

GLOBAL TRENDS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION The South-East European perspective

ABSTRACT

Societies in Western and Eastern Europe alike are facing the challenge of all-pervading global trends. Among them, the spreading of instrumental activism, individualization, upgrading of organizational rationality and value-normative universalization seem to exert the deepest influence. The South-East European societies have to cope with them under the precarious conditions of profound national transformations. Their core is the search for solutions to four major tasks. First, how to restructure the national economies by balancing instrumental activism with the value-normative and institutional patterns of sustainability. Second, how to complement the civilizational triumph of individualization by communitarian patterns of problem-solving. Third, how to upgrade organizational rationality and counteract the development of organizational pathologies. Fourth, how to co-ordinate the value-normative universalization with unavoidable particularisms. These tasks are complex and complicated. Therefore, South-East European societies will retain the potential of intensive risk. Most probably, their integration with the European Union will reduce this potential while loading the Union with internal tensions.

Key words: global trends, instrumental activism, individualization, rationalization, value-normative universalization

1. The problem

The integration of some South-East European societies into the European Union is already regarded as a task on the current political agenda. In reality, the practical steps in this direction will take decades. The key issue is the competitiveness of their national economies. It is not a matter of productivity and pricing alone. Political stability and cultural cohesion belong to the issue as well. As seen from another angle, the opening of the South-East European societies to the integration schemes of the European Union

is not the ready-made solution to the problems of adjustment to changing global and regional conditions. The European integration is part of the challenge itself since it raises a series of questions. How will the large agricultural sector in the South-East European subregion react to the integration process? How will the energy intensive industrial production there adapt to the economic opening? What would be the prospects for human development under the rapidly changing economic, political and cultural conditions?

In broader terms, there are many open questions concerning the long-term social, political and cultural prospects of the Eastern European part of the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The general issue of the sustainability of their development might be well illustrated by two rankings from the mid-nineties. They vividly characterize the difference between the core of the modern civilization and the Central and Eastern European periphery or semi-periphery. The complicated situation of South-East Europe represented by Bulgaria and Romania is obvious in this context (Human Development Report, 1997: 146-7):


Table 1
Ranking of selected European countries according to their GDP per capita (US\$, PPP) and to the Human Development Index (HDI)¹

Country	GDP per capita	HDI ranking
Austria	20,667	12
Bulgaria	4,533	69
Czech Republic	9,201	39
Germany	19,675	19
Hungary	6,437	48
Poland	5,002	58
Romania	4,037	79

As seen in this context, Central and Eastern Europe and especially the South-Eastern part of the continent is not just a case of underdevelopment. It is a typical region marked by manifest and latent uncertainties and tensions, by high intensity risks as well (Genov, 1994a; Genov, 1996). Moreover, some major risks of far reaching social and economic transformations in the region are still ahead (Berend, 1997). This is obviously the case with a country like Bulgaria which has been repeatedly caught in transformation crises. In fact, changes of the country's political institutions have been successfully accomplished. However, the slight economic stabilization in 1994 and 1995 could not be sustained. Despite the promising predictions at the beginning of 1996, the year turned to an economic collapse with a drop of GDP by 10.9%. As a result, 1997 witnessed a dramatic change of government. Despite some signs of economic stabilization, the year brought about a new decline of GDP by 7.2% and an annual inflation rate of 578%. As

seen in this perspective, the economic development of the country after 1989 is rather depressing:

Figure 1
Major economic indicators of Bulgaria 1989-1997, 1989 = 100²



This is a clear case of high intensity transformation risks which have to be handled carefully and competently (Genov, 1997a). Thus, assessment and management of intensive risks remain the major tasks to be resolved by the South-East European societies. What concepts would grasp the problem situation best? What practical efforts for risk management seem to be most promising?

2. Global trends and national transformation

The changes in Bulgaria as well as all over Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 have one common denominator. It is the transfer of institutional patterns which have already proved their efficiency in managing industrialized societies (Wiesenthal, 1996). These institutions have first emerged in Western Europe and North America. The transfer basically concerns four types of value-normative orientations and institutions which embody the most fundamental trends in the development of modern societies (Genov, 1997b).

First, the subject of transfer are the value-normative ideas and institutional configurations of *instrumental activism*. The point is the concentration on instrumental values and behavioural patterns which make out the core of modern industrialism, or, broader, of the Western type of *Weltbeherrschung* in Max Weber's terminology.

Second, the institutional transfer concerns the modern forms of *individualization*. It shows various modifications under specific historical conditions. In Western Europe and in North America, the innovations in market economy, competitive politics and in pluralist culture made it the major feature of institutions in the form of *institutionalized individualism* as Talcott Parsons called it.

Third, another global trend which guides the recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe is the *upgrading of organizational rationality*. First of all, it concerns the timely and sufficient *differentiation* of social structures and functions. Another characteristic of this trend is the upgrading of social *integration*. The underlying assumption of the following discussion is that both achievements and failures in implementing this trend might be registered in Bulgaria as it is the case all over Eastern Europe.

Fourth, during the last decades we have experienced an intensive and worldwide *universalization of value-normative systems*. The process is being effectively pushed forward by the electronic media. The deeper causes and reasons of the trend are connected with the universal technological standards of industrialization and urbanization, with the globalization of economy, with global political interdependencies as well as with the globalization of culture and life styles.

How are these trends manifested in the ongoing transformation of Bulgarian society?

2.1. The challenges of instrumental activism

The dominant ideology of the transformation of Bulgarian society after 1944 had two focal points. The first one expressed the ultimate values of social justice, mass welfare and personal development. The second one found its expression in the instrumental ends of industrialization, mechanization of agriculture and development of the infrastructure of a technologically advanced society. Gradually, the moral impetus of the ultimate values got lost in everyday concerns dominated by instrumental ends. Among them, continuing industrialization took the lead. It was understood as the major precondition for economic development. In fact, during the sixties and the seventies Bulgaria had rather high rate of economic growth. As a region, Eastern Europe had the highest regional rate of GDP growth in the world and managed to reduce its distance to Western Europe in terms of GDP per capita (Berend, 1997:11):


However, the state socialist form of social and economic organization did not succeed in stabilizing its initial high rate of technological and economic growth. During the eighties it sharply declined in the region. Its peripheral position to the core of the modern civilization strengthened anew. For the first time in history, the GDP per capita fell in Eastern Europe below the level of Latin America (Berend, 1997: 12). Mainly this development and less the problem of human rights became the moving factor of decay and eventually brought about the political collapse in the region.

Table 2
Central and Eastern Europe's per capita GDP as percentage of the various regions of the world 1913-1973³

	1913	1938	1973
Western Europe	42.0	44.1	46.6
Overseas West	29.7	34.9	35.7
Southern Europe	88.8	107.9	95.2
Latin America	102.8	105.5	120.9
Asia	209.8	238.3	341.8
World average	97.8	108.3	132.6

After 1989 the solution of the problem is being sought for in the development of private initiative and market institutions. More specifically, the solution is searched for in the fast privatization. The process is well advanced all over the region. Bulgaria is in the middle range of the scale (From Plan to Market, 1996:15):


Fig. 2.
Private sector output as a share of GDP in the Central and Eastern European countries (end of 1995, %)



Though, the shift in the structure of property has not brought about positive changes to the extent it was expected. For large groups it is existentially important that the smaller GDP is being distributed in a more and more unequal manner. In Bulgaria, the ratio of the incomes of the richest 20% to the incomes of the poorest 20% was about 2.7:1 in 1990. At the end of 1995 the ratio was already 6.5:1 (Genov, 1997a: 38). This development and the strong trend towards commercialization of all activities cause intensive value-normative tensions and conflicts since they clash with influential traditional visions about social justice. These contradictions bring about moral disorientation which undermines the social sustainability of Bulgarian society. The division of society to rich and poor is exactly the perception of a specific risk whose intensity increases most rapidly in the course of the profound changes.

The second problem is also connected with ultimate values but in the context of the environmental sustainability. The international experience provides abundant evidence that the commercial instrumentalization of social life is shortsighted. In principle, it puts limits to the link of market principles with the practices of sustainable development. This limitation is particularly strong in the conditions of imperfect markets which hardly tell the environmental truth of production and consumption. The achievement of this result is even more difficult in conditions when the economic crisis suppresses the environmental issues to the periphery of the public interest:

Figure 3
Perception of risks facing Bulgarian society
 (National surveys, five points scale, only position 5 "Very serious problem", %)⁴



Briefly summarized, the market oriented instrumentalization of action brought about destabilization of the balance between the instrumental and ultimate values. Thus the

development of the ultimate value-normative system of sustainable technological, economic, political, cultural and environmental development has been postponed. However, *no sustainable social order would be possible under the domination of action by instrumental values*. The present day social disintegration of Bulgarian society leads it astray from the global trend towards bringing together instrumental activism with the ideas and practices of sustainable development.

2.2. Tensions of rapid individualization


It is often assumed that Eastern Europe has been isolated from the global process of individualization because of the collectivistic ideology which dominated the region after the Second World War. In reality, in the course of the rapid industrialization and urbanization and together with the increase of the well-being all forms of modern individualization found their way in the region. The enlargement of the pool of alternatives for personal realization coincided with the enhancement of personal capacities to make well founded selections. In a parallel manner, the potential for conflicts also increased since the state interventionism into economic, political and cultural life put narrow limits on the individual initiative and responsibility.

The beginning of the nineties brought about a new wave of rapid individualization in the region. The establishment of half a million private firms in Bulgaria which has about six million voters is an impressive illustration of the scale of the process. The registered more than two hundred political parties or about 4,000 non-governmental organizations would be impossible without the initiative of individuals who are seeking for new forms of personal realization. There is no doubt, this development might be adequately interpreted in terms of the *triumph of individuality* as an evolutionary achievement (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1994).

The close analysis reveals, however, both the achievements and the tensions of the process. More often than not the strengthening of individualities comes about *at the expense of the common good*. The most impressive example is the looting of state property which has been accumulated after the Second World War. Undoubtedly, the state did not effectively manage the property of an increasingly differentiated industrialized society. That is why the introduction of market mechanisms became unavoidable. The real problem is the ongoing transfer of state property into private hands without any compensation to the national community since the state machinery has been substantially weakened. The mechanisms of the transfer are various and effective. They start with the legalized low rate selling of state property to managerial teams and reach criminal plundering. This development has and will have negative implications on the economic situation of large strata as well as on their ability to adequately react to the new openings of individualization. Thus for deprived groups the changes move in the direction of restricting the field for individual development and realization as compared to the situation during the eighties.

Under these conditions the individual aspirations and the time horizon of personal planning shrunk substantially. Moreover, *the minimized time perspective stabilized itself* with the wide majority of the Bulgarian population:

Figure 4
Time perspective of personal planning (National surveys, %)



This is a clear indication of helplessness which is in a sharp contradiction to the requirements of a conscious government of the personal development and realization. No doubt, the emancipation from the restrictive official Party-State ideology imposed on the individuals is an evolutionary achievement. However, the high level of personal disorientation and insecurity indicates that the Bulgarian national transformation includes an intensive cutting of community bonds. However, *a sustainable social order cannot be established on the basis of extreme individualization*. The question is still open as to the proper mechanisms which should represent and strengthen the common good *together* with the support to individualization. It is clear that the necessity of a communitarian reintegration of the national society is acute. Bearing in mind the experience from the previous decades, it is also vitally important to achieve this reintegration without returning to authoritarian political and cultural patterns of over-integration.

2.3. Upgrading the organizational rationality

During the eighties it became obvious that the Eastern European societies were loosing the global competition in upgrading organizational rationality. A series of cultural and institutional causes and reasons were blocking the innovations in the region. The crucial moment for a timely adaptation of organizational structures to the complexity of industrial societies was missed at the end of the sixties. The chance to smoothly introduce economic liberalization, political democratization and pluralization of culture, what other authoritarian regimes successfully did (Genov, 1994b), was lost. The adaptation had to be carried out later on with substantial difficulties and at higher social costs. The processes during the second half of the eighties have shown this clearly.

The problem consisted and still consists mainly in the necessity to successfully manage the postponed *differentiation*. The crucial point is the differentiation of economy, politics and culture. They have been kept in a monolithic complex for decades by the political over-integration of the Party-State. Another key issue is the differentiated political representation of specific interests. In the long run, the differentiation of markets gets a growing importance as well. These and many other differentiations *of* action spheres and *in* action spheres materialize the global process of organizational rationalization.

At the regional Eastern European level the process is so complex that it cannot be free of tensions and paradoxes (Glatzer, 1996). They are rather intensive and put its very course under question. The most important paradox concerns the role of the state. The very core of the differentiation process is the withdrawal of the state from its domination on economy and culture. However, under the given civilizational conditions there is no other agency which might be able to manage this withdrawal than the state itself. Numerous misunderstandings and lack of coordination in this respect brought about consequences which *indicate a degradation instead of upgrading of organizational rationality* (Genov, 1997a).

This holds true mainly for the first stage of the radical economic reforms. It was marked in Bulgaria by the lack of fundamental legal arrangements, of crucial market institutions as well as of knowledge and skills for managing the introduction of market mechanisms. All this led to destructive institutional effects which put on stake the very political and economic legitimacy of reforms. The withdrawal of the state from the control on the banking system turned out to be especially explosive. The catastrophic development of Bulgaria in 1996 can be explained - other major factors notwithstanding - by the fact that tremendous resources were reallocated towards excessive consumption or drained abroad via the liberalized banking sector of the national economy. It was deprived of vitally important capital flows. This development is a manifestation of political irrationality which has far reaching impacts on the major economic indicators of the country. No wonder why the trust in major state institutions reached remarkable lows in the mid nineties:

Table 3

Degree to which major institutions contribute to the governance of the country (National surveys, five points scale, positions 1 and 5)

Institutions	To a very low extent (%)		To a very high extent (%)	
	Oct. 1994	Nov. 1996	Oct. 1994	Nov. 1996
The Parliament	58.6	46.1	1.7	1.8
The President	34.9	43.0	3.4	1.8
The Government	52.4	53.4	1.4	1.1
Courts and Prosecutors' offices	50.1	51.8	1.9	0.7

The organizational rationalization has not been compromised by the inefficient or lacking state intervention alone. Many processes exceed the capacities of the Bulgarian national state. Whatever the clarifications, the very problem remains a burning one: *Can the stabilization of social order be accomplished without the active participation of the nation state in the transformation?* The question does contain an intellectual provocation but it aims mainly at a burning practical problem. The intellectual answer was already clear in the moment when the obstacles in the way of the development of institutional frameworks of market economy became obvious. The processes all over Eastern Europe manifest the necessity of an active participation of the state in the regulation of the economic transformation (Eatwell et al., 1995: Ch.7). The search for an optimal solution to this problem will certainly make the core of political debates in Bulgaria in the years to come. It remains a burning issue in the integration of the country with the European Union.

2.4. Value-normative universalization

In their development after the Second World War the Eastern European countries did not manage to effectively adapt to the ongoing world-wide process of value-normative universalization. The major reason for this failure was their rather unequal position under the conditions of a polar division of the world in spheres of influence. Eastern Europe was practically isolated from the world markets as well as from other fundamental political and cultural processes. This isolation substantially contributed to the paralysis of their capacity to innovate in order to adapt effectively to the global trends.

The dissolution of the polar political and military confrontation speeded up the development of universalistic value-normative systems in the region. The *universal rights of the human individual* are in the core of the new constitutional arrangements. The particularisms of thinking in categories of ideological, political and military confrontations have not disappeared but they have been suppressed to the periphery of the value-normative orientations.

The strengthening of the universalistic value system does not imply, however, any end of the conflictual history of struggling particularistic views. To the contrary, we witness a general value-normative uncertainty. Facing a similar situation at the end of the First World War, Max Weber registered the decline of the large ideological systems but also predicted the rise of competing value orientations in everyday life (Weber, 1992[1919]: 101). This new potential for cultural conflicts makes the illusions connected with the "end-of-the-history" thesis manifest. The indications for a number of future conflicts is easily recognizable in the different assessments of rural and urban population as well as in the rapidly ongoing economic differentiation.

A substantial potential for conflicts is also present in the ethnic and religious differences. The processes in former Yugoslavia showed this clearly. Nationalism which was regarded there as a remnant of traditionalism has re-established itself as a major factor determining the value orientations. The revival of traditional religions and the intrusion of non-traditional sects indicate that religiously based cultural conflicts have a future - may be even a rather important one. In the Bulgarian national context this potential for future conflicts is easily recognizable in the *deep and stable social distances* between the major ethnic groups in the country:

Table 4
Would you accept a representative of another ethnic group for:
(National surveys, position "No", %)

	A Turk		A Gypsy	
	1993	1996	1993	1996
Neighbour	35.2	30.2	71.0	67.9
Colleague at the work place	31.5	25.5	63.1	60.8
Close friend	51.7	48.2	78.7	79.6
Member of the family	77.0	78.9	90.2	90.0

Thus tensions between the *universalized value-normative structures* and the specific ethnic, religious and other identities which incorporate the diversity of cultures will certainly leave their imprints on the future of Bulgarian society.

3. Contradictory trends in social differentiation and integration

The explanatory perspective searching for the causes and reasons of the acute problems conditioning the integration of South-East Europe with the European Union should refer to the belated differentiation of nation-states in the region. In broader terms, the major problem is *the belated differentiation of action spheres but also in specific action spheres*. However, problems of social integration at societal level are no less relevant in the context of the European integration.

In the course of the whole 20th century all societies from South-East Europe have been *dominated by politics*. They all are societies in which the state intervention in economy and culture is the normal state of affairs. The forms of interventionism vary from country to country and from period to period. It reached its peak in the cases of full nationalization of economy and full state control on culture as it was the case in Bulgaria. The major way for achieving individual economic success under such conditions is the use and abuse of political power.

The development of this common model of domination of economy by politics has its historical reasons. The countries from South-East Europe have not had and do not have the historical time to develop their modernization via industrialization in an organic way. Just having appeared on the political map, they faced well defined areas of economic and political influence. Their only promising reaction could be the state governed modernization. The intellectual and emotional moving force of this type of modernization is nationalism. This model of modernization has retained its vitality in the region during a long period (Mouzelis, 1987).

As seen from a social-structural point of view, the major reason for the domination of politics in the South-East European societies in most cases was the *weakness of the middle class* and *of civil society*. Moreover, in large parts of the region the civil society has been suppressed during the development of their industrial base. In these cases the de-differentiation of economy and politics has been developed to the extreme. One of the major reasons for this is the effort to maximally concentrate the scarce national resources for achieving fast advances in economic modernization. In this way relatively fast industrialization has been accomplished. However, in the long run the de-differentiation of economy and politics turned out to be counter-productive since it suppressed the economic initiative and responsibility. Thus in several countries of the subregion, Bulgaria included, the future differentiation of economy and politics will substantially depend on the development of the middle class.

Societies in South-East Europe still remain politically dominated because of international reasons as well. The great powers exert their influence on the subregion through the local political elites. They readily take this function of intermediators since the foreign patronage supports their own position. There are abundant examples of economic and political strengthening of ruling political groupings exactly because of their role as implementing agencies of foreign interests.

The political domination of society continues the tradition of *paternalistic political culture and practices* which have been inherited from the medieval empires. The various forms of political paternalism combined with a strong familial traditionalism persist in the political tissue in the subregion. The similarities with political structures in the Mediterranean and in Latin America is obvious.

The low level of differentiation of politics from other action spheres goes hand in hand with a *low level of differentiation in the sphere of politics itself*. The most extreme

case is the elimination of the division of powers which was practiced in most countries of the subregion after the Second World War. Bulgaria is a typical example in this respect. The unclear differentiation of political interests and processes is another side of the coin. It is not by chance that, national specifics notwithstanding, the dictatorial traditions of suppressing the differentiation of politics are widely spread all over the region.

Thus, as paradoxical as it may seem, exactly the domination of society by politics is one of the major reasons for the *permanent political instability* in the region. The overconcentration of political power is not necessarily the most effective answer to the economic, ethnic, religious and other challenges to sustainable development. More flexible forms of government are needed. Among other things, this means to leave economy and culture to develop along their own logics and not to subject them to the logic of politics. This means also a sufficient differentiation in the sphere of politics itself.

The Bulgarian case shows how urgent and complicated is the task to continue the differentiation of social systems. This is a challenge to most other countries in the subregion. Another common task is the need to connect the differentiation with strengthening the domestic and international mechanisms of social integration. In the latter respect, the major issue is the difference between the South-East European societies and the core of the European Union in work productivity, in economic organization, in stability of democratic institutions and in the dominating value-normative orientations. The differences are too substantial to be overcome in the short run (Riedel, 1996). The domestic integration is also a difficult task since the belated modernization will be marked by differentiation of economy and culture from politics, continuing differentiation of powers, of political identities and groupings. This predominance of differentiation will be stronger in the former state socialist countries like Bulgaria. Thus, we shall certainly witness new tensions and conflicts at national and international levels. Substantial efforts will be needed in order not to leave them to develop into intensive confrontations. Attempts at political overintegration of societies at the expense of their opening to regional and global cooperation are still quite possible in the subregion.

4. Conclusion: Integration and sustainable development

In this complicated context the crucial issue is the prospect of economic, political, cultural and environmental sustainability in the development of South-East European societies. In Bulgaria the task meets complicated problems in the course of the ongoing transformation. *First*, taking the form of all-pervasive commercialization, *instrumental activism* turns into an obstacle in the way of the long-term oriented sustainable development, which can be only materialized on the basis of ultimate values referring to the common good. The positive prospect of this trend is the strengthening of the idea and the practices of sustainable development without stifling the innovative potential of instrumental activism. *Second*, there is no doubt that *modern individualism* has no

alternative. However, its negative effects should be minimized by the effective functioning of mechanisms of communitarian solidarity. Sustainable development is not possible under the conditions of value-normative and institutional predominance of individualism, as it is the trend in Bulgaria at present. The clash of individualism with traditional and prospective forms of communitarianism continues with high intensity. The results will determine the future of sustainable development in the country. *Third*, the neglect of evolutionary universals of state government brought about a series of tensions and conflicts. The crash of financial pyramids is only one of the numerous examples of deviation from the patterns of organizational rationalization which threaten the sustainable development in the country. *The advancing rationalization of organizational structures and processes* requires institutional changes in order to reduce the potential for organizational pathologies. *Fourth*, together with the rapidly proceeding universalization of values and norms one can observe various forms of particularism as well. So far, the most relevant among them is the particularism of political confrontation. Many others are still latent, however. As the experience of neighbouring countries clearly shows, they could be easily activated. That is why it is one of the most important tasks to preserve universalistic solidarity in order to cope with the extremes of particularism.

Against this background, the concluding thesis might be formulated as follows: *Sustainable development of Bulgarian society and its successful integration with the European Union is only possible when the current destructive trends would be replaced by a multidimensional domestic integration.* The consolidation of national economy by means of integrating market mechanisms has a priority in this respect. The restructuring of economy cannot be postponed any more. However, its impact on unemployment and living standards will become clear in the years to come. Another source of uncertainty is the perspective of mass privatization. Only after five or ten years it will be possible to assess its economic and social consequences. The continuing uncertainty as to the future organizational forms of agriculture is another major challenge. It is very much desirable to mobilize political will and organizational capacities in order to reduce the uncertainties. This is still another precondition for the sustainable development of the country.

The outlined complexity and unpredictability of many processes require a careful and long-term management. The re-establishment of social integration in general and of value-normative integration in particular will certainly be a protracted and difficult process. In the global and regional aspects the peripheral position of Bulgaria will be probably solidified. In both directions one can hardly expect a reduction of conflicts. Coping with these conflicts will gradually move into the hands of supranational organizations. In the short run, however, the way out of the economic, political and value-normative crisis, which is a serious crisis of sustainability as well, requires a *stabilization of the state institutions* first of all. Only under this condition the recovery of the national economy could be managed and resources could be mobilized in favour of sustainability (Genov, 1995: Ch. 8). The effects of these efforts depend on many domestic and international circumstances. The field for free choice has narrowed substantially, however. It is the time to act and to act immediately.

NOTES

¹The Human Development Index (HDI) combines the level of GDP per capita, the life expectancy and data about the educational level of the population in a given country.

²According to data from the National Statistical Institute and author's calculations.

³The calculations are made on the average of sample countries. Western Europe is represented by 12 countries; the Overseas West is the aggregate of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US. Southern Europe is the average of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey; Central and Eastern Europe consists of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; Latin America is represented by seven countries; Asia by eleven countries, including China, India, Bangladesh, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea; Africa is represented by ten countries; and the world average is composed by the average of the above 56 countries.

⁴All survey data from public opinion polls stem from national surveys carried out by a team headed by the present author at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

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