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Javnost in novi mediji v procesih globalizacije

The Public and New Media in Processes of Globalisation

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Povzetek

V doktorski nalogi sem si zastavila dva ključna cilja: analizirati odnos med globalizacijo in javnostjo in analizirati sodobne pristope k vprašanju vzpostavljanja transancionalne javnosti. Do nedavnega je bilo razumevanje javnosti največkrat implicitno vezano na državo. Javnost je v večini sodobne znanstvene literature zamišljena kot nacionalni fenomen tako na ravni strukturnih pogojev pod katerimi se vzpostavi javnost, procesa in vsebine javne razprave kot učinkov delovanja javnosti. Z globalizacijo pa javnost v smislu prizadetosti z javnimi transakcijami ni več omejena z mejami nacionalne države - ko se posledice javnih transakcij širijo prek nacionalnih meja, bi se morale vzpostavljati tudi transnacionalne javnosti.

Temeljno klasično razumevanje javnosti, na katerem gradim v disertaciji, je Deweyeva (1927/1956) opredelitev javnosti kot skupine ljudi, ki jih neposredne posledice transakcij toliko zadevajo, da se zdi sistematična skrb nad temi posledicami nujno potrebna (Dewey 1954, 15 – 16). Kot ključen element globalizacije prepoznavam dolgotrajnost in resnost posledic, ki jih imajo delovanja nacionalnih in mednarodnih akterjev, pri čemer razsežnosti posledic presegajo nacionalne meje in s tem tradicionalno razumevanje legitimnosti javnih odločitev. Prepoznavanje tovrstnih posledic kot javnih, to je takšnih nad katerimi se zdi nujno potrebna sistematična skrb, je osnoven element klasične misli o javnosti kot skupine državljanov, ki postanejo pozorni na tovrstne javne probleme, o njih oblikujejo alternativne rešitve in v procesu javne razprave oblikuje skupno odločitev, ki nato vpliva na delovanje oblasti. Globalizacija vključuje predvsem tri procese, ki predstavljajo nove izzive za konceptualizacijo javnosti: širjenje javne narave problemov prek nacionalnih meja, pomnoževanje števila in raznolikosti posledic transnacionalnih problemov in pomnoževanje števila transnacionalnih problemov in njihovo kompleksno povezovanje. Ti trije procesi prinašajo spremembe, zaradi katerih je treba javnost v njenem normativnem pomenu ločiti od koncepta nacionalne države in jo razumeti v skladu s transnacionalno naravno javnih problemov.

V drugem delu doktorske naloge analiziram procese regulacije, ki so se vzpostavili na mednarodni ravni in se označujejo pod pojmom globalnega vladovanja. Ugotavljam, da ti sicer navidezno vključujejo javnost pod pojmom globalnih deležnikov, vendar tovrstni predlogi in pojmovanja vključujejo predvsem ekonomske organizacije in dobro organizirane nevladne organizacije. Tudi novi mediji, kot so uporabljeni s strani akterjev moči v procesih globalnega vladovanja, ne pripomorejo k večji demokratičnosti teh procesov, saj problem ni v tehnološki zmožnostih komuniciranja temveč v nepripravljenosti na poslušanje. Nasprotno je nujno potrebna vzpostavitev javnosti kot državljanov v sferi, ki bi bila avtonomna od pritiskov moči in ekonomskih resursov.

Nadalje se osredotočam na mednarodna družbena gibanja, njihovo uporabo novih medijev in predvsem problem ideološke fragmentacije znotraj in med gibanji. Na tem mestu posebej analiziram štiri koncepte v razmerju do ideala transnacionalne javnosti: aktivizem, samo-omejevanje nevladnih organizacij, proti javnosti in interesne skupine. Pri tem sklenem, da je pojem aktivizma problematičen dokler spodbuja učinkovitost pred demokratično vključenostjo, pojem proti javnosti dokler legitimizira izključevanje in fragmentacijo v imenu vključevanja, s pojmom samo-omejevanja nevladnih organizacij je javnost oropana ideala učinkovitosti, in kot najbolj problematično, pojem interesnih skupin poudarja učinkovitost brez vključenosti.

Kot zadnje se usmerim k pristopom, ki rešitev problemov transancionalnih javnosti vidijo v uporabi novih medijev v okviru tako imenovane „zadnje faze" razvoja novih medijev: socialnih medijih. To poglavje spremlja tudi empirična analiza raznolikosti glasov in politik upravljanja največjega in najbolj mednarodno razširjenega spletnega video portala YouTube. V analizi sklenem, da so tudi tovrstni spletni prostori pod izrednim ekonomskim pritiskom in so, kljub obljubam o razmeroma široki transancionalni uporabi, še vedno predvsem ameriško-centrična sfera.

Abstract

The main question that I pose in the dissertation is what transformations does globalisation bring that call for the rethinking of the public. I return to the classical writings on the public, which conceive of the public as a democratic ideal with four dimensions: structural conditions, process, content and efficacy. Each of the four dimensions of the public includes several ideal normative characteristics that face challenges in connection with globalisation.

The public is nowadays implicitly understood as a national phenomenon, the outer borders of the nation are usually taken to be the public's outer borders and the inclusion of national citizenry is implicitly assumed to ensure the legitimacy of political decisions. I analyse the relationship between globalisation and the public and argue that globalisation entails a threefold expansion of indirect, enduring and serious consequences that should be accompanied by the extension of the public across national borders: expansion in the transnational character of public issues, expansion in the variety and number of transnational consequences, and expansion in the number of issues with transnational consequences and subsequently their complex interrelatedness. The main thesis that I propose in the dissertation is that globalisation calls for the formation of transnational publics whereby the legitimacy of inclusion follows the "all affected principle".

In the remaining sections of the dissertation I analyse the three main concepts around which the discussion on transnational public revolves: global governance, transnational social movements and social media. I conclude that the transnational public, as envisioned by scholarly literature on global governance, especially concepts such as strong publics and the inclusion of stakeholders, neglects the structural conditions of autonomy from political and economic powers and inclusion of all those affected. Equating the concept of global governance to the ideal of the organised public is problematic, since the actors who form the broad arena of global

governance are not legitimate, nor are they held accountable by the national or global polity.

I analyse transnational social movements in relation to the ideal transnational public, especially within the conceptualisation of counter publics. I conclude that the idea of transnational counter publics serves as a reminder of exclusion and the power balances within empirically existing communicative groups which term themselves as *the* public. The concept itself, however, would become problematic if it were completely to replace the concept of the (transnational) public, since it is the notion of the public and not of the counter public that calls for the maximum inclusion of all those affected.

I focus also upon literature that proposes social media, such as YouTube, as serving the formation of the transnational public. This chapter is accompanied by an illustrative case study of structural conditions of the ideal transnational public as afforded by YouTube: a sphere for political communication, inclusiveness, transnationality and freedom from commercial constraints. While the results of the analysis were to some extent positive regarding inclusiveness and the political nature of YouTube, the analysis also showed that YouTube is, on the one hand, a highly US-centric sphere, and, on the other hand, operates under the commercial imperatives of the commodification of communication that are in contrast to the normative ideals of the public.

The concluding chapter ties together the conclusions drawn in other chapters: it provides an oversight of the challenges that globalisation entails for each of the four dimensions of the public and the answers and still open questions provided by writings on global governance, transnational social movements and social media.

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1 Introduction

The last few decades have seen enormous speed and progress in the development of information and communication technologies. For some social strata the Internet has become the main medium for personal communication, the gathering of public information and for entertainment. At the same time, the world has become more interconnected and interdependent than ever before – a stage in the process of globalisation that could not have been achieved without the development of communication technology. As a result, the individual has been left with fewer and fewer opportunities to affect the outcomes of social processes that have serious consequences for her or his everyday life. With globalisation it is more difficult for individuals "to translate private worries into public issues and conversely, to discern and pinpoint public issues in private troubles" (Bauman 1999, 2).

The main research question I pose in this PhD thesis is: How can the public be conceptualised in a globalised world? In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this dissertation comprises five chapters. In this introductory chapter, I look briefly at classical thinking about the public and preview the composition of the whole dissertation. After the introduction, the dissertation divides into two main sections. In the first section, I argue that there is a need for transnational publics, and in the second section I analyse current proposals on where to look for transnational publics. In the first section (composed of Chapter 2), I analyse the relationship between the public and globalisation and conclude that the public should be thought of as a transnational phenomenon in relation to transnational public problems. In the second section (composed of three chapters), I analyse three main models of the transnational public sphere, as identified in the most recent wave of scholarly thought on the transnational public. The concluding chapter ties together the main conclusions from the other chapters and provides recommendations for further research.

The public in its classical understanding was not understood to be solely a national phenomenon. Kant (1795/1957) proposed that publicity should

extend national borders and serve the cause of world peace. A good century later, World War I led Tönnies (1922/1998, 433-444) and Dewey (1927/1954) to express similar sentiments. Tarde conceptualised the public as being composed around the printing press, and proposed that journalism has not only nationalised but also internationalised the "public mind" (Tarde 1989/1969, 303-304). Blumer (1946/1953, 46) specifically stressed that the public is not necessarily the same as the citizenry of a nation-state, since its outer boundaries are defined by the issue at hand. In delineating the transnational public, I build primarily on this classical literature about the public, drawing on writings from the European Enlightenment in the 18th century (Kant 1784; 1795/1957; Bentham 1791/1843; Mill 1832), as well as early 20th-century German (Tönnies 1922/1988) and American thinking about the public (e.g., Dewey 1927/1954; Park 1924/2007; Mills 1956; Blumer 1946/1953).

This tradition conceives of the public as a democratic ideal with four dimensions: structural conditions, process, content and efficacy. The first refers to the conditions under which the public is formed, the second to the conditions to which members of the public adhere while deliberating, the third to what the public is deliberating about and the fourth to the results of its deliberation.

(a) *Structure:* The public is a group of people who are confronted by a potentially public issue, are divided by their ideas as to how to address the issue and proceed to engage in deliberation (Blumer 1946/1953, 46). All those who are potentially affected are able to participate as peers in deliberations concerning the organisation of their common affairs (Fraser 2007b, 20). The public is autonomous from and serves as a public check on public powers in authority (Bentham 1791/1843). Institutional authority, with its sanctions and controls, does not, therefore, penetrate the public (Mills 1956, 304). Nor could power and money influence its deliberation (Habermas 1996, 364). Finally, the information that members of the public need in order to become aware of some potential public problem and make

the best decision possible is publicly accessible (in analogy with Bentham 1791/1843, n.p.; Splichal 2002, 168; Gastil 2008, 20).

(b) Process: The public's deliberation proceeds in such a way that in the public, as many people express opinions as receive them and everyone has the opportunity to respond to an opinion without internal or external reprisals being taken (Mills 1956, 302–304). Deliberators provide mutually justifiable reasons for their assertions (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 129).The authority of deliberators is built purely upon their deliberative proposals and not outside sources of power (Cohen 1989, 21). Every member of the public can put issues on the agenda, propose solutions and offer reasons in support or criticism of proposals (Cohen 1989, 21). Deliberators acknowledge the value and dignity of all human beings—those with whom they deliberate ("politeness" as suggested by Papacharissi (2004, 262)) and also others who are not participating in deliberation ("civility" as suggested by Papacharissi (2004, 267)). Nothing is to be taken for granted; everything could be subject to argument and evidence (Carey 1995, 381).

(c) Content: Deliberators deliberate whether an issue is a matter of public affairs in that its potential consequences are extensive, long-term and serious (Dewey 1927/1954, 126-128). Members of the public thus realise how personal troubles relate to social problems and, conversely, how the community's problems are relevant to its members (Mills 1956, 318). Second, members of the public deliberate whether an issue is outside the realm of necessity, or, in other words, whether it is possible to make the social changes the issue calls for, where the public is the primary agent in the process of politicisation (Gamble 2000/2006, 7; Hay 2007, 79) (see Figure 1.1).[1]

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1   Gamble (2000/2006) sees the realm of the political narrowing, with diminished powers to imagine any alternatives to the current social position and the perception of social affairs as being subject to the influence of fate. The end of history, the end of the nation-state, the end of government and the end of the public sphere are presented as

Figure 1.1: Mapping the political realm

Governmental sphere	Non-governmental sphere		Realm of necessity (non-political)
Public and governmental	Public and non-governmental	Private sphere	
Realm of contingency and deliberation (political)			

(Hay 2007, 79)

(d) Effectiveness: The first important result of public deliberation is that participants "hear the other side" and know the opinions of other deliberators and understand their reasons for holding these opinions (Mansbridge 1983, 78; Graham 2008, 30). Furthermore, deliberators come to a common decision or they agree to disagree but continue to seek fair terms of cooperation among equals (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 53). The opinion of the public is finally effective in the shaping of decisions with powerful consequences (Mills 1956, 302–304; Fraser 2007b, 22), either by influencing the majority opinion or by influencing the assessment of public opinion that those in power take into account in the decision-making process (Splichal 1997, 4). Public officials are representatives of the public and are accountable to the public so that the interests of the public are preserved and protected (Dewey 1927/1954, 15-16). Finally, public powers are able to implement public decisions (Fraser 2007b, 22).

Classical thought on the public has been disrupted by the English translation of Habermas's (1962/1989) work on *Öffentlichkeit*[2] as "the public sphere", resulting in what Splichal (2010) terms the "eclipse of the public" in scholarly thought. Here, the term "public" refers to the agency of public deliberation—basically to the question of who deliberates. The public sphere refers to the question of conditions of deliberation. It is, however, difficult to divide the normative conditions of public deliberation so that

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consequences of fate, as the end of the endeavour of humans to take their future in their own hands, according to Gamble. These modern "endisms" furnish visions of society in which people are seen as being held captive by the forces of modernity, trapped in the iron cages of the modern world: bureaucracy, technology and the global market (Gamble 2000/2006, 18).

2 See more on the consequences of this translation in Darnton (2000, n.p.), Kleinstüber (2001, 96–98) and Splichal (2006, 105).

each would separately belong to either the public or the public sphere—which is probably why the public sphere and the public are nowadays used in a simultaneous and inconsistent fashion (see for example Fraser 1992). The ultimate defining characteristic of the public sphere is whether it actually serves the organisation of the public. The public is, by definition—to borrow Darnton's (2000, n.p.) words—"an active agent in history, an actual force that produces actual effects." The public sphere by itself, Darnton (2000, n.p.) continues, could not be ascribed with any such agency.

Fraser (2005b; 2007) criticises Habermas's *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962/1989) for implicitly assuming the Westphalian nation-state frame on a number of counts which could be understood here through the lens of the four dimensions of the public. First, regarding openness, the outer borders of the public have been assumed to be equal to the national identity. Habermas, Fraser (2007, 10) argues, equates the making of the bourgeois "public" with Anderson's (1983/2006) making of the imagined nation. Second, at the level of process, Habermas implicitly assumed a national communicative structure, both by assuming a single shared medium of public communication and assuming a national language (Fraser 2005b, n.p.; 2007, 10). Third, at the level of content, Habermas assumed that the primary focus of public concern was a national economy contained within a nation-state (Fraser 2005b, n.p.; 2007, 10). Finally, at the level of efficacy, Habermas assumed that the national political authority would be the addressee of public decisions and that it would, furthermore, have the sovereign authority to regulate the public affairs of a national population (Fraser 2005b, n.p.; 2007, 9).

The first section of the dissertation consists of just one chapter (Chapter 2), in which I analyse globalisation from the Deweyan (1927/1954) position on the relationship between public and private affairs. Dewey's work is taken as the main theoretical frame of this doctoral dissertation, since he defines democratic inclusion according to the consequences of public problems and

not national borders or sovereignty. We could easily imagine Dewey writing about globalisation when he wrote about World War I:

> Extensive, enduring, intricate and serious indirect consequences of the conjoint activity of a comparatively few persons transverse the globe. […] their acts affect groups and individuals in other states all over the world […] The need is that the non-political forces organize themselves to transform existing political structures: that the divided and troubled publics integrate. (Dewey 1927/1954, 128-129)

According to Dewey, the public consists of all those "who are affected by the indirect consequences of transaction to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for" (Dewey 1954, 15-16). Since there are individuals who are not direct participants in public transactions, it is "necessary that certain persons be set apart to represent them, and see to it that their interests are conserved and protected" (Dewey 1954, 16). This reflects a process whereby the public organises itself. Heuristically speaking, the process by which a public is organised goes through several stages: from awareness of public problems, to public discussion, and finally achievement of a consensus that influences decisions adopted by a majority.

In the second chapter, I argue that globalisation brings a threefold expansion of indirect, enduring and serious consequences: an expansion of consequences over existing national borders; an expansion in number of consequences with a transnational character; and an expansion in the number of issues with such consequences (and subsequently their complex interrelation). Following Dewey's (1927/1954) ideal of the public and the "all-affected principle"[3], this means that the transnational expansion of public consequences should be followed by the formation of transnational publics.

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3   Term borrowed from Fraser (2007).

The term transnational, in contrast to international, is deliberately selected here to be analogous to Dewey's idea of trans-actions – actions, the consequences of which pass from one party to the other (Dewey 1927/1954, 13). The term international is furthermore taken here as implicitly assuming nations and nation-states as the subjects, while I reserve the transnational for an understanding that goes beyond this implicit assumption. Mitzen (2000, 402) proposes that "transnational" should be reserved for vertical dynamics among non-state actors, and "international" for horizontal dynamics among states. Since the public is by definition characterised by horizontal communication among those affected, the concept of the transnationality of the public refers to the extent of direct communicative interaction among members of the transnational public i.e. not mediated by political representatives.

If we apply the four dimensions of the public (see above) to the transnational realm, the transnational public is defined as follows:

(a) S*tructure:* The transnational public is a group of people who are confronted by a potentially transnational public issue, are divided by their ideas as to how to meet the issue and engage in deliberation over the issue. Since the issue is recognised as potentially transcending national borders, all who are potentially affected are able to participate regardless of their nationality. A transnational public is autonomous from and serves as a public check on public authorities, both national and international. Finally, such information as is needed to become aware of the transnational nature of public problems and make the best decision possible is accessible to all those who are potentially affected.

(b) Process: The transnational public is formed by public deliberation, whereby deliberators propose mutually justifiable reasons for their belief in their assertions. The authority of deliberators is built purely upon their argumentative proposals and not outside sources such as power, money or

national citizenship. In the transnational public, all opinions may be responded to and criticised by those who are potentially affected.

(c) Content: Members of a transnational public deliberate whether the potential consequences of the issue in question are transnationally extensive, long-term and serious. Members of the transnational public thus realise how personal and national troubles relate to transnational and global social problems. At the same time, through deliberation, members of the transnational public search for the best possible social change in response to the potentially transnational problem.

(d) Effectiveness: Members of the transnational public are listening to the extremely diverse range of views of all those who are potentially affected by the issue at hand. By doing so, the members of the transnational public understand the problems and opinions of others who are also affected by the issue at hand and understand their reasons for their opinions. Members of the transnational public either come to a common decision regarding the transnational issue at hand or they agree to disagree but continue to seek fair terms of cooperation among equals. The opinion of the transnational public is effective in regulating the activities that have extensive, long-term and enduring consequences upon members of the transnational public. Finally, public officials, both national and transnational, are accountable to the transnational public.

In the second section of this dissertation (Chapters 3 – 5), I turn to the three models of the transnational public sphere and analyse their answers to the question of how can the public be conceptualised in a globalised world.

There have been three recent waves of writing on the transnational public. The first was the debate around UNESCO's New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) [4] (MacBride et al. 1980). The UN system

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4 For accounts of the historical importance of the NWICO debate, see for example Padovani (2005), and especially the 2005 special issue of *Javnost/The Public*: Ayish

followed the classic ideals contained in the concept of the public enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights by recognising rights to:

(a) freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (Article 19);

(b) freedom of peaceful assembly and association (Article 20);

(c) to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives (Article 21).

The universal human right to freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas has been specifically addressed as the right to communicate regardless of frontiers – arguing thus in favour of the transnationality of communication, especially against state censorship of "foreign" information.

The NWICO debate started in the 1970s within the non-alignment movement and has drawn attention to a more complex picture of world communication, in which not only state censorship, but also the imbalanced overall structure of world communication were problematic. Instead of the desired horizontal flow, global communication was recognised to be in fact a vertical flow, dominated by Western corporations which transformed information into a commodity and continued the division between the rich and the poor (Masmoudi 1979 in Thussu 2005, 49). The MacBride report (MacBride et al. 1980) devoted a special chapter to the public and public opinion. World public opinion, they argue, if it exists, is still in the process of formation, and "thus is fragile, heterogeneous, easily abused and still unable to be considered as an authentic power" (MacBride et al. 1980, 198). If it revolves around any problems, it is around those that are common to a large number of countries, e.g. hunger and malnutrition, social inequalities or questions of international scope, e.g. general disarmament, the

(2005); Osolnik (2005), Preston (2005), Thussu (2005).

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establishment of a new economic order, decolonisation (MacBride et al. 1980, 198).

The second wave of scholarly attention to the transnational public(s) came at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, when the first critical voices called attention to the fact that, with globalisation, power in the political and economic realms was being transferred to the international level without the parallel development of the public sphere (e.g. Garnham 1986/1995, 250-251; Keane 1991, 135-146; Splichal 1994; 1031; Thompson 1995, 234-235). It was at this time that Habermas's *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962/1989) was translated into English, giving rise to a plethora of scholarly attention on the concept of the "public sphere". At this time the focus was on Habermas's early understanding of the concept of the public sphere. Authors such as Garnham (1986/1995, 250-251) and Keane (1991, 135-146) generally addressed the need for thinking on the transnational public sphere in the era of globalisation, yet at the time there was no evidence of specific proposals or differentiation on the definition and understanding of the ideal of the transnational public sphere .

The focus of this dissertation is the third, most recent and largest wave of writing on the transnational public sphere, which I differentiate here into three models. In the second half of the 1990s, different models of the public sphere evolved which differ according to the normative ideals of the public sphere, modes of communication and relevant ideas about where to search for empirical approximations of the public sphere in general (but implicitly national). Two overlapping typologies governing modern theories of the public sphere can help to understand differences in modern writing on the transnational public. The first has been proposed by Marx Ferree et al. (2002a; 2002b; 205-231). They provide a typology of four models of the public sphere: (a) representative liberal, (b) participatory liberal, (c) discursive, and (d) constructionist. These four models differ according to inclusion, political process, normative conditions of public discourse and

outcome of the relationship between discourse and decision-making (Marx Ferree et al. 2002, 316) (see Table 1.2).

Table 1.1: Typology of democratic theories in relation to the public sphere

Theory	Who	What and how	Outcome
Representative liberal	Elite dominance Expertise Proportionality	Free marketplace of ideas Transparency Detachment Civility	Closure
Participatory liberal	Popular inclusion	Empowerment Range of communicative styles	Avoidance of premature closure
Discursive	Popular inclusion	Deliberativeness Dialogue Mutual respect Civility	Closure contingent on consensus
Constructionist	Privilege the periphery/oppressed	Empowerment Narrative	Avoidance of premature closure

(Marx Ferree et al. 2002b, 229)

The second typology of modern public sphere theories comes from Pinter (2005), who differentiates between four models of the public sphere according to the dominant mode of communication the models propose: (a) liberal, (b) antagonistic, (c) dialogical, and (d) mediated model. The main difference between Pinter's (2005) typology and typology of Marx Ferree and colleagues (2002a; 2002b) is that (a) Pinter does not recognise the representative liberal model as a special theory of the public sphere, since it argues for elite dominance and not democratic inclusion; and (b) Pinter adds additional theory, not recognised by Marx Ferree and colleagues: a mediated public sphere where the media are recognised as the main mediators that provide the infrastructure of the public sphere.

In respect of the transnational public sphere, we can distinguish between three main models based on how they operationalise the transnational publics, in other words, in which current social processes they identify the formation of transnational publics. Each chapter in the second section of the dissertation addresses one model of the transnational public:

(a) Chapter 3: global governance;

(b) Chapter 4: transnational social movements;

(c) Chapter 5: social media and online user-generated content;

Each of the three models of the transnational public follows different theoretical ideas on the structural conditions, process of public deliberation, content and effectiveness of the transnational public sphere, and usually combines theories of the public sphere as identified by Marx Ferree et al. (2002a) and Pinter (2005):

(a) the transnational public sphere as global governance builds on the representative liberal and dialogical theory of the public sphere (Chapter 3);

(b) the transnational public sphere as transnational social movements builds on the constructionist or antagonistic theory of the public sphere (Chapter 4);

(c) the transnational public sphere as online user-generated content builds on the participatory liberal or liberal model and mediated theory of the public sphere (Chapter 5);

By analysing the relation between globalisation and the public and critically comparing the three most recent models of the transnational public sphere, I hope to come closer to establishing the conceptualisation of the public in a globalised world.

The approach of this dissertation is primarily theoretical yet Chapter 5 is an exception since it is accompanied by an empirical exploration of the relation between the transnational public and YouTube as a selected case study of social media. Chapter 5 thus serves as an exemplification of an empirical approach to only one of the presented models of the transnational public and only a small selection of the problems that I tackle in the overall theoretical part of the dissertation. Since time does not permit an all-encompassing empirical investigation of the research questions guiding the dissertation. Instead, this dissertation provides an illustration as to how one component of the overall theoretical framework can be empirically investigated. In this sense it is a valuable exercise yet it should be noted that it is intended as only a small

contribution to the much more complex question: How can the public be conceptualised in a globalised world?

2 Globalisation

2.1 Introduction: Globalisation and the need for a transnational public

The international economic system, with clear boundaries between a state's domestic economy and foreign trade relations, has been transformed into a transnational economy(ies). According to Habermas (1994, 28), in this new system, state actors are no longer the nodal points that shape global economic exchanges, and have effectively been disempowered by market globalisation. Consequently, nation-states are facing growing legitimisation deficits in decision-making, and are forced to deal with an increasing inability to provide legitimate and effective steering and organisational services (Habermas 2003, 88). Citizens are facing an ever greater gap between being affected by something and participating in changing it (Habermas 1994, 28). At the same time, with globalisation, some states, according to Splichal (2009, 5), have acquired new privileges: "today, decisions made by states have implications not only for their own citizens but also for foreigners". The paradox of global political interconnectedness is, as Dahl notes, that "a smaller democratic unit provides an ordinary citizen with greater opportunities to participate in governing as a larger unit. But the smaller the unit the more likely that some matters of importance to the citizen are beyond the capacity of the government to deal with effectively" (Dahl 1999, 22). The more globalised the world is, the less chance an individual has to influence the decisions or public transactions which affect them.

At the same time, as we witness the accelerating pace of globalisation, "old" political organisations (e.g., political parties, trade unions) are losing support (Franklin 2004; Dalton 2006; Hay 2007), and there seems to be an increasing shift toward unassociated, individualised forms of political action, such as lifestyle politics (Giddens, 1991) or conscious consumption and environmentalism (Shah et al., 2007, Stolle et al., 2005).These activities, however, give an individual no power to influence the public

actions of global or regional actors who influence him or her every day in serious but non-transparent ways. What the globe in globalisation needs is "the new public"[5] that will collectively address transnational problems.

This chapter begins with an analysis of globalisation through the lens of Dewey's (1927/1954) differentiation between private and public affairs, whereby I recognise globalisation as a process of transnational expansion of public affairs. In the second section of this chapter, I follow Dewey's (1927/1954) analysis of the legitimacy of inclusion in relation to the consequences of public affairs and the relationship between this principle and the national borders of the public. In the third section I analyse the relationship between the national and transnational publics. Finally, I identify the main problem facing the public in the globalised world: the identification of common interests under conditions of structural inequality.

2.2 Globalisation as a transnational expansion of consequences

Globalisation is usually understood in terms of "time-space compression" (Harvey 1989, 260–308), as a "social process in which constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding" (Waters 1995, iii). Held (1999, 16) defines globalisation as "a process (or set of processes) that embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or inter-regional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power".

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5   The term "new public" is used here in complete contrast to how Mayhew (1997) conceptualised the term. He defines the New Public as a public in which "influence is dominated by professional practitioners who largely control the channels, forms and messages of public communication and can therefore set the agenda and terms of public discussion" (Mayhew 1997, 208). In contrast, by "new public" I mean a public in which transnational communication is based on democratic principles of collective inclusion of those affected by global issues.

There are a number of different views of globalisation, each focusing on a specific aspect and actors of globalisation and accompanied by a specific set of critiques:

(a) Globalisation as a multidimensional process of transformation of social relations by creating international networks of activity, interaction and power (e.g., Held 1999; 16), global interdependence (e.g., Rosenau 1980), increasing unicity (Robertson 1992) and interconnection of the global system (Axford 1995);

(b) globalisation as the liberalisation of markets (e.g., Cable 1999) together with critiques of this neo-liberal global market expansion (e.g., Bourdieu 1998; Beck 2000; Amin 1997; Burbach et al. 1997; Green and Griffith 2002) and calls for an alternative globalisation (e.g., Katsiaficas 2004; Weir 2007);

(c) globalisation as a political process and critiques of democratic deficits of global governance and its depoliticising effects (e.g., Nye 2001; Gamble 2000/2006; Scholte 2005; Hay 2007);

(d) globalisation as a highly unequal process which means freedom for some and an impossibility to act for others (e.g., Castells 1997; Bauman 1998); and

(e) globalisation as a cultural and communication phenomenon (e.g., Tomlinson 1999), together with critical apprehensions of the inequality of global media flows (e.g., Schiller, 1970; de Bens and de Smaele 2001; Chakravatti and Sarikakis 2006; Chalaby 2006; Boyd-Barrett 2006; Sparks 2007).

The Westphalia system, which is nowadays taken as the beginning of the international system based on the principle of national sovereignty, was created because of the need to regulate potential wars, and can thus be viewed as a form of regulation of transnational consequences. Kant (1795/1957) was one of the first to argue for a form of global federation among nation-states, which would secure "perpetual" global peace. Similarly, Dewey's thoughts on a transnational public were triggered by

World War I, in which the "extensive, enduring, intricate and serious indirect consequences of a conjoint activity of a comparatively few persons traverse the globe" (Dewey 1927/1954, 128).

Globalisation as "transcontinental or inter-regional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power" (Held 1999, 16) is a social process of creating transnational networks, in which actors range from strong nation-states and governmental organisations to corporations, mass media and civic associations. Their activities have *transnational consequences* which in turn call for the transnational public, as imagined by Dewey (1927/1954), to come into existence.

Dewey defines the public on the basis of the consequences of human acts upon others:

> The public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically taken care for. (Dewey 1927/1954, 15–16)

The indirect consequences of human transactions are those which affect people who are not directly involved in these transactions. An issue is judged as a public affair when its potential consequences are perceived as: *(a) extensive:* an issue is public when its consequences affect large numbers of people, *(b) enduring:* an issue is public when its consequences are far-reaching in time, and *(c) serious:* an issue is public when the extent of injuries or benefits the potential consequences may bring are high (Dewey 1927/1954, 64-67, 126-128), therefore including both collective goods (e.g., Kaul et al. 1999) and collective bads (e.g., Hardin 1999). All previous criteria mean that public consequences are usually also *intricate*: difficult to recognise.

For Dewey, World War I served as an example of the fact that public consequences are intricate and therefore difficult to recognise. This is

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mostly due to the fact that the more people a specific issue affects and the more enduring and more serious its consequences, the more the issue in question becomes complex and interconnected with other issues. Not only did World War I produce an enormous and tragic death toll, it also triggered a series of complex intricate consequences such as those which affected agriculture (Dewey 1927/1954, 129–130), consequences of which the farming population could hardly have acted with knowledge but saw as uncontrollable as the forces of nature (Dewey 1927/1954, 130). To make the complex nature of the problem more explicit: during World War I a great demand arose for food and other agricultural products which caused food prices to rise and farmers to profit. After the end of the war, impoverished countries could not pay for food at even pre-war prices; taxes were increased and currencies were devalued, while the prices of agricultural necessities increased. The subsequent deflation hit at a time when there was a restricted market, costs of production had increased and farmers were trying to pay back mortgages which they had taken out when prices for their products were high (Dewey 1927/1954, 129–130).

After World War II, the European Coal and Steel Community was founded to prevent future wars between European countries by means of economic integration among those countries which had been warring, on the basis that by connecting economically, the parties to the conflict would not fight wars among themselves.[6] Later, as the states tried to regulate common matters of peacekeeping, their efforts gradually came to incorporate attempts to achieve higher levels of interconnectedness on a wider range of of issues and thus create newer complexes of public issues.

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6   French Prime Minister Robert Schuman argued that the Steel and Coal Community would help to preserve peace since it would make war between France and Germany "materially" impossible: "The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. […] By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace" (Schuman 1950, n.p.).

Building on Dewey's understanding of public consequences, we can see that globalisation brings a threefold expansion of indirect, enduring and serious consequences:

(a) expansion in the transnational character of public issues in terms of those affected seriously and in the long term beyond existing national borders;
(b) expansion in the variety and number of consequences that are transnational in nature;
(c) expansion in the number of issues with transnational consequences and subsequently their complex interrelatedness.

A prime example of the threefold expansion of indirect, enduring and serious consequences across the globe is the current global financial crisis. At the time of writing, most of the world has experienced an extremely serious economic downturn: individuals all over the world have been exposed to the consequences of unemployment and deprivation caused by seemingly invisible and extremely complex financial operations. The consequences of the global financial crisis are described by Crotty (2008, 10) as a process in which the large financial gains of the financial boom were private but losses incurred during the crisis are "socialised" through massive state bailouts.

Brinkman et al. (2009) describe the graveness and the interconnection of the consequences of global financial crisis in terms of the reduced quality and quantity of foods people consume: potentially an additional 457 million people are at risk of going hungry and many more are unable to afford the quality of diet required to perform, develop and grow well. The complex nature of these consequences is simplified and represented in Figure 2.1: the global financial crisis affects food prices, income and government spending, which in turn leads to inadequate food access, care, insufficient health services and an unhealthy environment.

Figure 2.1: Framework for the analysis of malnutrition

Brinkman et al. (2009, 2)

Kotz (2009) identifies three structural reasons that have resulted in this most recent global financial crisis: growing inequality, a financial sector that became increasingly absorbed in speculative and risky activities and a series of large asset bubbles. The real-estate bubble in the US which triggered the current crisis was the result of increased inequality and an unregulated and speculative financial system. The increase of profits relative to wages and the rising concentration of household income at the top produced a large volume of funds which had been spent on purchasing assets such as real estate. Furthermore, the growth of the bubble was supported by borrowed money, the result of the mortgage lending practices of the deregulated financial market. Since consumer spending by workers was restricted by the stagnation or decline in real wages, they started to borrow more in mortgages for their houses, often at a low initial rate. This increasing level borrowing was at the same time supported by low interest rates that were set in order to sustain the deflation of the 2000 stock market crash (Kotz 2009).

As Claessens (2010, 182) points out, the real-estate bubble in the US would have had widespread repercussions in any event, simply because of the size of the US economy. Yet the greater interconnectedness of financial markets has significantly increased the transnational gravity of this crisis. That is, the US mortgage-based financial instruments were bought by institutions all over the world (Crotty 2008; Kotz 2009; Claessens 2010). At the same time, they were also an important part of foreign exchange reserves and sovereign wealth funds for many countries (Claessens 2010, 182).

The financial sector has in the last 20 years become highly deregulated, which has enabled it to become increasingly absorbed in speculative and risky activities. Banks and other financial institutions pursued higher profits through extremely complex and speculative financial products such as those handled by hedge funds (Krugman 1999, 118-120).[7] Evaluating these various newly developed and complex financial instruments was left to the private rating agencies, yet, as Crotty (2008, 2) argues, these mortgage-backed securities were so complex and opaque that they could not possibly be priced correctly and their "computerisation" only added to the problem (Hakken 2010). Financial markets have developed to an extent that goes well beyond the "real" economy and have been the most important drivers of economic globalisation. The proportion of foreign exchange dealings that relate to transactions in goods fell from 90 per cent in the early 1970s to around 2 per cent in the late 1990s (Scholte 2005, 166). This system is extremely unstable and volatile and operations by a few actors have had

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7   "Hedge funds don't hedge," Krugman (1999, 118) exclaims. "One hedges in order to make sure that the market fluctuations do not affect one's wealth. Yet funds, in contrast, want to try to make the most out of market fluctuations. The way they do this is to promise to deliver assets at a fixed price at some future date. 'To sell a stock short', one borrows the stock from the owner with a promise to return it later—then one sells it. This means that the stock must be repurchased before the due date; the short-seller is betting that its price will have fallen by then" (Krugman 1999, 119). "The good news from this kind of financial play," Krugman continues, "is that it can deliver very high return to the hedge fund's investors. The bad news, of course, is that the hedge fund can also lose money very effectively" (Krugman 1999, 120).

devastating effects for large sections of the world's population. Bisley (2007, 49) identifies important differences between recent financial markets and financial markets in the past: recently, investments have been mostly short-term (and speculative) – in the 19th century, investment was almost entirely composed of long-term capital intended to develop primary goods (e.g., factories, farms and railways); now, almost all of the major economies (with the exception of China) have free-floating currencies, in contrast to currencies pegged to precious metal, as was the case in the past; and finally, financial markets are also more integrated now than they were in the past, since almost all major economies have become open to free capital movement.

Finally, the global financial crisis is also an example of the complex interconnection of global problems, specifically global warming. Uldam and Askalnius (2001) describe the discourses surrounding the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, where the issues of global warming and global financial crisis were recognised as interrelated. The solutions to the problem of global warming proposed by government consisted of green industries that were designed to solve both problems, global warming and the global economic downturn, at the same time. On the other hand, the alliance between supporters of alternative forms of globalisation and the environmental movement argued that the very root of the problem is not so much a particular set of polluting practices, but rather the underlying logic of the capitalist system itself. The market-based solutions proposed by governments were attacked for being based upon the very same capitalist logic that caused the two problems in the first place (Uldam and Alskanius 2009, 2).

2.3 Inclusion of all those potentially affected

Habermas implicitly equated the public to the nation-state polity or citizenry. He defines the public sphere as "all those conditions of communication under which there can come into being a discursive

formation of opinion and will on the part of *a public composed of the citizens of a state*" (Habermas 1992, 446, emphasis added). Fraser (2005b) criticises Habermas's (1962/1989) early work for equating the public to the nation in terms of common identity, or "imagined community" (Anderson 1983/2006), where the national "we" defines the "common" in the common good. Furthermore, a national communicative structure has been assumed and a national language has been implicitly taken as "natural"[8] (Fraser 2005b, 2007b). In line with the democratic spirit of inclusiveness, Habermas argued that the public, as the only truly legitimate agent of political change, was "recruited from the entire citizenry". By equating the public with the citizenry, it has been assumed that the democratic norm of inclusiveness has been assured. Yet the ideal of democratic government does not derive directly from the ideals of pre-existing nation states with a fixed citizenry. Before Habermas writes that the public needs to be recruited from the entire citizenry, he states the reason why: because it needs to be recruited from "those who are potentially affected" (Habermas 1996, 365).

Blumer (1946/1953, 47) specifically stresses that the public is not necessarily the same as the nation-state citizenry, nor is it the audience of a mass medium. It is a spontaneous and elementary response to the situation of the recognition of a common problem—its existence is based on this recognition. As the perception of the problem changes, so does the public. Similarly, in John Dewey's classical writings the public is not bound by citizenship but by the consequences of the issue under consideration. Dewey wrote on the consequences of World War I in a way that could easily be applied to current transnational problems, such as global warming and the global financial crisis. We could just as easily imagine Dewey talking about either of these two problems, when he wrote:

> Extensive, enduring, intricate and serious indirect consequences

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8   As the history of national languages shows, the commonality of a language has been very much constructed top down and even enforced by the state's nation-building aspirations (e.g., Billig 1995).

of the conjoint activity of a comparatively few persons transverse the globe. […] The consolidations of peoples in enclosed, nominally independent, national states has its counterpart in the fact that their acts affect groups and individuals in other states all over the world… The need is that the non-political forces organize themselves to transform existing political structures: that the divided and troubled publics integrate (Dewey 1927/1954, 128-129).

Dewey builds on a Rousseauean (1762/1988, 92) idea of freedom in relation to democracy: the reason behind efforts to regulate public transactions is the human will to regulate one's own life—to have as great a grasp as possible on one's own life course. Dewey conceptualised the term "trans-action" as the action (or failure to act) of one or both parties, which has consequences for the other party. Dewey provided conversation as an example of a trans-action: "When A and B carry on a conversation together the action is a trans-action: both are concerned in it; its results pass, as it were, across from one to the other" (Dewey 1927/1954, 13). Transactions bond the parties through their consequences. Thus, an action which provides consequences only for its bearers and for no one else is never a trans-action and always remains private by nature. Dewey built on the concept of consequences of transactions in order to delineate the "all affected principle" (term borrowed from Fraser [2007b, 22]), which serves to identify the "outer-boundaries" of the public. Consequences which affect only the persons directly involved in a transaction define the transaction as private in nature. When transactions also have consequences for others who are not directly involved in the interactions, they are *indirect*. According to the all-affected principle, all those who can argue that the potential consequences affect them in indirect, extensive, enduring and serious ways can legitimately participate in public deliberation upon the regulation of these consequences, regardless of their citizenship.

In writings on globalisation, the "all-affected principle" has recently been revived by authors who call for a global public which would not be bound by national citizenship (e.g., Benhabib 1996, 70; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; 144–145; Calhoun 2001, 162; Sparks 2001, 76–77) but should be recruited from the global polity (e.g., Jelin 2000; Barber 2004, n.p.). Globalisation, Barber (2004, n.p.) argues, is a genie which cannot be put back into the nationalist bottle, but should be regulated by democratic means through "citizens without frontiers". Benhabib (1996, 70) stresses that in a legitimate democracy, there are no "prima facie" rules that would limit the identity of participants, such as nation-state citizenry. As long as each excluded person or group can justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm in question, they are legitimate participants. Similarly, Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 144–164) argue that constituency in terms of the political accountability of political representatives should be expanded according to three dimensions: (a) space (non-residents), (b) identity (groups) and (c) time (future generations). Foreigners are, according to Gutmann and Thompson (1996; 148), moral constituents for political representatives of nation-states.

According to Fraser, globalisation means that four distinct kinds of community are facing a "mismatch" and should be realigned or "mapped onto one another":

-the imagined community, or nation;
-the political (or civic) community, or citizenry;
-the communications community, or public; and
-the community of fate, or the set of stakeholders affected by various developments (included here is the "community of risk") (Fraser 2005b, 6).

Within the "Westphalian" perspective, there seemed to be no need to distinguish between these four types of community, since they were understood as composing the ideal of shared citizenship in a confined national community and "it went without saying that the 'who' was the

national citizenry" (Fraser 2007, 21). Yet under the current conditions of globalisation, the inclusiveness condition of legitimacy should be rethought (Fraser 2007, 21). She distinguishes between "intra-frame" and "extra-frame" representation (Fraser 2005a, 76–77). In the first case, political decisions wrongly prevent some of the included from participating fully as peers (e.g., women, recognised minorities, labour). In the second case, boundaries are drawn in such a way as to wrongly exclude some people from the chance of participating at all in political decisions, and it is this second-order misrepresentation that has become more visible with globalisation (although it could be argued that it existed long before, especially during colonialism). The solution proposed by Fraser (2007) is the "all-affected" principle. She argues that the fourth type of community – the community of fate affected by various developments – should be the basis to the answer of "who" should participate. Henceforth, Fraser concludes (2007, 22), public opinion is legitimate if and only if it results from a communicative process in which all the potentially affected can participate as peers, regardless of political citizenship.

2.4 Interdependence of national and transnational publics

For Dewey (1927/1954, 223), "the very doctrine of sovereignty is a complete denial of political responsibility" at times when human actions within one state prove to be trans-actions with far-reaching consequences for people in other states. He was a strong proponent of global regulation through the United Nations Organisation, where he saw "evidence that there is developing the sense that relations between nations are taking on the properties that constitute a public" (Dewey 1927/1945, 222). The current global governance is not, however, accompanied by transnational publics that would ensure legitimate oversight and accountability for global governance processes. Splichal argues that this does not imply that the "Westphalian" type of public is outdated: "On the contrary, as long as the transnational public does not come into existence, the only hope is to

(re)create public opinion governance within national boundaries" (Splichal 2009, 399). The formation of the transnational public versus the national public should not be regarded as two separate processes but as interdependent dimensions of the same process. On the one hand, transnational publics are "a function of porous national publics" (Olesen 2007, 305). On the other hand, national publics, too, can be (but not necessarily) a function of "transnational porosity".

Olesen (2005, 425) considers the question of whether the plurality of national publics means that we cannot also speak of a transnational public in the singular. His answer is that the two are interconnected in the sense that the transnational public is a function of porous national publics where people are "aware of 'voices' in other places, debate the same questions at the same time with reference to the same events, statements and actions" (Olesen 2007, 305). The transnationality of a public is the extent to which various national and sub-national publics are (a) aware of the same common problem and are (b) aware of "voices in other places", to use Olesen's (2007, 305) words. The two dimensions of transnationality are circularly interdependent. Awareness of the transnational nature of a public problem could be a result of the awareness of voices in other places and, vice versa, the awareness of voices in other places could be a result of awareness of the transnational nature of a problem—in other words, the motivation to seek out and listen to these voices. By bringing the voices of "others" and their concerns into the national communicative domain, this may bring to life a new public concerned with transnational problems. In this way a new national public may emerge which could be said to be a function of the transnational public.

Tarrow (2006, 32) described six processes of transnational contention which could to some extent[9] also be said to reflect the relationship between the

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9   The main difference between the concept of a transnational public and transnational activism is the extent to which different voices have been included. While transnational coalition formation includes actors with similar claims and opinions (Tarrow 2006, 32), a

national and transnational public (see Figure 2.2). Global framing is the mobilisation of international symbols to frame domestic conflicts. Internalisation is a response to foreign international pressures within domestic politics. Diffusion is the transfer of claims or forms of contention from one site to the other and scale shift is the coordination of collective action at a different level from its initial one. Externalisation is the vertical projection of domestic claims onto international institutions or foreign actors and, finally, transnational coalition formation is the horizontal formation of common networks among actors from different countries with similar claims (Tarrow 2006, 32).

Figure 2.2: Six processes of transnational contention

Tarrow (2006, 33)

Many political and economic actors who are the prime perpetrators of transnational transactions can be influenced only by the voices of their national "constituencies": in the case of political representatives, these are the people on whose votes and/or subjugation they depend, and in the case

transnational public is by definition characterised by diversity of opinion (see Chapter 4).

of economic actors, these are their consumers (as the popular spread of "political consumerism" shows (e.g., Stolle et al. 2005; Kann et al. 2007; Shah et al. 2007). "International law cannot be enforced against powerful states, except by their own citizens" (Chomsky 2010, n.p.). The national constituencies of such strong states need to become aware of the voices of people who are suffering the consequences of actions decided upon by their political representatives, since they operate "in their name".

Unrepresented peoples and nationally marginalised groups may, contrary to their national communicative domain, be heard in the transnational communicative domain, which can lead to the transnational community exerting pressure on those national powers that are preventing the marginalised voices from being heard (for example, arguments presented by official foreign and EU voices for the rights of the Roma population in EU member states). Arguments presented to the national majority should help the national communicative domain to make progress towards "(re)creating public opinion governance within national boundaries", to use Splichal's words (2009, 399).

2.5 Common interests and structural inequality

Characteristic of the public, according to Mills (1956, 318), are the reflection and debate through which members of the public perceive their personal troubles as social issues. And issues are perceived as social when they are seen to be shared by others and could not be solved by any one individual but only through modification of elements of the structure of society. Nowadays, however, it is ever more difficult for individuals "to translate private worries into public issues and, conversely, to discern and pinpoint public issues in private troubles" (Bauman 1999, 2).

Dewey's (1927/1954, 15-16) implicitly assumes both common interest and conflict of interests among those affected and those who affect. There is the common interest of members of the public: those that are potentially

affected by the transactions in question. Their common interest is to regulate the extensive, grave and long-term consequences of the transactions of those social actors in whose operations they are not directly involved—and transnationality refers to their communication. The conflict of interests is between members of the public and those whose transactions are deemed to be necessarily regulated.

Rousseau idealistically perceived a state as a community of people with common interests: a single will which is concerned with their common preservation and general well-being (Rousseau 1762/1988, 148). He argued that there is a common general will in the general interest. Since the general will is indivisible—necessarily the will of the whole body politic (Rousseau 1762/1988, 99)—it can be neither the will of a single individual nor the will of only a fraction of the people constituting the sovereign. Thus, for Rousseau, the diversity of opinion is a sign of negative fractionalism. Yet his proposals regarding recognition of the common interests were naïve: he asserted that "only the common sense is necessary to see the common good and thus reach a consensus" in such a state (Rousseau 1762/1988, 148).

For Dewey, an individual should never be regarded as a separate entity, free from human interactions:

> The idea that individuals are born separate and isolated and are brought into society through some artificial device is a pure myth. … Even when a person is alone, he thinks with language that is derived from association with others, and thinks about questions and issues that have been born in intercourse. … The *human being is an individual because of and in relations with others.* Otherwise, he is an individual only as a stick of wood is, namely as spatially and numerically separate. (Dewey 1908/1960, 79-80 emphasis added).

Dewey thus expresses extreme criticism of what he terms "individualism" –

a political and economic doctrine that regards an individual as separate from society (Dewey 1927/1954, 86-109). Its main problem lies in the idea of self-interest, which is identified with "petty selfishness" – interests can be employed as a useful concept only when the self is seen to be in the process of change and not a rigid naturally existing entity which is something complete within itself (Dewey 1920/1957, 195). For Dewey, individualism reduces the social possibilities for change to an individual's capabilities and moral standings, neglecting social institutions and social groups and neglecting the effects of socialization on the creation of the self:

> The result of this kind of thinking is to throw the burden for social improvement upon free-will in its most impossible form. Moreover, social and economic passivity are encouraged. Individuals are led to concentrate in moral introspection upon their own vices and virtues, and to neglect the character of the environment. (Dewey 1920/1957, 196)

Dewey recognised that there are no simple criteria outside the human mind which would help in seeing the common good, just as there is no simple division of objective and subjective events or separation of "internal" from "external" knowledge (Dewey 1946, 15–16). The problem could be presented in terms of Dewey's description of the process through which religion was transformed from a public to a private issue in Western countries, not by any change of objective facts, but by a change in perception. As long as the prevailing belief was that the consequences of religion affected the entire community, religion was considered to be a public affair. Later, these consequences were thought to be confined only to persons directly concerned with religion or the lack thereof, and religion came to be considered as a private affair (Dewey 1927/1954, 49).

Common interests are not easily recognised in national contexts and the problem is exponentially aggravated in the case of the transnationality of interests. The common interest in the regulation of transnational capital, for

example, is not easily recognised, nor is it without competition from other forms of collective allegiance, as Amin (1997, 55) points out when he asserts that class allegiance is giving way to self-identification by race, ethnic group or religion.

The most important result of public deliberation is "hearing the other side", which means coming to understand and appreciate the needs of other people (Mansbridge 1983, 78). By doing so, people could change their preferences and even decide against what is at first assumed to be in their interest. When interests are assumed to be in conflict, the ideal of public deliberation would mean that preferences are amenable to change through public deliberation[10] and should in fact be the result of such deliberation. On complex social and political issues, Benhabib (1996, 71) argues, more often than not, individuals may have views and wishes, but not an ordered set of preferences. It is actually the deliberative process itself that is likely to produce such an outcome, by leading the individual into further critical reflection on the views and opinions they already hold. Furthermore, even when interests are recognised as being in opposition, members of the public may decide either that that is better, or that they will sacrifice some interests in the name of the greater good. Mansbridge (1983) provides an example of such "sacrifice": even a childless citizen might decide that the town school needs more funding and would vote for a tax increase. To make such a sacrifice, however, one needs to decide freely and on the basis of full information.

Perception of the communicative process here is similar to Carey's (1992, 13–35) ritual view of communication, ritual here meaning the *common* effort of understanding the world. Carey defines communication as a

10 This has led to some unfounded critiques of the ideal of public deliberation. Przeworski (1998), for example, defines deliberation too broadly as an endogenous change of preferences resulting from communication. The problem with his definition is exposed in Stoke's (1998) writing: she takes a change of opinion as the only criterion of public deliberation, which leads her to write about the "pathologies of deliberation" when in fact she is writing about the pathologies of propaganda.

"symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed" (Carey 1992, 23). A ritual view of communication perceives communication as the human effort to "produce reality"—to (a) create a *shared understanding* of reality and (b) to *change* reality. Carey argues that "reality is not there to discover in any significant detail. The world is entropic [...] whatever order is in the world is not given in our genes or exclusively supplied by nature" (Carey 1992, 26). "Although we are accustomed to think of social thought as essentially private," Carey (1992, 29) argues, "the thought is predominantly public and social."

Not only common but also partial interests are not easily recognised. Mansbridge (1990, n.p.) claims that by ruling partial self-interest out of public deliberation, it becomes more difficult for the less powerful to discover that usually the prevailing sense of "we" does not adequately include them. Building on women's experiences, Mansbridge shows that "we" can easily be exploited to represent a false universality, as "mankind" used to do. Deliberation, Mansbridge concludes, should first make participants more aware of their interests, even when those interests turn out to be conflicting with those of others.

Deliberation may lead to resolutions such as compromise, consensus or only deliberative disagreement.[11] Yet such resolutions of conflicts of interests have been proposed as outcomes of *public* deliberation where participants are equal and communication (and not power or money) is the only medium. The public as imagined by Dewey needs to form itself precisely because of the structural inequalities which result in transactions undertaken by some people having serious, long-term and extensive consequences for others. In the case of actors whose transactions call for transnational publics to emerge, the conflict of interests is between the interests of "all those affected" versus those who affect.

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11   Deliberative disagreement (Gutnamm and Thompson1996, 53) is an outcome of public deliberation in which participants agree to disagree but continue to seek fair terms of cooperation among equals.

In order to prevent the public regulation of their operations, the actors whose transactions should be regulated may negate the actual existence of extensive, long-term and grave public consequences – the negation of the existence of global warming could be one such example. If such consequences are recognised, the actors in question may negate the responsibility for such consequences. In the case of global warming, it is often argued that global warming is not a man-made but a natural phenomenon. Finally, the actors whose operations have transnational consequences may negate the common interest in regulating such consequences and try to build "coalitions" by framing their operations as the national interest versus the interests of others. The example taken from the public discourse on global warming would be to argue that whole nations (and not only specific elites) would benefit from the regulation of global warming more than others. Furthermore, by doing so they may present calls to accountability from those affected as attacks on "sanctimonious" and idealised institutions which are portrayed as being beyond the scope of public change (Dewey 1927/1954, 169-171), such as national sovereignty.

In short, these actors have a plethora of arguments at hand to argue against regulation of their operations. Yet these arguments are in themselves not problematic and would, under the ideal circumstances of open and equal public deliberation, be welcomed for discussion and dispute. The problem is in the structural advantages these actors have. Power relations enter the arena of public deliberation even in cases where officially the differences in political and economic power seem to be bracketed (Young 1996, 122), let alone in cases against actors with transnational consequences. To be more specific, strong nation-states and transnational economic and political actors have transnational consequences precisely because they are strong, rich and influential. More likely than not, it is in their interest not to be regulated by those whose lives they affect. It would be naïve to think that these actors step into public expression stripped of power, money and influence and do not try to use these resources in order to tip the scales in their favour. The

most important problem for the transnational public is how to combat the very structural problems that, on the one hand, are the reasons why the transnational public should emerge, and, on the other hand, prevent this public emerging in the first place?

2.6 Conclusion

Globalisation broadly understood as "transcontinental or inter-regional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power" (Held 1999, 16) implies consequences for all those that are not directly included in the transcontinental flows and networks. Specifically, globalisation brings a threefold expansion of indirect, enduring and serious consequences:

(a) expansion in the transnational character of public issues in terms of those affected seriously and in the long term beyond existing national borders;
(b) expansion in the variety and number of consequences that are transnational in nature,
(c) expansion in the number of issues with transnational consequences and subsequently their complex interrelatedness.

In a nutshell, globalisation means that the public should be thought of as a transnational phenomenon. The main conclusion of this chapter is that globalisation entails structural inequalities which paradoxically prevent the transnational publics from emerging and are at the same time the reason why the transnational publics should emerge. What is needed are mechanisms and institutions which combat these structural inequalities. The question that I address in the next four chapters of this dissertation is how this paradox is addressed by the three main proposals on the transnational public as found in current literature: global governance processes, transnational social movements, and social media.

3 Global governance

3.1 Introduction

In recent years, a new term has been coined to refer to the regulation of transnational public affairs: global governance. Finkelstein (1995, 369) defines global governance as governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. Similarly, according to Dryzek (2000, 120), global governance is "the creation and maintenance of order and the resolution of joint problems in the absence of such binding decision structures". The Commission on Global Governance describes global governance as "the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs" (Report of the Commission on Global Governance 1995, 1). Global governance is thus presented as a process in which there is no central authority that would make binding decisions upon the global polity, yet the global community finds ways to resolve common problems. Such claims for global governance come very close to Dewey's (1927/1954) understanding of an organised public which regulates transactions with long-term, serious, transnational consequences.

New actors are said to gain power as part of global governance processes. The United Nations Commission on Global Governance, for example, identifies four types of actors of global governance, in addition to national governments: "non-governmental organizations, citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence" (Report of the Commission on Global Governance 1995, n.p.). Rosenau claims that, in the process of global governance, authority is relocated from the nation-state "upwards to transnational and supranational organisations, sidewards to social movements and NGOs, and downwards to subnational groups" (Rosenau 1999, 293). The concept of global governance thus seems to describe a reality in which the regulation of public affairs has become more democratic, since new voices are said to have been empowered within the

international arena: non-governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations and private firms.

There are five explicit statements in current scholarship on global governance that evoke the idea that a transnational public should be sought within the developing processes of global governance:

(d) in global governance, decision-making processes follow rational, deliberative practices (e.g. Lynch 2000; Eriksenn and Fossum 2001; Kapoor 2005; Mitzen 2005);

(e) global governance represents the transnational public sphere, since it involves inclusive, deliberative consultations (e.g. Dryzek 1990; 1996; Nanz and Steffek 2004; 2005; 2007; Backstränd 2006; Eckersley 2007);

(f) global governance is an inclusive phenomenon since it includes stakeholders (e.g. Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2004; Backstränd 2006, MacDonald 2008);

(g) global governance involves the disempowering of the nation-state (e.g. Rosenau 1999);

(h) global governance is the process whereby transnational public issues are regulated and the effectiveness of this regulation provides it with legitimacy (e.g. Backstränd 2006).

Each of the following sections deals critically with one of the statements presented above to establish why global governance seems to represent a process which leads to the creation of a transnational public.

3.2 Strong publics and rational deliberation

There are a number of authors who identify the international public sphere with the rational deliberation of political representatives, such as state diplomacy (Mitzen 2005), the United Nations Organisation (Lynch 2000) the "strong publics" of the European Parliament and European Union Committee (Eriksenn and Fossum 2001, n.p.). These authors argue that

rational deliberation of public powers is a sufficient characterisation of the transnational public sphere (Lynch 2000; Mitzen 2005) and transnational publics (Eriksenn and Fossum 2001).

The ideas of the transnational "strong publics" reflect a broader, ongoing process of change in theoretical thought on the public, under the heading of deliberative democracy theories, in which the focus has been much more on rational deliberation than on inclusion (e.g. Habermas 1996; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Bohman and Rehg 1997). The concept of "strong publics" was introduced by Fraser (1992, 134), who criticised Habermas's early conception of the public for promoting weak publics whose deliberative practices function as a critical discursive check on the state, and consist exclusively of opinion formation but do not encompass decision-making. Fraser provides an example of direct decision-making processes as they happen in parliaments, where both opinion formation and decision-making are present. Paradoxically, in contrast to her own argument, which stresses that there should be as much inclusion as possible in decision-making processes, she terms the national parliaments as "strong publics" (Fraser 1992, 134). By doing so she creates a rupture in the critical tradition of theoretical thought on the public, whereby the public is conceptualised as sovereign over its public officials (Rousseau 1762/1988; Dewey 1927/1954), is autonomous from the public authorities it supervises (Bentham 1791/1843) and stands *in opposition* to institutional authority, which in turn does not penetrate the public with its sanctions and controls (Mills 1956).

In his later writings, Habermas (1996, 307) followed Fraser's concept of "strong publics" and thus created a definition of the public in which rational deliberation and not autonomy and democratic inclusion became the most important defining concepts of the public. Habermas argues for a distinction to be drawn between the "weak public sphere", the sphere of opinion formation that is relieved of the need to achieve collectively binding decisions, and the "strong public sphere" of the political system. Yet the

public, in its normative, classical understanding, is not "weak" – it is necessarily sovereign over its political representatives. By arguing for the distinction as a positive description of reality, Habermas himself retreats from the democratic ideals of combating political exclusion, as presented in his early work *Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere* (Habermas 1962/1998).

Writings that equate global governance to the transnational public sphere reflect this shift in theoretical thought on the public. Lynch (2000), for example, argues that, since the public sphere exists when action is co-ordinated through a discourse focused on securing consensus, the international public sphere exists when states exchange interpretations and arguments in pursuit of international consensus. By applying Habermas's (1981/1984, 284) distinction between communicative and strategic action, Lynch (2000, 317) thus sees the international public sphere developing in state diplomacy. If diplomacy as practised by the representatives of states is characterised by deliberation and communicative action and not the strategic pursuit of pre-defined interests, then this is, according to Lynch, the international public sphere[12]. Similarly, Mitzen (2005, 402) borrows Habermas's (1996, 307) distinction between "publics of parliamentary bodies" and the "weak public". She proposes that governmental organisations and forms of deliberation between states are international public spheres. Eriksenn and Fossum (2001, n.p.) argue that the European Parliament should be considered a "strong international public", since parliaments are decision-making deliberative bodies: "They embody this combination better and more explicitly than any other political body: they are quintessential strong publics" (Eriksenn and Fossum 2001, n.p.). Similarly, the committees of the European Union could also be regarded as the strong publics Eriksenn and Fossum (2001, n.p.) propose, since they deliberate and make decisions which influence EU states. Yet even if the

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12 The WikiLeaks affair reveals, however, that diplomacy has been far from an ideal communicative action but very much the strategic pursuit of pre-defined interests. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jan/17/wikileaks-governments-journalism, accessed 20.2.2011)

decision-making of global governance were genuinely to follow the ideal deliberative process, this would still not make it the equal of the transnational public, since the deliberations of transnational political actors are exclusive in nature. International bodies such as the European Commission and the committees of the European Union are precisely the types of bodies that need to be confronted by a transnational public, not presented as equal to it. Describing the deliberative processes of political authorities as "publics" inevitably adds to the confusion surrounding questions of the autonomy, efficiency and accountability of government in relation to the public.

3.3 Deliberative consultations and inclusiveness

Global governance is said to be equal to the transnational public sphere when it involves top-down organised deliberative consultations, such as "discursive designs" (Dryzek 1990), "stakeholder democracy" (Backstränd 2006, 472) and "deliberative participatory publics" (Nanz and Steffek 2004, 315). Dryzek (1990, 106) argues that, at the international level, discursive designs promise authority based on consent and voluntary compliance and, as such, are ideally suited to the highly decentralised international system. Keane (2009, 695-747; 2010, n.p.) optimistically argues that deliberative public consultations, together with the spread of a culture of voting, have become a new mode of "monitory democracy" – that since 1945 the world is in the form of the "deepest and widest system of democracy ever known" (Keane 2010, 698).

Nanz and Steffek propose that global governance should be accompanied by "deliberative participatory publics" which "stimulate an exchange of arguments in which policy choices are exposed to public scrutiny" (2004, 315). According to Nanz and Steffek (2004, 2005, 2007) the "appropriate public sphere" of global governance is the "institutionalized arena for deliberative political participation beyond the limits of national boundaries" (2004, 315). Such a global governance regime would, they argue, draw its

legitimacy from the "deliberative quality of their decision-making process: it is not designed to aggregate self-interests, but rather to foster mutual learning, and to eventually transform preferences while converging on a policy choice oriented towards the public interest" (Nanz and Steffek 2004, 319). Such international deliberative forums would involve a variety of actors (e.g. national officials, scientific experts, NGOs) and cooperatively address a specific global problem. The main public actors would be the organised civil society organisations, who "can give voice to citizens' concerns and channel them into the deliberative process of international organizations" and "can make the internal decision-making processes of international organizations more transparent to the wider public" (Nanz and Steffek 2004, 323; 2007, 8). Deliberative public consultations are therefore considered to be the most important democratic innovation involved in global governance, since they follow deliberative principles and include a wide variety of stakeholders.

Eckersley (2007) positions the transnational public sphere within global governance institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO, according to Eckersley, (2007, 331) represents a step in the direction of the transnational public sphere, since it includes a mechanism, "amicus curiae brief", by which "non-state actors have found a new space for the display of 'critical public reason' within the organs of the WTO" (Eckersley 2007, 331). He takes a positive view of this mechanism as a link between civil society and decision-makers.

Similarly, Backstränd (2006, 427) argues for more diverse and hybrid forms of inclusion of a wider range of stakeholder interests in deliberative procedures, both at the level of policy decision-making (through advisory, top-down initiated and organised multi-stakeholder deliberations) and at the level of policy implementation (in the form of partnerships between governmental, private and non-governmental organisations). The example of good practice that she provides is the 2002 United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development.

Compared to the discourse on strong publics, the idea of transnational deliberative designs is a step closer to democratisation: it argues for greater inclusion of civic voices. On the other hand, compared to the classic ideal of the public as being autonomous from political and economic powers (e.g. Bentham 1791/1843; Dewey 1927/1954; Mills 1956), the proposals on discursive public consultations neglect the question of autonomy in relation to top-down organisation. These proposals explicitly assume that public authorities will organise and finance transnational deliberative consultations. Yet such top-down organisation is problematic, since it does not guarantee the autonomy, inclusion, transparency and effectiveness of public deliberation, but directly serves the interests of political (and economic) "sponsors". The most serious danger inherent in top-down organised discursive designs may be, as Dryzek (1996, 42) recognises, the co-opting of potential troublemakers and the use of those designs to justify decisions already made. To illustrate: the common conclusion of research on e-government public consultations carried out by means of new media has usually been that the main problem lies not in technologies but political representatives' lack of will to listen (e.g. Jankowski and van Selm 2000, 158; Stanley and Weare 2004, 511; Hyeon-Suk 2008, 55-57; Delakorda 2009, 109-125).

A direct critique of Eckersley's (2007) comparison of the WTO's public consultations with the transnational public sphere is provided by Young (2001). In response to the criticism of the WTO as an exclusive forum dominated by corporate interests in the service of northern hemisphere economies, some of its officials, Young (2001, 680-681) reports, organised a meeting for the day before the official WTO meeting, to which representatives of non-governmental organisations were invited. Many protesters, Young claims, considered this gesture an absurd attempt to co-opt and dampen opposition to the WTO's proceedings, and therefore chose not to attend. Some of the NGO representatives who decided to attend, however, found the agenda already decided and that they were passively listening to

the WTO director-general, the US political authorities and other powerful figures, with only minimal time available to question their speeches or make speeches of their own.

A similar critique can be applied to Backstränd's (2006) suggestion that the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development is a model of good practice for the transnational public sphere. Inclusion in the World Summit was decided on by the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, who picked "focal organisations", those whom it regarded as "obvious leaders" among the nine major groups (Backstränd 2006, 485): business, farmers, indigenous people, local governments, non-governmental organisations, the science and technology community, trade unions, women and youth. Backstränd does not question this decision, neither regarding the nine groups, nor regarding the "obvious leaders", but merely assumes it to be a good example of inclusion on the transnational level. Regarding the nine groups selected, Willetts (2001, n.p.) claims that the choice of these groups was the arbitrary and incoherent outcome of negotiations at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. He argues that it is arbitrary since it singles out women but not men; the young but not the elderly; indigenous people but not other minorities etc., but he stresses that, above all, "it is analytically inconsistent to have NGOs as one of the nine major groups, when all other eight are represented in the UN system via the ECOSOC arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations" (Willetts 2001, n.p.). He claims that the selection was influenced by the personal concerns of the secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and by the lobbying of NGOs who were accredited to the conference. According to Willetts, this incoherence came about because many of those in the other "major groups" participating did not wish to be labelled as NGOs and that by adding NGOs they met the requirement to have a special category which would encompass environmental and development NGOs.

How the process of inclusion to the World Summit on Sustainable

Development operated was that "the CSD Commission on Sustainable Development Secretariat picks focal organizations, i.e. those whom it regards as obvious leaders among the major groups. Hence, the secretariat coordinates the dialogue process by identifying core organizing partners" (Backstränd 2006, 485). Backstränd (2006, 485) takes a positive view of the decision to include "obvious leaders" in the World Summit as a "bottom-up activity". The criterion of "obvious leadership", is, however, far from "obvious", since it could be interpreted in line with a large number of different criteria (e.g. number of members, access to mass media agenda, duration of existence etc.). These criteria relate to differences in resources much more than to differences in legitimate representation. Various groups, for example, do not necessarily even have a specific leadership and work much more like a network among which there is cooperation *and* competition to secure a voice within the global governance system. Furthermore, the top-down selection of participants could hardly be named a "bottom-up process".

Yet another critical conclusion regarding a transnational deliberative design is provided by Cammaerts and Carpentier (2006) and Hintz (2007), who analysed inclusion in the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS). They concluded that accreditation for the WSIS process was geared towards large NGOs – applicants either needed to be an entity officially recognised by the UN, or they had to prove their credentials as formally established organisations with a headquarters, a democratically adopted constitution and annual reports (Hintz 2007, 4). Access for poorer countries and smaller NGOs was restricted due to the unequal distribution of resources (Hintz 2007, 4). Most importantly, some groups, such as Reporters Without Borders and Human Rights in China, were strategically excluded, (serving the interests of powerful states) without any official explanation of why they were excluded. Similar measures were also put in place in respect of the opportunity to publish on the WSIS website (Cammaerts and Carpentier 2006, 30-31).

These analyses thus show that existing examples of transnational deliberative public consultations have fared badly in terms of autonomy and inclusion. As Young argues, participation in exclusive systems merely helps confer undeserved legitimacy on these processes and offers no representation to those who remain outsiders (Young 2001, 680). Merely thinking about financial support for non-governmental organisations from "developing" countries (e.g. Nanz and Steffek 2004, 335) is not enough. As long as there is no vibrant transnational public autonomous from political and economic powers, there is no legitimate way to extend inclusion in global governance, since there is no "base" from which inclusion can be secured.

3.4 Stakeholders and the all-affected principle

The main "break" that the notion of global governance represents with the Westphalian model for the regulation of transnational affairs is a critique of state-centrism. According to Rosenau (2002, 71), global governance neither posits a highest authority nor anticipates that one is likely to arise. "Global governance is a summarising phrase for all the sites in the world where efforts to exercise authority are undertaken" (Rosenau 2002, 71). It is "governance without government" (Rosenau and Cziempiel 1992/1998).

Dewey's (1927/1954) understanding of the public as all those affected by indirect transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to systematically regulate those consequences has been replaced within the discourse on governance by the concept of stakeholders. The term stakeholder is "imported" from management theories and theories of corporate responsibility to thoughts on globalisation (e.g. Jones and Fleming 2003), global sustainability (e.g. Steurer et al. 2005, Sharma and Henriques 2004, Pratt 2003), global stakeholder democracy (e.g Backstränd 2006, MacDonald 2008) and "multistakeholder networks" (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 129). Although the stakeholder concept appears to be similar to Dewey's understanding of the public, it is, nevertheless, different

in important ways. Economic stakeholders' theory has been, "released from the burdens" that the concept of the public encompasses, with its inherent association with democratic ideals.

Freeman, who introduced the concept of stakeholders in economic management, defines a stakeholder as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation's objectives" (Freeman 1984, 46 in Werhane and Freeman 2006, 502). In contrast to Dewey's position on the public as those affected by public transactions, Freeman takes into account not the moral definition of the public (as all those who are affected), but the position of power: all those who can affect the organisation's objectives. Freeman's understanding leaves enough space for an interpretation which argues that managers should be responsible – but only to those who have enough power to affect the outcome of their outputs. The emphasis on stakeholders as those who have the means to influence the organisation is, for example, clear from Clarkson's (1995, 106) differentiation between primary and secondary stakeholders. Judged from this perspective, the corporation should take into account stakeholders' claims only if they are primary stakeholders – if they manage to organize themselves in such a way to threat with potentially "significant damage to corporation" (Clarkson 1995, 107). While there is no risk of pressure, there seems to be no responsibility for the corporation either.

Furthermore, management stakeholder theory is "manager-centric". While the concept of the public emphasises democratic decision-making, the concept of stakeholders emphasises managers' decision-making. For Dewey (1927/1954), those who are seriously affected in the long term by the issue in question identify themselves as the public, while the stakeholders, on the other hand, are identified by those who affect (i.e. managers) and not those who are affected by their transactions. Mitchell et al. (1997), for example, identify stakeholders on the basis of the priority given to different groups by managers who take into account the perceived legitimacy, perceived power and perceived urgency of stakeholders' claims.

Dewey's focus was on final regulation by political authority (the state). The focus of stakeholder theory is on self-regulation between corporations and their social environment. Steurer et al. (2005, 264) argue that stakeholder theory gained momentum because relationships between corporations and societal groups are less likely to be the subject of active state interventionism than they were in the Keynesian era. According to Freeman, "creating value for stakeholders is important, if for no other reason than to avoid the folly of regulation and government expropriation" (Freeman et al. 2004, 366).

Finally, the concept of the stakeholder is "based on the idea that sustaining viable stakeholder-relations creates long lasting value for corporations" (The Global Stakeholder Strategies Program[13,] 2009). As LaPlume et al. (2008, 1158) note, Freeman's approach was "unabashedly strategic in content because consideration of stakeholder interests was seen as playing an instrumental role in enhancing firm performance". According to Jones and Fleming (2003, 434), the stakeholder theory promotes, at best, more "enlightened" behaviour by firms (and other actors), but behaviour that remains fundamentally self-seeking.

Business ethics theories, according to Crane et al. (2004, 108), have successfully promoted the idea that corporations are citizens. Discussion of stakeholders and corporate responsibility is, according to Banerjee (2008, 51), an ideological movement that is intended to legitimise and consolidate the power of large corporations in global governance processes. Economic actors have been one of the loudest voices arguing for "global stakeholder democracy", since they present themselves as important stakeholders of global governance. The "multistakeholder networks" proposed by Held and Koenig-Archibugi (2004, 130-131) and Benner et al. (2004) argue for the

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13   http://www.business.gwu.edu/icr/global_stakeholder_strategies.asp, accessed 14. 10. 2009.

inclusion of corporations. In the last decade, powerful economic players have gained a seat in global governance procedures, especially within the United Nations Organisation's conferences. To illustrate: the United Nations Global Compact has been proposed as a model of good practice for "harnessing corporate power" (Kuper 2004; Risse 2004; Zadek 2004). Similarly, at the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), according to Hintz (2007, 5), corporations were represented both individually and through their respective business associations.

The transnational consequences of economic actors, such as the externalisation of costs (Wallerstein 2004, 47-48; 81), tax evasion (Burbach et al. 1996, 60; Sassen 1996, 8; Scholte 2005, 138), and evasion of responsibility by creating global "flexible accumulation" (Harvey 1989, 141-173), emphasise the need for a transnational public to emerge in response to economic actors. The reality, on the other hand, is that economic power provides resources which allow economic actors to be the most organised and "loudest" actors within existing global governance processes. The economic actors who have pushed for the economic globalisation that we know today are the same actors who push for representation as stakeholders in global governance.

3.5 States and their disempowerment

Global governance has contributed to two processes: depoliticisation and denationalisation. Denationalisation is the process of transferral of regulatory powers from the nation-state to political authorities that lie outside the arena of national legitimacy. Depoliticisation is the process of transferral of regulatory powers from the nation-state to economic or private actors that lie outside the arena of national legitimacy. Both processes have resulted in political powers, sovereignty, democracy and citizenship no longer being bound by a national territorial space. In this situation, the nation-state is forced to share power with different transnational, public and

private organisations within a global governance system (e.g., Rosenau, 1980, 2002; Held, 1995; Scholte, 2005; Habermas, 2003).

On the other hand, the discourse on the death of the nation-state in relation to the "victorious" march of global capital promotes a myth of inevitability produced by neoliberal ideology (e.g. Bourdieu 1998, 29-44, 93-105; Kantola 2001, 65-67; Gamble 2000/2006, 43-62). The end result of such a myth is voluntary disempowerment, which happens because policy-makers deny themselves political autonomy, either because they believe that there is no alternative or because they believe that private regulation is better (Hay 2007, 151).

Previously strong nation-states are not losing their powers in global governance. The neo-liberal ideology that argues for deliberate contrationc of the state has been part of global governance because it has been championed by strong nation states (e.g. Sassen 1996, 23; Scholte 2005, 186; Harvey 2006, 25-29). A key example of this process is cited by Sassen: institutions which "fulfil the rating and advisory functions that have become essential for the operation of the global economy" (Sassen 1996, 15) and can be seen "as both a function and a promoter of US financial orthodoxy" (Sassen 1996, 17).[14] Another instance, one that has been praised by Keohane and Nye (2000, 12) as an exemplary case of "public-private" partnerships in global governance, is ICANN. The International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is the best-known private internet regulator (e.g. Kleinwächter 2004; McLaughlin and Pickard 2005). Established in 1998, it identifies itself as a "not-for-profit public-benefit corporation with participants from all over the world dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable".[15] It is responsible for managing the assignment of domain names and IP addresses. It was established by the American government – not as a public organisation but

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14   The "effectiveness" of these rating agencies can be seen in the current global financial crisis (e.g. Naudé 2009, 3)

15   http://www.icann.org/en/about/ , accessed 15. 10. 2010

as a private NGO. Keohane and Nye (2000, 12) argue that the American government "turned to the NGO form because it feared that a formal international governmental organisation would be too slow and cumbersome in dealing with rapidly developing issues related to Internet domain names" (Keohane and Nye 2000, 24). The American government, thus, took the liberty of assigning decision-making on issues that concern the world's internet users to a private organisation, and therefore effectively assisted in the depoliticisation of a specifically global affair. The process of global depoliticisation – making decisions about public regulation outside the sphere of formal politics – is thus to a large extent the result of the increasing power of private actors in global governance, not against but with the support of strong nation-states.

Finally, global neoliberalism, Hutchings (2007, 60) points out, is simply the latest in a long succession of systems where the terms of the debate about justice and democracy are set in the First World. The case of trade liberalisation shows that there is a long history of hypocrisy and inequity when developed countries call for global free markets: Western states have pushed for trade liberalisation for products that they have exported but at the same time continue to protect those sectors in which competition from developing countries might threaten their economies (e.g. Stiglitz 2002, 60; Wallerstein 2004, 54).

3.6 Effectiveness and legitimacy

Global governance "multisectoral networks" have developed, Benner et al. (2004, 192) argue, "in response to the failure of traditional governance mechanisms, and offered new and alternative ways of getting things done". The notion of global governance is implicitly interconnected with the idea that the effectiveness of regulation, not democratic inclusion, is the most important value of transnational organisation. Backstränd (2006, 473) identifies two types of legitimacy: "input" and "output" legitimacy. The first refers to inclusion in decision-making processes:it is "the participatory

quality of the decision-making process and asks whether the process conforms to procedural demands, such as representation of relevant stakeholders, transparency and accountability" (Backstränd 2006, 473). The second refers to the effectiveness of the problem-solving capacity of the governance system (Backstränd 2006, 473).

Backstränd (2006, 473) proposes that "high output legitimacy in terms of effective collective problem solving can, on some accounts, compensate for low input legitimacy", or, in other words, she claims that the effectiveness of problem-solving can compensate for inclusiveness. Such negation of legitimacy in terms of democratic inclusion is very much in line with the overall neo-liberal approach to global governance, what Higgot and Erman (2008, 5) term the "economic theory of global governance". This approach promotes "output legitimacy" by means of "public-private partnerships" beyond public oversight, such as the examples of credit rating agencies and ICANN.

Effectiveness, however, can never compensate for legitimacy. Criteria of what is effective need to be set by the "input legitimacy" of all those potentially affected – those who are potentially affected by the issue at hand know their problems best (Dewey 1927/1954) and can be therefore be the final judge on whether a specific problem has been solved effectively. However, the actors who constitute the broad arena of global governance are not democratically selected, nor are their operations transparent. Furthermore, they are not held accountable by the people whose lives they affect (e.g. Benner et al.2004; Scholte 2004; Bexell et al. 2006; Gupta 2008).

Splichal (2010) argues that global governance is characterised by a global democratic deficit, because new forms of governance often escape traditional mechanisms of accountability, while the new accountability mechanisms lack efficiency. In a democratic nation-state, civil society and the economy are regarded as spheres outside the political system, having the

potential to influence the state, but not to be involved in governance. The notion of governance, however, blurs this differentiation between the state, economy and civil society (Splichal 2007, n.p.) and thus also the notion of accountability and legitimacy of representation. It results in a situation in which it is "extremely difficult if not impossible to know who decides what, and how it is decided" (Splichal 2009, 396).

Consider, for example, the European Union. Starting out as an organisation for economic regulation, it has become an important regional actor entrusted with powers to deliver political regulation of much more than just economic transactions. EU nation-states have transferred their regulatory powers and re-delegated their sovereignty to the political bodies of the EU in the process of denationalisation. The EU is criticised on account of its democratic deficit, most commonly for a lack of democratic mechanisms within the EU (Rumford 2003, 34) and thus a shortage of opportunities for its citizens to influence its decisions. As long as decisions within the EU are reached by experts who are not accountable to elected representatives, and the decision-making process has little transparency (e.g. Krašovec 2006), denationalisation within the EU will equate to depoliticisation (Hay 2007). In the face of such criticism, the EU has responded with highly public attempts to construct a European public sphere as a top-down process (e.g. Brüggemann 2005; Baisnée 2007). In 2001, the Commission of the European Communities issued a White Paper on European Governance, in which it argued for greater involvement and more openness with regional and local governments and civil society. Yet, as Höreth concludes in his analysis of the White Paper, this is not a means to reduce the EU democratic deficit, since the White Paper represents the expert-driven approach, where "participation and consultation can only be initiated and controlled by the institutions, should lead to enhanced governance capability, are limited to consultation and mainly directed to sectoral functional actors" (Höreth 2000, 13).

3.7 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to analyse the literature on global governance in relation to the transnational public. I have reflected on five statements that have been provided in order to equate global governance to an ideal process of democratic organisation of transnational publics:

(a) in global governance, decision-making processes follow rational deliberative practices;

(b) global governance represents the transnational public sphere, since it involves inclusive deliberative consultations;

(c) global governance includes stakeholders – a concept which invokes Dewey's (1927/1954) ideal of inclusion of the public as all those affected;

(d) global governance means disempowering the nation-state;

(e) global governance is the process whereby transnational public issues are regulated and the effectiveness of this regulation provides it with legitimacy.

In responding to these five statements, I have drawn upon the classic ideal of the transnational public as democratically inclusive and autonomous from political and economic power (Bentham 1791/1943; Dewey 1927/1954; Mills 1956). The critique of global governance in relation to the transnational public can be summed up here as follows:

(a) even if the decision-making seen in global governance were to follow the ideal of rational deliberation, this would not make it equal to the transnational public sphere, since the deliberations of transnational "strong publics" are exclusive in nature;

(b) deliberative public consultations are a further step towards the democratisation of global governance, but more thoughtshould be given to preventing co-opting and and the exclusive nature of these models;

(c) the concept of stakeholders is not a proper substitute for the concept of the public; while the ideal of the public derives from inherently democratic theory, the notion of stakeholders derives from management theory that does not call for democracy and allows for economically powerful voices to intervene in public decision-making processes;

(d) previously strong nation-states are not losing their powers as part of global governance; rather, the process of global governance has been created in a way that endorses private regulation, with support from strong nation-states;

(e) the effectiveness of collective problem-solving can confer legitimacy on global governance, but cannot compensate for its lack of inclusiveness.

The main conclusion of this chapter is that, until a vibrant and inclusive transnational public exists outside the formal global governance processes, it is not possible to term these processes democratic. In the remainder of this dissertation, I turn to the question of the relationship between the transnational public and three interconnected spheres that exist outside the formal global governance processes: transnational social movements, and user-generated content by means of new media.

4 Transnational social movements

4.1 Introduction

The second half of the 20th century witnessed a steady and long-term decline in traditional political participation, such as voting and membership of political parties. Protest activism and participation in social movements, on the other hand, are generally said to be on the increase (e.g. Norris 2002; Dalton 2006; Hay 2007). Meanwhile, social movements are becoming increasingly transnational in nature (e.g. Waterman 1998/2001; Keck and Sikink 1998; Tarrow 2006). I argued in Chapter 2 that, for the transnational public to be truly autonomous, it should form itself outside of global governance processes. If the transnational public is to emerge, it would be through networks of transnational civil society actors that, as proposed by Castells (2007, 250), escape their "confinement in the fragmented space of places" and form online networks by seizing "the global space of flow" (Castells 2007, 250). From the protests on the Multilateral Investment Agreement (e.g. Deibert 2000; Smith and Smythe 2000), to the alternative globalisation (Bennett 2003b; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004) and anti-corporate movement (Rosenkrands 2004; Juris 2005), the environmental movement (e.g. Castells 1997, 110-133; Van de Donk et al. 2004), Zapatista's uprising (Langman 2005), the peace movement (Nah et al. 2006) and human rights networks (Brophy and Halpin 1999), new media have been proposed as a prominent factor in transnational communication and networking amongst members of these movements.

The model of transnational social movements as transnational publics proposes that transnational social movements and transnational publics have a number of characteristics in common:
(a) they are composed of voluntary associations distinct from states and markets (Amoore and Langely 2004, 30);
(b) they are communicative networks (e.g. Dryzek 2000; Guidry et al. 2000; Cochran 2002; Olesen 2005, 425);
(c) they are engaged with issues that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state (Cammaerts and van Audenhove 2005, 179);

(d) they function on the basis of transnational debate, discursive scrutiny and non-instrumental communication (Dryzek 2000, 135; Kaldor 2003, 8; Cammaerts and van Audenhove 2005, 179);

(e) the process of their creation is bottom-up (Cochran 2002, 523);

(f) they question the democratic legitimacy of other transnational actors such as international governmental organisations or the corporate sector (Cammaerts and van Audenhove 2005, 179);

(g) they aspire to regulate transnational public issues and are seeking access to decision-making (Cochran 2002, 532);

(h) they are created in response to exclusion within the dominant discourse, seek to counter these discourses and aim to transform the exclusionary social orders (Olesen 2005, 242; Fraser 2005b, 84; Thörn 2007, 900).

The particular focus of this chapter will be the last of the above points, since this is the central element in discussion about surrounding the deliberative democracy theory of the public sphere and the antagonistic theory. Deliberative democracy theories would, as Schudson (1997, 308) and Young (2001, 670) point out, be critical towards social movements which, per definition (e.g. Tarrow 1994, 3; Melucci 1996, 28), entail conflict and forms of contentious collective action such as public protests, demonstrations and civil disobedience – on the grounds that members of social movements confront rather than engage in deliberation with those with opposing opinions. The constructionist[16] or antagonistic[17] theory of the public sphere (e.g. Mansbridge 1990; Fraser 1992; Benhabib 1992; 1996a; Young 1996; 1999; 2001; Mouffe 1996; 2005) has developed in response to Habermas's early work (1962/1989), and even more so his late work (Habermas 1981/1984; 1996), and has been a direct critique of the deliberative democracy models of the public sphere[18] and the most

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16 Term borrowed from Marx Ferree et al. (2000).

17 Term borrowed from Pinter (2005).

18 See more on deliberative democracy theories of the public sphere and its transnational equivalents in Chapter 3.

important theoretical foundation for analysing transnational social movements as potential transnational publics.

In this chapter I analyse the main arguments the antagonistic public sphere theory offers regarding social movements as existing embodiments of transnational publics. In the following sections I focus upon the five main points around which the debate between the antagonistic and deliberative theories of the (transnational) public sphere revolves: counter publics, rationality, effectiveness and consensus.

4.2 Counter publics

The constructionist or antagonistic theory of the public sphere focuses above all on democratic inclusion. Young (1999, 154-156), for example, argues that inclusion should be recognised as a special principle of democracy, one according to which the current political regimes, even democratic ones, do very badly. She stresses that it is not enough to forbid active and explicit exclusion - most democracies must take positive action to promote the inclusion of people and perspectives when some segments of the polity might profit from excluding or marginalizing them. While the primary focus of the antagonistic theory is thus on democratic inclusion, this theory, seemingly paradoxically, argues that sometimes inclusion needs to be reduced in order to promote greater inclusion in the future. This argument is represented within the concept coined by Fraser (1992): counter publics.

A common criterion to distinguish between singular and multiple publics is the extent of inclusion, or the difference between normative ideal and empirical approximations. Within the normative position of maximum inclusion, there would be only one public – including all those who are potentially affected by the issue at hand. There would, furthermore, be only one public sphere, a social space which would provide the opportunity for all views to be presented to all others – providing for communication across

different groups with different views. The idea of one public sphere defends the normative position, in which there should be various channels for different groups to participate in common discussion, yet at the same time these channels should interconnect and transcend the separation into different enclaves.

The lack of distinction between the normative and empirical positions has been the main problem with Habermas's (1962/1989) early writing on the public sphere. Although he normatively argues for a singular public and a singular public sphere, he empirically describes the late 18th and early 19th century communicative domain as a "bourgeois public sphere". He narrows the public to the bourgeoisie, whose interests he perceived as coinciding with the universal interest and whose public deliberations were held in public spaces (at least in principle), which was approximate enough for Habermas to argue that such a "bourgeois public" is a good enough approximation to the singular public. Such a picture of the "bourgeois public sphere" has prompted a number of authors to accuse Habermas's work of idealising historical development and neglecting the extent of exclusion among certain social groups, most prominently the proletariat (Negt and Kluge 1972/1989) and women (Fraser 1992).

Fraser (1992) argues that Habermas's (1962/1989) description of the bourgeois public was too idealistic, since Habermas did not account for the fact that the bourgeois public had been exclusive. Specifically, she describes how women at the time of the bourgeois public sphere were excluded from this public life and how they reacted to this by building alternative, women-only associations or, among economically less privileged women, by supporting working-class protest activities (Fraser 1992, 114-116). This critique led Fraser (1992, 121-128) to call for a rethink of the public, in terms of acknowledging not *the* public, but various "subaltern counter publics" which emerge in response to exclusion within the dominant public discourse (Fraser 1992, 124). Although she simultaneously and inconsistently employs the terms the public sphere and the public, which

seemingly suggests that she is writing only about the plurality of publics as opposing social groups, she also specifically stresses the plurality of public spheres. In empirical situations in which equality and inclusiveness do not meet the required standards, she stresses, marginal groups should have the possibility to first discuss matters among themselves, without the "supervision of dominant groups" (Fraser 1992, 123). This would allow them to deliberate about their needs, objectives and strategies among themselves. Within these counter public spheres, they would not be burdened by the need to find the right ways to stress their opposition to the dominant group and could identify their own interests. This would render them more able to articulate and defend their interests in the overall, comprehensive public sphere (Fraser 1992, 123). Thus, normatively, Fraser discusses one overarching public sphere, but she stresses that *in conditions of social inequality* it is better to perceive plural publics and public spheres as legitimate, rather than to conclude that the existence of such spheres is in itself a negative development for democracy. The concept of counter publics thus means lesser extent of inclusion than the normative ideal of the public (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: The public as a normative ideal versus counter publics and dominant groups that present themselves as *the* public

The main difference between the concept of the counter public and the classical understanding of the public is, as Pinter (2005, 124) points out, that members of counter publics specifically reflect upon their marginalised position in relation to the dominant, majority representation of the public sphere. Transnationally, Fraser (2005a) proposes that the World Social Forum is an example of a transnational public sphere where its members are "prefiguring the possibility of new institutions of post-Westphalian democratic justice" (Fraser 2005a, 84). The World Social Forum emerged as

a "parallel summit" in response to exclusion within the dominant World Economic Forum (e.g. Teivainen 2002; Berger 2006, 57-59). It was constructed as an opposing voice to the World Economic Forum and as another set of perspectives on global problems which necessarily deserve to be presented within transnational communication and international and national mass media.

Fraser's term, counter publics, and counter public spheres, resonated powerfully with those who call for a multitude of transnational publics and/or transnational public spheres. Fenton and Downey (2003, 10) argue that counter public spheres are increasingly relevant due to the intensification of globalisation, the rise of neoliberalism and the decline in trust and social democracy, resulting in instability in the dominant communicative domain. The potential of counter-public activities is, according to Wimmer (2005), the revival of the existing communicative domain, particularly in the framework of the European Union. He presents two case studies of European-wide counter publics: the Luther Blissett collective and the Attac network, whose structural characteristics, in keeping with the ideal of the public, are transnationality, network structure and opposition to copyright.

In respect of transnational counter public spheres, the focus has been on the differentiation between the alternative and mainstream media. Ndlela (2007, 328), for example, conceptualises the global public spheres as a manifold of public spheres served by the mainstream and the alternative media. Similarly, Couldry and Dreher (2007) equate counter public spheres to alternative media channels, within which otherwise excluded minorities, such as indigenous people and diasporas, claim their public voice. They conclude, however, by returning to the normative ideal of the singularity of the public sphere, when they argue that these channels should not be understood simply as "counter-public spheres operating in parallel to a unitary mainstream public sphere, nor as local public "sphericules" floating unattached to any shared space of dialogue" (Couldry and Dreher 2007, 96),

but as differentiated from the mainstream communicative domain, yet at the same time seeking to contribute to a dialogue with this domain. Finally, Thörn (2007) perceives the distinction between singular and multiple public spheres in terms of the conflictual nature of relations between social groups and their discourses, and argues that the empirically existing dominant "public sphere" should be challenged by counter-public spheres, either nationally or internationally. At the same time, he follows the normative argument of a singular public sphere: "In order to keep democratization processes in a society alive, there must be a space for a public discussion accessible to all who are affected by political decisions" (Thörn 2007, 899).

The main strength of theoretical thought on counter publics is their critical opposition towards existing world economic, political and communicative orders that are exclusionary, and thus this body of thought calls for counter publics to emerge in order to confront such exclusions. However, there is a question that the theory of counter publics fails to answer adequately: when does fragmentation into multiple publics become a negative and not a positive development?

The vast increase in the number of international non-governmental organisations (see Figure 4.2) is, according to Fenton and Downey (2003, 22), one of the most important indicators of the particular significance of counter-public spheres in the current conditions of globalisation.

Figure 4.2: Membership growth in international NGOs

140,000

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0

1990 ☐ 2000 ■

High Income | Middle Income | Low Income | Western Europe | North America | Oceania | Japan | East Asia and Pacific | Europe and Central Asia | Latin America and Caribbean | North Africa and Middle East | South Asia | Sub-Saharan Africa

*International non-governmental organisations.

Source: ©Union of International Associations (1990; 2000), presenting data collected in 1989 and 1999 respectively. See table R20 for fuller information. Data have been restructured from more comprehensive country and organisation coverage in the Union of International Associations' *Yearbook of International Organizations*.

Anheier et al. (2001, 5)

Tkalac and Pavicic (2003, 490) argue that international non-governmental organisations are the only "Robin Hoods" left to help in situations where governments and governmental institutions are either not able or willing to be involved in the resolution of transnational social problems. They dismiss other, not so "Robin Hoodean", NGOs as mere "rotten apples in the barrel" (Tkalac and Pavicic 2003, 494). Scholte's (2002, 293-298) position is, however, more critical: he stresses that, within empirical reality, civic organisations can under-perform substantially with regard to normative ideals, which means that civic associations (at national or transnational level) are not *inherently* a force for democracy. Such organisations are often said to be run by "advocates and managers without members" (Skocpol 1999) and are often centralised organisations who do not perform internal democratic communication and employ the internet only in one-way mode (e.g. van de Donk et al. 2004).

Social movements are formed, just as the public, around a specific issue. An important difference with the public is that the public is by definition a

totality of different perspectives, while a civic association usually argues for one or the other perspective. The danger here is that associations address only the like-minded and form enclaves within which the counter-arguments are not aired and responded to but are deliberately excluded. The public is supposed to be characterised by the "public use of reason" because it is formed by people with different, even opposing, opinions. The defining characteristic of the public, Park (1972/1995) argued, is the division of opinion which leads to expression of criticism. This, due to the pressing need to reach an agreement among members of the public with different views, means that the public is guided by rational reflection (Park 1972/1995, 21).

This brings us to the relationship between new media and transnational social movements. Some fear that the "online public sphere" risks generating a very fragmented public communicative domain, since new media bring about channel multiplication and consequently fragmentation (e.g. Norris 2001, Splichal 2006, 73; Gurevitch et al. 2009). Norris (2001, 230-231) stresses that the internet is the medium of choice, where the individual can freely choose information according to her/his own interests. This makes it even easier for people to tune out of public life. She asserts that it is highly unlikely that the internet reaches the non-interested and non-engaged, and that it actually widens the democratic divide by increasing the distinctions between the activists and the apathetic within societies. The multiplication of communication channels and intensified competition mean that the sort of political news and analysis, which, in the past, reached most people, can easily be missed (Gurevitch et al. 2008, 169). The result of such fragmentation is, according to Splichal (2006, 73), the diminished power of public communication.

Splichal (2009, 393) argues that it is questionable whether web communities significantly enhance democracy, because "similarly to traditional public fractions, they hardly transcend group particularisms based on racial, gender, age, or ideological, religious, professional, and other identities and

interests". As Dahlgren (2001) notes, many online users simply seek out groups of like-minded others, where a member's interests, values and prejudices are reinforced rather than challenged. Gurak (1999) terms this a shared ethos of online activists, which, together with lowered costs, enables online protests to spread with extreme speed, but this also means that speed may supersede accuracy and take priority over the responsibility of citizens to make informed decisions. Since people are said to search for information on the internet more than they do using traditional mass media (e.g. Shah et al. 2001), they are expected to do so in a way that is in tune with what they already believe. Confirming one's judgements is effectively a way of avoiding "cognitive dissonance" – an unpleasant state when one's opinions are not congruent with each other (Festinger 1956/1999). The result is, Sunstein (2001) argues, exclusion of dissent, group polarisation towards extreme opinions and fragmentation into like-minded groups. This phenomenon hinders the very elementary defining characteristic of the public: diversity of views.

While internet users argue that they "appreciate the diversity of persons and viewpoints they encounter in their chosen discussion spaces" (Stromer Galley 2003, n.p.), research into online discussions usually shows a different picture (e.g. Wilhelm 1999; Tsaliki 2002; Koop and Jansen 2009). To provide specific examples from authors who set out to search for transnational publics in the online arena: Cammaerts and Van Audenhove (2003; 2005) analyse whether the online activities of transnational activists' networks (Indymedia, Attack and LabourStart.com) contribute to a strengthening of the transnational public sphere. From their empirical research they conclude that a thesis on "an emerging transnational public sphere is highly problematic", since participants are often located in the western hemisphere and discussion often happens between activists who think the same and speak the same language   (Cammaerts and Van Audenhove 2005, 196).   Similar conclusions were reached by Curran's (2003, 238) analysis of an online alternative journal – while the discussions seemed at first to take the form of a dispute between the U.S. and the rest of

the world, the forum, Curran concludes, entails "not one part of the globe talking to another, but, rather, like-minded groups – such as liberals in the United States and Europe – addressing each other" (Curran 2003, 238).

4.3 Rationality

The ideal of the public derives from the European Enlightenment's faith in human reason and its struggle for freedom of thought and expression (e.g. Kant 1784/2009; Bentham 1791/1894; Mill 1832/1977). Kant (1784/2009, n.p.) described the Enlightenment as "man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another." "Nothing is required for this enlightenment," he continues, "except freedom to use reason publicly in all matters." Mill (1832/1977, 242-243) argued that it is not so much through experience as through discussion that one reaches for the truth: "Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning." (Mill 1832/1977, 242). How can one think of her/his interpretation as being reliable? Mill (1832/1977) answers that only when the person who holds the opinion has kept her/his mind open to criticism and learns how to profit of criticism in terms of gaining deeper understanding.

Rationality has been held up as the main differentiation between the public and the crowd (Blumer 1946/1953; Mills 1956; Park 2972). At the end of the 19th century, the writer Le Bon (1896/2001) summed up all the prejudices and negative perceptions of "the crowd" which today still haunt those who are wary of the "common people" and who propose forms of elitist expert-driven world-orders. By forming a crowd, Le Bon argues, an individual loses his own intelligence, his own "cultivation" and, guided by instinct, becomes guided by a collective mind which makes him think and behave differently from how he would were he isolated (Le Bon 1896/2001, 15). Le Bon's work includes racist and chauvinist discourse, equating the crowd to the "inferior forms of evolution—women, savages and children"

for whom "impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgement and of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of the sentiments" were supposed to be the prime characteristics (Le Bon 1896/2001, 20). Due to our inherent instincts, Le Bon continues, human beings are incapable of being rational when forming a crowd. Those who want to persuade members of a crowd should not use reasoning, Le Bon continues, but should engage in the repetition of affirmative claims, "pure and simple, kept free of all reasoning and all proof", and their claims will be spread by contamination from one member to another, similar to the way germs contaminate an organism, since "man, like animals, has a natural tendency to imitation" (Le Bon 1896/2001, 72–74). Furthermore, due to its exaggeration in its feelings, "a crowd is only impressed by excessive sentiments" of those who want to persuade it. (Le Bon 1896/2001, 30). Finally, the crowd, according to Le Bon, thinks in images, and these images for its members "are almost as lifelike as the reality", and images "always have an enormous influence on crowds" (Le Bon 1896/2001, 40).

It is such elitist depictions of contentious collective movements as represented by Le Bon's (1896/2001) writing that have been the focus of three antagonistic critiques of rationality. First, activists, Young (2001, 676) argues, are not irrational extremists who act on the basis of impulses and without thought – they are reasonable in the sense that they have thought about various alternatives and are able and willing to justify their aims and actions to others. As Melucci (1996, 17) points out, collective action is not an expression of irrationality but meaningful behaviour which entails certain relational structures, the presence of decision-making mechanisms, the setting of goals, the circulation of information, the calculation of outcomes and the process of learning from the past. Collective action, Melucci continues:

> is not unstructured behaviour in the sense that it would not obey
> any logic of rationality […]. It only appears unstructured when
> set against the dominant norms of social order, and against the

interests which that order wishes to maintain as in the discourse that labels collective action as marginal, deviant, rootless, irrational. (Melucci 1996, 18)

Second, Young (1996, 124) criticises the norm of rationality of public deliberation which privileges speech that is dispassionate and disembodied, and tends to presuppose an opposition between mind and body, reason and emotion. Park (1924/2007, 106), for example, similarly to Le Bon's writing on crowds, wrote of the crowd as being characterised by direct and spontaneous emotions and impulses similar to those found among herds of animals. The public, according to Park, does not display such spontaneous emotions, but is characterised by rational discussion among those in conflict, where participants are able to judge various aspects of the issue at hand and do not get "carried away" by their own emotions. Such understanding or rationality, according to Young, tends "falsely to identify objectivity with calm and absence of emotional expression. Thus expressions of anger, hurt, and passionate concern discount the claims and reasons they accompany." (Young, 1996, 124). Young (1996, 130) claims that the perception of deliberation should include rhetoric, which she identifies with emotional appeals and figurative language. She criticises Western perceptions of rational argumentation, which has been an important Eurocentric element of classical writings both on the public and on Habermas's public sphere. The separation between the mind and the body, of reason from living experience and of rationality from reasonable and emotive elements has been identified by Guanaratne (2006, 123) as one of the most Eurocentric elements of Habermas's (1962/1989; 1982/1984) work on the public sphere. Guanaratne (2006, 124) tries to "provincialise" Habermas's theory of communicative action by analysing it from the perspectives of Chinese and Indian philosophies. He cites Shalin (1992 in Guanaratne 2006, 124) as implicitly expressing Chinese philosophy by stating that "knowledge uninformed by feelings and stripped of emotive elements can be rational without being reasonable".

Third, Guanaratne (2006, 16) points to another critique of the Western ideal of rationality: its limitation to formal pragmatics expressed with language. Antagonistic theory claims that the Habermasian vision of ideal speech situation and theories of consensus-building through deliberation neglect the differences within the power relations in society's deliberative settings. Specifically, Young (1996) rejects too narrow an ideal of rational discussion, since she fears that this norm could be exploited for the further exclusion of already marginalised groups who do not share the Western norm of rational discussion in the form of argument and counter-argument, but express themselves in different forms such as rhetoric, testimony and storytelling. The main problem that Young exposes is the ambiguity of rational argumentation and how one understanding of what is rational can exclude other understandings. As Mansbridge explains: "When deliberation turns into a demonstration of logic, it leaves out many who cannot work their emotionally felt needs into a neat equation" (Mansbridge 1990, n.p.). Examples of expression that are not easily identified with the formal Western ideal of logical argumentation but are nevertheless an important part of public deliberation are pictures, song, poetic imagery and the expression of mockery (Young 2000). A more specific example is provided by Jenkins (2010, n.p.) when he refers to "Avatar activism."[19] Elements of popular culture, such as the "blockbuster" movie *Avatar*, can be used as metaphors, "standing in for something bigger than they can fully express" (Jenkins 2010, n.p.). Thus, images are not, as Le Bon (1896/2001, 40) would have us believe, forms of expression that are inferior to the language and logic of formal pragmatics and are especially suited to "the crowd" but not the public. The quality of the expression should be judged not in terms

19 "Five Palestinian, Israeli and international activists painted themselves blue to resemble the Na'vi from James Cameron's blockbuster *Avatar* in February, and marched through the occupied village of Bil'in. The Israeli military used tear gas and sound bombs on the azure-skinned protestors, who wore traditional keffiyahs with their Na'vi tails and pointy ears. The camcorder footage of the incident was juxtaposed with borrowed shots from the film and circulated on YouTube. We hear the movie characters proclaim: "We will show the Sky People that they cannot take whatever they want! This, this is our land!" (Jenkins 2010, n.p.)

of its mode but in terms of whether it serves the primary function of allowing people to deliberate and secure greater empathic understanding from their partners in communication. To claim that one form of expression is superior to another is to position one-self outside of the communicative situation independently of communicative actors.

These three points in the critique of rationality are extremely important in relation to the transnational public – they remind us that there are no objective criteria of what the public use of reason is and that no specific group or culture could monopolise it – it can only be a result of a communications process where all parties participate as equals. In this light, the antagonistic theory is right to point to the elitist, Western-centric nature of critiques that have been used to delineate between social movements and the public. At the same time, these three points of critique lead to an important conclusion regarding transnational public communication: the ideal of the public use of reason should not be based on pre-defined positions about what is a proper rational argument. Rather, it should be a result of the communication process itself.

Another problem with rational deliberation, Young (2001, 685-688) argues, is that even when power relations are recognised as balanced and the deliberative setting is inclusive, the majority of participants in a deliberative setting will be influenced by a common discourse that is itself a complex product of structural inequality. People will be influenced by a hegemonic discourse, which means that although people agree on some matters, their consent is at least partly conditioned by unjust power relations, and, for that reason, their agreement should not be considered to amount to genuinely free consent. Activist, Young (2001, 687) proposes, claims to identify such hegemonic discourses and her/his response is to:

> […] continually challenge these discourses and the deliberative processes that rely on them, and often he must do so by non-discursive means: pictures, song, poetic

imagery, and expressions of mockery and longing performed in rowdy and even playful ways *aimed not at commanding assent but disturbing complacency.* One of the activist's goal is to make us wonder about what we are doing, *to rupture a stream of thought, rather than to weave an argument.* (Young 2001, 687)

Young is right to point out the problem with hegemony, which is of prime importance in relation to the transnational public, yet the solution in terms of activism as "rupturing a stream of thought, rather than to weave an argument" (Young 2001, 687) reveals four problematic assumptions in respect of the imagined activist. First, "rupturing a stream of thought without weaving an argument" assumes that the arguments for one's claims are so obvious that, once people start thinking about the problem, they will automatically come to the same conclusion. In this light, the position of the activist as presented by Young (2001) is naïve – she/he assumes that the reality will be interpreted by all observers alike and that hegemony is easily overcome by simply "disturbing complacency".

Second, by "rupturing a stream of thought" the stance of the activist may be only to point to a specific social problem and then call on people to participate in order to deliberate collectively over the problem, its causes, potential consequences and solutions. Yet this stance also needs to be accompanied by arguments – reasons why the social problem would be *social* and thus worthy of attention in the first place. The ideal of public communication does not mean excluding the pursuit of persuasion – taking an active role in public participation means both listening and providing reasons for one's opinion. Finding creative ways to highlight a problem is the first step, which must be followed by the supply of reasons for our own statements. If we do not provide reasons for our critique of hegemonic discourse, it is much more likely that this same hegemonic discourse will be used against our own critique, since it does not have to confront a thorough explanation but merely short "soundbites".

A third problem was identified by Talisse (2005), who asserts that "reasonableness" entails an acknowledgement on the part of the activist that her/his current views are possibly mistaken, incomplete and in need of revision. "Reasonableness is hence a two-way street: the reasonable citizen is able and willing to offer justifications for her views and actions, but is also prepared to consider alternate views, respond to criticism, answer objections, and, if necessary, revise or abandon her views". The character of the activist as proposed by Young (2001), believes that she/he knows that those who oppose her/his opinions are "either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not "think seriously" about the injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them" (Talisse 2005, 428). Action, in this sense, is understood only as "enlisting other citizens in support of the cause" (Talisse 2005, 428) – it does not mean listening to them. In this sense, activism comes close to idealising collective action which is understood only in terms of persuasion. For example, Brunsting and Postmes (2002, 527–528) define collective action "as actions undertaken by individuals or groups for a collective purpose, such as the advancement of a particular ideology or idea or the political struggle with another group". They identify "soft" and "hard" actions and their online and offline equivalents. Soft actions refer to letter-writing, lobbying and petitioning, "the primary purpose of which is to persuade others of certain viewpoints". Hard actions "engage and confront other parties more directly, as in demonstration, blockade, (cyber)sabotage". What is completely missing from such definitions of (online) activism is the element of collective action in conditions of inequality, and listening to those who are *not* beneficiaries of the existing power structures.

Finally, "non-discursive means: pictures, song, poetic imagery, and expressions of mockery and longing" (Yung 2001, 687) are not inherently devoid of hegemony. The main problem with hegemony in relation to public deliberation is that its functioning is inherent in any form of communication

that has become to be recognised as dominant. Dryzek (2000, 70) stresses that argument is only force-less if all involved share an equal communicative competence – in practice those who are most powerful are usually those best able to articulate and defend their positions. Yet, at the same time the same means of expression, be it arguments or other forms of "non-discursive" expression, are also employed to expose the workings of hegemony. There is no other way of overcoming hegemony than *through deliberation*, where the most critical element is to find the balance between persuasion and listening. Sit-ins and demonstrations are not intended to persuade without arguments – their intention is to attract attention – to create the opportunity to present one's arguments, whereby arguments are not pre-defined in line with formal logic but are attempts to explain the reasons for our opinions, emotions and acts. The only way to escape the hegemonic stream of thought in deliberation is *by* deliberation. Deliberation, even after the majority has reached a consensus , always needs dissent, and this dissent needs to be accompanied by arguments. If those who dissent against the hegemonic discourse claim that they can identify such a discourse, they need to provide reasons as to why they think so. "Weaving an argument" *is* the most important task of dissenters in order for a hegemonic discourse to be broken. If I may borrow the words of Freire (1970/1996, 47), "to substitute monologue, slogans and communiques for dialogue is to attempt to liberate the oppressed with the instruments of domestication." If the protest remains only at the level of statement of opinions and/or desires, without additionally providing reasons, then the activists themselves are not really trying to liberate from hegemony those in whose name they are supposedly speaking. Many political and educational plans have failed, Freire stresses, "because their authors designed them according to their own personal views of reality, never once taking into account (except as mere objects of their actions) the people-in-a-situation to whom their program was ostensibly directed" (Freire, 1970/1996, 75).

4.4 Effectiveness

Dryzek (2000, 23) defines the public sphere as the politicised aspect of civil society: associations which are directed towards the state[20] but do not pursue any share of state power. Such a definition reflects a currently accepted definition of non-governmental organisations, which have nowadays become recognised as the main form of organisation of global civil society (e.g. Salamon and Sokolowski 2004; Bäckstrand 2006). The concept of the non-governmental organisation has been introduced into the international political realm, Willetts (2001, n.p.) argues, as an "uncontroversial catch-all term" which supplements other concepts that have gained specific negative connotations in various national contexts, such as interest group, pressure group, lobby, private voluntary organisation etc. Willetts ascribes four negative[21] criteria for the UN's definition of NGOs: (a) they are not under government control, (b) they are not political parties, (c) they do not make a profit, and (d) they are not violent. An NGO is thus defined as "an independent voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis, for some common purpose, other than achieving government office, making money or illegal activities" (Willetts 2001, n.p.) – this became a definition that was also accepted by others, such as the EU[22]. This official definition of non-governmental organisations is, however, stripped of the ideal of the effectiveness of the transnational public.

In order to legitimise the generally approved definition of NGOs as the main embodiments of civil society, Dryzek (2000) provides a definition of the (transnational) public sphere which does not serve analytical ends. What exactly is the relationship between being oriented towards the state and not

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20 The state, for Dryzek, is a set of individuals and organisations that are legally authorised to make binding decisions on behalf of a society (Dryzek 2000, 20).

21 By negative, I mean that he describes what NGOs are not.

22 The European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organisations (Council of Europe 1986)

pursuing the state's power? Typical examples, according to Dryzek (2000, 100), are social movements and civil society associations that "do not pursue power as interest groups or through electorally-oriented parties; yet they are of course concerned with public affairs" (Dryzek 2000, 100), a characteristic termed by Dryzek as "self-limitation". Dryzek elaborates more on this relationship by enumerating several ways in which power can be exercised by civil society: it can exercise communicative power: change political discourse and so affect the content of public policy; it can legitimise new ways of public action; it can constitute a deliberative forum within civil society which is policy-oriented; it can create fear of political instability and thus trigger a governmental response; it can employ "paragovernmental activity" – taking over the functions of the state; finally, it can bring about cultural change which, although it has no direct public policy effects, has a long-term influence on the political system (Dryzek 2000, 101-102). In all these examples, however, the aim is, either in the short or in the long term, to influence public policy – legally binding decisions on behalf of society – or, in other words, to gain effectiveness.

Public opinion is, according to Fraser (2007), considered effective "if it is mobilized as a political force to hold public power accountable, ensuring that the latter's exercise reflects the considered will of civil society" (Fraser 2007, 22). Efficacy, according to Fraser, includes translation of communicative power into binding laws and the capacity of public power to be able to implement decisions. Fraser's focus is a continuation of her critique of Habermas's proposals of what she understands as "weak publics", which do not participate in decision-making. Berger criticises the concept of public opinion as a concept which "upholds the divide between government and citizens in bourgeois republics: to accept the concept is to accept the chasm between the publics and the state" (Berger 2006, 46). Similarly, Kleinstüber (2001, 101-102) argues that Habermas's (1962/1989) conceptualisation of the public sphere is conservative, in the sense that it does not argue for a revolution in terms of people's participation in politics, but limits political demands only to the opening up of the political realm for

public debate, and permitting criticism of the authorities in public. Kleinstüber links this to the German tradition of "intellectual debate without political consequences" (Kleinstüber 2001, 102).

Young (2001) constructs the imagined characters of a deliberative democrat and an activist. While the deliberative democrat argues only about the normative, yet contrafactual ideal itself, the activist exposes the problems with the unequal distribution of power within society, where the powerless are only hindered by submitting to such an ideal, while the powerful exploit it in their own interests. While the first party assumes that those in power listen, the second party tries to find ways to make them listen. The deliberative democrat believes that, eventually, people, even public elites, since they are public officials, will be rational enough to recognise the value of public deliberation and argue for further attention to be paid to persuasion and argument. The activist perceives such a stance as naïve, since those in power are capable of listening to it, yet it is in their own interest not to listen, so they choose not to do so. And as long as they will not be forced to listen, nothing will change. The deliberative democrat thus claims that parties to political conflict ought to deliberate with one another, while the activist claims that those who care about promoting greater justice should engage primarily in critical oppositional activity, rather than attempt to come to agreement with those who support or benefit from existing power structures (Young 2001, 671). Young (2001) thus stresses that, in conditions of extreme structural inequality, contentious collective action is needed in order to come closer to the ideals of deliberative democracy. Social movements are created, Tarrow (1994, 1) argues, when political opportunities open up for social actors who usually lack them, and contentious collective action is the basis of social movements, he continues, because it is the main and often only recourse that people possess against better-equipped opponents.

On the other hand, Talisse (2005, 437) points to the fact that the arguments proposed by Young's (2001) imagined activist are "put in the service of a

wide range of policy objectives, each claiming to be just, liberatory, and properly inclusive." In light of this, there is a question the activist must confront: "how should he deal with those who share his views about the proper means for bringing about a more just society, but promote a set of ends that he opposes" (Talisse 2005, 437).

Fung (2005) tried to create a bridge between Young's (2001) and Talisse's (2005) arguments by proposing that the choice of non-deliberative means of "translation" from the public to political powers should be governed by four principles that generally apply to civil disobedience: (a) democracy should represent the primary ideal; (b) the political powers deserve treatment as if they are willing to engage in deliberation, until they prove otherwise; (c) non-deliberative political methods should be abandoned until reasonable efforts to persuade and to institute fair, open and inclusive deliberations fail; (d) the choice of means should be scaled according to the extent to which political adversaries reject the procedural norms of deliberation (Fung 2005, 402-403). The problem that Fung (2005) does not solve, however, is the question of the inclusiveness of the public, in terms of listening not to the political powers or those who benefit from the structural inequality, but to other members of the public that are also affected by the issue in question.

Engaging in direct, "short-cut" activities to influence the government(s) and/or global governance institutions is against the norm of public inclusion: this goes specifically for the lobbying activities of different NGOs and interest groups who self-righteously proclaim themselves as working in the public interest and do not communicate first in an open communicative arena, where others who may potentially be affected seriously and in the long term by the issue at hand (but are not those who gain from the existing power structures) have the possibility of counter-arguing and evaluating their proposals. Only through the public confrontation of diverse views can any final decision, in the form of public opinion or simply a deliberative disagreement, be said to be legitimate.

The ideal of the public negates "interest groups" as understood by Carey (1995), since the notion of interest groups proposes only effectiveness in terms of influencing the policy agenda, without inclusion.

> By definition interest groups operate in the private sector, behind the scenes, and their relation is essentially propagandistic and manipulative. When interest groups arrive upon the scene, the public ceases to have a real existence. (Carey 1995, 388)

While public protests are narrowly perceived merely as political activities which need to be resorted to by relatively powerless social groups (e.g. Lipsky 1968, 1144), *public* expression should not be regarded only as a political resource but first and foremost as a positive normative condition. Trying to reach the mass media agenda, for example, is sometimes perceived as merely a pesky problem which needs to be resolved in order to gain power (a problem which is easily overstepped by the powerful, who can influence this agenda on their own terms). Yet normatively it is not a means but necessarily an end in itself. What gives the public its legitimacy is, on the one hand, the seriousness and gravity of the potential consequences that will affect it unless it regulates the transactions in question, and, more importantly, the process of public deliberation, inclusive of all those who are potentially affected.

4.5 Consensus

As argued in Chapter 2, Rousseau (1762/1988) idealistically perceived the diversity of opinion as a negative sign of fractionalism, and that "only common sense is necessary to see the common good and thus reach a consensus" (Rousseau 1762/1988, 148). If the deliberation is too long, it is, according to Rousseau, not a sign of the difficulty of the problem itself, but a sign of "ascending private interests and a descending social bond" (Rousseau 1762/1988, 149). In such a state, "the fruits of deliberation are often lost through constantly deliberating" (Rousseau 1762/1988, 124). Later writing on the public did not assume such an easy process of perceiving the common good and reaching consensus, yet the consensus still remained the main ideal. Mills (1956), Blumer (1946/1953) and Park (1972/1995, 21) argued that diversity of opinion is a necessary condition which distinguishes the public from the mass, yet this diversity is eventually overcome with rational deliberation. The idea of rational public deliberation as the means of achieving consensus on public affairs has been reinvigorated by Habermas (1962/1998, 1981/1984, 1996) and especially the American tradition on deliberative democracy (e.g. Barber 1984, Fishkin 1991, Dryzek 2000).

The antagonistic theory of the public sphere is, however, characterised by what Marx Frerree et al. (2002b, 229) term "avoidance of premature closure." Benhabib (1992, 84) stresses that all struggles against oppression in the modern world begin by redefining what had previously been considered as a consensus on what is private, non-public and non-political. Sunstein (2003, 9) asserts that political thought has, by focusing on consensus, paid too little attention to the dangers of conformity and agreement. He thus reinvigorates the ideas of J.S. Mill (1832/1977, 240), who claimed that silencing dissent, either by censorship or conformity to the perceived consensus, is a public affair, since its silencing not only has consequences for the person holding the opinion, or her/his narrow social circle, but is robbing the whole of humanity, present and future generations.

If the silenced opinion is right, Mill (1832/1977, 240) argues, others are robbed of the possibility of knowing the truth. If the opinion is wrong, they lose the benefit of the better understanding that develops when faced with opposing views. As Ivie (2005, 279) states, "without dissent, there is no democratic polity of adversaries and thus no politics, only forced and unmitigated enmity that is the end of politics, per se."

In this light, the antagonistic theory is right to point to the need for ever-present dissent. On the other hand, Mouffe (2005) claims that not only consensus but any kind of agreement is impossible in the current pluralistic world. She argues that the political always entails the agonistic, due to the ever present "us" versus "them" dichotomy. By neglecting the nature of collective identities, she claims, these approaches are "unable to grasp the pluralistic nature of the social world, with the conflicts that pluralism entails: conflicts for which no rational solution could ever exist" (Mouffe 2005, 10). The public interest is always a matter of debate and a final agreement can never be reached, Mouffe argues, thus one should not hope for the elimination of disagreement but for its containment within forms that respect the existence of democratic institutions (Mouffe 1993, 50). The task of the political is, according to Mouffe, to transform the antagonistic into agonistic human relations in which conflicting parties recognise each other as adversaries and not enemies, which means that the opponent is recognised not as an enemy but as an adversary with a legitimately opposing opinion: "We will fight against his ideas but we will not question his right to defend them" (Mouffe 1993, 5).

Mouffe's argument poses a specific problem for the idea of the transnational public – namely, it implicitly assumes that, with the problems faced by the transnational public, no agreement can be reached amongst those who are extensively affected by the long-term and serious transnational indirect transactions inherent in processes of globalisation (see Chapter 2). It also assumes that on these problems the "fruits of deliberation would be lost to constant deliberating", to borrow the words of Rousseau (1762/1988, 148).

Yet, in Mouffe's own critique of what she terms the "substantive" perception of common interest, we can find her defending a common interest, which she does not debate, but takes for granted as the ideal of political life.

Mouffe's argument rests on one basic proposition: that society will always be distinguished by the "us" and "them" dichotomy, which is a necessary condition for building identity and a necessary condition for public engagement with politics. According to this perspective, the identity is built upon "the other" – "who I am is defined by who I am not". And the other can at any point in time be perceived as our enemy, and not just different, "as putting in question our very existence" (Mouffe 1993, 3). First, if I extend this understanding to the transnational public, then this would inevitably mean that global identity is not possible as long as there is no "other" on the global level. This, however, is a problematic assumption. It views identity as being created by a non-hierarchical grouping in which different identities are in opposition, instead of a hierarchical system (being a member of the globe as well as of the national group, for example). Furthermore, even if identities are different and there are "us" and "them" differences, this does not necessarily mean that the groups do not have some common interests or that they are not capable of discussion. Mouffe (2005, 20) herself sees the global interest in the fact that the groups need to recognise that they share "a common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place" and in the transformation of antagonistic relationships into agonistic relationships. Yet recognition of the legitimacy of other groups is exactly the recognition of a common interest in peaceful co-existence and the regulation (but not extinction) of conflicts. Mouffe therefore implicitly assumes that an agreement on a common interest *is* possible – albeit the most basic interest, that of peaceful co-existence.

4.6 Conclusion

I argued in Chapter 2 that globalisation entails structural inequalities which, paradoxically, prevent transnational publics from emerging and. at the same time, are the reason why transnational publics should emerge. Transnational social movements such as the alternative globalisation and environmental movement are the direct response to this problem. By building communicative networks outside the global governance processes, they are the most important existing approximation to the ideal of the transnational public. In this chapter I have, on the one hand, emphasised the five positive arguments regarding the transnational social movements as highlighted by the constructionist or antagonistic theory of the public sphere, and, on the other hand, the critical points of caution that encourage us to guard against premature optimism and the identification of transnational social movements in relation to the transnational public.

First, by terming transnational social movements as counter publics, the antagonistic theory points to the problem of exclusionary communicative domains that need to be confronted with the realisation of and communication about exclusion and marginalisation. Yet the problem with a multiplicity of counter publics is the danger of fragmentation into separate enclaves of communication. The idea of transnational counter publics thus serves as a reminder of exclusion and the power balances within empirically existing groups which term themselves as *the* public. The concept of counter publics, however, becomes problematic if it were to completely replace the concept of the (transnational) public, since it is the notion of the public and not of the counter public that calls for the maximum inclusion of all those affected.

Second, antagonistic thought on the public sphere claims that the Habermasian (1981/1984) vision of ideal speech neglects the differences within society, and that power relations enter the arena of public deliberation even though officially the differences in political and economic power seem

to be bracketed (Young 1996, 122). One of the most pertinent problems for the ideal of the emergence of a transnational public is the question of mode of communication, which, in classical literature, has been narrowed down to rational deliberation. In the transnational public, communication has to take place amongst members of extremely diverse cultures. In this context, any pre-defined, fixed idea of an "argument" is dangerous, since it takes a specific (usually Western) position and means of discussion as a universal ideal to which all other cultures should subscribe. On the other hand, there is no way of countering hegemony other than through deliberation, and "weaving an argument" in terms of providing reasons for one's assertions is the most important element of communication in transnational publics.

Third, the antagonistic theory highlights the problem of stripping the public of its effectiveness in terms of influencing the regulation of the transnational transactions in question. At the same time, effectiveness is necessarily a process that follows the process of inclusive public deliberation – if civic actors such as non-governmental organisations pursue direct activism without mediation of public communication, they merely become one of the interest groups lobbying public officials in private.

Finally, the antagonistic theory highlights the dangers of a final consensus and the need for constant dissent – even against decisions already made. At the same time, the transactions that have indirect, transnational, extensive and serious consequences for the transnational publics highlight the ever pressing need for the public to come to an agreement regarding their regulation.

5 Social media: The case of YouTube

5.1 Introduction

New media are said to extend transnationality due to the exposure of voices from all over the globe within the "deterritorialized cyberspace" (Fraser 2005b, n.p.), the inclusion in the global space of flows created by "mass self-communication" (Castells 2007; 2008), the circumvention of censorship imposed by authoritarian national regimes (Volkmer 2003; Splichal 2009a; 2009b), and the extension of "transnational porosity" – aiding in raising awareness of voices beyond national borders (Olesen 2007). The internet has been identified as carrying the most important potential for the transnational public sphere, since it operates on more inclusive principles than transnational mass media (e.g. Sparks 2001; Bohman 2004; Boyd-Barrett 2004; Calhoun 2004). Cochran (2002, 538) asserts that "a natural place to look for the transnational public sphere is in "new technologies of communication which are global in reach", since "through the internet, persons can communicate so as to learn of and inform themselves about indirect consequences which affect them, and if necessary organize publics, the members of which can all share in work coordinated on the internet to control those effects" (Cochran 2002, 539).

The focus in this chapter is upon the latest developments in new media technologies, popularly known as social media or Web 2.0, proposed by Castells (2008, 90) as *being* the global public sphere. Although there is no consensus on what exactly the term conveys[23], and where Web 1.0 ends and Web 2.0 begins, user-generated content seems to be one of the main characteristics of this allegedly new phase in new media. Personal sites, picture provision and videos could be published on the internet a long time ago; what is characteristic of Web 2.0, according to Hilbrich (2007, 2), is the fact that it simplifies the use of technology. As providing content does not require a deep understanding of the underlying technologies, the user base is growing rapidly (Hilbrich 2007, 2). Intermediaries or "platforms[24]"

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23 Depauw (2008), for example, identifies more than 25 definitions of the term.

24 For a critique of the use of the term "platform" for these Web 2.0 intermediaries, see

such as YouTube, Flickr, Facebook and different blogospheres are increasingly inviting large numbers of globally dispersed individuals to provide publicly accessible content.

In the introductory chapter I presented four dimensions of the public: structure, process, content and efficiency. New media such as YouTube are implicitly assumed to *be* the structure that allows the transnational public to emerge, due to its inclusive, transnational nature (e.g. Castells 2008, 90). Such claims are, however, accompanied only by anecdotal evidence and based on a single structural condition of the public – inclusiveness – which is assumed to be assured by extending possibilities to publish online through the means of social media. In this chapter I empirically analyse YouTube as an exemplary case study of the relationship between the transnational public and new media. YouTube was selected since it is the most salient example of Web 2.0 given in scholarly literature (e.g. Croteau 2006, 342; Castells 2008, 90; Jenkins and Deuze 2008, 5; Gurevitch et al. 2009, 168). Ubayasiri (2006) and Miliken et al. (2008, n.p.) claim that YouTube is similar to the public sphere because of its multiple sources of content, the opportunities for exchange between video-posters and viewers and the ability of members to upload content without paying or being paid. YouTube was, furthermore, selected as a case study since it is almost a global monopoly within online video-sharing (see Stalvik 2007 and Silva and Dix 2007 below). YouTube was also selected because of its official slogan "Broadcast Yourself!", whereby YouTube LLC[25] calls for communication that is similar to the broadcasting media in terms of open access for all audiences.[26] The aim of the present case study is to analyse YouTube in relation to four structural conditions of the transnational public

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Gillespie (2010).

25 I employ the term "YouTube LLC" to refer to the YouTube Limited Liability Company as a media company, and the term "YouTube" to refer to uses of the YouTube website.

26 Another example of social media that is equally or even more transnationally popular than YouTube is Facebook (see Alexa below). Facebook was not selected, however, since it does not primarily promote expression open to all but rather communication within one's delineated network of "friends".

in its ideal conceptualisation: YouTube as a sphere for political communication, its inclusiveness, transnationality and freedom from commercial constraints. Each of the following four sections concerns one of these four points and introduces the four research questions that have guided the empirical analysis.

5.2 Political communication

The first research question in this section is: what is the political nature of YouTube in terms of its uses and in terms of how YouTube LLC constructs itself as a medium for political communication? YouTube is criticised by Hess (2009) as a sphere for conversation on private matters such as entertainment, sports and individual interests. In contrast to the traditional news media, the political nature of communication by means of new media such as YouTube is, just as with everyday communication (e.g. Mansbridge 1999), in greater flux. Dahlgren (2009, 167) points to the complex relationship between the personal and political character of new media. He identified the "pre- or proto-political domain", which consists of different kinds of "self-publications such as personal and organizational web sites, blogs, webcasting as well as discussion/chat and so on, and where politics is not explicit but always remains a potential" (Dahlgren 2009, 167).

According to Benhabib (1996, 70), to "politicize" an issue is to draw the attention of the public to something the public should discuss as a collective, with a view to possible change. The phrase "the personal is political" has been introduced to emphasise the fact that a number of issues related to individual life which were previously trivialised as being merely personal, were later deliberated upon in public.

Communication about the political is not confined to communicative settings that are at first sight defined as political domains. Graham (2008) searched for political content within online discussion forums that are not defined in advance as political (online discussions on Big Brother,

entertaining television series). He followed Mansbridge's (1999, 216) identification of the political in everyday settings and operationalised political content as: "all those threads which contained a posting where a participant makes a connection from a particular experience, interest, issue, or topic in general to society" (Graham 2008, 22). For Graham (2008), an individual thus talks about a political issue when she/he defines an issue as concerning society (and not the private life of an individual). He concluded that nearly a quarter of the postings from the Big Brother sample were engaged in political talk (Graham 2009; 2010).

Couldry and Curran (2003, 5) provide two contrasting images of the media: "the waterfall" versus the "processing plant". The first image treats the media almost as a neutral technological mediator, where the relationship between wider social forces and media output is seen as the result of water simply flowing through a waterfall. The Internet as a communication technology is usually viewed as a technological "waterfall" in which diverse voices are, similar to water, "poured" into technology. Heller (2006, 323-326), for example, divides forms of communication according to whether they are mediated by any technological feature or not. Yet the difference between the examples she provides of technological mediated public and non-public communication is not so much in "special devices", but in mass media as social institutions of mediation. Voice provision provided by Web 2.0 is not so different from voice provision as delivered by the traditional mass media – in both cases, what is published and eventually received is the result of complex processes of social mediation by the intermediaries that provide the technology and their relations with other actors. The optimistic equating of Web 2.0 "platforms" such as YouTube to the public sphere (e.g. Castells 2008; Miliken et al. 2008; Ubayasiri 2008) has a "blind spot" when it comes to discussing new media and their potential contributions to the international public and public sphere. They regard the providers of technology, such as YouTube LLC, as simply technological tools or almost "naturally" existent spaces, and neglect the importance of actors such as

YouTube LLC as social mediators in terms of their role as a medium for political communication.

5.3 Transnationality

The second research question I pose is: how transnational is YouTube in terms of its political uses and in terms of YouTube LLC as a media institution? Fraser (2005b, n.p.) states that "the where of communication, once theorized as the Westphalian-national territory, is now deterritorialized cyberspace". According to Splichal (2006, 702), the interactive virtual spaces of internet helped develop an understanding of a deterritorialized public sphere not bound to a particular locality. The extended potential for crossing borders in communication has been accompanied by the broadening of the scope of an imagined public sphere. Poster (1995, 51), for example, proposed that new media aid in the creation of "differentiated cosmopolitanism" through the thickening and intensification of communication, where previously subjugated voices are more readily brought to public attention and the previously private speech and practice of elites are available for all to see.

Yet the transnationality of new media, Web 2.0 included, is said to be hindered by the dominance of Western voices (e.g. Cammaerts and Van Audenhove 2003; 2005; Curran 2003) and the world's digital divide, typically defined as "the differential access to and use of the internet according to gender, income, race, and location"(Rice 2002, 106). Most structural barriers to online communication are by definition characteristic for the most deprived parts of the world's population, who are at the same time the prime victims of global problems. In Europe, the cost of information technology amounts to less than 5 per cent of monthly gross national income per capita while in Africa the cost represents 41 present of the region's average monthly income (ITU 2009, 6) and the price for fixed broadband access remains prohibitively high in most developing countries (ITU 2009, 6).

The digital divide is, Couldry (2002) argues, neglected in the discourse on Web 2.0. In the current literature on YouTube, the issue of the digital divide is, with exception of Hartley (2009), very rarely if ever brought up. With YouTube the barriers to both reception and even more so content production are even greater than with the "old" digital forms of written text. It is true that for publishing on YouTube, users do not need to know programme codes such as those needed to create a website – a characteristic which propelled the Web 2.0 applications to their position of popularity and which is, according to Hilbrich (2007), their common defining denominator. Users, however, need at least basic digital literacy in terms of knowledge of video montage and video creation. Although visual communication has become globally familiar via the medium of television, the creation of visual material is far from self-explanatory, as Hartley (2009, 128-129) warns. In contrast to reading and writing skills, there has been no official recognition of the importance of digital education, and "the scaling up of digital literacy is left largely to entertainment providers seeking eyeballs for advertisers, and those who want consumers for their proprietary software applications; in other words, to the market." (Hartley 2009, 129).

The first tentative answers regarding YouTube's transnationality have been provided by Benvenuto et al. (2008). They analysed 400,000 video responses and concluded that the top five countries account for 76.8 per cent of total video responses uploaded to YouTube. Similarly, Wall (2009) conducted a content analysis of 277 YouTube videos about Ghana and Kenya. The majority of people posting videos on the two countries indicated they were Westerners. The videos published by people who identified themselves as being North Americans have had more views than those who were from Europe or Africa[27]. Burgess and Green concluded that only about

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27 There is, however, an important caveat regarding Wall's (2009, 399) analysis of the number of visits according to country of publisher. Wall did not account for the fact that the differences between the number of views could also be ascribed to the difference in the period within which the analysed videos were available. The response a video

15 per cent of the sample they analysed (n=4320) were videos that were in a language other than English.

Boyd-Barrett (2004, 2006) and Sikka (2006) point to the USA's dominance in international business, media concentration and IT development. Western companies such as Google and its subsidiary YouTube are the prime intermediaries of the online experience for most parts of the world. Pauwels and Hellriegel (2009) argue that YouTube LLC steering mechanisms such as predefined categories of content and their rankings embody preconceptions of what the site is to be used for. And since the categories are more or less the same throughout all geographical versions of YouTube, they represent an Anglo-Western cultural stance (Pauwels and Hellriegel 2009, 9). Within just one year of its birth in 2005, YouTube managed to become one of the most visited websites in the online world (e.g. Madden 2007, 4; Stalvik 2007). YouTube has become almost a generic name for online video-sharing. Many other similar video-sharing sites exist, yet the user-generated video-sharing phenomenon has almost completely been referred to as the YouTube phenomenon (e.g. Lovink and Niederer 2008). The European Broadcasting Union compared numbers of visits to 29 video-sharing sites in Europe. From March 2006 until August 2007, YouTube managed to attract the largest number of visits, leaving behind all other analysed video-sharing sites (see Figure 5.1) (Stalvik 2007, 97).

receives in one year cannot be compared to the response another video receives in a week. As a solution to this problem, I analyse the numbers of views, ratings, comments and video responses the videos receive within one month of their publication.

Figure 5.1: Internet traffic to main video-sharing sites

Source: EBU based on comScore

Stalvik (2007, 97)

YouTube's almost monopolistic position within the field of online video-sharing is very much transnational. Silva and Dix (2007, 1) performed a query on Alexa[28] on 22 May 2007. They concluded that at that time YouTube was the fourth most visited website, and the first if they did not include search engines. I performed a similar query on Alexa three years later: on 15 May 2010. This time YouTube ranked globally as the third most visited website, preceded only by Google.com and Facebook.com. If we compare Alexa's web ratings by country we see that, with only a few exceptions (Belarus, China, Cuba, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia), YouTube ranks among the top 10 visited websites among the 130 countries for which data is provided.[29]

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28 Alexa is a company which provides data on websites' popularity according to the number of page views http://www.alexa.com/, 10.5.2010

[29] It is important to note, however, that Alexa provides information only on 130 countries and that it is mostly African countries that are excluded from the selection.

The new media, Volkmer (2003) states, are aiding in the bypassing of censorship imposed by one state through the provision of communication channels outside the state (Volkmer 2003, 12). On the other hand, Goldsmith and Wu (2006) argue that the online "borderless world" is merely an illusion, since governments control the internet by controlling its intermediaries such as internet service providers, search engines, browsers, the physical network and the financial intermediaries (Goldsmith and Wu 2006, 68 – 85). China, for example, has been criticised for elaborate mechanisms of censorship with help and compliance from Western companies: Microsoft, Yahoo and Google (Fry 2006; Garvie 2007; Liang and Lu 2010). There is no available research data, yet, according to media reports, access to YouTube has been blocked in a number of countries across the world as a result of attempts by the authorities to censor content. Turkey[30], China[31], and Pakistan[32], for example, continuously or only at some specific points in time block access to content published on YouTube. The fear remains that governments will develop more elaborate means of censorship. Another fear is that YouTube's owner, Google, will start cooperating with such demands for censorship, as was the case in China.

The potential for new media to serve the transnational public sphere is, furthermore, hindered by the need for translation or a common language – a problem which, according to Sparks, could potentially be solved by machine translation, which in 2001 was still "primitive and slow" (Sparks 2001, 87). Burgess and Green (2008) warn of the potentially negative consequences of the localised versions of the YouTube website, the customisation of content search according to location and separate language versions of YouTube. Language and localization, Burgess and Green warn, are two separate

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30 Radio Free Europe.Turkey's YouTube Ban Is Cause For Concern, 8th July 2009
       http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkeys_YouTube_Ban_Is_Cause_For_Concern/1772 003.html, 18.2.2010
31   Sommerville, Quentin. 2009. *China 'blocks YouTube video site', BBC News, 29* March 2009
       http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7961069.stm , 21. 8. 2010.
32 The Pakistani government, for example, tried to censor YouTube and consequently blocked access to the internet for a large part of the world for two hours (BBC: Pakistan Lifts   the   Ban   on   YouTube,   26th   February,   2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7262071.stm , 18.2.2010

issues. The introduction of languages other than English across YouTube may provide greater diversity of participation by overcoming language barriers for participants who do not speak English. Yet localisation actually means filtering out non-US and non-English speaking content for US viewers, which makes it increasingly unnecessary for Western users to encounter cultural differences in their experience of the website (Burgess and Green 2008, 81-87).

5.4 Inclusiveness

The third research question is: to what extent is YouTube inclusive in terms of its political uses, how does YouTube LLC address its users and to what extent does it include them in decision-making processes? The internet, Bohman (2004, 135) argues, has the potential to become a global public sphere, since it has radically lowered the costs of interaction with an indefinite and potentially large audience and thus extended the inclusiveness of public deliberation. Initial scholarly optimism about the internet's potential for the public sphere gathered momentum at a time when the internet was mostly composed of use-net conversations in which individuals, not organisations, participated (Oblak 2003, 60). Later, this optimism slowly gave way to more critical perspectives, which argued that political authorities and corporations have come to adapt to the new media, use the internet for their own benefits and use it in the "old way" of one-directional communication and "politics as usual" with "citizen-consumers" (e.g. Needham 2004, Åström 2004, Bucy and Gregson 2001). The fear has started to grow that the internet will become a "normalized dot-com" platform with one-way websites as its main feature (Margolis and Resnick 2000, 3-24). Margolis and Resnick (2000, 3-8) divide the internet into the old internet and the new internet – typical of the old version are "news-net conversations"; typical of the new internet (around the year 2000) were websites. This distinction is reflected in the level of special training and technical skills an individual needed in order to produce content. The process of "normalisation of cyberspace" meant a transformation from

interactive communication to forms of representation of mediated publicness (Oblak 2002, 7). In this process, internet users were increasingly seen to be just audiences – recipients and not producers of information (Oblak 2003, 60).

After 2004, however, with the discourse on Web 2.0 we could observe a renewed optimism regarding the inclusiveness of new media. In 2006, Time magazine chose "You" as their person of the year, due to the unprecedented levels of user-generated content available through new media. Jenkins (2006, 208) identified four principles in the operation of Web 2.0: access, participation, reciprocity and peer-to-peer rather than one-to-many communication. Bruns (2008b) writes of the introduction of Web 2.0 as "a significant paradigm shift" in which we are supposedly going "beyond the public sphere" (Bruns 2008b). It is important to note that Bruns wrongly equates the public sphere merely with traditional mass media – by optimistically writing about processes that mean transformation "beyond the public sphere", he actually describes the ideals of the public sphere.

On the other hand, Calhoun warns that "it is sometimes suggested that IT is a great equalizer, but as we have noted IT is used by corporations at least as effectively as protesters (if not a good deal more so)" (Calhoun 2004, 237). Traditional "big players" such as mass media broadcasting companies, corporations and political institutions all attempt to be included in these new media domains. We can now see a "hodgepodge" of different actors publishing videos on YouTube: from the European Commission (Da Silva 2009a; 2009b), the Transportation Security Administration (Losh 2009), activist organisations (Uldam and Alskanius 2010) and political candidates (Ubayasiri 2006). Burgess and Green (2008, 45-46; 51-54) compared the most viewed, most favoured, most responded-to and most commented-on YouTube videos according to the type of publisher. User-created content, especially vlogs, was the most commented-on type of YouTube video, which led Burgess and Green (2008) to conclude that individual publishing invites feedback, while this is less so with "traditional uploaders".

Jarrett (2009) analysed the You Tube LLC slogan "Broadcast Yourself", by which YouTube LLC promises a democratisation of broadcasting in terms of enabling mass participation and a more active role in selecting what to watch: "it indicates the centrality of user involvement as it urges us to do the broadcasting ourselves" (Jarrett 2009, 133). With this slogan, Jarrett (2009) points out, YouTube LLC builds on the desire to "broadcast your Self" – it focuses on individual visibility, acts of self-expression and identity creation. Van Dijck and Nieborg (2009) point to the common rhetorical ploy while describing Web 2.0 by advertisers and "gurus" of new media: they ascribe communal spirit to all kinds of user motives and "like to present telephone companies as being in the business of connecting people or who promote credit card companies as facilitators of love and affection" (van Dijck 2009 and Nieborg 2009, 863). Furthermore, YouTube LLC is described by Burgess and Green (2008, 16) as "courting" big media and granting them some special privileges – such as allowing the Oprah Winfrey Channel to edit the "featured videos list", which has spurred a number of protest videos from YouTube users (Burgess and Green 2008, 9).

Finally, for the new media to serve the transnational public sphere, inclusion should extend not only to the possibility of publishing content, but also in terms of influencing the structure and decision-making of the media as an organisation. Carpentier (2007b) critically reflects on equating the use of new media in terms of content production with participation. He follows Pateman's distinction between full and pseudo-participation, whereby full participation is characterised by having equal power to influence the outcomes of a particular decision. Building on this distinction, he (Carpentier 2007a, 88) distinguishes between participation "in" the media and participation "through" the media. Participation "in" the media is participation by non-professionals in the production of media output (content-related participation) *and* in media decision-making (structural participation). These forms of media participation allow citizens to be active

in one of the many (micro-)spheres relevant to daily life and to exercise their right to communicate (Carpentier 2007a, 88).

Structural participation entails public participation in media decision-making processes, the formulation of communication policies, the organisation and management of the media and ensuring the media's direct accountability to citizens. He describes Web 2.0 media, YouTube included, as media organisations that are oriented towards the facilitation of interaction between members of a specific community, where these members remain relatively detached from the actual organisation and its decision-making processes (Carpentier 2007b, 143-144). Pauwell's and Hellriegel (2009) analysed the steering mechanisms embodied in the YouTube infrastructure and content fluctuations in order to provide information on the ongoing negotiation of power and control between what they term the "YouTube controllers": owners, designers, editors and "prosumers". They concluded that, on the one hand, YouTube LLC can be described as an imposed and constantly monitored platform with predefined options and categories and rules of engagement. On the other hand, they invest hope in the tactical mechanisms of engagement by which YouTube's active base engage in boundary-bending activities to subtly resist the power being exercised from above: from protest actions against unilateral censorship exercised by YouTube's management to the circumvention of imposed link restrictions or providing mock descriptions and information to avoid becoming an easy marketing target and retaining anonymity (Pauwells and Hellriegel 2009, 20).

5.5 Freedom from commercial constraints

The final research question is: how does YouTube LLC's commercial nature affect YouTube as a sphere for public communication? According to Williams, technology is a result of the intentional process, "that is to say, as being looked for and developed with certain purposes and practices already in mind" (Williams 1974/2005). The practices that the ICT companies had

in mind when creating Web 2.0 technologies were less about political empowerment than "crowd-sourcing" (e.g. Brabham 2008; Huberman et al. 2009) and "harnessing collective intelligence" (e.g. O'Reilly 2005, 2, O'Reilly and Battelle 2009, 1).

Sparks (2001, 92) points to the fact that the majority of efforts to develop new media are intended to "render it a more perfect instrument for business". The popularisation of Web 2.0 publishing possibilities is not only a bottom-up process but is, to a large extent, also driven by media companies that are learning how to expand their revenue opportunities (Jenkins and Deuze 2008, 6). Scholz argues that discourse on Web 2.0 employs market ideology that "worships the creative amateur" (Keen, 2007) and is actually "a framing device of professional elites… who are trying to mobilise novelty as a marketing ploy" (Scholz 2008, n.p.).

Wasko and Erikson (2009) call for a political economy of YouTube whereby the focus is upon the relationship between YouTube LLC and its owner Google, and the subsequent processes of commodification of communication on YouTube. They argue that, ever since acquiring YouTube, Google has struggled to see a return on its investment (Wasko and Erikson 2009, 377). This means that on YouTube "the user-generated content is not as desirable as professional media content from major companies, unless it can somehow be manipulated to make profit for media companies and for Google, but certainly not for the individual user" (Wasko and Erikson 2009, 382).

Google dominates the online market in a number of countries worldwide to an extent that would not be permissible for other media and, in Europe, according to Machill et al. (2008, 593), would be curbed by rules that limit their reach. YouTube LLC was purchased by Google within its first year of existence for the sum of 1.65 billion USD. Google gains its revenue from advertising – the share of its advertising revenue in 2005 was 98.8 percent of the total turnover (Machill 2009, 595). It must thus continuously acquire

new users and generate high access rates (Machill et al. 2009, 595). Since Google already had its own Google Videos, it is unlikely, as van Dijck (2009, 42) points out, that the acquisition was about technology: it was about the large number of publishers and audiences that YouTube LLC attracted.

Google's acquisition of YouTube LLC is, according to Milberry and Anderson (2009, 393), one of the three mechanisms that are used by Google to create "the Google layer". The "Google layer" is the "synergistic membrane created by media companies with prescribed circuits that constrain user freedoms and constrain users' range of motion within a narrow, privatized slice of the world wide web" (Milberry and Anderson 2009, 393). The three mechanisms for creating synergistic membranes are node development, node promotion and rival exclusion. Google's acquisition of YouTube is "node development", whereby an "extra node" is added to the layer and thereby the flow of traffic in the network is increased (Milberry and Anderson 2009, 400). Node promotion is the practice of using existing properties to promote other properties in a media conglomerate's network (Milberry and Anderson 2009, 400). "Each time an online participant is encouraged to click through to a promotional node, it decreases the vibrancy of the "outside" internet" (Milberry and Anderson 2009, 403). Rival exclusion is the blocking or degrading of access to competitor services, spaces or tools. The example provided by Millbery and Anderson (2009, 403) is the decision by Google in 2007 to stop posting links to rival map applications and show only Google Maps in Google's map search engine.

Mosco (1996) identifies five interconnected types of commodification: commodification of content is transforming messages into marketable products (Mosco 1996, 146); audience commodification is a process in which media companies produce audiences and deliver them to advertisers, especially in specific demographically desirable forms (Mosco 1996, 149); intrinsic commodification is a second-order commodification whereby the

outcome of the information production process is the production of a new commodity, such as audience ratings and other measurements and techniques of surveillance (Mosco 1996, 151); extensive commodification is the expansion of commodification to areas that were previously organised according to non-commodified social logic, such as cultural areas, public education and common spaces (Mosco 1996, 153); and finally the commodificaton of labour is the process of producing communicative goods and services or the use of communicative systems to expand the commodification of labour processes in general (Mosco 1996, 157).

YouTube LLC has been criticised on most of the five types of commodification identified by Mosco (1996). First, regarding commodification of content by YouTube LLC, the most prominent issue in the up-to-date literature on YouTube is "the copyright wars" (Burgess and Green 2009, 30-35) between YouTube LLC and mainstream media who accuse YouTube LLC of being a distribution platform for illegally reproduced proprietary content. YouTube LLC is a limited liability company – the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides limited liability to online service providers – according to McDonald (2009, 398), these limitations create a "safe harbor" for online service providers. They are not held liable for infringing material available over their services if: (a) the provider has no knowledge the material was available, (b) does not gain any direct financial benefit from the infringing activity, (c) acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to such material once notification is presented (McDonald 2009, 398). The "copyright wars" are described by Andrejevic (2009, 409) as "a manifold struggle with at least three elements: (a) the attempt to assert copyright claims and thereby to command the revenues that may eventually flow from them; (b) the attempt to gain control over user-generated data; (c) the attempt to shape the media environment in accordance with advertising imperatives". Burgess and Green (2009, 35) argue that the "copyright wars illustrate the difficult dual identity" of YouTube LLC: as a business and as a cultural resource co-created by its users. Similarly, Gillespie (2010, 17) argues that "it is

YouTube LLC's complex economic allegiances that compel it to both play host to amateur video culture and provide content owners with the tools to criminalize it."

The result of the "copyright wars" has been, as Wasko and Erikson (2009, 381) point out, the content-identification technology provided by YouTube LLC that allows the media company to claim its content and run advertising with it and thus gain advertisement revenue. Another result identified by MacDonald (2009, 392) was advertising only with "partner" videos, where the content is checked for its compliance with the copyright laws. The creation of YouTube "partners" has been criticised by Jarrett (2008) as monetisation of historically non-economic forms of expression. A third result has been advertising deals with mainstream media. McDonald (2009) argues that YouTube LLC has "been particularly keen to recruit content partners from big media brands" (McDonald 2009, 392). He describes the case of WMG's partnership with YouTube LLC by publishing full-length episodes on YouTube and then removing its content, since it was allegedly "frustrated by the poor return of its revenue-sharing arrangements with YouTube, particularly as competing sites like AOL and MySpace offered better terms" (McDonald 2009, 396).

On commodification of audiences, Bermejo (2009) compares audience manufacture in broadcasting media with the manufacture of the online audience, especially by Google. He describes Google as an innovator in terms of online advertising, since it introduced a cost-per-click pricing model coupled with a system of keyword auctions (Bermejo 2009, 148). In exposure pricing models, known from broadcasting, the audience attention was sold in terms of exposure. In performance pricing models it is not exposure but audience response (e.g. clicking, providing or asking for information, purchasing, etc.) that determines the revenue, or in other words is sold to the advertisers. Since the response of audiences is not under direct media control, but depends mostly on the quality and pricing of the product advertised and advertisement (Bermejo 2009, 148), Google added a specific

possibility: the order in which advertisements are shown depends on the previous performance of advertisements. "That is, the more successful a particular advert linked to a particular keyword is in generating clicks (and revenue for Google), the more prominent it will be in successive appearance on the search results page" (Bermejo 2009, 148).

Regarding intrinsic commodification on YouTube, van Dijck and Nieborg (2009) point to the value of metadata, which is used to profile people and their interests and therefore deliver successful targeted marketing: "Google is less interested in co-creation or content than it is in people making connections – connections that yield valuable information about who they are and what they are interested in" (van Dijck and Nieborg 2009, 865).

Finally, YouTube has been criticised by Andrejevic (2009) as commodifying free online labour. On YouTube, Andrejevic (2009, 419) argues, "users are offered a medium of control over the product of their creative activity in exchange for the work they do in building up an online community and sociality upon a privately controlled networked structure". Attempts at commodification of free online labour are part of the discourse of "crowdsourcing", whereby the focus is upon direct enthusiasm over its "potential to exploit a crowd of innovators" (Brabham 2008, 75). Yet Terranova (2003) stresses that commodification of online labour is performed in more subtle ways than the simple story of "the bad boys of capital moving in on underground subcultures/subordinate cultures and "incorporating" the fruits of their production (styles, languages, music)" but rather that cultural flows originating within a field that is always and already capitalism" (Terranova 2003, n.p.).

5.6 Methods of analysis

I have analysed the relationship between YouTube and the transnational public sphere with quantitative content analysis of YouTube videos and qualitative content analysis of YouTube LLC discourse. The research was

conducted with regards to the four main elements or critiques of YouTube in relation to the transnational public sphere: YouTube as a sphere for political communication, its transnational nature, its inclusiveness and its economic nature. In Tables 5.2 and 5.3, I provide a scheme of operationalisation through quantitative content analysis of a selection of YouTube videos and the research questions that have guided the qualitative content analysis of You Tube LLC discourse. In the following section I provide a detailed description of both methods of analysis.

Table 5.1: Research questions guiding the quantitative content analysis of YouTube videos

	Quantitative content analysis		
Political nature	What is the political nature of YouTube in terms of its uses?		
	Number of videos on global financial crisis and global warming	Attention received in one month per theme	
Transnationality	How transnational is YouTube in terms of its political uses?		
	Diversity of voices according to national self-identification	Attention received in one month per nationality of publisher	
Inclusiveness	To what extent is YouTube inclusive in terms of its political uses?		
	Diversity of voices according to functional background	Diversity of sources in user-generated content	Attention received in one month per type of publisher

Table 5.2: Research questions guiding the qualitative content analysis of YouTube LLC discourse

	Qualitative content analysis
Political nature	Does YouTubeLLC construct itself as a medium for political communication, and, if so, how?
Transnationality	How transnational is You Tube LLC as a media institution?
Inclusiveness	How does YouTube LLC address its users and to what extent does it include them in decision-making processes?
Economic nature	How does YouTube LLC's commercial nature affect YouTube as a sphere for public communication?

5.6.1 Quantitative content analysis

The unit of selection and analysis was a video published on YouTube (within a specific time-frame) that directly addressed the global financial crisis or global warming. Videos were selected using YouTube's search engine. Videos were selected on the basis of two criteria: word search and date search. The diversity of video publishers was analysed according to their country, if provided, and "functional background".

The quantitative content analysis conducted here is similar to the work of Burgess and Green (2008), but with a different video selection procedure and a different typology of voices. Since I understand the transnational public as emerging through public communication on a transnational public problem, I analysed the diversity of voices publishing on two selected issues: the global financial crisis and global warming. This means that:

(a) by focusing only upon the selected issues, I narrowed the analysis only to transnational political content;

(b) sampling according to the upload date provides information not only on the use of YouTube by the most popular actors, but an overview of the diversity of all types of actors that publish on YouTube and the amount of attention they receive;

(c) the data on the number of views, rates, video responses and comments can be compared since the same time-frame was used (30 days after a video was published).

Global warming and the global financial crisis as selection themes

YouTube's word search engine collects videos on the basis of their descriptions in text (headline, key words and textual description). Two global public issues were selected for empirical analysis: global warming and the global financial crisis. This selection was based on three assumptions:

(a) the two issues have serious, extensive and long-term transnational public consequences; they should be recognised as such; and transnational publics should start forming in response to these two issues in accordance with the idealised process of the formation of the transnational public as presented in Chapter 1;

(b) the two issues have, at the time of the analysis, been to some extent recognised as having serious and long-term transnational consequences: international public opinion polls conducted prior to the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, such as The World Public Opinion (July 2009) and Eurobarometer (November 2009), for example, report that climate change is recognised as an important public issue in a number of the countries surveyed. I therefore assume that the two issues will attract some attention from YouTube video publishers;

(c) finally, the two issues have been characterised as "global" – the transnationality is implicitly assumed by naming the two issues as global.

The unit of selection and analysis was a video published on YouTube (within a specific time-frame) that directly addressed the global financial crisis or global warming. All videos have been checked in order to assess whether the videos themselves really address the global financial crisis or global warming (either within the whole video or only within a specific section of a video). Checking the content of the videos for coherence with the two themes is important for selection, since one common technique to boost views is by adding textual information to videos with words that video publishers believe will attract a large audience. Both "global financial crisis" and "global warming" have been employed as "attention-grabbing" words. For this reason YouTube's search engine has also provided videos which do not address the selected issues. These videos have been excluded from the analysis.

The coherence of a video with the two selected issues has been shown to be an important issue for the selection of videos. Specifically, the selection of videos showed that the concept of content coherence of a video with a

selected issue is far from self-evident, as Adami's (2009) study of YouTube interaction shows. Following Graham's (2008, 20) warning that content coherence should be understood as a scale, I excluded only videos which I considered to be completely unrelated to the selected issues and included all those videos that could be considered as indirectly related to the two issues under consideration. For example, I excluded videos of computer-games where global warming or the global financial crisis were mentioned within the description of a computer game, yet the aim of the publisher was not to publish on global warming but to present her/his own technique of video gaming. On the other hand, I included videos that I considered less directly related to the two selected issues. For example, videos of nature (e.g. green forests or snow in the backyard etc.) were included even though there was no specific reference to global warming within the video itself (only in the video's tag). I considered these videos expressed a concern for the issue – pictures of green forests could, for example, be showing the beauty of nature which could be lost due to global warming. Pictures of snow in a backyard entitled "global warming" were similarly taken as an expression of the discrepancy between the idea of global warming and one's own first-hand experiences. Similarly, I included music videos which did not include any lyrics or images but where the video publisher claimed they were made in an attempt to spread awareness about global warming or the global financial crisis (I excluded them, however, if no such attempt was published and if "global warming" was only one of a very diverse range or tags or diverse word description accompanying the video). I also included sarcastic and humorous videos which employed the two concepts in order to provide entertainment for the video audience (e.g. a video of Spiderman taking a job in a call centre due to the financial crisis; a film parody in which Hitler is presented as being disturbed by the global financial crisis; or a video of a polar bear shaving its hair due to the warmer climate). As has been argued, infotainment and the convergence of politics and popular culture are an important and not necessarily negative part of public expression (e.g. Brants 1998). Excluding such content would risk following an exclusive, pre-determined conception of public expression and consequently excluding

public voices that do not follow a narrow understanding of the political as being devoid of humour.

Video selection according to upload date

YouTube's search engine allows users to searching for videos according to selected words and upload time (e.g. published within the last 24 hours). All videos published on the two chosen issues every fifth day in September and October 2009 were selected. From these, only those that were in the English language and were confirmed to have published on the two themes were selected. Altogether, 1166 videos were selected and analysed.

Received attention

Furthermore, I analysed the extent to which the selected videos attracted views, ratings, comments and video responses from YouTube users within the first month of their publication (the videos that were published and collected, for example, on 4 September were analysed for number of views, ratings, comments and video responses on 4 October).

Diversity of publishers according to their "functional background"

The distinction among YouTube video publishers builds here on the tripartite distinction between the state, civil society and economy (e.g. Cohen and Arato 1992, ix). In other words, it builds on the distinction between publishers according to their "functional background" (Habermas 1996, 375). Habermas (1996, 375) distinguishes between the loosely organised actors who emerge from the public and actors who appear before the public, "the latter have organizational power, resources, and sanctions available *from the start.*" (Habermas 1996, 374 emphasis in original); their activities belong to the "functional systems" of the state and economy (where the medium is organisational power in the first case and money in the second).

For each of the selected videos I analysed the type of publisher as indicated on the channel or, in the case of organisations and institutions, the "about"

section on their official website (either hyperlinked from the YouTube channel or, if possible, identified by means of a search engine). The types of publishers I analysed were individual, affiliated individual, non-governmental organisation, educational organisation, political organisation or actor, business organisation and media organisation.

User-generated and copied content

Finally, in cases when the YouTube video publisher presented himself or herself as an individual (affiliated or non-affiliated), in addition I analysed whether the video content was user-generated or copied in total from another outlet (e.g. content copied from a TV news channel). In those cases where the content was copied, I analysed which actors the content was copied from (who originally produced the content – e.g. mass media). In those cases where the content was presented as user-generated, I analysed the form of the video (e.g. "vlog" – a person talking directly in the video camera ("talking-head").

Additionally, video content published by individuals was analysed to determine whether it was their own original content or whether it was copied in total from other outlets. A common critique of content published on YouTube is that it is mostly content copied from other outlets (e.g. Kruitbosch and Nack 2008, n.p.; Green and Burgess 2009, 42). The original content versus copied content is not analysed here in any hierarchical relationship in terms of one being less of a participation, or "pseudo-participation" (Klotz 2007), than the other.

Klotz (2007, 3) identifies "astroturf support" as " plagiarized participation, whereby would-be participators are encouraged to present the words of others as their own in support of a cause". Klotz's definition is too broad, since people generally form their opinion using information they receive from others. I will assume that copying content from external sources and publishing is an equally important element of public expression as original content production. Within such intrinsic issues as global warming and the

global financial crisis, other sources, e.g. mass media, scientific reports, political public statements etc are a necessarily important element in discussion, since, for most participants, these are the main ways of connection between private concerns and global issues. How else could one know, for example, that other parts of the world face the same public problems, other than through the reports of others? The world beyond our first-hand experiences is by definition mediated. Research on user-generated content, specifically blogs (e.g. Singer 2005, Herring et al. 2007), shows that publishers use other sources, mostly mass media, to perform their citizen journalistic "surveillance" function (Scott 2007, 42) – collecting news and information in order to disseminate it further (this could also be understood in terms of the two-step-flow of communication) and/or to provide commentary. The additional indicator of the inclusiveness of voices is the answer to the question of whose "mediation of the world" is represented by YouTube video publishers.

Diversity of voices according to national self-identification

"Country" is one of the default possibilities of self-description for YouTube video publishers. In cases where publishers identified themselves as individuals, I analysed whether they provided information on their country and, if so, which. In those cases where the publishers were organisations, companies or institutions, I searched for the information on their website; usually it was provided within their "about" section (if the organisation did not have a website or I was unable to find it, I analysed their YouTube country identification, if provided).

5.6.2 Qualitative content analysis of YouTube LLC discourse

Data selection

The aim of this analysis was to gain information on how YouTube LLC discursively constructs itself and its potential users. The qualitative content analysis as conducted here is most similar to research performed by Van Dijck's (2009) and by Pauwells and Hellriegel (2009), since I am analysing

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YouTube's terms of use and its structure, but have broadened the selection of texts to the YouTube LLC voice within the website. I analysed YouTube public statements which I gathered from various documents.

First, I analysed the YouTube homepage and documents which could be hyperlinked to from the YouTube LLC homepage site and are divided into five sections:

a) YouTube (Contact Us, Company Info, Press Room, Business Blog, YouTube Blog);

b) Programmes (Advertising, Developers, Partnerships, Content Management);

c) Help (Get Help, YouTube Handbook, Community Help Forums, Safety Centre, Creator's Corner)

d) Policy (Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, Copyright Notices, Community Guidelines)

e) Discover (YouTube on Your Phone, YouTube on Your Site, YouTube on your TV, YouTube RSS Feed, TestTube),

Here I analysed information that was provided in two depths of hyperlinking from the homepage (content that was available on the websites within these five groups (primary websites) and content that was available on websites that were hyperlinked from the primary websites).

In cases where the information on the hyperlinked website was extensive and divided into more websites (e.g. blogs), only the first website was analysed. Thus, in additional to content on primary websites, I collected:

a) seven blog posts and eight videos published at the first site of the YouTube blog (plus all content that was hyperlinked from these seven posts)

b) six blog posts published at the first site of the YouTube business blog,

c) 31 media articles in the YouTube media coverage description under the title "Most Current[33]",

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33 http://www.youtube.com/t/media_coverage, 2.8.2010

d) 36 YouTube partners' channels under the title "Content Partners",

e) 20 presentations (five for the UK and 12 for the USA) of YouTube partners in the YouTube Non-profit Programme.

Additionally, I analysed the first websites of official YouTube channels (one depth of hyperlinking, selected by following links (manually "crawling"), starting from the Official YouTube Channel:

a) Official YouTube Channel: Broadcasting Ourselves ;)[34]

b) CitizenTube[35]

c) YouTube Reporters' Center[36]

d) YouTube Video Volunteers[37]

e) YouTube Project Report[38]

I also analysed a blog that belongs to the CitizenTube channel (other channels did not have special blogs at the time of the analysis):

a) CitizenTube blog[39] (10 blog posts and 24 videos that were posted on the blog's homepage).

Overall I collected and analysed ca. 300 pages of text and 39 videos which can be identified as YouTube LLC's official voice.

Analysis

The analysis could, according to some understandings (e.g. Fairclough 2005a, 2005b), be defined as critical discourse analysis, since the overarching aim is to identify "the presence and forms of combination of recurrent and relatively stable and durable 'discourses' in texts" (Fairclough 2005b, 916). As overviews such as Cheek's (2004) and Burr's (1998, 46-61) show, there are, however, various understandings and applications of

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34 http://www.youtube.com/user/YouTube, 12.2.2010
35 http://www.youtube.com/user/citizentube#p/c/90F63A67203CC49F, 12.2.2010
36 http://www.youtube.com/user/reporterscenter, 12.2.2010
37 http://www.youtube.com/user/YTVideoVolunteers, 12.2.2010
38 http://www.youtube.com/user/projectreport, 12.2.2010
39 http://www.citizentube.com/, 12.2.2010

discourse analysis. Furthermore, since there are various usages of the term, it is not clear whether discourse analysis is simply a method or a specific paradigm (Hammersley 2003). I decided to follow Mayring's approach to qualitative textual analysis since I appreciate the rigour and clearly identified procedures of the analysis and his perspective towards combining qualitative and quantitative content analysis (Mayring 2001, 2007b).

I employed a qualitative content analysis of the documents and videos, following the steps of analysis identified by Mayring (2000, 2001, 2007a, 2007b). Specifically, following the research questions, the material has been processed and categories have been tentatively created and deduced step by step from the collected text (Mayring 2000, n.p.). I therefore follow what Mayring terms an "inductive approach." It should be noted, however, that this is not a completely inductive approach, as, for example, found in grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1998), since it builds on theoretical background and research questions which determine the aspects of the textual material taken into account (Mayring 2000, n.p.).

5.7 YouTube as a site for political expression

The large number of videos published, especially on global warming, shows that YouTube as an online "everyday" setting has become both "the tool for and site of politics" (Turnšek and Jankowski 2008, 1). The two transnational issues selected attracted very different levels of interest as indicated by the number of published videos: there were approximately 10 times more videos published on global warming than on the global financial crisis (see Table 5.4).

Table 5.3: Number of videos per theme

	September 2009						October 2009						Total
Date	th 4	th 9	th 14	th 19	th 24	th 29	th 4	th 9	th 14	th 19	th 24	th 29	
Global warming	53	47	61	39	*	57	64	79	99	189	167	182	*1037*
Global financial crisis	6	11	28	13	*	17	4	16	5	3	24	3	*129*
Total	59	58	89	52	*	74	68	95	104	192	191	185	*1166*

The difference in the number of videos per theme can be attributed to the fact that the time of the selection of data preceded the United Nations Climate Change Conference (Copenhagen, 7-18 December 2009), where the countries were due to reach agreement regarding a treaty that would succeed the Kyoto Protocol (but then failed to do so). As the Copenhagen conference approached, the number of videos regarding global warming steadily increased. In contrast, the number of global financial crisis videos published per day stayed relatively equal. These results therefore support Ulsdam and Askalnius's (2010) conclusions that YouTube was an important tool for activists' expression prior to the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference.

The number of videos posted specifically on global warming support the thesis that YouTube is a "pre- or proto-political domain" (Dahlgren 2009, 167), in which political communication takes place. In the case of the two selected issues, YouTube has been an online setting where political expression and mobilisation appeals are posted with the hope of reaching people in their "everyday" online environment. Overall, the level of attention the selected videos on the two themes received in one month was very low: 90 per cent of sampled videos on global warming received fewer than 380 views, fewer than eight ratings, fewer than four comments and 0 video responses in the month following their publication. Ninety per cent of the sampled videos on the global financial crisis received fewer than 1305 views, fewer than 21 ratings, fewer than 10 comments and 0 video responses. Some videos, however, did manage to attract very high numbers of views, comments, ratings and video responses (Tables 5.5-5.8); the maximum number of views in one month for a video on global warming

was 20,178 and for global financial crisis 38,147. These numbers thus show that Web 2.0 technology such as YouTube represents a combination of communication of small circles of people, termed by Mills (1956) as "primary publics" and by Mansbridge (1999) as everyday political talk, and on the other hand communication that resembles traditional mass media, whereby communication is delivered to a very large audience.

While there were more videos on global warming than on the global financial crisis, the latter in general received more attention as measured by number of views, comments, ratings and video responses (see Tables 5.5-5.8). On average, a video on global warming received around 304 views, where for videos on the global financial crisis this average is 1,148.

Table 5.4: Number of views per video after one month

video theme	Valid	Missing	Min.	Max.	Median	Mean	Std. Deviation	Kurtosis	Skewn ess	Std. Error of Kurto sis	Std. Error of Skewne ss
global warming	990	47	1	**20178**	**27**	**303,9**	1405,6	100,5	9,1	0,2	0,1
global financial crisis	122	7	2	**38147**	**132**	**1147,8**	4552,3	46,9	6,6	0,4	0,2
Total	1112	54	1	38147	34	396,5	2021,3	164,6	11,4	0,1	0,1

Table 5.5: Number of textual comments per video after one month

video theme	Valid	Missing	Min.	Max.	Median	Mean	Std. Deviatio n	Kurtosis	Skewn ess	Std. Error of Kurto sis	Std. Error of Skewne ss
global warming	986	51	0	**200**	**0**	**2,3**	9,9	184,2	11,5	0,2	0,1
global financial crisis	112	7	0	**750**	**0**	**15,3**	80,4	65,7	7,7	0,5	0,2
Total	1098	63	0	750	0	3,6	27,5	515,0	20,6	0,2	0,1

Table 5.6: Number of ratings per video after one month

video theme	Valid	Missing	Min.	Max.	Median	Mean	Std. Deviation	Kurtosis	Skewness	Std. Error of Kurtosis	Std. Error of Skewness
global warming	982	55	0	**145**	**0**	**3,5**	11,8	60,0	6,9	0,2	0,1
global financial crisis	122	7	0	**489**	**2**	**19,2**	76,1	27,2	5,3	0,4	0,2
Total	1104	62	0	489	0	5,3	28,0	196,4	13,2	0,2	0,1

Table 5.7: Number of video responses per video after one month

video theme	Valid	Missing	Min.	Max.	Median	Mean	Std. Deviation	Kurtosis	Skewness	Std. Error of Kurtosis	Std. Error of Skewness
global warming	990	47	0	**5**	**0**		0,3	147,9	10,1	0,2	0,1
global financial crisis	122	7	0	**10**	**0**	,2	1,3	55,5	7,4	0,4	0,2
Total	1112	54	0	**10**	**0**		0,5	306,4	16,1	0,2	0,1

T-Test analysis[40] of equality of means shows important differences between the attention that the two groups of videos received in terms of number of views, ratings and comments (the number of video responses was too low for the analysis). This poses an important question: why is there a discrepancy among the two themes between the attention received by publishing and the attention received by watching, commenting on and rating videos? In other words, how is it that, on the one hand, there is an abundance of published videos on global warming and, on the other hand, these videos received much less attention from YouTube users than videos on global financial crisis, which were considerably fewer in number?

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40   T-Test for equality of means for number of views: F = 46,706; t = -4,387; Sig. = 0,000

   T-Test for equality of means for number of ratings: F = 92,999; t= -5,938; Sig. = 0,000

   T-Test for equality of means for number of comments : F = 81,198; t= -4,807; Sig. = 0,000

Taking form idea that "a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention" (Simon 1969 in Shapiro and Varian 1999, 6), one answer for this discrepancy may be that an abundance of information brings a dispersal of attention – the more videos there are on one issue, the less attention the individual video receives, since it needs to compete with a larger number of information sources for the same audiences. More research should be conducted before this thesis can be supported or rejected, yet I point to two problems regarding this explanation. A specific problem with this argument is that it assumes a definite, non-changeable number of interested individuals for whose attention the video sources are competing. It is questionable whether such a non-changeable number of people interested in a specific subject exists. Public attention on specific issues is a complex process and can change over time. According to the agenda-setting theory (McCombs and Shaw 1972), for example, the media influence the importance people attach to specific public issues.

Perhaps we can search for explanations in the difference in the extent of engagement with the issue and direction that the two forms of communication (video publishing versus video viewing, rating and commenting) involve. Publishing videos on global warming prior to the Copenhagen Climate Change may mean that, in this case, the communication was more a one-way mobilisation technique in terms of persuasion and not a search for information. It may be that those who were publishing on global warming were more interested in communicating the issue *to* YouTube users and less in searching for information on global warming *from* YouTube users. The problem with this explanation is that it assumes that people who publish are the same as people who receive information. It makes more sense to assume that the differences between the attention received for the two themes should be sought not in the number of videos published per theme but in differences between the characteristics of video publishers and video content – I will return to this question later in my analysis of the diversity of publishers.

Finally, the role of YouTube LLC's intermediation could have influenced the attention received by the two themes – for example by specific promotion of one of the themes. To provide an example: the most viewed video amongst the selected videos was the video published by the White House: "Weekly Address: Progress in the Global Economy" (see Figure 5.9).

Figure 5.2: White House video: "Weekly Address: Progress in the Global Economy"[41]

Weekly Address: Progress in the Global Economy

whitehouse 1,076 videos Subscribe

The President:
Leaders of the world's largest economies will gather next week

Figure 5.10 represents data provided by YouTube LLC on the same video – the number of views for the video that the hyperlinks from which the views for the video came – in other words, what directed YouTube users to watch this specific video. As we can see from Figure 5.10, YouTube LLC had an important role as an intermediary for this specific video: it had been hyperlinked from at least four YouTube LLC sites: the YouTube homepage, the YouTube videos page, YouTube news page and by search for content through the "related videos" possibility from another video.

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41   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hq8XowRpQRI, 28.5.2010

Figure 5.3: Number of views per hyperlink for the video "Weekly Address: Progress in the Global Economy"

Links

	Date	Link	Views
A	21 Sep 2009	First referral from related video - The Obama Plan in 4 Minutes	810
B	19 Sep 2009	First referral from YouTube - /videos	3,413
C	19 Sep 2009	First referral from YouTube - /news	1,594
D	19 Sep 2009	First embedded on - www.politico.com	716
E	19 Sep 2009	First referral from YouTube - Homepage	696
F	18 Sep 2009	First embedded on - www.whitehouse.gov	16,019
G	18 Sep 2009	Other/Viral	3,342
H	18 Sep 2009	First referral from a subscriber module	2,651
I	18 Sep 2009	First embedded on - my.barackobama.com	864
J	18 Sep 2009	First view from a mobile device	855

The research question that guided the qualitative content analysis of You Tube LLC discourse was whether YouTube LLC constructs itself as a medium for political communication, and, if so, how. In this respect I first analysed the relationship between political content and entertainment as presented by YouTube LLC. Although entertainment and political expression do not exclude each other (e.g. Brants 1998, Graham 2010), it is nevertheless important that the emphasis of YouTube's LLC self-presentation is primarily on entertainment. For example, while describing the process of selection of featured videos, they reveal entertainment as the most important value of selection: "Our editorial team reviews the videos users have made popular and features the *most entertaining and compelling content* on the homepage."[42] Similarly, they define themselves as the "*most entertaining* video experience on the internet":

> The community is still in control and, at the end of the day, they decide what's entertaining. Our independence empowers us to continue to build the best, most entertaining video experience on the Internet. [43] *(emphasis added)*

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[42]   http://www.youtube.com/t/faq, 8.2.2010

[43]   http://www.youtube.com/t/faq, 8.2.2010

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Other words to describe YouTube could be "worth seeing", "important" etc, but YouTube LLC specifically selected the word "entertaining", which reveals that they imagine their users as primarily interested in entertainment and their own functioning as serving these main interests.

On the other hand, YouTube LLC presents itself as a medium that combines entertainment with educational and political content. Through its mechanism of "Spotlight videos" YouTube LLC performs an agenda-setting function, selecting videos which they consider to be relevant in terms of specific themes or events that they deem important:

> Spotlights run a few times per week and showcase interesting and timely videos from our community and partners, all organized around an event or theme. […]
>
> 2/5 -- Black History Month: videos spotlighting African-American personalities and achievement (tag: ytbhm)
> 2/12 -- Winter Sports: videos relating to activities in Vancouver (tag: ytwinter)
> 2/14 -- Valentine's Day / Year of the Tiger: videos about love and/or the Chinese New Year (tag: ytvaltiger)
> 2/18 -- Pluto Turns 80: astronomy videos (tag: ytpluto)
> 2/19 -- Interactive Adventures: videos that use annotations to tell a story in a cool way, like this one from Chadmattandrob (tag: ytinteractive)[44]

Analysis of YouTube channels reveals that You Tube LLC actively promotes political content within their own channels - four out of five YouTube channels at the time of the analysis were directly concerned with political content in terms of addressing social problems: CitizenTube;[45] YouTube Reporters' Center;[46] YouTube Video Volunteers; [47] YouTube

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44   http://ytbizblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/february-homepage-opportunities.html, 8.2.2010
45   http://www.youtube.com/user/citizentube#p/c/90F63A67203CC49F, 12.2.2010
46   http://www.youtube.com/user/reporterscenter, 12.2.2010
47   http://www.youtube.com/user/YTVideoVolunteers, 12.2.2010

Project Report.[48] Similarly, at the CitizenTube channel hyperlinks to political institutions such as The White House, U.S. Government, and U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives are provided

Next to the promotion of political institutions, YouTube LLC engages in the promotion of non-governmental organisations through its "Non-profit programme", which allows for (a) promotion of content created by NGOs, (b) fundraising, and (c) engaging YouTube users in a form of online volunteering: creating YouTube videos that promote the cause of selected NGOs through the "Video Volunteers platform".

> Non-profit programme allows for:
> Premium branding capabilities and increased uploading capacity
> Listing on the Non-profit channels and the Non-profit videos pages
> Ability to add a Call-to-action overlay on your videos to drive campaigns
> Posting a video opportunity on the YouTube Video Volunteers platform to find a skilled YouTube user to create a video for your cause. The option to drive fundraising through a Google Checkout "Donate" button (only for USA)[49]

The YouTube Video Volunteer platform has at the time of the analysis focused on health awareness in partnership with the Stand Up 2 Cancer organisation. The winning volunteers were rewarded with promotion of their videos on the YouTube homepage.

> HERE'S HOW TO BECOME A VIDEO VOLUNTEER FOR
> HEALTH THIS MONTH:
> 1. Choose your favorite health organization (if you can't find one
> check the feed at http://www.youtube.com/vide... to find one that
> needs help)
> 2. Create your video by midnight on 2/23 and submit it to the gadget
> on http://www.youtube.com/vide...

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48 http://www.youtube.com/user/projectreport, 12.2.2010
49 http://www.youtube.com/nonprofits , 8.2.2010

3. The top 3 videos plus a video for our partner Stand Up 2 Cancer
will appear on the YouTube homepage at the end of the month!50

It is not stated how the specific organisation, in this case Stand Up 2 Cancer, was selected for the Video Volunteer platform, nor do they provide information on how the themes are selected. The selection of organisations for the Non-profit programme at the time of the analysis was represented by four organisations: Beatbullying – an organisation for awareness raising on peer bullying, The Disasters Emergency Committee – a charity organisation, Friends of the Earth – an environmental NGO, Missing People – an NGO which, as its name suggests, helps find missingpeople, WaterAid – an international charity organisation that focuses upon safe water, hygiene and sanitation. Among these selected organisations, only Friends of the Earth shows direct engagement in targeting the international and national political system, while the other organisations should be considered more in terms of Dryzek's (1996, 47) understanding of civil society as "para-governmental" organisations, who try to tackle social problems directly not through the political system.

YouTube LLC promotes citizen journalism. Its Reporters' Centre targets "citizen reporters on YouTube" with the aim of educating them on how to report the news:

> Ever captured a natural disaster or a crime on your cell-phone camera? Filmed a political rally or protest, and then interviewed the participants afterward? Produced a story about a local issue in your community? If you've done any of these things or aspire to, then you're part of the enormous community of citizen reporters on YouTube, and this channel is for you. The YouTube Reporters' Center is a new resource to help you learn more about how to report the news. It features some of the nation's top

50   http://www.youtube.com/videovolunteers, 8.2.2010

journalists and news organizations sharing instructional videos with tips and advice for better reporting.[51]

Similarly, YouTube Project Report, in partnership with the Pulitzer Center, is a journalism contest "intended for non-professional, aspiring journalists to tell stories that might not otherwise be told"[52].

Alongside the promotion of citizen journalism, YouTube LLC aspires to be an actor who mediates between members of civil society and the political system. On the CitizenTube Channel, YouTube LLC called on its users to post questions to US President Barack Obama. YouTube LLC claims to have received over 11,600 questions and over 660,000 votes. The final questions were selected first by votes from YouTube users and second by the CitizenTube team. They describe the procedure of selection as follows:

> Only able to ask less than 0.2% of the 11,696 questions submitted, it was hard to choose the final handful. Here's how the selection process worked: we tried to cover a range of issues, minimize duplicate questions, and include both video and text submissions. First, we looked at which topics had the highest participation -- like jobs, foreign policy, health care and government reform -- to determine how many questions to ask in each category. We then took the top 5% of video and text questions and picked questions that reflected what you cared about. None of them were chosen by the White House or seen by the President before the interview.[53]

The US president then provided an interview live from the White House and answered the questions posed. Additionally, the CitizenTube hosted a live chat in which US administration officials answered additional questions from YouTube users[54]. In this light it seem that YouTube LLC aspires to

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51   http://www.youtube.com/user/reporterscenter, 12.2.2010
52   http://www.youtube.com/user/projectreport, 12.2.2010
53   http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2010/02/your-questions-for-president-obama.html, 8.2.2010
54   http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2010/02/white-house-answers-more-of-your.html, 8.2.2010

perform a combination of two roles of journalism as as identified by Christians et al. (2009) – monitorial in the sense of providing information on the political system and facilitative in the sense of fostering discussion with the political system.

5.8 YouTube and transnationality

Quantitative content analysis of selected videos on global warming and the global financial crisis shows that YouTube video publishers eagerly provided information on the country they identify with. In other words, country seems to be an important identity characterisation for "YouTubers". From 1037 videos published on the theme of global warming, only 40 videos (3.9 per cent) were published by actors who did not provide any country identification. Among the 129 that published on the global financial crisis, only one video publisher (0.8 per cent) did not identify her/his country.

There were 49 countries in total that were "represented" within the two collected samples of YouTube videos. Videos on global warming were produced by publishers from 47 countries and videos on the global financial crisis by publishers from 19 countries (see Figure 5.11 and Table 5.12). If we simplify and divide the world into "rich" (including North America, Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) and "the rest", 91.2 per cent of the videos analysed belonged to publishers from "the developed" countries.

Figure 5.4: Percent of YouTube videos per country for global warming (n=1037), see exact data in Table 5.12

Table 5.8: Number of published videos per first 10 countries

	Global warming			Global financial crisis	
Country	Frequency	Valid percent	Country	Frequency	Valid percent
USA	**640**	**61,6**	**USA**	**32**	**24,4**
UK	74	7,1	international	24	18,3
Australia	39	3,8	Austria	17	13,0
Missing	**40**	**3,7**	UK	14	10,7
international	34	3,3	Australia	13	9,9
Canada	31	3,0	Spain	9	6,9
Portugal	21	2,0	India	4	3,1
India	16	1,5	Malaysia	2	1,5
Thailand	14	1,3	Germany	2	1,5
Germany	14	1,3	Canada	2	1,5

The number of videos published by African YouTube publishers is especially low: three in the case of global warming (South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia) and one in the case of the global financial crisis (South Africa). These results are in keeping with Wall's (2009, 389) research on Africa on YouTube, concluding that on YouTube the age-old inequities in terms of western dominance in media production continue.

"Over 50 % of YouTube traffic comes from outside the U.S.[55]" YouTube claims. Presentation of statistic data is always subject to interpretation (e.g. Suhonen 2001; Turnsek 2006), and, while YouTube LLC values "over 50 %" as a high and positive value, the same percentage may also be described as a low value and an indicator of American dominance in YouTube traffic. Reflected through the prism of the fact that YouTube is among the leading websites in a large proportion of the world's countries in terms of the number of visits (data provided by Alexa, see above), the dominance of US voices is even more problematic.

Some 57.2 per cent of videos that were published on "global warming" belonged to publishers that identified themselves as US citizens, organisations or institutions. This percentage is much lower, though, for the global financial crisis, where only 25.6 per cent of videos belonged to US publishers.

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[55]
http://www.gstatic.com/youtube/engagement/platform/autoplay/advertise/downloads/YouTube_InTheKnow.pdf, 10.2.2010

Table 5.9: Number and percentage of videos published by US publishers

	Global warming		Global financial crisis	
	Total	U.S.A. n (%)	Total	U.S.A. n (%)
non-affiliated individual	555	268 (48,2 %)	58	10 (17,2 %)
affiliated individual	24	12 (50,0%)	7	1 (14,2%)
national NGO	311	300 (96,5 %)	5	4 (80,0 %)
national educational organisation	10	10 (100,0 %)	12	3 (25,0 %)
national mass media	43	28 (65,1 %)	14	10 (71,1 %)
national political actor/organisaiton	6	5 (83,3 %)	2	2 (100,0 %)
national business corporation	8	3 (37,5 %)	2	1 (50,0 %)
international mass media	9	-	15	-
international political actor	3	-	4	-
international business corporation	3	-	1	-
International NGO	20	-	1	-
Total	992	568 (57,2 %)	121	31 (25,6 %)
Missing	45		8	
Total	1037		129	

Table 5.13 shows the number and percentage of videos published byUS YouTube publishers. We can see that geographical diversity among non-individual publishers was extremely low. Almost all the videos published by educational organisations, non-governmental organisations and political actors/organisations belonged to actors that were US-based. Specifically, out of 310 videos published on global warming by national non-governmental organisations, 300 (96.8 per cent) videos were published by non-governmental organisations that proclaim themselves to be US-based. Slightly more diversity but still strong US dominance in terms of the nationality of participants could be observed in the case of individual publishers. Out of 555 videos published on global warming by non-affiliated individuals, 268 (48.2 per cent) were from individuals who proclaim themselves to be US citizens, and only 10 out of 58 (17.2 per cent) in the case of the global financial crisis.

At first sight it seems that it might be the large difference between the

proportion of US-based publishers in the case of global warming (57.2 per cent) versus the global financial crisis (25.0 per cent) may account for the differences in the levels of videos published and attention attracted between the two themes, as discussed above. In this case we should expect a significant difference in levels of attention between US publishers and non-US publishers. Yet although YouTube is dominated by US voices, the numbers of views, ratings, textual comments and video responses received per video reveal that these videos in general did not receive much more attention than videos published by actors from other parts of the world (Table 5.14) – if anything, to a slight extent, but not significantly, it seems that non-US publishers in general received more attention than US publishers did.

The fact that U.S. publishers did not receive significantly more attention than non-U.S. publishers is a positive observation regarding YouTube's transnationality. These results contradict Wall's (2009) conclusion that the videos published by people who identified themselves as being North Americans are more likely to have been videos visited than videos produced by people from Europe or Africa. Since Wall (2009) did not account for differences in attention that may be due to differences in the time period in which the videos were available, the differences in attention in terms of the nationality of video publishers in her analysis may be due to the fact that videos from these countries have been published earlier. The important conclusion from the results here is that, although the US publishers dominate the video sample, they did not in general receive more attention than publishers from other countries.

Table 5.9: Comparing US and non-US videos per number of views, ratings, text comments and video responses

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Nb. of views	USA	615	301,67	1582,94	63,83
	non-USA	375	307,65	1054,08	54,43
Nb. of ratings	USA	612	3,05	11,08	,45
	non-USA	370	4,30	12,95	,67
Nb. of text comments	USA	615	1,99	7,74	,31
	non-USA	371	2,74	12,74	,66
Nb. of video responses	USA	615			
	non-USA	375			

These results are partly contradict the conclusion from the qualitative content analysis of YouTube LLC discourse in terms of its transnationality. While, on the one hand, YouTube argues it is a global company, it is on the other hand primarily US-centred. To illustrate, among the location preferences which could be set on the homepage, the "worldwide" option equals the American option (see Figure 5.15).

Figure 5.4: "Location content preferences" on the YouTube homepage[56] (since Slovenia does not feature among the options, I selected Germany as my current location)

Current Location: **Germany**   Show locations

Set Your Location Content Preference (What is this?)

🌐 Worldwide (All)

Australia	India	New Zealand	
Canada	Ireland	UK	
Brazil	France	Japan	Poland
Czech Republic	Hong Kong	South Korea	Russia
Germany	Israel	Mexico	Sweden
Spain	Italy	Netherlands	Taiwan

Current Language: **English**   Show languages
Safety Mode is off

Similarly, the two promotional videos for the two versions of the programme are entitled: "The YouTube Nonprofit Program[57]" for theUS and "The UK YouTube Non Profit Programme[58]" for the UK - here too theUS version is described as universal. The non-profit partnership programme was at the time available only for the US and the UK. Most importantly, YouTube LLC is US-centric when it comes to promotion of political institutions.

On the other hand, at the time of the analysis of official YouTube LLC discourse (February 2010), the YouTube LLC's channel CitizenTube provided a large number of videos on anti-government protests in Iran. It thus promotes YouTube as a space for overcoming censorship imposed by national governments. In this sense You Tube LLC builds on ideas associated with the "YouTube effect" (Naim 2009, n.p.):

> Fifteen years ago, the world marveled at the fabled "CNN effect." [...]
> But the YouTube effect will be even more intense. Although the BBC,

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56 http://www.youtube.com/, 8.2.2010

57 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3hiDCNM1G50&feature=player_embedded,
   8.2.2010

58 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oaF6oFmZ_qw&feature=player_embedded,
   8.2.2010

CNN, and other international news operations employ thousands of professional journalists, they will never be as omnipresent as millions of people carrying a cell phone that can record video. Thanks to their ubiquity, the world was able to witness a shooting on a 19,000-foot mountain pass. (Naim 2009, n.p.)

On the CitizenTube blog, the postings of video footage of protests in Iran are described by YouTube LLC as follows:

Within hours of the protesters hitting the streets of Iran today, videos began streaming onto YouTube that document the large crowds chanting anti-government slogans and violent clashes with anti-riot police forces. Once again, these extraordinary videos provide an exclusive window into what's taking place on the ground, as foreign press have been banned from the country. YouTube remains blocked in Iran, but dissidents are passing videos to friends out of the country and using Internet circumvention technologies to post the footage, according to news reports and correspondence with those on the ground.59

According to the "CNN effect", the visual coverage of human suffering was seen to drive US foreign policy (e.g. Gowing 1994; Bahador 2007). This idea has, however, been criticized by Hafez (2005/2007, 46-51), since CNN is seen not to be leading but following US foreign policy. The same note of caution should be sounded in the case of YouTube LLC promoting videos from the protests in Iran – it remains to be investigated whether YouTube LLC follows US foreign policy or has an influence upon it. At this point optimism regarding the "YouTube effect", arising from the attention given by YouTube LLC to the Iranian protests, should be cautioned with the acknowledgement that relations between the US and the Iranian government were tense before the protests started and that a negative view of the Iranian government followed rather than countered US foreign policy.

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59   http://www.citizentube.com/2010/02/hundreds-of-new-protest-videos-flood.html, 12.2.2010

YouTube LLC claims that it is "the leader in online video, and the premier destination to watch and share original videos *worldwide* through a web experience"[60] (emphasis added).

> YouTube provides a forum for people to connect, inform and inspire others across the globe[61]

YouTube is accessible in languages which reflect the choice of the countries for which YouTube wishes to "glocalise" its offer. The term glocalism, according to Robertson (1992, 173), was developed in particular reference to marketing issues and is in this sense closely related to the concept of "microtargeting": "the tailoring and advertising of goods and services on a global or near-global level to increasingly differentiated local and particular markets" (Robertson 1995, 28). An example of such localised targeting is provided on YouTube Advertise Channel[62] where content could be specifically selected from five countries: the US, the UK, Canada, Germany and France. The content is slightly different in each of the versions of the channel. The presentational video "Welcome to the World of YouTube" presented on the US and Canada version of the channel, for example, changes slightly in the German[63], UK[64], and French[65] versions.

Among those parts of the world that are less addressed by YouTube LLC, we find the African continent. To illustrate: the YouTube "Insight tool" (part of Google "Video Targeting") refers to the possibility of analysing the general YouTube audience or the audience for one's own video according to several criteria (the tool is available to all users who have a YouTube or

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[60] http://www.gstatic.com/youtube/engagement/platform/autoplay/advertise/downloads/YouTube_Targeting.pdf, 10.2.2010

[61] http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet, 8.2.2010

[62] http://www.youtube.com/advertise, 9.2.2010

[63] http://www.youtube.com/watchv=NTINpgroRR4&feature=player_embedded, accessed 9.2.2010, video content

[64] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nCpMDC54OkU&feature=player_embedded, accssed 9.2.2010, video content

[65] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5poHyrkU0Y&feature=player_embedded, accessed 9.2.2010, video content

Google account), one of which is geographical location. The geographical location is diversified into three groups: Americas (United States, Canada, Brazil, Mexico), Asia-Pacific (Australia, Japan), and EMEA (France, Germany, Italy, Israel, Poland, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, United Kingdom). The selection of countries almost completely ignores Asia and completely ignores Africa.

The 19 countries identified are seen by YouTube as its primary markets and are the countries for which it allows "location content preferences" – filtering the content from selected countries. One of the responses to "frequently asked questions" at YouTube LLC's "Press Room" site is that they:

> want to do *more than simply translate the service and features* into our users' native languages—we *also want to contextualise and localise the features* for each individual market. This takes time, but is very much in our plans and *we look forward to bringing YouTube to an even larger global audience* in the near future.[66] (emphasis added)

In "bringing YouTube to an even larger global audience", YouTube LLC does not specifically address its potential role as an intermediary of communication amongst these audiences – thus to extend communication beyond their specific countries or regions. YouTube LLC attempts to create localised version of YouTube for each individual market – thus to make specific separate national YouTubes in plural rather than a common overarching communication platform.

Moreover, YouTube promotes a glocalised approach amongst its users. For example, YouTube description's of the "success story" of one of its partners, DemandMedia, specifically stresses the glocalised approach as a reason for its popularity:

> The Insight tool available to YouTube Partners helped Demand Media gain deeper knowledge about its audience as well. When the company

66   http://www.youtube.com/press_room, accessed 8.2.2010

realised that a significant portion of its channel traffic was coming from outside the USA, Demand Media created country-specific channels to engage audiences in their local language, with local experts, such as eHow channels for UK, Mexico, France, India and Japan. [67]

With the aim of "bringing YouTube to an even larger global audience", YouTube LLC thus paradoxically narrows this audience. First, by selecting the specific countries whose *markets* they are interested in and neglecting others, for whom it would not pay to provide a localised version of the site. Second, as Burgess and Green (2009, 86) have already warned, by glocalisation of YouTube use. Glocalisation means segregating YouTube users according to their country of residence, creating different YouTube experiences for different countries and diminishing the possibilities for interaction that would transcend the borders of nation-states.

5.9 Inclusiveness

The analysis showed that to a very large extent YouTube is a space for user-generated content published by individuals. The most common actors publishing YouTube videos on the two selected global issues were non-affiliated individuals: 55.9 per cent of videos on global warming and 47,9 % of videos on the global financial crisis were published by actors who presented themselves as individuals and did not express any affiliation on their YouTube "channel" (see Table 5.16).

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67 http://www.youtube.com/t/partnerships_success, 9.2.2010

Table 5.10 : Number of published videos per type of video publisher

Type of video publisher	video theme				Total	
	global warming		global financial crisis			
	n	%	n	%	n	%
non-affiliated individual	556	55,9%	58	47,9%	614	55,1%
affiliated individual	24	2,4%	7	5,8%	31	2,8%
non-governmental organisation	332	33,4%	6	5,0%	338	30,3%
educational organisation	9	,9%	12	9,9%	21	1,9%
mass media house or press agency	52	5,2%	29	24,0%	81	7,3%
political organisation/actor	9	,9%	6	5,0%	15	1,3%
business corporation	12	1,2%	3	2,5%	15	1,3%
Total	994	100,0%	121	100,0%	1115	100,0%
Missing	43		8		51	
Total	1037		129		1166	

In the case of global warming, 33.4 per cent of videos belonged to NGOs. The number of NGOs publishing on the global financial crisis was much lower (5 per cent). This difference confirms the thesis above that, in the run-up to the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, YouTube was recognised as an important space for appeals for awareness and mobilisation.

In the case of the global financial crisis, the second most common type of publishers were media houses or press agencies (24 per cent for the global financial crisis and 5.2 per cent for global warming). These results show that the "big players" in mass media have obviously recognised YouTube as an online environment appropriate for the extension of their viewership. Agence France Presse and Associated Press both published YouTube videos on global warming on the selected dates. And among the main international news providers, Al Jazeera English, Russia Today, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle English and Euronews all published videos on the two issues. This is not due to the cheapness of the technology (they can and do publish videos on their websites), but due to the potential of reaching YouTube users by providing content that can be searched for within the

YouTube search engine. Most of these actors, however, were not very successful in reaching YouTube users, and the differences between the number of views the individual videos received were very large. While Associated Press managed to reach 4.144 views with its video on global warming, Agence France Presse on average earned only 115 views with the two videos on global warming they posted on YouTube. With only a few exceptions, most of the international news channels attracted fewer than 300 views per video in one month and almost zero ratings, comments or video responses –far less than they attract with their regular television broadcasting. Amongst the most viewed international news providers was the small "vloging" media network Rocketboom[68]. With 12,763 views, 364 ratings, 206 comments and zero video responses, it was topped only by Al Jazzera and the White House (see Table 5.17). Rocketboom could be described as a "poster child" for YouTube news provision. It is a small group of media producers specialising in online content provision and providing daily news in the form of entertaining yet critical parodies of the "serious" daily news provided by television channels.

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68 Rocketboom describes itself as "a daily international news and entertainment network of online programming based in New York City. We cover and create a wide range of information and commentary from top news stories to contemporary internet culture." http://www.rocketboom.com/about/ 10. 8. 2010

Table 5.11: First 30 YouTube videos according to number of views

	Global warming (n=1037)			Global financial crisis (n=129)		
1	country	Type	views	country	type	views
2	USA	non-affiliated individual	20178	USA	The White House	38147
3	USA	non-affiliated individual	19211	international	Al Jazeera English	28658
4	USA	individual affiliated with BC Prints	14277	international	Rocketboom	12762
5	USA	League of Conservation Voters	13714	UK	non-affiliated individual	9572
6	Not-provided	non-affiliated individual	10961	UK	non-affiliated individual	7302
7	USA	non-affiliated individual	10224	India	non-affiliated individual	5714
8	USA	Minnesotans For Global Warming	8495	international	Al Jazeera English	4111
9	Canada	non-affiliated individual	7944	international	Al Jazeera English	3115
10	Canada	non-affiliated individual	7901	international	Al Jazeera English	2407
11	Canada	non-affiliated individual	7048	Canada	non-affiliated individual	1652
12	USA	Environmental Defense Fund	6342	international	ITN News Channel	1458
13	Italy	non-affiliated individual	6193	international	International Forecaster	1371
14	USA	Reason.tv	6182	international	International Forecaster	1151
15	USA	non-affiliated individual	5796	international	Al Jazeera English	1058
16	Denmark	non-affiliated individual	5324	international	International Forecaster	1024
17	USA	Beaufort Tea Party	4851	international	Al Jazeera English	1021
18	USA	non-affiliated individual	4495	international	International Forecaster	945
19	USA	Greenpeace USA	4479	UK	individual affiliated with Thomson Reuters	922
20	international	Associated Press	4144	international	The World Bank	842
21	USA	non-affiliated individual	3595	Ireland	non-affiliated individual	647
22	USA	individual affiliated with Freedomfists.net	2943	international	RussiaToday	639
23	international	Surfrider Foundation	2795	USA	Carnegie Mellon University	594
24	Canada	non-affiliated individual	2699	USA	FORA.tv	592
25	Canada	non-affiliated individual	2687	Spain	non-affiliated individual	570
26	Russia	Russia Today	2580	Germany	non-affiliated individual	501
27	USA	non-affiliated individual	2560	UK	non-affiliated individual	475
28	USA	non-affiliated individual	2538	international	United Nations Organisation	455
29	USA	350.org	2513	USA	non-affiliated individual	433
30	UK	individual affiliated with Paranormalcrazy	2452	USA	non-affiliated individual	418
31	Denmark	Stop Wasting Food	2384	AUS	non-affiliated individual	349

With its slogan "Broadcast Yourself!", You Tube LLC promises the same level of reach as the traditional broadcasting media. It therefore promotes public communication in its classical meaning as being open to strangers (e.g. Kant 1784 n.p.; Carrey 1995, 381; Calhoun 2001, 162). If we compare the top 30 videos according to number of views (Table 5.17), we see that the videos on the global financial crisis reached "higher peaks" than the videos

on global warming. The most striking difference between the two themes is the fact that, on global warming, the top 30 most viewed videos were published almost exclusively by individuals and NGOs. The only two exceptions were Greenpeace USA and Russia Today. Moreover, there were no political actors amongst these top 30 videos on global warming. In the case of the global financial crisis, the share of traditional "big players" was much larger, especially in terms of major mass media: Al Jazeera, ITN News, International Forecaster and political actors: the White House, the World Bank and the United Nations Organisation. These differences may thus explain why global financial crisis videos received more attention than global warming videos.

Political and business actors were, in relative terms, more involved in publishing YouTube videos on the financial crisis than on global warming, but still much less common than other actors: less than 1 per cent in the case of global warming and 6 per cent in the case of global financial crisis were published by political and business actors (excluding mass media) – almost exclusivelyUS-based. From Table 5.17 it can be seen that the video that received the highest number of views amongst all selected videos belonged to the White House. This was, as noted above, US President Barack Obama's "Weekly Address: Progress in the Global Economy". [69] It received 38,147 views, 448 ratings, 550 textual comments and zero video responses for this video. The fact that the video from the White House attracted the most attention among all videos analysed supports the thesis that on YouTube we can speak of "politics as usual", to borrow the words of Margolis and Resnick (2000). Yet this result should be analysed with caution – the data on the level of attention that the political actors received in general show that the video from the White House was an exception that cannot be easily extrapolated to all political actors that publish on YouTube.

Castells advises the United Nations Organisation to engage with civil society not only via institutional mechanisms and procedures of political

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69   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hq8XowRpQRI, 28.5.2010

representation but also in "the global public sphere built around the media communication system and Internet networks, particularly in the social spaces of the web 2.0, as exemplified by YouTube, MySpace, Facebook, and the growing blogosphere" (Castells 2008, 90). The United Nations Organisation seemingly followed this advice and started to invest in their online presence on YouTube. There were three videos published by the United Nations Organisation (two on global warming and one on the global financial crisis) in the sample for analysis. Three videos were also published by the World Bank. It seems that these two institutions wanted to tap into the everyday Web 2.0 online environment of the global citizenry by publishing on YouTube – yet in terms of absolute numbers, they were not very successful . Within one month of publishing the three videos published by the United Nations Organisation on average earned 323 views, six ratings, one comment and zero video responses per video. The three videos from the World Bank on average received 396 views, two ratings, zero comments and zero video responses.

The ANOVA test of differences between number of views according to the type of video publisher shows, that with the exception of differences between business corporations and non-affiliated individuals, the difference in number of views per type of video publisher is not significant. It thus seems that the differences within groups in terms of number of views are greater than the differences between groups.

Table 5.12: Number of views according to type of publisher

	Valid	Missing	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Valid
non-affiliated individual*	573		1	20178	52	**376,28**	1606,32
affiliated individual	28		6	14277	86,5	**815,61**	2729,55
non-governmental organisation	331		1	13714	7	**181,47**	1040,42
educational organisation	21		2	594	12	**87,1**	163,39
mass media house or press agency	81		2	28658	117	**1033,54**	3556,00
political organisation/actor	15		4	38147	220	**2829,73**	9774,48
business corporation*	15		2	874	24	**83,8**	219,75
Total	1064		1	38147	32	**402,03**	2064,40

*The ANOVA Test shows significant differences between non-affiliated individuals and business corporations.

Comparison of the number of ratings[70] and comments[71], however, shows a different picture from comparison by number of views. Both in terms of the number of ratings and the number of textual comments non-affiliated individuals attracted a significantly larger volume of feedback from YouTube users than NGOs, educational organisations and business corporations. Thus, on the one hand, these data confirm Burgess and Green's (2008) thesis that individual publishing most commonly invites feedback, while this is less so with "traditional uploaders". On the other hand, the data also contradict this thesis – individual users did not attract larger numbers of ratings or comments than media and political actors. Both political and media actors on average received larger numbers of views, ratings and

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70 Univariate ANOVA for number of ratings after one month according to type of publisher and theme: Levene's test of equality of error variances shows that variances are not equal (sig.= 0,000); the Games-Howell test shows less than 0.5 significance among non-affiliated individuals and business actors; non-affiliated individuals and educationalorganisations; non-affiliated individuals and non-governmentalorganisations.

71 Univariate ANOVA for number of ratings after one month according to type of publisher and theme: Levene's test of equality of error variances shows that variances are not equal (sig.= 0,000); the Games-Howell test shows less than 0.5 significance among non-affiliated individuals and business actors; non-affiliated individuals and educational organisations; non-affiliated individuals and non-governmentalorganisations.

comments, yet the ANOVA test and standard deviations show that these differences should not so much be attributed to group differences but to a smaller number of very "successful" cases among media and political actors. Further research is needed, yet it may be that different users attract different comments depending on to whom they are addressed. Thus, on the one hand, individual publishers may invite more feedback than other actors, as Burgess and Green observed (2008). On the other hand, the large volume of comments on videos published by "traditional uploaders", in this case political and mass media publishers, may not be the result of an intention to communicate directly *with* these publishers, but to communicate with other YouTube users *about* these publishers. More research is thus needed in the future to distinguish between direction and aims of communication in forms such as video comments.

Table 5.13: Number of ratings according to type of video publisher*

Type of video publisher	Valid	Missing	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Deviation
non-affiliated individual*	568		0	489	1	**5,74**	28,75
affiliated individual	28		0	56	1	**6,46**	12,54
NGO*	331		0	81	0	**1,47**	7,88
educational organisation*	21		0	3	0	**0,48**	0,87
mass media house or press agency	81		0	364	1	**13,23**	44,27
political organisation/actor	15		0	448	3	**33,40**	114,75
business corporation*	15		0	4	0	**0,93**	1,44
Total	1059		0	489	0	**5,22**	28,46

*The ANOVA Test shows significant differences between non-affiliated individuals and NGOs, educational organisations and business corporations.

Table 5.14: Number of textual comments according to type of video publisher*

Type of video publisher	Valid	Missing	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Deviation
non-affiliated individual*	571		0	316	0	**3,33**	16,79
affiliated individual	28		0	19	1	**2,57**	5,11
NGO*	331		0	34	0	**0,65**	3,19
educational organisation*	20		0	5	0	**0,25**	1,12
mass media house or press agency	74		0	206	0	**11,99**	36,84
political organisation/actor	15		0	750	1	**52,73**	193,01
business corporation*	15		0	2	0	**0,40**	0,74
Total	1054		0	750	0	**3,68**	28,08

*The ANOVA Test shows significant differences between non-affiliated individuals and NGOs, educational organisations and business corporations.

Another result of the analysis was that video responses were an extremely rare form of communication: 96.7 per cent of videos, in the case of global warming, and 94.3 per cent in the case of the global financial crisis, did not receive any video responses. The video that received the most video responses (10) was once again the video published by the White House. It seems that video communication is employed on YouTube mostly in terms of one-directional flow, as the slogan "Broadcast Yourself!" suggests, and that the possibilities for two-directional video deliberation were not employed.

Table 5.15: Number of video responses after one month

	Global warming		Global financial crisis	
Video responses	Frequency	Valid Percent	Frequency	Valid Percent
0	957	96,7	115	94,3
1	28	2,8	5	4,1
2	4	,4	0	0
5	1	,1	0	0
10	0	0	2	1,6
Total	990	100,0	122	
Missing	47		7	
	1037		129	

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Additionally to analysing the diversity of publishers, video content that was published by individuals was analysed in terms of whether it was their own original content or whether it was copied in full from other outlets. A common critique of content published on YouTube is that it is mostly content copied from other mass media outlets (e.g. Dean 2007, 125; Kruitbosch and Nack 2008, n.p.; Green and Burgess 2009, 42). The results of this analysis show that 41.7 per cent of all videos published by non-affiliated individuals on global warming were indeed copied in full from other sources. This percentage was twice as high in the case of the global financial crisis: here 82.8 per cent of videos published by non-affiliated individuals were copied in full from other sources. Similarly to the results of the work of Green and Burgess (2009, 42), the content is to a large extent copied from mass media outlets: 32.1 per cent in the case of global warming and 69.3 per cent in the case of the global financial crisis (Table 5.22). Yet in contrast to Green and Burgess' analysis, where they assumed that content could be copied only from "traditional mass media", this analysis shows that in the case of global warming, NGOs were also an important source for individuals' YouTube videos: 11.0 per cent of videos published by non-affiliated individuals were copied from national or international NGOs. This result again shows that global warming was the issue that aroused more mobilisation and engagement from "activists" on YouTube.

Table 5.16: Videos published by non-affiliated individuals and copied in full according to the type of source

	Global warming		Global financial crisis	
	n	%	n	%
non-governmental national organisation	21	9,0%	-	-
non-governmental international organisation	7	3,0%	1	1,9%
national mass media house	64	27,4%	25	48,1%
international mass media house	11	4,7%	11	21,2%
national political organisation	1	,4%	1	1,9%
international political organisation	1	,4%	-	-
national business corporation	9	3,8%	2	3,8%
international business corporation	1	,4%	2	3,8%
Not possible to determine	119	50,9%	10	19,2%
	234	100,0%	52	100,0%

Regarding inclusiveness, the analysis of YouTube LLC discourse in relation to its political nature has shown, as presented above, that YouTube LLC promotes US political institutions and non-governmental organisations. At the same time, the "typical" YouTube user is conceived by You Tube LLC, on the one hand, as an individual actor, and, on the other hand, as a member of the "YouTube community". YouTube LLC offers its video publishers the possibility of becoming "YouTube partners", described by YouTube LLC as:

> [...] large media companies such as Universal Music or MGM, through niche media properties such as Expert Village or Mondo Media, to members of the YouTube community who have created such consistently popular videos that we have invited them to join the YouTube Partner Program like Fred or Smosh.[72]

I analysed which types of YouTube publishers were promoted on the Partner Programme[73] description. Most of these (28 from 36) belonged to

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     http://www.gstatic.com/youtube/engagement/platform/autoplay/advertise/downloads/YouTube_PartnerWatch.pdf, 10.2.2010

73   http://www.youtube.com/t/partnerships_showcase, 8.2.2010

publishers who identify themselves as non-affiliated individuals, 3 belonged to groups of individuals, who however were not organised into any organisation or association and 3 to companies or corporations which identified themselves as media companies but were not large media companies but rather "niche media properties". The videos published by individual partners were mostly vlogs (video publisher speaking directly into the camera) or home-made humorous videos. YouTube LLC thus promotes, in line with its official slogan "Broadcast Yourself!" YouTube partnership as an opportunity for voices that are marginalised in the mainstream broadcasting models of mass media.

YouTube LLC presents itself as "all about the community" and "community control". They carefully avoid other expressions such as audience or users, but consistently term YouTube users as the YouTube community which is "for everyone":

> YouTube is a place for people to engage in new ways with video whenever and wherever they want. YouTube began as a personal video sharing service and has quickly grown into the world's leading video community on the Internet. YouTube offers a community for everyone**,** including personal video creators such as cooking, beauty, health and fitness experts; aspiring and professional musicians; amateur and established filmmakers; comedians; and professional content owners. The community is truly in control on YouTube and they determine what is popular on the site.[74]

YouTube LLC thus directly builds upon the prognosis of "regenerating community thorough mediated forms of interaction" (Jankowski 2002, 34), which has been an important part of scholarly debate on new media (not just the internet) (for an overview see Jankowski 2002). Tönnies's (1922/1998, 71-72) classical conceptualisation of the term "community" is characterised by personal interactions where people know each other. What is lost in

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74   http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet, 8.2.2010

YouTube's employment of the term versus Tönnies's understanding is the concept of hierarchy and hierarchical communication. On YouTube, it seems, everyone is equal: individuals are presented by YouTube LLC as being equal even to "professional content owners" – in other words large media houses. By adding organisations to the concept of the community, the line between individuals and organisations is blurred, implicitly arguing that individuals can feel the same level of interactive communication with actors of various forms of organisation, as they would have towards members of one's own community. YouTube's employment of the term community furthermore does away with the distinction between audience and producer, in line with current ideas on "produsage" (Burns 2008). Moreover, as social ties and not locality are often understood as the main indicators of (virtual) community (Jankowski 2002, 38), by employing the term "community" YouTube LLC evokes the idea of being an international community of interest where people gather and form ties not on the basis of their pre-defined ethnic identity, but self-created identity of interests.

YouTube LCC argues that on YouTube "the community is truly in control" and thus connotes that this means inclusiveness in structural media participation – in the production of media output and in media decision-making. Yet what YouTube LLC has in mind by being "truly in control" is that the users "determine what is popular on the site".[75] Determining what is popular in terms of having greater influence on the selection of content to view is, to a certain extent, an extention of structural participation – especially when compared to traditional media monopolies. Yet by claiming that determining popularity means that on YouTube "the community is truly in control", YouTube LLC narrows structural participation in two ways. First, by neglecting other forms of inclusion in decision-making processes regarding YouTube, such as its structure, design, video promotion processes etc. And second, by denying the role of YouTube LLC as an intermediary with an important role in determining which content gains popularity – for example by means such as the promotion of videos, word search engine

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[75]   http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet, 8.2.2010

possibilities and navigation by means of "related videos". In comparison to the "old" mass media, the editorial responsibility of YouTube LLC is denied while editorial functions are not abandoned.

Another mechanism of structural participation may be the fact that YouTube users have the opportunity to report content that they deem inappropriate: "YouTube staff review flagged videos 24 hours a day, seven days a week to determine whether they violate our Community Guidelines".76 In order, however, for this mechanism to be considered as a form of structural participation, the criteria on inappropriate content written in the "Community Guidelines" should be a result of inclusion in the decision-making process and not defined top down by YouTube LLC.

Finally, Google allows for options such as "opting out" of interest-based advertising or adding or deleting interest categories.[77] Yet this possibility cannot be considered as an element of structural participation – not only because the default possibility is "opting in" but because the options in this decision are pre-defined by Google – you cannot, for example, "opt out" of advertising as a whole.

5.10 YouTube LLC's commercial nature

Google's acquisition of You Tube LLC is one of the three mechanisms in the creation of the "Google layer" (Milbery and Anderson 2009). YouTube LLC describes itself as an autonomous subsidiary, which will only gain from "Google's resources and technology leadership". The acquisition, they argue, did not affect YouTube's mission to be "all about the community".

> YouTube's business was built, for the most part, by our community. The user experience will not change—we are committed to our users and will continue to listen to our community's feedback. The

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76   http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines, 10.2.2010
77   http://www.google.com/privacy_ads.html, 10.2.2010

community is still in control on YouTube and, at the end of the day, they decide what's entertaining.

Our independence empowers us to continue to build the best, most entertaining video experience on the Internet. Google's resources and technology leadership will provide us with the flexibility to expand and improve that experience further[78]

Google's ownership is recognisable within YouTube LLC operations, from design synchronisation (see Figure 5.23) to interconnectivity of functions, especially advertising mechanisms.

Figure 5.5: Google and YouTube homepage logotypes, 11.7.2010

Milberry and Anderson (2009, 400) have identified two mechanisms in the creation of the "Google layer" (see above): (a) node promotion – the practice of using existing properties to promote other properties in a media conglomerate's network promotion; and (b) rival exclusion – the blocking or degrading of access to competitor services, spaces or tools. My analysis of YouTube LLC discourse did not provide information regarding rival exclusion, but it didshow a very high volume of node promotion. For example, promotion of Google is prominent on the YouTube homepage, where there is a specific option entitled: "Add YouTube to your Google homepage" and "Try YouTube in a fast, new browser! Download Google Chrome for PC" (see Figure 5.24). Google's promotion is furthermore intertwined in YouTube's self-promotion. Within one promotional video, for example, theystate: "YouTube has become as synonymous with online video as Google has with websearch[79]".

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78   http://www.youtube.com/t/faq, 8.2.2010
79 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iFXcNnq2OHc&feature=player_embedded,
     10.2.2010, video content

Figure 5.6: Promotion of Google on YouTube homepage

Another element of node promotion could be seen in YouTube LLC's use of Blogger for its official blogs, since Blogger is owned by Google. Some YouTube features may use other Google services such as Google Checkout or AdSense[80]. Furthermore, the content belonging to YouTube's sometimes transfers from YouTube to Google. Within YouTube developer's tools there is, for example, a tool named "Developer Dashboard" which requires a Google account since it belongs to Google Code.

Most importantly, YouTube has become part of the "Google layer" through its attempts to synchronise users' Google and YouTube identities. Specifically, it is possible to sign into YouTube either via a special YouTube account or via a Google account. Within the "Google layer", attempts are thus made to shape a world where everyone is identifiable through the same online account. This makes online preferences traceable through a broad variety of online activities and the data, due to its target-marketing value, even more profitable.

As stated above, Miliken et al. (2008, n.p.) claim that YouTube is similar to the public sphere because of the ability of members to upload content without paying or being paid. It is true that content commodification in terms of paying for access to YouTube content is not directly present on YouTube – it is not true, however, that no one pays to publish their content (advertisers) or that no one publishing on YouTube is paid (YouTube partners).

With the exception of Community Guidelines and Terms of Service, most other YouTube LLC documents I have analysed seem to be addressing not "the community" but advertisers and potential partners. Advertisers on YouTube are afforded a number of possibilities to advertise accompanying

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80 http://www.youtube.com/t/privacy?hl=en_GB, 10.2.2010

YouTube videos. Gaining revenue from advertising means that YouTube LLC is involved in audience commodification in terms of selling audiences to advertisers, whereby they especially prize the possibilities of target marketing, for example by words for advertisers: "The right user at the right time with the right message."[81] Advertising can be targeted according to the geographic location of the user: specific by country, region or even city. Audiences could be targeted according to age, gender and interest. "Interest-Based Advertising", for example, identifies common interest groups among users that have affinities for particular types of content.[82] Advertising can also be added to videos that receive the most views, comments and ratings.

YouTube LLC has developed a specific model of labour commodification. On the one hand, as Andrejevic (2009, 419) points out, it commodifies the free online labour of YouTube users in terms of their everyday activities on YouTube, such as publishing video content, tagging videos, reporting copyright or other violations of "YouTube community guidelines" and even viewing and rating videos and thus working as editors of content. On the other hand, it commodifies its users' labour by sharing advertising revenues with its "YouTube partners".

The potential partners need to show that they will prove themselves commercially profitable either by having already become popular with YouTube users or by being an important player in terms of "popular or commercially successful" content provision outside of YouTube.

> To become a YouTube Partner, you must meet these minimum requirements:
> You create original videos suitable for online streaming.

81

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ODBXPuV34mk&feature=player_embedded, 10.2.2010, video content

82
   http://www.gstatic.com/youtube/engagement/platform/autoplay/advertise/downloads/YouTube_Targeting.pdf, 10.2.2010

> You own or have express permission to use and monetise all audio and video content that you upload—no exceptions.
>
> You regularly upload videos that are viewed by thousands of YouTube users, or you publish popular or commercially successful videos in other ways (such as DVDs sold online). […]
>
> Applications are reviewed for a variety of criteria, including your country of residence, content quality, consistency with our Community Guidelines and Terms of Service, and size of audience on YouTube and through other distribution channels.[83]

With the partnership programme, YouTube seems to follow Bruns' (2008a) positive description of "produsage" as a model where consumers also become producers in the financialsense. With the words "Share in revenue-generating opportunities"[84], YouTube LLC wants to describe the partnership programme as a positive response to critiques of exploitation of free online labour (e.g. Terranova 2003; Andrejevic 2009), by not exploiting the free labour of its users but sharing advertising revenue with them.

By introducing the "monetisation" of content, YouTube LLC also performs external commodification. It is transforming communication that was not originally conceptualised in economic terms, such as expressing one's opinion and participating in public communication, into a commodity that can be sold.

Once selected, YouTube partners are offered a variety of benefits[85]:

a) "monetisation" – "As a YouTube partner, you will be able to share in revenue-generating opportunities", by four mechanisms: advertisement, video renting, co-marketing and own advertisement

b) "insight" – "Use our Insight analytics tools to optimise your existing content and create more targeted content to satisfy your audience and advertisers."

c) "protection" – users can protect their work as copyright (although nothing

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83 http://www.youtube.com/t/partnerships_faq, 8.2.2010
84 http://www.youtube.com/t/partnerships_benefits, 8.2.2010
85 http://www.youtube.com/t/partnerships_faq, 8.2.2010

is said here about the copyrights that are afforded to YouTube automatically according to Terms of Service),

d) "quality" – YouTube partners can publish their videos in high-definition quality.

In other words, on YouTube "the rich get richer". Those who are already very popular are afforded additional techniques, such as the possibility of analysing user demographics, thus leading to the creation of targeted content. The mechanism of YouTube partnerships thus follows the mechanism of Google advertising described by Bermejo (2009, 148), whereby Google promotes those advertisements according to their previous performance. With this sort of mechanism, YouTube LLC is not actively engaging in the monopolisation of voices on YouTube but is actively promoting it.

The primary aim of the YouTube partnership programme is for YouTube LLC to have control over which content is being placed next to which advertisements. YouTube LLC states:

> We understand that some advertisers may be nervous about running advertising against unknown user generated content. Your advertising will only appear against the videos of our tried and trusted content partners. Each partner goes through a thorough vetting and is regularly checked to ensure that they are uploading appropriate content.[86]

YouTube LLC developed automatic video identification to secure copyright:

> This [video identification] allows us to establish ownership and make sure that when we run advertising we have all the appropriate rights cleared.[87]

86
   http://www.gstatic.com/youtube/engagement/platform/autoplay/advertise/downloads/YouTube_PromotedVideos.pdf, 10.2.2010

87   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWizsV5Le7s&feature=player_embedded,

While individual copyright owners can request video removals if their copyright has been breached, another possibility is to "monetize" the publication of such content. This option is possible for "rights holders who have more complex and high-volume copyright needs"[88] Instead of removing YouTube videos that breach copyright, YouTube LLC has thus developed a more profitable mechanism – allowing those copyright owners for whom it would be profitable (such as large media houses) to monetise or gain online metrics from those videos.

As stated above, content commodification in terms of paying for access to content is not present on YouTube. Content commodification is performed by YouTube LLC by means of another mechanism, securing copyright, whereby it promotes freedom of entrepreneurship before freedom of communication and the right to property before the right to communicate (Splichal 2002a; 2002b). At the same time, YouTube LLC reserves the copyright of the content produced by its users for itself:

> For clarity, you retain all of your ownership rights in your User Submissions. However, by submitting User Submissions to YouTube, you hereby grant YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable and transferable license to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform the User Submissions in connection with the YouTube Website and YouTube's (and its successors' and affiliates') business, including without limitation for promoting and redistributing part or all of the YouTube Website (and derivative works thereof) in any media formats and through any media channels.[89]

10.2.2010
88 http://www.youtube.com/t/content_management, 10.2.2010
89 http://www.youtube.com/t/terms, 10.2.2010

5.11 Conclusion

New media such as YouTube have been proposed to be a prominent hope for the organisation of the transnational publics, due to their structural conditions: their potentially political nature, inclusiveness, transnational reach and freedom from commercial constraints. These four potentials represent the four main research questions that initiated the empirical exercise conducted in this chapter. This chapter served as an exemplification of an empirical approach to one of the presented approaches to the transnational public, and only a small selection of the problems that I tackle in the overall theoretical part of the dissertation. The chapter provides an illustration of an analysis of one of the dimensions of the transnational public – structure – and is as such intended as only a limited contribution to the overall theoretical analysis of the dissertation. Here I will first briefly summarise the analysis of YouTube in relation to the normative conditions of the structure of the transnational public. Subsequently I will provide proposals for future research on three other dimensions of the transnational public: process, content and efficiency.

First, the analysis of a sample of 1,166 YouTube videos on global warming and the global financial crisis has shown that, on YouTube, expression on transnational public issues does take place, which means that YouTube is recognised as a site for political communication. In particular, the large number of videos published on global warming indicated that YouTube was recognised as an important site for political expression prior to the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. This conclusion is also supported by the large number of videos that were published by NGOs or copied from NGOs and published subsequently by individuals. YouTube LLC engages in activities that shape YouTube as a sphere for political communication: it promotesUS political institutions, NGOs and citizen journalism and performs the more "traditional" media role of mediating communication between YouTube users andthe US authorities. The extent of attention the videos on the two issues received, on the other hand, shows a less positive

picture regarding YouTube as a sphere for political communication, since most videos published only attracted a very small number of views, comments, ratings and video responses. Similarly, the analysis of YouTube LLC discourse has shown that YouTube LLC conceptualises its operations and its users as being focused on entertainment.

Second, regarding YouTube's transnationality, the research results, on the one hand, support the thesis that YouTube is a transnational sphere of communication: videos on the two issues were published by publishers identifying themselves with 49 countries.US video publishers dominated the sample of videos analysed, yet they did not in general receive more attention and feedback from YouTube users than videos published by actors from other countries. On the other hand, YouTube LLC is a US company that is at the same timeUS-centric and attempting to have worldwide market dominance. The companies' model for achieving the goal of worldwide market dominance is the approach of glocalisation – creating specific versions for its 19 primary markets. In this way, YouTube LLC does not engage in performing a role as an intermediary of transnational communication, but rather strives to achieve dominance in each specific market without interconnection of communication amongst its members.

Third, regarding YouTube's inclusiveness, the research results show that YouTube is, as its slogan "Broadcast Yourself!" suggests, to a large extent employed for the video expression of individuals: around half of the videos analysed were published by non-affiliated individuals. At the same time, it is also employed by non-governmental organisations (especially in the case of global warming) and mass media and political actors (especially in the case of the global financial crisis). In the case of global warming, individual publishers gained the most attention and feedback. In the case of global warming, the most attention was received by traditionally powerful voices, such as international mass media (Al Jazeera) and theWhite House. Similarly ambivalent conclusions regarding inclusiveness can be drawn from the analysis of You Tube LLC's discourse. On the one hand, it operates

as a promoter of marginalised voices such as NGOs, citizen journalists and small media. On the other hand, it promotes already powerful political institutions such as theWhite House. The most crucial point regarding YouTube's inclusiveness in relation to the transnational public is the fact that YouTube LLC addresses its users as a "community" and claims that the "YouTube community" is "truly in control", yet this inclusiveness is addressed only at the rhetorical level, in terms allowing users to determine "what is entertaining", and does not mean inclusiveness in the decision-making processes regarding YouTube as a domain of public communication.

The last research question focused on the relationship between YouTube LLC's commercial nature and its function as a sphere for public communication. The fact that YouTube LLC is a commercial company owned by Google is the most problematic structural feature negating its comparison to the structural ideal of the transnational public. This means that YouTube is a privatised sphere that belongs to YouTube LLC, which has the sole decision-making power. Within this private "Google layer", attempts are ongoing to create synchronised identities of users, supporting voice monopolisation of "YouTube partners". YouTube LLC also performs all five types of commodification of communication as identified by Mosco (1996):
– audience commodification by means of advertising,
– content commodification by securing and at the same time reserving copyrights of YouTube content,
– intrinsic commodification by selling metadata on YouTube users,
– commodification of labour by exploiting free online labour and "sharing" advertisement revenues with selected YouTube publishers,
– extensive commodification by creating a sphere of public communication as a privately-owned sphere.

Taking YouTube as an exemplary case study, I have provided some initial tentative critiques regarding attempts to equate the dimension of structure of

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formation of the transnational public to commercially owned new media that function primarily on the basis of user-generated content. I have focused here only upon the dimension of structure of the public (see Chapter 1), since it is argued that social media are a communications structure that provides an opportunity for transnational publics to emerge. Future research should, however, also focus on the other three dimensions of the transnational public: content, process and efficiency.

Regarding content, more research should be conducted in order to analyse how transnational public issues such as global warming and global financial crisis are discursively constructed by YouTube publishers. Here I refer especially to the process of (de)politicisation (Hay 2007) of public issues in two stages: connecting personal troubles with public issues and searching for possible social changes regarding the issue.

Regarding the process, one of the tentative answers of the research conducted on YouTube was that the possibility of video discussion (and not one-way video communication) was almost non-existent in the case of the two issues selected. Further research should be conducted to analyse the relationship between video communication and processional conditions of the public, such as equality, respect, rationality and interactivity. An especially important question that remains to be answered is: how do the structural characteristics of YouTube analysed above influence the process of communication?

Finally, regarding effectiveness, the analysis of YouTube LLC discourse has shown that the company has tried to perform the function of translation, from its users to the White House, by allowing questions to be addressed to the American president via YouTube. This, however, has been an exceptional case. It still remains to be determined what is the relationship between the participation of public authorities in social media such as YouTube, and their willingness to listen to the public.

6 Conclusions: The public in processes of globalisation

6.1 Introduction

The overarching research question that I posed in the present dissertation was: how can the public be conceptualised in a globalised world? In this concluding chapter I first present the four dimensions of the public that have served as an analytical frame throughout the dissertation: structural conditions, process, content and effectiveness. In the second section of this chapter, I analyse the relationship between globalisation and the public and identify the challenges that globalisation has brought for conceptualisation of the public regarding these four dimensions. In the next three sections of this chapter, I analyse the responses to these challenges provided by the three main approaches towards the transnational public in scholarly literature: global governance, transnational social movements and social media.

6.2 Four dimensions of the public

In its classical conceptualisation, the public represents a group of people who are confronted by a potentially public issue, are divided by their ideas as to how to address the issue and proceed to engage in deliberation (Blumer 1946/1953, 46), which in turn is effective in the shaping of political decisions (Mills 1956, 302). The main analytical frame of this dissertation was the conceptualisation of four dimensions of the public in its classical normative understanding: structural conditions, process, content and effectiveness (see Table 6.1). Structural conditions refer to the conditions under which the public is formed: inclusiveness, autonomy from political and economic powers, publicity of required information and diversity of opinion. Process refers to the conditions to which members of the public adhere while deliberating: equality, respect, interactivity and rationality. Content refers to what the public is deliberating about: whether the issue in question is a social problem in terms of having far-reaching, serious and extensive consequences, whether it is possible to effect change and whether this change could not be brought about by any single individual but only through modification of elements of the structure of society. Finally,

effectiveness refers to the results of the organisation of the public: empathic understanding, reaching common decisions (or continuing to seek fair terms of cooperation among equals), and translating the decisions to public powers that are responsible for their implementation.

Table 6.1: Four dimensions of the public in its normative conceptualisation90

Dimension	Normative condition	Definition
Structure	Inclusiveness	Public deliberation is open to all those who may potentially be affected in a significant and long-term way.
	Publicity of required information	Information needed to make the best decision possible is publicly accessible.
	Autonomy from economic and political powers	Institutional authority, with its sanctions and controls, does not penetrate public deliberation, nor does the economic system hinder it in any way.
	Diversity of opinion	Members of the public have different views about the issue at hand.
Process	Equality	Public deliberation is a process of communicative interaction in which virtually as many people express opinion as receive it and all expressed opinions are being listened to. The authority of members of the public is built only upon their deliberative proposals and not outside sources of power, money or influence.
	Interactivity	There is the possibility of responding to an opinion without internal or external reprisals .
	Respect	Members of the public acknowledge the value and dignity of all human beings.
	Rationality	Members of the public propose reasons for believing in their assertions.
Content	Public nature of the issue	The public deliberates whether an issue is a public affair in that its potential consequences are extensive, grave and far-reaching.
	Possibility of social change	The public deliberates whether an issue is subject to change.
Effectiveness	Empathic understanding	Members of the public know the opinions of other members and understand their reasons for holding these opinions.
	Agreement/Deliberative disagreement	Deliberators come to an agreement or they agree to disagree but continue to seek fair terms of cooperation among equals.
	Translation	Decisions reached in public deliberation are transmitted to public powers.
	Regulation	Authorities have the power to regulate the transactions in a way agreed upon by the public.

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90 See Chapter I for a detailed description and references for each of the four dimensions.

6.3 Globalisation and its challenges for the public

On the relationship between the public and globalisation, I have built primarily on the definition of the public's inclusiveness as conceptualised by Dewey:

> The public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically taken care for. (Dewey 1927/1954, 15–16)

Building on Dewey's (1927/1954) distinction between private and public affairs, I argued in Chapter II that globalisation entails a threefold expansion of indirect, enduring and serious consequences that should be accompanied by extension of the public over national borders, which can be illustrated with the case of the global financial crisis.

1.) *Expansion in the transnational character of public issues* in terms of those affected seriously and in the long term beyond existing national borders – the global financial crisis illustrates the expansion in the transnational character of the consequences: although it was triggered by the US real-estate bubble bursting and at first sight seemed to be a purely national phenomenon, it had devastating consequences for people living far beyond US borders. People all over the world have been exposed to the consequences of unemployment and deprivation caused by seemingly invisible and extremely complex financial operations. What at first seemed to be purely US causes of the crisis - growing inequality, an unregulated financial sector involved in speculative activities and a series of large asset bubbles - have proved to be characteristics of economic globalisation and have thus had consequences for most parts of the world.

2.) *Expansion in the variety and number of transnational consequences* – attempts were made to address the financial crisis via state bailouts of banks, which meant the previous financial gains were private yet the losses were made public. It affected food prices, income and government spending, which in turn led to shortages of food, healthcare and other social services.

3.) *Expansion in the number of issues with transnational consequences and subsequently their complex interrelatedness* – the global financial crisis has been recognised as being intrinsically interconnected with global warming – on the one hand, by the arguments about "green industries" representing the solution to both problems, and, on the other hand, by arguments that propose that the two issues are interconnected by their structural causes as part of the capitalist system.

6.3.1 Content

At present, with issues such as the global financial crisis and global warming, we are to some extent witnessing changes in the perceptions of potentially public issues. These changes mostly relate to content as one dimension of the public. Transnational issues brought about by globalisation, such as the global financial crisis and global warming, have so far been recognised as public issues in the sense that their consequences have grave, long-term and extensive consequences. Whether these changes will lead to other changes in content – possibilities for political change and modifications of structural causes – depends primarily on whether and how the changes in content will be accompanied by changes in three other dimensions of the public: structure, process and efficiency.

6.3.2 Structure

Regarding structure, it is particularly the concept of inclusion that needs to be rethought in accordance with the transnational nature of issues in question. In Chapter II I have criticised the modern, primarily Habermas's (1992, 446), narrowing of inclusiveness of the public to the nation-state citizenry. By equating the public with the citizenry, it has been assumed that the democratic norm of inclusiveness has been assured. The inclusiveness of

the public, however, should follow the nature of the issue in question. All those who can argue that the potential consequences affect them in indirect, extensive, enduring and serious ways can legitimately participate in public deliberation upon the regulation of these consequences, regardless of their citizenship.

Globalisation also poses a challenge for the issue of publicly accessible content. Nationally, this condition has been assumed to be served by public institutions such as public service media and public education. On the transnational level, such functions are ascribed mostly to international mass media (e.g. Volkmer 2003) and to non-governmental organisations (e.g. Scholte 2002, 293 – 295), especially by means of new media. Yet the media, new media included, and education operate on the transnational level primarily as economic corporations, something that is contrary to the third structural condition of the public: autonomy from political and economic constraints.

Globalisation entails a specific problem for the public: it entails transnational inequalities that negate the ideals of the structure and process of the public. The common interest of members of the transnational public is to regulate the activities of actors who influence their lives with grave and long-term consequences. Here we encounter a conflict of interests between those affected and those who affect. The problem is in the structural advantages of those who affect, such as strong nation-states and transnational economic and political actors. The most important problem for the transnational public is how to combat the very structural problems that, on the one hand, are the reasons why the transnational public should emerge, and, on the other hand, prevent this public emerging in the first place.

Specific challenges in terms of diversity of opinion are the cultural differences inherent in the transnational diversity of opinion, especially differences in values. This problem is further aggravated by the fact that the

ideal of the public itself is a concept deriving from Western tradition and is as such open to scrutiny of its Western-centric elements.

6.3.3 Process

Regarding process, equality is hindered by the fact that globalisation entails structural inequalities that provide the very reason why the transnational public should be formed. To illustrate this point in the case of the global financial crisis: economic actors that operate in the speculative financial markets are those whose operations should be transnationally regulated. The structural inequalities in terms of wealth have allowed these actors to operate in a way that has led to extensive, serious and long-term consequences at the transnational level. All those affected by these consequences should start forming a transnational public that would strive for the regulation of such operations. Yet the same inequality in terms of wealth that has allowed transnational consequences also allows these actors to have structural advantages when it comes to transnational public communication – which hinders the formation of the transnational public in terms of equal communication.

This sort of structural inequality also has consequences in turn for the normative condition of rationality, since dominant groups are usually also those who are best equipped to provide the most elaborate defence of their own proposals. Rationality has been criticised as one of the most Eurocentric elements of Habermas's (1962/1989) theory of the public sphere (e.g. Guanaratne 2006). Adhering to the too narrow understanding of rationality may thus include the continuation of Western dominance in transnational communication.

Another challenge for the public is the ideal of respectful communication at the transnational level. Considering the reality of ongoing conflict and wars that have beset the world in the 21st century, this ideal seems utopian. The ideal of respectful communication has been violated repeatedly in existing

transnational communication.[91] Thus, the primary challenge for the public is how to transform antagonistic relations into agonistic relations?

6.3.4 Effectiveness

The first result of transnational communication would be an empathic understanding of those from different cultures and diverse views regarding the issue in question.

A more pertinent problem for the transnational public is the question of reaching agreement. If an agreement is not to be reached, then members of the public still pledge to communicate under fair terms of agreement (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Yet the issues in question, such as globalisation and global warming, represent a pressing need to reach a common decision and finally act upon the problems – otherwise the problems pertain and may even aggravate over time. Failure to reach some kind of an agreement in the end means disempowering the public and negating its existence as a political force that brings forth social changes.

In globalisation the addressees of the public's demands need to be broadened – including not only political authorities in one's own national state but also in the state responsible for regulation of the transactions in question, as well as the international governmental and non-governmental system of global governance. With the narrowing of the public to the nation-state citizenry, it was assumed that the national political authority would be the addressee of public decisions and that it would have the sovereign authority to regulate the public affairs of a national population. The ideal of the transnational public at first seems to negate the principle of a state's sovereign authority over its national territories. Yet the primary negation of sovereignty is globalisation, given the existence of transactions that have extensive, grave

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91 The most recent example is the case of a Florida pastor burning the Qur'an, which sparked outrage and attacks on a UN compound in Afghanistan (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/02/pastor-terry-jones-burning-koran, accessed 15.4.2011).

and long-term consequences that transcend existing national borders. The idea of national sovereignty in cases where the issues in question are transnational in nature is a negation of the existence of such transnational issues and most likely serves to defend the position of power of those states that are the perpetrators of operations with transnational consequences in the first place. This does not mean that the transnational public means a negation of national publics. The relationship between the two is rather one of interdependence. On the one hand, transnational publics are "a function of porous national publics" (Olesen 2007, 305). On the other hand, national publics, too, can be (but not necessarily) a function of the "transnational porosity" of communication. The final challenge for the transnational public in terms of effectiveness is a direct result of diminishing sovereignty – within the concept of national sovereignty, the state had authority over its territory and it was assumed that it had the powers to implement the decisions of the public. At the transnational level, there are some indications that these functions of governing are performed by the processes of global governance, which are, however, still in formation. More importantly, within global governance the relations of power are not transparent, nor are the powerful actors accountable to all those affected – in order for global governance to be accountable, it needs to be accompanied by processes of formation of transnational publics regarding the issues in question.

I have turned to the three main approaches to the transnational public present in current scholarly literature: global governance; transnational social movements; social media and online user-generated content. The three approaches to the transnational public I have presented in this dissertation differ according to which of the four dimensions of the transnational public they primarily focus on. Put simply, we can say that the model of global governance focuses on effectiveness, the model of transnational social movements on process and the model of social media on structure. This derives from the fact that each of the three models builds on a different theory of the public sphere as present in modern literature (especially after translation of Habermas's (1962/1989) *Structural Transformations of the*

Public Sphere into English): the model of global governance builds on the representative liberal and dialogical theory of the public sphere; the model of transnational social movements builds on the constructionist or antagonistic theory of the public sphere and the model of social media builds on the participatory liberal or liberal model and mediated theory of the public sphere.[92] In the following sections of this chapter I focus upon these three approaches and their responses to the challenges of globalisation for the public.

6.4 Global governance

In the early 1990s, the new term "global governance" was coined to refer to processes of regulation that, on the one hand, accompany and support globalisation, and, on the other hand, represent a response to globalisation. Hirst and Thompson (1999, 269) define the difference between government and governance as follows:

> Sovereign nation-states […] claimed a monopoly over the function of governance. Hence the tendency in common language to identify the term "government" with those institutions of state that control and regulate the life of a territorial community. Governance – that is, the control of an activity by some means such that a range of desired outcomes is attained – is, however, not just the province of the state. Rather it is a function that can be performed by a wide variety of public and private, state and non-state, national and international institutions and practices. (Hirst and Thompson 1999, 269)

According to Rosenau (2002, 71), global governance neither posits a highest authority nor anticipates that one is likely to arise. "Global governance is a summarising phrase for all the sites in the world where efforts to exercise authority are undertaken" (Rosenau 2002, 71). States are still important

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92 See the two typologies of public sphere theories: Marx Ferree et al. (2002b) and Pinter
    (2005) presented in Chapter I.

players in this system, but what is typical for global governance is that they share their authority with other non-state actors. Regulation of public transactions in global governance is dispersed horizontally as well as vertically. Horizontally, it is no longer solely the activity of the political system of the state, but is also dispersed among economic and civil society actors. Vertically, it is no longer the domain of the state, but has extended in supra-state as well as sub-state directions. Global governance is thus presented as a process in which there is no central authority that would make binding decisions upon the global polity, yet the global community still finds ways to resolve common problems. Such claims for global governance come very close to Dewey's (1927/1954) description of the transnational public that organises itself in order to regulate transactions with extensive, long-term and grave consequences. Yet analysed from the perspective of the challenges of globalisation for the public presented above, the literature of global governance provides only limited answers to these challenges.

6.4.1 Structure

According to the literature on global governance, the transnational public is created not in opposition to political powers but *by* these powers through the creation of transnational deliberative consultations (e.g. Nanz and Steffek 2004; Backstränd 2006). Such ideas build on the deliberative theory(ies) of the public sphere, where the focus is upon cooperation amongst political authorities and the public (e.g. Habermas 1996; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Bohman and Rehg 1997), especially in the form of deliberative consultations organised and financed by political authorities (e.g. Fishkin 1991; Gastil 2008). Within global governance, the international deliberative forums would involve a variety of actors (e.g. national officials, scientific experts, NGOs) and cooperatively address a specific global problem. In this way, global governance is represented as the extension of democracy on the transnational level. Rosenau claims that, in the process of global governance, authority is relocated from the nation-state "upwards to transnational and supranational organisations, sidewards to social

movements and NGOs, and downwards to subnational groups" (Rosenau 1999, 293). The concept of global governance thus seems to describe a reality in which the regulation of public affairs has become more democratic, since new voices are said to have been empowered within the international arena: non-governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations and private firms.

Yet compared to the classic ideal of the public as being autonomous from political and economic powers (e.g. Bentham 1791/1843; Dewey 1927/1954; Mills 1956), the proposals on global governance neglect the question of autonomy in relation to top-down organisation. These proposals explicitly assume that public authorities will organise and finance transnational deliberative consultations. Such top-down organisation is problematic, since it does not guarantee the autonomy, inclusion, transparency and effectiveness of public deliberation, but is prone to directly serve the interests of political (and economic) "sponsors" – as critical analyses of existing consultations have shown (e.g. Young 2001, Cammaerts and Carpentier 2006; Hintz 2007). At the same time, the strong nation-states are not losing their powers in processes of global governance. Rather, global governance has been created in a way that endorses private regulation not against the strong nation-states but through their support. This process has been in line with neo-liberal ideology on the deliberate contraction of the state (e.g. Sassen 1996, 23; Scholte 2005, 186; Harvey 2006, 25-29).

Nor does the literature on global governance sufficiently address the problems of transnational structural inequalities. It recognises this problem to a very limited degree – as proposals for the financial support of non-governmental organisations from poorer countries (e.g. Nanz and Steffek 2004, 335). The specific problem of structural inequalities is not only largely unrecognised within the model of global governance, but even aggravated by the adoption of the concept of stakeholders from economic management theories. Stakeholder is defined as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation's

objectives" (Freeman 1984, 46 in Werhane and Freeman 2006, 502). The concept of stakeholders is thus very similar to the all-affected principle. Yet the concept has been employed in order to legitimise and consolidate the power of large corporations in global governance processes. Instead of supporting those who are affected by the transactions with grave and long term transnational consequences, the process of global governance – under the heading of stakeholders – includes the perpetrators of such transactions in whose interests it is to oppose the transnational regulation of their activities.

The global governance regime would, according to Nanz and Steffek, draw its legitimacy from the "deliberative quality of their decision-making process: it is not designed to aggregate self-interests, but rather to foster mutual learning, and to eventually transform preferences while converging on a policy choice oriented towards the public interest" (Nanz and Steffek 2004, 319). In other words, the prime legitimatising element of global governance is supposed to be the condition of rational deliberation. Here again, the literature on global governance builds on the deliberative theories of the public sphere, specifically late Habermas (1996), who adopted Fraser's (1992) distinction between "weak" and "strong" publics and argued that political deliberative bodies are "strong publics". The concept of "strong publics" was initially introduced by Fraser (1992) to criticise Habermas's (1996/1989) lack of thought on the effectiveness of the public in terms of direct democracy and/or translation to political authorities. The term has, however, been transformed from a concept that criticises the political order to one that legitimises it. This latter conceptualisation of the concept of "strong publics" has become very popular amongst those who argue that, at the transnational level, legitimacy is to be drawn from rationality of the decision-making process (and not inclusiveness), and equate "strong publics" with international political bodies (e.g Lynch 2000; Eriksenn and Fossum 2001, n.p.) and state diplomacy (Mitzen 2005).

6.4.3 Effectiveness

The focus in the literature on global governance is upon the last normative condition of effectiveness: regulation of transnational public issues. Global governance "multisectoral networks" have developed, Benner et al. (2004, 192) argue, "in response to the failure of traditional governance mechanisms, and offered new and alternative ways of getting things done". Translation from the public to regulation by global governance authorities is assumed to be assured by the main defining principle of global governance: that there is no main governing authority on the transnational level and the actors composing the broad arena of global governance need to communicate and come to an agreement regarding proper regulation of global issues. This assumption is, however, too optimistic, since global governance processes lack public inclusion and transparency, whereby translation has become even more difficult since it is "extremely difficult if not impossible to know who decides what, and how it is decided" (Splichal 2009, 396).

6.5 Transnational social movements

Transnational social movements such as the alternative globalisation movement and environmental movement have started to form around transnational public issues. They are organised on the basis of awareness of the transactions with long-term and grave consequences extending over national borders. In this light, transnational social movements have become the focal point of the literature that builds on the antagonistic theory of the public sphere and equates the transnational public with transnational social movements (e.g. Olesen 2005; Fraser 2005b; Thörn 2007). This literature focuses primarily on issues of structure – especially autonomy from and opposition to economic and political powers and confronting exclusion within the dominant discourse.

6.5.1 Structure

The primary focus of this theory is upon the extension of inclusion. Yet by introducing the concept of counter publics (Fraser 1992), the antagonistic theory of the public sphere seemingly paradoxically argues that sometimes inclusion needs to be reduced in order to promote greater inclusion in the future. Fraser (1992, 121-128) called for the public to be rethought in terms of acknowledging not *the* public, but various "subaltern counterpublics" which emerge in response to exclusion within dominant public discourse. In empirical situations in which equality and inclusiveness do not come up to standards, Fraser argues, marginal groups should have the possibility to first discuss among themselves without the "supervision of dominant groups" (Fraser 1992, 123). This would allow them to deliberate among themselves about their needs, objectives and strategies. This would render them more able to articulate and defend their interests in the overall, comprehensive, public sphere (Fraser 1992, 123). Fraser's terms counterpublics and counterpublic spheres gained considerable traction amongst those who call for a multitude of transnational publics and/or transnational public spheres (e.g. Fenton and Downey 2003; Wimmer 2005).

The main strength of theoretical thought on counterpublics is their critical opposition towards existing world economic, political and communicative orders that are exclusionary, and thus call for transnational publics to emerge in order to confront such exclusions. Contrary to the literature on global governance, the literature on transnational social movements directly tackles the issue of structural inequalities and positions itself on the side of all those affected by the existing transnational power balances. In this light, it is an extremely important critical counterweight to theories that attempt to effect top-down construction of transnational publics. It warns against implicit operations of power that prevent equality on the transnational level: Western-centric conceptualisations of rationality and the denouncing of contentious collective actions as acts of irrationality rather than acts of legitimate resistance to structural injustice. The challenge of globalisation for which this model does not find sufficient answers, however, revolves

around the issues of fragmentation of all those affected by the same issue into like-minded groups. By introducing the concept of "counter publics" (Fraser 1992), this literature legitimises the breach of inclusiveness in the name of extending democratisation in the future. Yet the concept of counter publics negates the condition of diversity of opinion as one of the main defining elements of the public. Social movements are formed, just as the public is, around a specific issue. An important difference with the public is that the public is by definition a totality of different perspectives, while a civic association usually argues for one or the other perspective. The danger here is that associations and movements address only the like-minded and form enclaves within which the counter-arguments are not heard and argumentatively responded to, but are specifically excluded. Another danger is that fragmentation of all those affected by the same issue into separate groups diminishes their potential power and thus effectiveness.

6.6.2 Process

The antagonistic theory of the public sphere (e.g. Young 2001) critically focuses upon the normative condition of rational deliberation. Social movements by definition include contentious collective actions such as public protests, demonstrations and civil disobedience. In the classical literature on the public (e.g. Park 1924/2007), these activities were "frowned" upon and identified as elements of the crowd and not the public. Young (2001), however, negates such a distinction and argues that contentious collective action is not irrational extremism that results from the incapability of thought, but rather from the lack of opportunities to be heard in the existing communicative domains. The ideal of rationality is identified as one of the most highlighted Western-centric elements of the concept of the public – especially by privileging dispassionate communication (Young 1996, 124) and narrowing communication to formal pragmatics and verbal expression. Examples of expression that are not easily identified with the formal Western ideal of logical argumentation but are nevertheless an important part of public deliberation are pictures, song, poetic imagery, expression of mockery and storytelling (Young 2000). This model reminds

us that, in order for the transnational public to form itself, rationality of communication should not be judged by the external, objectified criteria of reasoned arguments, but from the position of whether it serves the primary function of people arriving at a greater empathic understanding of their communicative partners.

Another problem with rational deliberation, Young (2001, 685-688) argues, is that even when the power relations are officially balanced and the deliberative setting is inclusive, the majority of participants in a deliberative setting will be influenced by a common discourse that is itself a complex product of structural inequality. Yet other means of expression proposed by Young (2001) as a solution to this problem are not inherently devoid of hegemony. The main problem with hegemony in relation to public deliberation is that its functioning is inherent in any form of communication that has come to be recognised as dominant. The only solution to this problem is identification of hegemonic elements in deliberation through deliberation.

6.6.3 Effectiveness

The literature on transnational social movements points to the problematic nature of the currently accepted definition of non-governmental organisations that strips the public of its effectiveness. While within the classical concept of the public it is assumed that those in power listen, the antagonistic theory focuses upon the possibilities to make them listen. Young (2001) thus emphasizes that, under conditions of extreme structural inequality, contentious collective action is needed in order to come closer to the ideals of deliberative democracy. On the other hand, Talisse (2005, 437) points to the problem that not all who call for public powers to liste do so in the name of a more just society. The only solution to this problem is that public communication should precede effectiveness in terms of translation to political powers. Otherwise we are faced with the operations of private lobbyists.

The antagonistic theory of the public sphere is characterised by what Marx Frerree et al. (2002b, 229) term "avoidance of premature closure", and directly positions itself on the side of the dissenters against the mainstream decisions and opinions. This, however, poses a specific problem in terms of reaching a final conclusion – how is a balance to be achieved between a common decision and the need for the ever present dissent? And how exactly is it possible to say at the transnational level that the point has been reached where the final conclusion has been made? The model of transnational social movements as transnational publics does not take these questions into consideration, since the formation of a social movement inherently assumes a general consensus regarding the issue in question – it takes the social movements to be the dissenting voices and does not tackle the question of dissent within the movements themselves.

6.6 Social media

The third approach towards the transnational public analysed in this dissertation belongs to what Pinter (2005) terms mediated theory of the public sphere. The literature on global governance perceives the role of new media in accordance with the top-down approach, which is a continuation of e-government initiatives (e.g., Needham 2004, Delakorda 2009): providing information on global governance to outside audiences and initiating online consultations where possibilities to participate are structured and initiated top-down (e.g. Cammaerts and Carpentier 2006, 30-31). Within the literature on transnational social movements, it is argued that, on the one hand, new media are an important element that assists in extending the transnational nature of social movements (e.g. Deibert 2000; Bennett 2003b; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004; Juris 2005). On the other hand, the role of new media has been criticised as aiding in the process of fragmentation into like-minded groups (e.g., Curran 2003, Cammaerts and Van Audenhove 2005). The main difference between these two approaches and literature on transnational public mediated by social – or Web 2.0 – media is in the focus upon inclusiveness as the prime structural condition of

the transnational public, where it is understood as a personal right and assumed to be assured by the "mass self communication" that transcends national borders (e.g. Castells 2007; 2008). The focus here is thus primarily upon the dimension of structure of the public.

6.6.1 Structure

Mills (1956) proposed that in the public, virtually as many people express opinions as receive them, by which he was criticising the traditional mass broadcasting model of communication. With the increased inclusiveness afforded by new media, the issue may become problematic at its other extreme – that the numbers of those receiving opinions in terms of listening to others are lower than the numbers of those expressing opinions. The question that needs to be analysed in the future is how to overcome the problem of creating the public as a collective phenomenon under conditions of maximum inclusion of all those affected. In other words – how do we proceed from individual to collective expression? Social media, with their focus upon individual "mass self-expression", provide an opportunity to extend inclusiveness – yet this inclusiveness cannot be equated with the archetypes of public expression such as the Athenian agora, town councils (Gastil 2000, 180) or mass media, where the audiences for the expression of an individual were assumed to be gathered in one (symbolic) space. For every individual affected by a transnational public issue to hear every other affected individual would be an impossible and redundant task. Social media are, instead, similar to what Mills (1956, 299) termed "primary publics" – circles of people talking with one another. The question remains, however, of whether and how these circles interconnect at the transnational level and to what extent we can speak of the creation of a transnational collective entity that transgresses individual expression.

Another problem of structure with social media in relation to the organisation of transnational publics is the commercial nature of most social media institutions, such as YouTube LLC. The transnational public should have the power to influence the structural conditions of its communication –

the commercial nature of social media, however, prevents such influence, since these spheres of communication operate under conditions of private property of the media institutions that own them. The commercial nature of these media means that the media institutions strive for maximisation of profits, which they achieve with the commodification of the communication of its users. The principle of maximisation of profits supports efforts towards the creation of monopolies such as the "Google layer", which, according to Milberry and Andreson (2009, 393), "constrain users' range of motion within a narrow, privatized slice of the world wide web." It also means that the commercial interests of the owner trump the interests of the (transnational) public.

6.6.2 Process

In the relationship between social media and the dimension of process of the public, the most important questions are:

− How to ensure that in communication via social media, the authority of members of the public is built upon their deliberative proposals (and not outside sources of power, money or influence)?

− How can new media serve the function of deliberation, in which participants talk amongst one another and provide reasons for their claims?

− How to ensure that those with different views communicate with each other?

At present there is an abundance of research on online discussions that follows Habermas's (1962/1989; 1984) identification of normative conditions of ideal speech, such as rationality and deliberation across differences of opinion. Yet most of this research is confined to the descriptive level of analysis and primarily describes the extent to which these conditions are fulfilled within online discussions (e.g. Wilhelm 1999; Dahlberg 2001, Graham and Witschge 2003, Papachirissi 2004, Hyeon Suk 2008, Strandberg 2008). Empirical research of new media in relation to the dimension of process of the public should in the future extend beyond

description and focus on explanatory factors of normative conditions of the dimension of process – especially factors that belong to the structural dimension of the public.

6.6.3 Effectiveness

By extending the "transnational porosity" of communication (Olesen 2007), the primary function of social media in terms of the effectiveness of the public should be to deliver an empathic understanding amongst their users at the transnational level. This, on the one hand, depends on the characteristics of users, while, on the other hand, research into the influence of the structural features of social media upon the formation of empathic understanding amongst its users is needed in the future. The most important challenge for the use of social media remains the formation of an agreement. At this point the social media function on the principle of individual inclusion, in terms of maximising the numbers of those who publish online. Do social media support the creation of a process in which individual publishing is gradually interconnected towards a collective agreement and mobilisation towards translation to authorities? Alternatively, can we speak of a "narcotic dysfunction[93]" of social media in terms of satisfying the need for individual expression but not supporting collective operations?

6.7 The transnational public as an ideal

How can the public be conceptualised in a globalised world? This question is far from definitively answered in the present dissertation. Globalisation brings forth transnational problems that call for transnational publics to emerge. If asked to simplify, I would answer that the public remains, as it was within the conditions of national sovereignty, primarily a counter-factual ideal. The public and the public sphere are normative ideals that have never been fully realised within any nation-state. Nor is there any

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93 Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948/1972) have identified the narcotic dysfunction of mass media as a feeling that only being informed is enough which from any other forms of action.

reason to believe that they will be in the near future at the transnational or even global level, since the extent of obstacles is far greater than that within a national sphere. The ideal, however, should be taken as an "ultimate anchoring point and horizon for our analyses" (Carpentier 2007b, 110). By participating in "public"[94] discourse on the ideal of the public as a proper response to global public problems such as the global financial crisis and global warming, I try to participate in the politicising process of its potential future realisation. Not only should issues such as the global financial crisis and global warming be accompanied by the formation of transnational publics – the conditions for the realisation of the transnational public and the ideals that it inherently includes are a public issue around which the transnational public should start to form. In other words, we need to start forming the transnational public in order to deliberate upon the transnational public.

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94   I employ the term "public" here with caution, since I am aware of the exclusive nature of academic discourse.

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8 Index

9 Daljši povzetek v slovenskem jeziku

Uvod

V doktorski nalogi analiziram preplet treh kompleksnih procesov: globalizacije, razvoja novih medijev in vzpostavljanja javnosti. Presek teh treh procesov predstavlja vprašanje vzpostavljanja transnacionalnih javnosti.

V uvodnem poglavju disertacije na kratko predstavim zgodovino pisanja o transnacionalni javnosti. V klasični misli javnost ni bila sama po sebi razumljena kot nacionalni pojav, Kant (1795/2007) je na primer trdil, da je v namen večnega miru nujen princip popolne transnacionalne publicitete. Prva svetovna vojna je stoletje kasneje spodbudila Tönniesa (1922/1998, 433-444) in Deweya (1927/1954) k podobnim mislim. Tarde (1989/1969, 303-304) je v novinarstvu videl silo, ki da bo internacioalizirala javno misel. Blumer (1946/1953, 46) pa je, podobno kot Dewey (1927/1954), javnost opredelil glede na problem in izpostavil, da so meje javnosti opredeljene z mejami problema, okrog katerega se javnost vzpostavi.

V novejši zgodovini lahko govorimo predvsem o treh valih pisanja o transnacionalni javnosti, javnem mnenju in/ali javni sferi. Prvi je bil del razprave v okviru UNESCO-vega New World Information and Communication Order (MacBride in drugi 1980, 198), v okviru katere je takratna Jugoslavija igrala pomembno vlogo. Drugi večji val pisanja o transnacionalni javnosti je spodbudila pozornost na procese globalizacije pred približno dvema desetletjema. Takrat so prvi kritični glasovi začeli opozarjati na globalizacijo, ki je prinesla spremembe v mednarodnem političnem in ekonomskem polju brez vzporedno primernih sprememb v

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javnosti in javni sferi (Garnham 1986/1995, 250-251; Keane 1991, 135-146; Splichal 1994; 1031; Thompson 1995, 234- 235). V pričujoči disertaciji se osredotočam predvsem na najsodobnejši val pisanja o transnacionalni javni sferi, v katerem je zaslediti predvsem tri ideje o tem, kako bi se transnacionalna javnost morala vzpostaviti oziroma se že vzpostavlja: globalno vladovanje, transnacionalna družbena gibanja, in množično individualno komuniciranje prek socialnih medijev kot je YouTube. Vsakemu izmed teh treh pristopov posvetim eno poglavje v disertaciji.

Štiri dimenzije javnosti

V klasični misli je javnost opredeljena glede na strukturo, proces, vsebino, in učinkovitost. Struktura so družbeni pogoji v katerih se formira javnost, proces so lastnosti razpravljanja med člani javnosti, vsebina je to o čem javnost razpravlja in učinek so rezultati razprave javnosti.

(a) *Struktura*: vsi, ki jih problem potencialno zadeva imajo možnost sodelovati kot enakovredni člani javne razprave (Dewey 1927/1954; Fraser 2007, 20). Javnost je avtonomna od politične oblasti in je hkrati njen nadzornik (Bentham 1791/1843). Institucionalna avtoriteta države s svojimi sankcijami in kontrolo ne posega v delovanje javnosti (Mills 1956, 304). Medij javnosti je razprava – v javnosti ni prostora za medij moči ali denarja (Habermas 1996, 364). Informacije, ki jih javnost potrebuje za doseganje najboljših možnih odločitev so javno dostopne (Bentham 1791/1843; Splichal 2002, 168; Gastil 2008, 20).

(b) *Proces:* Javnost se vzpostavi čez argumentirano javno razprav, v kateri je delež teh, ki govorijo in teh, ki poslušajo enakovreden in imajo vsi možnosti odgovarjanja brez nevarnosti sankcij (Mills 1956, 302-304). Avtoriteta razpravljavcev se vzpostavi zgolj čez razpravo in ne na račun razpravi zunanjih virov moči (Cohen 1989, 21), kot so denar, moč ali poprejšnji družbeni ugled. Vsi imajo možnost razpravljanja, ugovarjanja in predlaganja novih tem razprave (Cohen 1989, 21). Člani javnosti prepoznavajo dostojanstvo vseh ljudi – tako sodelujočih v razpravi (spoštljivost), kot drugih družbenih skupin (civiliziranost) (Papacharissi

2004, 262-267). Sodelujoči v javni razpravi podajajo vzajemno sprejemljive razloge, zakaj verjamejo v svoje predloge (Gutmann in Thompson 1996, 129). V javni razpravi ni nič predpostavljeno za samoumevno – vse je lahko tema razprave in argumentiranja (Carey 1995, 381).

(c) Vsebina: Člani javnosti razpravljajo o tem, ali je nek problem javna zadeva v pomenu, da njene potencialne posledice zadevajo veliko število ljudi in so dolgoročne ter resne (Dewey 1927/1954). V javnosti člani javnosti analizirajo strukturne vzroke za osebne probleme (Mills 1956, 318). Javnost nadalje razpravlja o možnostih in načinih družbenih sprememb, po katerih kliče izbrani javni problem s čimer se izvije iz „prijema nepolitičnega" (Hirschman 1991, 45; Gamble 2000/2006, 7; Hay 2007, 79) (slika 1)

(d) Učinkovitost: Najpomembnejši učinek javne razprave je poslušanje in razumevanje „druge strani" - člani javnosti spoznajo in razumejo stališča drugih (Mansbridge 1983, 78). Člani javnosti sprejmejo skupno odločitev oz. v primeru, ko se ne morejo zediniti, sklenejo nadaljevati iskanje pravičnih načinov kooperacije med enakimi (Gutmann in Thompson 1996, 53). Končno mnenje javnosti ima posledice v odločitvah s pomembnimi posledicami (Mills 1956, 302-304; Fraser 2007, 22), tako da vplivajo na večinsko mnenje ali oceno javnega mnenja, ki jo oblastniki upoštevajo pri svojih odločitvah (Splichal 1997, 4).

Tabela 9.1: Štiri dimenzije javnosti

Dimenzija	Normativna zahteva	Definicija
Struktura	Odprtost	Javna razprava je dostopna vsem, ki jih potencialne posledice problema pomembno in dolgoročno prizadevajo.
	Javnost informacij	Informacije potrebne za doseganje najboljših odločitev so javno dostopne.
	Avtonomnost od ekonomskih in političnih moči	Institucionalna avtoriteta s sankcijami in kontrolo ne posega v javno razpravo, niti ni javna razprava omejena z ekonomskim sistemom.
	Raznolikost mnenj	Člani javnosti imajo različne opredelitve glede problema.
Proces	Enakost	V javni razpravi približno enako število ljudi izraža mnenja, kot jih posluša in vsa izražena mnenja so slišana. Avtoriteta članov javnosti je zgrajena zgolj na osnovi njihovih predlogov in ne zunanjih vplivov politične in ekonomske moči.
	Interaktivnost	Na vsako mnenje je možno brez nevarnosti negativnih sankcij hitro odgovoriti.
	Spoštovanje	Člani javnosti priznavajo vrednost in dostojanstvo vseh ljudi.
	Racionalnost	Člani javnosti podajajo argumente za svoje predloge.
Vsebina	Javna narava problema	Javnost razpravlja o razsežnostih, resnosti in trajanju potencialnih posledic problema.
	Možnost družbene spremembe	Javnost politizira problem v pomenu, da išče možnosti za regulacijo njegovih potencialnih posledic.
Učinkovitost	Empatično razumevanje	Člani javnosti poznajo mnenja drugih članov javnosti in razumejo njihove razloge za predloge, ki jih podajo.
	Sporazum / Razpravljalni nesporazum	Člani javnosti pridejo do skupne odločitve oz. so odločeni nadaljevati iskanje pravičnih oblik sodelovanja kljub odsotnosti skupne odločitve.
	Prevod	Javne oblasti sprejmejo odločitve javnosti.
	Regulacija	Oblasti regulirajo problem na način, kot ga predlaga javnost.

Tako javnost kot javna sfera sta normativna ideala, ki nista bila nikoli zares uresničena. Njuna vrednost pa je prav v njuni normativnosti, saj kot taki služita za cilj družbenih sprememb in merilo kritičnega premišljevanja o družbi. Ideal javnosti je pogosto kritiziran kot utopičen, kar je spodbudilo Habermasa, da ga opisuje kot „kontrafaktičnega" (2005, 91) - v nasprotju s trenutno obstoječo družbeno realnostjo, vendar ne popolnoma nemogoč (kar je lastnost utopičnega). Z nasprotovanjem kritikam o utopičnosti zagovorniki javnosti tudi javnost samo pretvarjajo v politični projekt, saj jo skušajo iztrgati iz prijema zaznane nezmožnosti, ki je hkrati meja političnega (Hay 2007).

Poenostavljeno je javnost odgovor na vprašanje o akterju javne razprave in javna sfera na vprašanje o pogojih javne razprave. Vendar je štiri ravni opredelitve: strukturo, proces, vsebino in učinek težko razdeliti tako, da bi vsaka zase ali njeni deli neodvisno pripadali javnosti ali javni sferi, saj je javnost tista, ki mora izpolnjevati pogoje javne sfere. Argumentiranost in odprtost razprave sta npr. pogoja javne sfere, vendar je javnost tista, ki mora delovati argumentirano in biti odprta za glasove vseh, ki jih problem zadeva. Nezmožnost preproste ločitve med pogoji delovanja in akterji delovanja je morda eden izmed ključnih razlogov, zakaj sta javna sfera in javnost dandanes pogosto in nekonsistentno uporabljeni kar kot sinonima.

Sploh prevod Habermasovega dela *Strukturne spremembe javne sfere* v angleščino je v akademski sferi doprinesel k procesu, ki ga Splichal (2010) imenuje „mrk javnosti". Hiter porast popularnosti termina javna sfera, predvsem v ameriških krogih, je pomenil prelom s precej starejšo tradicijo, ki se je osredotočala okrog pojmov javnosti in javnega mnenja[95]. Ključna razlika med javnostjo in javno sfero je v tem, da javna sfera služi kot premostitveno polje med civilno družbo in državo (Habermas 1962/1998, 43). Javnost je bila po drugi strani zamišljena kot zunanji nadzornik nad

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[95] Več o posledicah prevoda termina *Öffentlichkeit* v javna sfera v: Darnton (2000, n.s.) Klenstüber (2001, 96-98) in Splichal (2006, 105).

oblastjo, njej ločen in neodvisen suveren (npr. Bentham 1791/1843; Mills 1956). Hkrati se z javno sfero navadno poudarja njena „prostorska" metafora, kjer je razumljena kot družbeni prostor razprave, ki po nekaterih pogledih lahko obstaja celo brez javnosti ali pa jo zasedejo akterji moči in denarja (npr. Habermas 1996, 374). Po drugi strani pa je pri javnosti poudarjena njena vloga kot ključen in najbolj legitimen *agent* družbenih sprememb (Darnton 2000).

Javnost in globalizacija

V drugem poglavju naloge analiziram globalizacijo in predstavim osnovno tezo doktorske disertacije: da je skupaj z osmišljanjem procesov globalizacije treba tudi vzpostavljanje javnosti kot normativni koncept razumeti kot transnacionalni proces. Do nedavnega je bilo razumevanje javnosti največkrat implicitno vezano na državo. Javnost je v večini sodobne znanstvene literature zamišljena kot nacionalni fenomen tako na ravni strukturnih pogojev pod katerimi se vzpostavi javnost, procesa in vsebine javne razprave kot učinkov delovanja javnosti. Ideal javnosti je neposredno povezan z demokracijo in tako kot demokracija je tudi javnost največkrat razumljena kot primarno nacionalni fenomen. Z globalizacijo pa javnost v smislu prizadetosti z javnimi transakcijami ni več omejena z mejami nacionalne države - ko se posledice javnih transakcij širijo prek nacionalnih meja, bi se morale vzpostavljati tudi transnacionalne javnosti.

Globalizacija je postala populiren termin, ki je predvsem v medijskih študijah, kot trdi Hardt (2004, 54), zamenjal koncepte „amerikanizacije" in „kulturnega imperializma". Popularnost termina je še posebej spodbudilo ozko razumevanje globalizacije kot globalne odprtosti trgov in transkontinentalnega pretoka kapitala, blaga in storitev (npr. Cable 1999). Kritični odgovor na tovrstno razumevanje se je razvil v „alter-globalističnem" gibanju (npr. Wall 2003; Yuen et al. 2004; Horrowitz 2009), ki nasprotuje neo-liberalni paradigmi globalizacije. V širšem pomenu

je globalizacija opredeljena kot skupek procesov, ki »utelešajo transformacijo v prostorski organizaciji družbenih odnosov in transakcij in ustvarjajo medkontinentalne ali medregionalne pretoke in mreže delovanj, interakcij in moči« (Held et al. 1999, 16). Podobno široko Waters (1995, xi) opredeljuje globalizacijo kot proces, v katerem se geografske omejitve družbenih in kulturnih ureditev umikajo in se ljudje tega vedno bolj zavedajo. Globalizacija pa v prvi vrsti pomeni sklop procesov, ki jim je skupno to, da javni problemi presegajo nacionalne okvirje.

Globalizacija kot proces vzpostavljanja mednarodnih omrežij delovanj in moči (npr. Held et al. 1999; 16; Rosenau 1980) pomeni, da imajo ta omrežja pomembne posledice za ljudi, ki ne sodelujejo v odločanju o omrežjih. Ključni akterji, katerih delovanja imajo transnacionalne posledice so po definiciji močne države. Te so že od nekdaj imele pomembne posledice za življenja ljudi daleč izven svojega kroga državljanov, o čemer sta najzgovornejša primera vojna in kolonizacija. V sodobni kapitalistični svetovni ureditvi močne države vplivajo na šibkejše predvsem tako, da jih silijo in prepričujejo k odpiranju trgov in se hkrati upirajo zahtevam po recipročnosti (Stiglitz 2002, 60; Wallerstein 2004, 54). V akademski razpravi o globalizaciji je pogosta teza o izgubljanju moči nacionalnih držav nasproti akterjem svetovne ekonomije. Habermas (1994, 28; 2003, 88) npr. trdi, da zaradi ekonomske globalizacije države izgubljajo zmožnost učinkovitega reševanja problemov svojih državljanov in s tem svojo legitimnost. Vendar je govor o tovrstni izgubi moči, kot opozarja Hutchingsova (2007) izrazito zahodno-centričen, saj izključuje vse dele sveta, za katere globalizacija ni prelom z zgodovino temveč zgolj njeno nadaljevanje. Teza o izgubljanju moči države je nadalje del širjenja neoliberalne ideologije in „globalizma" (Pikalo in Trdina 2009, 46)- strukturno determinističnega pogleda na procese globalizacije s katerim se vzpostavlja mit o neizogibnosti in se izključuje alternativne politične rešitve (npr. Bordieu 1998, 29-44, 93-105; Gamble 2000/2006, 43-62; Kantola 2001, 65-67). Končen rezultat tovrstnega mita je prostovoljno odrekanje moči, ki ima predvsem dve obliki. Prva je rezultat verovanja v nezmožnost

delovanja: ko politični akterji verjamejo, da je njihova avtonomija v veliki meri zmanjšana in da morajo biti v dobi globalizacije njihove izbire v skladu z imperativi ekonomske tekmovalnosti, si bodo sami zmanjšali politično avtonomnost, ki bi jo lahko imeli (Hay 2007, 151). Druga oblika prostovoljnega odrekanja moči regulacije je sledenje idejam učinkovitosti zasebne regulacije in spodbujanje raznih oblik „zasebno-javnega partnerstva", ki pa je izven javne kontrole (npr. Sassen 1996, 23; Scholte 2005, 186; Harvey 2006, 25-29). Oboje pomeni prenos politične odgovornosti z nacionalne ravni na transnacionalno raven, kjer politična odgovornost ni tako transparentna po drugi strani pa se politično upravljanje prej političnih zadev prepusti globalnim tržnim silam (Pikalo in Trdina 2009, 46-48).

Kritiki neo-liberalne paradigme liberalizacije svetovnih trgov (npr. Bourdieu 1998; Beck 2000, Amin 1997; Burbach in ostali. 1997; Green in Griffith 2002) opozarjajo na posledice, ki jih imajo tokovi kapitala, blaga in storitev na prebivalce svetovnega „severa", še bolj pa marginaliziranega „juga". Ekonomsko globalizacijo spodbuja iskanje vedno novih trgov, o čemer sta pisala že Marx in Engels (1848/2009, 99), in želja po zmanjševanju stroškov. S selitvijo (pa tudi samo grožnjami selitve) v revnejše države se zmanjšujejo stroški dela, materiala, in davkov. Ne samo produkcija, tudi storitve se selijo – zgovoren primer so Disnejevi animirani filmi, ki so pogosto izrisani v južni Aziji (Miller 2002). Pri tem se išče čim večje možnosti „externizacije" stroškov podjetij na družbeno okolje, npr. stroškov transporta, okoljske degradacije, in izčrpavanja materialov (Wallerstein 2004, 47-48; 81; Harvey 2006, 79-81; Burbach in ostali 1996, 88). Globalna uporaba zunanjih izvajalcev omogoča podjetjem izredno fleksibilnost pri iskanju nižjih stroškov in hkrati prelaganje odgovornosti na podizvajalce (Burbach 1996, 59). Največjo raven globalizacije pa so dosegli vedno bolj deregulirani in globalno povezani finančni trgi, odsev česar je tudi trenutna globalna finančna kriza. Posledice krize, ki se je začela v ZDA bi nedvomno čutili po vsem svetu že samo zaradi velikosti ameriškega gospodarstva, vendar so izredno zapleteni in špekulativni finančni produkti

bili razprodani po vsem svetu, kar je krizo še bolj zaostrilo (Barell 2008; Crotty 2008; Kotz 2009; Claessens 2010).

Temeljno klasično razumevanje javnosti, na katerem gradim v disertaciji, je Deweyeva (1927/1956) opredelitev javnosti kot skupine ljudi, ki jih neposredne posledice transakcij zadevajo do te mere, da se zdi potrebna sistematična skrb nad temi posledicami (Dewey 1954, 15 – 16). Dewey definira javnost na osnovi razsežnosti posledic, ki jih imajo delovanja oz. „transakcije" ljudi za tiste, ki v njih niso neposredno udeleženi. Javna narava posledic se ocenjuje po treh kriterijih: (a) *razsežnos*t: zadeva je javna, ko njene potencialne posledice prizadenejo veliko število ljudi, (b) *trajanje*: zadeva je javna, ko so njene potencialne posledice dolgotrajne in (c) *resnost*: zadeva je javna, ko so njene potencialne posledice velika grožnja ali velika prednost za prizadete ljudi (Dewey 1927/1954, 17- 27).

Ključen element globalizacije je dolgotrajnost in resnost posledic, ki jih imajo delovanja nacionalnih in mednarodnih akterjev, pri čemer razsežnosti posledic presegajo nacionalne meje in s tem tradicionalno razumevanje legitimnosti javnih odločitev. Globalizacija vključuje predvsem tri procese, ki jih je možno ilustrirati na primeru globalne gospodarske krize:
(a) *javne posledice in s tem javnost v pomenu vseh, ki jih problem zadeva, so z globalizacijo razširjene preko nacionalnih meja* – čeprav se je globalna finančna kriza začela s pokom nepremičninskega balona v ZDA, je imela uničujoče posledice za ljudi daleč preko meja ZDA. Ljudje po vsem svetu občutijo pomanjkanje, ki je posledica navidezno nevidnih in ekstremno kompleksnih finančnih operacij. Strukturni vzroki krize - povečevanje neenakosti, dereguliran finančni trg in vrsta premoženjskih balonov – so z globalizacijo finančnega sistema postali osrednji element večine globalne ekonomije in so tako imeli posledice za večji del sveta.
(b) *pomnožitev števila in raznolikosti posledic transnacionalnih problemov* – finančno krizo so v velikem številu držav reševali z državnimi odkupi bank, pri čemer so poprejšnji dobički bili privatizirani, izgube pa so postale javne. To je imelo hude posledice za cene hrane, prihodke ljudi in državne

porabe, kar je vodilo v nezadostno ponudbo hrane in okrnitev javnih storitev.

(c) *pomnožitev števila transnacionalnih problemov in njihova kompleksna povezanost* – vprašanji globalnega segrevanja in globalne finančne krize sta npr. po mnenju nekaterih povezani po svojih rešitvah v „zeleni“ ekonomiji in po mnenju drugih po svojih vzrokih v ekonomiji neomejene akumulacije in izkoriščanja.

Ti trije procesi globalizacije: širjenje javne narave problemov prek nacionalnih meja, pomnoževanje števila in raznolikosti posledic transnacionalnih problemov in pomnoževanje števila transancionalnih problemov in njihovo kompleksno povezovanje, pomenijo, da je v globalizaciji javnost, v skladu s »principom prizadetosti« (Fraser 2007), treba razumeti kot transancionalen pojav. V nadaljnjih poglavjih disertacije analiziram tri ključne sodobne pristope k odnosu med globalizacijo in javnostjo, ki iščejo transnacionalne javnosti v treh različnih trenutno obstoječih procesih: globalnem vladovanju, vzpostavljanju transnacionalnih družbenih gibanj in množični uporabi socialnih medijev za objavljanje, ki presega nacionalne meje.

Javnost in globalno vladovanje

V tretjem poglavju pričujoče disertacije analiziram procese regulacije, ki so se vzpostavili na mednarodni ravni in jih označujemo s pojmom globalnega vladovanja. Ugotavljam, da ti procesi sicer navidezno vključujejo javnost pod pojmom globalnih deležnikov, vendar tovrstni predlogi in pojmovanja vključujejo predvsem ekonomske organizacije in dobro organizirane nevladne organizacije. Tudi novi mediji, kot so uporabljeni s strani akterjev moči v procesih globalnega vladovanja, ne pripomorejo k večji demokratičnosti teh procesov, saj problem ni v tehnološki zmožnosti komuniciranja temveč v nepripravljenosti tovrstnih akterjev na poslušanje. Nasprotno je nujno potrebna vzpostavitev javnosti kot komunikacijske

skupnosti teh, ki jih procesi globalnega vladovanja prizadevajo, v sferi, ki bi bila avtonomna od pritiskov moči in ekonomskih resursov.

Globalno vladovanje se je začelo vzpostavljati v odgovor in hkrati kot del globalizacije - po Finkelsteinu (1995, 369) je npr. globalno vladovanje »vladanje brez suverene avtoritete odnosom, ki presegajo nacionalne meje.« V splošnem je globalno vladovanje razumljeno kot skupek procesov v katerih raznoliki, javni *in* zasebni akterji, poskušajo regulirati transnacionalne javne zadeve (npr. Rosenau in Cziempel 1992/1998; Hirst in Thompson 1999, 269; Dryzek 2000, 120; Keohane in Nye 2000, 12). Na prvi pogled je globalno vladovanje razvoj v večji smeri demokratičnosti, saj vključuje veliko število raznolikih akterjev in je regulacija razpršena »navzgor k transnacionalnim in supranacionalnim organizacijam, vstran k družbenim gibanjem in nevladnim organizacijam ter navzdol k subnacionalnim skupinam« (Rosenau 1999, 293).

Z idejo globalnega vladovanja se hkrati promovira govor o »deležnikih«, ki navidezno vključuje idejo principa vključenosti vseh prizadetih. Termin »deležnik« izhaja iz teorij ekonomske odgovornosti (Freeman 1984, 46 v Werhane in Freeman 2006, 502) - pri čemer pa fokus ni toliko na tem, koga posledice prizadenejo, temveč tem, kdo lahko prizadene cilje podjetja (npr. Podnar in Jančič 2006, 300). Osrednje vprašanje Freemanove teorije o deležnikih v razmerju do globalizacije je, kako lahko menedžerji usmerjajo odnose deležnikov na globalni ravni tako da bodo »delničarji želi profite« (Freeman in ostali 2004, 367). O deležnikih so nato začeli pisati v diskurzu o globalizaciji (npr. Jones in Fleming 2003), globalni vzdržljivosti (npr. Steurer et al. 2005, Sharma in Henriques 2004) in nenazadnje »globalni demokraciji deležnikov« (npr. Backstränd 2006, MacDonald 2008). Za razliko od koncepta javnosti, ki v svojem klasičnem pojmovanju izključuje ekonomsko moč, je koncept deležnikov postal popul_aren v skladu z neo-liberalnim pristopom in aktualnim pretvarjanjem korporacij v državljane (Crane et al. 2004). Ideja globalnega vladovanja kot omrežij deležnikov (npr. Held in Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 130-131) tako postane legitimizacija

vstopa podjetij v odločevalske procese. Če so podjetja prej morala biti deli združenj, so kot deležniki v procesu globalnega vladovanja postala legitimni akter političnega odločanja – kar priča npr. dejstvo, da so se na Svetovni posvet o informacijski družbi (angl. World Summit on Information Society) lahko neposredno registrirala velika podjetja (Hintz 2007, 5).

Pomembna smer akademske razprave o javni sferi zadnjih dveh desetletjih, ki je vplivala na aktualne ideje o globalnem vladovanju, je tako imenovani pristop k deliberativni demokraciji, predstavljen predvsem v ameriških krogih (na primer Gutmann in Thompson 1996; 2004; Bohman in Rehg 1997; Elster 1998; Dryzek 2000) in katere zagovornik je v svojih poznih delih tudi Habermas (1996; 2009). Fokus tega pristopa je v iskanju legitimnosti pri odločanju glede na racionalnost razprave manj pa v demokratični vključenosti. Najpomembnejša pozitivna lastnost tega pristopa je v njegovih zahtevah po nujnosti razprave kot legitimnega procesa javnega odločanja političnih predstavnikov. Vendar samo proces enakopravnega (med temi, ki so vključeni) in spoštljivega soočanja različnih argumentov (tudi če bi se idealno gledano res izvajal v forumih političnih predstavnikov) še ne konstituira javnosti. Osrednja strukturna elementa javnosti sta odprtost vsem, ki jih problem potencialno zadeva, in avtonomnost od političnih in ekonomskih moči, ki v sodobnih idejah o močnih transnacionalnih javnostih, ki da bi naj bile del globalnega vladovanja, umanjkajo.

Termin »močne javnosti« je predlagala Fraserjeva (1992, 134) kot kritiko Habermasovega predloga o javnosti, ki bi naj bila »šibka«. Po Fraserjevi je Habermas posvetil premalo pozornosti vprašanju učinkovitosti mnenja javnosti, to je realizaciji odločitev, ki jih sprejme javnost. Učinkovitost pomeni »prevajanje« odločitev javnosti političnim predstavnikom in njihovo zmožnost uresničevanja teh predlogov (Fraser 2007). Fraserjeva je izpostavila problem »šibkosti« javnosti v tem, da javnost sama ne izvršuje svojih odločitev, temveč jih prevaja političnim oblastem. Podobno Kleinstüber (2001, 101–102) kritizira Habermasovo zgodnje razumevanje javnosti kot konservativno, saj ne dopušča možnosti neposredne

demokracije, temveč ostane zgolj na ravni spodbujanja javne kritike oblasti. Za Kleinstüberja (2001, 102) je tako Habermasovo delo nadaljevanje nemške tradicije »intelektualne razprave brez političnih posledic«. Njuna kritika predstavlja pomembno in osrednje vprašanje – kako natanko zagotoviti prevajanje odločitev javnosti v njihovo izvrševanje in po drugi strani, kako zagotoviti maksimalno participacijo javnosti v javnih odločitvah? Vendar je bil termin močnih »javnosti«, kot ga je skovala Fraserjeva, izredno »ponesrečen«. Fraserjeva je želela opozoriti na to, da javnost potrebuje moč, da izvršuje svoje odločitve – moč, ki je primerljiva z močjo parlamenta. »Ponesrečenost« je v tem, da je parlament poimenovala »močna javnost«, s čimer je pravzaprav ponudila način za legitimacijo političnih teles, ki niso vključujoča in nad katerimi bi morala javnost sploh imeti nadzor. S tem je Fraserjeva paradoksalno sama prispevala k razvoju v akademski razpravi, ki je pravzaprav zašel iz smeri, katero Fraserjeva konsistentno zagovarja v svojih delih: to je demokratične vključenosti kot temelja ideala javnosti. V predlogih o transnacionalnih »močnih javnostih« (na primer Lynch 2000; Eriksen in Fossum 2001; Mitzen 2005) in transnacionalnih deliberativnih modelih mrežnega vključevanja deležnikov (na primer Held in Koenig-Archibugi 2004, Backstränd 2006, MacDonald 2008) je obstoj racionalne in spoštljive razprave že dovolj, da politične predstavnike in velike nevladne organizacije ter velike korporacije enačimo s transnacionalno javnostjo oziroma javno sfero. Javnost kot avtonomni suveren in nadzornik nad političnimi oblastmi (Benhtam 1791/2007) je v teh pristopih popolnoma izključena. V nasprotju z namenom Fraserjeve (1992), ki je opozorila na vprašanje odnosa med javnostjo in njenimi odločitvami, so ti pristopi privzeli pisanje Fraserjeve o »močnih javnostih« kot novi normativni ideal. Brez vzporednega razvoja transnacionalnih javnosti - avtonomnih od političnih in ekonomskih pritiskov ter odprtih do vseh, ki jih potencialne posledice zadevajo, je globalno vladovanje usmeritev k manjši in ne večji demokratičnosti. Akterji, ki delujejo v globalnem vladovanju, namreč nimajo legitimnosti niti niso odgovorni tem, čigar življenja regulirajo (npr. Nye 2001; Benner et al.2004; Gamble 2000/2006; Scholte 2005; Bexell in ostali 2006; Hay 2007; Gupta 2008; Splichal 2010).

Javnost in transnacionalna družbena gibanja

V četrtem poglavju disertacije se osredotočam na transnacionalna družbena gibanja, njihovo uporabo novih medijev in predvsem problem ideološke fragmentacije znotraj in med gibanji. Na tem mestu posebej analiziram štiri koncepte v razmerju do ideala transnacionalne javnosti: aktivizem, samo-omejevanje nevladnih organizacij, proti javnosti in interesne skupine. Pri tem sklenem, da je pojem aktivizma problematičen dokler spodbuja učinkovitost pred demokratično vključenostjo, pojem proti javnosti legitimizira izključevanje in fragmentacijo v imenu vključevanja, s pojmom samo-omejevanja nevladnih organizacij je javnost oropana ideala učinkovitosti, in kot najbolj problematično, pojem interesnih skupin poudarja učinkovitost brez vključenosti v javno razpravo vseh teh, ki jih posledice problema zadevajo.

Medtem ko se glede sistemskih oblik politične participacije, kot so na primer sodelovanje na volitvah in udeležba v političnih strankah, opaža dolgoročen trend upadanja, pa se po drugi strani govori o trendu naraščanja sodelovanja v protestnih aktivnostih in družbenih gibanjih (na primer Dalton 2006; Hay 2007). Tovrstne aktivnosti so tudi vedno pogosteje opisane kot transnacionalni fenomeni (na primer Flacks 1995; Waterman 1998/2001; Tarrow 2006). Transnacionalna družbena gibanja, kot je gibanje proti neoliberalni globalizaciji in okoljevarstvena gibanja so za razliko od globalnega vladovanja precej bližje klasičnemu idealu javnosti. Vključenost v transnacionalna gibanja ni določena z nacionalnimi mejami, temveč mejami problema, ki ga naslavljajo (Cammaerts in van Audenhove 2005, 179). Transnacionalna družbena gibanja nadalje težijo k avtonomnosti od ekonomske in politične moči (Amoore in Langely 2004, 30) in se vzpostavljajo v odgovor na delovanja globalnega vladovanja, čigar legitimnost prevprašujejo (Cammaerts in van Audenhove 2005, 179). Njihovo delovanje je namenjeno odpiranju javne razprave, saj se vzpostavljajo v odgovor na izključevalne prakse trenutno obstoječih oblik dominantnega diskurza in izključujočih družbenih redov (Olesen 2005, 242;

Fraser 2005, 84; Thörn 2007, 900). Kot takšna so družbena gibanja pogosto poimenovana z nedavno skovanko: »proti javnosti«.

Največja nevarnost uporabe pojma javnosti je v njeni aplikaciji na empirični ravni, kjer opisujemo svet kot takšnega, v katerem so izpolnjene vse idealne dimenzije opredelitve javnosti. Slednje nazorno predstavi Mills (1956, 299–300), ko opiše popularne predstave o obstoječem političnem režimu, v katerem obstaja javnost, ki pa ima z resničnostjo toliko skupnega, kot pravljice, in služi zgolj legitimizaciji empiričnih dejstev. Podobna kritika je doletela Habermasa (1962/1989) pri opisovanju zgodovine vzpostavljanja buržoazije kot dovolj dobre ponazoritve ideala, kar je spodbudilo Fraserjevo (1992), da uvede koncept »proti javnosti«.

Termin »proti javnosti« je skovala Fraserjeva (1992, 121–128) v namen kritike Habermasove ideje »buržoazne javnosti« kot univerzalne in dovolj vključujoče javnosti. Pogosto dominantne in izključujoče družbene skupine predstavljajo same sebe kot vsev-ključujočo javnost in lasten interes kot skupen interes. V teh primerih, trdi Fraserjeva, bi morali biti skeptični do ene same singularne javnosti in javne sfere. Proti javnosti so odgovor na in protest proti tovrstnemu izključevanju. Vendar za svoj nastanek, opozarja Fraserjeva, potrebujejo ločeno proti javno sfero, saj dokler so marginalizirane skupine izpostavljene predvsem enosmernemu komuniciranju s strani dominantnih elit, le stežka prepoznajo in artikulirajo svoje drugačne interese in spregledajo, da jih predstavljen »javni« interes v resnici ne vključuje. Zato Fraserjeva predlaga, da skupine, ki komunicirajo samo znotraj samih sebe, to je proti javnosti v zaprtih proti javnih sferah, še niso nujno negativni element v razvoju demokracije, temveč so, kadar so odgovor na socialno izključenost, pravzaprav korak naprej k večji demokratičnosti.

Transnacionalne proti javnosti naj bi se vzpostavljale v transnacionalnih družbenih gibanjih in omrežjih, ki predvsem s pomočjo interneta dosegajo večjo medcelinsko povezanost in večjo učinkovitost pri protestih, kot so bili

na primer protesti za alternativno globalizacijo v Seattlu (na primer Juris 2005) in protesti proti Multilateralnemu sporazumu o investicijah (na primer Deibert 2000; Smith in Smythe 2000). Fraserjeva (2005, 85) vidi primer transnacionalne proti javnosti predvsem v Svetovnem socialnem forumu, ki je nastal v odgovor na izključenost iz prevladujočega javnega komuniciranja, predstavljenega predvsem na Svetovnem ekonomskem forumu. Svetovni socialni forum je pomemben in izredno nujen element v procesu vzpostavljanja transnacionalne javnosti, saj v svoji obliki vzporednih srečanj (Pianta 2003) predstavlja protiargumente, predstavljene na Svetovnem ekonomskem forumu (Teivainen 2002; Tarrow 2006, 103–136). Argumentiranost razprave javnosti izhaja iz tega, da javnost sestavljajo ljudje z različnimi in nasprotujočimi si mnenji, ki se morajo soočiti v javni razpravi (Park 1924/2007, 110). Argumenti tako Svetovnega socialnega foruma kot tudi Svetovnega ekonomskega foruma morajo biti soočeni, čemur bi idealno gledano morale služiti medijske in izobraževalne institucije, zaradi česar je njihovo idealno delovanje v javnem interesu. Vendar so prav te institucije v veliki meri del dominantnega sistema, katerega izključujočo naravo podpirajo. Primerjava poročanja o Svetovnem ekonomskem forumu in Svetovnem socialnem forumu v dnevniku New York Times med leti 2001 in 2004 je pokazala, da je medijsko poročanje daleč od omogočanja javne razprave in da tovrstni mediji samo utrjujejo že obstoječa razmerja moči (Bennett in ostali 2004).

Normativni ideali javnosti pa služijo tudi kot vodilo in pomoč pri prehitrem oziroma presplošnem pozitivnem opisovanju družbenih gibanj – ta namreč niso po definiciji avtomatsko sprememba k večji demokratičnosti. Največja nevarnost pri družbenih gibanjih, ki so po definiciji odgovor na izključevanje in nesorazmerja moči (Tarrow 1996, 3), je zanemarjanje ideala enakovredne in dostopne razprave med temi, v imenu katerih se gibanja sploh vzpostavijo.

Javnost in socialni mediji

V petem poglavju se usmerim k pristopom, ki rešitev problemov transnacionalnih javnosti vidijo v uporabi novih medijev v okviru tako imenovane »zadnje faze« razvoja novih medijev, to je socialnih medijev oz. »spleta 2.0«. To poglavje spremlja tudi empirična analiza raznolikosti glasov in politik upravljanja največjega in najbolj mednarodno razširjenega spletnega video portala YouTube, ki obljublja opolnomočenje navadnih državljanov. Osredotočam se zgolj na strukturno dimenzijo konceptualizacije javnosti in izpostavim štiri normativne zahteve na ravni strukture, ki bi jih socialni mediji morali izpolnjevati v razmerju do transnacionalne javnosti: politična narava komuniciranja, vključenost, transnacionalnost, in avtonomija od komercialnih pritiskov.

V empirični analizi sklenem, da na YouTubeu poteka objavljanje o globalnih javnih problemih kot sta globalna finančna kriza in globalno segrevanje in da podjetje YouTube LLC spodbuja objavljanje političnih vsebin, da pa po drugi strani primarno osmišlja svoje uporabnike kot osredotočene na zabavne vsebine. Glede transnacionalne narave uporabe YouTubea in politik delovanja podjetja YouTube LLC sklenem, da je YouTube predvsem ameriško-centrična sfera, da pa videji, objavljeni s strani uporabnikov iz ZDA niso značilno bolj obiskani kot videi uporabnikov iz drugih držav. Analiza tudi pokaže, da so na YouTubeu večinoma objavljali posamezniki, da pa so organizirani akterji: nevladne organizacije, medijske hiše in politični akterji zelo pogosto med temi, ki objavljajo na YouTubeu. Slednji so v primeru globalne finančne krize dobili značilno večjo pozornost s strani uporabnikov YouTubea, kot pa videi objavljeni s strani posameznikov. Po drugi strani pa so videi o globalnem segrevanju, objavljeni s strani posameznikov, pridobili več pozornosti kot videi objavljeni s strani drugih akterjev. Podobno ambivalentne sklepe glede vključenosti ponuja analiza politik podjetja YouTube LLC, ki po eni strani promovira marginalizirane glasove, po drugi pa glasove akterjev moči. Kot zadnje, komercialna narava podjetja YouTube LLC pomeni, da je YouTube

kot sfera komuniciranja zasebna lastnina v kateri ima pravico odločanja lastnik in je komuniciranje komodificirano (Mosco 1996).