored by the U.S. government. As already mentioned, it was established when USIA was consolidated within the State Department in 1999 and inherited USIA's Voice of America. Besides Voice of America, it also encompasses Radio Sawa, Radio Farda, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio and TV broadcastings Marti and Alhurra. BBG receives policy guidance from the Secretary of State who is also a BBG Board member.

On September 23, 2004, Congress approved the creation of the **Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs**. This office provides long-term strategic planning and performance measurement of public diplomacy and public affairs programs. It also provides information to Under Secretary on the allocation of public diplomacy and public affairs resources and measures the effectiveness of the programs.

The Office of Private Sector Outreach was established in 2006 to develop innovative ways for the State Department to work with the private sector on different public diplomacy initiatives: partnerships to empower women business leaders, provide humanitarian relief, strengthen international education, address health issues and to promote social and economic development. Thus far this Office has pledged nearly $1 billion by creating partnerships with companies, foundations, and NGOs.

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy is a bipartisan panel created by Congress and appointed by the President to oversee U.S. Government activities in the area of information and understanding of foreign publics. The Commission has existed for 57 years. It is responsible for assessing public diplomacy policies and programs of the U.S. State Department, American missions abroad, and other agencies as well. Advisory Commission responsibilities are: extension of international exchanges, international information programs, and funding of non-governmental

organizations. By law, the Commission's seven members are appointed by the President with U.S. Senate approval. They are selected from different professional backgrounds and serve three-year terms with the possibility for reappointment. The Commission reports its findings and recommendations to the President, the Congress, the Secretary of State, and to the American public.

9. HOW DOES IT WORK?

One should note that not all U.S. embassies and missions around the world participate in every program. Most participate in popular, high-profile programs such as the Fulbright program or U.S. Speakers program. Otherwise, each embassy or foreign mission has great latitude in deciding which programs they will implement. In addition, many State Department programs are limited to, or target particular regions or countries (i.e. the Eastern European Democracy program or Radio Sawa which targets Arabic-speaking countries in the Middle East).

9.1 Organization of the Public Affairs Section (PAS) within the Embassy of the United States of America in Slovenia

The head of the section is the Public Affairs Officer assisted by the Public Diplomacy Officer. Both positions are reserved for U.S. Foreign Service Officers. Beside these two Americans, the Public Affairs Section in Ljubljana employs five local employees (so called Foreign Service Nationals).

9.1.1 Information Resource Center (IRC)

IRC provides current, trustworthy information to Slovenians who for professional or research purposes need information about the United States. Using specialized Internet based resources and online databases it offers: U.S. Government official documents, including research papers, speeches and statements by officials, and texts related to major foreign and American domestic policies, other materials on U.S. foreign policy and politics, business

and economic issues, law and legislative processes, and American institutions in general.

The IRC director is also responsible for up-dating Embassy's web-page and for the coordination of the U.S. Embassy Speaker Program. This program activates the American diplomats to speak to various audiences (secondary and university students, non-governmental groups and local communities) in order to disseminate information about the United States, its policies, values and society, as well as to simply share their experiences.

9.1.2 The Exchanges Office

This Office provides comprehensive information about the U.S. Government's sponsored exchange programs and administers these programs in Slovenia on behalf of the Department of State. The cornerstone of U.S. Embassy Slovenia's exchange activity is the **Fulbright Program** which operates under a 1993 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the Government of Slovenia. The Fulbright Program was established in 1946 under legislation introduced by then Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas. Approximately 279,500 Fulbright Scholars and Students, 105,400 from the United States and 174,100 from other countries, have participated in the program since its establishment. The Fulbright Program awards approximately 6,000 new grants annually. The Congressional appropriation for the Fulbright Program in fiscal year 2006 was $184.6 million. Foreign governments, through binational commissions or foundations abroad, contributed an additional $50.4 million directly to the Program. The J. William Fulbright Scholarship Board is composed of twelve educational and public leaders appointed by the President of the United States to define the policies, procedures and selection criteria for the Program. Binational commissions and foundations overseas propose the annual country programs that include the request for the number and categories of grants based on requests from local institutions. In a country without a commission or foundation, the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy develops and supervises the Fulbright Program. Currently, 50 commissions are active, 48 of which are funded jointly by the United States and respective governments. Each commission or foundation has a board,

which is composed of an equal number of Americans and citizens of the participating nation. Some Fulbright programs are administered directly by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Others are administered with the assistance of cooperating agencies

Currently, the Fulbright Program operates in over 150 countries worldwide. In Slovenia an annual average of seven scholars and students are sent both ways to lecture and research. Fulbright grants are ranging from five to ten months. This office closely cooperates with relevant Slovene Government ministries, Slovenian universities and the Fulbright Committee of Slovenia. Fulbright awards come in two categories: Postdoctoral Research/Lecturing (Fulbright Scholars); and Pre-doctoral Research (Fulbright Students).

International Visitor Leadership Program and Voluntary Visitors Program (IVLP) is also coordinated by the US Embassy Ljubljana. The International Visitor Leadership Program operates under authority of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays Act). The emphasis of the program is to increase mutual understanding through communication at the personal and professional levels.

Every year, this program brings approximately 5.000 foreigners from all over the world to the United States to meet and discuss different issues with their professional counterparts and experts. It also presents the opportunity for the firsthand experience about the United States. Participants are nominated by the officers at the overseas posts. The major justification for the selection is that those people are current or potential leaders in a certain field, such as politics, government, business, NGOs, academia, media and other fields. Usually they are a good current or potential future contact for the Embassy. The nomination is approved by the whole country team (a group of American officers led by the ambassador) and sent to the State Department. Department of State confirms the nomination pending upon the eligibility and quality of nominees.

Logistical arrangement is led by Department of State and volunteer organizations. There are currently 95 Councils for International Visitors in 42 states. Nomination can be either for a certain already existing program or for an individual program (program created especially for a certain person or

group of persons). The group or thematic projects focus on a particular topic. Group projects can bring together colleagues with similar professional interests from particular countries, geographic regions or worldwide. Program last from three to 21 days and are fully or partially funded.
Among the thousands of distinguished individuals who have participated in the International Visitor Leadership Program since its existence, more than five decades ago, are more than 200 current and former Chiefs of State, 1,500 cabinet-level ministers, and many, many other distinguished leaders from the public and private sectors. Among Slovenians taking part in this program were former president Janez Drnovšek, current European Commissioner Janez Potočnik, president of the Supreme Court Franc Testen and many others.

9.1.3 Press and Media Office

The Public Affairs Press Section works with Slovene print and electronic media to provide official information on U.S. Government policies. It also tracks media opinion on issues of interest to the United States. In addition to answering media inquiries, the press section issues Embassy press releases and statements and assists the Slovene and U.S. press during high-level U.S. Government officials and speakers visits.
Some of the other important functions of the Press Section include:
- Organizing all media events with the U.S. Ambassador and offering him or her the support in media appearances.
- Organization of press conferences for high-level U.S. Government officials visiting Slovenia.
- Arranging reporting tours, and training programs for journalists in cooperation with the State Department
- Preparation of press briefings for Ambassador and his/her team.
Information Office's responsibility is to establish and nourish good and long-term relationships with media outlets.

9.1.4 Grants Programs

The Public Affairs Office also manages Grant Programs. US Embassy Ljubljana is currently running two such programs:

- NGO Development Grants, which support the activities and development of civil society and not for profit and non-governmental organizations in various topics.

Over a period of 15 years, the U.S. Embassy to Slovenia has provided over $1,500,000 to Slovenian NGO's as part of the Democracy Commission Small Grants Program. These funds were used to support the activities and development of grassroots organizations working to strengthen civil society in Slovenia. With this support, Slovenes have focused on civic education, human and minority rights, the rule of law, legal reform, environmental protection, an independent media, and other grass-roots initiatives. In 2004, Democracy Commission Small Grants ceased to exit in Slovenia, but the Embassy decided to continue to support projects that aim at strengthening the NGO sector in general, that address trans-Atlantic cooperation, minority issues and promoting inter-ethnic dialogue, promote entrepreneurship, address international security issues, regional stability, climate change and environment issues and have a broader regional impact, Local non-profit, non-governmental and public organizations, institutions and associations are eligible. The total amount for this program varies from year to year, but up to 60.000 USD is devoted for its implementation each year.

- Cultural Grants support artistic and cultural performances, exhibitions, different workshops and lectures whose aims promote and deepen the understanding of American culture in Slovenia. Grants are awarded to individuals, groups, and organizations whose presentations show the richness and diversity of American culture. The Embassy supports projects with outstanding artistic, cultural, and educational value. Approximately 50.000 USD is targeted at this program annually.

9.1.5 The U.S. Speaker and Specialist Program

This program facilitates communication between individual Americans (experts from different fields) and counterparts, key foreign audiences. The U.S. Speaker and Specialist Program awards grants to American experts who lecture, serve as consultants; or are guest speakers at the conferences, they

conduct seminars and workshops for professional audiences. Grantees can either travel to the country or participate in digital video and tele-conferences. Slovenia has approximately five slots – travel grants, for every year. The process includes writing of the request explaining the rational for the speaker (can be a name request or just area of the expertise request) and proposed program. After State Department approves and administers the necessary paper work, the post organizes and coordinates the actual implementation of the program.

Public Affairs Section is also marking celebrations and commemorative days, such as 09/11, Earth Day, National Breast Cancer Awareness Month, Days of activism combating violence against women and implements cultural programs, such as exhibits and performances of various American artists (Andy Warhol, Edward S. Curtis, Keith Secola, Western Jazz Quartet, etc.)

9.1.6 American Corner Koper

Closely related to Public Affairs Section is American Corner. Though not in the same location and with its own director, it presents a partnership between the U.S. Embassy in Ljubljana and the University of Primorska, as well as the Municipality of Koper and private local company. A network of over 200 American Corners are operating globally through partnerships between the U.S. Department of State and local host organizations. It was established in order to facilitate co-operation in the fields of education, research and culture. It represents the focal point for information on education in the U.S., organizes lectures and round-tables, exhibits and other cultural performances, not only for Primorska (South-West Slovenia) region, but for the whole country.

10. THE IMPACT OF POST 09/11 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL AND SLOVENIAN ATTITUDES ABOUT THE U.S.

Prior to the military intervention in Iraq the Bush administration focused on building public support for the intervention. According to public polls, it was successful. Gallup International Poll on Iraq invasion in 2003 indicates that approximately half of the people in the world were not in favor of military action against Iraq under any circumstances. But on the other hand if military action was taken, 73% of Americans felt that their country should support this action. (Gallup International Association 2003). According to The Pew Research Center and the poll they conducted in March 2003, seven-in-ten Americans overall (72%) believed the decision to take military action against Iraq was correct.(Pew Research Center 2003)

But the project of "winning hearts and minds" of the majority of Muslim countries and European countries, was destined for failure from the beginning. The Pew Global Attitudes Poll released in June 2003 showed that the majority of Muslim populated countries (Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan and others) strongly opposed the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism. The belief that United States pursues unilateralist foreign policy has only grown in the war's aftermath in Western Europe (Pew Research Center 2003)

In June 2003, the House Appropriations Committee included a directive in the supplemental appropriations bill that stated:

> *"The Committee expects the Department to engage the creative talents of the private sector to the maximum extent possible to develop new public diplomacy approaches and initiatives. In this regard, the Committee expects the Department [of State] to establish an advisory group on public diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim world to recommend new approaches, initiatives and program models to improve public diplomacy results. This advisory group should include individuals with extensive expertise in public diplomacy, media, public relations, and the region."* (House of Representatives 2003)

In previously mentioned report, released on October 1 2003 by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, a new strategic direction for U.S. public diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World was requested. In the executive summary, the report states “At a critical time in our nation’s history, the apparatus of public diplomacy has proven inadequate, especially in the Arab and Muslim world.” (Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World 2003:9)

Despite a strong White House focus on the subject, the effort to influence overseas opinion on the war was not successful. According to some research the overall attitudes toward United States have worsened since 09/11, mainly because of the U.S. policies in Iraq and policies related to Israeli-Palestine conflict; this is true especially in Arab countries. People in five countries, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, polled in face-to-face interviews, expressed strongly unfavorable attitude towards the U.S. On average, 82% expressed the unfavorable attitudes (Zogby International 2006). Looking broader, Pew International summary of findings also gives us alarming picture. In 1999/2000, 58% of those taking part in the survey, had a favorable opinion of the U.S., in 2006 only 38.5% still thought the same. A bit more encouraging was that 54.66% of people still saw American people favorably. (Pew International, 2006) But public support for President Bush’s efforts in Iraq and the President himself was down to 24.66% of people that had confidence in Bush’s international presidential leadership, and 29.07% believed the efforts to establish democracy in Iraq would succeed (Pew International 2006).

In Slovenia, Slovenian Politbarometer, a public poll research affiliated to the Faculty of Social Sciences, implemented by the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, questioned Slovenians about the military action in Afghanistan (October and November 2001) and about the Coalition of the Willing intervention in Iraq (April, June 2003, March 2004 and 2005 and January 2006). Asking whether they approve of military actions of the Western allies in Afghanistan, in November 2001, 39.2% did and 36.8% were oppose. One month earlier 37.2% approved and 33.5% disapproved (Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center 2001)

The story with Iraq is completely different. When asked how do you, from the present point, estimate American-coalition intervention in Iraq? In April 2003, 41% of Slovenes approved or at least partially approved the intervention. But in 2006 the percentage of those approving was 18%, and those completely or partially disapproving was 56% as indicated in Table 10:1. (Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center 2003 and 2006)



Table 10:1: The Estimation of the US-Coalition Intervention in Iraq (Politbarometer January 2006:24)

In June and July 2007, I implemented a survey among the Slovenian participants in Department of State funded exchange programs; Fulbright Program, Ron Brown Program, International Visitors Leadership Program and Humphrey Program.[8]

Surprisingly, the results were much better than expected. 52.18% had favorable or somewhat favorable opinion about the United States foreign policy in general. (See Table 10:2)



Table 10:2: Opinion about the United States Foreign Policy

The majority even favored U.S. led fight against terrorism. 54% of those who answered said the phrase “I favor the U.S. led efforts to fight terrorism” was closer to their view than the opposite “I oppose the U.S. led efforts to fight terrorism”. The latter was closer to 46% of those who participated. (See Table 10:3)

[8] Questionnaire included questions about the programs themselves; about the content, the impact and benefit for individuals, as also general questions about the American people and U.S. foreign policy (see attachment A). Questionnaire was sent via e-mail to 250 persons who participated in either program unitl 2007. I received back 80 of them, but some decided to answer just partially.



Table 10:3: How do You See US-Led Efforts to Fight Terrorism

But they were less optimistic when asked if they believe that efforts to establish a stable democratic government in Iraq would succeed. The results were more in line with the international surveys; 57% said these efforts will definitely fail. (See Table 10:4)



Table 10:4: How Will the Efforts to Establish a Stable Democratic Government in Iraq End

As an indicator of how supportive of the Iraqi intervention they are, the survey included a question regarding their support for Slovenia's decision to send troops to Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. The results for Iraq were the lowest, but nevertheless not so alarming; 43.1% of surveyed supported Slovenia's decision. (See Table 10:5)



Table 10:5: Support for Slovenia's Peace-keeping Troops in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo

Another question asked if they think the world is a safer or more dangerous place without Saddam Hussein in power. 51% thought it is more dangerous and 38% safer. (See Table 10:6) Results from Pew International poll from 2006, indicated 65% thought it is more dangerous place (Pew International 2006).



Table 10:6: The World after Saddam Hussein was removed from the Power

Most participants in the U.S. government funded exchange programs had a very positive opinion of the American people. They strongly agreed that Americans are friendly, cooperative and trustworthy and strongly disagreed that they are arrogant, self-centered and pushy. The majority (68%) also did not see U.S. foreign policy reflecting average American opinion. (See Table 10:7)



Table 10:7: U.S. Foreign Policy as a Reflection of Average Americans

Even surveys done just among Americans recently showed that the majority opposed Bush administration foreign policy, especially in Iraq. In June 2007, 45% had confidence in President Bush and his global leadership (Pew International 2007b). In February 2007, just 30% of Americans still thought things in Iraq are going well and 63% opposed President Bush's plan to send more soldiers to Iraq (Pew International, 2007a).

In the fourth edition of the Public Agenda's Confidence in U.S. Foreign Policy Index[9], conducted in association with *Foreign Affairs*, the foreign policy anxiety indicator hit 137 on 200-point scale, edging toward the 150 mark, which is considered a crisis in governmental policy. Two-thirds said U.S. foreign policy is on the wrong track and the majority would like the U.S. to withdraw from Iraq. (Public Agenda 2007) One of the latest surveys, measuring terrorism

[9] The index conducted every 6 months, uses more than 110 questions to track the average American's views on U.S. foreign policy (same way as the consumer confidence index).

index by *Foreign Policy* magazine and the Center for American progress among more than 100 foreign-policy experts (former secretaries of state, national security advisor, intelligence officers and senior military leaders), indicated a negative impact – nearly all (92%) believed the war in Iraq has a negative impact on U.S. national security. 84% believed the United States is not winning the war on terror. Rating various areas related to U.S. national security on a scale from 0 to 10 (10 meaning that U.S. government is currently doing the best possible job, and 0 meaning the worst possible job), public diplomacy received the lowest ranking at 2.8. On the other hand, the State Department, on a question on how different departments and agencies perform in protecting the American people from the global terrorist network and in advancing U.S. national security goals, received a pretty average mark: 5.4. In addition, the majority (75%) thought creating peace between Israelis and Palestinians would be very or somewhat important in addressing the threat of Islamist terrorism worldwide. (Foreign Policy/Center for American Progress Terrorism Index, 2007)

If we look at the recent surveys among Iraqis, the results were relatively similar. In a BBC/ABC poll implemented in March 2007 among Iraqis, 66% thought things for Iraq are going very bad or quite bad. On a question to compare the overall situation in the country before 2003 and after, 50% said it is much worse or somewhat worse now. 53% said it was absolutely or somewhat wrong that US-led coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003. More worrisome is the response to a question of how much confidence do they have in US and UK occupation forces. 52% answered not at all and 30% not very much confidence. Also a large majority said that the U.S. and coalition forces are doing a very bad job or quite a bad job in carrying out their responsibilities (76%). 78% strongly or somewhat opposed their presence in Iraq and overall thought U.S. forces are making the security situation in Iraq worse (69%). 31% blames for that United States and coalition forces and 9% blames President Bush himself making security situation in Iraq worse (BBC/ABC 2007). In September 2006, the Program on International Policy Attitudes came to similar results. An overwhelming majority of those surveyed believed that the US military presence in Iraq was provoking more conflict than it was preventing

(78%). Most felt the U.S. was having a predominantly negative influence in Iraq and had little or no confidence in the U.S. military. (Program on International Policy Attitudes 2006)

Let us remember that such sentiments on U.S. foreign policy are not a new occurrence and as such is not an exclusively Muslim phenomenon. Europeans, Asians and Latin Americans harbor many of the same criticisms of the United States as Arabs and other Muslim countries – primarily that it is too unilateralist and too arrogant. There is a split image in terms of how America is viewed by others (Zogby 2002).

It could be that U.S. policy in the war on terrorism and in Iraq is not well understood, and more information would change public attitudes. But there is, at least some evidence that American policy is perfectly understood but disliked (U.S. Public Diplomacy series, Georgetown University, 2002). A strengthening of U.S. public diplomacy is required, but, as already mentioned, public diplomacy cannot sell the un-sellable (Derghan 2002). If the United States wants to improve its image in the Middle East, it may ultimately have to change its policy, at least to some extent (U.S. Public Diplomacy series, Georgetown University 2002).

But public diplomacy believes that public opinion matters. Publics do not make foreign policy, but in democratic countries, they set the parameters within which policies are made and carried out (Oglesby 2006). Mass opinion cannot be the base for foreign policy decisions and does not de-legitimize the foreign policy, but it nevertheless can help to detect if other ways and means and different approaches have to be taken into account.

11. EXCHANGE PROGRAMS IN SLOVENIA ARE SUCCESFUL

The Embassy of the United States in Ljubljana sends, on average, seven to eight persons on International Visitors Leadership Program each year. It also receives seven to eight American Fulbright Scholars and sends the same number of Slovenian scholars to the U.S. Approximately seven U.S. speakers visit Slovenia under the U.S. Speaker and Specialist program and approximately seventy to eighty grants are given out for the implementation of various projects, mainly targeted at non-governmental and cultural organizations.

In order to find out what impact these programs have, I polled participants in U.S. Embassy exchange programs – namely Fulbright Program, Ron Brown Program and Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program (these two cease to exist in Slovenia) and International Visitors Leadership Program. The questionnaire was sent to 250 people that participated in those programs from 1991 on and was able to reach them via e-mail. 80 of them answered and sent back questionnaires: 40 participants in Fulbright Program, 26 participants in IVLP program, 8 Ron Brown Program participants and 3 Hubert H. Humphrey Fellows. In addition, 3 responded without identifying which program did they attend.

Overall, we can say participants were very satisfied with the program. 81.25% said they were very satisfied, 12.5% said they were satisfied, 5% were moderately satisfied and only 1 person was not satisfied with the administration of the program. (See Table 10.1:1) Regarding the content of the program, 77.5% said the content of the program was very good and 22.5% good. No one choose the answer bad or very bad. (See Table 10.1:2) A strong majority also said the content of the program was either very relevant (78.75%) or relevant (16.25%) for their work and professional development. Only 5% (4 persons) said it was moderately relevant. (See table 10.1:3)



Table 10.1:1: Satisfaction with the Administration of the Program



Table 10.1:2: Satisfaction with the Content of the Program



Table 10.1:3: Relevance of the Program

I was also interested in seeing if the programs cover enough topics. 92.5% said there was a wide enough variety of angles covered in the program. 7.5% said there could be more. (See Table 10.1:4)



Table 10.1:4: Diversity of the Program

Visits to the U.S., no matter how lengthy, helped 97.5% to better understand the U.S. as a country in general, as well as 87.5% understand its institutional arrangement. But significantly fewer said their visit helped them understand U.S foreign policy (70%, 30% didn't think so) and the role of the U.S. in the international arena (26.25% thought they could learn more about it and 73.75% thought they better understand this role due to their visit). (See Table 10.1:5)



Table 10.1:5: Better Understanding of Issues Appropriate to Visit

General trust in Americans remained unchanged for the majority polled. 56.25% said that after having a first-hand experience, they trust Americans the same, but 42.5% said that they trust Americans more. (See Table 10.1:6) If we take a closer look at various programs, we see that only those on long-term programs – Fulbright Program answered at this question in a manner that majority choose the answer "more". Out of 40 people, 23 said they trust Americans more after having the first-hand experience; 57.7% responded "more". But overall, the majority sees the U.S. as a trustworthy partner for Slovenia. (89%). (See Table 10.1:7)



Table 10.1:6: Trusting Americans after First-hand Experience



Table 10.1:7: US, a Trustworthy Partner for the Country

Another question asked how the respondent viewed Americans on a range of characteristics on a scale from 1 to 5 (with 5 being strongly agree and 1 disagree). The characteristics that they evaluated were: friendliness, trustworthiness, cooperativeness, religion, concerns about people from the other countries, whether they see them as self-centered and pushy. Those who participated in the survey see Americans as really friendly (42 out of 80 strongly agreed with this statement). 52 persons said they strongly agree or agree that they are cooperative. 37 persons disagreed that Americans are arrogant. Among negative characteristics, 12 persons strongly agreed that Americans are self-centered. (See Table 10.1:8)

On a scale from 1 to 5 (with 5 being strongly agree and 1 disagree) do you think Americans are:

	1	2	3	4	5
Friendly	7	1	3	20	42
Trustworthy	4	3	18	28	20
Cooperative	4	6	11	24	28
Religious	2	8	23	27	12
Concerned about the people from other countries	5	16	23	9	4
Arrogant	15	22	21	11	2
Self-centered	8	9	21	21	12
Pushy	7	17	27	19	2



Table 10.1:8: Perception of Americans

It was also interesting to see that professional U.S. web-site and professional U.S. press and publications respondents trusted most when wanting to get information about U.S. related issues. (See Table 10.1:9)



Table 10.1:9: Which Media is Trusted When Searching Information Related to the U.S. Issues

Overall, participants were pretty interested in the U.S. affairs in media. 67, 5% said they follow the U.S. affairs in media often and 28, 75% that they followed them occasionally. (See Table 10.1:10)



Table 10.1:11: Tracking U.S. Affairs in Media

In order to see how the information and knowledge gained during participants programs is disseminated and used, I asked what kind of methods they used to share the information gained on the program. Colleagues at work was the most frequent answer – 97.47% answered they shared the information with their colleagues. 73.42% shared information by lectures, 60.63% in workshops and 51.89% addressing participants at conferences. (See Table 10.1:12) The next question: “With whom and how did you share your information and experience gained during the program?” also indicated that dissemination of the information among professional colleagues is as strong as it can be with 100%, followed by family and friends (97.3%) and people in the community (71.62%). 53.42% of polled gave some kind of a public presentation about their experience, 38.36% wrote an article using information and knowledge gained. More than a third (33.78%) used media interviews to share information. 13.7% wrote a book using knowledge gained in the program. (See Table 10.1:13)



Table 10.1:12: Sharing of the Information Gained



Table 10.1: 13: Targets of Information Sharing

Based on their experience, the majority introduced new knowledge and ideas (93,24%), established new exchanges (71.62%) and introduced new initiatives

(70.27%). 54.05% said they introduced new curricula, pedagogical methods and/or educational standards and 44.59% said they introduced new policies and/or procedures. The lowest response was “founding an NGO or other organization (9.46%). (See Table 10.1:14)



Table 10.1:14: Actions Taken After the Visit

If we compare our results with those made by the State Department, we see that the answers from Slovenian participants are somehow in line with the answers from participants polled by the Office of Policy and Evaluation in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,[10] regarding the program implementation, the content and the impact.

[10] the Office of Policy and Evaluation in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs implemented three different evaluations: U.S. Fulbright Scholar Program (801 scholars between 1976 and 1999 answered the survey), U.S. Fulbright Student Program (1,087 students between 1980 to 2001) and IVLP assessment (827 participants from Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Georgia who participated from 1996 to 2001).

The following paragraph provides a few examples. On a question how IVLP participants were satisfied with the administration of the program, 96.1% of Slovenians said they were very satisfied or satisfied with it. The same answers were given by 98% of those polled by the State Department. All Slovenians found the content of the program to be very good. 97% of those polled by the Department of State shared the same thought. Slovenians' valid relevance of the program for their professional development was little bit lower (84.62%) in comparison with others (94%). Slovenians presented a higher percentage regarding U.S. seeing as a trustworthy partner for the country. 92% of those who answered the survey said U.S. is a trustworthy partner for Slovenia. 71% of Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs and Georgians think U.S. is a trustworthy partner for their country. Regarding dissemination of the information and applying the knowledge gained, 82.3% of Slovenian participants in IVLP said they introduced new ideas and knowledge based on their experience while visiting U.S. 64% of those polled by the Department of State claimed the same. On the other hand, while asking how they shared the knowledge gained, the results referring to writing newspaper articles are almost the same – 38.5% of Slovenian participants wrote a newspaper article as a result of their experience in the program and 36% of Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs and Georgians did the same.
If we look at Fulbright program, the statistics are pretty much the same. 92.5% Slovenians that went on a Fulbright scholarship think exchange programs contribute to mutual understanding. 99% of those surveyed by the State Department think the same. 98% shared their new knowledge and experience through some form of media or community actions, similarly, all Slovenians shared the information gained and exchange with professional colleagues comes on the first place. The great majority of all surveyed also cultivate strong relationships with other participants in the program, U.S. professional contacts and their hosts on a longer and continuing basis.

Both surveys indicate that participants in the exchange programs, no matter which, have a very strongly positive impact on their professional lives. The great majority praise the organization, administration, the content and the

implementation of the programs. The majority expressed great appreciation and value of such program for their professional lives. They have continued to use knowledge gained and ideas deriving from being part of such a program as well as nourish connections with their hosts, host organizations and other participants. In general, we could say that exchange programs implemented by the State Department play strong role in mutual understanding and are successful in the longer run, as they are a pillar of building strong long-term relationships. When I analyzed the foreign policy issues, the results did not yield results that would flatter the U.S. Asking further, we could conclude that the war in Iraq is definitely the number one reason behind it. Although the answers indicated they do favor U.S. led efforts to fight terrorism, they seriously doubt the U.S. will succeed in establishing a stable democratic government in Iraq (2% answered U.S. will definitely succeed), 51% thought world is more dangerous place without Saddam Hussein in power and almost 57% are against Slovenia's decision to send troops to Iraq. A majority blame foreign policy decision-makers for Iraq policy, as 68% don't see U.S. foreign policy as a reflection of the minds of average Americans.

12. CONCLUSION

No matter what the mix of public diplomacy tactics, it is clear that American public diplomacy can be improved. It remains unclear as to whether public diplomacy alone can make a significant difference in foreign attitudes when U.S. policy decisions are unpopular abroad — an unfortunate result, some say, of the Administration's failure to listen to the Foreign Service's public diplomacy experts in the first place. If there is to be success, it will be evident in years, not months. The widespread opposition to the U.S. regional policies limits what public diplomacy can achieve (Hoffman 2002). Several experts question the efficacy of such efforts and whether the existing style of public diplomacy is still relevant. There are skeptics who say that much of the world is not against United States in general, but simply opposed to U.S. foreign policy. No amount of public relations, marketing, or listening tours will change the global antipathy over U.S. policies in the Middle East. Public diplomacy is a necessary component to, but not a substitute, for foreign policy making (Beehner 2005).

The United States must take different perspectives, politics and cultural lenses of others into account when it establishes and communicates its policy in order to make that policy better understood and/or accepted (Johnson 2006).

I must conclude this overview with a positive spirit, as in late 2007, the U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication was released. It revealed that public diplomacy priorities actually mirror the majority of recommendations and criticism made by different experts and reports in the last couple of years: to expand education and exchange programs, to modernize communications, to nourish partnership and make a better promotion of "deeds", better coordination between agencies and establishment of monitoring of results and measurement of efficiency of programs. This indicates that this strategy leans more toward long-term public diplomacy. Time will show how the strategy will be successfully implemented.

It was already said at the beginning of this thesis that it is hard to define the success or failure of public diplomacy, as it is a very complex art and includes several different activities, from short-term media campaign, broadcasting and

poster shows to long-term relationships with different groups, such as non-governmental organizations, including exchange programs, joint research and cultural activities. As there is no one unique and world-wide accepted definition, it makes the case even harder. It can become tempting to use all sorts of propaganda as part of public diplomacy. Propaganda can become part of the broader public diplomacy, especially in crisis. In war the psychological and covert operations, grey or even black propaganda often intrude on public diplomacy, especially as many different agencies become involved.

The second part of thesis described the evolution of the American public diplomacy. It can be observed that in the past, each time the U.S. entered a crisis of some kind, a new institution to handle the issue was established. The Committee on Public Information during First World War was tasked with production of posters and pamphlets to increase patriotism and gain support among the publics. The Office of War Information derived from the need to fight fascism in World War II and the United States Information Agency to tackle Cold War world. When the Berlin wall fell and the Soviet Union disintegrated, USIA was consolidated into Department of State. U.S. public diplomacy transformed once again after 9/11 and the war in Iraq. The events of 09/11, brought public diplomacy back to the U.S. foreign policy table.

At first, public diplomacy did not have such an active role as it should, but as it became clear that foreign publics need special attention, its role strengthened. Target groups changed and now include the younger generation and the general public. New importance was given to partnerships with different groups, from private institutions to non-governmental organizations.

Surveying public attitudes indicated negative view of the United States, especially in Muslim countries, brought public diplomacy back to the fore. But there are limits to what public diplomacy programs can do to assist with foreign policy goals. On the other hand foreign policy would not be necessarily successful if public diplomacy would be involved from the beginning. As can be observed from the survey of Slovenian participants in the exchange programs implemented by the State Department, these programs did not lead to increased support for Bush administration policy in Iraq. We can confidently say that participants were thrilled about the content, the administration and the

relevance of the programs and that the majority see such programs as a benefit to mutual understanding. They all shared the experience one way or another and have very high regards for Americans. On the other hand, they are not so positive about the U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, the programs do help foreign audience gain positive impressions about the U.S. and its people.

As the scope of public diplomacy increases and becomes comprehensive, a well-prepared strategy is needed. Not just public diplomacy officers, but all employees at overseas posts should be educated in public diplomacy in order to understand their colleagues who do it as their job. On the other hand, those who exercise public diplomacy should be skilled in a variety of different activities; from language training to values and norms of the culture, to be receptive to other people's opinion and know how to listen. At this point let me reiterate that in order to be a successful public diplomacy officer there is a need for a certain "soft skill", a gift, and often someone either has it or does not have it. Though, it must be nurtured constantly. Also because of that, public diplomacy deserves a special attention vis-à-vis traditional diplomacy.

APPENDIX A

A questionnaire on Exchange Programs Implemented by the Embassy of the United States to Slovenia

Please tell us in what State Department exchange program did you take part? (Fulbright Program, International Visitors Program, Voluntary Visitors Program) and when (if more programs or repeat years, please state).

What was your position at that time?

What is your current position?

Did you visit United States of America for the first time (while taking part in the State Department Program)

Did you visit the United States anytime after you returned from the Department of State Program?

Do you follow the U.S. affairs in media?

How were you satisfied with the administration of the program?

VERY SATISFIED SATISFIED

MODERATLEY SATISFIED UNSATISFIED

How did you find the content of the program?

VERY GOOD GOOD

BAD VERY BAD

How relevant was the program for your professional development?

VERY RELEVANT RELEVANT

MODERATE NOT RELEVANT AT ALL

Were there enough various angles covered in the program?

ENOUGH NOT ENOUGH

How did you share the information gained on program?

Lectures	YES	NO
Conferences	YES	NO
Workshops	YES	NO
Colleagues at work	YES	NO

Other:

How did your understanding of the U.S. changed as a direct result of your visit within the exchange program?

Daily life in the United States

U.S. values and culture

U.S. democracy

U.S. foreign policy

Religion in the United States

Do you , due to your visit, better understand:

U.S. in general

YES NO

Americans in general

YES NO

U.S. diversity

YES NO

U.S. government institutions

YES NO

Federal versus State

YES NO

U.S. foreign policy

YES NO

Role of the U.S. in the international arena

YES NO

Do you think you have had an impact on Americans you met in the United States?
YES/NO

Do you think exchange programs as the one you took part in contribute to mutual understanding?
YES/NO

Do you think U.S. is a trustworthy partner for your country
YES/NO

After having a first-hand experience I trust Americans

MORE SAME LESS

Please mark which media / information source you trust most when wanting to get information about U.S. related issues:

professional U.S. web-sites YES
NO
U.S. Embassy YES
NO
Professional U.S. press and publications YES
NO
U.S. television news YES
NO
U.S. government web-sites YES
NO

Slovene governmental institutions	YES	NO
Slovene media (TV, print media, radio)	YES	NO
Professional Slovene web-sites	YES	NO
EU institutions	YES	NO
Media from other EU countries	YES	NO

Do you follow the U.S. affairs in media?

OFTEN OCCASSIONALLY RARELY NEVER

Would you take part in another U.S. State Department Program if offered?

Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the United States foreign policy?

FAVOURABLE SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE

SOMEWHAT UNFAVORABLE VERY UNFAVOURABLE

Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the Americans?

FAVOURABLE SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE

SOMEWHAT UNFAVORABLE VERY UNFAVOURABLE

On a scale from 1 to 5 (with 5 being strongly agree and 1 disagree) do you think Americans are:

Friendly: 1 2 3 4 5

Trustworthy: 1 2 3 4 5

Cooperative: 1 2 3 4 5

Religious: 1 2 3 4 5

Concerned about the people from other countries:

1 2 3 4 5

Arrogant: 1 2 3 4 5

Self-centered: 1 2 3 4 5

Pushy: 1 2 3 4 5

Based on your experience while visiting U.S. did you:

Introduce new ideas and knowledge YES NO

Introduce new initiatives YES NO

Introduced new policies and/or procedures YES NO

Tried to influence public opinion about the United States through the media YES NO

Established new exchanges YES NO

Introduced new curricula, pedagogical methods, educational standards YES NO

Founded an NGO or other organization YES NO

With whom did you share your information and experience gained during the program?

Family and friends YES NO

Professional colleagues YES NO

People in the community YES NO

Other –

If you shared your knowledge and opinion publicly, how did you do it:

Media interviews YES NO

Writing newspaper articles YES NO

Writing a book YES NO

Giving a public presentation YES
NO

Please illustrate us the concrete results of your exchange experience:
(What kind of a project/initiative/results did you introduce/implement that otherwise would not happen)

After coming back from the program, have you remained in contact with and for how long:

Other participants in the program

YES NO

If YES for how long:

U.S. embassy staff

YES NO

If YES for how long:

People that were on the same program from your country

YES NO

If YES for how long:

U.S. professional contacts-organizations

YES NO

If YES for how long:

U.S. hosts

YES NO

If YES for how long:

Which of the following phrases comes closer to describing your view?

I favor the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism

OR

I oppose the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism.

Which country poses the greatest risk to regional security?

Which country is most interested in the world peace?

Which country does the most to sustain world peace?

Overall, do you think the world is a safer or more dangerous place without Saddam Hussein in power?

Regardless of what you think about the original decision to use military force in Iraq, do you now believe that efforts to establish a stable democratic government in Iraq will

definitely succeed probably succeed

probably fail definitely fail

Do you support your country's decision to send troops in Afghanistan?

Do you support your country's decision to send troops in Iraq?

Do you support your country's decision to send troops to Kosovo?

Do you see U.S. as having a positive or negative role in the world?

Do you see U.S. foreign policy as a reflection of the minds of average Americans?

APPENDIX B

Summary in Slovenian Language

Magistrsko delo “Javna diplomacija ameriške agencije za informiranje in zunanjega ministrstva ZDA" poskuša odgovoriti na osrednje vprašanje - kako so se programi ameriške javne diplomacije prilagodili novemu svetovnemu redu po dogodkih 11. septembra in ali, oziroma do kolikšne mere, je uspešna. V prvem delu naloge sem se osredotočila na pomen termina javna diplomacija. Ker je težava že v tem, da ni definicije, ki bi veljala v vsakem času in prostoru, sem vsebino poskušala razložiti tudi tako, da sem termin primerjala z drugimi, sorodnimi termini: tradicionalno diplomacijo, propagando, odnosi z javnostmi in lobiranjem. Omenjeni pregled pokaže, da se vsebina mnogokrat prepleta, oziroma je komplementarna. Če povzamemo glavne značilnosti: javna diplomacija vključuje širšo publiko in ni samo diplomacija, ki poteka med dvema ali več vladami, ampak vključuje aktivnosti namenjene tako širši publiki (državljanom s pomočjo medijev), kot tudi specifičnim skupinam (primer so aktivnosti namenjene akademikom, raziskovalcem, podjetnikom in nevladnim organizacijam). Njen namen je informiranje in komuniciranje. Za njeno uspešno delovanje je potrebna povratna informacija, poslušanje in dvo-smerno komuniciranje. Je odprtega značaja. Vzajemno razumevanje in vključevanje tuje publike omogoča skupno akcijo, ki je zaradi tega v prid, ni pa to nujno, ciljem ameriške zunanje politike. Nekateri avtorji ločujejo mehko in trše krilo javne diplomacije. Signitzer in Coombs tako pravita, da je trša usmeritev povezana z vplivanjem na tuje publike, na primer s pomočjo medijev, medtem pa mehka javna diplomacija pomeni vzajemno razumevanje in se izvaja s pomočjo programov izmenjav in štipendij kot primer (Signitzer in Coombs v Kos 2002 in Glassgold 2004). Joseph Nye jo vidi kot del t.i. mehke moči (Nye 2003). Postulat javne diplomacije sta kredibilnost in resnica. V nekaterih primerih, predvsem v času vojne, pa del njenih aktivnosti lahko postane tudi propaganda v svojem perojativnem pomenu in del psiholoških operacij, ki jih praviloma izvaja vojska. Prav tako je značilno, da

ima propaganda večje učinke in je bolj uspešna v manj demokratičnih državah, kjer je dostop do različnih informacij in virov omejen oziroma je posredovanje določenih informacij strogo nadzorovano. Globalizacija, informacijska tehnologija in čedalje bolj odprta in osveščena družba omejujeta njeno izvajanje.

V nadaljevanju sem pripravila pregled razvoja institucij, ki so v ZDA izvajale javno diplomacijo v preteklosti: Odbor za javno informiranje, Urad za vojno informiranje, Agencija za informiranje (USIA) in kako je trenutno javna diplomacija umeščena v ameriško zunanje ministrstvo. Na tem mestu bi želela poudariti dva zakona, ki še danes predstavljata osnovo na kateri se izvajajo programi javne diplomacije: Fulbright-Hayes iz leta 1961 in Smith-Mundt iz leta 1948. Prvi je zakonska osnova za vse vrste izmenjav, štipendij, skupne raziskave in akademsko sodelovanje, drugi pa predstavlja zakonsko osnovo za programe, ki spodbujajo boljše razumevanje Združenih držav Amerike po svetu (informacijski in kulturni programi).

V drugem delu sem se bolj posvetila tudi vsebinskemu prilagajanju javne diplomacije času hladne vojne, reorganizaciji, ki je sledila in ukinila samostojno neodvisno Agencijo in programom, ki so namenjeni glavni ciljni skupini po tragičnih dogodkih – Bližnji vzhod in muslimanska populacija. Marshallov plan je, poleg obsežne finančne pomoči Evropi, pomenil tudi ameriško preusmeritev iz izolicionistične zunanje politike, v bolj aktivno zunanjo politiko, ki je pomenila tesnejše sodelovanje, predvsem z Evropo, pa tudi večji aganžma v svetovne probleme. Brez najmanjšega dvoma lahko trdimo, da je bila javna diplomacija v okviru Ameriške informacijske agencije, v času hladne vojne primer izredno uspešne in priznane javne diplomacije. Eden izmed njenih direktorjev, Edward R. Murrow, je s svojim ugledom in držo pokazal kako neodvisna je bila Agencija v tistem obdobju. Njegov dober odnos s takratnim predsednikom John F. Kennedyjem pa je javno diplomacijo pripeljal bližje k odločevalcem. Jasno je dal vedeti, da mora biti javna diplomacija del zunanje politike od začetka do konca. Poleg tega je njegova prepoznavnost in predanost pripomogla k izboljšanemu ugleda same Agencije in njenih zaposlenih. Biti del ameriške javne diplomacije je postala čast. Obdobje hladne vojne in vladavine predsednika Ronalda Regana je prineslo tudi

največjo finančno injekcijo. To lahko povežemo tudi z dejstvom, da je omenjeni ameriški predsednik aktivno uporabljal televizijo kot medij sporočanja. Leto 1999 je pomenilo velike reorganizacijske spremembe. Ameriška agencija za informiranje je prenehala s svojim delom, njene aktivnosti in programe pa so prenesli na zunanje ministrstvo; na oddelke za odnose z javnostmi. Glas Amerike (Voice of America), nedovisni, a strani vlade financiran, radio, je postal del neodvisne agencije za televizijo in radio, kjer so se mu pridružili še ostali programi (Radio Europe, Radio Free Europe, Radio Marti, AlHurra, Radio Sawa in drugi). Leto 2001, 11. september, dogodki, ki so sledili v Afganistanu in Iraku, so prinesli nove spremembe. Tokrat v samo filozofijo javne diplomacije. Ciljna skupina so postale islamske države in države z visokim številom Muslimanov. Uvajajo se novi programi, ki so namenjeni predvsem mladim in da bi šli v korak s časom, tudi ameriško zunanje ministrtsvo pri tem uporablja informacijsko tehnologijo in najnovejše medije sporočanja (elektronsko sporočanje, blogi, ipodi...).

Ameriško zunanje ministrstvo ni edina institucija, ki izvaja programe javne diplomacije. Najpogosteje sodeluje z Ministrstvom za obrambo in Centralno obveščevalno agencijo in njihove aktivnosti so večkrat komplementarne. Vendar pa to ne izključuje možnosti podvajanja in v določenih primerih celo nasprotujočih si akcij; predvsem v kriznih in vojnih časih.

V svojem delu na kratko opredelim tudi trenutne probleme in izzive. V prvi vrsti gre velikokrat za nerazumevanje narave in značilnosti javne diplomacije *vis-à-vis* odnosov z javnostmi in tradicionalne diplomacije. To je postal problem predvsem s konsolidacijo v sistem zunanjega ministrstva. Še vedno, osem let po združitvi, ni tiste prave integracije. Oddelki za odnose z javnostmi, kot se zdaj imenujejo, nimajo osrednje avtoritet in jasnih navodil in usmeritve. Sredstev za programe je v realni vrednosti vedno manj in resno ogrožajo samo izvajanje in njihov uspeh. Poleg vsega pa je vedno večji problem tudi v kvaliteti zaposlenih. Zunanje ministrstvo med svoje vrste težko pridobi izkušene kadre. Veliko pozicij ostaja nezasedenih. Motivacija zaposlenih ni na najvišji ravni, kar seveda predstavlja oviro za njihovo usposabljanje. Manjka jim znanja jezika, kar je v nekaterih regijah ključnega pomena, primankuje jim sociološkega in kulturološkega znanja o določenih družbah in na zadnje,

vendar ne nepomembno, je pri nekaterih lahko opaziti pomanjkanje usposobljenosti na področju javne diplomacije na splošno; kaj to sploh je in kaj lahko od nje pričakujejo. Da bi tudi bralcu približala vsebino programov, sem opisala organizacijsko strukturo oddelka za odnose z javnostmi in javno diplomacijo pri ameriškemu zunanjemu ministrstvu in delovanje javne diplomacije v okviru Veleposlaništva Združenih držav Amerike v Ljubljani. Zadnji del je praktične narave. Poleg obstoječih študij in anket o zunanji politiki Združenih držav Amerike in uspešnosti programov izmenjav in štipendij, ki jih je že opravilo ameriško zunanje minstrstvo, sem s ciljem ugotovitve, ali so programi javne diplomacije uspešni, na primeru programov izmenjav in štipendij, izvedla anketo med slovenskimi udeleženci the programov. Podroben vprašalnik, ki je vseboval 37 vprašanj o samem programu, kot tudi mnenju o ameriški družbi in zunanji politiki, sem poslala 250 osebam; udeležencem programov Fulbright, Ron Brown in Hubert H. Humphrey štipendij, in tistim, ki jih je Veleposlaništvo ZDA v Ljubljani poslalo na krajše študijske obiske od leta 1991 dalje. Odgovorilo je osemdeset oseb. Vprašalnik je pokazal, da so udeleženci nadvse navdušeni nad vsebino in izvedbo programov. Pridobljeno znanje so zagotovo delili vsaj na en način in vsaj med službenimi kolegi. Večina jih ima še vedno stike z osebjem veleposlaništva, pa tudi s so-udeleženci na programu in tistimi, ki so jih spoznali med bivanjem v ZDA. Lahko rečemo, da so omenjeni programi, kot del javne diplomacije v Sloveniji, zelo uspešni in pripomorejo k medsebojnemu razumevanju in krepitvi medsebojnih odnosov na dolgi rok. Ko pa pogledamo rezultate o ameriški zunanji politiki, in predvsem aktualnem boju proti terorizmu in politiki do Iraka, vprašani niso ravno navdušeni. Naj pa poudarim, da so rezultati, v primerjavi z raziskavami med splošno publiko, precej boljši. Večina, 68%, pa za trenutno stanje krivi zunanje politike, saj menijo, da ameriška zunanja politika ni izraz povprečnega Američana.

Na koncu lahko rečem, da se je izvajanje javne diplomacije in vseh njenih programov skozi čas izredno spremenilo. Sprememba ni v sami vsebini programov (Fulbright štipendije tečejo na približno enak način že več kot 60 let), ampak v načinu izvajanja. Ciljne skupine se spreminjajo, kot tudi način izbora. Vsebine se prilagajajo trenutnim aktualnim zadevam. Razmah

informacijske tehnologije nima zanemarljivega učinka na delo ameriške vlade. Spletne klepetalnice, blogi in podcasti niso tuja orodja obveščanja ameriškim ministrstvom in agencijam. Ne glede na to, da je z reorganizacijo javna diplomacija fizično bližje odločevalcem, pa je njen doprinos še vedno odvisen od dovzetnosti vsakega posameznika. Vse prevečkrat se še vedno pozabi na njene učinke in možnosti, ki jih ponuja in potencial, ki ga ima. Izziv ostajata uspešna koordinacija in splošno sprejeta strategija izvajanja javne diplomacije. Pri tem pa naj še enkrat poudarim, da ne gre pozabiti, da uspeh javne diplomacije ne moremo meriti samo s pomočjo uspehov zunanje politike. Naloga javne diplomacije je tudi to – informiranje o zunanje političnih ciljih in poskus pridobivanja podpore za uresničevanje teh ciljev – vendar pa je še veliko več – pomeni medsebojno razumevanje, je dvo-smerna komunikacija, ki vključuje poslušanje in iskanje skupnih kulturnih in družbenih vrednot, ki pripeljejo do sodelovanja za dosego skupnih ciljev.

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