

**UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE**

Petar Popović

**Jugoslovanska kriza v kontekstu II. hladne vojne
(1980-90)**

**Yugoslav Crisis in the Context of the II Cold War
(1980-90)**

Doktorska disertacija

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Mentor: red. prof. dr. Bojko Bučar

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Jugoslovanska kriza v kontekstu II. hladne vojne (1980-90)

Povzetek

Politika velikih sil iz časov blokofske polarizacije hladne vojne med leti 1945 do 1989 je imela veliko vlogo za razvoj, stabilnost in integriteto multietične Socialistične Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ). Problem delovanja države, nastanek krize in razpad državne skupnosti ni mogoče analizirati brez upoštevanja teh procesov v okviru mednarodnih odnosov. Pričujoča disertacija se ukvarja z analizo tega mednarodnega okvira s predpostavko, da se kriza SFRJ ne more v celoti spoznati brez razumevanja vplivov politik zunanjih sil.

Za razumevanje vpliva mednarodnih razmer na političnoekonomski in družbeni razvoj in procese znotraj SFRJ je bila v nalogi uporabljena konstruktivistična teorija mednarodnih odnosov. Glede na to, da je konstruktivizem kot sodobna teorija postpozitivistična in zaradi tega zelo fleksibilna pri uporabi ustreznih metod, se v disertaciji koristita sistemska teorija za potrebe pojasnitve konteksta II. Hladne vojne (1979-1985) in Habermasov model krize za pojasnitev notranjih razlogov za razpad države. Za razumevanje problema kompleksnosti krize v SFRJ in razpada v obdobju II. Hladne vojne je potrebno analizirati 'konstrukcijo reničnosti' tedanjih političnih elit (njihovo videnje notranjepolitičnih procesov v SFRJ in njihov položaj v mednarodnih odnosih), analiza države SFRJ kot take s konstruktivističnega vidika, ki združuje vse pomembnejše tradicije (webrovske in marksistične), in uporaba analize konstruktivistične vzajemnosti 'identitete in interesa' oziroma družbe, oblasti ter njihove vloge pri oblikovanju zunanje politike v mednarodnih odnosih.

Po izključitvi Komunistične partije Jugoslavije in njenega vodje Josipa Broza Tita iz Informbiroja leta 1948 je postala SFRJ pomemben geostrateški zaveznik Združenih držav Amerike (ZDA) v jugovzhodni Evropi. Posledično je to pomenilo veliko ekonomsko in vojaško podporo. Prav tako je SFRJ v šestdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja kot ena izmed vodilnih članic v Gibanju neuvrščenih (GN) predstavljala resno alternativo blokovski delitvi sveta ter bipolarnosti takratnega obdobja. Aktivna zunanja politika SFRJ s Titom na čelu, ki je temeljila na iskanju ravnovesja med bloki in vodenju GN, je bila porok notranje stabilnosti in integritete države.

Izgube poglavitnih vodij med leti 1979 in 1983: Edvarda Kardelja (član predsedstva SFRJ in najbližji Titov sodelavec), Josipa Broza Tita (predsednik SFRJ) in Vladimirja Bakariča (najvplivnejši politik v Zvezi Komunistov s Hrvaške), ki so predstavljali vrhovno avtoriteto, so povzročile, da je partijska nomenklatura SFRJ ostala brez jasno določenih ciljev in metod reševanja krize. Ideološka pogojenost ohranbe nasledstva, ki ga je za seboj zapustilo staro partijsko vodstvo na čelu s Titom, kaže na percepcijo, katera ni imela zaslombe v resničnosti. Vodstvo, vodenje katerega je temeljilo na idejni doktrini znanstvenega materializma, je izvajalo napačno ekonomsko politiko. Na drugi strani je prav tako vedno bolj prevladovala nesposobnost zunanjepolitičnega delovanja, kar je puščalo za seboj dolgoročne negativne posledice. Te posledice se bodo, ko bo mednarodni socializem v vzhodni Evropi doživel svoj zlom, odslakavale v neskladju pri oblikovanju identitete in interesov v postitovski SFRJ. Identiteta je namreč temeljila na praksah republiškega prakticiranja avtonomnega sprejemanja odločitev (ki bo pripeljala do spopada med Slovenijo in Hrvaško, ki sta se zavzemali za nadaljnjo decentralizacijo in liberalizacijo, na eni strani, ter Srbijo na drugi strani, ki je težila k obnovitvi velikodržavnega centralizma). Interes skupne države, katerega je definirala Tito vse do svoje smrti, je izginil.

V začetku osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja prihaja do korenitih sprememb v intelektualnih in ideoloških premislekih političnih elit vodilnih sil o odnosih v Hladni voljni. Povojna generacija politikov je predstavljala svojstveno reakcijo na dotedanje realistično razumevanje

odnosov v sistemu Hladne vojne. Pojav nove desnice na zahodu, tržne reforme na Kitajskem ter prebujanje islamskega fundamentalizma na bližnjem in srednjem Vzhodu so s konstruktivnega vidika najavile nove spremembe v odnosu identitete in interesov posameznih družb. Nova konstrukcija družbene resničnosti oziroma prilagajanja ekonomskopolitičnim procesom v svetu se ni dogodila niti v socialističnem bloku niti v SFRJ. V vzhodni Evropi je še naprej vladala nezamenljiva nomenklatura, medtem ko se v SFRJ po Titovi smrti niso izvršile družbenopolitične spremembe.

V dosednji literaturi se mednarodni vidik krize in razpada SFRJ ni sistematično obdeloval. V analizah so se ukvarjali z mednarodnim vidikom, ki ni izhajal iz okvirov ekonomskega dejavnika kot povzročitelja dezintegracije v SFRJ. Pri določenem številu avtorjev je izpostavljen zaključek o neposredni odgovornosti zahodnih finančnih institucij v odnosu do socialistične ekonomije SFRJ, kar je imela za posledico vzpon republiških nacionalizmov. Pričujoča disertacija kaže na notranje procese krize v SFRJ v osemdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja v okviru mednarodnih odnosov – torej v obdobju t.i. II. Hladne vojne (1979-1985). Mednarodni vidiki krize predstavljajo važen element krize (v disertaciji je obdelan odnos do ZDA, Zveze sovjetskih socialističnih republik (SSSR) in GN), da bi se lahko razumela vseobsegajoča družbena kriza in kriza samoupravnega sistema SFRJ (ekonomska kriza, kriza racionalnosti, kriza legitimnosti in kriza identitete) kot vzrok razpada države in izbruha vojne leta 1991.

KLJUČNI POJMI: Mednarodni odnosi, SFRJ, II. Hladna vojna, konstruktivizem, J.B.Tito, dolžniška kriza, kriza racionalnosti, kriza legitimnosti.

Yugoslav Crisis in the Context of the II Cold War (1980-90)

Abstract

During the Cold War bipolar system (1945-89), the politics of bloc powers had a great influence on the internal processes, stability and integrity of the multiethnic Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). It is impossible to analyze the processes of change of the internal state structures of SFRY, the beginning of the crisis and the collapse of the state in the late 1980s without considering the context of the international system. This dissertation conducted the research of the international context of the so-called II Cold War (1979-85), and its influences on the stability and integrity of SFRY.

In order to explain the role of the international factor, this dissertation applied the constructivist theory of International Relations (IR). Because constructivism as the contemporary theory of IR is post-positivist and flexible in the methodological approach, we applied the systems theory to explain the context of the II Cold War and Habermas's model of crisis in order to explain the internal reasons of collapse of SFRY. To properly examine the complexity of the crisis and collapse of SFRY, it is necessary to analyze the so-called 'constructed reality' of the post-Tito political elites (their perception of the internal issues and political processes in SFRY, as well as its position in the international affairs); to analyze SFRY as a state from the constructivist standpoint that combines major theoretical traditions of definition of the state (namely Weberian and Marxist); and finally to apply the paradigm of 'identity and interest' (meaning the relation between society and the governing elite, and their role in creating the foreign policy in international affairs).

After SFRY and its leader Josip Broz Tito were expelled from Cominform in 1948, SFRY became an important geostrategic ally of the US in South-Eastern Europe. The result of these circumstances was US's strong economic and military support. Furthermore, during the 1960s SFRY would as the leading country of the Non-alignment Movement (NAM) represent the respectable alternative to the bloc divisions of the bipolar international system. Balancing between blocs and pioneering the NAM, the active foreign policy of SFRY guaranteed the internal stability and the integrity of the country.

The departure of the leading figureheads of SFRY between 1979 and 1983 (Edvard Kardelj, the member of the Presidency of SFRY and Tito's closest associate died in 1979; J. B. Tito, the President of SFRY in 1980; and Vladimir Bakarić, the most influential leaders of the League of Communists of Croatia in 1983) left the party nomenclature without clearly defined goals and methods to properly approach the crises. Party elite's ideologically conditioned political defense of the revolutionary heritage, left by Tito and his war time associates, points to a perception that did not correspond to the realities of the 1980s. The leadership that remained on the course of the doctrines of scientific Marxism, did not properly managed the economic crisis nor was it competent and capable to continue the active foreign policies of the Tito era. This would have the enormous long term consequences, which would parallel to the collapse of the socialist system in Eastern Europe manifest in the dysfunctional formation of 'identities and interests' of the post-Tito SFRY. In other words, identity was based on the autonomous decision making process on the republic's level. In the late 1980s, this would result in the conflict between Slovenia and Croatia, republics that advocated further decentralization of political system and liberalization, and Serbia on the other, which aspired to reintroduce the strong state centralization. Thus, the common identity and interest of the federal state that was previously defined by Tito as the main decision-making actor disappeared.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the major shift emerged in the perception of the political elites of the leading Cold War powers in their intellectual and ideological perception. In a certain way, post-II World War generation of leaders represented a reaction to the conventional realism in the Cold War approaches to foreign policy. The emergence of the 'New Right' in the West, market reforms in China, and the wake of the Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and Central Asia represent from the constructivist standpoint the change in the 'identity-interest' formation of the leading Cold War societies. The newly 'constructed reality', based on the adjustment to the economic-political processes in the world, did not emerge in the Socialist bloc and SFRY. In Eastern Europe as well as in the post-Tito's SFRY, the power was held by the irreplaceable *nomenclature* incapable to conduct social and economic reforms.

In the literature on the SFRY crisis and collapse there has so far been no systematic analyses of the international aspect. These researches mainly dealt with the economic factor as the leading cause in the state's collapse. Thus, a number of scholars concluded that there is a direct link and responsibility of the international actors in relation to the SFRY crisis. This dissertation pointed that SFRY's crisis and collapse of the 1980s were primarily of the internal nature that can fully be understood by presenting the international context of the so-called II Cold War (1979-85). International aspect (this dissertation analyzed SFRY's relations with the US, USSR and NAM) represents an important element in understanding the overall social crisis of the self-managing system in SFRY (economic crisis, rationality crisis, crisis of legitimacy and identity) as a cause of the collapse of the state and the breakout of war in 1991.

Key words: International Relations, SFRY, II Cold War, constructivism, J. B. Tito, debt crisis, rationality crisis, crisis of legitimacy

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Introduction

This dissertation is about the 1980s decade, the world affairs and the crisis in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in that period. It is a decade which marks the turning point between the turbulent twentieth century, defined by the ongoing conflict between different ideological systems, and the post-ideological process of Globalization (after 1989), dominated by liberalism. SFRY was the state that did not survive this transitional process of change from one international system (bipolar Cold War) to another (Globalization). There are deep historical, political, economic, ideological and cultural reasons for SFRY's inability to adjust to the changing international tendencies, ultimately leading to its collapse. This dissertation focused on three elements: politics, economy and ideology as the key and decisive factors that in the specific timeframe (1980-90) entered the stage of the crisis that the state, due to the certain internal and external conditions, was not able to overcome.

Researching SFRY's crisis and collapse had two objectives – the first was to present through the theoretical aspect of the contemporary International Relations theory of constructivism the international context of the 1980s system, and SFRY's position within it. Second objective was to conduct the historical-political analyses of SFRY crisis (and its ultimate collapse) within this context. In order to successfully examine the wider international context of SFRY's crisis in 1980s, this dissertation focused on political, economic and ideological factors on both a micro and macro level of analyses. The aim was to demonstrate that SFRY, as a failed state, was highly dependable and conditioned by the international structures of the Cold War system (1945-1989). Since its expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, SFRY played a specific role in the bipolar Cold War structure.¹ Understanding SFRY and its collapse in the context of the bloc divisions is thus essential. Once these structure began to change (as was the case during the so-called II Cold War (1979-85), which was seen as a new arms race between the United States, US; and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR), SFRY's stability and integrity entered the phase of the crisis that ultimately led to the country's collapse with the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991.

¹ Communist Information Bureau, set up in 1947 as a successor body of Comintern (the Communist International, which was dissolved by Stalin in 1943), a form of the international communist movement, which was comprised of Socialist bloc Communist parties and Communist parties of Italy and France.

By setting the case of SFRY's crisis and long term causes of collapse in an appropriate theoretical IR framework, this dissertation will try to demonstrate the importance of an international system in the context of a critical period known as the Second Cold War (1979-1985) in order to provide a new aspect of the collapse of SFRY.

To prove that SFRY was highly dependable on the international system of the Cold War, this dissertation was built on the following premises:

1. The first premise is that SFRY was a multi-ethnic society based on the socialist one-party system whose stability and integrity was conditioned by the mitigating circumstances of the so-called 'balance of fear' between the two nuclear powers in the Cold War. Supported by the US's economic and military aid since the late 1940s and normalizing the relations with the post-Stalinist USSR after 1956, SFRY managed through active non-bloc policy to build its own identity and secure popular legitimization based on the sense of extra-ordinary Self.
2. The second premise is that by forming its own interest, based on the established domestic identity of a self-managing system (a type of socialism that is opposed to capitalism but accepts a mild form of market economy; and is against highly centralized and bureaucratic state planned-economy but still preserving one party system and plan); SFRY's constructed social reality was based on the bipolar concept of a capitalist-communist division, anti-imperialism and imposed fear of a possible USSR's military intervention.
3. SFRY entered the crisis once these structures began to change in 1979 (the beginning of the II Cold War). International economy and international financial organizations played a decisive part in this phase, primarily because the realm of international economy was the only deregulated sphere in the Cold War among units, where 'international anarchy' still prevailed.²
4. The changes on the international level, that reflected internal stability of SFRY, placed the country into the context of the crisis of East European real-existing socialism. This outcome was caused primarily because SFRY applied similar or identical methods in attempting to resolve its internal crisis, and that was the bureaucratization of politics

² International anarchy was an exclusively realist concept of world affairs in IR. Its main premise is that there is no World government; states operate independently. The main characteristics of anarchy are mistrust among units, materialist power distribution and overall disorder that makes units prone to conflict. The term was, for the first time, introduced by a British historian Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson in his 1926 book *International Anarchy: 1904-1914*.

by the party (instead of furthering the liberalization of the reforms that were set in the mid-1960s and continued well into the 1970s; namely moving towards a con-federal system with a market economy).

5. Collapse as a result of the crisis cannot be observed outside the context of the system change, specifically the end of the Cold War and especially within the context of the crisis of East European socialism.
6. SFRY's crisis, as a result of international changes and power shifts on a global level in the 1980s, had a top-down effect that resulted in the internal atrophy – the system crisis (economic and rationality crisis) and consequently turning into identity crisis (legitimization and motivation crisis); thus by the end of the decade SFRY was turned into a dysfunctional, power-diffused and popularly delegitimized state with one form and different content.
7. SFRY's stability was guaranteed through the constructed myth of Cold War powers that SFRY was an important strategic, economic and ideological factor in the world affairs. In the 1980s, this illusion that was maintaining the international recognition of SFRY form ignored the content (nationalism), which was moving in the direction of the dissolution of the state.
8. The outbreak of armed conflict was possible because the international support for integrated SFRY was consistent, while the key international actors were not responsive to the realistic needs of the federal units to dissolve the state.

Based on these eight premises, this dissertation demonstrated that the active foreign policy during Tito's era was an important integrating factor of SFRY's multi-ethnic society. The identity-interest formation by the ruling elite, in the context of the internally constructed myth, played a major incentive in the structurally divided world among two blocs since 1945. Yet it must be emphasized that SFRY's crisis and collapse during the 1980s were purely a matter of internal relations; yet, these internal processes cannot be properly observed by rejecting the international context.

Researching and writing on the subject of the crisis of SFRY and the ensuing armed conflict presents a certain challenge due to the complex and multifaceted nature of the matter. There has been a plethora of titles published that have dealt with this topic from various fields within the social sciences, each field finding their own interesting facts that they concentrate on in order to elaborate their own theoretical models. In this dissertation we pointed to the

international context; thus we have to briefly explain the relevant literature that has emphasized the relations between the internal crisis and the international factor. It must be noted here that most of the authors we discuss in the introduction would be later analyzed in the dissertation.

There are authors who *a priori* claimed, without further analyzing, that the collapse of the Socialist bloc and USSR inevitably had to mean the collapse of SFRY. For example, Jasna Adler wrote that “the disintegration of SFRY should be seen as an *inevitable* consequence of the collapse of the international communist system in Europe (...) that SFRY would not survive the end of the communist rule in Europe was obvious” (Adler 1998, 96). James Gow similarly considers the influence that the end of the Cold War had on SFRY collapse, writing that “the end of the Cold War removed the restraint which the East-West conflict had imposed on a fissiparous federation (...) creating a particularly (unstable) environment. SFRY’s conventional strategic interest was lost, reducing international concern for its future” (Gow 1997, 12). How much exactly did the international factor (the collapse of Socialist bloc) and the overall reduction of strategic importance contribute to the country’s collapse?

Richard Ullman wrote that “the international system of the Cold War was not anarchic, in the sense that it lacked an overarching supranational authority able to assure order either in the interactions of states or in the relations of groups and individuals within them. Yet it was also a relatively organized system in which order was maintained by each of the two superpowers taking on the role of disciplinarian within its own bloc” (Ullman, 2006). Thus, according to Ullman, SFRY’s crisis of the 1970s and 1980s could not have triggered the armed conflict or dissolution as SFRY was the integral part of the international system. “Had real war ever appeared likely, leaders of both alliances would have found that their standard military repertoires included responses to the contingency of the break up of SFRY either caused or followed by the intervention of the other alliance” (Ibid.). From a strictly realist perspective, it was the international anarchy that gave a unique opportunity to SFRY's republics to separate. However, Ullman did not offer deeper analyses and comparison of both internal and external causes for collapse.

An insightful study is *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union* by Reneo Lukić and Allen Lynch (1996). The disintegration of SFRY, Czechoslovakia and the USSR in 1991 is the focus of the comparative analysis of their respective political systems from the perspective of the US foreign policy. Emphasizing structural similarities of the gradual decay in all three examples (Lukić and Lynch 1996, 6-7),

the authors present the case of SFRY in an appropriate international context of a crisis of Eastern-European real existing socialism. Yet their study is a comparative analysis that analyses the failed federative models of a decaying socialist order, whilst not providing the overall IR theoretical perspective on major tendencies that led to the change.

The unavoidable and most influential work, considering the cultural/civilization international aspect of SFRY's collapse, is Samuel Huntington's *Sukob civilizacija i preustroj svjetskog poretka* (The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of the World Order) (1998). By pointing to the historical pattern (the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Austro Hungarian Empires in 1918) Huntington concludes that the civilization sentiments had to erupt into another cycle of violence after the collapse of the USSR and SFRY because "these citizens could not have identified themselves anymore as communists, Soviet citizens and Yugoslavs; thus desperately needing new identities" (1998, 322). Huntington describes his argument in simple terms. He states that when ideological division in Europe disappeared in 1989 with the end of the Cold War, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam on the other, had reemerged (Ibid., 200). Henry Kissinger (2003) followed a similar line of reasoning when observing the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, by claiming in *Treba li Amerika vanjsku politiku*, (Does America Need a Foreign Policy) that the conflict was an ever present phenomenon but always contemporarily frozen by international factors "first as a buffer zone between Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires; then Tito (communism is seen as an external force) and finally today by NATO" (2003, 219). The problem with the civilization argument is its determinism; that peoples of SFRY would inevitably enter a conflict, where international aspect only serves as a structural support argument, without its system analysis. That there were certain patterns is a fact; Yugoslavia as such had a geopolitical significance in certain constellations and would collapse when those constellations change – either as Kingdom in 1941 (the collapse of the Versailles system) or as SFRY in 1991 (the collapse of the bipolar Cold War system). Again, none of these authors made effort to analyze the relations between international and domestic SFRY structure.

The argument that has attempted, however, to explain and emphasize the decisiveness of the international aspect is the international economic argument stemming mostly from the neo-Marxist authors. The international economic argument is probably the most debatable argument of all. It deals with the economic crisis of the 1980s and argues that nationalism, which exploded in the late 1980s, was a direct consequence of the economic changes that led

the country into armed conflict (Bojičić, 1996; V.P. Gagnon 2004). Furthermore, and strictly speaking of the international economic factor, this aspect has preoccupied a number of scholars who saw a direct link between the Western and IMF harsh economic policies towards SFRY and the rise of nationalism as its result (Woodward 1995; Chomsky 2007; Hudson 2003). There is still an open debate whether the economic crisis was indeed the result of an intentional undermining of SFRY's system by the western economic power holders, or whether it was the incapability of the SFRY political elites to recognize, analyze and ultimately deal with the crisis. However, these authors, like Hudson, emphasized that the Western 'imperialist' governments "targeted SFRY's economy (...) to promote a 'quiet revolution' to overthrow the communist governments and parties while re-integrating the countries of Eastern Europe into the orbit of the World Market" (2003, 57). Authors like Woodward went a step further, entering the domain of a conspiracy theory when claiming that "from the mid-1980s on, both Austria and the Vatican had pursued a strategy to increase their sphere of economic and spiritual influence in central and Eastern Europe, respectively" (1995, 148-49). This dissertation emphasized that the international economy is important insofar as it served as a wider context for analyzing deeper and complex reasons for the crisis and collapse of SFRY.

Considering the internal aspect of the crisis of the 1980s, the most in-depth research so far has been that of Dejan Jović *Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla* (Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away) (2003). Jović's work is primarily focused on the internal, ideological causes of SFRY's collapse, and does not pay much attention to the international aspect (Jović 2003, 68). Furthermore, Jović made clear that armed conflict is not in the domain of research that encompasses the structural collapse, even though systemically the collapse and armed conflict as its immediate outcome are part of the same process (Ibid., 9-22).

In order to understand the reasons for the crisis and collapse of SFRY in the 1980s, the importance of the international aspect needs to be determined through critical analysis. When analyzing our case in relation to the Socialist bloc, the approach should not be comparative but contextual. It should point to the indirect effects that international changes have on domestic processes.

This study is normative-historical. Therefore, it did not rely purely on statistical information in order to empirically prove the deterministic cause-and-effect that brought on the crisis and collapse. It rather observed comparatively (within the international context) the tendencies that made the internal collapse possible.

As mentioned, this dissertation explored the IR theory by conducting a historical research. Because IR by nature is a very wide and complex area of study, and because as a science it is relatively young, there is no generally established and commonly accepted method as yet. Therefore, the method that was conducted in this research is qualitative, relying primarily on secondary sources. These included scientific articles and literature that critically analyzed our case both on a domestic and international scale. Considering other sources like: party programs, memoranda, memoirs, interviews and speeches of key decision makers, these were to examine them analytically, presenting a view and determining the established perception of that period by key-decision makers. This part is specifically important in relation to the constructivist theoretical approach of a 'constructed reality' and perception.

By placing SFRY's case in an international context, the top-down effect needs to be determined analytically. This cause-and-effect was explained through the application of variables: the independent variable in this case was the II Cold War, while the dependent variable was the SFRY crisis. Considering these variables, it must be noted that when analyzing the economy (and a great part will be focused on international economy and the internal economic crisis) causal effects were not necessarily in direct relation. In other words, an independent variable served primarily as a framework taking into consideration an intervening variable; in this case the death of the leader Josip Broz Tito (who was a major integrating factor) and implications that came about as a result of the post-Tito structure.

This dissertation also used the interviews carried out with individuals who had insight into the diplomatic efforts of SFRY, and especially considering the role of 'human agency' during the crisis and collapse. The interviews were structural; the questions were focused on the specific period and/or event and/or people in question.

Finally, the literature used was mostly in English or in Serbian/Croatian/Slovenian language. When the title of the source is originally English, but translated into one of the latter three languages, then the source is cited by (1) the translated title in italics and then (2) in the brackets with the original title. Furthermore, all the citations whether on Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian or German are translated in English.

The dissertation is composed of five main chapters.

Chapter one presented theoretical background, by introducing the theoretical framework of contemporary IR theory of constructivism and introduced the case of the SFRY crisis and collapse of the 1980s within this framework. The analyses pointed to the methodological

problems in literature that have so far been written and explain why economic and political factors cannot be observed from the conventional materialist aspects of pure power distribution (this part will in a way expand on some parts of the literature review from this introduction), without considering the ideas and how they lost their appeal in the socially constructed myth.

Chapter two presented a historical overview: it defined the international structures and how the system of the Cold War functioned. It defined the actor (SFRY) with its main characteristics and the process of its identity interest formation in the context of its interaction with the actors: the US (in an economic and strategic sense), USSR (in the sense of ideological differentiation) and with the Non-alignment Movement, NAM (where SFRY found its space for an active foreign policy). After explaining the main actors, the interaction and the level of dependence of the system, this chapter will introduce the year 1979 as the turning point that led to the II Cold War, and explain how conventional wisdom, intellectual understanding and political behavior during the Cold War change diametrically.

Chapter three set the context of the II Cold War. It will analyze the levels of interaction in order to explain the nature of interaction; namely moving from a conventional 'balance of fear' of a nuclear era to international anarchy in the international economic realm, where international financial institutions would play a major role. By explaining this context, we observed SFRY's interaction with the US, USSR and NAM in the 1980s and point to the change of pattern in relations which would eventually affect the internal stability of SFRY. Namely, this dissertation focused on the change in identity-interest which was not adaptable to the new challenges coming from the international system.

Chapter four introduced (after the international context is set) strictly historical-political research by analyzing the internal causes of crisis. This chapter observed the crisis of the system and the crisis of identity through the application of the Habermas model of the crisis. Attention was given to the economic crisis and how this evolved into the crisis of the state (rationality crisis), consequently affecting the legitimization and motivation (identity) of the system. Special focus was given to this legitimacy in order to present how internal legitimacy decayed much faster than international legitimization. Quite on the contrary, the external modes of the legitimization were keeping the state integrated until the final collapse of the USSR and the Socialist bloc in 1991.

Finally, chapter five focused on the state of SFRY as an unfinished and ultimately failed concept within the changed international context of the fading Cold War (1989-91). It looked

at the actions of the human agency that made the armed conflict an unavoidable solution to the decomposition of the state.

The purpose of this dissertation was not only to offer a new perspective from the contemporary IR theory of constructivism to the already well researched case of SFRY collapse, but to emphasize the structural and systemic importance of the IR in the state's crisis and collapse. Second, this research presented a whole range of economic and political trends (on both internal and external level), proving against the common and popular opinion that there was a direct foreign force that contributed to the country's demise. Arguing against the methodological determinism, in this dissertation we pointed to the series of political phenomena that led in the direction of the collapse and armed conflict. International context is unavoidable in almost all the studies that have been written on SFRY. However, it has been either a passively supportive argument seen by other scholars as a given, or it has been much too emphasized, making those authors fall into the trap of not only methodological determinism but conspiracy theory. This dissertation intended to critically analyze the international context and give a full perspective on the 1980s crisis (what they were and what was its legacy); finally determining the real role of the international factors and their influences on SFRY's demise.

1 Theory: researching SFRY case from an IR perspective

The goal of every International Relations (IR) research through the application of appropriate theoretical paradigms is to determine a possible pattern in the state's, government's or society's behavior. In other words, we seek answers to questions of why in certain historical period of specific socio-economic and political conditions do states go to war; why do they begin cooperation; or why do they collapse (whether the causes are civil wars or internal system collapses; the so-called failed states)?³ In order to determine to what extent did the changes in international structure of the Cold War system influence the internal SFRY crisis in the 1980s, and in the long run causing the country's eventual collapse and armed conflict, we need to define specific methodological IR theory parameters and apply them to the SFRY case; in order to analyze the processes in an international context of the so-called II Cold War (1979-85) as a cause for the country's collapse in 1991.⁴ The specific IR theory this dissertation is focused on is constructivism, which means that we examined a wider specter of elements beyond the traditional understanding of IR (namely the distribution of power, the role of the state and its relations with other units in strictly economic, military and political context). The elements we considered are primarily ideology, the myth based on the social construction of reality, the values and norms and rules in the context of the role of institutions.

1.1 Methodological problems in researching the SFRY case

As a social science, IR is a relatively a young discipline that emerged as a peace study in the aftermath of World War I in 1919, predominantly in the Anglo-Saxon world (Knutsen 1997, 211-216). As yet, scientifically, an undeveloped discipline, its research method is largely influenced by the methods of other disciplines like history, political science, political theory, gender, critical theory, comparative politics, economics, sociology, recently more and more psychology etc.⁵ It should also be emphasized that the IR discipline emerged in the specific geographical area, mostly influenced by its dominant culture. "When new courses in International Relations emerged after World War I (...) the zone of scholarly growth was

³ The failed state lacks the basic conditions and elements that make a state and its government sovereign, including; the loss of physical control of its territory; no legitimate authority; certain level of social anarchy; impossibility to interact with other states in the international system. Afghanistan is an example of a failed state.

⁴ Even though the armed conflict of 1991-95 is complex; by some considered a civil war, by others a war of aggression, and commonly known as The Wars of Yugoslav Succession, we will use the term armed conflict for a simple reason that there never was an official 'proclamation of war' as such from none of the conflicting parties.

⁵ Very insightful overview of the contemporary condition of theories in humanities generally is given in Dryzek, Honig and Phillips's *Oxford Handbook of Political Theory* (2006).

limited to the North-Atlantic academic culture; its language was English; its theoretical tradition was that of liberalism; its vision of war, wealth, peace and power were those of the Enlightenment project” (Ibid., 211). Basically, in its primal shape IR emerged as a peace study whose purpose was to explain academically the roots of wars (such as was World War I) in order to prevent future conflicts. This intellectual urge followed the idealism coming from the political sphere, which was set forward by the US president Wilson, especially when he announced that World War I would be ‘the war to end all wars’.⁶

IR theories tried, through the application of the above mentioned disciplines (political science, history, sociology etc.), to explain the bipolar system of the Cold War and its outcome in the form of the collapse of the Socialist bloc in 1989-91, and the prevailing of the Western values (democracy, pluralism) and neo-liberal economic model. Cold War is a complex period that has to be examined not only from the aspect of an ideological difference of two contending nuclear powers – the US and USSR – but also from the supranational level (being also a part of the liberal theory’s tradition) of political, economic and military institutions (United Nations, Conference on European Security and Cooperation, NATO, Warsaw Pact, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, COMECON etc.), which emerged from the post-1945 reconstruction of the world order.⁷ Thus, the complexity of overlapping spheres of power and interest in the Cold War system has been a great challenge and has influenced the scientific and historical development of IR theories. Meyers writes that in the IR discipline “there is a continuous and renewed emphasis on the close interconnection of non-scientific crisis outbreaks and scientific, newly formulated and ontologically based presumptions of cognitional interest, problem and cognitional subject” (Meyers 1999, 19). Basically, we have to draw the line between IR theory as such and the so-called ‘real-world politics’.

As a discipline researching international processes, IR encompasses a large field of human knowledge and phenomenon. “The goal of the (IR) discipline is to not only investigate the important facts, primal forces, intellectual, ideological and doctrinal basis, as well as the practices between the states, nations, groups and individuals (...) but also rules, mechanisms and institutions that regulate those relations” (Vukadinović 2004, 51). Because IR is in its essence a study that researches political, economic, cultural and social relations between

⁶ The phrase ‘war to end all wars’ was first introduced by the British science fiction novelist H.G Wells, in a series of articles written before and during World War I, basically arguing that the defeat of German militarism would bring about the eternal peace. The phrase was used by Wilson during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

⁷ As a term, Cold War was first coined by the American financier and presidential advisor Bernard Baruch in 1947. That same year a wider acceptance of the term was given by Walter Lippmann with his book *The Cold War*.

states and analyzes the reasons states interact the way they do, the scientific paradigms of other humanities, namely political science and history are of great importance. History is probably among most important fields for the IR research. As Dimitrijević and Stojanović noticed “(...) there are indicators which have to be taken into consideration in order to conduct a successful IR research;

- a. *Historical research of IR* and its phenomena is essential because it is precisely these phenomena that could not be properly researched by applying other methods. Historical research can allow us to determine certain patterns by examining similar processes that can be found in the history of International Relations.
- b. Historical research needs to be supplemented and examined with examples of contemporary practices in IR.
- c. IR cannot be successfully analyzed without combining the overall social relations. Thus, in International Relations research it is essential to examine all the direct or indirect relations between all the elements and the influences that emerge thereafter. In this sense, it would be useful to examine certain International Relations determined rules with social patterns that have been acknowledged by other social science disciplines (...)” (Dimitrijević and Stojanović 1979, 70).

Among all the mentioned disciplines that influence IR, history is probably the most important discipline, which serves the purpose of determining certain patterns and tendencies. As IR scholar Paskal writes “the standard methodology for planning of all kinds (of IR research) is to analyze the historical record and the current situation in order to extrapolate from the past and present what might happen in the future” (Paskal 2009, 1144). However, it must be emphasized that methodological approach in IR is not exclusively a historical research. Basically, “IR history offers historical facts in which theory searches for constants, trends, models and examples that are prone to repetition. On the other hand, history needs abstract paradigms and concepts of mutual dependence between certain events and their frequency” (Vukadinović 2004, 56). Historical material is thus important for research, as “in order to understand IR, it is necessary to have a strong bond between history and IR” (Ibid.). In other words, historical facts serve as scientific units to build a case in support of a set of theoretical paradigms.

Finally, history as a discipline has become in some academic IR circles the traditional approach for research. Of these groups, the most prominent is the English School of International Relations (also known as liberal realism); an academic fraction that emerged sometime in the 1950s at the London School of Economics (Martin Wight and Hedley Bull being its pioneers).⁸ In its methodological approach, the basic characteristic of the English School of International Relations is, among other methodological applications in their research, the usage of historical facts. Methodologically, this school has been supportive of the *traditionalist*, or *classical* approach. Therefore, the English School of International Relations is characteristically traditionalist and “rely overmuch on idiosyncratic, highly personalized insights from history, philosophy, political theory and law and consequently tend to employ intuitive, subjective judgments unsupported by empirical evidence to explain international phenomenon” (Ibid. 541).

Because historicism represents the major factor in conducting research, we inevitably face the problem of what is scientifically known as ‘positivism’. We are faced with the evaluation of the facts that we are presenting. This has been a constant issue in social science, thus as well as when it comes to the research of the SFRY collapse.

1.1.1 Positivism in research of the SFRY crisis and collapse

Positivism as a scientific approach emerged in the nineteenth century as an attempt to scientifically apply the laws of nature in the sphere of social science. Its founding father Saint-Simone claimed that social problems should be examined by the ‘positive’ method; that is, the method of natural science. As Stanovčić writes, this approach made “many authors, from Bacon to Durkheim, set up as a methodological rule that men and social facts should be observed as material objects” (Stanovčić 2006, 632). Essentially, positivism is based on four main assumptions; “(...) first, a belief in the unity of science, i.e. that the same methodologies apply in both the scientific and non-scientific world. Second, that there is a distinction between facts and values, with facts being neutral between theories. Thirdly, that the social world, like the natural one, has regularities, and that these can be ‘discovered’ by our theories in much the same way as a scientist does when looking for regularities in nature. Finally, that

⁸ The School’s basic assumption is that the world is comprised of a ‘society of states’. Basically, the English School is constructivist by nature, as it builds its argument on the non-deterministic nature of international anarchy.

the way to determine the truth of statements is by appeal to these natural facts; this is known as *empiricist epistemology*” (Baylis and Smith 2001, 227).

The reason why the parameters used by science to determine the patterns in the laws of nature cannot be applied in social science, is because the conditions are different. Even for those theories in social science that are empirically proven to be a social pattern, the logical application of induction is not a correct nor reliable approach in the final analysis. Stanovčić writes that “some theories are the product of inspiration in a moment when we realize that there is a possible connection between more causes which are sometimes available and accessible to us, but sometimes are the product of our instinctive conclusions about the nature of a specific phenomena and order of things. It is pertinent to prove a theory, thus it remains a compact part of social science; for as long as it explains certain phenomena (...)” (Ibid., 359). Therefore, it is the value of the fact and not the fact itself, which is seen as a material object, that is of interest to us. In the research on SFRY’s crisis and collapse, this methodological problem emerged in a large number of studies.

Of the recent ones, we should mention Dejan Jović’s (2003) study, mentioned in the introduction. For the purpose of his research, Jović gathered a large number of primary sources, including interviews with witnesses and decision-makers of the SFRY crisis prior to its collapse. In her critique of Jović’s work, the author Olivera Milosavljević (2009) points to a big methodological problem in the study – Jović conducted interviews with some of the highest ranking decision-makers of that period (politicians, military figures, intellectuals etc.) who all claimed that they did everything in their power to preserve the state and prevent the outbreak of war. Thus, it was easy to conclude that SFRY collapsed due to some higher ideological and metaphysical reasons. Such a positivistic approach, to take opinions for granted and coming from the majority of people who were directly or indirectly responsible for the collapse of the state, without evaluating them, perfectly suited Jović’s attempt to prove his thesis that SFRY collapsed as a consequence of higher, ontological reasons. In this case, Jović argued that the political application of the Marxist ideological concept of the *withering of the state*, imposed by the Communist League theoretician Edvard Kardelj, determined the fate of SFRY (2003, chapter I). Therefore, the positivistic approach of Jović’s method, the method that divides the facts from its value, represents the core problem of his approach.

Furthermore, it would be the large number of neo-marxist authors that would dogmatically embrace the logical parameters of positivism in their research of the SFRY crisis and

collapse.⁹ One such prominent author is Susan Woodward (1995), whose study was also mentioned in the introduction. (Interesting critique of Woodward's study is given by Attila Hoare (2008)). Woodward avoids some of the most important elements that brought about the collapse of the state, when she writes that "Yugoslav society was not held together by Tito's charisma, political dictatorship or repression of national sentiments but by a complex balancing act at the international level and an extensive system of rights and of overlapping sovereignties" (Woodward 1995, 45). As the II Cold War began in the late 1970s, causing domestic crisis in SFRY, Woodward ignored the main ideological and political aspects, focusing primarily and solely on international economy, empirically proving through the positivistic logic that it was the economic foreign policy of US president Ronald Reagan that caused SFRY's crisis and collapse. Woodward writes that all "began with fundamental changes in the international environment. The attempt, led largely by the International Monetary Fund, to salvage the international monetary system in the late 1970s through massive global lending of recycled petrodollars came to a halt in 1979. Banks retreated. The interest rate on the US dollar skyrocketed, and with it the foreign debt of all the countries holding debt in those dollars" (Ibid. 47). The conclusion was thus plainly simple: "the result by the end of the decade was a breakdown in all elements of domestic order, political disintegration, and rising nationalism" (Ibid. 50).

1.1.2 Scientific determinism vs. indeterminism

The main problem of the nineteenth century positivism in social science was its attempt to scientifically support political action through theory. Thus "through this method, laws of science, including the laws of social science, could be formulated and order established. Action could be based on accurate prediction, arising from regular laws" (Curtis 1981b, 133). Determinists would argue that if there are certain patterns in social relations, it would mean that it is also scientifically possible to predict when a certain country will collapse, or go to war. This issue of determinism vs. indeterminism in social science has preoccupied some of the best minds of philosophy in the nineteenth century and has reflected on the contemporary scholar objectivity of research on SFRY's crisis and collapse.

⁹ It must be noted that the 'neo-marxist' label is not necessarily correct, because these authors (in IR belong to the Radical theory) are not always limited to the Marxist thought. However, what makes them Marxist-like is their critique is the unequal distribution of wealth (something that none of the other theories considers pivotal). Thus, they see the economic base of relations as the major source of all processes, and the need for reform should not be attributed to the 'international anarchy' but rather to the 'international economic structure'.

Considering the social traumas of the nations living on ex-SFRY territories, which were constantly exchanging rulers; the Great Powers (Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires), dictatorships (royal under the Karađorđević dynasty (1929-35) and communist under Tito (1945-90)), World War I and II, the experience of ethno-nationalistic, religious and civilization antagonism, all these factors seemed to be a solid scientific pattern to prove the inevitability of SFRY's collapse. Authors such as Kaplan (1993); Anzulović (1999); Huntington (1998) etc suggested in their work that it was exactly centuries old hatreds that made the common state impossible to sustain from its beginning.¹⁰ For social science, however, it would be more accurate to determine the trends and elements that, on a social platform, made the SFRY collapse and armed conflict highly probable.

The *probability* that led to the state's collapse is what should be determined by analyzing the context of the international structure (specifically the II Cold War) as an important historical change; the change of economic, political and social patterns. Specifically considering the collapse of the Socialist bloc and in its relation the collapse of SFRY, it is incorrect to *a priori* determine the inevitability of the state's demise. As Stanovičić explained, "Max Weber correctly presented the concept of the social phenomenon as 'Einmalige', or the one that is unrepeatable because there are no strict laws or patterns in the field of political processes. There are of course tendencies, but to predict the outcome is almost impossible. At the beginning of 1989 no one could have predicted that by the end of the year the Socialist bloc would begin its gradual collapse" (Interview with Stanovičić, 2009).

The issue of 'empirical' in the intellectual history has its roots in the debates of the second half of the nineteenth century. The theoretical critique of empiricist/social determinists that emerged at the time, claiming that "natural phenomenon reappears only when causes and circumstances recur, while (...) social and historical phenomenon (...) are 'one-time', unrepeatable; these phenomenon have their 'meaning' and to understand them it is not enough to describe the process or facts. Natural sciences are nomothetic (those that discover laws) while social sciences are idiographic (those that describe and try to understand certain

¹⁰ The widely accepted argument was Samuel Huntington's theory of *post-Cold War civilizations' conflict*. The Middle European roots of Croats, Ottoman roots of Bosnian Muslims and Byzantine roots of Serbs determined the political preconditions which made living together impossible. A variety of authors followed this line of reasoning and tried to explain the deep cultural distinctions which were used for war purposes at the time of SFRY's collapse. Branimir Anzulović (1999) claims that the *fiddle* was the main political tool, used by Serbian Orthodox clergy, intellectuals and poets to create a myth of great Serbian statehood which presented an incentive for inevitable collapse. Among less persuasive authors is Robert Kaplan (1993), whose extensive account sets to demonstrate that violent nationalism – which Kaplan claims has given birth to European fascism – was a centuries old phenomenon in the region, which in combination with illiteracy and general backwardness of the society was directly responsible for the state collapse.

phenomenon)” (Stanovčić 2006, 632). Karl Popper (2002) claimed that because the human knowledge is a causal factor in the evolution of human history and because there is no society that can scientifically predict the future of its cognition, there is no scientific method that can predict the future of the human history. Thus, according to Popper’s conclusion, there is a strong connection between metaphysical and historical indeterminism. Furthermore, the socio-political trends analyzed in the historical context should be examined on all levels and include all possible factors, even including the banal ones. Blaise Pascal’s famous remark that “had Cleopatra’s nose been shorter, the face of the world would have been changed” (Gračanin 2005, 97) is a good example where seemingly unimportant factors, elements and events can influence the course of historical processes. Of recent examples is the outcome of the end of the Cold War – most of the US academic analysts of the 1980s, when analyzing future relations between the USSR and the US, rejected the idea that USSR might collapse (with the exception of Zbigniew Brzezinski (2010)) and later being stunned by the fact that their academic work had been built on wrong premises.¹¹

The phenomenon that happened once is unrepeatable; in other words, there is no scientific pattern that can be used to predict the repetition of events in the future. The SFRY crisis and collapse was a phenomenon of its own, that can be explained as highly probable only if placed within the appropriate historical context. Thus, *in order to explain the high probability of its collapse using IR theory, we have to use historiography as a main methodological tool and place it in a defined international context in order to explain the internal institutional and state decay*. Historiography in IR is an important part of methodological approach, thus the question is how can we use it and avoid the problem of ‘empiricism’? How can we value the facts and avoid the problem of positivism? As we have mentioned, the research on SFRY’s collapse has led a number of scholars in a debatable direction primarily because they used sources in a positivist manner (Jović 2003; Woodward 1995), or were deterministic in their analysis (Kaplan 1993; Huntington 1998 etc.). In order to accurately evaluate the facts, we have to use the descriptive method and what Quentin Skinner called in his research of political thought: *contextualization* (Palonen 2003, 11-25).

In that sense, the anti-positivist aspect of the IR constructivist theory can offer new perspectives, as being based on an ideational-descriptive approach that allows us to consider a

¹¹ According to Kevin Brennan, the US “sovietology failed because it operated in an environment that encouraged failure. Sovietologists of all political stripes were given strong incentives to ignore certain facts and focus their interest in other areas. I don’t mean to suggest that there was a giant conspiracy at work; there wasn’t. It was just that there were no careers to be had in questioning the conventional wisdom” (Brennan, 2010).

wider social and political aspect of SFRY's crisis in the *context* of the international system. The historicism of the English School of International Relations supplements our constructivist approach. The English School's holistic approach "displays a vision of international society where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, i.e. the sovereign states (...) and its central thesis is that state behavior cannot properly be explained without reference to the rules, customs, norms, values and institutions that constitute international society as a whole" (Newnham and Evans 1998, 148).

Through the application of the constructivist theory, historical facts are presented methodologically in order to set the international context, through which we theoretically analyzed the roots of SFRY's crisis and collapse as a highly probable outcome of changes in the international structure. SFRY dissolved in a long-term historical process that had complex causes which are almost impossible to limit to a single period or event. Thus we avoided the deterministic tendencies of other theories, ranging from those claiming that SFRY deterministically, as a 'Versailles creation', was prone to collapse; to those who claim that SFRY dissolved exclusively due to the intentions of a few nationalistic leaders in the late 1980s.¹²

To present the trend and probability of SFRY's crisis and collapse, we have to analyze it on a holistic level. This finally brings us to the theory on which our analysis is based; the constructivist school of thought.

1.2 The Constructivist approach

In the IR discipline, the constructivist school of thought emerged in the early 1990s, in the aftermath of the Cold War, based on the presumption that the international system is the *social construction* of each individual society based on its own cognition, which is largely conditioned by its identity.

The earliest 'constructivist' ideas can be traced back to the early eighteenth century philosopher Giambattista Vico (Fabiani, 2009) and whose theory of the so-called 'three phases of human history' presume that the "natural world is made by God, but the historical world is made by Man" (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010). Thus, the historical world – the world we live in as individuals in society and as a state in the society of states – is basically created through our

¹² Considering the letter, Zimmerman wrote that "SFRY's tragedy is not the result of the old ethnic or religious rivalries, nor is it the result of the fall of Communism (...). The violence that followed was the work of the nationalistic leaders who were well aware of their actions." (Zimmerman 1997, 11).

own cognitions and perceptions, which determine how we should interact. In other words, constructivists argue that social structures “are made up of elements, such as shared knowledge, material resources and practices” (Baylis and Smith 2001, 265).

1.2.1 Basic characteristics of constructivism

Constructivism emerged as a kind of theoretical synthesis of the neo-realist and neo-liberal theories, and their scholarly debate of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The reason for the debate was Kenneth Waltz’s book *Theory of International Politics* (1979), which introduced the new theoretical concept of neo-realism (or structural realism, which basically supplements the classical realism) by extending the traditional realist principle; the principle of *international anarchy* onto the analytical level of international structures.

According to this theory “states seek to survive within an anarchical system. Although states may seek survival through power balancing, balancing is not the aim of that behavior. Balancing is a product of the aim to survive. And because the international system is regarded as anarchic and based on self-help, the most powerful units set the scene of action for others as well as themselves. These major powers are referred to as poles; hence the international system (or a regional subsystem), at a particular point in time, may be characterized as unipolar, bipolar or multipolar” (IR Theory Web Site, 2010). Furthermore, Waltz sees international anarchy as a defining feature of international relations: “Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state at any time may use force, all states must constantly be ready to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this view, imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist” (Waltz 1959, 160).

Neo-liberalism on the other hand “refers to a school of thought which believes that nation-states are, or at least should be, concerned first and foremost with absolute gains rather than relative gains to other nation-states. The notion is often connected with neo-liberal economic theory. (...) even in an anarchic system of autonomous rational states, cooperation can emerge through the building of norms, regimes and institutions” (International Relations Theory, 2010). Opposed to the neo-realists on issues such as distribution of power and domination, the neo-liberals stressed that actors in IR should be more concerned “with economic welfare, or international political economy issues and other non-military issues areas such as international environmental concerns” (Baylis and Smith 2001, 191).

Waltz (1979) suggested that the interdependence of states in the contemporary world system still depended primarily on the distribution of power between the states themselves. It would be the neo-liberal scholars like Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1977) that criticized Waltz's perspective, claiming that IR was made of a 'complex interdependence' of a variety of factors, thus rejecting the neo-realist traditionalism, where the state, its power and interests are – in a Westphalian sense of sovereignty – the main subject of analysis in the international system. In their book *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (1977) Keohane and Nye argue that the exclusiveness of neo-realism failed to capture the complexities of international behavior and in particular distorted reality by ignoring the institutions, processes, rules and norms that provide measure of governance in a formally anarchic environment. Accepting the fact that the state is the basic unit in IR, Keohane concluded that IR theories should be supplemented by further theory of the state – a theory that addresses the origins of states' interests, specific objectives, beliefs, and perceptions (Keohane and Nye, 1977).

Among the Waltz's neo-liberal critics was one of the future pioneers of constructivism John Ruggie, who was specifically critical of the neo-realist argument that the state was still the main driving force in IR, by claiming that neo-realists were ignoring an important aspect of structural changes in the international system that was not necessarily always related to the state as such. In that sense, Ruggie writes that "the modern system is distinguished from the medieval not by 'sameness' or 'differences' of units (states), but by *the principles on the basis of which the constituent units are separated* from one another. If anarchy tells us *that* the political system is a segmental realm, differentiation tells us *on what basis* the segmentation is determined" (Ruggie 1983, 273). Furthermore, in his critique of power distribution among the states, as the most important factors of change in IR, Ruggie notices that "there is an extraordinary impoverished mind-set at work here, one that is able to visualize long-term challenges to the system of states only in terms of entities that are institutionally substitutable for the states. Since global markets and transnationalized corporate structures (not to mention communications satellites) are not in the business of replacing states, they are assumed to entail no potential for fundamental international change" (Ruggie 1993, 196).

The beginning of the II Cold War in 1979, which brought back the military/power aspect of worsened US-USSR relations, influenced the outcome of the neo-realist-neo-liberal debate. Keohane admitted, that in fact his and Nye's theory of 'complex interdependence', did not present an appropriate alternative to the neo-realist theory. Thus, Keohane had accepted some

of the neo-realist arguments “linking the creation of the ‘regimes’ in areas of trade, finance and oil market to the presence of American hegemony. He also concluded that power and interdependence were not independent of one another” (Griffith 2009, 187).

However, it would only be with the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the beginning of the process of rapid globalization of world affairs that the neo-realist theory lost its primacy in both a theoretical and methodological sense. As the end of the Cold War brought fundamental changes in the world system, the neo-realist theory was subjected to a new theoretical criticism, out of which the constructivist theory would emerge. Altogether, realism (neo-realism just being its recent theoretical development) has been undermined by three sets of developments in post-Cold War world – “(...) firstly, *globalization* has brought a host of other features of world-politics to center-stage; secondly, *positivism*, the underlying methodological assumption of realism, has been significantly undermined by developments in the social sciences and in philosophy; and thirdly, *neo-liberal institutionalism* has become increasingly important in challenging realism in the mainstream literature (...)” (Baylis and Smith 2001, 226).

Post-positivism in method and constructivism in theory began a new trend in IR research in the early 1990s. This new trend recognized the state of complexity of the international system in the age of globalization.¹³ Thus, the constructivist school of thought was developed according to the new principles. Basically, “it is not an external reality whose laws can be discovered by scientific research and explained by scientific theory as positivists and behaviouralists argue. The social and political world is not part of nature. There are no natural laws of society or economics or politics” (Jakson and Sorensen, 2010). Based on the critique of neo-realism and Waltz’s theories, Alexander Wendt (2009), the pioneer of the constructivist theory, introduced new concepts – one of the main ideas of constructivism is that elements such as identity, culture and the interest of an individual actor (state) determine the nature of interaction with other actors in the system, defining whether the international system would be based on either conflict or cooperation.

Thus, Wendt’s main thesis is that *anarchy is what states make of it*, which he introduced for the first time in his essay of the same name (1992). Therefore, it is the state that decides of what nature the international anarchy will be. This decision is largely influenced by the state’s own identity. Furthermore, constructivism emphasizes that there is no *a priori* natural law or

¹³ The most significant work of that period is Francis Fukuyama’s article ‘The End of History’ (1992), which analyzed the remaining theoretical and conceptual challenges to the liberal theory.

pattern according to which we could determine how the states would behave and interact. This aspect follows the line of reasoning of the nineteenth century indeterministic thinkers who claimed that all events and social phenomenon are historically unrepeatable; they are ‘one-time-only’ events.

Wendt defined the constructivist theory according to the following points:

“Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims:

1. States are the primary units of analysis for international political theory.
2. The key structures in the state system are inter-subjective, rather than material.
3. State identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics” (Wendt in Griffiths 2006, 201).

Table 1.1: Basic characteristics of three major IR theories

	Realism	Idealism	Constructivism
Actors	States	States	States
Actors’ behavior in anarchy	Increase power to ensure survival	Promote social learning through : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - institutions (e.g. UN) - ideas (e.g. democracy and liberal capitalism) 	Unpredictable prior to social interaction
What mitigates state behavior?	Self-help because <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - no world government (anarchy) - cooperation among states unreliable 	International society	Inter-subjectively constituted structure of identities and interests <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - if state identities and interests produced as competitive → competition - if state identities and interests produced as cooperative → cooperation
Logic of anarchy	Conflictual	Cooperative	Anarchy is what states make of it

Weber (2001, 66).

1.2.2 The *state* in the constructivist thought

Conceptually, it is important to note that the *state* as an actor is still the main object/*primary unit* of research to a constructivist (as it is to the neo-realists). However, it must be emphasized that the state seen by neo-realists (a power hungry, self-help entity) is diametrically different in the eyes of a constructivist.

The constructivists see the state as a complex set of rules and values within a broader international structure. In addition to other theories, specifically to “(...) idealism, a key feature of constructivism is holism or structuralism, the view that social structures have effects that cannot be reduced to actors and their interactions. Among these effects is the shaping of identities and interests, which are conditioned by discursive formations – by the *distribution* of ideas in the system – as well as by material forces, and as such are not formed in the vacuum” (Wendt 2009, 138). That *anarchy is what states make of it* suggests that it is the state’s identity, which differs from state to a state that makes its behavior unpredictable and impossible to scientifically determine. Therefore, Wendt recognizes that states do not have a highly complex role in IR, “in domestic political systems units perform different functions – some deal with defense, others with welfare, still others with economic growth; in the international system, states all perform the same functions (internal order, external defense) and so are ‘like units’” (Ibid., 98). The question we have to ask how was it possible for SFRY institutions to become atrophic and collapse with the end of the Cold War. The answer lies in the complexity of the domestic level (the value system of the structure, culture, norms and rules and myth) and how these responded to the interaction on the international level.

Therefore, when we analyze the state we have to determine the essence of its structure and the nature of its affairs in the international order. The structure is an important element in understanding the state behavior and its functionality. The constructivist notion of structure was inspired by the definition given by Anthony Giddens.¹⁴ According to him “structure provides parameters within which agents engage in various forms of behavior extending from war to peace, from conflict to cooperation. Whether or not structures exist in reality or only as constructs in the human mind, they shape the choices available to agents” (1984, 2). What Giddens calls the relationship between subject and object where “each subject and object is

¹⁴ Giddens pointed out two major parametrs in understanding the state behaviour; physical (geography, resources, industrial potential etc.) and social environment (the way people or groups communicate with each other).

constituted through recurrent practices” (Ibid., 17), is, in this case, to determine how SFRY with its own rules and system functioned within the structure, and why eventually it became dysfunctional.

The state represents the synthesis of mutual relations of society and its leadership; this relation forms the basis for the state’s interaction within the international structure. Tito’s methods of rule and the strategy of his domestic and foreign policy should be analyzed in order to determine the essence of the agent/actor – structure relationship (or as Giddens would suggest subject-object relationship). Literature, so far, agrees that when it came to Tito’s policies, there has always been a technique of “balancing” in use (Pirjevec 2011, Pavlowitch 1988, Bilandžić 1999, Ramet 2002, Kuljić 2005 etc.). As the structural thinkers would argue that rules and practices within the structure determine its behavior on the interactive arena of international relations, we will argue that Tito’s domestic conduct of balancing reflected its foreign policy approach. Foreign policy and international position of SFRY were, through Tito as an actor, major integrating factors of SFRY’s multiethnic society, while at a same time the culture of interaction within the structure of the Cold War system. As Todor Kuljić noticed, “Tito very quickly realized that successful intra-ethnic cohesion could not be achieved without independence from outside forces. Therefore, his unusually active foreign policy was the guarantee of relatively successful autonomous resolution of internal intra-ethnic confrontations” (Kuljić 2005, 291).

Nicholas Onuf, one of the pioneers of the constructivist school of thought, explained this dialectic on a domestic level as a “two way process” in which “people make society and society makes people” (Onuf in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 149). Wendt sees the state as an “inter-subjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system” (Wendt in Weber 2001, 64). As a structure formed by the dialectic of identities and interests, the state is to a large extent conditioned by its own identity; this conditionality determines how the state will interact with other actors in the international system. In that sense, the state and its identity and interests, lead toward the formation of what Wendt calls *the institutions*. Thus, the Wendtian constructivism would suggest that “institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world works” (Weber 2001, 64). Institution represents the framework within which the society imposes rules, based on collective ideas of how the system should work. Thus, the rules as expression of certain values imposed by the institutions become a constructed social reality. Onuf writes that these rules turn human beings into agents who “*make* the material world a social reality for

themselves as human beings” (Onuf in Zehfuss 2002, 21). The state, based on institutions as materialized forms of social perceptions of rules, values and norms, is the object of our research. In this sense we can talk of SFRY as an ‘unfinished’ and ultimately ‘failed’ state.

1.2.3 Identity-interest formation

Behavior in the international system is part of a larger interdependence process in the state structure; namely the interdependence between the concept of interest and the concept of identity. When we speak of an interest conditioned by identity, we should consider it also as the ‘state interest’, which again is formed on the basis of the socially constructed reality. According to Martha Finnemore, “interests are not just ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction” (Finnemore 1996, 2). By determining the ‘state interest’ in relation to state identity as well, we will be able to explain more accurately the state’s behavior in the international system. In other words, agents (i.e. J. B. Tito and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) leadership) shape society (self-management system based on the Marxist concept of the associated labor), while society shapes the behavior of agents (non-aligned foreign policy) in an interactive set of patterns (SFRY’s political balancing on the international arena between the US and USSR). Wendt and constructivists “applied the identity-interest formation paradigm as a framework to the concept of national interest of state-society complexes in survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem” (Finnemore 1996, 2).

By definition, identity is an expression of solidarity of the specific group of people, based on ideological premises. Basically, “actors who have such a collective identity define their interests on a higher level of aggregation, based on feelings of solidarity, community and loyalty” (Zehfuss 2002, 15). As with the notion of structure, so did Anthony Giddens largely contribute and made influence of the constructivists’ understanding of identity. “The body cannot be any longer merely ‘accepted’, fed and adorned according to traditional ritual; it becomes a core part of the reflexive project of self-identity. A continuing concern with bodily development in relation to a risk culture is thus an intrinsic part of modern social behaviour. As was stressed earlier, although modes of deployment of the body have to be developed from a diversity of lifestyle options, deciding between alternatives is not itself an option but an inherent element of the construction of self-identity. Life-planning in respect of the body is hence not necessarily narcissistic, but a normal part of post-traditional social environments.

Like other aspects of the reflexivity of self-identity, body-planning is more often an engagement with the outside world than a defensive withdrawal from it” (1991, 178). Placed on the macro-level of analyses, the states identity is also determined by the level of interaction.

On a holistic level, the constructivists claim that despite the collective historical continuation, there is no stable identity, but the processes of change that emerges as a consequence of actors’ interaction within the international structure. Giddens also claims that identity is constantly changing in relation to the changes in social surroundings, thus it is generally viewed that the change depends “from circumstance to circumstance in time and space” (Kalanj 2008, 14). On a holistic level, “Wendt focuses on the so-called *collective identity formations*, which he defines in terms of relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self” (Zehfuss, 2002, 40). This aspect is crucial for understanding the inward process as well; or how the *collective identity* on the holistic level affects the units within the system.

Because identity is not formed on the basis of natural inheritance, but by interaction within the international anarchy, interest is one of its most focal points that has to be analyzed within the context of the given period. In other words, we do not have to seek the inherent identity factor of ‘Yugoslav identity’, with all its controversies and problems following the permanent state crisis since the country’s formation in 1918, and reject altogether the scholarly perspective that sees a continuity of the same crisis in the SFRY/Kingdom of Yugoslavia from ‘Versailles’ to the ‘Cold War’ system. Certainly, we do not suggest that the identity factor, in a historical sense, did not play an important role in the crisis of the 1980s; however, it is primarily SFRY’s interest change within the context of the II Cold War that is essential for understanding the collapse. Or as Zehfuss puts it, “the nature of identification in each situation shapes how boundaries of the self are drawn. If there is no positive identification, the other is relevant to the definition of interests only insofar as it may be used for purposes of the self” (Zehfuss 2002, 15). This aspect relates to the collapse of the Socialist bloc (the other) as the final blow to the non-positive identification within the SFRY (self); to which it was ideologically bonded.

Furthermore, identity as a phenomenon produces a ‘need’ according to which the interest is formed. Wendt writes that “there is no guarantee identity needs will be translated into appropriate beliefs about how to meet them, which is to say into (subjective) *interests*, but if they are not translated then the agents they constitute will not survive. Identity needs are

ultimately a matter of individual and social cognitions rather than biology” (Wendt 2009, 130). Thus, as a cognitive concept, need appears in the sense of cooperation (whether economic, political, or cultural) as well as the need for conflict. Considering the latter, an important aspect in any society’s system is the ‘danger’, “posed either from within or outside towards security and life of a nation, which, according to Wendt, again is not in its essence a ‘natural’ but ‘socially constructed’ phenomena” (Weber 2001, 65). Weber writes that “it is identities that produce collective meanings like social threats and identities are produced in and through ‘situated activity’” (Ibid.). Finally, “to reproduce the identity of a state, a group needs to sustain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in their territory (...) these needs reflect the internal and external structures that constitute these actors as social kinds” (Wendt 2009, 130). The idea of danger, specifically in the context of building SFRY’s identity in the aftermath of the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 and the constant government-projected fear of a possible ‘Soviet invasion’, has been one of the key elements of Tito’s rule and an important integrating factor in society.

What is the relation then between identity and interest? “Identity and interests are defined by international forces, that is, by the norms of behavior embedded in international society. The norms of international society are transmitted to states through international organizations. They shape national policies by ‘teaching’ states what their interests should be” (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010). However, which of the two concepts comes first, the identity or the interest, is difficult to answer. According to Wendt, “interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is” (Wendt 2009, 231). In order to know *who it is* society needs to have cultural and identity self-awareness. Only then can the interest be formed. States “do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations” (Wendt 1992, 396).

In the communist world, the late phase of the Cold War saw changes in both identity and interest formation on all levels. The dialectic relationship of identity and interest is not only of interest in order to determine the actors behavior within the structure, but also inwards. This dissertation will further develop this point when dealing with identity-interest dialectic during the domestic SFRY crisis of the 1980s. Wendt gave an example which is closely tied to this case – the collapse of USSR. Despite the economic crisis and an unsuccessful military campaign in Afghanistan, Wendt sees the main reason for the collapse of USSR in the Communist Party’s top leadership, which perceived the cause of all problems in their own

policy. Or as Wendt puts it, the “Soviet behavior changed because they redefined their interests as a result of having looked at their existing desires and beliefs self-critically” (Wendt 2009, 129). Therefore, when the constructed idea of reality begins to collide with the practiced realization of interests, the system can expect internal failures.

The question of whether the identity of the state is prone to conflict or cooperation in the international system is also a matter of deeper social change on both micro and macro levels of interaction. As Zehfuss points out “(...) the claim that definitions of identity, which are subject to change, influence security practices and ultimately the type of security environment states find themselves in establishes that the self-help system, although ingrained at this point in time, is not given, unchanging fact. Identity provides a category which may change but which at the same time is ‘relatively stable’” (Zehfuss 2002, 41). Thus, this dissertation holds a view that without the international context of the SFRY crisis – the crisis of Non-aligned Movement (NAM) since 1979, the ‘debt crises’ of the III World in the early 1980s, and finally the collapse of the Socialist bloc in late 1980s – we can not fully understand the reasons for the country’s identity collapse. The identity-interest formation based on social needs in SFRY was in the II Cold War diametrically different from the period of 1945-79. The changed social context or according to Wendt the newly *defined situation*, radically influenced the self-awareness/identity of SFRY’s society, and its interest formation. Such a perspective should be further widening a point that there was a certain anarchical element in the state of affairs in the II Cold War, primarily in the realm of international finances.

1.2.4 Materialism vs. idealism

The structure of the state is a result of a “‘mutually constitutive’ processes in which ‘people’ act toward objects, including other actors (states) on the basis of meanings that the objects have for them” (Weber 2001, 64). This can be observed on both the domestic and international level. On the international level, the structure of the system undergoes certain identity changes itself; thus, in order to survive within the system, states have to behave according to the rules. When communism collapsed in 1989, it was difficult for certain smaller states, like SFRY, to preserve the socialist system, as the identity (with the structure: the bipolar concept of Cold War system) was transformed overall. Furthermore, on the internal level of analysis, by observing identity-interest relations we will be able to understand how the state will interact in the international anarchy. In other words, “we will only know if anarchy (...) will lead to conflict or cooperation once we know what states do socially”

(Weber 2001, 65). But what determines the nature of the system and structure within which the interaction happens among the states?

Despite conceptual similarities between a constructivist and neo-realist theory (i.e. state as subject, international anarchy, structure) the essential difference is the understanding of how the system of relations functions in IR. The neo-realists base their analysis of IR on materialist and empirical understandings – it is the power (primarily military power); interest (the state's egoistic will to acquire more power, wealth and security); and international institutions (which represent the framework for international anarchy) that are the main paradigms for analysis, according to which the scholars determined the patterns of the state's behavior within the international system. Considering the structure, both constructivists and neo-realists would agree that the states perform similar functions and that the anarchy of their interaction is one continuous process. However, the explanation of why the change in the system occurs is different. For neo-realists, the *distribution of material capabilities* determines the change. Or, as Waltz puts it, "states are differently placed by their power" (Waltz 1986, 93). During the 1980s debate between neo-realists and neo-liberals, on whether the main element in relations was power (advocated by neo-realists) or international institutions (advocated by neo-liberals), it was significant that neither of the parties questioned the 'material' basis of relations. Thus, with the end of the Cold War, at the time of the emergence of the constructivist school of thought and post-positivist critique, the IR scholar community emphasized that the basic element in relations within the structure was not power but – ideas.

Under the presumption that social interaction forms an interest, Wendt and constructivists made an essential distance from neo-realists, claiming that interest – and as a consequence the state's behavior in the international system – is not based on 'material' understandings, blunt distribution of power and security system, but primarily on cognitive principles. It is the 'ideas' that determine the interaction. According to constructivism, the state interest is formed on the basis of a *constructed* collective idea of state and its society, and not on the material needs of the society.¹⁵ Wendt writes that "the uniquely realist hypothesis about national interests is that they have a material rather than social basis, being rooted in some combination of human nature, anarchy, and/or brute material capabilities" (Wendt 2009, 114). Contrary to this understanding, Wendt claims that what creates interest is human nature, and

¹⁵ That SFRY was the ideocratic state, where ideology had primacy over practical political issues, and thus making the society function on the basis of a constructed reality was argued by Jović (2003); as well as Puhovski (1989).

that the role of material forces in creating interests is relatively little. Wendt writes that “(...) meaningful power is constituted through the distribution of interests (...) only a small part of what constitutes interests is actually material. The material force constituting interest is human nature. The rest is ideational: schemas and deliberations that are in turn constituted by shared ideas or culture” (Ibid. 114-15). In addition to this concept is Onuf’s conclusion that certain events cannot and should not be analyzed apart from the concept of ‘idea’. Onuf writes that idea as a concept and political events as such are not only dependent of one another but they actually interact; “together they are deeds, and through our deeds we make the world we know” (Onuf 1991, 429). Therefore, the states that constitute international system interact on the basis of the distribution of interests; which are constituted not by the sheer material forces of power-hungry actors but by ‘ideas’ – a cognitive concept that results from a complex interaction of social interdependence between the individual, group and society.

To conclude: in order to analyze the fields of social and political interaction within the state based on the distribution of interests (that are based on ideas), we have to set the international context appropriately in order to prove the relevance of IR aspect in the SFRY case and that is on non-material basis. To do so from the constructivist aspect, we have to build the international context with the help of additional theoretical parameters.

1.3 Setting the international context

Contemporary disciplines in social science tended to merge, and studies like the IR adopted a multi-disciplinary character. In order to present an appropriate IR context for the purposes of our research, it would be helpful to adopt a more flexible methodological approach with the side help of a possible additional theory. To apply exclusively one theory on the case of the SFRY crisis and collapse is almost impossible, specifically because SFRY as a state, throughout the Cold War, had an evolving identity. The SFRY of the late 1940s was not the same as in late 1970s. Not only because of its internal social evolution (from predominantly peasant to industrial society), but because the nature of the international system evolved and changed as well. Thus, the multi-disciplinary approach would be of use in order to theoretically explain our case within the appropriate contextualization of that time, namely the II Cold War. Finally, all historical events and each theory that tries to explain them are in a way a reflection of their own time – meaning that they are a reflection of contemporary issues. Lord Acton suggested in his inaugural lecture, that the social scientist should analyze “the problem, not the period” (Curtis 1981a, 15). In other words, “the history of political

philosophy is not the series of answers to the same question but the history of a problem that is constantly changing” (Ibid.).

In order to accurately explain the causes of what made that problem (internal SFRY stability and integrity) different from its previous phases, we have to contextualize it and reflect it within the nature of its time. In other words we have to theoretically explain the international system of the Cold War and its structure. In neo-realist terms, SFRY as an actor played an important strategic and geopolitical role in the international system after the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, however, the role of an actor in that classical sense cannot be applied to SFRY in the late 1970s. The structural changes of the system; namely the role of new actors such as the international financial institutions or technological progress, completely changed the role of the state as an actor in IR.

Such a multi-disciplinary approach is possible because constructivism as a theory in IR is methodologically flexible. Vukadinović wrote that unlike three major theories (neo-realist, neo-liberal and radical), the constructivist theory “does not have a unique category, which would bring together all the theoretical trends together, but as its pioneers suggest, the world is such a complex place that it is impossible to create a unique theory of IR” (Vukadinović 2004, 63). The scientific justification for using this multi-disciplinary approach can be found in the so-called ‘eclectic approach’ in IR. This approach is based on a “presumption shared by a large number of scholars who believe that all of the monistic approaches, regardless of their name or method, cannot rationally explain the process on the international level. They also claim that each of the different approaches have a certain value and that in each one of them we can find a useful material which will enable us to conduct a more complex research” (Ibid., 50). Furthermore, Wendt wrote that “constructivism is not the theory of international politics. Like rational choice theory, it is substantively open-ended and applicable to any social form – capitalism, families, states, etc. – so to say anything concrete we have to specify which actors (units of analysis) and structures (levels) we are interested in” (Wendt 2009, 193). The early constructivists were open to other theoretical approaches in social science; history, politics, but also philosophy and sociology.

1.3.1 The structure

Considering the influence of sociology, it was Anthony Giddens who had a major influence with the concept of structuration “as a way of analyzing the relationship between structures

and actors. According to Giddens, structures (i.e. the rules and conditions that guide social action) do not determine what actors do in any mechanical way, an impression one might get from the neo-realist view of how the structure of anarchy constrains state actors” (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010). Furthermore, Giddens claims that “the relationship between structures and actors involves inter-subjective understanding and meaning. Structures do constrain actors, but actors can also transform structures by thinking about them and acting on them in new ways” (Ibid.). Specifically considering the latter point is crucial for understanding the crisis in SFRY – as an actor SFRY was constrained by a bipolar structure of the Cold War (and found its own space for political maneuver within the NAM); however, actors that transformed the structure in 1979 (further explained in chapter II) basically contributed to the new set of rules and values to which SFRY’s identity (and thus interests) did not and could have not been adapted.

The constructivist notion of structuration, therefore, leads to a less rigid and more dynamic view of the relationship between structure and actors. Finally, Wendt has emphasized that constructivism is a ‘structural’ theory, therefore relaying very much on system research within the structure. Neo-realism is not thus fully distinct from constructivism. For example, what most theories of international politics have in common on all levels of analyses (from integration, decision-making, conflict etc.) is:

- “1. models of international systems in which patterns of interaction are specified.
2. the process by which decisions makers in one national unit, interacting with each other and responding to inputs from domestic and international environment, formulate foreign policy (...) system construct can be used to examine how foreign policies are formulated and how states or other units interact or relate to each other.
3. Interaction between a national political system and its domestic subsystems – such as public opinion, interests groups, and culture – to analyze patterns of interaction.
4. External *linkage groups* – that is, other political systems, actors or structures in the international system with which the national system under examination has directed relations.
5. the interaction between external linkage groups and those internal groups most responsive to external events, such as foreign affairs elites, the military, and business people engaged in world trade” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 105).

Throughout this dissertation, these parameters of analyses in one way or another will be considered and discussed. Important to note is that these points “are by no means mutually

exclusive: understanding decision-making process and systems at the national level is essential to understanding interaction among the national units of the international system” (Ibid.).

1.3.2 The system

The specific side-help this dissertation tends to apply in setting the international context, comes from the ‘systems theory’. Systems theory, whose most prominent pioneer was Talcott Parsons (1961), is not a theory in a classical sense of the word. It is more of a practical approach in research; it is “a perspective or paradigm (...) thus open to application at any or all of the levels of analyses that can be stipulated for the study of world politics” (Newnham and Evans 1998, 148). Because international contextualization is essential for the subject of our research – SFRY’s internal crisis and collapse in the 1980s – the systems theory will enable us to use certain paradigms. Systems logic “places phenomenon and processes in relation to each other (interconnections and relations) within the structure as a whole; it represents the object of our research (the phenomenon or a process) as a complex system with its input and output signals, (...) and it crystallizes the picture of the object of our research as an internally organized and connected system, with specific connections that give us a variety of approaches for our research” (Vukadinović 1998, 348).

The systems theory is a useful method to set the international context, because by “analyzing specific trends in the interactions within the IR system, the systems theory tends to get the whole picture of the world and explain the complexity of interdependence and interconnections of actors” (Little in Vukadinović 1998, 347). As Robert J. Lieber wrote, “(...) systems theory subsumes an integrating set of concepts, hypotheses, and propositions, which (theoretically) are widely applicable across the spectrum of human knowledge” (Lieber 1972, 123). The term *system* in its essence refers to the description of interaction between actors; however, “understanding decision-making processes and systems at the national level is essential to understanding interaction among the national units” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 105).

The systems theory pays a lot of attention to the interdependence of units within the international structure. Interdependence was, from the financial aspect, the main point of the dispute between Waltz and Keohane, during the neo-liberal and neo-realist debate of late 1970s. However, interdependence should not be reduced to the economic aspect alone, but

should observe the structure and the system as a whole. Ever since 1945 and the end of World War II, IR became much too complex to be explained from a single theoretical aspect (especially from the realist aspect which places the nation-state as an essential unit for understanding the relations within the international structure). The overlapping spheres of interest and power in ideological-political; social; economic; technological; and military-strategic realms have been labeled by James Rosenau as phenomena of “cascading interdependence in post-Cold War international politics” (Rosenau 1984, 225). Considering the relevance of units in the international structure, Paola Subacchi made the distinction between “‘power-centers’ – nation-states – and ‘power-brokers’; (...) institutions such as NGOs, multinational companies and investment funds that ‘transcend’ formal interstate relations” (Subacchi 2008a, 485).

Rosenau introduces three levels of interaction. According to his theory, these three levels represent and explain the international system in IR.

“1. *Ideational or inter-subjective level*. This level is based on what people perceive to be the ordering of the world, or in the constructivist frame of reference, how the world is socially constructed in the minds of those who comprise its agents or actors. This level would include academic and media commentators, the speeches of political leaders, and theorists (...).

2. *Behavioral level*. This level is concerned with what people actually do on a regular basis to maintain existing global arrangements, based on their ideational understandings or perceptions. This may include negotiations, instances of resorting to war, threats to enemies, and promises to allies.

3. *Institutional level*. This level consists of the institutions and regimes within or through which states and other actors act in keeping with their ideational and behavioral expressions.

The extent to which global affairs at any time in history are orderly depends on activity within all three of these levels, which, within and among themselves, are viewed (...) as an interactive set of dynamics producing change in the global system” (Rosenau in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 113).

Based on anti-positivism and on non-material or empirical approaches, the systems theory will provide us with the context of an international system (namely the II Cold War) and the interaction within the system of an actor; the SFRY. In the following chapters we will basically consider aspects of the international structure by analyzing the international system, its structure and identity-interest formation of the SFRY, in the context of the II Cold War.

Thus, the multi-disciplinary approach serves as the contextual framework (with the help of the systems theory), within which the crisis and collapse of SFRY can be analyzed from the aspect of the constructivist theory.

1.4 The focus of research

In order to analyze the crisis and collapse of the SFRY state in terms of identity-interest relations, we have to set the context of interaction within the following areas; world communism; non-alignment; and strategic/economic relations with the US and the Western bloc. In order to do so, we have to first set the structure and distinct key phases of the Cold War system as our main framework for analysis of SFRY history leading up to the crisis. For the purpose of that research, we find the best suiting categorization of the Cold War in four distinct phases, offered by Len Scott (2001).¹⁶

According to Scott, the first phase is ‘Onset of the Cold War 1945-1953’. In this dissertation, we will label this phase ‘the rigid phase of the Cold War’, primarily because this phase is characteristic of the original nuclear era ‘balance of fear’, determined by its rigid bipolarity.

The second phase is ‘Conflict, confrontation and compromise 1953-1969’. This phase was characteristic for periodical intensification and relaxation of bloc relations. “Some civil and regional wars were intensified and prolonged by superpower involvement; others may have been prevented or shortened” (Scott in Baylis and Smith 2001, 84). These include US involvement in Vietnam, Hungarian uprising in 1956, Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-5, Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, as well as phases of relaxation; détente between US president Nixon and USSR’s leader Brezhnev.

The third phase is the ‘Rise and fall of détente 1969-1979’. This phase is, in our case, characteristic for SFRY’s active foreign policy. It was marked with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act at the *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (CSCE) in 1975.

The fourth and final phase is ‘the II Cold War’, which will be further developed and analyzed as our independent variable for SFRY’s case. (Description of all phases presented by Scott can be found in Baylis and Smith 2001, 79-84).

¹⁶ There are numerous chronological categorizations of the Cold War. Categorization presented by Leon Scott is highly debatable, especially his view that the relaxation of relations (with which the first phase of the Cold War ended) began in 1953 with Stalin’s death. However, the reason this dissertation will apply Scott’s categorization is primarily because it fits the major changes in SFRY’s own internal identity change and the changes in patterns of its own foreign policy.

To set the appropriate IR context, this dissertation will focus on constructivist's paradigms (on both a domestic and international level) such as institutions, processes, rules and norms. These paradigms are also the objects of the English School of International Relation's research, according to which they constitute the 'international society'.

For explaining the international context of 'international society', the processes in IR are very important to understand. The *change* as a part of every process is essential to this dissertation. To explain the process that led to the II Cold War in 1979 (and the SFRY crisis as its reflection), one needs to focus on an ideological, political and economic change of the international system and its structure. Changes are constant and come about as a result of peoples' interactions. It is the change of identity that can make the state collapse or force societies to go to war. Richard Little argues that in order to detect the roots of a large-scale historical change one should determine the relationship between the structure and agency, "it is the structure that establishes interactive patterns that change as structure changes". (Little in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 106).

Not only is this relationship interactive, but it determines the patterns of behavior. When changes emerge on a structural level (as was the case with blocs in the II Cold War), so do the patterns according to which the states in the system function. In other words, "if, (...) there is a bipolar structure containing two equal or equivalent states, each of which is more powerful than any remaining state in the system, the system will remain stable so long as one or the other bipolar power does not create inequality (...)." (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 123).

To further explain the context of the II Cold War, one should focus on rules and international regulations. In this case, special attention will be given to economic rules and financial world order. This is because this dissertation fully supports John Ruggie's criticism of Kenneth Waltz's structuralism and neo-realism, in terms that structural changes in the international system are not necessarily related exclusively to the state's/political interaction. In the 1970s and 1980s, the changes that emerged in the international system should be examined primarily in the international financial realm; not inter-states relations. The main reason why the changes emerged in the field of international economy (1971 the fall of the gold standard, 1973 introduction of liquid currency, 1979 monetary shock and the beginning of the debt crisis), was primarily because this realm of the actors' interaction was still in the state of 'international anarchy' (the collapse of the Bretton-Woods System, which was supposed to regulate the interstate economic relations, is perfect example).

Throughout the Cold War, the network of laws and rules provided by the UN Charter was more or less successful in regulating relations. In that respect, regardless of the Cold War bipolar system based on nuclear intimidation, the world came closest to reaching the liberals' vision of 'international¹⁷ society'. "Slowly, the subject, scope and very sources of the Westphalian conception of international regulation, particularly its conception of international law, were all challenged. (...) Individuals and groups have become recognized as subjects of international law on the basis of such innovatory agreements as the charter of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunal (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the European Convention on Human rights (1950)" (Held and others 2008, 62). Individual became the main subject of IR with prevail of liberal democracy in the post-Cold World, and that was an aspect that through 'human rights' initiatives greatly challenged legitimacy of the socialist states in the 1980s.

However, despite the Bretton Woods initial ambitions to regulate international economy, the financial sphere remained uncontrolled. "Whereas trade was more and more subject to a genuinely international rule-making process through the World Trade Organization, in monetary affairs the development has been going in the opposite direction" (James 2008, 427). Or as Dani Rodrik concluded, "contrary to the conventional wisdom and much punditry, international economic integration remains remarkably limited" (Rodrik 2007, 197). The reason why international anarchy still prevails in the financial system is because "in practice, the main source of international regulation (still) remains national law, extended across borders through a process of extraterritorial judicial activity by which the law of powerful actors such as the United States or the European Union influences legal standards across the globe" (James 2008, 427).

The globalization of the world financial order since the 1980s was precisely one of the key elements that caused by the change in rules and values in the international society. What made SFRY and the USSR share the same destiny in 1991 was the global trend of the weakening of the concept of the state: the concept of sovereignty in the Westphalian sense. UN and international law, in the context of global prevalence of the economic neo-liberal model, would be criticized well into the twenty-first century. Some authors point that "(...), there are those who characterize the changing reach of international law as being ever less concerned

¹⁷ The domination of liberal theory in IR is evident from the UN's introduction of 1994 concept of the 'Human Security', which directly challenged the old undisputable concept of 'national security'.

with the freedom of states, and ever more with the general welfare of all those in the global system who are able to make their voices heard, such as corporations, pressure groups and so on.” (Held and others 2008, 62).

Considering the norms, they represent in constructivism “an accepted standard of behavior among a group of actors (...) they are treated as means of understanding the structure of international relations, and as explanations of why states do what they do (...)” (Williams, 2010). Norms should be analyzed in the context of understanding what the true nature of interaction of SFRY was in the international system; in other words how did post-Tito SFRY interact in the changed environment of the II Cold War.

To that end, *this dissertation focused on the pattern of Tito's and the party's construction of self-managing socialist reality and its foreign policy interests in the broader structural sense: the II Cold War. In other words, the analysis will try to explain the strong bondage and dependence of the SFRY system (institutional, norms and rules) on the international system; and finally, why and how did the domestic ‘reality’ collapse as a reflection of the change in the international system after 1979.*

2 Historical overview: actors and interaction (1945-79)

This chapter had two tasks. First, to define SFRY as a national unit and the nature of its internal system through the historical overview of its government's development, and development of its ideological and economic system. Second, this chapter presented and explained the identity-interest formation in SFRY and its interaction in the Cold War system through the description of three historic phases of the Cold War, set by Leon Scott. After defining the unit and its interaction within the international system, we introduced the fourth phase, the II Cold War (1979-85). The answers we seek to – what were its main characteristics, structural concept and ideational platform? These questions are essential in order to set the international context for analyzing the SFRY crisis and collapse in the 1980s.

2.1 Defining the unit (SFRY) and interaction in the Cold War system

Even though IR is a young social science discipline, IR has been present in social and political relations ever since the first organized communities emerged. In the twentieth century only two communist states managed to temporarily isolate themselves from the international interaction: The Peoples' Republic of China (during the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s) and Enver Hoxha's Albania. Their official rejection to communicate with the rest of the world did, however, prove to be short-lived and simply impossible to sustain, primarily due to the economic factor. The communist idea of self-sustaining development was common to most socialist states and to a certain extent, at least in its early phases, to SFRY, which practicing autarkist economy (Obradović 2007, 28-37).

However, the relations among states based on trade are an inevitable outcome of any interaction. The idea that international relations are a natural state of interaction between any organized communities was already developed by Plato, who wrote in his *The Republic* that “it will be next to impossible to plant our city in a territory where it will need no imports. So there will have to be still another set of people, to fetch what it needs from other countries” (Plato in Curtis 1981, 35). Thus, Plato continues, “(...) besides everything wanted for consumption at home, we must produce enough goods of the right kind for the foreigners whom we depend on to supply us” (Ibid., 36). With emphasis on trade relations, which Plato pointed to as an unavoidable consequence of any primal form of organized social interaction, SFRY was an example of a state whose ideology and internal political cohesion to a large extent depended on international constellation. Tito was well aware of the importance of the

international factor, and saw an active foreign policy (together with a strong currency) as the most important feature of one state's independence. According to Milovan Đilas sometime in 1950, during the discussion over how SFRY was forced to depend on the US economic aid, Tito would tell his associates that "there can be no independence without an independent foreign policy" (Đilas 1980, 65).¹⁸

Considering ideology, after 1948 SFRY gradually developed its own foreign policy course that reached its intellectual peak within the Non-Aligned Movement (on intellectual history of the NAM greatly contributed Edvard Kardelj's *Istorijski koreni nesvrtavanja* (Historical Roots of Non-Alignment, 1975), which was from the aspect of constructivist's identity-interest formation, highly influenced by the developments and processes of the relations among blocs in the Cold War.¹⁹ On the one hand, there was a specific economic aspect (US economic aid and the vast trade area in the III World for SFRY companies); and on the other, a carefully built perception of SFRY as an important and respected factor in international relations. As diplomat Branko Lukovac mentioned, "SFRY was thanks to its active foreign policy the most respected member in UN. On several occasions, during the 1960s and 70s, British diplomat Imray Collin, who was Secretary of Lord Carrington in the Foreign Office, told me that when the UN voted on a certain resolution, the whole Assembly would turn to SFRY's delegate, waiting to see whether his raised hand would support the resolution or not" (Interview with Lukovac, 2010).

Constructivism holds the view that there is an unquestionable interconnection between how agents construct their interests according to domestic needs, which, according to Wendt is a "constant, not processes or outcomes" (Wendt 2009, 316). Through "interaction states are not only trying to get what they want, but trying to sustain the conception of Self and Other which generate those wants" (Ibid.). Considering SFRY in the Cold War system, and when it comes to governments construction of reality in general, Todor Kuljić noticed that "each individual regime longs to present itself and to its subjects in a messianic manner and at the same time to gain international respect, thus through the combination of antifascism, anti-Stalinism, self-management and non-alignment, SFRY and Tito would achieve recognition in the world,

¹⁸ Milovan Đilas: a Montenegrin, Tito's close associate who was in charge of propaganda. After criticizing the party elite in a series of articles written in 1953-54 for the daily *Borba*, he was expelled from the party and jailed, thus becoming the first dissident.

¹⁹ Edvard Kardelj: a Slovene member of LCY, Tito's close associate. In 1948 held the post of minister of foreign affairs in the crucial period of SFRY's expulsion from Cominform. He was considered as the main theoretician of the party.

while domestically, this ideological cohesion would empower SFRY's conscience of their extra-ordinary self" (Kuljić 2005, 289).

Self-management and a non-bloc (and later non-aligned) foreign policy were major integrating factors of SFRY's multiethnic society. Precisely due to internal instability Tito would, through international emancipation of SFRY, keep the society intact. Unlike powerful actors like the USSR, which due to its technological progress and nuclear power in the 1950s dictated its own rules within the Socialist bloc; or Peoples' Republic of China, which would during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s be able to shut down its ministry of foreign affairs; SFRY would, primarily due to internal political and economic instability, depend too much on international structures and, thus, had to place most of its political effort into its foreign policy and international promotion. Its identity-interest formation, expressed in the materialist needs of the social dialectic in domestic and foreign policy, was based primarily on the interpretations of Marxism-Leninism.

2.1.1 Unit: SFRY identity and domestic system

Identity and interest are formed on the basis of specific social desires, which are then manifested through the behavior of actor/state in the international system. Forming an identity on the macro-level, which then presupposes whether the nature of units' relations would be conflictual or based on cooperation (Wendt's main premise that *anarchy is what states make of it*), is essential for the constructivist argument. However, the critics of Wendt's approach noticed that his "systemic constructivism (...) also rules out the most important aspects of that identity – especially the internal dimension of it – from the analysis. This inattention to the domestic sources of identity – internal dimension – and its interaction with the external dimension essentially weakens the constructivist argument" (Bozdaglioglu, 2010). Analyzing an actor internally (the self-managing system) in relation to the international context is crucial in the case of SFRY, especially because the same community already experienced a collapse and armed conflict during World War II.

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia collapsed after the Nazi invasion in April 1941; however, its identity and interest between its ruling elite and the society was never solidly formed – it was a case where the ruling elite (Karađorđević dynasty) enjoyed large support and recognition

from the external actors rather than internal ones.²⁰ Hoptner noticed that had there not been war, it would have taken at least one more generation to develop a functional society. Hoptner wrote that “from its beginnings, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was weighted by the figures of narrow-minded views and even weaker flexibility, thus showing no capability for common work for a common good” (1973, 285). As the aggressive foreign policy of the III Reich pressured Europe in the late 1930s, revising the Versailles system through negotiation in the first phase (i.e. Munich Conference in 1938) and later through war, so did the international relevance of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia gradually decay in the eyes of the great powers (Barker 1976, 87-102; and Hoptner 1973, 67-97). The reshaping of the international structure, in this case the Versailles system that guaranteed the Kingdom’s integrity inevitably had to affect the internal cohesion, the culmination of which would be the creation of a semi-independent Croatia, *Banovina Hrvatska* in 1939, as a Serb-Croat political compromise to avoid the war (Đokić 2007).²¹ SFRY was formed as a successor state of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia; however this outcome came as a result of external rather than internal pressure. In order to win the recognition as a ‘party in civil war’ during the Nazi occupation, Tito accepted all agreements and future arrangements made by the Allies, that proclaimed the restoration of the pre-Nazi aggression order in Europe. Eventually, as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was dependent on the Versailles system, Tito’s SFRY would gradually become dependent on the future Cold War constellations.

SFRY was proclaimed on November 29, 1945, as a Federal Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia, during the III session of Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, *Anti-fašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije* (AVNOJ).²² The Declaration of AVNOJ, drafted by the Constitutional assembly, proclaimed the new structure of the state as a “federal peoples’ state of republican form, the community of equal people who freely expressed their desire to remain in the united Yugoslavia” (Matković 2003, 280). The state was comprised of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and its two autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia. It was predominantly a rural society. From the geopolitical aspect, SFRY was based on geopolitically and strategically important directions – the ‘Ljubljana gate’, *Ljubljanska vrata*; Panonian Valley, *Panonska*

²⁰ The decision by King Alexander to introduce dictatorship in 1929 was caused primarily because his rule could have been seriously shaken by the outcome of the eventual parliamentary elections, as the Serb Democratic Party entered a coalition with the Croatian Peasant Party, thus forming the strongest political force in the country.

²¹ The Cvetković-Maček Agreement.

²² At the I Session of AVNOJ in 1943, Yugoslavia was proclaimed Democratic Federative Yugoslavia, DFY. Federal Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia or FNRJ was the country’s legal name until 1963, when it changed the name to SFRY. In due the text SFRY will be used.

nizina; Lower Danube, *Donje Podunavlje*; the 'Adriatic gates', *Jadranska vrata* (Tešić wrote extensively on the geopolitical position of SFRY (1987, 80-83 and 89-92)).

SFRY's political system and political culture radically changed after the end of World War II, as Marxism-Leninism became an official state ideology. Through its internationalist character and appeal, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) managed to overcome the nationalistic differences, already deepened by the bitter war of Liberation (1941-45) (Bilandžić 1999, 189-203). Between the victory of the Peoples' Liberation Struggle, *Narodno oslobodilačka borba* (NOB) in May 1945 and the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, SFRY's internal political sphere was conditioned and influenced by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Economically and politically, SFRY elites copied the USSR model – the 1946 Constitution written by Edvard Kardelj was in form and content a reflection of the USSR constitution, while the first Five-year plan (1947-51), managed by Boris Kidrić copied the Soviet-style collectivization and concept industrialization.²³

The Tito-Stalin split on June 28 1948, was caused primarily by Tito's independent foreign policy activities; namely the initiative for creating a great Balkan Federation that would include SFRY, Bulgaria and Albania (Stalin realized that a strong Balkan Federation, economically and politically dominated by SFRY, would result in the regional balance of power with the Socialist bloc, thus Moscow would lose its central position in the Communist world); and SFRY's open support of ELAS in the Greek civil war.²⁴ The latter was especially problematic for the USSR's strategy in the region, as it directly endangered the Stalin-Churchill agreement that the West sphere of influence would be 90% in that country. The division of influence in the whole of Eastern Europe was secretly agreed in Moscow in October 1944 (Dedijer 1978, 453-508). It would be by the beginning of 1950s that the SFRY slightly began to move towards Western Europe and NATO, and consequently forcing the highly centralized state apparatus to begin reforming. The purpose was to distance the state's economic and political system as far as possible from the USSR's model.

Thus began the process of turning the state's system into a self-managing socialist economy. The roots of the ideology of socialist self-managing in SFRY are complex. Externally, it represented the alternative to the monolith USSR model in the world communist movement,

²³ Boris Kidrić, Slovene member of the CPY and president of the Economic Council and Federal Planning Commission

²⁴ Even though SFRY's independent foreign policy was one of the major reasons for the 1948 clash, there were a variety of reasons. Among most important was the rejection and expulsion of Soviet economic experts, who represented a joint enterprises in the local industries through which the USSR controlled the product.

which suited the US strategy in Eastern Europe. It would represent an attractive model of independence from Moscow to Eastern European countries. The so-called Peasants Working Unions, *Seljačke radne zadruge* (SRZ), which were supposed to transform the village by copying the USSR collectivization of the 1930s, were shut down by the government and by 1953 disappeared completely. One of the US government's "conditions to grant aid to SFRY was to abolish *Seljačke radne zadruge* altogether" (TV Kalendar, 2010). Internally however there were a number of reasons to move away from the USSR's model, one of which was the utter failure of the Soviet-style collectivization that brought the state-centric government of SFRY to an almost collapse.

The idea to have an alternative system to the USSR's already emerged in the late 1949, and was proposed by Edvard Kardelj, Milovan Đilas and Aleksandar Ranković.²⁵ In order to distance themselves from the USSR, Tito's closest associates proposed the so-called 'workers councils', *radnički savjeti*.²⁶ The following year, a new law was introduced according to which the state handed over the factories to the workers. Thus, "in addition to the idea of self-management, the factories introduced the councils as the organs of management; and it was not only the factories but all workers' organizations (schools, universities, hospitals, institutes etc.), and which on average numbered 15 to 120 members, depending on the number of employees" (Matković 2003, 308).

Even though Kardelj's concept of self-management found its ideological source in Marx's *free and associated labor*, the idea was conceptually very close to the ideas of the English socialist Fabian Society, namely the social concept of the so-called Guild socialism. Propagated by a Fabian Society's member, economic theoretician George D. H. Cole, Guild socialism (which was inspired by medieval craftsmen guilds), "advocated the formation of all-inclusive, democratic, industrial unions which would be agents of transformation to a society in which they would become Guilds controlling the productive process using means of production owned by the whole community" (Blaazer, 2010). In their critique of the USSR model, SFRY's leadership advocated the return to the original 'soviet' model of the revolutionary period in Russia 1917-20, which was suppressed by Lenin during the Russian Civil War. The Soviets, or the 'councils' in translation, were "representatives of workers, peasants and soldiers in a given locale (rural soviets were a mix of peasants and soldiers,

²⁵ Aleksandar Ranković, a Serb and a head of the secret police UDBa, whose figure was a metaphor for strong state centralism.

²⁶ The first 'workers council' was formed on December 29, 1949, in the Factory for Concrete in the city of Solin in Croatia. It was comprised of only 13 members, but the model would gradually spread to the rest of the republics.

while urban soviets were a mix of workers and soldiers)” (Encyclopedia of Marxism, 2010).²⁷ In 1955 SFRY introduced the *commune* system, as a basic unit of society. Similar to the original idea of Soviets, the commune and workers’ councils allowed workers’ control of industry, and its means of production. In the constructivist sense, the cognitive perception was in this case of major importance: the social legitimization was not only imposed through the use of organized violence in the Weberian sense, but found ontological support as Tito and the party decided to rectify the lost traditions of the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

As a new revolutionary concept, self-management was officially introduced in 1952 on the VI Party Conference of the CPY (which changed its name to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), to further distance itself from the sister communist parties of the Socialist bloc). Tito’s report titled *The Struggle of Communists for Socialist Democracy* called for greater engagement of the party in workers councils, in order to prevent and oppose the bureaucratization and become the workers vanguard. Turning against the bureaucracy in the revolutionary manner (after the original revolution was achieved in the war 1941-45) and known as the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’, was in this case a light form of a top-down process that did not exist in the communist world before. In much more oppressive form, the transformation of the system based on ‘anti-bureaucratic’ coup was implemented during the Cultural Revolution in Mao Zedong’s China in the 1960s; and Slobodan Milošević would try the similar method in SFRY in the late 1980s, but on a completely different platform (namely, the Serb nationalist platform) (Garde 1996, 248). The workers’ councils were created or shut down by special self-managing acts, along with “various directives, production plans or the plans of non-economic organizations, financial plans, tariffs, selecting boards of directors (as executive organs) and deciding on the distribution of the accumulation” (Ibid.).

However, the party organization had all the real power over the self-managing organizations, thus “the self-management of the immediate producers was purely symbolic. The administrative-operative subordination of the firms under state organs was replaced with the system of mutual rights and obligations, and where the state’s influence was decisive” (Ibid., 309). In other words, *in the self-managing system of the SFRY, the workers’ councils had no real rights, while the distribution of means to the firms was still under the strong and close state’s supervision.*

²⁷ According to Trotsky, the Soviet “was an organization which was authoritative and yet had no traditions; which could immediately involve a scattered mass of hundreds of thousands of people while having virtually no organizational machinery; which united the revolutionary currents within the proletariat; which was capable of initiative and spontaneous self control – and most important of all, which could be brought out from underground within twenty-four hours” (Trotsky, 2010).

International dimension is here significant. In the 1960s the period of first détente in US-USSR relations began.²⁸ The further fragmentation of the world communist movement emerged with the Sino-Soviet split.²⁹ Thus, with the weakening of external pressures on SFRY (matched with the internal economic development and growth of the 1960s) the system moved towards further liberalization, also known as *deetatization*, in the form of the weakening the state apparatus. On the VIII Congress of the LCY in 1963, Kardelj and Tito announced the decentralization of the economic and political system in SFRY, which would culminate three years later with the sacking of the chief of the secret police Aleksandar Ranković, who popularly represented the embodiment of state centralism. Marx's concept of *withering of state*, which Kardelj first mentioned in 1954 during his lecture in Oslo (1954), was supposed to result in the power/control reduction of the LCY, while at the same time the emancipation of the republican administrative units was supposed to grow. Even though Kardelj's 1946 constitution did proclaim that the republics were sovereign, the reduction of the state centralism along the republican lines would not really be achieved until the process of liberalization, announced at VIII Congress of LCY and with the introduction of the new constitution. The idea was that under the party's guidance, the self-managing units would gain a larger autonomy which would in the end result in the *withering of state*.

The immediate result of *deetatization*, sacking of Ranković and the weakening of the state apparatus, was the formation of the liberal movement among the political leaders of the young post-World War II generation.³⁰ Following the trend of the student upheavals in the world, between 1968 and 1971 in Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia and later in Croatia, large student demonstrations expressed their dissatisfaction with the system, calling for further liberalization and decentralization (on the liberal movement in Serbia and its sacking see Đukić, 1990; on the movement in Croatia see Kastratović, 2002). Despite the crushing of the student movements and sacking the liberal republican leaderships, the process of *deetatization* under the party supervision would continue through the series of constitutional reforms. The pattern was set with the constitutional amendments of 1967, 1968 and with the decisive ones of 1971. The XX Amendment of the 1968 constitution changed SFRY's

²⁸ The first easing of relations between US and USSR would gradually evolve after Stalin's death in 1953. In 1959 Khrushchev met with Eisenhower, which was the first sign of easing the tensions. This would, in the early 1960s, take form in a series of summits; the Partial Test Ban Treaty from 1963 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Outer Space Treaty later in the decade.

²⁹ Because of the easing of relations between US and USSR, rapprochement with Tito and the internal process of de-Stalinization irritated Mao Zedong, thus provoking the political conflict between China and USSR.

³⁰ In Serbia it was Marko Nikezić and Latinka Perović; in Slovenia Stane Kavčič; in Croatia Miko Tripalo and Savka Dapčević-Kučar.

centralized structures by granting sovereignty to both Republics and Autonomous Provinces, however, still focusing solely on the socialist ideal of the ‘working class’. The 1974 Constitution went one step further. The Basic Principles of the Constitution state that “working peoples and nations and nationalities shall exercise their sovereign rights in the Socialist Republics and in Socialist Autonomous Provinces in conformity with their constitutional rights, (...)” (The Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 1989, 10).

When the new constitution was introduced in 1974, it confirmed the so-called principle of parity, which claimed that all the republics are equal and in a voluntary unity with other republics and autonomous provinces, thus the basic principles are the rights on self-determination and eventual succession (Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia 1974, 1989). The sovereign republics (which adopted their own constitutions) with independent party organizations were structured according to the principle that all the power comes from the ‘working peoples’. Following previously mentioned tradition of ‘soviet’ model and the slogan ‘all power to the soviets’ the final act of decentralization of the federal system was archived through the Law of Associated Labor in 1976.

With this Law, the so-called *Osnovna organizacija udruženog rada*, Basic organization of associated labor, or BOAL was set up. Its function was to operate independently and elect candidates to the political posts; from party and presidency post on the republican level to the federal level. This not only strengthened the regional party organizations, but it also opened a possibility of independent economic management. To do so, local party organizations needed to have a complete control over the local banks. Thus, in order to acquire economic subsidies through banks, another law was passed – the Banking Law of 1977. Since then, the banks were placed under control of the local republican League of Communist party organization and their officials, completely independent from the central bank in Belgrade.³¹ The Belgrade-centered *Investbanka* and *Jugobanka* for foreign trade were turned into a network of ‘associated banks’, an association of independent republican banks. In other words, from the second half of the 1970s, despite of the strong party control, SFRY “*de facto* functioned as a con-federal state” (Malešević 2004, 278).

From the perspective of the international law, the con-federal character was more a precondition for the final process of dissolution of the state in 1992, when Slovenia and Croatia would be recognized as independent republics. However, at the time it was simply a

³¹ In example, Privredna Banka Zagreb in Croatia.

characteristic of the internal structural reform, not of the socialist system. The system itself was dysfunctional because of the inequality among the republics and the distribution of financial share. In 1969 Slovenia protested over the unequal share in the federation. Macedonia, one of the least developed republics, was the first to resist the Slovenian pressures. In 1971, one of the high ranking Serbian party officials Draža Marković “objected to Kardelj that Slovenes wish that the Serbs would defend their borders so that they can get more rich on the common Yugoslav market” (Kuljić 2005, 226). Soon Croatia joined Slovenia, objecting to the unequal distribution and claiming its right on the foreign exchange that was earned from tourism.

The economic conflict and mistrust among the republics was irresolvable because of the unchanging and undisputed rule of the party leadership. This was confirmed in the Constitution of 1974 with the proclamation of Tito as a President for life. On top was the strong power center (LCY, Tito, JNA and secret police), while below the structure was highly decentralized. Miko Tripalo, Croatian party functionary and the supporter of the Maspok movement in Croatia in 1971 noticed that “the crisis were not caused by the extremists in Croatia or in Serbia, but by the LCY leadership that did not operate jointly and flexibly (...) however, whenever LCY leadership did initiate a change, as it was with the constitutional amendments (of 1971), then the fear emerged over the consequences of their own actions” (Tripalo 2001, 204).

Furthermore, the lack of the dialogue between the republics was the consequence of party’s interventionism on all levels of the system. “Tito himself never proposed nor demanded to open direct talks between Croatian and Serbian republican party leaderships over the key issues in the crisis, but was offering mediation and even arbitration” (Ibid., 205). Once Tito died, and with the breakout of the economic crisis in the early 1980s, the lack of communication among the republics would further deepen and in the long term prove to be terminal for the country’s stability and integrity. The inter-republican conflict between Slovenia/Croatia and Serbia/undeveloped republics was resolved temporarily by high decentralization and the Law on banks 77’, which at that point expressed the view of the time that “de-concentration of capital from several ex-federal banks based in Belgrade was necessary, refusing them the monopoly and privileged position (...) because, the newly created financial capital based only in one center endangered equality of the republics; especially if we consider that besides the economic, (that center) had concrete political ambitions” (Ibid. 207).

The sovereignty of federal units grew strong within the federal structure with the Constitution of 1974, however, the process of *deetatizaion* did not weaken the structures of the League of Communists, Tito's unquestionable authority, the Yugoslav Peoples' Army, *Jugoslavenska narodna armija* (JNA) and the federal secret police *Državna bezbednost*, popularly known as UDBA. These were still key institutions by which the state was held intact and kept society under strong supervision. Finally, at the time of the XI Congress of LCY in 1978, Kardelj wrote his pivotal work *The Directions of the Development of the Political System of Socialist Self-management* (1983) in which he pointed to the evident flaws in the system.³² The structure of SFRY had dual character: the autonomous units within the system that operated independently from one another, and the system itself embodied in the party's political monopoly and the powerful institution of the President that relied on the strength of the army and the secret police (Kuljić 2005, 138-42 and 176-185).

Important to note is that a bipolar concept of the Cold War system enabled SFRY, as an ideological buffer-zone between the blocs, to develop its own domestic system that adopted some aspects of a market economy and (at least in theory) had cut the interventionism of the state; yet it never moved from being a one party system with economic planning.

2.1.2 Interaction: SFRY in the international system

One significant aspect of SFRY's history under Tito's rule was its foreign policy and the internationally respected status the country enjoyed during the Cold War period. Thus, in order to understand the country's crisis in the context of the II Cold War, a period between the country's expulsion from Cominform in 1948 and Tito's death in 1980 has to be observed from the IR perspective.

The evolution of SFRY's interaction in the Cold War is presented through three phases outlined by Scott; the 'rigid phase' (1945-1953); the phase of 'conflict, confrontation and compromise' (1953-1969); and the phase of the 'rise and fall of détente' (1969-1979). Finally, the fourth phase, the 'Second Cold War' will be analyzed independently, as it represents the context for our research. The purpose of analyzing these phases is to present the patterns of dependence of SFRY on the international system and its structure. Furthermore, considering the constructivist notion that states perform similar functions in the international system, we

³² Realizing the evident gap between self-managing theory and reality, 'The Directions of the Development...' called for a greater democratization of society.

further analyzed SFRY on the micro-level, to present the whole aspect of identity-interest formation regarding the notions of Self and Other in the system.

Phase 1: the rigid phase of the Cold War (1945-1953). The structure and the system of the early Cold War phase are important for understanding the nature of interaction between SFRY and other actors. This phase is structurally known as the ‘rigid phase’ of the Cold War, which lasted from the end of World War II in 1945 up to 1953 and Stalin’s death. Such a constellation was “specific for involving only two powers and for defining their lines of separation according to the ideological and not national preferences” (Vukadinović 2001, 235). US Secretary of State John F. Dulles would state in 1955 that “neutrality has increasingly become an obsolete and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and short-sighted conception” (Dulles’s lecture at Iowa State College, 2008). This perception of rigid bipolarity of the blocs, which rejects any form of a ‘third way’ or ‘neutrality’ as immoral, was the official doctrine behind the nuclear superiority of the two blocs. The dominating *raison d’etat* in the intellectual thought of US foreign policy was expressed by Hans Morgenthau, who would in his major work *Politics among Nations* (1967) argue that human nature, always prone to conflict in order to achieve national interest, can never change.³³ Thus, the concepts such as ‘the balance of power’ (in this case the bipolar structure), were seen as elements of certain value (1967, 4-14).

The ‘rigid phase’ of the Cold War can be described as a nuclear stalemate or *status quo* based on fear from the Other. Or as Lawrence Freedman noticed, “the lack of actual campaigns involving nuclear weapons and the problems inherent in any attempt to make sense of how such a campaign might develop in the future has not inhibited the development of nuclear strategy. Indeed, the quest for a nuclear strategy that can serve definite political objectives without triggering a nuclear holocaust has occupied some of the best minds (...). (Freedman 1986, 735). Therefore, “the nuclear weapons transformed the politics of the classical use of intimidation to a level of the most powerful political strategy of all time – the strategy of nuclear intimidation.” (Dimitrijević and Stojanović 1979, 198). Considering SFRY’s identity; self-management and non-bloc foreign policy, these evolved from favorable circumstances of the rigid bipolar structure of the 1950s.

The clash with Stalin in 1948, which resulted in the expulsion of SFRY from the Cominform, gave a new dimension to Tito’s role in the Cold War. SFRY would turn from the most loyal

³³ Morgenthau was one of the leading realist thinkers, and was, in the early phases of the Cold War, a consultant in the U.S. State Department.

USSR ally into an important strategic partner of the Western block.³⁴ In 1947, Marshall Plan was offered to Europe in the spirit of John Maynard Keynes's suggestion.³⁵ At the time Keynes proposed that "the Allies in 1945 should not repeat the mistake of 1919 – to punish Germany and provoke the rise of aggressive nationalism. Keynes's original proposition of 1919 was joint economic support to an economically ruined Europe, including Germany. In 1945 his suggestion was accepted, and in that spirit the Marshall Plan was drafted. The reasons why SFRY and other Eastern European states rejected the Plan were strictly political. The decision to refuse the Plan came as suggestion/pressure from USSR's leadership" (Interview with Stanovičić, 2009). In 1948, in the light of the Marshall Plan economic aid to a war-ruined Europe, which was the 'soft' aspect of the Truman Doctrine ('hard' being the US strategy of *containment* of the USSR, explained by Gaddis 2005, 32), all Eastern European Socialist bloc countries had to cancel their arrangement with the West, except SFRY which never even considered receiving aid. Nevertheless, despite the refusal of Marshall Plan, after Tito-Stalin split in 1948, the US Secretary of State John F. Dulles's perception of SFRY and Tito's regime was primarily of strategic nature: SFRY was perceived as a potentially useful partner.

The US financial support to Tito's regime would come to be remembered as the strategy of 'keeping Tito afloat'. The CIA document *Economic Situation in Yugoslavia* from September 1950, stresses that the main strategy in keeping Tito's regime in power should be maintaining SFRY's "stable economy and improving industrial production and living standards in order to prevent the possible pro-Soviet forces taking over the country" (Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 2008). The document highlights that apart from certain positive economic benefits, which SFRY's defection denied the USSR, it is of utmost importance that "the USSR will also be denied the strategic benefits which would result from the development of SFRY's ports and bases in the Adriatic, airfields, rocket launching sites, rail lines, roads, storage depots and certain lines of munitions production. (...) while Western Europe; particularly Western Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK will derive new economic benefits from SFRY trade" (Ibid.)

³⁴ According to Andrej Paczkowski, Tito's bolshevism was unique in Eastern Europe due to the experience of the authentic Yugoslav socialist revolution during World War II and the Nazi occupation, and because SFRY was the first country in Eastern Europe to self-impose without Moscow's supervision a one party monopoly, nationalization of industrialization, attacked religion and introduced collectivization (2001, 174).

³⁵ John Maynard Keynes, an English economist and the founder of the macroeconomics. He advocated the state's intervention in the economic matters, and was one of the founders of Bretton Woods institutions.

The benefits from the financial support were for the Western bloc large, as Christopher Cviić noted, “from the point of view of Western governments, the policy of ‘keeping Tito afloat’ and thus denying SFRY to the Soviet Union was a relatively a cheap way of improving the defense of Italy and strengthening the Western Alliance’s strategic position in the Southern Mediterranean” (Cviić 1995, 52). On the other hand, SFRY’s need for support was not caused so much from external pressures, but from internal; the country was experiencing a grave economic crisis due to the break of USSR’s economic and technical aid and the failed concept of the Soviet-style collectivization, attempted by the first Five-year plan, which, along with starvation that broke out in 1950, provoked anti-governmental upheavals in the country.³⁶

During the yearly conference of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank held in New York in 1950, SFRY’s delegation, headed by the diplomat Vladimir Velebit, met with Eugene Black, the president of the World Bank. Here they discussed the possibility of giving loans that would help SFRY’s development. Velebit was told that in order to build relations with the World Bank and other Bretton Woods institutions, SFRY had to guarantee that it was capable to meet its debt obligations. Thus, “the proposition was given that the US Government should supply SFRY with free aid in the form of food and some other specific resources; this decision was approved by the US Congress in 1951, and the World Bank loans were granted” (Šuvar 2001, 373). The assistance was expanded to the military field as well, which was originally Velebit’s initiative. According to CIA documentation, the military support “was realized in the supply of weaponry, worth few hundreds of millions of dollars” (Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 2008). Thus, “The US officers, who were part of the Military Assistance Group, helped to transform the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army from guerillas into a large standing army” (Jakovina 2002, 39)

Since its beginning in the late 1940s, the strategy of ‘keeping Tito afloat’ would throughout the Cold War period turn into US’s political routine of financing the SFRY regime and its ideological system. Just in the first phase between 1951 and 1961, an “estimated 3.5 billion dollars worth of assistance came from the West (and) nearly half of this was contributed by the United States” (Staar 1988, 249). It would not only be the government sector that contributed to the support, based on the perception that SFRY played an important

³⁶ Nearly 600 people rebelled against government measures of collectivization in the region of Cazinska Krajina in Western Bosnia (1949-50). The so-called *Durđevdanski ustanak* rebellion of 1950 adopted some Serbian nationalistic sentiments, with the slogans 'for King and fatherland'. Even though the protests were crushed, the trend of popular dissatisfaction continued during the next two years.

geopolitical role, but the private financial sector would join the process as well in the period after the internal liberalization in the mid-1960s. Among these non-state investments, the US Export-Import Bank would take the leading role in landing loans to SFRY and already in the winter of 1950 SFRY was granted a loan worth 20 million dollars” (Ibid.).

In the table 2.1, we can see the support in presents and military and economic loans that made altogether “three quarters of the whole aid” to the Tito’s regime (Adamović and Lampe 1995, 65).

Table 2.1: The US loans and presents (in millions of dollars)

Program	The Period of the Marshall Plana (1949-52)	The Period of the Law of Mutual Security (1953-61)	The Period of the Law of Military Aid (1962-84)	Total in Loans and Presents (1946-88)
1.Economic Aid: Total	186,8	1.038,4	536,4	1.734,1
a) Presents	186,8	616,7	91,9	1.188,5
b) Loans	-	421,7	444,5	545,6
2.Military Aid: Total	310,0	411,5	1,8	723,4
a) Loans	-	-	0,4	722,0
b) Presents	310,0	411,5	-	689,6
3.Total Economic and Military Aid	496,8	1.449,9	1.162,0	1.240,7
a) Loans	-	421,7	974,9	1.052,9
b) Presents	496,8	1.028,2	187,1	187,8

Agency for International Development in Adamović and Lampe (1995, 66-7).

What was the nature of the ‘keeping Tito afloat’ strategy? The myth of the SFRY importance had very concrete economic and political support behind. The US National Security Council agreed already in February 1949 (seven months after SFRY was expelled from Cominform) that economic support to SFRY, regardless of its Communist character, would be of great

interest to the US. At one point, when in the US Senate SFRY was accused of voting too often against US interests in the UN, J. F. Dulles immediately stood in defense of SFRY by presenting the statistical information on SFRY's voting. Most significant was Dulles's comment that "independent SFRY is much more valuable than any statistic, showing who is for what and who is voting for whom" (Gustinčić 1984, 42). Darko Bekić writes that "the strategy of 'keeping Tito afloat', which was justified with the National Security Council resolution Nr. 18/2 that proposed the weakening of the export control of SFRY, turned into the long-term, almost strategic dedication towards SFRY" (Bekić 1988, 62).

However, the primary objective of the US economic aid policy during this crucial period of bloc consolidation was not "in supporting SFRY's development, as SFRY's state leadership might have imagined; to support the country's complete independence, its building of socialism and the affirmation of SFRY on the international political scene" (Ibid.). Quite to the contrary, "by definition the US policy of support had no other purpose but to keep the (Tito's) regime alive, which would serve as an example to other USSR's satellite states that breaking away from Moscow was not only possible, but also profitable" (Ibid.).

Even though Tito would eventually normalize the interstate relations with Stalin's successor Nikita Khrushchev in 1955, the US strategic support of SFRY would continue in principle.³⁷ The US economic and military aid that managed to preserve the strength of SFRY's communist regime and maintain Tito's solid rule, came as a result of the strictly as the consequences of the international constellation of the Cold War's 'rigid bipolarity'. With the begging of 1960s the principal approach towards SFRY did not change as the myth proved its effective support of Tito's regime. This principle was laid down by Foy D. Kohler, aid to the State Department Secretary to Europe and Canada, in his letter to George Kennan dating from October 12, 1961;

"Our long-term policy is;

1. To support SFRY, a communist state that has distanced itself from USSR, so that it can build a strong national independence (...).
2. To influence present and all future leaderships in the direction of the evolution of economic, political and social institutions into a democratic representation and humanist relations with the West.

³⁷Khrushchev visited Belgrade in 1955, and the rehabilitation of relations was expressed by drafting the Belgrade Declaration. The rapprochement was completed next year with the Moscow Declaration.

3. Follow the course that would be maximally useful to US, in the significant role of SFRY as an independent socialist state outside of the Socialist bloc, which would discourage the ideological and political unity of the international communist movement, and stimulate East European governments under USSR's dominance to seek more freedoms in organizing their own institutions and policy regarding Moscow”

(Despot 2009, 435).

The end of the first phase of relations came with the trip to Great Britain in March 1953, when the SFRY delegation headed by Tito, traveling on his ship *Galeb*, visited London (this was the first Western blocs country that Tito would visit). The significance of Tito's visit was that it represented a factual recognition of his regime by the West. Thus, the new phase of foreign policy maneuvering began, where SFRY spontaneously turned to the Western bloc. The event matched the VI. Congress of the LCY, which introduced a new SFRY domestic profile; self-management, which fundamentally opposed the state-centric concept of USSR. The inter-state relations of US and SFRY would remain strong throughout the Cold War period.

Phase 2: conflict, confrontation and compromise (1953-1969). The significance of SFRY's history in this phase is the evolution of its foreign policy from no specific ideological attachment to the foreign policy of non-alignment. Unlike the late 1940s that marked the copied USSR ideological model in foreign policy and the 1960s non-aligned ideology, the 1950s were characteristic for their simple and pure non-bloc stance. Also, this period was probably the only time in history that the official SFRY's foreign policy was openly pro-European, in which SFRY leadership discovered a potential neutral ally. Furthermore, in the context of identity-interest formation and in the context that 'needs' are adjusted to the given place and time, the significance of domestic policy of self-management reflected that same doctrinal and technical balancing in the Cold War structure. SFRY was neither a democratic market economy or state-centric, Soviet-style bureaucratic system.

The process of overcoming the international isolation in the immediate period after the 1948 break with Cominform was slow and difficult. Not only were SFRY's relations with the Socialist bloc on the verge of war (Bela knjiga 1951, 371-397), but with the western neighbors as well; with Italy over the Free Territory of Trieste. With the beginning of this historical period, and especially after the London visit of 1953 where Tito met with Churchill, SFRY's foreign policy would gradually turn towards the West. The London memorandum

was reached on October 5, 1953, which resolved the SFRY-Italian conflict over the Free Territory of Trieste. Furthermore, the creation of the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey, which was expanded to the military field, signed in Bled on August 9, 1954, brought SFRY ever more close to NATO. Thus, Tito and his foreign minister Koča Popović saw natural development in directing SFRY's state interests towards Europe, in which they recognized a strong anti-block potential, (especially after the 1951 Paris agreement which formed the European Coal and Steel Community).³⁸ In 1954 Popović wrote that "for SFRY there were three major priorities – united and independent Europe, neutrality and strengthening of the Balkan Pact" (Popović in Bilandžić 1999, 336); emphasizing further that "Europe necessarily needs to overcome its self-destructive fragmentation" (Ibid.).

Therefore, the basic premise of the new foreign policy would not be to fight only against 'imperialism' and for the 'world revolution', but to negate any system that either supports or actively provokes the bloc divisions and bipolarity. According to the new ideological guidelines, the main directions of SFRY's domestic and foreign policy were developed and laid in the Program of the League, which was accepted during the VII. Congress of LCY, held in Belgrade in 1958.³⁹ The important ideological standpoint the program presented was that the contemporary bipolar world was in its *transitional period*, in which capitalism would inevitably have to transform itself due to the historical necessity and enter a new form of *one socialist economy*. The program calls for the internationalization of a world economic order, where "the policy of active co-existence is an expression and a need for a stronger development of production forces. Such a development will lead to a factual unification of the whole world. (...) One of the main goals of socialism needs to be an economic unity of the world; however such unity should also overcome capitalist forms of the division of labour (...)" (Program SKJ 1958, 83).

The LCY Program further emphasized that one of the main obstacles in overcoming capitalist forces were Moscow's imperialistic tendencies, which were inevitably deepening the bloc divisions. The program explicitly states that, "today, it is of up most importance that the efforts of all the peaceful forces, all the states and responsible statesmen bring about the cooperation between the East and West. To that end, the role of the countries that do not belong to the blocs and who thus can contribute to the suppression of bloc antagonisms, is significant" (Ibid., 84). Behind the mission of spreading peaceful co-existence was the vision

³⁸ ECSC was signed between France, West Germany, Italy and BeNeLux.

³⁹ Provoked by Program's anti-USSR stances, all invited delegates from the Socialist bloc Communist Parties demonstratively left the Congress (except the Polish delegate who fell asleep during the session).

according to which overcoming bloc antagonisms would be the final step of the transitional phase of capitalist imperialism, which would be replaced with the new world socialist utopia; something similar to what was proposed in the 1970s as the New International Economic Order by the leaders of NAM.

The process of SFRY's system moving towards the new forms of integration with the Western bloc would, however, be spontaneously avoided in 1955 not only because of the restored relations with Moscow, but also because Tito discovered the political potential of the newly decolonizing world. Or as Bekić noticed that for Tito it was an "intellectual catharsis, in which Tito finally got rid of his Balkan style animacy and Euro-centric perceptions" (Bekić 1988, 674). The process of decolonization in the 1950s played a major role in the expansion of the non-aligned anti-colonial ideology, with which Tito supplemented SFRY's official non-bloc foreign policy.

The origins of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) can be traced to the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, initiated by Sri Lanka, India and Indonesia. The original form of the non-aligned idea was based on five principles of peaceful co-existence known as *pancha shila*.⁴⁰ Tito's trip to Burma and India on his ship *Galeb* between December 1954 and January 1955, where he met Nehru, the President of India, would mark the beginning of Tito's new perspective on world affairs. While passing through the Suez Canal on his way back in February, Tito met Nasser, the President of Egypt, and with these fateful two new acquaintances, the non-alignment idea would for the first time become the object of SFRY's political interest. The early discussions between Nasser, Nehru and Tito took place in Brioni in 1956. However, the non-bloc ideas would not be further developed until September 1960, when in the office of SFRY's Mission to the UN, Tito, Nehru and Nasser would be joined by Indonesia's President Sukarno and Ghana's President Nkrumah. Their meeting would soon result in the so-called 'Initiative of Five'; the early stage in the creation of the NAM, whose first formal gathering was agreed for September 1, 1961 in Belgrade. Thus, the official course of SFRY's foreign policy – overcoming anti-bloc divisions – was supplemented by the ideological aspect of the non-alignment as a progressive movement against colonization, imperialism and bloc divisions.

⁴⁰ The 1954 Treaty between China and India over Tibet; the five principles were 1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty 2. Mutual non-aggression 3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs 4. Equality and mutual benefit 5. Peaceful co-existence.

In his article *The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution* (Lenin, 2008a) Lenin considered that at one point co-existence with the capitalist states will be an inevitable historical necessity. Kardelj adopted and interpreted Lenin's thesis through the contemporary perspective, claiming that "the process of the world socialist revolution is not being fought as a war between two fronts, but as an organic social process, (...) that is, the process of *peaceful* political fight (...)" (Kardelj 1958, 85). Furthermore, Lenin's final goal was expressed in the pamphlet *Slogan for United States of Europe*, in which Lenin wrote that "a United States of the World (not of Europe alone) is the state form of the unification and freedom of nations which we associate with socialism – about the total disappearance of the state, including the democratic" (Lenin, 2008b). This logic on relying on Lenin's writings follows the same pattern of applying (the same as with the internal self-managing system) the original traditions in Marxist-Leninist thought. Lenin's appeal had set the dual task for the top theoreticians of SFRY socialism. Not only was Lenin's view adopted as the final goal of peaceful coexistence (to *overcome capitalism*, the finale phase in world affairs), but of self-managing socialism being correctly interpreted by the LCY as the first step in the process known as the *withering of state* (which would be imposed through the process of *deetatization* during the reforms of the mid-1960s).

As the Cold War in its primal form of rigid bipolarity ended in the late 1950s, the stage for ideological maneuvering was set after the I Belgrade summit of NAM in 1961, which paved the way for SFRY's diplomatic activities. The political vacuum that was created with the process of decolonization opened a large international space. For SFRY's multiethnic society; culturally, religiously and nationally diverse, and held together by a socialist (internationalist) one party system, which was internationally under pressure by the two blocs, the non-alignment offered a third path; "to reinforce SFRY's efforts to end its position of relative diplomatic isolation by seeking a political and security community with which it could ideologically identify and associate; to link SFRY to the progressive forces in the world; and to develop the markets SFRY enterprises thought they saw in the new nations of Asia and Africa" (Rubinstein 1970, 39).

Kardelj took the leading role in theoretical structuring of the new foreign policy concept. After Mao Zedong's attack on Khrushchev for de-Stalinization of the Soviet Communist Party; rapprochement with 'revisionist' SFRY; and for opening the process of détente between US and USSR in the late 1950s, Kardelj wrote his prominent elaborate *Socijalizam i*

rat (Socialism and War).⁴¹ Here he attacked the Chinese's aggressive foreign policy, which held the view that only through war could the socialist revolution internationally be exported. Kardelj argued that only through peaceful development can the world socialist revolution be achieved. Here we can see a certain contradiction; the peaceful co-existence did not apply internally. Triaplo warned that by the end of the 1960s, with the beginning of the détente among the two blocs, the universal rights and freedoms that SFRY preached through its non-bloc foreign policy was something that it did not hold onto internally (Triaplo 2001, 268-69). In other words, the double standard of LCY policy was expressed in appeals for peaceful co-existence abroad, while crushing liberal-reformist movements (1968-71) and any other form of opposition at home. Such a double standard was not an anomaly of the system, but was official stand of the top party officials.

In 1964, Milentija Popović wrote, "As we see it, the class struggle is the domestic process of progress within each individual country, thus there can be no compromise or co-existence between the classes. On the other hand, co-existence between the states is possible, however, not between the blocs (for the sole logic of the bloc inevitably leads to war and confrontation) but between the states with different socio-political systems, because the question of class struggle in international relations, the question of capitalism vs. socialism cannot and should not be resolved by means of war" (1964, 162).⁴² Such a stand would have grave long term consequences. In the final phases of SFRY as a state 1989-91, internal oppression and party's power monopoly on decision-making resulted in a situation that almost all republics longed for independence, and were in conflict with each other because there was no tradition of dialogue (in a form that the republics could not independently among themselves seek solutions to common problems over i.e. uneven economic distributions and shares, but only through party's mediation). On the other hand, the republican leaderships were pressed by international forces to prevent dissolution, due to the well-established perception of SFRY as an important international factor, which throughout the Cold War placed all its diplomatic efforts to overcoming the bloc divisions and contributed to the peaceful co-existence. Pressures to preserve SFRY at any cost in a large part contributed to the violent decomposition of the state.

Furthermore, in *Socialism and War* Kardelj supported the ideological fragmentation of the International Communist Movement along the national-cultural lines by stating that

⁴¹ SFRY was considered by China and Albania, the only two remaining stalinist countries, to be revisionist and fascist.

⁴² Milentija Popović, Serbian politician of liberal provenience.

“socialism is not a process which is repeated every time and every where in the same way, but is one which never appears anywhere in *pure* form, that is, free from all the influences of the material and ideological elements of the given period, environment and condition” (Kardelj 1960, 229). Peaceful co-existence and respect for cultural and national diversity became the main objectives of SFRY’s foreign policy in the international arena. Even though individual rights and freedoms were suppressed, the national-cultural were respected as a part of the overall policy of solving national question through the right on self-determination. In the context of identity interest formation, domestic policy was to a large extent influenced by foreign policy and vice versa.

When it came to the smaller nations like Muslims, Montenegrins, Macedonians and minorities (*narodnosti*), the rhetoric was similar to the appeals for colonized and subjugated nations of the III World. In mid-1952, during the visit of Socialist Party of India, Tito said that unlike in the USSR the national question in SFRY federation, comprised of six republics, is resolved: “based on equality, in which all nationalities are deciding freely on their lives and their future. What is formed here is a national community in which there is no dominant nation that imposes its will on other nations and is trying to subjugate them. (...) Our goal is to create as soon as possible, and in the most human way, better life for our people, for the individual and for the whole society (...) and help those building socialism” (Dedijer 1978, 664). At the 1964 NAM Conference in Cairo, SFRY’s official domestic rhetoric reflected the conclusions considering III World subjugated countries. The Declaration confirmed “the right of nations to self-determination and the right to decide its own destiny. (...) The representatives of respective governments confirm absolute respect of rights of ethnic and religious minorities” (Program za mir i međunarodnu suradnju 1964, 185). This in truth speaks a lot about the internal identity formation; the right on self-determination as a part of the national interest expressed in the foreign policy approach. However, “whether identities can be seen as collective depends on how interests are defined. What matters is whether and how far social identities involve an *identification* with the fate of the other” (Zehfuss 2002, 14-15). The crisis of NAM and the III World debt crisis of the early 1980s prove that the bonds and identification on a collective level was weak.

Phase 3: the rise and fall of détente (1969-1979). SFRY’s independent socialist course continued to be threatened by the USSR’s expansionism, and was especially on the high alert

after the USSR's 1968 crushing of the so-called *Prague Spring*.⁴³ "The occupation of Czechoslovakia surprised Tito and strengthened the anti-USSR's fraction in the LCY (...) the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, elaborated as the 'highest expression of proletarian internationalism', was referring to all socialist states in Europe" (Kuljić 2005, 323-24). Thus, in 1969, SFRY introduced the concept of Territorial Defense, *Teritorijalna odbrana* (TO). Conceptually, TO was close to the overall concept of *deetatization* and decentralization as it relied on the mobilization on the municipal level. In June 1970, during the discussion with the political leadership of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, Tito said that "(...) with this individual territorial armies in our multi-national community, the cohesion and mutual trust is so great that no one should be scared anymore. (...) This means that all our republics, especially the smaller ones, are secured from all sides; through the League of Communists and through Territorial Defense etc." (Simić 2009, 299). This concept (which was created as a reaction to the specific external factor; the crushing of Prague Spring) would in the final stages of SFRY in 1991 make the processes of the dissolution easier, especially for Slovenia. After proclamation of independence and JNA intervention in late June 1991, TO structure offered Slovenian police forces strategic advantage to get a hold of the armaments, swiftly organize and defeat JNA.

It should be noted that at that period of the first half of the 1970s, SFRY's strategic role in the interests of the US grew for the last time. However, this time not in the context of the 'attractive' model of independence to USSR's satellites in Eastern Europe, but in the 'Mediterranean context'; specifically in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was evident from the US president Nixon's visit to Belgrade in October 1970. "For the US it was of major importance to block the USSR's presence in the Adriatic, in order not to jeopardize the movement of the US navy in this area (VI Fleet) as well as to block the pressures on Italy" (Kuljić 2005, 348). SFRY neutral and independent position was in this area thus very important, especially witnessed in the rejection of the USSR's condemnations and public musters of the SFRY leadership. Consequently, "SFRY's foreign policy was in the new conditions of a growing strategic importance of the Mediterranean area (following the Arab-Israeli conflict and Cyprus crisis) obtained wider space for maneuver" (Ibid.).

The project that would eventually result in the greatest success of the policy of peaceful co-existence was in the first half of the 1970s initiated by the USSR – the Conference on Security

⁴³ Prague Spring was the term used for the wave of political reforms and liberalization in Czechoslovakia, led by Alexander Dubček. Perceiving the liberal reforms as a threat to the stability of the existing order, the Warsaw Pact members (except Romania) intervened and occupied Czechoslovakia.

and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE. The Conference began in 1973, originating from the talks of the previous year at Dipoli, Espoo and Helsinki (Finland). Initiative would ultimately be accepted and ratified by the XX session of the UN General Assembly. The idea to have an all-European security and a cooperation meeting emerged at the time when the US President Richard Nixon initiated Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the USSR leader Leonid Brezhnev.⁴⁴ With the beginning of the Nixon-Brezhnev détente, the first multilateral negotiations would take place in 1972, leading to the Helsinki meeting of CSCE a year later, which would determine the inviolability of existing borders, reduce tensions, broaden economic cooperation and introduce the issue of human rights.

The CSCE was not however attended by the US. The purpose of the Conference was to confirm the invulnerability of the borders in Europe, thus confirming the USSR's dominant position in the Eastern Europe. By the time the Final Act of CSCE was signed in Helsinki, the USSR side seemed to have won a great strategic battle. "There were a number of Western analysts, especially in the US, who claimed that this was the defeat of the Western diplomacy; that the Helsinki process defined the borderline of the Cold War division (...)" (Vukadinović 2001, 235). The CSCE was also a great boost to the NAM's affirmation in the world affairs. The Helsinki Final Act was in the eyes of the LCY only the first step towards global pacification and democratization of international relations. Miloš Minić, the minister of foreign affairs, stated that "we in SFRY believe that the consistent implementation of CSCE principles will primarily give an essential meaning to the strengthening of the process of détente and its spread to all the regions and all levels of international relations" (Jugoslavija i Evropska bezbednost i saradnja 1977, 40).

While giving a speech at the Conference in connection with its results, Tito stated that "we are worried that the Conference did not even begin resolving the problems which are, as we see it, the greatest problem for European security today. Here I primarily refer to the arms race and the relations between the blocs; interference in the internal affairs of other countries, economic inequality and neglecting the less developed countries of Europe and the world (...)" (Ibid., 15). *The economic inequality and neglect of less developed*, was expressed in the context of NAM's proposition of creating a New International Economic Order. Tito further stated that "everything said so far only proves that this Conference is not the end but the beginning of the single process. We are faced with the forthcoming serious efforts to

⁴⁴ SALT was first of the two bilateral discussions between the US and the USSR held in Helsinki in 1969 on matters of armaments control. The talks resulted in the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty. The ABM Treaty represented the beginning of the relaxation, or détente in the relations between two blocs.

overcome everything that is negative and that has deep roots in social, political and economic structures of Europe (...)” (Ibid.). Because Tito’s personal role in organizing the CSCE was greatly admired by the international environment, the second Conference of the CSCE was agreed to be held in Belgrade in 1977.

By the late 1970s the three spheres of SFRY interaction: the one with US and its financial support, based on the perception that SFRY plays an important strategic role against the Socialist bloc; the one with USSR that had its own moments of tension and relaxation (Kuljić 2005, 302-331); and with NAM where the constructed myth of extra ordinary Self was imposed as an important internal social integrating element, which would fundamentally change as the international system transformed in 1979 with the beginning of the last historic phase of the Cold War – the so-called ‘II Cold War’.

2.2 International structure: the II Cold War (1979)

The Cold War of the 1950s and early 60s was not the Cold War of the 1980s. Strictly from the pure power aspect, the Cold War in its ‘rigid phase’ (1945-1953) was in its nature best portrayed in Joseph Stalin’s short reply to the French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval to whom he sarcastically said “The Pope? How many divisions has he got?” (Stalin’s joke, 2010). In other words, it was the nuclear monopoly, power politics and realism of thinkers like Hans Morgenthau that dominated the conventional thought of the early Cold War period. After overcoming the ‘rigid phase’ and especially after the process of de-colonization of the III World, the Cold War system was characteristic for what Raymond Aron observed as a situation where “for the first time in history it seems that it was in the interest of the strong (nation) to help the weak” (Aron 2001, 590). Both blocs, restrained by a nuclear status quo, entered a psychological competition through economic support of the weaker states (especially in the III World). This situation (with some extreme examples like India, where both blocs at the same time financially supported the same regime) had primarily the purpose of producing psychological effects. This was the case especially with the USSR.

By 1960 USSR invested 2 billion of credit into potentially or already loyal regimes, “which is insignificant in comparison with 20 billion granted by the Marshall Plan” (Ibid., 591). However, the purpose of granting a credit to a certain non-aligned country “meant to show that (USSR) had a surplus of means; that the Russian people were ready, as in the previous forty years, to sacrifice for the better future of the most disadvantaged nations (...) thus, in

this case the economic support is not a means of *subversion* but a means of *persuasion*” (Ibid., 592). In the period of 1956-57, the US financial support to the sixteen countries (and among them SFRY) that were supported at the same time by USSR “which granted 1, 581 million dollars, was in all 781 million dollars of credit,” (Ibid., 598). Even though the US was at an advantage in a quantitative sense when it came to the financial support of III World countries, the USSR primarily relied on the psychological effects to expand the anti-imperialistic sentiments among newly decolonized nations. To that end, “the purpose of support was to *divert* a certain country from the Western bloc, and bond it with the Socialist bloc; or to make it at least politically dependable on USSR, finally preparing for eventual *subversion* and taking over; or strengthening the local communist movement” (Ibid., 593).

Nuclear monopoly, the realism in the conventional Cold War thought, and altruistic support for the III World regimes and NAM, would eventually change. With the beginning of the 1980s, the new intellectual milieu emerged as a driving force behind *finances* that would dominate this change in the nature of the world affairs. And if we consider the fact that the beginning of the end of the USSR empire began with Solidarity strikes in Poland that were supported by Pope John Paul II in 1980, “it is an irony of history that the figure whose weakness Stalin scorned helped to catalyze the fall of his empire” (Stalin’s joke, 2010). If the economy and politics were between 1945 and 1979 subjected to the policy of military superiority and nuclear monopoly, in the early 1980s the means of interaction would for the first time be subjected to the other sources of power; namely financial and currency power. The nature of relations was adjusted to the new power-shift among the power-centers; primarily from UN to the international financial organizations, because the economic sphere was deregulated and in a continuous state of international anarchy. Previous period was a reflection of the realist conception of IR, through the materialist power distribution by armed or economic means. After 1979, the role of the state would begin to transform.

2.2.1 The new actors

In order to present an accurate historical context of the international system and the relation among units, we have to consider the revolutionary aspect of that period in a theoretical sense from an ideological-political and economic perspective. J. L. Gaddis claims that by itself the international culture and structure in the Cold War offered great opportunities for changing the course of history, because in that state of relations the line between reality and illusion was never too clear. However, Gaddis writes that “these opportunities did not become fully

apparent (...) until the early 1980s, for it was only then that the *material* form of power upon which the US, the USSR, and their allies had lavished so much attention for so long – the nuclear weapons and missiles, the conventional military forces, the intelligence establishment, the military industrial complexes, the propaganda machines – began to lose their potency” (2005, 196). IR analyst Caryl wrote that “if you want to understand the surge of politicized religion, post-communist globalization, and *laissez-faire* economics that has defined our modern era, forget 1968. Forget even 1989. It is 1979 that is the most important year of all. A remarkable chapter in international affairs and intellectual history” (2009, 50).

Why is the year 1979 decisive?

There was a whole series of events that marked the begging of the new era in the world politics; in the West the conservative revolution began with the emergence of Thatcherism in Great Britain (the politics of *monetarism*, which would later be accepted and adopted in the US with the presidential victory of Ronald Reagan); the emergence of Pope John Paul II at Holy See, who openly supported the Solidarity Movement in Poland; the Islamic Revolution in Iran became the source of the rise of Islamic tribal sentiments in the Middle East and Central Asia; Deng Xiao Ping as the new head of the communist China began his economic reforms oriented towards a mild market economy; the NAM began the process of political fragmentation, which would culminate in the Tito-Castro clash at a VI Havana Summit of the NAM over the question of ‘natural alliance’ with the USSR; and finally the US-USSR détente collapsed as relations between the two blocs worsened with the USSR invasion of Afghanistan.

The individuals who entered the international scene around the year 1979; like Margaret Thatcher; Ronald Reagan; Pope John Paul II; Ayatollah Khomeini; and Deng Xiao Ping were the pioneers of the new generation that challenged the established and conventional Cold War thought. They emerged in a political-intellectual vacuum caused by the international economic crisis of the 1970s. Their ideas of how to ‘fight’ in the Cold War were diametrically different from the ideas of their predecessors. “They all set out to overturn, in their unique ways, the defining spirit of their age – the progressive, secular, materialist order that had, until then, dominated the political landscape of the post-war twentieth century. Theirs were not just political movements, but moral rearmaments that passionately rejected what they saw as the decay, malaise, stagnation, and suffocation that resulted from heavy-handed technocrats trying to accelerate humanity’s march towards the end of history” (Ibid., 52). These new actors, US president Reagan being the first among them, “shared their belief in the power of

words, in the potency of ideas, and in the uses of *drama* to shatter the constraints of conventional wisdoms. (Reagan) saw that the Cold War itself had become a convention: that too many minds in too many places had resigned themselves to its perpetuation. He sought to break the stalemate (...) his preferred weapon was oratory” (Gaddis 2005, 222).

Furthermore, the new generation of actors naturally emerged on the wave of the new social process which reshaped the conventional Cold War social system – “one is major technological revolution generated in the advanced industrial countries, the other educational revolution mounted in the more advanced developing countries which is putting them in the position to absorb and apply the new technologies. (...) Taken together these revolutions were accelerating the diffusion of power away from both Washington and Moscow and posing domestic challenges that render the ideological aspect of the Cold War increasingly anachronistic” (Rostow 1987, 840). Consequently, this change in a social, technological, political, intellectual and ideological sphere would influence the power-shift from the conventional power-centers. Critically observing these processes – moving back to the old traditional values and in China’s case to, as Deng’s enemies noted, ‘capitalist reorder’ – can be described not as the ‘revolutions’ of 1979, but rather as the ‘reactions’ to the existing order. Margaret Thatcher made clear of the reactionary nature of the New Right’s movement when in April 1979 she told the Conservative Party, “Well, there is a lot to react against!” (Caryl 2009, 52).

In the case of SFRY, these changes emerged at the time of Tito’s death and the questionable party monopoly (already challenged in popular risings 1968-71) that relied on the ‘traditions of the revolution’. The political elite in the LCY and the top army leadership were bonded through the influential World War II veteran organization *Savez boraca*. And while the new generation of political forces set in on the Cold War stage, the veterans motto in SFRY was “‘No one can challenge the traditions of the revolution, especially not those who did not take part in it’ with which the army cadre reserved the right on the perpetual monopoly on power” (Kuljić 2005, 184).

2.2.2 The power shift

Historically, the event that triggered the begging of the II Cold War happened in December 1979 when NATO passed the decision to deploy *Cruise and Pershing II* missiles on European soil. The cause for such a decision was the result of West-European dissatisfaction

with the US-USSR policy of détente. The heads of West-European states shared the same belief with the US conservatives that US president Jimmy Carter's policy of human rights and détente with Brezhnev would lead to the political and military predominance of USSR in Europe.

NATO's decision provoked Brezhnev and later that month USSR invaded Afghanistan. Carter reacted immediately and all the contacts with the USSR were frozen; embargo was imposed; sea and air travel was restricted along with cutting of all cooperation in the field of culture and science. "It was decided that US would boycott the Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980 (...) now in the focus of the US national interest was a democratic pluralistic system; the principles of free trade and respect for human rights; thus the US once again took on the lead as the chief promoter and defender of Euro-Atlantic civilization" (Vukadinović 2007, 130). In addition to Carter's change in the foreign policy approach towards USSR, future US president Reagan noted that "I know that President Carter has said he's just discovered that the Soviet Union can't be trusted. That's something that a great many people would have been happy to tell him anytime over the last several years" (Buckley 2008, 117). Reagan's opposition to détente at that point in time had wide popular support in the US. Or as Gaddis noted, "despite its elite origins, détente requires support from below, and this proved difficult to obtain. It was like a building constructed on quick-sand: the foundations were beginning to crack, even as the builders were finishing off the façade" (Gaddis 2005, 199).

The II Cold War was on the outset a new arms race. "Reagan demanded and achieved the largest defense build up in history. In his first five years in office, military spending increased by over 50 percent in real terms totaling nearly 1.5 trillion dollars" (Reeves 2000, 238). Nevertheless, Reagan's new arms race and very expensive space program Star Wars; the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), were created in a completely new ideological context, which had very little in common with the traditional Cold War thinking. The expensive programs like Star Wars had primarily the purpose of intimidating the USSR and to express the economic and technological superiority rather than have a concrete strategic purpose. After all, Reagan's military programs were based on the defensive, not on the offensive doctrine as was the case with the 1950s Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The psychological effects of technological and military superiority of the US would by the mid-1980s prove to be fruitful, despite USSR's confidence in winning the arms race (Kennedy 1989, 646-49).

Constructivism suggests that there is a dialectical relationship between identity needs and the formation of interests; how interest is formed and consequently how the unit interacts within the international system is determined in large part by domestic social developments. Let us for a moment consider Wendt's observation that the interaction of actors in the international system reflects internal social needs; that "identities are the basis for interests, which are once again constructed relationally" (1995, 138). If we supplement this idea with Onuf's observation that this relation is developed on the basis of social perception and cognition of material elements, we should observe the US conservative economic policy of the 1980s as a reflection of both domestic and foreign policy.

In the Western bloc in the late 1970s, particularly in Great Britain and the US, the decade long economic crisis and stagnation (known as stagflation)⁴⁵ developed among the political elites the new ideology that bizarrely combined neo-liberal economic thinking with the values of conservatism. In its essence, "neo-liberalism refers to a body of thought that claims to return to the liberal values in their original form – which neo-liberals believe, requires strictly limited government and an unfettered free market" (Gray 2007, 76). The 'New Right' "propagated its devotion to the kind of freedom that overcomes all obstacles to the individualistic competition, while at the same time reviving the foundations of the organic community" (Eccleshall 2006, 107). This combination of radical individualism and free-market economy with nationalism and conservatism inevitably had to change the rules and behavior on domestic and then, consequently, the international level.

On a domestic level, it moved away from conventional state realism – Thatcher's aim of "rolling back the frontiers of the state" (Gray 2007, 76) – which was directly challenged by the New Right's ideology of uncompromising laws of *supply and demand*. Internationally, it would radically challenge the collectivist nature of socialist ideology. The laws of economy would be in the focus of promoting freedom and liberal-democracy around the globe. Or as one of the exponents of Thatcherism, Norman Tebbit explained in one of his speeches in 1985, "many of our enemies also claim to be defenders of freedom (...) however, they do not understand or they do not want to admit that political freedom could not be sustained for long if it is separated from economic freedom" (Ibid., 108).

⁴⁵ Stagflation is a process in economics when both the inflation rate and the unemployment rate rise, even though in classical economic theories, these two naturally should exclude one another. Stagflation occurred in the first half of the 1970s with the US recession.

The ideology of implementing a free-market in the US was known as the so-called ‘reaganomics’. Domestically speaking, Reagan’s conservative economic policy was highly influenced by the theories of the *laissez-faire* politics and the principles of the ‘invisible hand’, and economic philosophers such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek (his influential work *The Constitution of Liberty*), and other economists from the Mont Pelerin Society (i.e. Karl Brunner, Alan Walters etc.). The right-wing circles that supported Reagan were mostly gathered around the Republican Party and some other NGO’s specific for the Anglo-Saxon societies – “before the New Right emerged as a serious political project, there was a whole range of various organizations and think-tanks at work with the purpose of preventing the tide of collectivism and promoting the philosophy of free-market who now acted as a conservative forefront” (Ibid., 113). Of these organizations, the Heritage Foundation was the most prominent and influential one. The ideational element played an important role in shaping cognition of this conservative milieu and the non-material aspect attached to it can be read from the Heritage Foundation’s own pamphlet, which states that “we (the Heritage Foundation) are not afraid to begin our sentences with the words ‘We believe,’ because we do believe: in individual liberty, free enterprise, limited government, a strong national defense, and traditional American values” (Heritage Foundation, 2010).

Thus, the French president Francois Mitterrand interestingly noticed – and probably gave the best short explanation of what the New Right essentially was – that Ronald Reagan “has two religions: free enterprise and God” (Brown 1994, 411). The domestic level together with the conservative US foreign policy approach represents a good example of a constructivist dialectic of which both Wendt and Onuf wrote.

Domestically, the four pillars of ‘reaganomics’ are:

- “1) reduce the growth of government spending;
- 2) reduce marginal tax rates on income from labor and capital;
- 3) reduce regulation;
- 4) control money supply to reduce inflation” (Niskanen, 2010).

The growth in economy had to prove that state as such was its main obstacle. Ronald Reagan said “Only by reducing the growth of government, can we increase the growth of the economy” (Ibid). This aspect largely influenced the foreign policy approach. Ideologically, this was a direct challenge to the USSR model of high state centralization and the challenge to the planned-economy system. In his speech in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords in 1982, Reagan stated that “we are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis (in the USSR),

a crisis where the demands of the economic order are conflicting directly with those of political order. (...) Overcentralized, with little or no incentives, year after year the Soviet system pours its best resources into the making of instruments of destruction. (...) What we see here is a political structure that no longer corresponds to its economic base, a society where productive forces are hampered by political ones” (Kissinger 1994, 768).

The New Right’s critique of the paternal role of the *state*, which inevitably turns into the oppressor of the individual’s freedom, was basically equal with the critique of the SFRY

political leadership. In her speech at the Conservative Party Conference in 1975, Margaret Thatcher said that “some Socialists seem to believe that people should be numbers in a State computer. We believe they should be individual (...) Engineers, miners, manual workers, shop assistants, farm workers, postmen, housewives – these are the essential foundations of our society. Without them there would be no nation” (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2011). In the early 1950s, Tito criticism of the socialist system brings to attention a striking similarity: “In the USSR a man is a number and the people are a faceless mass which must be obedient to the will of their masters (...) the turn in SFRY towards decentralization of economic, cultural and other spheres of life is very obvious as this system is really in accordance with the concept of government that lives in this nation” (Dedijer 1978, 664).

How was it then that such structurally similar ideologies (that oppose state centralism, and are in their view of world affairs rather idealist than realist) managed to find themselves on the opposite sides in the II Cold War, the result of which would be the collapse of the SFRY state in 1991? To understand that, it is important to analyze the ideological shift that moved the power to the international financial realm that was constantly deregulated (in a state of international anarchy). Only within that international context of the ideological, economic and political changes that the II Cold War brought we can fully understand the internal reasons for the crisis and collapse of SFRY.

3 International context: three SFRY interactions

With the change of US strategy towards USSR and the Socialist bloc in the 1980s through the power-shift from UN to the international financial sphere, the patterns in the structure according to which SFRY functioned changed as well. This notion is important to understand, as constructivists would suggest “how the actors relate to each other and the relationship between the structure and the actors/agents (the structure-agency relationship) forms a critically important part of the quest for understanding change at the systemic, holistic level” (Wendt 2009, 106). Not only that such a change reflected the lack of power and authority in top party leadership, but the decision-making process directly jeopardized the identity; namely the integration of SFRY. In order to explain these changes as a top-down effect (from the international system to domestic SFRY relations), we have to analyze political, ideological and economic fields of interaction.

3.1 Setting the context of the II Cold War

In chapter I we explained that the systems theory will serve as a helping method to build a structural context in order to explain the levels of interaction within the international system. Here we will use the three levels introduced by James Rosenau; first, the ‘inter-subjective’ on which the idea is developed on the basis of *cognition/perception*; second, the ‘behavioral level’ on which the *action* is formulated and carried out; and third, the ‘institutional level’ on which the action is being carried through the *institutions*, thus causing a certain type of interaction in the international system among actors.

3.1.1 Ideational level: the US anti-detente establishment

Perception based on *cognition* should be considered and analyzed as an important element in explaining how and why the II Cold War began in 1979. Thus, the first ‘inter-subjective’ level or ideational level should be viewed in the context of the US interaction with other actors in the international system.

The II Cold War emerged as a consequence of the negative perception of influential conservative political elites in the US, who saw the US position in the world affairs as disadvantaged. In the second half of the 1970s, the conservative elites concluded that it was very probable that the US will lose its historical battle against the world communism. A

whole series of events supported their argument – capitalism was experiencing another cycle of economic crisis known as stagflation; the Vietnam war was lost; the majority in the UN (where the III World countries, which were predominantly members of the NAM, made up two-thirds) were not sympathetic to the US cause in the world, describing it in most cases as neo-imperialistic; the new revolutionary upheavals in the III World with socialist pretexts (see table 3.1.); the politics of détente were seen as a politics of concession to the USSR aggressive foreign policy; the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was seen as US President Ford's betrayal of Europe, which was basically 'handed over' to the USSR for the second time (first time was at the Yalta Conference in 1945, when Roosevelt did not object to Stalin's occupation of Poland).

Among the general population, the conservative critique would further gain legitimization after the outbreak of the scandal known as the so-called 'Sonnenfeld Doctrine'. This doctrine, which leaked out from the Ford administration by accident "accepted that Brezhnev's doctrine of 'limited sovereignty' of Eastern Europe under Moscow was a *natural* order" (Vukadinović 2001, 260-263 and in Gaddis 2005, 189). From such a perspective, the perception of threat and fear for the US security by the conservative circles was to an extent justifiable, and if "we add to it the interests of the US military-industrial complex, and its continuous debates whether the growth of USSR military capabilities jeopardizes the US national interests, it becomes clear why the term 'détente' changed its meaning" (Vukadinović 2001, 261). Through the US Congress, the Republicans tried to limit the effects firstly of Ford and later Carter administration's foreign policy approach as much as possible. To that end, Leonid Brezhnev would accuse "certain 'influential circles' in the US for being opposed to developing friendly relations with the USSR and the policy of détente in general; (Brezhnev) said that these circles present the USSR in a false light; they speak of the so-called 'Soviet threat' and they advocate the arms race" (Ibid., 263).

One of the most influential critiques of Carter's Administration and Democrat's foreign policy in general would emerge in November 1979, in the form of an essay written by Jeane Kirkpatrick, future US ambassador in UN during the first presidential term of Ronald Reagan (1981-85), *Dictatorships and Double Standards*. In this essay, Kirkpatrick states that "(...) since the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as President there has occurred a dramatic Soviet military buildup, matched by the stagnation of American armed forces, and a dramatic extension of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, and the

Caribbean, matched by a declining American position in all these areas. The U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in the Third World” (Kirkpatrick, 2010). The essay was a reaction to the revolutionary upheavals with socialist elements in the III World between 1974 and 1980, with some cases of late decolonization, which threatened newly independent states turning socialist and against the US (table 3.1). The so-called ‘Kirkpatrick Doctrine’, built on the critique of Carter’s foreign policy towards the USSR and the III World, advocated the idea that strong and unscrupulous anti-communism in the US approach towards world politics should include the support of autocratic and even dictatorial regimes that were openly anti-communist (i.e. Argentina, Chile, El Salvador etc.). Such an ideological approach in international political relations would become the essence of the future Reagan foreign policy.

Table 3.1: Revolutionary upheavals in the III World (1974-80)

Ethiopia	Overthrow of Haile Selassie	September 1974.
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge takes Phnom Penh	April 1975.
Vietnam	North Vietnam/Viet-Kong take Saigon	April 1975.
Laos	Pathet Lao takes over state	May 1975.
Guinea-Bissau	Independence from Portugal	September 1974.
Mozambique	Independence from Portugal	June 1975.
Cape Verde	Independence from Portugal	July 1975.
Sao Tome	Independence from Portugal	July 1975.
Angola	Independence from Portugal	November 1975.
Afghanistan	Military coup in Afghanistan	April 1978.
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini installed in power	February 1979.
Grenada	New Jewel Movement takes power	March 1979.
Nicaragua	Sandinistas take Managua	July 1979.
Zimbabwe	Independence from Great Britain	April 1980.

Halliday (1986, 92).

Firstly, these conservative circles saw the millenarian role of the US – the role of an advocate and promoter of democracy, individual freedoms and human rights – in the popular perception of the III World states degraded, due to the Vietnam War and the overall Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy approach. As Westad suggests, “it was thought that it was the duty of the US to bring back the order of the natural development of the ‘recently independent states’, which were successfully distorted by the USSR during the period of détente” (2009, 373). Therefore, Reagan’s decision to take his anti-communist crusade on the global level was primarily based on the conservative perception that the US has been for years tricked by the hostile III World regimes.

Reagan’s manicheistic perception of the conflict between democracy/capitalism and communism as a fight between good and evil can be explained precisely from the constructivist non-material aspect of relations. In many of his public addresses before and during his presidential term, Reagan constantly warned of the ‘USSR threat’ to the ‘free world’, calling for decisive action against what he labeled as ‘the Evil Empire’. Constructivists, and Onuf among them, explained this phenomenon, claiming that individuals construct the social reality on these bases and consequently forming the interests on which states relate to each other. “The subjects (agents) relate to objects in the world (including other agents) on the basis of meanings that the objects have for them. Thus, states relate to each other on the basis of meanings (and not by virtue of some distribution of power, as the neo-realists would believe” (Kuntsen 1997, 280-81). That the Cold War would end on the US advantage came as a conclusion based on Reagan’s deepest beliefs and cognition of what is *right*. In 1975 Reagan said that communism is a “temporary aberration which will one day (...) disappear from the earth because it is contrary to human nature” (Reagan in Gaddis 2005, 217). Reagan’s highly ideological and holistic approach to international issues was essentially the driving force behind his foreign policy, of which Henry Kissinger wrote that “despite (Reagan’s) rhetoric about ideological confrontation and the reality of conducting a geopolitical conflict, Reagan did not in his own heart believe in structural or geopolitical causes of tension. He and his associates considered concern with the balance of power too confining and too pessimistic. They strove not for gradualism, but for final outcome” (Kissinger 1994, 771).

The ideational realm of Reagan’s cognition of communism as ‘evil’ determined the course of US interaction in the international system by taking it to the holistic level. The crusade against communism should not be fought as before (like in Vietnam) to prevent ‘the fall of dominos’,

but on a global level and directly against the USSR; the policy which came to be known as the ‘roll back of communism’. In the late 1970s Reagan perceived some of the local but geopolitically important troubled areas – like the rise of Islamic revolutions in the Middle East and in Central Asia, as well as some other hotspots like Angola – as provocation primarily coming from the USSR, with which the US should deal altogether. Behavior towards these situations by itself, however, cannot represent a true explanation of the actor’s thoughts, ideas and desires. In a strictly positivist sense, the behavior would explain the problem without contextualizing it. The same can be seen in the US position in the II Cold War; strictly from a behavioral aspect it would be enough to analyze the period as a new arms race. However, to explain these changes and broaden the perspective from the constructivist standpoint, we have to analyze the second level Rosenau presented – the behavior of the main actors on the basis of their cognition.

3.1.2 Behavioral level: going holistic

In analyzing the behavior of the US side during the II Cold War, the military factor from the outset was the most important factor. After all, the II Cold War was primarily a new episode of the arms race between the two blocs. As previously mentioned, the purpose was psychological. For example the SDI was taken very seriously by the USSR leadership, even though “the technological advances claimed by SDI proponents did not materialize, (...) and the program was reduced and marginalized” (Baylis and Smith 2001, 87). Nevertheless, the effects produced long term results. According to Gaddis, the SDI “challenged the argument that vulnerability could provide security. (...) It exploited the USSR’s backwardness in computer technology, a field in which the Russians knew that they could not keep up. It also undercut the peace movement by framing the entire project in terms of *lowering* the risks of nuclear war; the ultimate purpose of SDI, Reagan insisted, was not to freeze nuclear weapons, but rather to render them ‘impotent and obsolete’” (2005, 226). According to Kissinger, to render them ‘impotent’ and ‘obsolete’, the phrases Reagan used in his March 23, 1983, speech, “must have had a chilling ring in the Kremlin. The USSR’s nuclear arsenal was the key stone of the USSR’s entire superpower status. (...) Now with a single technological stroke, Reagan was proposing to erase everything that the USSR had propelled itself into bankruptcy trying to accomplish” (1994, 778).

Even though the US position in the II Cold War had its down-sides (there were moments when the US government was seriously shaken by public scandals and pressures, i.e. the

Lebanon fiasco in 1983 and the Iran-Contra Affair in 1986) the psychological effects gave overall positive results to US foreign policy efforts. For example, in 1983, after the USSR air-defense shot down a South Korean civilian airliner, US deployed nuclear missiles in Europe, which was seen as an open threat. Consequently, “(...) there is evidence that USSR leadership took very seriously the words (and deeds) of the Reagan administration and believed that US leadership was planning a nuclear strike first” (Baylis and Smith 2001, 83).

The effects were also successful because the whole internal US economic system was subjected to military intimidation of the Other. In order to succeed, the international monetary system turned to be an important source for financing the arms race with the USSR by imposing the high interest rates. However, in order to have the high interest rates, the domestic production and savings need to be high (Fisher theory).⁴⁶ The core problem of the US economy and its high interest rate “was its 10 million unemployed, the deficit that was reaching 240 billion dollars, inflation and the decline in export, which was reaching 30%” (Buvač 1982, 3). Despite the chronic state budget deficit, US kept interest rates high. This damaging policy mostly affected the domestic economies of US’s Western allies, who openly attacked the US government at the G7 summit in Versailles in 1982. They could have realized and object to the militant warmongering behind the economic policy to understand “why Reagan could not reduce the budget deficit, while at a same time keeping the taxes low as a basic principle of reagonomics – because with the high interest rates he was at the same time intentionally increasing the expenditure for armaments for the arms race” (Ibid.).

According to some analysts Reagan’s behavior could be explained in simple terms. Reagan ‘provoked’ the II Cold War simply to win over the ideological battle with the USSR, “in more concrete terms, he did it to re-establish American strength, de-legitimize the Soviet Union and curb its III World adventurism” (Catsambis, 2010). Therefore, some analysts claim that the main characteristic of Reagan’s foreign policy approach towards the Socialist bloc and the III World was more in “a change of a method, than in the change of goals” (Westad 2009, 373). Whether the method determined the whole US foreign policy decision-making approach rather than conservative ideas is debatable and in all does not seem quite so. The position of this dissertation is that the ideas played a pivotal role, while the behavior was adjusted and narrowed to the given realities. The conservative US foreign policy preserved in practice some aspects of geopolitical realism and the ‘spheres of interests’ (i.e. the classic military interventions in Lebanon and Grenada in 1983 and undermining enemy regimes in the Iran-

⁴⁶ Irving Fisher, US economist and proponent of neoclassical economics.

Contra Affair in 1986). Thus, it seems more that the US conservative ideology of the New Right was rather using old methods, but with new means and ideologically new set of principles (and that is exactly the sphere where finance would play a major role).

The conservative discontent with the conventional realist US foreign policy in the Cold War already emerged in the early 1970s during the Nixon term. Nixon's National Security adviser Henry Kissinger noted that "to conservatives, Nixon's strategy of treating the USSR as a geopolitical phenomenon was unfamiliar and uncongenial. The majority of them viewed the conflict with communism as being almost exclusively ideological" (Kissinger 1994, 743). How the action would be carried out on a holistic level would be determined in the late 1970s by the Republican Party neo-liberal conservatives. Seyom Brown wrote that this platform was "written largely by Reagan ideologists and it committed the next Republican President to achieve the overall military and technological superiority over the Soviet Union and to use the 'nonmilitary means' to roll back the growth of communism" (Brown 1994, 391). The 'non-military means' were the dynamics of capitalism and the market economy that would prove to be a more effective means than the old fashioned policies of nuclear intimidation in the crusade against communism.

Considering the III World (also seen as a threat from the perspective of the 'Kirckpatrick Doctrine'), the 'non-military means' and conservative political principles would become part of an ideological strategy that would be put into practice in order to fight world communism in local areas. Because the III World was dependent on the financial aid of the two Cold War powers and on international financial institutions, the US would use that dependence to their own political advantage. "The US parole was *conditionality* – meaning that domestically and internationally, the solutions should be found only within the framework of the free-market, as an only condition for granting aid – and *adjustment* – that meant for the aid receiving countries that they had to cut government regulated quotas; subventions from the budget; and social expenditure. And all that under the supervision and coordination of the IMF experts" (Westad 2009, 405).

Going holistic in US foreign policy strategy thus meant a power shift from the UN to financial non-state actors, namely the Bretton Woods institutions. Westad writes that "Reagan's followers had had enough of it; they felt that the third-rate dictatorships – the regimes that wheedled Soviets, and brought their people to the brink of starvation and misery – were offending the US, especially in the UN. Many Americans wondered why their country should continue to offer aid and support to the openly anti-American regimes; why should US tax-

payers finance special UN organizations whose only purpose – as they perceived them – is to undermine US position in the world? The US conservative right claimed that the moment had come to strike back the III World regimes; the regimes that opposed the US mission in the world” (Ibid., 403).

As Kenneth Waltz correctly replied to Keohane’s critique of neo-realism in 1979 during the neo-realist-neo-liberal debate, within the international system the main distribution of interest was coming from the state as a main actor and in this case; the US national interest. Despite the interests of the private financial sector and financial institutions, it was Reagan’s administration in Washington that shaped the strategy and determined the interests and rules of interaction. One of the reasons the international financial realm seemed suitable for political maneuvering was because it was the only sphere in the IR that was not regulated. The dominating international anarchy in international finance presented the most convenient space for maneuver to the US foreign policy strategy.

The intention to combine the financial aid for the III World with the national interest was announced in late 1983 by the Carlucci Commission. The Commission “proposed an increase in all types of American foreign assistance, including an increase in grant military aid that became a controversial subject among the commissioners” (Nowels, 2010). Because the Commission’s “premise (was) that the structure and focus of the American foreign assistance policy was flawed and needed a comprehensive remake” (Ibid.), the conclusion was that only those states that support US would be granted aid. This policy would become evident after granting aid to Grenada, “which prior to US military intervention was not even on the list of states that US considered aiding” (International Herald Tribune 1984, 22). Of 42 billion dollars the Commission granted to the state fund for aid “52% went on Egypt and Israel, 13% to the states that host US military bases” (Ibid.).

Alongside the official governmental institutions, the foreign policy course of the US conservative government was also supported by a whole web of unofficial and civil organizations; among others was the already mentioned the Heritage Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), formed personally by Reagan, and which stated that it “has remained on the leading edge of democratic struggles everywhere, while evolving into a multifaceted institution that is a hub of activity, resources and intellectual exchange for activists, practitioners and scholars of democracy the world over” (National Endowment for Democracy, 2010). NED, as a covert organization for the CIA operations in the III World during the 1980s and its role in general, still raises many questions and is an open source of

ongoing controversy, which was among other criticized by the influential French journal *Le Mond Diplomatique* (Neuber, 2010).

That the ‘non-military means’ – the economics – presented the core of the US behavioral approach in the international interaction of the 1980s, can be seen from the focus of US strategy in their intelligence analysis. The National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) No. 54 *United States Policy towards Eastern Europe* from 1984, reveals Reagan’s foreign policy strategy towards Eastern Europe, which clearly states that the goals of the US policy were to re-integrate Eastern Europe into the Western Hemisphere through economic means. This strategy enhanced the main principles of Reagan’s conservative ideology; neo-liberal economic concept, democracy and human rights. The most important objectives listed are,

- “1. Encouraging more liberal trends in the region.
2. Furthering human and civil rights in Eastern European countries.
3. Reinforcing the pro-Western orientation of their peoples.
4. Lessening their economic and political dependence on the USSR”

(National Security Decision Directive 54, 2010).

Credit policy was one of the most important means mentioned in the directive, which would also include the US strong political support for the Eastern European countries membership in the IMF. Basically, through their membership in the IMF, the political and economic principles mentioned in the directive would have been easily implemented and the influence of the USSR would decrease, because “given their approach to the issue of conditionality in IMF lending, it was expected that the IMF would require debtor states to adjust their economic activity towards greater privatization and market-orientation” (Newnham 1998, 114).

The overall US position towards Eastern Europe (and in that context towards the SFRY) was based on the politics of the so-called ‘differentiation’. Here we are not only talking of the economic aspect of the US strategy, but also the strategy that involves national sentiments and a very important factor of *culture*. This further proves the weakness of the realist perspective of power-distribution based on material interests. Economic and military means were as such only a means where the *idea* of ‘policy of differentiation’ had far more reaching effects; especially in the context of the bloody SFRY collapse in early 1990s. These factors were, in the same way as military and economic factors, used and put forward by the Reagan

administration in a provocative manner. For example, the US Vice President George H. W. Bush in his 1983 Vienna speech (which provoked neutral Austrian hosts and some European media) stated that USSR was not a European country because it did not follow in the European tradition and heritage of Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment (Garthoff 1994, 128). Bush's controversial speech was addressed precisely in the manner of 'differentiation' policy, according to which the differing cultural, historical, ethnic and geographic elements of Eastern Europe "seek to be different from the USSR and from its neighbors in the pursuit of its national interests" (Luers 1987, 979).

The US conservative identity-interest formation on the national level reflected in many aspects the international approach, specifically in the case of Eastern Europe. Faced with the state's coercive policies, oppressed freedoms and low economic standards, such policies, as was the case with 'differentiation' had to have an important impact on Eastern Europe as well as on SFRY in the 1980s. Even though the free-market capitalism was the offspring of the protestant ethic, liberalism as a theoretical concept had its roots in the Enlightenment, namely in Kant's *Perpetual Peace*. The main Enlightenment argument in IR was that the war as such can be terminated and the world united in one peaceful and prosperous republican federation only through the setting up of the network of international trade. Such an appeal of the policy of 'differentiation' seems to have been an open call to the peoples of Eastern Europe to accept the US political and economic values and reject Russian-style socialism as it, above all, lacked the essential humanist traditions. After all, the Reagan administration did believe that economic freedoms and an overall neo-liberal model necessarily had to go hand in hand with the national sentiments of individual nations. The strategy "(...) assumed that the Western use of carrots and sticks in dealing with Eastern Europe would provide incentives to those ruling elites to pursue policies different from the USSR's, though not challenging USSR primacy in the region. Western policies, specifically US policies, could promote economic reforms (in Hungary) or some independent behavior in foreign policy (in Romania), thus making an impact at the margin" (Newnham 1998, 114).

The new arms race, the policy of 'differentiation' and the economic strategy of the IMF and other private financial institutions were part of the holistic approach of confronting the USSR. Eastern Europe was in the strategic focus; Poland, Hungary and Rumania were much more interesting units and in that context SFRY as well. The ideological *force* behind the crusade would be the free-market and monetary policy. Because the IMF and the World Bank would be the key institutions through which Reagan's conservative ideology would formulate its

behavior and apply it in practice, we should now examine how the action was carried out on an institutional level.

3.1.3 Institutional level: Bretton Woods institutions

By observing the institutional level, we will notice that major change emerged in the US strategy when the activity of Reagan's foreign policy shifted from the UN – where the space for maneuver was limited due to proportions of the NAM/III World – to the international financial institutions through which the US could more efficiently achieve its national interests and goals pursuing its ideology of free-market and monetarism. Reagan's conservative administration moved its “attention at the Bretton Woods institutions – namely, the World Bank and IMF – as instruments of the US economic policy towards the rest of the world. (...) Their goal was to move these two institutions completely towards the monetarism and market ideology, and at the same time – as much as it was possible – to use the credit resources of these institutions for achieving the interests of US security policy” (Westad 2009, 404).

There were numerous attempts to change the direction of this new power-shift and to preserve the role of the UN as the main mediating framework, or a watchdog of the international society of states. In early October 1982, the Romanian Ambassador to UN Andrei Stefan urged the nations to form a special UN commission for mediation in order to avoid the Cold War effects on the international institutions (Buvač 1982, 1). The French PM Pierre Mauroy emphasized that “the US is misusing the state of disorder in the world monetary system for their own purposes, taking unilateral measures that affect other countries” but also noticing that at the same time USSR “uses directly or indirectly the military force to prevent other states deciding on their destiny” (Ibid., 2). During the session, the SFRY foreign affairs minister Lazar Mojsov gave the similar warning, stating that “the roots of the present crisis are of deep structural nature and should be found in imbalances and inequalities of the present economic system (...) thus blocking the work and functioning of international organizations. The UN is becoming more and more powerless in its attempt to preserve peace, to protect the independence of nations and countries, and a forum for resolving major international issues” (Ibid.).

The Bretton Woods institutions, specifically the IMF, were convenient for a number of reasons. First, since its formation in 1944 and until the beginning of the 1980s ‘debt crisis’,

the IMF played a considerably small role in the international financial structure. During the fixed rate, the ‘gold standard’ monetary system (1946-73), the IMF exclusively operated in the service of a few industrialized countries and under strictly determined constitutional rules. During the critical period of the western economic crisis (the stagflation between 1974 and 1981), the IMF participated in the overall financial movements with “only 4% of the capital” (Stanovnik 1985, 13). It would be only during the II Cold War in the 1980s that the IMF would be rediscovered by Reagan’s administration for the new US foreign policy strategy. Stanovnik writes that by 1979 only 26 countries received loans from the IMF, however “that number rose to 51 in 1981 and to 63 in 1983. And while in 1979 the developing countries borrowed only 1.8 billion dollars, IMF’s contribution to settling the ‘debt crisis’ in 1983 was 12.5 billion dollars” (Ibid., 14).

The second important thing about IMF's role in the international system is the institution’s ideational distancing from the original principles that were the reason for its formation in the first place. Its purpose was to become one of the main pillars of the post-war international financial system in 1945 (together with the World Bank and World Trade Organization); and to help countries in the case of economic crisis, in order to avoid the reduction of export. That there was a problem with IMF’s determination to follow its own principles was already indicated by one of its founders Lord Maynard Keynes, the representative of the British delegation at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. There he would already in the early phases of talks he would encounter a reaction coming from the representatives of the US delegation, Harry White and Edward Bernstein, over the future role of the IMF. In his memoirs, Keynes wrote that the US delegation wanted the IMF to “interfere in the domestic politics of the member states; there was also a collision over the question whether the obligated ‘adjustment’, including the devaluation and reducing expenditure should concern only the ‘deficit’ countries, or should the ‘surplus’ countries be adjusted as well with the revaluation and higher import” (Ibid., 9). Bretton Woods ‘compromise’ was never achieved, and IMF as its institutional tool would remain in the service of the US financial policy, specifically in relation to *interfering in the domestic politics of the member states and adjustments concerning deficit countries*.

Basically the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program for the indebted countries “generally require (these) countries to *devalue their currencies against the dollar; lift import and export restrictions; balance their budgets and not overspend; and remove price controls and state subsidies*” (Structural Adjustment Program, 2010). Such a program inevitably forces a planed

economy system towards market economy, and which would as a result internally provoke a popular need for further liberalization and even political pluralism. During the debt crisis of the 1980s, IMF was acting on behalf of both state and non-state actors; firstly by the Reagan administration in the service of the grand strategy of 'rollback of communism'. The second was the private sector, or the banks, because it was in large part the private sector that gave loans to the III World countries during the 1970s, in order to recycle petrodollars amounted from the first oil shock of 1973.

The 'debt crisis' – also known as the 'crisis of banks' – emerged in the III World as a consequence of the Western monetary shock. The roots of the 'debt crisis' can be traced back to the monetary shock with the collapse of the 'gold standard' and the beginning of the 'floating rate' in 1973. The crackdown of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s had "hurt the developing countries worst, generating a serious instability on the raw resources market. (...) fluctuation of the raw material price did not depend only on the fluctuation of supply and demand on the international markets, but also on the fluctuation of the currencies on which international price is determined" (Stanovnik 1983, 357). Throughout the decade, the fall of the value in raw material resources hit the export oriented III World countries the worst, as the export was the only real guarantee of economic, and consequently political stability. Therefore, by the time the II Cold War began "only in the period between 1980 and 1982 the price of the raw resources fell on average 40%" (Westad 2009, 405).

Parallel to that, the first oil shock in 1973 further contributed to the crisis as most of the III World countries were energy-dependent. Due to low export capabilities on raw materials and energy dependency, the III World countries had no other choice but to turn to the financial private sector. On the other hand, the US banks were willing to begin granting loans to the developing countries without any regulation in order to recycle their petrodollars. This practice would continue throughout the decade. In that period it was feasible for these private financial institutions to give loans because, "private corporations often ask fewer questions than governments and they certainly make fewer demands – particularly of a political nature – than are made in government-to-government dealings" (Newnham 1998, 113). One of the first banks of that period to start giving loans in order to recycle petrodollars to countries like Mexico, Argentina, Poland and SFRY (the countries that would be hit worst by the debt crisis) was Bank Manufactures Hannover Trust from New York. Stanovnik noticed that the cause of the problem in the international financial system was that "the problem does not lie in the fact that the international financing experienced great expansion in absolute gains and

in relation to commodities market (...); the real problem was that the growing international private financing did not invest in economic development, which can only create profit, but, to the contrary, more and more in simple covering the deficit of balance of payments” (Stanovnik 1983, 365).

At the beginning of the II Cold War in the late 1979, Paul Volcker, the new chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (FED) initiated an anti-inflation campaign, claiming that the inflation is a continuous consequence of the government budget deficit. Volcker’s anti-inflation policy matched the outbreak of the II energy crisis caused by the Iranian Islamic Revolution, which made oil and energy dependent III World countries extremely vulnerable.

When it became obvious that the III World countries could hardly meet their debt obligations (Mexico and Latin America in general), the policy of lending loans to the III World was halted; “FED tightened money supply. As a result, dollar interest rates shot up sharply, even to 20% per year or above” (Debt Crisis of the 1980s, 2010). The banks stopped giving loans and interest rates went high. “Although this caused a serious economic slowdown in the US and the rest of the world, in the long run Volcker succeeded in stopping the global inflation of the 1970s” (Ibid.). The result of such a policy was ‘debt crisis’, which would hit hardest the countries of Latin America; Poland in Europe (the first country to be hit by the crisis); followed by Hungary, Romania and SFRY.

Unlike the banks, the states cannot bankrupt and disappear, but they can turn non-solvent. In that case they can only be functional with further financing. Because the private sector had to retreat after the II oil shock, “the financial rescue was extended to (the debtor states) by the IMF and the World Bank in close collaboration with the US government. They extended loans to fill the ‘financing gap’ provided that the government of the affected country took the ‘correct’ adjustment policies” (Ibid.). Finally, the interest of the conservative US government under Reagan and those of the private sector – which feared that the debt would not be met – matched together by a single act. This act was signed before Reagan took office, when FED took under its control the coordination of the banks’ interests (and that was the decision to rise the interest rate to the indebted III World countries) by the ‘Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act’, signed by US president Carter. As the banks came under the government’s coordination, the beginning of the 1980s saw the IMF enter the

international financial structure and begin to play its role Of an adjuster of central-planned economies.⁴⁷

The power of currency (dollar as a basic international currency) showed its full strength when being used for political purposes by the US foreign policy, as “the US government further worsened the international debt crisis by absorbing all disposable credits in order to finance its own arms program, and at the same time making an effort to keep the exchange rate of the dollar very high, thus making the III World debt obligations even more difficult to meet – mostly because the majority of those debts were denominated in US dollars” (Westad 2009, 406). In other words, not only were III World countries obliged to adjust their economic systems to the new rules, but they were also indirectly financially supporting the US side in the II Cold War arms race. The essence of the new relation was, as Stanovnik writes, that the “debt became in the post-colonial world the basic tool of discipline, which prevented a free development of national economies, and where the IMF acquired a strategic function in managing the discipline” (Ibid., 31). In table 3.2 we can see the growing debt burden from the 1970s according to the source of financing on the yearly average dynamic and interest rate.

TABLE 3.2: Total III World debt burden according to the source of financing (in millions of dollars)

Source of financing	1978	1979	1980	1982
Developed countries OECD	49,8	64,6	75,8	115,2
a) aid	2,3	2,6	2,8	3,4
b) export credit	21,0	25,5	29,6	44,8
c) private banks	26,5	36,5	43,4	67,0
International organizations	3,2	3,8	4,8	6,7
Socialist countries	1,4	1,7	1,8	2,5
Other	0,9	1,3	1,7	2,0

Stanovnik (1983, 397).

⁴⁷ The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act enabled FED to take control over non-member banks as they had to, among other things; follow FED rules; it allowed them to merge; it removed the power of the FED Board of Governors under the Glass-Steagall Act and Regulation Q to set interest rates of savings accounts; and allowed institutions to charge any interest rates they chose.

So far we have set the II Cold War context by analyzing the three systemic levels of interaction – how the Reagan’s foreign policy ideology evolved based on the specific conservative perception of the international system during the late 1970s; how the US government behaved towards the USSR, Eastern Europe and the III World through the arms race, covert organizations and overall theatrical approach and phraseology; and finally institutionally how the Reagan administration made the strategy interaction within the system with the power shift from UN to Bretton Woods institutions. Taking into consideration the US view of SFRY, and if we consider the constructivist’s notion that it is a distribution of ideas, rather than a pure materialistic distribution of power, through which we should observe the specific interaction within the system, the question is – what was the US’s view on SFRY during the II Cold War?

3.2 Interaction US-SFRY (1979-85)

It is important to emphasize that when we talk of the US-SFRY interaction during the entire Cold War period, we are talking of an interaction from a geopolitical and strategic aspect, although not strictly in the classical sense of the term geopolitics (the one that exclusively considers the strategic position of territory, resources etc.) but in the sense of the one specific factor – ideology.

To some extent it is difficult to analyze the interaction of the actors US and SFRY in the period of the 1980s, primarily because the interaction was relatively minimal. Unlike the period of the 1940s and 50s (the ‘rigid’ phase), when SFRY played a concrete and important strategic role in the US overall policy of *containing* the USSR, during the 1980s (and even earlier) SFRY lost its original strategic importance. In this part we will analyze the reason for SFRY’s decay of geopolitical and strategic importance in respect to the Western bloc and try to answer why there were no long term implications for stability and the country’s integrity?

3.2.1 Weakening of the strategic importance

When SFRY’s President Tito died in the 1980, there was an expressed fear among not only the heads of the LCY but also from some Western analysts that “the USSR intervention against SFRY was inevitable” (Glenny 1999, 623). The fear of Western leaders for SFRY’s

security was relatively justifiable, based on their perception that the USSR had strength and potential for an intervention, already witnessed in the case of the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. However, it still remains a question whether the US and NATO would have militarily confronted the USSR in such a case?

When asked whether he would intervene if the USSR invades SFRY, Reagan was categorical; his answer was in the spirit of the 1950s and the context of the 'rigid phase' of the Cold War. Reagan stated that "(...) the United States would have given enough signals to the Soviet Union, beginning with, say, Afghanistan – such as an American presence now in the Middle East; an American presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf area; the restoration of arms sales to Pakistan and an American presence even there (because we have a treaty with Pakistan) – that the Soviet Union would have received enough signals that a move of that kind (intervention in SFRY) would run the very serious risk of a direct confrontation with the United States. And I don't think the Soviet Union *wants* a direct confrontation with the United States (...)" (Buckley 2008, 117). Nevertheless, the question remains, how sincere was Reagan's statement; was the US really prepared to confront the USSR militarily in the case of an invasion of the SFRY, or was the purpose of such a statement more to criticize and condemn Carter's administration in order to acquire legitimization for the new conservative foreign policy approach?

The nature of Dulles's and Truman's strategic conception of 'keeping Tito afloat' in the late 1940s and 50s was not based purely on classic geopolitics, but primarily on the support of an alternative socialist ideology to the monolith USSR model, which represented to the Eastern European states of the Socialist bloc an attractive model of independence from Moscow. Considering geography, before the process of decolonization began in the 1960s, the only Cold War front between the blocs was the European continent. Therefore, SFRY being on the strategically important Balkan area that borders the East with the West represented an important geopolitical ally to the US. Ranko Petković, however, went further claiming that SFRY with its strategic position was never even really considered geopolitically important for the blocs, especially in the case of the nuclear war. Petković writes that because "the Balkans were somewhat distant from the epicenter of the Cold War in Europe, namely Germany, but were no less influenced by its impact. While there was an assumption that any kind of conflict in the middle of Europe between the two military-political camps would inevitably lead to a nuclear war, there was a belief, justified or not, that the conflict in the Balkans could be isolated" (1978, 34).

Since the late 1950s, when the rigid phase of the Cold War softened, consequently the strategic importance of SFRY did weaken. With the beginning of the process of decolonization of Africa and South-East Asia in the 1960s, a wider space opened for the blocs' maneuver and the new strategic front moved to the III World. The focus shifted from the European continent, and consequently from SFRY. The signing of the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki in 1975, when the 'Yalta formula' was officially recognized and confirmed by both blocs, made SFRY lose all relevance in the eyes of Ford's and later Carter's administration. According to the chief of Kardelj's cabinet, Vojislav Stanovičić, there was a discussion among Tito's inner circle regarding the Tito-Carter discussion in 1976. When Tito asked what US's reaction to the eventual USSR invasion would be, "Carter said that the US would send one ship, which Tito correctly commented as symbolic support rather than concrete help" (Interview with Stanovičić, 2009).

Furthermore, the ideological fragmentation (the primary purpose of 'keeping Tito afloat' strategy) was achieved well throughout the 1960s and 70s, with the Sino-Soviet split; the emergence of the unique Marxist movements in the III World and the creation of Euro-Communism in Europe in 1975.⁴⁸ All these processes to some extent contributed to the complete demise of SFRY's strategic importance. Despite the reduction of strategic interest, one element in the US-SFRY relation remained strong and constant: the element of economic support for Tito's regime. In the case of post-Tito's SFRY economic crisis, that came as a result of the overall international financial change in 1979 and the debt crisis, the US continued to grant financial support based on the preserved myth of strategic importance of SFRY.

3.2.2 The 'debt crisis' in the context of the post-Tito SFRY

The first serious signs of the debt crisis in SFRY emerged in mid-1982. That year, a commercial bank from the Socialist Republic of Croatia (the republic which was the most indebted in SFRY, Jović 2003, 238), *Privredna Banka Zagreb*, did not manage to meet its debt obligations to the Citibank, whose credit was allocated for certain projects of the oil company INA. When it became obvious that the obligations would not be met, and despite the objections from both the World Bank and the IMF, Citibank granted a new loan of 200

⁴⁸ The basic characteristic of Euro communism was the attempt by various Western European communist parties to develop their own socialist brand of social construction that would be, to an extent, distant from the power 'center' in USSR.

million dollars. Furthermore, the republican executive committee of Croatia met in July 1982 with the representatives of local banks. Chaired by Ante Marković, the meeting resolved to help Privredna Banka Zagreb to settle its debt towards its foreign investors. “This joint cooperation will be achieved in a way that our banks will grant PBZ all means on our disposal. In cooperation with the central bank *Narodna Banka Jugoslavije*, the PBZ will manage to meet its obligations to foreign investors” (Piršl 1982a, 22). Even though the problem with the Citibank’s loan was solved, the federal government did not react at all to the first signs of serious indebtedness of one federal unit.

SFRY, which throughout the Cold War represented an alternative economic model to the Eastern European Socialist bloc and a successful model of an independent socialist country, in the first half of the 1980s fell into a regional context, mostly due to the incompetence of the political elite.

Table 3.3 illustrates the SFRY debt crisis in a regional context of the crisis in Eastern Europe.

Table 3.3: Foreign gross debt (in millions of current dollars)

	1975.	1980.	1981.	1982.
USSR	15.400	25.200	29.000	29.400
Eastern Europe	23.320	64.557	66.688	65.105
SFRY	6.584	18.873	21.096	20.341
Bulgaria	2.730	3.630	3.170	2.850
Czechoslovakia	1.047	4.522	4.099	3.700
DR Germany	5.210	13.640	14.410	12.574
Hungary	3.091	9.090	8.699	7.715
Poland	8.328	24.118	26.150	25.900
Romania	2.860	9.557	10.180	9.766

FOREIGN NET DEBT⁴⁹ (in millions of floating of US dollars)

	1975.	1980.	1981.	1982.
USSR	122.480	165.920	20.549	18.383
Eastern Europe	17.944	58.186	60.703	56.934
SFRY	5.798	17.347	19.511	18.623
Bulgaria	2.347	2.853	2.364	1.893
Czechoslovakia	742	3.265	3.034	2.956
DR Germany	3.570	11.602	12.258	10.696
Hungary	2.151	7.714	7.796	6.985
Poland	7.749	23.458	25.393	25.535
Romania	1.385	9.294	9.860	9.469

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in Sirotković (1990, 259).

Here we can see that even though SFRY was in relative advantage to the Socialist bloc as a unit, the country was more indebted in comparison to some individual countries of the bloc. Its economic policy of excessive lending of loans throughout the 1970s, brought it into a difficult position and no different from its counterparts in Eastern Europe. This perception of ‘the successful socialist economy’ should not at all be underestimated; in the period between 1950 and 1975, the economic aid supplied by the US government, the international financial institutions and the private financial sector contributed to the rise of SFRY’s GDP (table 3.4), which at one point was higher “in comparison to the 24 European countries” (Sirotković 1990, 238-39).

Table 3.4: Yearly growth of GDP (in %)

Year	SFRY	Four biggest European countries ⁵⁰	Nine smaller European countries ⁵¹	Turkey
1971-3	5, 7	4, 4	3, 4	5, 9
1974-5	5, 7	0, 1	- 3, 0	11, 3
1976-9	5, 6	3, 5	1, 0	4, 2

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in Sirotković (1990, 249).

⁴⁹ The net debt here refers to an amount that the state owes but not just the total amount, but how much debt it has in regarding its assets.

⁵⁰ France, Italy, Great Britain, Western Germany

⁵¹ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden.

Even though SFRY was US's strategic partner, and in a way ideologically similar due to the anti-*etatist* character of both the self-managing socialist and neo-liberal monetarist ideologies, the holistic nature of Reagan's crusade against world communism and the III World through the international financial institutions inevitably had to affect the socialist economic structures of SFRY.

3.2.3 The US still perceives SFRY as an important partner

As early as 1982, the Western perception of the debt crisis of Eastern Europe and the SFRY took on a new form. What worried the private financial institutions in the West was that the domestic economic crisis in SFRY would affect its ability to meet its debt obligations. Professor Dragomir Vojnić, who at that time was the member of the Federal Commissions for Long Term Stabilization, whose goal was to implement the long term economic program of recovery, said that "reprogramming the debt had more to do with the West's fear that SFRY after Tito's death might collapse, and thus would not be able to repay its debt" (Kiseljak, 2011). Furthermore, there was justified fear, as was already experienced with Mexico and Latin American countries in general, that if SFRY would not be able to pay off its debt to the West, it would provoke a chain reaction of non-compliance throughout Eastern Europe. In order to avoid economic devastation of the region, saving SFRY's economy would become a priority. Approaching SFRY would involve the IMF – the institutional tool of the US economic and foreign policy strategy. Thus, at the end of 1982 the West began forming a financial package, put together by the group known as the 'Friends of Yugoslavia', for the rescue of SFRY's nearly collapsed economy. In order to avoid the definitive crash, "the banks from the group 'Friends of Yugoslavia'; the IMF; the World Bank; and the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) offered a joint package of 1 billion dollars credit" (Adamović and Lampe 1990, 146).

On the outset, Reagan's administration did not consider SFRY outside of the context of the Socialist bloc. This was witnessed in the warnings and objections of certain bankers who were acquainted with the state of affairs in SFRY, and political figures like Lawrence Eagleburger (ex-US ambassador to SFRY 1977-81, Under Secretary of State in the Reagan administration) who urged that SFRY should be excluded from the context of Eastern Europe. The informal correspondence between the US Embassy in Belgrade and the State Department in

Washington shows Washington's concerns of making further investments in SFRY, specifically asking why there was a need and what was the exact purpose of saving SFRY's decaying economy. The reply from the US Embassy in Belgrade was infuriating; the note stated that "the phrases like 'in the interest of security' sometimes do sound like a cliché, but in this case it is a reality. It is a fact that the Soviet sphere of interest ends on the Danube, and not on the Adriatic coast; it is a fact that the Yugoslav people are focused and placing their effort to solve their own domestic problems, and not on other states to provoke problems with neighbors; it is a fact that the SFRY defense is oriented towards the East, not West. These facts, with minimum expenses over the past thirty years have served US well, however, these facts should not be considered as a given" (Ibid., 162).

Such diplomatic notes should, however, be read with caution. First, we should take under consideration a very common phenomenon which appears in diplomatic work – embassies in resident countries tend to prioritize their mission in order to attract more attention from the home country (or the 'center') either for economic benefits or pure attention (Vukadinović 2004, 101-115). Second, we should not underestimate the difference between politics and economy, even though they are interconnected. Reagan had a holistic approach to win over world communism, however, the financial realm, and especially the private one, had to look for its immediate interests. In the 1980s, the political perception of SFRY based on the established myth of its significance to the US Cold War strategy did serve as an argument for the US embassy in Belgrade and the financiers from the commercial sector to urge a change of behavior towards SFRY.

When Eagleburger's successor as Ambassador in SFRY, David Anderson, reached an agreement with the head of the SFRY federal government Milka Planinc over the new arrangements for both commercial and government's economic aid to SFRY, Anderson sent a telegram to the State Department in which he further promoted the myth of SFRY as an 'independent' country, "and that that independence, if we preserve it in this strategically important part of the world, will contribute to the overall US security" (Adamović and Lampe 1990, 142). Expectedly, in order to preserve this 'strategically important US ally' from economic collapse, Anderson recommended loans which would be provided by "EXIM Bank; Commodity Credit Corporation; Exchange Stabilization Fund etc" (Ibid.). Furthermore, at the end of 1982 at a request of the ex-chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank (then an Ambassador in West Germany) Arthur Burns, Anderson sent a report on the situation in SFRY, in which he concluded that saving SFRY's economy is of utmost strategic importance. If SFRY would

not meet its debt obligations “its trade and other credit arrangements would sour (leading to) a catastrophic slow-down in domestic, industrial and commercial activities, (thus) the political and economic system of SFRY would enter such a crisis that SFRY would have no other choice but to economically and politically tie itself to the Socialist bloc” (Ibid.)

In Washington, these factors were not entirely ignored. The NSDD Nr. 75 report stated, in the spirit of the 1950s strategy, that there were “a number of important weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire which the US should exploit (...) should seek wherever possible to encourage Soviet allies to distance themselves from Moscow in foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically, (thus) the primary US objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow’s hold on the region” (National Security Decision Directive 74, 2010). In that sense and in that context, SFRY was still perceived as a strategic partner; this point would be further developed in 1984 in the NSDD Nr. 133 document, entitled *United States Policy towards Yugoslavia*. The directive states that “SFRY is an important obstacle to Soviet expansionism and hegemony in southern Europe. SFRY also serves as a useful reminder to countries in Eastern Europe of the advantages of independence from Moscow and of the benefits of friendly relations with the west” (NSDD 133, 2010).

Once again, the formulation of interests based on the perception of SFRY’s importance developed in the early stages of the Cold War, and did not correspond to the realities of the 1980s. The NSDD document states that “it is in US interest that SFRY be able to resist pressures from the USSR and the Warsaw Pact (...) we will seek to expand US economic relations with SFRY in ways which benefit both countries and which strengthen SFRY’s ties with the industrialized democracies” (Ibid.). An important element that can be read from this perception is the ‘traditionally’; it is always the ‘traditional’ support and partnership with SFRY, rather than a concrete interest.

Reagan officially expressed his intention to strengthen political ties with SFRY in February 1984, when he met with SFRY’s President Mika Špiljak. This was the first visit on the highest level since the passing of Tito. Based on this well rooted US perception, Reagan stated “relations between SFRY and the United States are good. President Špiljak’s visit (to Washington) follows a long and well-established *tradition* of consultation and cooperation. The United States strongly supports SFRY’s *independence*, unity, and territorial integrity. Further, we respect its policy of nonalignment” (Remarks of President Reagan..., 2006). If the financial institutions continued to support SFRY (unlike Poland in 1981 due to the abandoning of the Solidarity Movement by the government), and further supplemented with

the constructed myth of SFRY's strategic importance, where did the problem in SFRY's crisis lie?

3.2.4 Internal reasons for the crisis

Even though SFRY's geopolitical and strategic importance in the late 1970s was reduced, the well established myth based on 'traditional' relations that dominated the US perception of SFRY was a major stimulus for continued financial support. Despite the 1980s US crusade against world communism, attitudes towards the socialist SFRY basically remained the same as they were in the 1950s. The question is how did SFRY bond itself to the Socialist bloc and how eventually, after the 'democratic revolutions' swept through the Eastern Europe in 1990, managed to collapse?

It would be exactly the party's and government's answer: the policy implementation to solve the crisis that placed SFRY into the context of the Socialist bloc camp, rather than just the 'lack of strategic purpose'. Marijan Korišić noticed that "socio-economic *problems*, in concrete terms the *dynamics* in the economy and its *results*; the results with which we can conclude that in a way we are talking about identical countries (SFRY and Eastern European)" (1988, 160). When Korošić writes about the *dynamics* and *results* in the economy, he is specifically pointing to the government's model to find solution to the crisis. What made SFRY part of the Eastern European problem in that process was that its model and its implementation were in doctrinal sense identical and identically implemented as they were in the Socialist bloc countries. Or, as Mark Mazower explained, "due to the political reasons, the communist regimes did not want to save their economy with deflation or massive unemployment, using the model of their Western opponents. Therefore, they adopted the strategy contra to the Western one, thus letting consumers to suffer next to empty stores and low quality products" (2004, 348). In that respect, SFRY was in the context of Eastern Europe crisis no exception.

In the constructivist sense, the ideas predominantly influenced the mentality of post-Tito communist leaders' formation of interests, (the *apparatchiks*). Their ideological prejudice of US imperialism was such that they, in the crucial moments – when the crisis was in its primal phase – refused the US help. When in May 1982 the new SFRY government was formed under Prime Minister Milka Planinc, the proposition was given to reprogram the debt through the help of the Club of Paris. This offer was easily dismissed on ideological grounds "due to

the keeping of the non-aligned course, because all the countries that comprised the Club of Paris were NATO members” (Adamović and Lampe 1990, 146). When Tito died in 1980, the financier and the head of the Chase Bank David Rockefeller visited the SFRY consulate in New York to make a tribute and sign up in the book of grievances. There he told SFRY consul Nino Kopač that he is ready to offer his services to the SFRY government and make a complete free of charge audit of the financial situation in the country. When Kopač informed Belgrade through the SFRY Embassy in Washington, “the offer was refused with the because of the mistrust of ‘western imperialism’” (Interview with Kopač, 2010).

The incompetence of the government based on the doctrinally conditioned decision-making also reflected a lack of strategically important foreign investments in the country. The reason why the US investments were low during the crisis was primarily the result of an overall anti-business climate in SFRY and not the ‘hidden imperialistic agenda’ or the ‘lack of strategic relevance’. SFRY’s red tape problem for the international investments began in March 1978, with the passing of the new government’s regulation law on joint investments. Since the reforms of the mid-1960s, when Tito and Kardelj announced the decentralization and introduced mild version of the market economy, the joint investments were regulated by the simple set of rules. However, since 1978, “apart from the formal request, to start a business a company had first to get an approval from the local government, then from the Federal Institute for Economic Planning (which concludes whether the project matches state’s plan for development), then Federal Chamber of Commerce has to conclude whether the logistics and material, which foreign investor plans to enter the country, can not be secured in SFRY, and finally the whole project had to be approved by the Federal government *Savezno Izvršno Vijeće*” (Adamović and Lampe 1990, 116). Added to this bureaucratic process was the ideological mistrust of the ‘western imperialism’, and SFRY basically made it impossible for foreign investments to enter the country, begin the process of production and lessen the hardship of the crisis. Specifically, the policy that refused foreign investments most was “that the proportional participation of the foreign investor’s gains was restricted to his participation in the investment, and the maximal gain that could have been transferred abroad was restricted to the 50% of the foreign currency that is earned by the company’s export” (Ibid.)

As an example, one of the major losses for the SFRY’s economy was the collapse of the joint investment between Croatian oil company INA and US Dow Chemical Company. Throughout the 1970s their joint investments made great profits, not only because of the flexible laws, but also because of the international energetic crisis after the oil shock of 1973, which resulted in

a great demand for oil products on international markets. When the joint project was signed in 1976, it represented the greatest foreign investment in SFRY ever signed, “worth 1 billion dollars” (Ibid., 120). However, the 1978 Law on Joint Investments and the fall of the oil prices in the early 1980s made the joint project difficult to sustain. After long and hard debates, the joint project was finally shut down. This was one of the well known examples; however, other examples of failed investments represent the pattern in SFRY’s poor trade policies. Journalist Gustinčić witnessed on several occasions how the SFRY-US business meetings were incompetently held, where SFRY representatives promised the US investors the “hasty changes or ‘manicuring’ the 1978 Law on Joint Investments and every time they (the government of SFRY) would not in the end keep up to these promises” (1984, 12-13). The consequences were two-fold: first, SFRY internally lost the possibility of earning, and secondly, the US interest in SFRY expectedly fell. Again, ideology played a major part in this process, and Gustinčić thus correctly noticed that SFRY’s ruling elite’s problem was that “for too long it has perceived the US as a political-economic and financial, but not as practical-business factor in SFRY trade” (Ibid.).

The chief institution that supervised the package of ‘Friends of Yugoslavia’ was the IMF, under whose control was all of the basic economic instruments. There was no possibility of granting new credits or making new investments without consultation or approval by the IMF experts. This control expectedly irritated the party elite which got used to enjoying its independence and practicing its political sovereignty from the Tito era. History of IMF-SFRY relations go back to the post-World War II years. In chapter II we explained the context in which SFRY delegation headed by Vladimir Velebit managed to arrange the first IMF loan in 1949. In the 1980s however, the trust in SFRY’s political capabilities to deal with its debt crisis weakened, which was directly the result of the decentralized economic structures of the republican and BOAL system. In other words, the central bank in Belgrade, by having no control over the republican banks (the Banking Law of 1977) could not have been fully responsible for the debt to IMF or any other foreign investment institution. “IMF requested that, apart from regaining the trust, SFRY should implement the already affirmed procedure of ‘conditionality’. Expectedly SFRY refused to do so, as it was aware of the resistance coming from the self-managing structures” (Stanovnik 1985, 77).

In mid-1983, under the continuous political pressures, SFRY Federal Assembly finally agreed to transfer the responsibility from the decentralized and autonomous republican banks to the central bank *Narodna banka Jugoslavije*. Furthermore, before the new loan for the ‘structural

adjustment' was granted, IMF warned that SFRY had "inadequate foreign exchange system; no market set prices, real exchange rate and real interest rate of dinar" (Rabrenović 1984a, 8). IMF objections and overall control and pressures met resistance from the party elite, who saw IMF regime of 'structural conditionality' as an attack on the self-managing ideology, as its 'revolutionary tradition'. This idea of IMF imperialism (which was also accepted by some neo-Marxist authors mentioned in chapter I)⁵² maintained that IMF intentionally targeted SFRY economy with the specific purpose of undermining its stability. However, there was nothing new in the IMF directive that was not already laid down in the government's own written *Long-term Stabilization Program*.⁵³ For "as much as the political elite was ready to accept the IMF regime and its imposed rules, then it was also ready to accept its own self-made program of Long-term Stabilization, something that was 'specifically theirs' and 'specifically their deed'" (Ibid.)

It is therefore important to analyze which elements of the *Long-term Stabilization Program* were in direct collision with the elements of the IMF's 'structural adjustment', and what were their similarities in order to determine the true nature of IMF's role in SFRY crisis. First, the similarities – what was identical in IMF imposed rules and Stabilization Program was "the need to make more efforts to include SFRY into the international division of labour (...); to cut overextended administrative interventionism in economy (...); to free self-managing structures from the administrative control (...); to set real foreign exchange-rate (...); to introduce the real interest rate (...); freedom to determine the prices on the market" (Stanovinik 1985, 80-81). The differences on the other hand can be seen over one fundamental issue: the structure of SFRY's economic system as such. "While the IMF saw the purpose of the economic development only in the rise of the production that would eventually and more or less automatically bring about the equal share of the income, SFRY continued to insist on the 'distribution by labour', and saw the purpose of development in attracting the wide range of the working class into the process of economic and social transformation. While IMF saw in the federal structure of the unique SFRY's market space an obstacle for economic efficiency, SFRY saw in it the basic tradition of its own revolution" (Ibid., 81). Therefore, the internal collapse of the system was not caused simply by the 'foreign factor' but it was rather the consequence of the party elite's misinterpreted perception of the Other,

⁵² Authors like Woodward (1995), Chomsky (2007) and Hudson (2003) argued that SFRY was intentionally targeted by the IMF adjustment program.

⁵³ This program was written by the crisis-managing commission headed by Slovene economist Sergei Kraigher.

incompetence of the political cadre and a diffused system of overlapping sovereignties where it was easy to rid off the responsibility.

When the new package was agreed in 1984 – the arrangement included the help of 600 banks and governments of 16 countries, which would together contribute to about 3,4 billion dollars – and which announced cuts in workers organizations by a 1/3, the member of government Janko Smole stated that “it is not really our arrangement with the IMF we should talk about, but a necessity to change our behavior (...) All these things: the real interest rate, real exchange rate, prices, financial discipline, should show us where are the critical spots that we should eliminate” (Rabrenović 1984b, 9).

The core of the problem in inter-republican relations in SFRY was the uneven share from the federal fund between developed republics (Slovenia and Croatia) and undeveloped (Montenegro, Macedonia and the autonomous province of Kosovo). For example “between 20 and 30 % of the Slovene gross national product is diverted to southern republics, which causes resentment” (Staar 1988, 230). Thus, the financial support from Bretton Woods institutions to undeveloped parts was intended as a stimulus to even the republican balance. In 1981 “(...) the World Bank loan of 83 million dollars would go to Morava district in Serbia for agricultural and agro-industrial development. The World Bank approved a 110 million dollar loan to finance small and medium-scale projects: 50 million dollars to Kosovo; 30 million to Bosnia and Herzegovina; 20 million for Montenegro; and 10 million for Macedonia” (Ibid.).

The overall confusion of the post-Tito era saw the decay of internal discipline, power-confusion in federal and inter-republican structures and professional political inexperience. While the country preserved its reputation and continued to be perceived by other international actors as a highly respected unit, internally, the moral decay emerged, mostly caused by the incapability of the ruling class. In 1981, when the SFRY delegation headed by Federal minister of finance Petar Kostić came to Washington to meet the representatives of the US Ministry of Finance in order to lend new loans, the level of diplomatic degradation of post-Tito SFRY was witnessed in two events – according to protocol “Kostić was supposed to bring to Washington a maximum of 15 people in his delegation, but he brought 20, causing a scandal. Furthermore, during the meeting Kostić made a scandalous comment by asking the US delegation how could they have ‘chosen that cowboy for a president’” (Interview with Kopač, 2010)?

3.3 Interaction USSR-SFRY (1979-85)

During the Cold War, the main ideological interaction of SFRY as a unit evolved within the two sub-systems; the non-aligned group (the space for diplomatic maneuver was in the UN) and the Socialist bloc (on an ideological basis, and economic, as SFRY was to a certain extent involved with COMECON), with which, however, relations were in a permanent state of mistrust ever since the Tito-Stalin split of 1948. At the beginning of the 1960s, when the SFRY foreign policy entered the 'non-bloc' phase of its foreign policy, relations with USSR and the Socialist bloc would gradually improve. As Kuljić writes, "the gradual strengthening of SFRY's reputation in the world, as well as the skill of measuring and balancing, enabled Tito to permanently rely on USSR, but also to be protected from the hegemony of the Socialist bloc" (Kuljić 2005, 303).

However, the imbalance in the international system which reflected SFRY's stability was primarily the cause of USSR's own ideological, political and economic decay. The solutions to economic problems, the approach to international affairs and internal state structures contributed to the collapse of the socialist order in both SFRY and USSR.

3.3.1 USSR in the II Cold War: rethinking the strategy

Unlike the US conservatives in the late 1970s, the political elites in USSR were convinced that their position domestically and in the international structure – regardless of the bad social conditions – was solid. In 1977, Brezhnev concluded that even though the definitive socialist utopia was way ahead, the USSR and its allies were, according to the Marxist concept of development, entering the final stage of socialism, also known as 'developed socialism' or 'real existing socialism'. In his *A Historic Stage on the Road to Communism* Brezhnev stated that "it is self-evident that a mature socialist society must rest on highly developed productive forces, on a powerful, advanced industry, on a large-scale, highly mechanized agriculture built on collectivist principles. Such is the USSR economy today, which both in scale and technical capability, differs fundamentally from what we had four decades ago (...)" (Brezhnev in Daniels 1984, 402). Thus, Brezhnev concluded that "(...) developed socialism has now been built in USSR, that is to say, a degree, a stage in the maturing of the new society has been reached when the repatterning of the totality of social relations on the collectivist principles intrinsically inherent in socialism is completed" (Ibid., 403).

Considering world communism, Brezhnev saw the role of the USSR model as an inevitable ‘dialectical’ process that would lead all communist states towards their final goal. However, Brezhnev admitted that the socialist development should be, as Kardelj argued in *Historic Roots of Non-alignment* and *Socialism and War*, an individual process. Thus, he states “(...) no matter what the specific conditions in the countries building socialism may be, the stage of its perfection on its own basis, the stage of mature, developed socialism is an essential part of the social transformations, of the relatively long period of development on the road from capitalism to communism. It stands to reason that this necessity, this regularity will be embodied in their own way in the conditions of the various socialist countries” (Ibid.).

In the case of the USSR’s party elite, this perception of Self, highly influenced the identity-interest formation on both a micro and macro-level. The roots of the crisis in formulating USSR’s foreign policy interests, with which Gorbachev was faced after the II Cold War in 1985, came mostly as a result of Brezhnev and the top party leadership’s false perceptions and judgments of the USSR’s true position within the international system. Since the times of de-colonization in the 1960s and the occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, their foreign policy efforts mostly gave illusionary results – the US fiasco in Vietnam and the establishment of socialist regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia were a tremendous boost to the moral of USSR’s party leadership, however, “after every successful socialist revolution, the newly created friendly land had to get economic support, but had almost nothing to offer in return” (Medvedev 1988, 187).

Ignoring the domestic interests and society’s needs by default, the USSR leadership under Brezhnev placed all its efforts into creating a non-profitable campaign of sustaining unstable III World socialist regimes. By the time Gorbachev entered office in 1985, he faced the system based on gigantic bureaucratic apparatus that was on all levels of political interaction (from internal to foreign policy) creating major economic losses. According to a report given to Gorbachev in October 1986 by Nikolai Kruchin, the Party’s administrative director, on yearly basis USSR would spend billions of dollars on non-profit campaigns and sponsors of friendly governments, parties and movements. In table 3.5 we can see the value of the USSR’s investments into allied regimes on yearly base in the first half of the 1980s.

Table 3.5: USSR support of the III World (in billions of dollars)

Cuba	15, 490, 60
Vietnam	9, 131, 200
Syria	7, 426
Iraq	3, 765, 600
Ethiopia	2, 860, 500
North Korea	2, 243, 100
Mongolia	9, 542, 700
India	8, 907, 500
Poland	4, 955
Afghanistan	3, 55
Algeria	2, 519, 300
Angola	2, 28, 900

Bunič (2006, 259).

Furthermore, on the inter-communist party level of relations, USSR continued to supply ‘brotherly parties’ with large sums of money.

“Communist party of United States	2, 000, 000
Communist party of France	2, 000, 000
Communist party of Finland	1, 800, 000
Communist party of Portugal	1, 000, 000
Communist party of Greece	900, 000
Communist party of Israel	800, 000
Communist party of Chile	700, 000
Communist party of Lebanon	500, 000
Communist party of Venezuela	500, 000
Communist party of India	500, 000

(...) Altogether around 40 million dollars per year would go to the communist parties and organizations such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)” (Ibid., 330).

The total amount of economic support to Moscow loyal regimes was 85.8 billion dollars. The amount of support in “a resource, raw materials and machinery finished products is as yet impossible to determine” (Ibid., 259). USSR was also spending its hard currency on its allies,

thus raising its own debt to the West, and “this debt would by the time of the collapse of USSR grow up to 17.900 billion dollars. Furthermore, the USSR was obliged to bail out the Eastern European debt with which its own debt rose to an extra 60 billion dollars” (Ibid., 258).

The economic aspect of the USSR’s foreign policy crisis immediately before the outbreak of the new arms race had a large implications for the USSR decision-makers; specifically because, there was already before 1979 a strong structural interdependence of the USSR economic system with Western financial institutions. The economic crisis in the period of 1979-85, which began with Volcker’s monetary shock, also affected USSR’s spending economy to great extent. Since 1979 its GDP drastically fell, and its growth was only 0, 7 %, which was so low that it was even “contrary to the CIA predictions of 3% or more” (Westad 2009, 378). In the economic sense, if anything caused the fatal blow to the USSR domestic stability, then it was the III oil shock of 1986, known as ‘oil glut’. This one, unlike the previous two shocks (1973-75 and 1979), was caused by the fall of oil price (from 27 dollars per barrel to below 10 dollars), due to a reduced demand and overproduction in the oil world market. Throughout the 1970s and especially after the energy crisis of 1979, the USSR profited from oil shocks, becoming “the world’s largest oil producer, and pumping about 11 million barrels a day” (Minaev, 2010). However, the drop in prices in 1986 presented a serious loss in revenue, as the “third of that oil was exported (...) mainly to capitalist countries” (Ibid.). Even though it used to be one of the largest grain exporters, by 1980s USSR became a grain dependent country. In order to feed itself, the oil production covered the costs: “between 1976 and 1985 the USSR earned 50 billion dollars from exports of oil and natural gas, but spent 41 billion dollars on grain imports alone” (Zubok 2010, 95). Thus, the 1986 oil glut brought the USSR to the brink of starvation.

Even though the USSR and the whole Socialist bloc were, throughout the 1970s, lending recycled petrodollars for domestic purposes, the interdependence on the international system level would inevitably, during and after the II Cold War, lead towards a rethinking of the foreign policy course. Medvedev writes that “the Soviet leaning on the Western capitalist countries when it came to high technology and basic commodities like grain; meat; sugar; and butter in order to avoid malnutrition of its own population, inevitably had to lead towards reorientation of foreign policy priorities” (Medvedev 1988, 187). But the foreign policy approach towards the III World represented and remained the biggest obstacle of the reform. “Too many countries had to be supported and there was too little use of that policy. The

collapse of détente and the new arms race was followed with all the negative consequences; however, the USSR continued toughly to deny that intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and economic and political crisis in Poland in 1980-81, were at least in part caused by the worsened internal state of relations” (Ibid., 188).

There was, furthermore, an ideational aspect to the problem of foreign policy reorientation. What Rosenau noticed and labeled as the ‘cascading interdependence’ of the international system, was that there was much overlapping among the power-centers and the new trends in technological, military, economic and political spheres. It was too difficult to simplistically adopt them to the general interest of society and its needs, and ultimately form a unique national interest. The international environment of the II Cold War was such a complex system that the USSR party leadership could not cognitively perceive it, primarily due to their simplified dogmatism of Marxism-Leninism.

It was not just the ideational level that could not percept the complexities of the international system, but it was also the state structures – the domestic institutional level that had serious flaws. Medvedev writes that “as the complexity of handling the foreign relations grew on all levels of foreign policy practice (diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, political, direct or with the mediator) – and very often without any real coordination between these levels due to too many departments, secrecy and bureaucratization – the result was at the end of the Brezhnev era such that there emerged a situation in which the USSR could simply not afford to sustain its own ‘empire’” (Ibid., 188). USSR had “800 ministries, confirming Lenin’s warning that ‘bureaucracy reproduces itself’” (Zlatanović 1987, 40). Even though the USSR’s foreign policy of the late 1970s and early 1980s would be in large part responsible for the collapse of the Socialist bloc and the USSR, the party’s cognition of Self rightness in international affairs was the determining factor in not questioning the party course.

The problem of defining USSR foreign policy priorities and interests was also caused by the chronic inability of forming a stable party leadership under the most important decision-making post in the country – that of the party’s General Secretary. Brezhnev died in November 1982; his successor Yuri Andropov in February 1984; and Andropov’s successor Konstantin Chernenko in March 1985. Between 1980 and 1984, the top four Politburo men; Kosigin; Suslov; Pelse; and Ustinov died. “The average age of the 13 Politburo members was 69. Three of them were between 75 and 80 years of age (Pelse, Suslov and Kosigin), four were between 70 and 74 (Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Ustinov, and Gromiko), four between 65 and 69 (Chernenko, Kunaev, Andropov, Grishin)” (Orlandić 2002, 63). Furthermore “The age

situation was no better among the candidates for the Politburo and the secretors at the Central Committee, which was by itself against pure logic” (Ibid.). This biological factor also played an important role on the ideational level of analysis, for aging actors are less likely to change their perceptions and way of thinking, adjust to new realities and thus be ready to reform the system.

Along with the economic-social, doctrinal, technological and pure administrative-technical (on the domestic institutional level) problems USSR was faced with when defining and formulating its interests during the II Cold War, we should not underestimate one additional element – the element of human rights, which from the constructivist aspect represents international culture on a macro-level. We have already mentioned that the international society is conditioned by the perception of Self and Other, thus interacting accordingly. Wendt wrote that “once the cultural formation of ‘Cold War’ was in place, the US and USSR had a shared belief that they were enemies which helped constitute their identities and interests in any given situation, which they in turn acted upon in ways that confirmed the Other that they were a threat, reproducing the Cold War” (2009, 187). In the first half of the Cold War period, human and civil rights were domestically violated as part of a defined identity-interest formation in the service of security from the Other in the context of pure logic of *raison d’etat*. Despite the process of de-Stalinization in the mid-1950s, USSR continued crushing political freedoms and kept running the Gulag system; the US violated civil rights during the 1950s McCarthy era, while domestic racial violence continued well after proclaiming segregation unconstitutional in 1968. However, in the 1970s, the culture of the Cold War changed fundamentally, especially because of the ever growing role of international organizations. Especially after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, “the UN Commission on Human Rights was receiving hundreds of thousands of individual petitions, and while states might angrily dismiss them or give evasive replies, they were openly embarrassed” (Kennedy 2006, 189).

The USSR attended the CSCE and signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, therefore accepting the human rights Basket III as an obligation to international society. As the new human rights journals and organizations began springing up, “dissidents as varied as the novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the scientist Andrei Sakharov, and the cellist Mstislav Rostropovich continually chided the fading Soviet regime regarding its suppression of free opinion” (Ibid.).⁵⁴ The

⁵⁴ Three ‘baskets’ agreed at the OSCE Conference were: Basket I contains a Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between participating States specifically concerned with politico-military affairs; Basket II is

violations of human rights and international pressures on USSR during the II Cold War resulted in the further decay of popular support and legitimization of the regime, both internationally and domestically. This affected the whole Socialist bloc, especially in Ukraine where in 1981 the complete Ukrainian Helsinki Group was jailed. Under strong government pressure, the Moscow Helsinki Group dissolved itself by the end of 1982. Despite of what appeared to be a US defeat in Helsinki, the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger defended the Ford administration, recognizing the importance of the Basket III of human rights, and the implications it might have for USSR in the future. A few weeks after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, Kissinger replied to the US right-wing critique saying “(...) it is not we who were on the defensive at Helsinki; it is not we who were being challenged by all the delegations to live up to the principles being signed. At Helsinki, for the first time in the postwar period, human rights and fundamental freedoms became recognized subjects of East-West discourse and negotiation” (1994, 760).

The Socialist bloc would ignore the international pressures and continue domestic oppression (like in Poland in 1981). It was significant that “the authoritarian ice was cracking in so many regions of the globe – South America, Central Europe, parts of Africa, Korea, even China (at least with respect to economic freedoms) – yet remained rigidly frozen in others (like in the Socialist bloc)” (Ibid., 190-91). This would be one of the major elements that would lead to the collapse of the system in 1989-91. It would be only after 1985 and the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev, that the state of relations would change and the Cold War would enter another (and also final) period of *détente*, before the collapse of USSR. By that time, the “internal decay of the USSR system during the 1980s was in large part caused by political and economic isolation, as “(...) Socialist bloc efforts to develop fuller trade links, greater travel opportunities and cultural exchanges with the West exposed the vulnerability of communism to the Western economic and cultural influence rather than strengthening it” (Baylis and Smith 2001, 106).

3.3.2 Myths and realities in the USSR-SFRY relations

Since the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, relations between USSR and SFRY had their ups and downs. The essential collision over the ideological questions between the two communist parties, which emerged after the clash in Cominform in 1948, and the fear of a possible USSR

concerned with the economic, scientific, technological and environmental cooperation; Basket III is concerned with human rights.

intervention which followed the break, preoccupied the minds of the LCY top leadership and SFRY's foreign policy decision makers throughout the Cold War. The SFRY-USSR interaction during the II Cold War was economically good and politically low in intensity.

On a political level, Tito's 'balancing' between the two blocs from 1948 until the late 1970s can be seen as a reflection of the so-called 'two pillars' of SFRY domestic stability – the US financing and aid and recycled petrodollars (in the 1970s) as a base for economic development, and the new Tito-Brezhnev relationship. Ever since the rapprochement with Khrushchev in 1955 and the drafting of the Belgrade declaration, Tito's political priority and main strategic effort was to transfer SFRY-USSR relations from inter-party to inter-state level. The relations with the USSR – which entered the cold phase after the 1968 crushing of the Prague Spring – improved and reached a phase of mutual recognition in the early 1970s. When Brezhnev visited Belgrade in September 1971, the joint SFRY-USSR declaration stated that "the two sides hold that it is essential to continue on these basis (Belgrade 1955 and Moscow 1956 declarations) to build a friendship between LCY and CPSU; the two parties that supervise the socialist and communist developments of their respective countries, thus strengthening the trust between the two parties and two sovereign states" (Zbirka Dokumenta Jugoslavije 1985, 1051). This was as recognition of *SFRY as a sovereign state* a major foreign policy success. According to Kuljić, the intensive correspondence between Brezhnev and Tito, which resulted in allowing the USSR planes to use SFRY air space for the efforts of the USSR military support of Arab countries in the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War of 1973, made it "seem as if SFRY was finally after the mid-1970s respected and recognized by the USSR as an independent socialist, non-bloc country" (Kuljić 2005, 328).

During his last visit to Moscow in May 1979, Tito met with Brezhnev where they once again acknowledged good relations between the USSR and SFRY. Brezhnev publicly stated that the idea that USSR would invade SFRY was a Western provocation. Brezhnev said "During my visit to Belgrade in 1976, I have already spoken about the goals of these provocations (...) dear comrade Tito, you know very well that there are no threats coming from our side towards SFRY (...) I wish to emphasize that SFRY was never considered in our plans as an enemy side, nor was its territory considered as a space for combat. (...) Our view is that if the imperialism wages the war, we will stand side by side at the barricade" (Orlandić 2002, 146). The strong relation and interaction between SFRY and USSR as two units was achieved through close personal ties of the two chief decision-makers and this relation was not politically constructed, but naturally sincere. Marko Orlandić, the SFRY ambassador in

Moscow, witnessed the strength of this relation, when during the same meeting Stane Dolanc, head of SFRY's secret service, criticized USSR influences in the internal SFRY matters and accused the USSR leadership for not changing its policy towards SFRY since 1948, which provoked Brezhnev's reaction. According to Orlandić, "Tito was extremely dissatisfied with Dolanc's action and even resented him on their return to Belgrade" (Ibid.).

When it came to the USSR-SFRY relations outside the diplomatic sphere of interaction, there was an important element of ever-present fear of USSR intervention, primarily because at that time Tito was in his mid-80s and was expected to die soon. From one aspect, the fear was justifiable, especially after the signing of the CSCE in 1975 and the outbreak of the 'Sonnenfeld Doctrine' scandal, which 'justified' the Brezhnev's Doctrine of 'limited sovereignty' in the whole of Eastern Europe. The result was the prosecution of suspected pro-cominformist elements in the SFRY: i.e. the breaking of the conference of the so-called pro-USSR elements in the city of Bar in 1975; the capture of Colonel Vlado Dapčević that same year in Bucharest by the SFRY secret police;⁵⁵ and in that period, the LCY even claimed to have had evidence that Politburo in Moscow drafted the resolution of the 'Croatian Communist Party Abroad', playing on Croatian nationalist sentiments to provoke a domestic conflict in order to implement the Brezhnev Doctrine (how the SFRY government combated the pro-USSR elements in the mid-1970s can be found in Ra'anan 1977, 51-53). Even though good USSR-SFRY relations were based on a close Tito-Brezhnev relation, there was a constant fear (among political circles and media, whether domestic or foreign) that with Tito gone, the threat of an intervention would re-emerge and become almost inevitable, the day Orlandić famously called 'the day X'.

According to certain Czech sources, in September 1968 Brezhnev made the following remark considering the future of SFRY – "in the next 10-15 years we will leave SFRY alone, because at the moment we are involved with the whole range of Asian and African countries (...) (SFRY) is not part of any bloc, but if it will ever be threatened, (SFRY) will stand with us. Time will come when the favorable circumstances will allow us to settle the situation in SFRY. The weakness is reflected in the structure of LCY; all kinds of forces are at work there; the class character is fading; intellectuals and others from the West are very loud (...) the self-management is a delusion, and is losing its support within the people. People's dissatisfaction is great, as is unemployment. The element of Tito's personality and authority is

⁵⁵ Vlado Dapčević was a prominent figure in the National Liberation Struggle, and the supporter of Cominform during the Tito-Stalin split in 1948. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

essential in keeping SFRY safe from outside forces” (Kuljić 2005, 319). Whether it was realistic or not, it is an important element to consider that the USSR’s main decision-maker was considering eventual intervention. Firstly, because the difference in the approaches in the ideological system that had lasted since the early 1950s should finally be overcome in the form of mutual inter-party and inter-state respect and recognition, and secondly, because Tito represents the only integrating factors in the country. Thus, with his eventual departure, it would be feasible to intervene.

After the USSR invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and Tito’s death five months later, SFRY’s Secretary of Defense Branko Mamula considered the threat of a USSR intervention as very realistic, writing in his memoirs that “the USSR entered Afghan adventure and challenged the US, and our position of a gate to the Mediterranean between the two blocs, fraught with dangers in surrounding, would now with Tito gone be even more in jeopardy from an open aggression” (Mamula 2000, 16). Furthermore, Mamula mentions the political manifesto that circled in the Italian secret service, called *The last hundred hours of Italian Republic*, which anticipated that after Tito’s death, the USSR Army would invade SFRY, supported by the domestic pro-cominform elements in the LCY and military core, thus directly affecting Italy’s stability (Ibid.). That the constructed fear of the USSR invasion preoccupied the top party leadership perception, is evident from the passed decision of the federal government in June 1980 (only a month after Tito’s death) to implement the Law on military service, which made all conscripts of the age of 19 obliged to enter military service, and would remain part of the service in the local Territorial defence until age 60 (Zakon o vojnoj obvezi 1985, article 48).

According to Orlandić’s overall conclusion, the fears of a USSR invasion of post-Tito’s SFRY were mostly constructed interpretations. Despite Brezhnev’s claim that the USSR will intervene once Tito dies (Day X), the situation and international position of the USSR made any action against the SFRY unrealistic. Not only was the USSR involved in Afghanistan’s expensive war, but they were also more focused on Poland and the Solidarity strikes of 1980-81. These two ‘local’ fronts were hard enough to sustain, as on the international level the new arms race and technological progress was simply exhausting USSR’s economic, military and political capabilities. In that sense, the SFRY ambassador in Moscow Orlandić noticed that despite opened and loud anti-USSR stances among some high-ranking politicians and certain media, as well as SFRY’s constant avoidance to fulfill its duties in the mutually agreed trade and economic deals with USSR, the Moscow leadership never once questioned the good

relations with Belgrade. Therefore, ambassador Orlandić concluded that “realistically speaking, it was not in the interest of USSR to pressure SFRY and bring our general relations into question” (Orlandić 2002, 401).

In April 1982, the head of Federal Executive Council, *Savezno izvršno vijeće* (SIV) Đuranović met with the minister of foreign affairs of USSR Gromiko, where they agreed to cooperation in the field of culture, education, science, technology, and considering trade “it was projected that cooperation for 1982 should reach nearly seven billion dollars” (Prišl 1982b, 1). Mutually good relations continued sincerely as one square in Moscow was named after Tito. The reason for such an approach was because USSR desperately needed allies in the II Cold War. At the meeting with Gromiko the emphasis was on resolving the II Cold War through ‘peaceful means’, which was the rhetoric of NAM. When giving a toast Gromiko addressed the SFRY delegation headed by Josip Vrhovec, stating that “our relations are based on equality and mutually beneficial cooperation. (...) This meeting proved that the stable post-Tito SFRY was in the strategic interest of USSR’s foreign policy” (ibid., 2). Faced with the arms race, that due to technological reasons they were not able to follow up, Gromiko urged that “the NAM, in which SFRY plays a significant role, also should contribute to finding and strengthening the peace” (Ibid.) As the Madrid meeting of CSCE did not give any positive results in bringing the II Cold War to an end, USSR placed all its diplomatic efforts to mobilize SFRY, NAM and neutral countries on their side in the confrontation with the US.

The economic interaction of the two units was never really jeopardized nor put into question. In the whole series of cyclical conflicts in the political sphere between the two party leaderships, good economic and trade relations continued. Already by January 1980, SFRY and USSR signed the ten-year commercial treaty “whose goal was to improve and increase international trade by 60%, and to expand better cooperation in the field of energy; food production; construction; and ship building” (Antić in Staar 1988, 252). Even though the relations between the two countries were not frequent in the first half of the 1980s (primarily due to the lack of a strong leadership in the form of an individual who would be the main actor in the decision-making process), economic relations increased – the trade relations between SFRY and USSR grew “from 16 billion dollars (in the period of 1975-80) to 26 billion in the period of 1980-85” (Ibid.).

Three factors should be emphasized as important for understanding the context for SFRY’s collapse within the Socialist bloc structure by the late 1980s. Firstly; the constructed myth of a possible USSR invasion after Tito’s death which was a strong integrating factor on the

domestic level, but which weakened in the collective perception, as the USSR during the II Cold War began its internal decay. Secondly, economically during the energy crisis SFRY was more dependent on USSR, changing its attitude towards Moscow, while Moscow desperately needed allies. And the third important factor is that during the crisis of the 1980s, post-Tito SFRY, having ideologically the same system, would technically deal with the crisis in a similar way, bonding its destiny to that of the international communist system.

3.4 Interaction Non-alignment Movement-SFRY (1979-85)

The relation with the III World and NAM is essential for understanding SFRY's internal stability. The financial means with which US supported SFRY's alternative socialist regime to the Socialist bloc, was to a large extent invested in the trade and projects with the III World, with which Tito successfully managed to build the country's international prestige. Since the 1960s, the international structure in which UN represented a framework for NAM's diplomatic maneuvering and the bipolar structure, ensured a situation in which both blocs would support newly decolonized states to divert them from 'the other', and had by the 1980s completely changed.

3.4.1 NAM in the II Cold War

The new state of worsened relations between the US and the USSR would mostly affect the III World. For the first time, the US leadership under Reagan would turn against the NAM as hostile subject towards the US position in international structure. Despite Tito's formal prevail in the debate against Castro's concept of 'natural alliance' with USSR at the VI Havana Congress of NAM in 1979, the remarks sent from the NAM conference were negatively perceived in Washington. The final NAM Declaration referred more to the US than to the USSR, stating that NAM countries continue the "(...) struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, including Zionism, and any form of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony, as well as the struggle against the policies of big powers or blocs" (Speech by Cuban President Fidel Castro, 2010).

Along with *imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism* which exclusively referred to the US, *racism and apartheid* referred to South Africa and *Zionism* to Israel, both countries that were close or belonged to the 'Western zone of influence'. Tito's non-bloc course in the NAM was officially preserved by the support of member states; however, to the US leadership it was more than a clear sign that the 'natural alliance' with the USSR was in many

cases a reality – i.e. the joint Cuba-USSR military involvement in the war in Angola, or Vietnam alliance with the USSR in the Cambodian-Vietnamese War (1975-79). The political weaknesses caused by the fragmentation of interests within the NAM was just one side of the III World weakness.⁵⁶ However, there was another aspect of the weakness that was further developing in the economic sphere.

On the international level, since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, there has been an ongoing debate (the North-South debate)⁵⁷ between rival agendas how to reorganize the international financial system. As expected, the collision emerged between Western economists' neo-liberal proposals and III World proposition of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The coming of Thatcher (1979) and Reagan (1981) to power in Great Britain and US, saw relations and attitudes changed radically, as “both governments emerged as strong supporters of financial liberalization and deregulation; indeed, one of the first decisions of Thatcher's new government was to abolish Britain's 40-year-old exchange controls” (Helleiner 2010, 626).

The Cancun Conference in Mexico of 1981, between Western leaders and III World countries, brought the idea of NIEO to definite defeat and the prevail of the economic neo-liberal concept in the international financial order. In relation to the III World, the USSR foreign policy was weakened, primarily because of the domestic crisis. For example, the USSR would criticize and protested over the results of the Cancun Conference but could do little about it. The newspaper *Pravda* wrote that “the experience of the past shows that such meetings cannot produce positive results unless capitalist states radically change their approach to the developing countries (...)” (Around the World: Pravda Denounces Cancun Conference, 2010). Altogether, moving away from the traditional and conventional thinking of the Cold War in the West; creating new perceptions focused on the financial power centers, the II Cold War affected both the Socialist bloc and the NAM/III World countries. Because SFRY as a unit interacted within both systems, these changes would affect its internal stability and its interaction specifically within the NAM.

⁵⁶ NAM was not only divided by the so-called ‘progressives’ and the ‘conservatives’ when it came to the relations with the USSR, but also there were energetically rich NAM countries that profited from the oil shocks, namely the OPEC countries.

⁵⁷ The North-South debate emerged in the early 1970s and was concerned with the developmental gap between the I World and the III World. The Debate was to some extent an attempt by III World governments to promote the idea of introducing NIEO. It was mostly discussed in the UN. Even though it was greeted as an idea by the US president Carter and West German chancellor Willy Brandt, it was never really negotiated.

3.4.2 NAM: SFRY's foreign policy burden

In real terms, there were neither concrete profits nor use of SFRY's involvement with NAM, because when it came to the most important elements for sustaining the system, SFRY was dependent on USSR with energetic resources and raw materials while on the US with the technical equipment. Export was also oriented towards OECD countries. Table 3.6 illustrates the role NAM played in SFRY's international trade.

Table 3.6: SFRY's foreign trade by area (in millions of dollars)

<u>1979</u>				
Field	<u>EXPORT</u>		<u>IMPORT</u>	
	(value)	(%)	(value)	(%)
OECD countries	81,615	44,1 %	232,868	60.8 %
Socialist bloc	75,003	40,4 %	97,335	25.5 %
III World	28,852	15,5 %	52,506	13.7 %
<i>Total</i>	185,470	100 %	382,709	100 %

<u>1986</u>				
Field	<u>EXPORT</u>		<u>IMPORT</u>	
	(value)	(%)	(value)	(%)
OECD countries	991,774	36.4 %	1,507,428	48.5 %
Socialist bloc	1,326,913	48.7 %	1,015,171	32.7 %
III World	405,547	14.9 %	585,631	18.8 %
<i>Total</i>	2,724,204	100 %	3,108,230	100 %

(Staar 1988, 253).

However, a very important advantage that this interaction contributed to was the unquestionable international reputation of SFRY, which in turn secured internal integration. The diplomatic success of the mid-1970s and the whole non-aligned diplomatic effort of that time would already suffer a serious defeat by the end of the decade in a series of events that marked the beginning of the II Cold War. By 1979, not only that détente (which SFRY saw as its success in 1975 in the form of the CSCE and the Helsinki Final Act) was brought to its end, but the whole of the NAM concept was put into question, as the non-bloc countries faced a serious dilemma: can the Movement be independent from the blocs? In other words, was the NAM in the structural sense dependent on the processes coming from the inter-bloc relations?

The major factor in the crisis of NAM was the ideological division between the so-called 'progressives' and 'conservatives/neutrals'. In other words, between those who in the period of the deepening Cold War wanted to side with the USSR and those countries that wanted to preserve the official non-aligned ideological policy line of the anti-bloc policies and peaceful co-existence. The pioneers of these two fractions were Fidel Castro (progressive) and Tito (conservative); Cuba being a strong supporter of the USSR's cause since the 'missile crisis' of 1962, and SFRY advocating to preserve the non-bloc course and independent status. Their clash, however, at the VI. Summit of NAM in Havana was unofficial and was not publicized. The root of the problem lay in the technical fact that in the nearly twenty years of its existence, NAM expanded to become the largest group in the UN, however, it never took an institutional form. Thus, by internally applying its own concept of peaceful co-existence, NAM became liable to more radical countries like Castro's Cuba, which was involved in armed conflicts alongside the pro-USSR's forces in Angola, Yemen and Ethiopia.

The Cuban rise in NAM began during the 1973 IV Summit in Algiers and its entrance into the newly setup Co-coordinating bureau of NAM, which basically served as the executive committee between the summits. Since then, the division between strictly non-bloc and pro-USSR's fractions became an unavoidable and unsolvable problem. Already at the Algiers Summit the debate over the definition of the term 'imperialism' in relation to the USSR determined the opposite sides, as Cuba openly supported the thesis that NAM, by being in its essence socialist and anti-imperialist, is a *natural ally* of USSR. Basically, the argument between Tito and Castro in 1979 was over the Cambodian-Vietnam War in which China supported Cambodia and the Pol Pot's regime, while the USSR supported Vietnam. Thus, "Tito, who finally managed after years of enmity to conclude friendship with communist China, wanted NAM to preserve a neutral stance and mediate between the two communist

blocs in this conflict” (Ridley 2000, 454). Upon his arrival in Havana, Tito visited Castro in his villa “where he tried to persuade Castro to accept a more neutral stance, with no serious public divisions at the conference” (Ibid.).

In terms of a non-aligned polarization, the Havana Summit was not that significant, because even prior to Cuba’s joining in 1973 there were evident divisions between states with a strict non-bloc course and those radical anti-western ones. However, in 1979 it would be the international context that would change the meaning of the argument; it would be “exactly at the Havana Summit that these divisions would be given larger international attention” (Willetts 1981, 11).

One of the main strategic reasons why Tito would have never accepted the *natural alliance* and let NAM lean towards USSR was due to the fear that SFRY might lose its main arena for independent political maneuver or, even worse, legitimize a possible USSR intervention in the case of a domestic crisis. However, as the structure changed with the beginning of the II Cold War, “many of the new leaders of the Non-alignment Movement member state regarded SFRY’s obsession with the danger of Soviet hegemony – as a historic interest of SFRY, understandable in the light of what had happened in 1948 – of little relevance when it came to the current problems” (Milivojević, Allock and Maurer 1988, 186). It would be precisely the authority and prestige of Tito that would make his course prevail at the Congress’s conclusion. The Final Declaration stated that “national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, sovereign equality, and free social development of all countries; independence of non-aligned countries from the great-Power or bloc rivalries and influences and opposition to participation in military pacts and alliances arising there from; (...); opposition to the division of world into the antagonistic military-political alliances and blocs (...); Basing themselves on the above mentioned principles, the heads of states or governments considered the following to be essential objectives of the Non-Alignment Movement” (Willetts 1981, 80).

Five months after the Havana VI NAM Summit, Tito would die and with him gone, NAM would suffer a spiritual loss, as the last of the great five forefathers of NAM were gone.⁵⁸ Negotiations between developing and developed nations towards more just order (the NIEO) would never formalize, with the coming of Reagan’s conservatives, and the prevailing of the neoliberal model of international economic order after the Cancun Conference. Finally, SFRY was since late 1964 partly active in the COMECON, and would thus in the first half of the

⁵⁸Jawaharlal Nehru died in 1964; Sukarno and Gamal Nasser both died in 1970; and Kwame Nkrumah in 1972.

1980s, with the energetic crisis of 1979, become completely dependent on USSR energy exports.⁵⁹ The II Oil Shock of 1979 affected the US, OPEC, but mostly the III World energy dependent countries, “whose deficit grew from 86,2 billion in 1980 to 100 billion dollars in 1981” (Buvač 1982b, 1). As the II Cold War deepened in the following years, the divisions in the NAM would adopt the elements of the natural state of affairs. The non-institutional character of the NAM and its undefined foreign policy concept towards the blocs resulted in the complete inadequacy and incapability to give a common answer towards the new international challenges. For SFRY this would have further implication as the country would enter the post-Tito era of internal crisis.

In 1983, SFRY foreign policy analyst Vane Ivanović openly criticized the SFRY involvement in international affairs, and called for a complete reform of the foreign policy approach (Ivanović in Đilas 1983, 40-50). After the Havana IV NAM Conference, Ivanović accused the NAM, calling it a “mantle that covers the pro-Soviet character of the organization itself”, thus concluding that in the hypothetical event of the invasion whether from Albania, Hungary (with the support from the USSR) or Italy (with the support from the US), none of the NAM countries would not and could not react, and the least SFRY would achieve is “the eventual UN Resolution condemning the attack” (Ibid., 43). Since its formation in 1960, the NAM served as a structure for Tito’s interaction with the largest group of actors that had an effect of rising SFRY’s international reputation and reflecting internal stability. As Branka Magaš noticed, “the three pillars upon which the Party’s policy had rested up to the late 1970s – borrowing abroad in order to extend the industrial base, without sacrificing the standard of living or civil freedoms of the current generation; East-West Détente, which reduced pressures on the country’s independence; and the NAM, which gave it a positive place in international politics” (Magaš 1993, 94).

The poverty of the post-Tito foreign policy was further witnessed in the case of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), a war involving two countries that were both members of NAM. Even though it was expected that SFRY (as well as the rest of the NAM countries) would condemn the Iraq aggression of Iran, SFRY remained neutral. On the one hand, it could be explained by immediate economic interests; “7 million tones of crude oil was exported from Iraq (...) and many SFRY construction companies and project organizations were engaged on some of the major Iraqi capital projects” (Orlandić 2002, 334). While it was expected to condemn the

⁵⁹ SFRY could participate partly in the work of the COMECON commission, with advisory rights. The areas in commission where SFRY was active were foreign trade, monetary-financial issues, industry of all sorts and scientific development.

Iraqi aggression, (despite some NAM members remaining neutral), SFRY continued to have no objections to Hussein's regime. In January 1982 the Vice president of SFRY's Presidency Petar Stambolić, made a state visit to Baghdad where he met with Saddam Hussein. During his two day visit, there was no word of Iraq's aggression on Iran, but Stambolić continued to use standard phraseology of "joint cooperation on the international level, especially within NAM. The export to Iraq in 1981 was 500 million dollars, while the investments of some 16, 000 Yugoslav citizens reached the value of 12 billion dollars" (Pivnički 1982, 1).

However, it was not just the economic interest but the lack of vision to create action and the lack of strength to take initiative, i.e. SFRY did not manage to come together on its own terms to mediate in this conflict, even though the majority of the NAM countries expected it to do so. Thus, SFRY's reluctance would have damaging results for its international credibility. On the ministerial conference of NAM in 1981 in New Delhi, a commission was created to find a peaceful solution to the Iraq-Iran War, in which SFRY was not included as a member.⁶⁰ Orlandić questioned who was exactly to be blamed for this fiasco, "the state leadership of SFRY or its diplomacy? Or maybe both?" (Ibid., 339). This observation interestingly portrays yet another element, a certain lack of organizational flexibility in SFRY. The formation of identity-interest was further jeopardized by the bureaucratization of domestic and foreign policy which was, apart from holding on to doctrinal principles, in the crisis of forming an idea and consequently implementing the action.

Ivanović suggested that "without much public outcry or causing international shock waves, (SFRY) should cautiously distance itself from the compromised organization of the non-aligned" (Ivanović in Đilas 1983, 45). With such a move, even though its economic and political stability would not be guaranteed, SFRY should move towards the position of neutral country, i.e. Austria. The dogmatism of ideology (of Marxism-Leninism) would, as on all levels of social process, represent the main obstacle to reform. Milovan Đilas was in that regard highly critical, claiming that "ideologization of (SFRY's) non-aligned foreign policy approach had – and that will soon become evident – outstandingly absurd and defeating consequences. Together with his theoretical followers, Kardelj for many years talked about non-alignment as a certain path towards socialism. The revelations these discussions created, left behind megalomaniac desires for creating a world leading role for SFRY; and of course Tito" (Đilas in Đilas 1980, 34).

⁶⁰ Countries that comprised the commission were Cuba, India, Zambia and Palestine.

3.5 The consequences of the II Cold War

Since the mid-1970s, NAM began to gradually fragment. One of the major characteristics of this fragmentation was the economic gap in the development between the III World countries themselves, which was weakening the political solidarity within the NAM. By 1979 only six III World countries (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brazil and Mexico) with a yearly growth of 13%, satisfied 40% of Western needs with the import of cloths, and these countries began demanding their share in the market. Therefore, when China under Deng Xiaoping “at the beginning of the 1980s began its ideological transition from socialism to reformism (turning to market economy), more and more elites in the III World began doubting whether collectivist ideologies were capable of creating conditions for economic progress, which they aspired to so much” (Westad 2009, 377). Expectedly, for many left-wing revolutionary regimes that were created during the 1960s and 70s, “the 1980s turned to be the years of great disappointments and great stagnations. Mostly relying on the models imported from Eastern Europe, which were not applicable to the existing social and economic conditions, none of those countries could on a domestic political level in the end develop a comprehensive alternative to capitalism” (Ibid., 377). Of those NAM countries that were leaning towards Socialist bloc in their foreign policy, “by the 1970s the disillusionment had begun to set in, with growing sense in many countries that heartless elites (and in some cases violent elites) had tried to impose a false, mechanistic vision of their own countries, running roughshod over traditional sensibilities” (Caryl 2009, 52). The Basket III of the Helsinki Accords, the human rights element to large extent contributed to the collapse of socialist systems in the III World, and consequently in Eastern Europe.

The III World debt crisis of the 1980s was an opportunity to reinforce, through the adjustment policy, the strategy of introducing market-oriented economies. “Indebted governments were presented with a powerfully simple message: cutting back the role of the state in economy through privatization, liberalization and welfare retrenchment would unleash market forces, promoting growth, while *reducing* fiscal demands on overstretched government budgets and international institutions” (Grugel 2008, 499). On the other hand, the structural adjustment of the III World and Socialist bloc by financial organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, are still criticized not only by the neo-Marxist but even by other Western liberal philosophers. For example, John Gray, an English political philosopher and Thatcherite who eventually became disappointed with Thatcherism, condemned the utopist character of the neo-liberal ideology, specifically in relation to its political promotion in the Socialist bloc. In his critique

of the philosophy of Hayek (who was along with Friedman the *spiritus movens* behind the ideology of the New Right), Gray wrote that “if free markets are normally the result of deliberate construction, spontaneously evolved social institutions are rarely liberal – in Hayek’s meaning of the term, at any rate. A political system of the sort Hayek admired came into being in England without anyone planning it; but as Hume showed in his *History of England* – that was by chance, not as a result of the operation of any divine or natural law” (2007, 91).

Therefore, Gray’s conclusion is significant. He sees neo-liberal utopists as being closer to their Marxist counterparts in their way of perceiving the ability of one economic-political model to be applied to any distinct social conditions. “The error of Hayek’s belief that the free market develops spontaneously was shown in Russia during the Yeltzin era – Western governments believed that once state planning was dismantled, a market economy would develop automatically” (Ibid.). Gray is pointing here to the economic realities of the post-Soviet space and some countries of Eastern Europe, where introducing capitalism resulted in financial illegalities by ex-communists during the process of privatization, crating the so-called oligarchy, which by itself obstructed the process of democratization, human rights and the creation of functional democratic institutions. Despite the consequences, the idea that human rights, self-determination, democracy and free market economy are all part of the overall ideological value was on many occasions expressed and defended by its main promoter Margaret Thatcher. How she saw the role of the US in IR is exactly how she perceived its ideology, writing that “US is not just a nation or a state or a simply a great power; the US is an idea – idea that transformed us all and is still doing so. The US is unique in its power, wealth but primarily in its own perception of the world” (Thatcher 2004, 17).

Gray is specifically critical considering the utopian role of the New Right, by writing that “the neo-liberal world-view that Thatcher accepted by the end of the 1980s was successor ideology to Marxism. (...) Led by Thatcher, Western governments told the countries of the former Socialist bloc that if they wanted prosperity they had to import the free market” (Ibid., 83). The result was expectedly mixed. SFRY unsuccessful transition to market economy was caused by the armed conflict among successor republics in 1991, and was according to critiques like Gray’s, in part responsible by the blind utopian ideology of Western neo-liberalism. Why SFRY’s collapse was not peaceful and USSR’s was should be analyzed primarily in the motifs and actions of the human agency (ch. V), but the context where the root of the problem lies is the same. Thus, Gray concludes that “utopian thinking is most

dangerous when it is least recognized. (...) First with neo-liberal economic policies in Russia and then humanitarian military intervention in the Balkans, western governments embarked on courses of action that had no prospect of success. They were unprepared when the spread of democracy triggered ethnic nationalism in the former SFRY, separatism in Chechnya and Islamism in former Soviet Central Asia” (Ibid., 4).

One of the most important elements that would bring about the collapse of the system in the late 1980s was an element of questionable identity. Based on the ideology of planed economy that was giving no long-term economic results, the large number of III World regimes were faced with internal conflicts and strife on the domestic level. “Sometime at the beginning of the 1980s, in many III World countries local pre-national identities began to strengthen, in opposition to the ‘post-colonial’ nation. That conflict was especially strong in the socialist countries, because these regimes would on the ideological platform deny any existence of local identities outside their own, (...)” (Westad 2009, 378). SFRY’s own ethnic problems; especially the conflicts in Kosovo between Kosovo-Albanians and Serbs in 1981, should be observed in this context. Gray wrote that “Hayek and Comte viewed history as a one-way street, and in this they were at one with Spancer and Marx. All these thinkers underrated the persistent power of nationalism and religion, which have interacted with new technologies to produce a wide variety of economic and political arrangements” (2007, 92).

Finally, an additional element of overall system collapse is to be found in the NAM itself, which as a political arena offered a multi-ethnical SFRY a sense of extra ordinary Self. Its fragmentation and political disunity in many cases supplements the overall international context that influenced the internal SFRY crisis; realizing the structural weaknesses of NAM, becoming disillusioned with its ideological concept and finally realizing the economic hardship of the debt crisis as its own problem strictly within the context of bipolar East-West relations.

Considering the II Cold War, the results of the Reagan’s ‘crusade’ and the ‘roll back of communism’ gave positive results. By the time Gorbachev began his internal reforms *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*, the change in the USSR’s foreign policy approach towards the III World (which was adjusted to the realities of the international system that was not based on the dogmatism of Marxism-Leninism or crude power-interests), most of the III World countries were already experiencing system turmoil. What began in 1979 as the new arms race (more in terms of technology, as the SDI’s purpose was rather to impress than to intimidate) supported by verbal offensive (i.e. labeling the USSR as the ‘evil empire’), turned

by 1986 into a state of affairs where “all of the USSR’s allies in the III World (except North Korea) had begun with some sort of mild market oriented reform” (Westad 2009, 409), thus preparing to introduce capitalism, and most importantly – pluralism. This was the point at which the II Cold War, and probably the Cold War as such would end. In October 1986, on the ‘half way’ meeting in Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev began talks that would a year later result in the *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty*, with which began the process of mutual eliminating of nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, thus ending the II Cold War.

After presenting the international context in this chapter, we should focus on strictly internal matters in SFRY. Question is how did the Western neo-liberal concept of the *state*, which in the end turned to be winning on the global level after 1989 (the concept that rejects pure *raison d’etat* and state realism), turned to be defeating for the SFRY? It must be emphasized that what began in SFRY as a process of *deetatization* in the 1960s and its reforms; which China introduced after 1978; USSR in 1987; and Cuba only in 2010, was the process which came to the point in 1980s crisis where it had to chose between continuing liberalization that would lead towards con-federal model and pluralism, or going back to pre-1966 centralization in order to save the economic space of unique SFRY market. This issue would soon be supplemented by the national question, where the political representatives of largest nation, the Serbs, would in the further liberalization see the threat of their national fragmentation.

4 Crisis of the system and identity

The IR discipline tends to understand and explain the behavior between states according to their interests as independent units, not only of one another and the international system, but also, in a Weberian sense, from the influences of their domestic societies. Constructivism as an IR theory first pointed out that there is an interconnection between society and the ruling elite, in a sense that identity-interest formation strongly influences the state's behavior and, thus, creates either international anarchy or international cooperation. As Constructivists would suggest that "it is commonly acknowledged that in order to understand the preferences and behavior of states in international relations, we need to take both domestic considerations and international considerations of states into account" (Bozdaglioglu, 2010). The crisis that emerged in the states of real existing socialism as a result of the II Cold War, directly contributed to the collapse of the system in the late 1980s. Paul Kennedy suggests that there were three main factors that led to the collapse of the Socialist bloc and the USSR in 1989-91: "a crisis of legitimacy; a crisis of economic production and social provision; and a crisis of ethnic and cultural relationships" (Kennedy 1993, 230-31). In this chapter we are dealing with the inward perspective from the top-down effect. Namely, how did the international crisis of the II Cold War influence the internal stability of SFRY?

4.1 Defining the crisis according to the Habermas model

The term crisis derives from the Greek word *krisis*, meaning the point that would soon lead to instability, whether on an individual or social/collective level. In IR the "crisis is a perceived turning point in a relationship between actors or between actors and their environment" (Newnham 1998, 101). For example "(...) the debt crisis was perceived as a turning point in relations between Latin America states and their creditors in the First World. Again unanticipated consequences of the moves to buy time for the debtors may lead to further turning points in relations" (Ibid., 101-02). There are two traditional approaches to the crisis: the 'decision-making approach'⁶¹ and the 'situational/structural' approach. Here we will consider the latter. The "(...) 'situational/structural' perspective rests its analysis upon the basic assumption that *conflict* is a systemic process and that, as a result, the crisis will occur almost naturally" (Ibid., 103). Thus, every crisis (economic, political or even environmental etc.) is based on a certain type of continuous natural conflict. In the Habermasian definition,

⁶¹ The decision making approach is exclusively related to foreign policy analyses.

“the *conflict* (which should be distinguished from the *contradiction*) is purely a product of incompatible demands and/or intentions within the system” (Korošić 1988, 15).

The disturbances that emerge in social processes can move in two directions – either on a micro level (i.e. the local conflict at the beginning of the twentieth century between Serbian government and Austro-Hungarian Monarchy over Bosnia and Herzegovina, which resulted in the assassination of the Arch Duke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, thus triggering the international crisis that would ultimately lead to World War I) or on a macro level (i.e. the international economic crisis in 1929 that reflected instability in individual units; i.e. the rise of Nazism in Germany). In both cases there is a process of reflection; either top-down or *vice versa*. In the case of the long term causes of SFRY’s crisis of identity and state legitimacy that led to the state’s collapse in 1991, we are talking of the crisis on a macro-level. Chapter III explained the context of the II Cold War as a new arms race, which unlike previous periods in the Cold War directly challenged socialism, not only thorough military strength and technological advancement, but also on an ideational level – ideologically, economically (individual competition vs. planned economy) and practically through the doctrine of a ‘roll back of communism’ in the III World. Yet, it must be emphasized that *the collapse of SFRY was strictly an internal process; there were no outside forces that directly pushed the state into its own demise.*

The top-down effect (the II oil shock crisis and debt crisis) applies in this case, but it would be wrong to observe it as a direct cause. According to Habermas, the crisis can never simply be the result of one external force. Habermas wrote that the “crisis signifies the turning point of a fateful process which, although fully objective, does not simply break in from the outside. There is a contradiction expressed in the catastrophic culmination of a conflict of action, and that contradiction is inherent in the very structure of the system of action and in the personality systems of the characters. Fate is revealed in conflicting norms that destroy the identities of the characters unless they in turn manage to regain their freedom by smashing the mythical power of fate” (Habermas on Crisis and Critique, 2010). In other words, “if crisis were simply something external, there would be no sense to it – at least, not as a tragic artwork. At any rate, apt critique in this sphere must identify how the crisis to which the actors are subject is a function of their personalities or belief systems” (Ibid.). The economic crisis of 1929 was the consequence of the Wall Street crash, but it would be impossible to suggest that the financiers and banks were directly responsible for causing World War II, even though their actions did in the long run and indirectly contribute to the rise of international

Fascism in Europe and its aggressive determination to overthrow the Versailles system, based on a belief that it was unjust.

Therefore, after setting an international crisis context (the II Cold War) for observing the SFRY crisis, we have to observe these ‘personalities and beliefs’ and how they functioned in the system – constructivist paradigms of cognition and beliefs are of great help here – in order to accurately explain the SFRY collapse.

According to Habermas, the definition of the crisis is that “the crisis emerges when the structure of the specific social system enables less choices to solve the problem than necessary to sustain the system itself. In that sense, the crisis is a constant obstacle to the system integration” (Habermas in Korošić 1988, 14). Habermas laid down the classification model of the crisis. There are three fields of social system where the crisis can emerge and evolve – (1) economic system; (2) political system; and (3) socio-cultural system. In the table below we can see the tendency of the evolving crisis.

Table 4.1: The habermas model of evolving crisis

The area of the emergence of the crisis	The crisis of the system	The crisis of identity
Economic system	Economic crisis	-
Political system	Rationality crisis	Crisis of legitimacy
Socio-cultural system	-	Crisis of motivation

(Ibid.).

The Habermas model gives us an important insight into understanding the relation between the ‘crisis’ and the ‘collapse’ of the system. If the crisis emerges in the *economic system*, than it will result in an *economic crisis*, but would not evolve into the *crisis of identity* of the state. Otherwise, every economic crisis in the history of capitalism (and which are since its beginnings in the eighteen century cyclical) would have threatened the state order, constitution and integrity. It has not been the case (Habermas gives the example of the Chartist Movement in the first half of the nineteen century in Great Britain, explaining that its

demands the normal working day did not cross the institutional line (Habermas 1975, 68)). That the economic failure did not directly influence the crisis of identity in the socialist states can be seen from what Puhovski explained that “as the experience shows, the real existing socialist regimes do not collapse when its subjects are suffering from malnutrition nor when they are killing each other, but they collapse – because of the systemic construction on the line of ideological-political production of replacing relations of existence – only when they obviously lose the ideological legitimization” (1989, 349). In the constructivist sense, it is not on the material grounds that state loses its legitimacy, but on the ideational level.

Habermas explains that in the eventual course of solving economic crisis (based on class conflict), the state has to take over “market-replacing” as well as “market-supplementing” tasks (1975, 68). By making possible a “more elastic” form of production of surplus value, the dominating class becomes dependent on the law of value. Thus “it now depends on factual constellations of power whether, and how, production of surplus value can be guaranteed through the public sector, and how the terms of the class compromise look. With this development, crisis tendencies shift, of course, from the economic into the administrative system” (Ibid.). Therefore, the crisis in the *political system* emerge. The external factors on a micro-level – and economy is one of them – are important but not decisive for understanding the crisis outcome. In other words, the economic element on a macro-level played an important but indirect role in the SFRY’s overall crisis of the system.

Political crisis lead directly to the *identity crisis* because of the (ir)rational use of means by the political elite. In order to solve the crisis, the political elite and the administration are not only preserving the social order but the institutional as well. How the economic crisis move into “the economic crisis has been intercepted and transformed into a systematic overloading of the public budget, it has put off the mantle of a natural fate of society. If governmental crisis management fails, it lags behind programmatic demands *that it has placed on itself*. The penalty for this failure is withdrawal of legitimization” (Ibid.).

Habermas describes crisis as “an objective force that deprives the subject (or collective subject) of some part or major part of his or their normal sovereignty” (Crisis of Confucian Values, 2010). Habermas writes that a crisis occurs when: “(1) the external, objective force occupies the dominant role and tries with force to change the basic structure or fundamental norms in accordance with its own criteria; (2) when the force of resistance breaks down and surrenders. This kind of crisis may be aggravated further and become more complicated at a higher level after a long process of rationalization, as Max Weber has predicted. In any case,

no crisis happens accidentally and alone” (Ibid.). That means that we are analyzing the debt crisis (as a result of the II Cold War) as an objective crisis, where the identities (socialist systems and SFRY as well) of subjects are placed into the *contradicting conflict* that would inevitably lead towards new identity.

4.2 The system crisis – SFRY’s economic and political/rationality crisis

The economic argument, commonly applied and argued in research of the neo-Marxist authors, as an explanation for SFRY’s collapse should be questioned, when considering the Habermas model. That there was no direct cause-and-effect relation between the economic crisis of the early 1980s and the rise of nationalism at the end of the same decade, which authors like Woodward (1995), Hudson (2003) and Chomsky (2007) argue. Rather, it was as Dejan Jović noticed that the general population in SFRY did not in fact have a critical stance towards the regime and their economic policies during the early 1980s. There were debates and there was a certain critique, but the overall attitude was such that “it was easier to go shopping in Trieste than to organize the strike or rebel against the system” (2003, 229). The economic crisis should therefore serve only as a domestic context for detecting the real source of the state’s instability and collapse and that is the realm of *politics*. For a start, we will use the thought of the founder of modern realism E. H. Carr, who wrote that “economic forces are in fact political forces (...) The science of economics presupposes a given political order, and can not be profitably studied in isolation from politics” (1939, 149). Therefore, we have to analyze the causes for the economic crisis in SFRY and how they influenced the internal political order.

4.2.1 Ideology: the root of the crisis

Korošić detected three reasons for the emergence of the economic crisis; “(1) low productivity of SFRY economy, (2) high inflation, (3) high foreign debt” (1988, 55). This was the general situation primarily on the federal level. The overall system was in worst shape, and had its deeper roots since the beginning of self-management and breaking the international blockade in 1952. “Characteristically for SFRY in the period between 1952 and 1986 was that its export of goods never reached the level of imports, and added to that is the fact that the import-export relation was never equalized with the domestic product, always moving in the direction contra to the pure logic” (Sirotković 1990, 202). Externally looking, SFRY never

managed to enter international trade competition (in the rank of the developing countries) due to the turbulence in the international trade ever since the fall of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the oil shock of 1973. The fall of prices of resources on international markets and the energetic dependency made the conditions for SFRY's participation in the international trade difficult. However, SFRY would through borrowed petrodollars and active foreign policy efforts in the NAM throughout the 1970s cover the possible damages. The 1979 monetary shock and the second energetic crisis hit the SFRY export worse, as "it was the lowest in relation to the gross product ever, making it only 11,1%, while the import was more than double, 22,9%" (Ibid., 205).

Turbulences on the international markets did contribute to the SFRY crisis, however, internal reasons were those that would have affected the political stability and legitimacy of the regime, primarily because there had been no results from the over ambitious and petrodollar financed 'grand social plan' (1976-80). The weak results in production matched the II oil shock of 1979 and the effects of the energy crisis on a macro-level. Adamović and Lampe noticed that the root of the problem in SFRY's borrowing habit of recycled petrodollars for financing domestic projects since 1973 was in the investment policy itself, because the borrowed petrodollars were "mainly invested into the industrialization. (However) to industrialize, SFRY needed to import requirements which outpaced country's ability to export" (1990, 149). Furthermore, the core of the problem can be traced to the nature of the investment policy itself – the policy of rapid industrialization, which from the constructivist standpoint cannot be explained otherwise than from an ideational perspective where the party adjusted economic realities to the ideological dogmatism (Marxism-Leninism), based on the materialistic cognition of world relations. Ever since the first Stalinist-styled Five-Year Plan (1947-51), SFRY's top party leadership was doctrinally oriented towards the Marxist-Leninist ideals of industrial development and followed the USSR course according to which the communist society can be achieved only through the process of massive industrialization.

Self-management was just a structural variation of the same doctrine. In the discussion with his closest associates, Tito said in 1952 that the conflict with Cominform made the Yugoslav communists "lose their belief in Stalin, not in socialism" (Dedijer 1978, 621). Plan remained the structural basis of the economic system, legitimized through the 1958 LCY Program that explicitly states that "centralized and planed economy is based on the scientific analyses of materialist elements of economic development" (1958, 152). Despite the reforms of mid-1960s that introduced mild market principles, the doctrinal perception of the correct form of

development did not change in the course of the next twenty years. “Through the 1970s, nearly 60% of long and medium-term foreign borrowing went to finance imports of industrial equipments” (Adamović and Lampe 1990, 156). As Branka Magaš noticed, the investment policy as a cause of the crisis is “to be found in the great imbalance created over the (1960s and 1970s) between an extractive industry which has been systematically neglected (along with other infrastructural investments like agriculture, transport, energy and health) and a bloated processing industry dependent on imported raw materials, mostly financed by foreign loans (...)” (Magaš 1993, 95). Thus, the effects of such an investment policy based on a certain doctrine and not on economic realities had to give low results and long term consequences. The trade deficit grew “from 4.376 million dollars in 1977; 4.315 million dollars in 1978; to 7.225 million dollars in 1979; on the other hand, covering import with export was constantly falling; from 66,2 % in 1976 to 54,6% in 1977 and 48,5% in 1979” (Bilandžić 1999, 716). Trade deficit reflected the deficit of the balance of payments, which amounted to “3.6 billion dollars, (while) foreign debt, which had been relatively modest 5.7 billion dollars in 1975, had swollen to 15 billion by early 1980, reaching the dangerous level of 19.2 billion the following year” (Ramet 2002, 10).

The roots of the crisis of the self-managing socialist economy are to be found in the unsolved issues that emerged already during the reforms of 1963-66. At that time self-management acquired some aspects of market economy, with the abandonment of the state’s practice to regulate the prices and handing over the economic process to the laws of the market. In other words “by the time of the 1960s reform, the economy was supported with regresses, grants, and protective tariffs with an ever growing inflation; but with the new measures it was directed to manage in a different way and to adjust to the laws of market (...) thus, the *capitalist way of doing business* was introduced, but without private ownership” (Matković 2003, 347). Self-management was exclusively SFRY’s brand of planned economy, however, even though the problem of its functionality was essentially the same as with the other planned economies (on dysfunctional nature of planned economy extensively writes Verdery 2005, 42-46), its problems were of a different nature.

Basically, the party did decide on the plan, but unlike in other socialist states, it did not manage the supplies. The supply of resources was done autonomously, by each individual BOAL in each individual republic, which resulted in a kind of ‘anarchy’ in the ‘center’. With the independent republican party organizations and autonomous republican banks (since 1977), the resources that needed to achieve the party’s proclaimed goals, were gathered on an

even more nontransparent way than in other socialist states. Without any obligation to ‘answer’ to the ‘center’, the BOAL managements – which since 1976 had a right within the republics to determine hard currency balances – without any state guarantees landed foreign credits (mostly petrodollars) for supplies, and which they were unable, and of course non-obliged, to repay.

The first case of such nontransparent dealings happened when the SFRY’s Federal finance minister Petar Kostić raised a credit of one billion dollars for the Metal factory of Smederevo. This practice would be adopted soon afterwards by other republics. The culmination would be the so-called ‘Agrokomerc’ scandal of 1987, when a manager from the region of Cazinska Krajina (western Bosnian and Herzegovina) Fikret Abdić was issuing notes, thus bringing the state’s credit rating to the brink of collapse. Even though Abdić was sentenced to prison term, he was only operating within the operational framework of the state economy. In addition, an interesting observation on the ‘Agrokomerc’ scandal was given by the then chief executive officer of the central bank *Narodna banka Jugoslavije* Janko Smole and former Federal finance minister, who said that “there was little sense, really no sense in complaining about the Agrokomerc, when the Federal Assembly, only a month earlier, had done the same thing by writing off the debts of two republics and one autonomous province (Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo)” (Benson 2001, 148). According to Smole, the economic system on which SFRY was based resulted in the situation best described as the “all-out civil war by financial means” (Ibid.).

The overall problem of the self-managing socialist economy was to be found in the nature of the dysfunctional state system itself. In theory, the Law on Associated Labor implemented through BOAL seemed possible, however such an organization was simply dysfunctional due to reproducing bureaucracy. The 1974 constitution guaranteed to the workers that the state would not intervene in the production forces of the society. To that end, the self-managing system (BOAL) introduced the so-called Self-managing Interest Union, *samoupravna interesna zajednica* (SIZ), which basically functioned as an independent organization in any field of social interaction; education, science, healthcare, culture etc. At the time it was introduced in 1974 there were 1.116 SIZ organizations; in 1975 this number grew to 2.448; then in 1979 it grew to 3.750; by the time of the crisis in 1983 to 4.500; and finally in 1984 the number of SIZ organizations was 8.105” (Spasojević 1984, 11). Only in 1984, this parallel structure, (sort of the state within the state) would absorb “10 billion dinars” (Ibid.). Added to this value are taxes; contributions; material and other expenses, which made the price of the

state expense even larger. But the problem of the 8.105 SIZ organizations, and the overall BOAL concept, was that that sum of money was not enough for the basic needs of the organization in the context of a decaying economy. The state system provoked an overall dissatisfaction – for the state it was too much money to spend, and for the SIZ organization it was too little to function properly.

The economic crisis broke out in 1979, but it would not be acknowledged for the next three years, until the crisis reached its peak. Economist Gligorov in 1981 criticized the effects of the policy that led to such stagnation and deficit. He said that the “present difficulties are a direct consequence of oppressing the market laws and functioning on the subjectivist grounds in which social and economic goals and plans were carried out not on the basis of our own capabilities but on the basis of what our socialist society wanted to achieve” (Gligorov in Jović 2003, 231). The party however did not consider the critiques coming from the distinguished economists (Gligorov and Korošić) nor the government (Đuranović), which in 1980 “required 15 percent of all foreign currency earnings just to service the foreign debt” (Ramet 2002, 10). Instead, the party’s vision of developing the socialist order was based on further accumulation of foreign capital and indebtedness. Thus, in November 1981 the party would – ignoring the warnings from economic experts – introduce a new social plan for the period 1981-85, which would like the previous one set unrealistic goals for rapid development based on foreign investments. Even though the Presidency strongly recommended that foreign loans should be borrowed in order to boost export, the republican party leaders and the party simply ignored them.

Prior to the crisis, economic realities were subjugated to the doctrinal and ideational factors, namely the authority of the main decision-making actor, Tito. For example, in order to stimulate the export and introduce a light version of protectionism, the federal government decided in 1979 to devalue dinar by 30%. The reason why this step was not implemented can primarily be found in what Wendt calls the *role specific understanding and expectation about self* in an actor. Namely, the expectation and understanding which Tito had about SFRY’s reputation and its international position. Seeing devaluation as a domestic threat to the country’s respected position in the international structure as well as a threat to national independence (Tito saw a strong currency as one of the main characteristics of an independent society), he told the Federal government delegation “(...) to you it is easy to devalue. A man with half a brain could do that, but where was your mind when this was happening and how did you even allow this to happen” (Bilandžić 1999, 715).

Only a month after Tito's death, in June 1980, the government of Prime Minister Veselin Đuranović, who headed the federal body Savezno izvršno vijeće (SIV), would devalue the dinar by 30%. In November, Đuranović gave an interview in which he, even though not mentioning Tito *per se*, attacked the overall political approach towards economic realities that led to the crisis during the 1970s. Đuranović stated that “there were even earlier (1970s) dilemmas and hesitations; and it would be exactly these hesitations that caused all the problems that led us to this adverse economic situation” (Jović 2003, 230).

By 1981, necessity called for the formation of the Commission for problems of economic stabilization (popularly known as the Kraigher Commission),⁶² set up in late 1981 under PM Đuranović. The decline in production, with the rise of foreign debt and inflation – which would by 1989 reach 2.685,4% per year; meaning the prices were doubling every month (Garde 1996, 104) – worsened the social conditions in SFRY; with constant shortages in food, gas, electricity etc.

Table 4.2: The economic crisis trend

	GDP (dollars)	Foreign debt (in billions of dollars)	Inflation 1979-85 on yearly basis (%)
1979	3.070	3.7	21.4
1981	2.591	18.4	39.5
1982	2.568	18.7	34
1983	2.067	19	58
1984	2.570	20	47.7
1985	2.120	19.6	86.6

L'Etat du monde in Garde (1996, 106).

This should also be view from the perspective of the internal inequality between the republics. On a domestic level, the fragmented identity of SFRY's multi-ethnic society in the post-Tito

⁶² This commission was named after its head, Slovenian politician Sergej Kraigher.

era showed early signs – in the context of an economic crisis – of the collision of a domestic interest formation between the republics, which further affected the collective motivation. Inequality in development between a northern and southern republic presented the major issue.

Table 4.3: Inequality in figure (in 1986)

Section 1: Gross domestic product (SFRY = 100%)

Section 2: Net personal income (SFRY = 100%)

Section 3: Workers applying for work in social sector (in %)

Section 4: Birthrate (in promille)

	1	2	3	4
Slovenia	179	124	1, 7	13, 3
Croatia	117	102	7, 7	12, 9
Vojvodina	133	101	15, 2	12, 4
Serbia	94	93	17, 7	12, 8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	80	96	23, 9	16, 3
Montenegro	80	84	24, 5	16, 9
Macedonia	75	80	27	18, 7
Kosovo	36	89	55, 9	30, 2
SFRY	100	100	16, 2	15, 5

(Ibid., 94).

Sirotković writes that “both republics (Slovenia and Croatia), which in 1955 had outstanding level of development, by 1987 improved their position; Slovenia jumped from 175 to 202 of productivity, meaning that it exceeded the average percentage of productivity in SFRY; and Croatia jumped from 122 to 127” (Sirotković 1990, 222).⁶³ This progress in both republics was related to the highest GDP and lowest (on SFRY average) population growth. Serbia represented SFRY’s average: “(91 to 99), while the deterioration is evident in the republics of Macedonia and Montenegro, followed by the Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the worst off

⁶³ The measurement of the republics’ rate of productivity is made according to the SFRY average, which is 100.

province of Kosovo” (Ibid.). Kosovo had also the highest population growth (2, 4% yearly in contrast to 0, 5% in Croatia (Ibid., 219)) which in comparison to the lowest GDP, productivity and unemployment inevitably had to in a long run provoke ethnic tensions.

4.2.2 The bureaucratization of politics

This economic background offers us a context on a micro-level within which we can analyze the emergence of the crisis in the area of the *political system*. According to the Habermas’s model, the emergence of crisis in the *political system* leads to a crisis of the state, or what Habermas calls the crisis of *rationality*. Habermas explains that “the concept of the rationality crisis is modeled after that of the economic crisis. According to this concept, contradictory steering imperatives assert themselves through the purposive-rational actions not of market-participants but of members of the administration; they manifest themselves in contradictions that directly threaten system integration and thus endanger social integration” (1975, 68). Rationality is an important element, for the misuse of rational means to solve the crisis and bureaucratization of the institutional decision-making directly affects the legitimacy of the state and government.

Korošić noted that even though Habermas analyzes the crisis of *rationality* only on the examples of capitalist states, his model can be perfectly applicable to the crisis in the socialist systems, because the problem naturally emerges in planned-economy where government administration is *a priori* involved. In that sense, we have to analyze the rationality crisis in a context of economic crisis involving the interaction of the following state-actors – the government (SIV) and the party (LCY), which both entered a collision course in the post-Tito era. Or as Bilandžić writes, the outcome of Tito’s death was “the end of the personal union between the party and the state organs” (Bilandžić 1985, 14).

The debate that had its roots in the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, and which Đilas addressed in *The New Class* in the 1950s – the question of ‘democratization’ of the party – remained a constant issue among sociologists and theoreticians in SFRY. The issue reemerged during the first liberal reforms after the fall of Ranković in 1966. Finally, the debate of 1980-81 on the causes of the crisis (and what the party’s role should have been) was mostly discussed among scholars, sociologists and economists, and its conclusions were that it was again party politics and ideology that prevented finding the solutions to the social crisis. The party’s involvement and interventions caused one of the major problems, among other things, that politics

becomes incapable in solving the economic crisis due to the bureaucratization of political decision-making.⁶⁴

Philosopher Predrag Vranicki addressed this problem in the 1980s, claiming that bureaucratization is the core problem of socialist development which is generally connected to the party's interventionism in social affairs. Vranicki writes that "the associate labor and free producers are a direct continuity of the revolutionary process, which leads towards the withering of the state – especially in the economic sphere, in which however, and under the concept of state socialism, it preserves great jurisdiction. But it is precisely because of these kinds of jurisdiction that the system is easily transformed into a bureaucratic system of the government; especially if it is based on the one-party system and a narrowed level of democracy in society" (Vranicki 1989, 93). Therefore, the question is where do the roots of the party bureaucratization lie?

When the economic crisis was for the first time publicly acknowledged in 1981 by the government, the politicizing of the problem became immediate and resulted in the collision of the party and the government. If the party was the visionary institution and a vanguard of the working class (proclaimed by Tito at the VI Congress of LCY in 1952), the government was to be an instrument for achieving this vision. However, as Deajn Jović wrote, "the paradox of the SFRY situation (in the 1980s) was that the state became a *reformer*, and a party *conservative*. Instead of revolutionizing the society with constant changes, the party for the first time took on the role of a defender of (almost) everything there is" (2003, 208). Thus, it become highly bureaucratic with a constant production of resolutions; conferences; restrictions; and bans. One of the most important reasons for ideational decay in the party was basically the same reason for USSR's lack of visionary policy of that period, and that was the departure of the authoritative actors and decision-makers – Kardelj died in 1979; Tito in 1980 and Bakarić in 1983.⁶⁵ "Abandoning the revolutionary program was the first sign of the crisis of a *vision* of the Yugoslav communists. This crisis resulted in the crisis of the action" (Ibid., 209). The government on the other hand; first Đuranović and Milka Planinc from 1982; the

⁶⁴ We should mention Robert Michels and his work *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of Oligarchic Tendencies in Democratic Societies*. Basically, Michels concluded that the paradox of modern society was its natural need for organizing. In other words, all the democratic parties that are fighting for democracy or declare themselves democratic inevitably due to their internal structure have to turn oligarchic. The same view Michels holds for socialist societies, because "socialists might win, that is come to power, but socialism itself can not. Primarily because it necessarily needs organization, and organization inevitably means the domination of one group over the other, thus socialism would reproduce the old hierarchical and class societies" (Michels in Stanovičić 2006, 545).

⁶⁵ Vladimir Bakarić, one of the closest Tito's associates and a powerful head of League of Communists of Croatia.

economists like Korošić and Gligorov and the whole working group of experts – the Kraigher commission – all came down to the simple conclusion that it was necessary to “apply the objective laws of economy and operate accordingly” (Bilandžić 1999, 718).

Obradović sees the problem in the 1980s party elite view of the root of the crisis. She writes that the “communist elites were prepared to rather see the cause of the crisis in the ‘mentality’ of the working class than in the system itself” (Obradović 2007, 17). The V Central Committee of the LCY meeting (February 1983) condemned the social critique of distinguished economists, sociologists and philosophers, using the standard revolutionary phraseology. Instead of taking the advice into consideration, the Congress concluded that “there is an ongoing open war against the LCY, which is being fought under the mask of ‘culture’, ‘science’, ‘art’ and ‘philosophy’ (...). These camouflaged enemies are worst than those exposed ones (...) therefore, we need to be patient with our actions on the public scene, using the persuasive Marxist critique with all the strength of our ideas and arguments” (Peta sjednica CK SKJ 1983, 25).

In October 1982, when the package of measures for solving economic crisis was presented by the new PM Planinc and the SIV, the new approach to dealing with the crisis faced expected party-generated restrictions and bans. The new economic policy solutions were again “oriented towards investments instead of accumulation; it pursued import instead of export; prices and not revenues; it believed in the plan not the market; it changed the contribution rates and taxes instead of satisfying the demand; (...) basically it functioned on the restriction of spending, as if production is not in the Marxist sense the essence of all economic and social relations” (Korošić 1988, 285-86).

When the steps for reducing inflation through the Anti-inflation program were introduced in 1982 at the XVI Central Committee conference of the LCY, it would take the government and the LCY three years to discuss the matter (in April 1985 at the XVII Central Committee conference). The discussion produced no results. “Basically, the LCY pursued the old policy; the policy of bans and restrictions” (Ibid., 285). Finally, the XII LCY Congress in mid-1982, the first since Tito’s passing, would affirm the party’s monopoly on all political developments. “(...) all radical proposals for organizational ‘reform’ (most of them inspired by hopes of reconstituting the center) were blocked, including Rade Končar’s rather dramatic proposal on the floor of the congress that the republic-based federal organization of the party be scraped and replaced with organization on the basis of lines of production” (Ramet 2002, 12). PM Planinc, observing that period retrospectively, noticed that, “the party was the main

obstacle. They constantly lamented on about the ideological and political situation, about the enemies of socialism etc. (...) Party Presidency was the major problem (...) they controlled all the votes in the Federal Assembly, in all republics and provinces. In order to secure their support, I had to convince them that the market was not opposed to the concept of self-management. We claimed that the market was limiting the state in the same way as was self-management, thus they could go together” (Planinc in Jović 2003, 233).

Therefore, the power of political decision-making in post-Tito SFRY was in the hands of the ideologically conditioned party which had no real means, ideas nor conditions to solve the crisis. Through the first half of the 1980s, the party continued endless debates whose only result was the reproduction of new bans and restrictions. One of the rear politicians of that period who realized the rationality crisis in the system was Montenegrin Veljko Milatović.⁶⁶ In May 1983, after two days of one of those useless debates on the conference of the LCY Presidium, Milatović warned that “we should not allow the state organ’s aspiration to turn us, the League of Communists, into the watchdog of law and regularities, or the defender of the system, or even worse – the organ of repression” (Marović 2006, 518). One month later, Milatović gave an interview to the journal *Borba* where he explained the core problem of the system, stating that “we have in this country a self-management system, yet too often we turn to the state in order to find solutions to all our problems, including those that are not in its domain. Aware of such non-constitutional behavior and because of the obvious defections in the system, the administration is intervening. (...) The main question is – why does the state take measures for which its executive organs and public administration are not capable enough in implementing? Because the self-managing organs are in no position to decide independently on any issue; because they are dependent on laws and regulation made by the state; and the state cannot do anything without the direct involvement of the party. And this is how it functions on all levels: from the workers organizations to the republics” (Ibid., 519).

There were already some radical calls for a new sort of anti-bureaucratic revolution. In March 1984, during the Central Committee session of LCY, Jakov Blažević stated that the party was a prisoner of etatist-bureaucratic structures, thus demanding a “cleansing of the party structures from bureaucrats” (Nikšić 1984, 8). Blažević saw the solution in the old party elite. He stated that those who should lead the state should be those coming from “the core of old revolutionaries with great political experience (...)” (Ibid). Essentially, this was a similar call for the party’s elite to clean the bureaucratic structures as it did in 1950-52 when self-

⁶⁶ President of the Presidency of Montenegro from 1974 to 1982.

management was introduced. This platform would also be used by Slobodan Milošević to help his rise to power in Serbia in 1988. Essentially, all the measures and all the steps were supervised by the party, which was ideologically and doctrinally conditioned. And while SIV was adjusting its programs to economic realities and the directions of IMF experts (the directions which were identical to the plan of recovery drafted by Milka Planinc's government, The Long-term Stabilization Program (presented in subchapter 3.2.4.)), LC's role was to criticize it on the ideological premises (that IMF is the tool of Western imperialism; that loans from the Club of Paris should be refused because the Club is comprised of exclusively NATO states, etc.) and constantly reproduce new restrictions, regulations, conclusions, conferences etc.

However, the other problem lied in the fact that the party, which had *all the power*, had in reality *no real power*, which was witnessed in the functioning system of the republican party organizations. As Ramet noted, "the LCY had become merely the institutional arena in which the real powers in the system – the regional party organizations – met and discussed their common concerns" (Ramet 2002, 8). In 1982, the XII LCY Congress legally enabled them to pursue regular policies, and as Ramet writes, although the Congress "accomplished little or nothing, it did signal the importance of the center, which naturally further encouraged republican and provincial elites to ignore exhortations emanating from the center. A subsequent Central Committee resolution (in April 1983) urging its own members not to misconstrue themselves as representatives of their respective republics or provinces was, for instance, ignored by all concerned" (Ibid., 13).

Prominent sociologist Josip Županov noticed that it was not just party-bureaucratization of politics that caused the stagnation but the overall incapability of SFRY to adjust its economic system to the international technological revolution. Županov wrote that "(...) fast technological development demanded major adjustments in our economic structure. This technological development presupposes an open and free market economy, and that means in our case that economic units that are capable to successfully compete on the international markets should do so in order to get a hold of foreign currency exchange for paying off foreign licenses, credits for equipment and reproduction material (...)" (Županov 1983, 56).

Let us now consider the level of party involvement, specifically, in economic terms. The level of interference of party politics can be seen from the example of the distribution of net income in table 4.4

Table 4.4: The distribution of Net income

	Net income	Per capita consumption	Accumulation (%)
1978	100	82,5	17,5
1979	100	80,5	19,5
1980	100	74,8	25,2
1981	100	74,9	28,1
1982	100	72,6	27,4
1983	100	70,4	29,6
1984	100	66,7	33,3
1985	100	70,4	29,6

Sirotković (1990, 151).

By analyzing the distribution of net income, Sirotković noticed an interesting phenomenon that emerged during the crisis. By itself, it was obvious that there should have been since 1979 a decline in general consumption in addition to the declining GDP; however, on the outset it is amazing that in 1984, when the individual consumption reached its low, there was a rise in accumulation up to 33.3 %, which was nearly as high as that of the mid-1960s (a period of much better economic conditions and a growing GDP, consumption and investments). In fact, “what was happening was that – in the conditions of stagnation in production, non stop economic expenditures, and growing debt – extracting from the income for the accumulation was law-biding and economic coercion, pursued for the purpose of paying off debts, which made the means for personal consumption residual” (Sirotković 1990, 152). In other words, the issue of personal income became the matter of the isolated state bureaucracy and its decision making. “As the secured means of production, not only long term, became completely dependent on the credit crunch, independence of the self-management decision-makers was reduced to eventually deciding on the narrowed reproduction. Thus, self-management ceased to be a social relation; associated labor was reduced to a rental relation towards workers, the situation which obviously had no socialist attributes” (Sirotković 1990, 152).

Among the general population, the economic crisis was felt, but not really understood. “In the initial phase of the debate (1980-81), the economic difficulties were not yet far advanced, and discussion therefore centered on the press policy, supervision of the universities, and the general political democratization, with lesser attention being paid to economic policy” (Ramet 2002, 10). However, as shortages in gas, electricity, food etc. grew rapidly; visible signs of economic decline could not have been diverted by the state, nevertheless the state did refuse admitting it was having a crisis (the word ‘crisis’ was even carefully avoided in the official phraseology; it was the word ‘difficulties’ with which society’s condition was addressed, (Jović 2003, 231)). The attention to other issues did distract society’s critical thinking of bad economic conditions, but was not the only factor.

The reason why the general population did not see the real source of the rationality crisis (party’s dogmatism, bureaucratization and interventions in state institutions) was due to the well-established perception based on the decades-long constructed myth, that socialism in SFRY was much more advanced than in the Socialist bloc. “For a long time SFRY’s society believed that its good standard of living was the result of a better and freer political system, self-management and better production than those in the states of the Socialist bloc. But now, the queues in front of grocery stores, reduction in transport and shortages of food products (...) were being compared with those in the Socialist bloc” (Jović 2003, 228).

Table 4.5: The growth of the gross national product

(Average annual growth rate of the gross national product at constant prices)

	Bulgaria	CSSR	GDR	Hungary	Poland	Romania	SFRY	Eastern Europe
1950-65	7.1	4.8	5.6	4.7	6.2	7.7	9.2	5.8
1965-70	4.7	3.5	3.2	3.1	3.8	4.0	6.3	3.8
1970-75	4.5	3.4	3.5	3.4	6.6	6.2	4.6	4.8
1975-80	1.2	2.2	2.4	2.3	0.9	1.4	5.8	2.3
1980-85	0.9	1.4	1.8	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3
1985-90	0.7	1.5	1.4	0.9	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.7

UN Economic Commission for Europe in Fowkes (1995, 200).

For the general population it did not make sense that after thirty years of an independent socialist path, the SFRY system would face the same problems and just simply not be able to find solutions in the same manner as did the system to which theirs was an alternative; the USSR one. Furthermore, even though the SFRY was not in the focus of the US strategic interest in that region (it was Poland), the US financial actors (state and non-state) continued to support SFRY economically. However, the one-party system; lack of democratization; bureaucratization; and the similar power structures as were found in USSR, were the main reasons why the SFRY party leadership, due to doctrinal reasons, adopted a similar approach towards a crisis as did the Socialist bloc. It was the ideational level – a matter of ideology – which directly affected the method, and which in turn placed SFRY in the context of the Socialist bloc. Such an approach, based on an ideological and doctrinal perception, would be a core problem of the socialist rationality crisis which would finally cause the crisis of the legitimacy of the system. Why could the party not have reformed the system?

Žarko Puhovski noticed that the reform of the system from the bottom-up – i.e. the Solidarity strikes in Poland in 1981 – in real existing socialist systems are not possible. The reform can only and exclusively be carried out from the ‘center’, or Politburo. There were two key reasons why it was impossible to introduce the reform in SFRY. Puhovski mentions firstly that the intention of reforming “can not be implemented strictly on the level of the change of ideological legitimacy (...) under the conditions of factual continuation of party monopoly on all of the decision-making elements in the social life. Secondly, the factual implementation of ‘state withering’ would mean – in the case of the official SFRY self-managing concept – the expiration of all the legal elements of the state, but not however the reduction of the power of imposition (and even production) on the imagined relations among people” (Puhovski 1989, 26).

4.2.3 Crisis tendencies towards the identity crisis

In both cases of analysis – capitalist analyzed by Habermas; or socialist – we are talking about the irrational use of means for avoiding the crisis by the state institutions and the political elite. In other words, as the “state is absorbed into the process of reproduction, it should on the basis of class compromise entrust the planning to the administrative system with the purpose of avoiding of the crisis” (Korošić 1988, 15). In case it fails, the *crisis of rationality*

provokes the crisis of *legitimization*. In the table below we can see the tendency of an evolving crisis in its natural order.

Table 4.6: Crisis tendencies proposed explanations

Economic Crisis	Rationality Crisis; The destruction of administrative rationality occurs through:	Legitimation Crisis	Motivation Crisis
The state apparatus acts as an unconscious, executive organ of the law of value;	Opposed interests of individual capitalists;	Systematic limits;	Erosion of traditions important for continued existence
The state apparatus acts as planning agent of a united "monopoly capital."	Or the production of a structure foreign to the system.	Unintended side effects (e.g. politicization) of administrative interventions in cultural tradition.	Overloading through universalistic value system (new needs).

Crisis of Confucian Values (2010).

The crisis of *rationality*, as a result of an administrative approach to the crisis, leads finally towards the crisis of *legitimacy* of the system (*crisis of motivation* will be considered later). Korošić gives the example of rising taxes to explain how this crisis emerged, claiming that “if the state stalls in selective imposition of the taxes within the framework of acceptable priorities of its use and administrative activities, the result is the *crisis of legitimacy*” (Korošić 1988, 14). Therefore, observing the overall process, we can note that there is a connection between *economic crisis* and the *crisis of legitimacy* of the state in case the state does not *rationally* administer its means to solve the crisis. Furthermore, “the existence of the legitimacy crisis comes as a result when there is a systematic production of expectations which are within the disposable range of means (financial ones) and are not being fulfilled, nor within the systemic conform compensations” (Ibid., 15). Thus, the unrealistic promises inevitably lead towards the crisis of legitimacy of the regime. In the case of SFRY “there were countless unrealistic goals. If in one year there was an inflation of 50%, it is absolutely

unrealistic to expect that it would fall to 15% (as was promised). The path towards administrative socialism is built on unrealistic goals” (Korošić 1988, 281).

So far, we have analyzed the crisis through an economic perspective in order to provide the context for the *rationality crisis*; or the crisis of the state. These two crises represent the *crisis of the system*. *How the process of economic and political crisis (system crisis) would evolve in the crisis of identity of SFRY, we have to analyze the crisis of legitimacy and the crisis of motivation (which eventually resulted in the country’s collapse in 1991).*

SFRY as a structure was thus a form with undefined and non-regulated content, its distribution of power was diffused, while the legality of its structure was sourced by the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. What Habermas calls the ‘constitution of the important structure’ in the crisis, necessarily differs from the elements of the system, because the structure is a regulatory factor within which a process of integration takes place between the systemic elements (social subjects) and which, even though they can change, they cannot (and must not) lose their identity. But to preserve the identity during rationality crisis, is to find a way to regain support in the society, because “people have a shared knowledge that induces them to follow most of the rules of their society, most of the time” (Wendt 2009, 209). However, this would primarily mean preserving the legitimacy of the system. In order to detect the *legitimacy* and *identity crisis* in SFRY structures – when and how they emerged in the given international context – we have to necessarily explore the institutional-legal order on the micro-level. Thus, we will first explain the nature of the legitimacy as the ideological source power and political monopoly of the main actors in SFRY’s structure.

4.3 The crisis of identity (I): legitimacy

Legitimacy as a term has preoccupied some of the best minds in the field of political science – major contribution to the scientific understanding of legitimacy was given by Max Weber, who determined three types of legitimacy – charismatic; traditional; and legal-rational. Charismatic considers the legitimization of a leader who “claims the right to rule (...) on the basis of heroism and other exceptional qualities, highly esteemed by society” (Holmes 1997, 43). Considering the traditional mode of legitimization, it refers to a “situation in which a leader claims the right to rule on the basis of long standing tradition” (Ibid.). And finally, the legal-rational ruler’s source of legitimization is based on laws and rules binding society together. However, considering the complexity of modern societies, especially communist

ones, T.H. Rigby for instance supplemented this theory with a goal-rational mode of legitimization, claiming that “those running the system seek to legitimate themselves primarily in terms of their ability to steer a given country and population to the distant end goal of communism” (Rigby in Holmes 1997, 43).

Defining the legitimacy from the aspect of society, and what Jean Blondel calls ‘the legitimacy based on individual support’, we could say that “legitimacy steams from individual support (and) that support may come from socialization process and thus from outside pressures as well as from the characteristics of the ‘personality’ – the whole personality, including its affective and cognitive elements” (Blondel 1995, 64-65). On the other hand, if we consider perception and understanding of the legitimacy from the aspect of the decision-makers and the ruling group, than, as Seymour Lipset writes, legitimacy “involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society” (Lipset 1983, 64).

From an IR perspective, the legitimacy is “bound up with notions of recognition and as such is more often a political matter rather than a strictly legal one” (Newnham 1998, 302). From a constructivist perspective, the international rule can be legitimate only when accepted by units within the system, which represents the true source of legitimacy even if on the micro-level there is no popular support (i.e. the popular revolutions of 1848 in Europe, which challenged the legitimate international order of the Holy Alliance in Central and Eastern Europe). The concept of legitimacy on an international level “means that states identify with each other, seeing each other’s security not just as instrumentally related to their own, but literally being their own. The cognitive boundaries of Self are expected to induce the Other. This (...) can be called many things, amongst them ‘collective identity’ and ‘solidarity’” (Zehfuss 2002, 57).

Therefore, we have to observe the SFRY crisis of legitimacy by asking – how did the ideological legitimacy of communism as a system erode the domestic structures?

As mentioned, Weber’s analysis of legitimacy has been supplemented with new aspects of legitimacy in addition to the communist system. According to Leslie Holmes, there are ten models of legitimization that could be applied for analysis of socialist systems: seven domestic and three external;

“The domestic ones are;

1. old traditional
2. charismatic

3. goal-rational
4. eudemonic
5. official nationalist
6. new traditional
7. legal rational

And the three external modes of legitimization are;

8. formal recognition
9. informal support
10. existence of an external role model” (Holmes 1997, 44-5)

It must be emphasized that these modes of legitimization have been originally constructed with particular reference to the communist world (Holmes 1993, 13-18, 58). We will analyze each, in order to present the following problem – by the late 1980s, when SFRY was entering the final stage of its integrity, the reasons why its collapse was traumatic was because its external modes of legitimization were stronger than the internal ones. In other words, it was the international system and structure that was preserving SFRY, while internally it completely decayed.

4.3.1 *The old/new traditional* mode of legitimization

The combination of the *popular support* and the *organized violence* within the *legal-rational* frame, gives the state structure a legitimization. Due to the nature and circumstances of the creation of SFRY’s regime and state, namely the war time context of the World War II period 1941-45, that included the civil war and the war of liberation (which the official party doctrine also labeled as a ‘socialist revolution’, Bilandžić 1999, 120-189), one factor should be considered – firstly, the factor of ‘natural law’ (Lockean tradition) which played an important role in legitimacy building and authority gained through domestic oppression. One of the pioneers of the ‘natural law’ tradition, John Finnis wrote that “an authoritative rule can emerge without being made by anyone with authority to make it, and even without the benefit of any authorized way of generating rules” (Finnis 1980, 238). Material forces of pure power are a relevant factor; “rule making, as well as rule enforcement is a function of power”

(Subacchi 2008b, 417). But, it is the ideology and the identity of society that makes that force meaningful and effective.

When radical social changes emerge, the emerging group claiming the right to rule has to find a source of legitimization in previous traditional paradigms. The old traditional mode of legitimization, according to Holmes, did not play a major role in the communist world because “leaders did not generally claim the right to rule in terms of family tradition or divine right/mandate heaven (...)” (1997, 44). However, this was not entirely the case with SFRY. To understand both the old and new traditional modes of legitimization and how it was achieved during the period of Tito’s and post-Tito rule, we first have to attribute the element of culture.

Knežević writes that, “political culture of real existing socialist societies was in the first place rudimental and/or undeveloped, traditional, actually parochial political culture, thus it resulted in a dominant authoritarian orientation and/or authoritarian structure of personality. Real existing socialist systems developed only a few elements of political culture (loyalty, identity, power) which, followed by the undeveloped social structure, could not have enabled the formation of a political culture and/or political orientations on the basis of concrete interests based on existential conditions of life. In other words, these patterns and/or orientations were inflicted or ‘determined’” (2007, 136-37). Here, we can see that the social construction of reality in real existing socialism was built on traditional structures – and some other elements like loyalty and identity – of society. Constructing a new reality on already determined traditional structures or social paradigms (material or non-material) in the Balkans and generally in the world was not new, and has been (successfully or not) practiced throughout history (i.e. placing early Christian mythology symbolism within the established structures of pagan traditions; Stojanović 1997, 172-80, and Stanovičić 2006, 31).

There was a specific diverse traditional-ethnic paradigm in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which was after the War of Liberation (1941-45) drastically transformed. According to Siniša Malešević (2004), the success of SFRY communists to create new traditions and replace old symbols with new ones was primarily achieved by adopting freshly created legends to already existing traditional models of Yugoslav peoples. The changing of the social paradigm (which includes the change of certain social premises and ideas) is, as Stanovičić explained, similar to when the barbaric tribe converts to Christianity. These kinds of change were observed in Eastern Europe three times during the twentieth century – after World War I in 1918 and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; after the end of World War II and the overall

end of the Versailles system; and after the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of the Socialist bloc. Basically, as Stanovičić writes, “the turning points in social conditions that are caused by the change of paradigm, or patterns, are in fact changing the social values and the meaning of certain phenomenon, including the changes in orientation of the global societies” (Stanovičić 2006, 31). Here constructivism explains the importance of the *socially constructed reality*, which is mostly imposed by human agency or organization (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Stanovičić writes that in “Eastern despotisms, later in European feudalistic absolutist states, and finally in later authoritarian socialist states, powerful individuals (the ‘leaders’) or groups reject the ‘old’ and determined the new ‘order’” (Stanovičić 2006, 32). In this case, this source of legitimization derived from Tito’s personality alone and his achievements during World War II.

The use of new symbols and the creation of a new identity by the party leadership can be seen in the examples where old traditional and folkloric heroes and events in national songs and poems were replaced with lyrics about Tito and the stories of Peoples’ Liberation Struggle, NOB.⁶⁷ “Instead of *uskoks* and *hajduks*, traditionally celebrated heroic guerilla against the Ottoman rule in the seventeen and eighteen century, we find communist partisans as new heroes and martyrs in the epics of every day life” (Malešević 2004, 209). The unity of the multi-ethnic SFRY was legitimized primarily through new versions of history. To that end, Tito said at his famous speech in Split in 1962 that ‘none of our republics would be anything if we weren’t all together; but we have to create our own history - history of United Yugoslavia, also in the future’.

The beliefs (supported by the doctrines of scientific socialism) of the ruling elite were not fully imposed in their purest forms, for the elite understood the sentiments and needs of the patriarchic and undeveloped SFRY society. Thus, they carefully and systematically exploited these sentiments in order to build their legitimacy. Considering the non-material elements, i.e. phraseology, Milovan Đilas mentions Tito’s rhetoric, which is a good example of how the new socialist tradition was carefully constructed on an old folkloric basis. In his speeches Tito used cliché phrases where he would combine Marxist mottos with old folkloric sayings – “‘What is ours we don’t give; theirs we don’t want!’; ‘We work as if peace will last forever, and we are prepared and on alert as if war will begin tomorrow!’ etc.” (Đilas 1980, 59). Considering the material elements like territory, symbolism played an important role, for

⁶⁷Words of melodies like “Na vrh gore Romanije...” were changed into “Ide Tito preko Romanije...” or “Družbe Tito, bela lica”, (Malešević 2004, 208).

geographical terms like rivers and mountains have historically had a special meaning in collective sentiments of Yugoslav peoples. The Serbian historian Vasa Čubriločić wrote that “the mountain was a defender of culture and national uniqueness (...) in its patriarchic civilization it preserves the democratic ideals of the old tribal society, which is here preserved in many forms” (Vrkatić 2004, 69). In that sense, an interesting example is the Drina River symbol. Before the communist rule, Drina was perceived as a natural border between the Eastern and Western culture, religion and civilization, (Milan Sufflay was the first to speak of Drina’s significance in the 1920s, and a large number of authors accepted this theory, including Franjo Tuđman (Tuđman 1996, 366). However, after 1945 the Drina border was intentionally replaced with the Sutjeska River where Partisans fought a legendary battle against the Germans and their collaborationists (Goldsetin 2002, 109-137).

What SFRY’s legitimization had in common with USSR’s was in its perception of the role of the party. The socialist systems in SFRY and in the Socialist bloc found legitimization in the claim that the redistribution of domestic product was in the interest of the common good. Therefore, as Verdery noticed “using this premise, socialist paternalism constituted its own ‘nation’ on the basis of its implicit understanding of society as one big family, headed by the ‘wise party’ as its father figure. As a real father it would take decisions on who will produce what and who needs to be rewarded – it was thus a state-parent” (Verdery 2005, 126).

Unlike the *old traditional*, the *new traditional* mode was a type of legitimization where a “contemporary communist leader was attempting to increase his regime’s authority by referring back to an earlier communist leader he initially believed still commanded widespread respect” (Holmes 2002, 44). Such a legitimization mode was specific for the 1980s, when the *old traditional* mode – by then a well established social norm – presented the source of legitimization itself. The *new traditional* mode was, however, less evident in SFRY than in the USSR. In USSR “Gorbachev claimed on various occasions that many of his country’s problems were related to the fact that Lenin’s successors, particularly Stalin, distorted the original Leninist aims. Gorbachev argued that if the USSR could return to the true Leninist path, many of its difficulties would be overcome” (Ibid.).

Returning to the root ‘principles’ of communism in USSR under Gorbachev represents the typical *new traditional* mode of legitimization, which was however slightly different in SFRY. The significance of SFRY in this case was that the society, which accepted the political formula ‘after Tito comes Tito’, perceived the *leadership* of an individual as something negative. Typical for the party politicians *apparatchiks* of post-Tito’s SFRY was

that they were unnoticeable, and all used socialist-scientific phraseology and terminology, constantly referring to Marx, Lenin and Tito. On the federal level, in SFRY there was throughout the 1980s no real political leader ready to exercise the *new traditional* mode of legitimacy, thus creating a power vacuum at the center.

Even though the breaking from the social paradigm of scientific Marxism (*old traditional mode*) did not appear on the federal level, the vacuum would be fulfilled in the Serbian communist establishment, namely with the coming of Slobodan Milošević to power in 1987. Yet again, unlike Gorbachev's, Milošević's *new traditionalism* was weak, as his political discourse would mostly rely on pre-*old traditional* paradigms; meaning exclusively Serbian traditions and ethnic-nationalism. "His speeches were full of short and simple phrases: 'Serbia will be united or it will not exist'; 'no one should dare to beat you'; 'my foot will not touch Kosovo ground until Kosovo is free'" (Malešević 2004, 291). Even though Milošević's political platform was based on Serb traditionalism and ethnic nationalism, the *new traditional* mode was present in some aspects of Milošević's political discourse. Under his rule "the Serbian regime had a difficult task to present itself as a new ideological force which is opposed to 'bureaucratic and con-federal socialism', thus it did not completely reject the previous political system, its achievements and the idea of socialism" (Ibid., 287). Successfully establishing his power position in Serbia on the revoked 600 year old Kosovo myth, his early political struggle was popularly legitimized (at least in Serbia and Montenegro) on the socialist concepts of combating 'counter-revolution' in Kosovo and reforming the system through 'Anti-bureaucratic Revolution'.

4.3.2 *Legal rational* and *goal-rational* mode of legitimization

Legal-rational mode of legitimization was highly problematic when it came to communist societies. Even though the structure of the state and its system are essentially based on the Weberian principle of 'men ruling other men', its sources of power, with which legitimacy is created through certain documents, is highly distinctive when comparing liberal-democratic with socialist-authoritarian regimes. Institutionally, the legal document keeping every state structure intact and legitimate is the *constitution*. However, the source of SFRY's legitimacy and its government – and this was the case with all communist states – was not based on the constitution (even though there were four constitutions in a row; in 1946, 1953, 1968 and 1974, all written by Edvard Kardelj) but precisely on Tito's charisma, the party power monopoly and its doctrine (Marxism-Leninism).

Nenad Dimitrijević explained that “constitution and law in socialism were special instruments that had a specific role in the process of achieving certain – socialist – goals” (Dimitrijević 2007, 178). In other words, the *rule by law* and *constitutional framework* are determined not by their essence but by the essence of a party’s ideology, namely its millenarian purpose to achieve socialist utopia. “Therefore, the constitution and law cannot be anything but the instruments that help unquestionable tasks of the party, which determine what the reality should look like and how it would be applied in practice” (Ibid.).

This brings us to the next mode, with which T.H. Rigby contributed to the legitimacy aspect of Weber’s theory of legitimization, by arguing that in the early 1980s communist states found legitimacy in terms of the so-called *goal-rational* legitimization. The *goal-rational* mode presupposes that the communist leaders “claim that they have a superior understanding of society and of the world generally” (Rigby in Holmes 1997, 43). This means that the source of legitimacy was to be found in the wisdom of human agency, not in an agreed set of rules and drafted documents. The leader or the ruling group found in the society such as SFRY, which was predominantly rural, undeveloped and parochial, a futile ground for imposing authority and self-claimed legitimacy. The main distinction between cognitions of party leadership and the population was in the explanation of the source of legitimacy; for the party leaders, socialism as a system and idea of ‘brotherhood and unity’ *bratstvo i jedinstvo* – that is keeping a multi-ethnic SFRY together, were Marxist theories in practice. And while Tito and the top party leadership perceived their authority as being derived from the empirical nature of scientific socialism and the anti-national doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, they had to present to SFRY’s patriarchic society that the party legitimacy was based on the grounds of “historical necessity of their own traditional culture” (Malešević 2004, 234). For the masses it was presented and explained as a consequence of certain historical developments. The historical roots of the South-Slavic nations’ dreams of unification had to be scientifically determined, and to that end “the history books from that period emphasized a historical necessity of our people to unite” (Ibid., 243), which came to be phrased as the so-called *brotherhood and unity*.

Furthermore, the *goal-rational* mode was specific for the leaders’ or ruling groups’ ambition for political achievement of a Marxist utopia, which in the case of SFRY was expressed in the concept of the *withering of state*. This process began already in 1950, when Kardelj and Milovan Đilas, in order to oppose the state-centric and bureaucratic USSR style system, proposed the concept of self-management to Tito. As the final goal of SFRY’s socialist

system, Kardelj openly spoke about the idea of a *withering state* in his lecture in Oslo in 1954 (Kardelj 1954, 29). Focusing on achieving certain idealistic goals, and subjugating all necessary legal means for this purpose, largely contributed to the political crisis of legitimacy in the communist world. In his study, Jović's main thesis is that Edvard Kardelj's concept of an *withering of state* resulted in the political and economic decentralization of SFRY (which was finally achieved in his 1974 constitution) made the federal government weak and powerless in the face of new challenges of the political and socio-economic crisis of the 1980s. Thus, Jović concludes that the "process of decay of the state organs basic functions (like defense, foreign policy, internal security and the whole economic system) was the main reason why SFRY's collapse was so chaotic and violent" (Jović 2003, 105).

It is precisely on the ideational level that the main crisis of legitimacy emerged. It was not the economic crisis that directly caused the collapse of SFRY, but the incapability of the party to find new solutions (formulated in interest) based on an ideological basis. Finally, there was no effective constitutional framework to mediate between the conflicting parties.

4.3.3 *Eudemonic* mode of legitimacy

The term *eudemonic* would mean 'conducive to happiness' or 'viewed as conducive to happiness', which refers "to attempts by political leaders to legitimate their rule in terms of the political order's performance, especially in the economic sphere" (Holmes 1997, 44). Wendt wrote that "the structure of any social system will contain three elements: material condition, interests and ideas" (Wendt 2009, 139). Considering the material conditions, the development of SFRY probably played the most important role, not so much as in building, but definitely in 'reducing' the regime's legitimacy as the certain point of progress was reached. Careful social construction (allegedly based on scientific methods of Marxism-Leninism) was the main source of legitimacy within SFRY's society for the period of at least twenty years since 1945.

From the constructivist perspective, the international culture and behavior on the macro-level affects the culture and behavior on the micro-level, and SFRY in its socialist path towards progress was no exception. In that sense, the industrial and economic developments in socialist systems from their early phases (collectivization and Stalinist Five-year plans in USSR during the 1930s) up until the mid-1960s (in the late period of post war reconstruction and investments), provided for world communism and all its subsystems support and main

sources for domestic legitimacy. But it was not purely a socialist cause, because “in the second half of the twentieth century, a powerful modernization paradigm had become a way of explaining necessity of progress and development. It was based explicitly on a means-rational argument, analogous to the functionalist approach to the question of legitimacy of rules in a domestic or international context” (James 2008, 435). The difference with the Western development was, however, the excessive use of force for the purposes of developing the socialist systems in socialist countries. “Development was presented by its advocates as a good in itself that would be automatically seen as good by any intelligent observer. It was not usually seen as linked to any higher value, any way of achieving greater human dignity or freedom. Instead, it was a technocratic mill through which humanity was supposed to be minced in the cause of progress and prosperity” (Ibid.) The result was that in the first two decades after the World War II, “SFRY turned from an undeveloped agrarian society into the developed industrial state with empowered economic capacity, research structures, technical skills and presence in the international market” (Cohen 1995, 30).

The development/modernization theory suggested that economic progress would inevitably lead towards a market economy and democratization of the society as a consequence of inevitable creation of the middle-class. This theory appeared in the 1950s in the US, and was from its begging very diverse in thought. One of the major proponents of this theory was Walt W. Rostow (2000). Successful industrial development of SFRY began in 1952 (after the failure of the first Five-year plan), and gradually changed the structure of society, especially because it was relatively quick due to external support (US economic support).

The growth in the 1950s, which continued well into the 1960s, reflected the reshaping of the society structure with the inevitable process of urbanization, which was a consequence of a massive move into the non-agricultural sector. Specifically in the 1980s, “the industrial production which after World War II represented only 19% of overall production, reached 40%, while the agricultural production fell from 43 to 18%” (Stanovnik 1985, 69). Moving from agricultural to industrial sector in principle meant moving to the industrial city centers. Parallel with the rise of urbanization was the rise in education, which meant changing cognition of a patriarchic society and its perception conditioned by tradition. After 1954, when the 8-year obligatory schooling was introduced “it extended to 97, 4% of the population and the illiteracy fell from 16, 3% in 1953 to 12, 9% in 1961” (Bilandžić 1999, 436).

Table 4.7: SFRY rural-urban population statistic

Agricultural population

	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981
Total	10 606 000	10 315 834	9 197 597	7 843 986	4 227 388
Active	5 627 000	5 360 026	4 691 679	4 207 645	2 487 616
Subsisted	4 979 000	4 955 808	4 505 918	3 636 314	1 789 772

Urban population

Total	3 288 652	3 682 563	5 247 378	7 914 526	10 336 854
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Sirotković (1990, 189).

Since the reforms of the 1960s, self-management adopted some characteristics of the market economy and the system was further liberalized in the 1970s. In a political sense, since the fall of Ranković in 1966 this meant more freedom, and with the liberalization in the economic sphere, SFRY society began experiencing some aspects of consumerism. The myths of SFRY people's working class, the *proletariat* and the party as its vanguard, *brotherhood and unity*, war heroism and NOB victory became in social perception simple phraseology. Not only that the so-called scientific socialism could not offer solutions to the real every-day challenges and society's needs – especially with the begging of the crisis in 1980s – but also the folkloric myths and post-war constructed mythology lost their appeal in the masses, especially with the post-war generation that enjoyed liberalization of the 1960s and 70s. According to Alexa Đilas, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism proved to be insufficient already after the student liberal upheavals in Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia in the period 1968-71). After sacking the Mass Movement, *Maspok* in Croatia in 1971 and the Serbian liberal party leadership in 1972, Tito personally ordered that the ideology should be reintroduced in schools and universities in its purest form; however, “expectedly, the effects were damaging and results next to none” (Đilas 1982, 33).

Not only was the Marxist-Leninist ideology insufficient for the developing self-managing society, which, with its market economy characteristic, could only move towards further liberalization, but “Marxism-Leninism turned to be nothing but the means of the top party leadership for power preservation, careerism and conformism” (Ibid.). This, in the eyes of the

society, only further deteriorated the party's legitimacy and ideology. That there were almost no results from an imposed ideologization and doctrination was seen from the shift on the ideational level, which philosopher Žarko Puhovski, himself a supporter of the liberal student movements in 1968, explained as a decisive turning point in the legitimacy sense. Puhovski wrote that "the historic legitimization of LCY simply moved on to the other side; it was adopted – as a Marxist element in its broadest sense – by the left-wing students and professors, who represented the most radical proponents of socialist options (and even claimed to be representatives of the working class). LCY was, thus, left without its traditional Marxist legitimization (and this was happening in the period in which the party was anyhow – at least seen from the traditional aspect – in the early stages of an unquestionable longing for market utopia)" (Puhovski 1989, 28).

Furthermore, Puhovski claims that the state's use of force to suppress *Maspok* student movement in Croatia in 1971 resulted in the change of legitimacy paradigm; this case witnessed the fact that 'national' legitimization was the only realistic option at that given moment. This legitimacy paradigm thus exchanged the 'class differentiation' with the 'national' one. In that context Puhovski writes that "LCY lost its social-ontological, as well as internationalist, predisposition. At the same time (especially during the mid-1980s) the party gave up on any programmatically based daily political actions" (Ibid.).

The gradual weakening of legitimacy as a consequence of a progressed and developing society was not exclusive to SFRY's regime. In fact, all autocratic and totalitarian regimes had to face this process in some form in one way or another. Even Stalin at the height of his power in 1945 would be faced with a society that was fundamentally changed. In his attempt to reintroduce the state terror of the 1930s in the post-war USSR through new purges, orchestrated trials, and overall police control, Stalin "simply could not have understood that by modernizing the society and stimulating the mass education, it was he himself who was 'poisoning' the spirit of the nation and preparing it to for the final break up with Stalinism" (Deutscher 1967, 492). There are several scientific explanations for this process. It was Huntington who argued that due to economic development there has been a process of decay and collapse of dictatorship systems internationally in the period 1975-89, which he called 'the third wave of democratization'. Huntington writes that "in considerable measure the wave of democratization that began in 1974 was a product of the economic growth of the previous two decades" (Huntington 1991, 61).

The industrial development of SFRY, and urbanization as its consequence, already showed signs of transformation in the collective mentality and cognition of society; the student upheavals of 1968 (Slovenia/Serbia) and 1971 (Croatia) were in part a consequence of such a transformation. And while in the 1980s the social context would be different, it would be the same collective-cognitive social structure which was transformed in addition to domestic development. “(...) Sooner or later developmental dictatorships usually discover that aspirations of their societies are not only confined to the sphere of consumption, but also encompass liberties and political rights” (Maravall 1997, 5). And human rights and liberties were aspects of social development that one-party system of socialist style was not being able to adopt. Thus, by the late 1980s, the socialist systems were generally losing their legitimacy on various grounds, but it was the development or *eudemonic* aspect that in large part contributed to the legitimization decay.

4.3.4 The *Charismatic* mode of legitimization

The *charismatic* mode of legitimacy might be argued to be crucial in keeping the SFRY structure together; on the micro-level, a very important aspect in explaining the loss legitimacy of SFRY was the departure of Tito in 1980, which matched the economic crisis. Weber wrote that “in contrast to any kind of bureaucratic organization of offices, the charismatic structure knows nothing of a form or of an ordered procedure of appointment or dismissal. (...) It knows no agency of control or appeal; no local bailiwicks or exclusive functional jurisdictions; nor does it embrace permanent institutions like our bureaucratic ‘departments’, which are independent of persons and of purely personal charisma” (Weber in Curtis 1981, 433).

Thus, Tito’s famous remark to lawyers that they should *not stick to the law like drunk sticks to a fence* is symptomatic; as a main actor and a decision-maker all the tools of institutional and political decisions derived from his personal authority. Furthermore, Weber writes that “in its economic sub-structure, as in everything else, charismatic domination is the very opposite of bureaucratic domination. (...) It is opposite to all ordered economy. It is the very force that disregards the economy. (...) Charisma can do this because by its very nature it is not ‘institutional’ and a permanent structure, but rather, where its ‘pure’ type is at work, it is very opposite of the institutionally permanent” (Ibid., 434). A disregard for economy in Tito’s case was also visible, and the way he handled it. His disapproval of dinar devaluation by 30% (which at one point might have been useful), reflects exactly what Weber suggests about

economy – that charisma always “rejects as undignified any pecuniary gain that is methodological and rational” (Ibid.). In this case, it was Tito’s irrational view that a strong dinar was a guarantee of national independence.

The way decisions were made and carried out belonged to Tito’s personal political domain as well as his view on society (Pirjevec 2011). On the example of SFRY’s relation towards Moscow we can see how the country’s foreign policy was dependent on one person/actor alone. For example, Tito personally decided upon the appointment of the ambassadors to USSR. “Tito could accurately measure the power relations in the world (...) and in the same way approach the installation of the leading diplomats. He would combine those who obey with those who were seen as independent-minded, however, it would be mostly from the latter that the leading diplomats and ambassadors and diplomats would be chosen (...)”. (Kuljić 2005, 364) Tito’s mediation between fractions within the party and in the foreign policy, as well as on the international level between the blocs, was not just a political technicality. “Tito positioned himself to be the arbitral between, on the one hand latent ideological hard-line pro-bloc fraction, and on the other opened pro-Western fraction that claimed SFRY’s place was in the European Community while the non-bloc policy was only a tool” (Kuljić 2005, 364).

Because of this, Tito’s death in 1980 would inevitably bring about the end of the relationship that would result in a variety of implications. Why is it important to focus on the techniques of the decision-making and on the individuals that carried them out? Primarily because their beliefs (whether pragmatic or idealist) when implemented reflected the society, and thus the society acted in accordance to these principles within the larger international arena. SFRY’s diplomacy had “no longer Tito to act as a resonance chamber; it sounded less convincing and raised no interest what so ever at home. (...) The need for austerity had forced the government to reduce the costs of its impetuous diplomacy” (Ibid., 121).

As in most autocratic and dictatorial regimes, the absence of charisma in SFRY represented a major legitimacy issue, because “rule-setting and rule-enforcement are possible when there is recognized authority in charge of the rules. Setting rules, enforcing them and making decisions in general are much more difficult when the power is diffused, (...)” (Subacchi 2008b, 416). And diffused power due to the self-managing character of the system; the BOAL and the republican party organizations; and 8-member rotating Presidency (comprised of representatives from six republics and two autonomous provinces) were specifically confused and disordered state of relations in the post-Tito SFRY. Thus, Đilas noted that “SFRY does not have neither the internal or external stability of the Soviet Union. Nor does it have a

strong homogenous ruling class. SFRY is not a major power, nor does it have a potential to become an independent or imperial world power. The stability of SFRY derived from the stability and absoluteness of Tito's personality" (Đilas 1980, 171). Đilas almost prophetically notes that "Tito was a politician of staggering proportions and of great independence, but he created, (...), no lasting spiritual or institutional forms. Titoism will fade in time, if Titoism is understood to mean personal power, the enforcement of one kind of ownership, the monopoly of Party bureaucracy, and the one-party system as the basis of unity and external independence" (Ibid., 179).

4.3.5 The *Official nationalist* mode of legitimization

This mode of legitimization refers to "nationalism – for now political activism that focuses on and privileges the nation above other allegiances – that is engaged in and encouraged by the state (...) in some cases, communist leaderships who believed they were failing to legitimate their rule by other modes resorted to official nationalism" (Holmes 1997, 45). This form of legitimization mode was dominant in some communist states (i.e. China), however not in the states like USSR or SFRY, due to their multi-ethnic characters. Rather, these states exercised something we might call 'unofficial nationalism' of specific ethnic group (this group might as well be suppressed).

SFRY's self-managing socialism was presupposed by the nation's right on self-determination. According to the war-time Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), the 'Serbian bourgeois' was both a class and national oppressor, and the party attempted to offer a new state project fundamentally different from the state system in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This was achieved by emphasizing the revolutionary right of each nation to self-determination and by offering the promise of a federal reorganization of the future SFRY. In December 1942, Tito stated that "the CPY will never depart from the principle stated by our great teachers and leaders, Lenin and Stalin, which is the right of every nation to self-determination, including secession" (Pula 2004, 800). Furthermore, that same year Tito stated that "Macedonians, Albanians, Croats, Muslims etc., are anxiously asking – what will happen if the old order (Kingdom) is to be restored? The flag of National Liberation Struggle (...) is at the same time the flag of struggle for national freedom and equality. (...) The question of Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohija, Croatia, Slovenia will be resolved to the general satisfaction because these nations will resolve these questions themselves alone" (Srbija i Albanci 1989, 13).

SFRY's concepts of self-management of the working class and non-aligned foreign policy approach were concepts that also served the purpose of overcoming local national sentiments. Thus, "if their pronouncements are to be accepted at face value – and we shall never know how genuine a Tito or Brezhnev was when they made them – many communist leaders appear to have believed that 'the problem' of nationalism had been basically solved within their societies. By this they meant that unofficial nationalism and traditional ethnic rivalries had been overcome, and that the 'new socialist persons' who putatively constituted the citizenry were committed both to the state in which they lived and to genuine socialist internationalism" (Holmes 1997, 286). However, "borrowing the legitimization patterns (mostly from the national-traditional 'reserves') leads to a series of unstable consequences in nationally mixed states (from USSR to SFRY), and also to the possibility, at least for some time, of the postponement of a serious debate and to replace the policy of favoring certain national communities with the important and necessary changes, which would inevitably have to occur" (Puhovski 1989, 349).

Serb 'bourgeois imperialism' and 'Yugoslav unitarism' were seen as the main, along with the bureaucratization of party politics, and probably the only obstacles to solving the national question. In addition to the specific SFRY concept of *deetatization*, Kardelj warned in 1957 that "on the basis of bureaucratic-centralist tendencies, here or there we can see the emergence of affirmation of old chauvinistic integral Yugoslavism as a tendency to negate the existing nations in service of affirmation of a new Yugoslav nation" (Kardelj u Zvizdić 1982, 6). Serb nationalism would thus remerge as a reaction in the second half of the 1980s, following the international trend in the context of economic hardship earlier in the decade. "Where governments failed to provide, aggressive new leaders played on tribal, communal, or religious bonds, to seize power and opportunities. Populist and religious extremism soon emerged in India and Pakistan; bitter ethnic conflict exploded in SFRY; Islamic extremism rose in central Asia and across the South Mediterranean" (Woods 2009, 5).

4.3.6 The *Formal recognition* mode of legitimization

Finally, we have to analyze three important 'external' modes of legitimization, which this dissertation argues was the only preserved mode in SFRY due to the long tradition of Tito's active foreign policy. The first is the *formal recognition*. In simple terms, the *formal recognition* refers to recognition of a certain system by external actors (state or non-state).

In the US and liberal-democratic countries' approach to the international relations in general, the *formal recognition* as an aspect of legitimacy is closely connected to the 'Tobar Doctrine', which suggests that "governments which came to power by means other than those laid down in the constitution should not be recognized by the international community; thus a *coup d'état* or a revolution would render a state illegitimate and therefore beyond the range and scope of international law and the conventions of diplomacy" (Ibid.).⁶⁸ With the US entry into World War I in 1917, the 'Tobar Doctrine' would undergo slight modification in the US foreign policy perspective, with the introduction of Wilsonian concept of 'democratic legitimacy'. US president Wilson refined the Tobar method by "invoking the idea of popular support: if the regime was popular it would be granted the legitimate status; if it was not, it would not" (Ibid.). It would be precisely in that spirit that the Atlantic Charter of 1941 was drafted by Roosevelt and Churchill, which explicitly stated that "they (the governments of the United States and Great Britain) respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live" (Atlantic Charter, 2010).

On the macro-level of analyses, this was the first (international) source of legitimization for Tito and NOB in the Nazi occupied SFRY, which would began to develop and gain further international recognition two years later, after the second convention of the AVNOJ in the city of Jajce on November 29, 1943, when Tito and the party proclaimed Yugoslavia to be a federal country; the founding structure of the future SFRY. On the domestic level, when we speak of 'popular support' as a source for the external legitimization, Tito and the party gained gradual legitimization for a number of reasons; first, SFRY was the only country in Nazi-occupied Europe to liberate itself by its own effort; second, it was the first socialist country to oppose Stalin and Cominform securing its independence in 1948 (thus, the concrete US military and economic aid would be granted); and third, the policy towards nationalities and minorities, *narodi* and *narodnosti* gave specific (federal or autonomous) rights to Montenegrins; Macedonians; Kosovo-Albanians; and (later in 1971) Muslims – who were not recognized as nations during the inter-war period of Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The latter point means that legitimacy based on popular domestic support, which rendered external support, was won through the 'right on self-determination' (Tarifa 1997, 441-43).

On the international level, the status SFRY enjoyed as an independent socialist state among the blocs gave it a strong external support to legitimacy of its regime. So far we have analyzed

⁶⁸ Carlos Tobar was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, and was the first to elaborate his doctrine of legitimacy in 1907.

how the US supported Tito's regime economically, as well as how the relationship was built with the USSR through the Tito-Brezhnev relationship. Together with the position SFRY held in NAM, these aspects represent a strong *external support* of legitimization. Because SFRY was a socialist country, its final legitimization resort would be *external support*, which would – after complete internal de-legitimization of the system – completely depend on the future of the Socialist bloc.

4.3.7 *Informal support and existence of an external role model* mode of legitimization

The main characteristics of the remaining two modes; *Informal support* and *existence of an external role model* refers to situations where the ruling elite or the “leaders might still believe in their own right to rule because of a direct or indirect external support, even though they are aware of their unpopularity and lack of authority among their own population” (Holmes 1997, 45).

Post-Tito's SFRY represents a good example of a system that still enjoyed a strong external support (primarily from the US) during the crisis of 1980s, but whose domestic legitimacy began decaying. When analyzing the mode *informal support*, we should consider an example of a factor that played important role in the overall decay of legitimacy of real existing socialist systems in the 1980s and that is the human rights. This aspect is important as it represents the exclusiveness of SFRY's *external support* mode of legitimization. After the signing Helsinki Final Act in 1975 (which allowed monitoring and reporting human rights violations in both blocs), international pressures on the USSR and on the Socialist bloc in general would intensify. Considering the human rights violations in SFRY, even though they were not intensive as in the USSR, the effective system of networked secret police controlled the social life and the state continued to suppress all political freedoms. However, unlike USSR dissidents the SFRY dissidents were not in the focus of Western interest, and there was no western in-depth research done on them.⁶⁹ This was primarily because of the “positive publicity that SFRY achieved in the West with its independent position towards USSR, and which generally avoided the negative aspects of SFRY regime” (Dragović-Soso 2002, 35).

The organs of oppression in SFRY would to a certain extent act according to the collective norms of the international system. For example, in 1974 due to the spreading of ‘enemy

⁶⁹ Dissidents as the novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the scientist Andrei Sakharov, and the cellist Mstislav Rostropovich continually chided the failing USSR regime regarding its suppression of free opinion (Kennedy 2006, 189).

propaganda' dissident Milovan Đilas was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, but would be released "three years later; a gesture as a part of general amnesty for political prisoners after the Belgrade Conference of CSCE" (Ibid., 47). After Tito's death in 1980, the economic and rationality crisis matched further civil rights violations, which supplemented the overall legitimacy crisis, which was of all republics most evident in the Serbia. In June 1981 Serbian poet Gojko Đogo would be arrested on the charges of subversive writings (in his collection of poems *Vunena vremena* he alluded to Tito as an 'old rat'). Parallel with Đogo's trial was the trial of young Albanian protestors from Kosovo and in Croatia to a group of intellectuals.⁷⁰ Sentencing Đogo to two years in prison for poetry resulted in a public revolt – along with the decaying legitimacy, in the early 1980s "intellectual opposition in Serbia created a front for protecting human and civil rights, thus challenging the communist system" (Ibid., 18).

In Slovenia there was a whole range of initiatives coming from the younger generation. In 1986, The XII Congress of the League of Communists' Youth of Slovenia drafted the resolution that supported human rights: freedom of speech, public gathering and freedom to intellectual expression, as well as the support for pacifism and rights of the homosexuals. The Congress also warned of the incompetence of JNA, objected to the military civil service and demanded the abandonment of running the popular 'štetfeta mladosti' which was held every year on Tito's birthday, the so-called 'Day of Youth' (Janko Kos made interesting observations of the cultural transformations in Slovenia (2004, 213-225)). Slovenian discontent and opposition to Serbia's oppression of rights of the Albanian minority in Kosovo the late 1980s should also be seen from the human rights aspect. Slovenian liberalization of society took the strongest form of all the states in the communist world. Throughout the 1980s, "alternative groups where not only tolerated (in Slovenia) but they were allowed to grow in number and operate as political parties" (Silber and Little 1995, 49).

Nevertheless, strong *external* and *informal* support of SFRY eroding regime continued, especially from the US. The NSDD documentation proves that the support for independent SFRY, based on the constructed myth of strategically important ally for the US, remained solid even during the II Cold War. Reagan officially expressed his intention to strengthen political ties with SFRY in February 1984, when he met with SFRY's President Mika Špiljak, regardless of the human rights violations of that period. By late 1980s, similar situation would emerge in USSR, where there was greater *informal support* to Gorbachev's domestic reforms,

⁷⁰ This group included Franjo Tuđman (three years imprisonment), Vlado Gotovac (two years), Dobroslav Paraga (three years) and Marko Veselica (eleven years); (Dragović-Soso 2004, 112).

than there was internal approval. Gorbachev was proclaimed to be the ‘man of the year’ in the Time magazine in 1989, and was even awarded a Noble Prize for Peace next year. “The relevance of this to legitimization is that Gorbachev appears to have continued to believe in what he was doing because so many outside the USSR, both politicians and ordinary citizens, had faith in him and his policies” (Holmes 1997, 45). The *existence of an external role model* refers to the situation where leaders may well be aware of their unpopularity at home, “nevertheless, they continue to believe in their own right to rule because of their faith in the regime of another country which, to a greater or lesser extent and whether it is openly acknowledged or not, they are emulating” (Ibid.). This aspect of legitimacy in the SFRY cases relates specifically to the army, JNA, and its self-legitimization in the post-Tito’s SFRY as the watchdog of the decaying order, by finding *existence of an external role model* in the still-existing USSR.

4.4 The crisis of identity (II): motivation

The wide range of modes of legitimization has offered us an insight into understanding the legitimacy crisis of the real existing socialist systems in the 1980s. So far we have seen how the economic crisis (debt crisis on the macro-level) have evolved into the rationality crisis (party interventionism and bureaucratization of politics), thus resulting in the legitimacy crisis of the regime and its system. The result is that *the legitimacy* of the state is put into question alone by the absence of charisma of the leader and the weakening of the party authority; parallel with the weakening of the popular appeal of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This lack of vision and action in the absence of the authority of main institutions, and the weakening of the social construct of mythology on which these institutions are based, finally results that the *crisis of the legitimacy* becomes the *crisis of motivation*, which is the final step in the understanding the overall field of *identity crisis*.

Motivation crisis considers *erosion of traditions important for continued existence and overloading through universalistic value system* meaning the society’s formation of new needs. How the needs are constructed should be examined from the constructivist notion of interconnected process of identity-interest formation. Based on the collective beliefs, the motivation is part of the desire and interest of the society to achieve certain goals. According to Wendt, “achievement implies a social standard about what counts as a legitimate aspiration – and as such is a cultural rather than material fact” (2009, 122). This means that certain objectives society tends to achieve in order to satisfy its desires, have to be collectively and

culturally accepted standards. Wendt gives an example, using the capitalist society, writing that “(...) in capitalist societies some people have a desire to get rich on the stock market. This is a schema which includes beliefs about external world (how the market works, where it is going, etc.), and also constitutes its holder with particular motivation that drives her behavior in the world” (Ibid.).

Taking into account the desires of the real existing socialist systems, and that is the interest of achieving a socialist utopia (in SFRY’s case the proclaimed idea of an *withering of the state*); the incapability of the system to achieve immediate social interests (economic and political), and its overall failure during the 1980s, inevitably had to result in the motivation crisis. In the words of Slovenian LC leader Milan Kučan, those were the years when “it was not just a political, economic crisis or a crisis between the relations of nations and ethnicities but also a crisis of social values. By then, the recognition became obvious that changes are indeed needed in SFRY. The Slovenian political leadership conceived and understood these changes as a new agreement about a common life within SFRY” (Milan Kučan as a witness on Milošević trial, 2010).

In order to fix the inflation, the government had to take necessary steps which affected some republics (Slovenia and Croatia primarily), while not the others, thus provoking popular dissatisfaction with not only the isolated leadership but with the general structure of the common state. “In order to tax the flow of hard currency, they (SIV) developed for the first time in the second half of 1981, the idea of a toll for every border crossing. (...) This draft was indignantly rejected by the western republics, especially Slovenia” (Meier 1999, 13). A year later, when the Federal Assembly passed a resolution according to which each citizen who wanted to travel abroad had to deposit 5,000 dinars in the bank for a period of a year for the first trip, and 2, 000 for each additional trip within the year, the western republics Slovenia and Croatia were further affected by the policy. The reformulation of republican interest, which was opposed to federal, immediately took place. First, “the high party functionaries in Ljubljana admitted that they had not been clear about the consequences of these measures; they had simply gone along with the new laws out of solidarity and a feeling of duty” (Ibid., 156). Their perception of the just distribution of power among the republics was changed, thus “confronted with the particular consequences of these measures, they had a feeling of having fallen into the ‘Balkan trap’. Slovenia was now, for all practical purposes cut from its western neighbors” (Ibid.).

The problematic drafting of the Resolution for the year 1984 portrays the problem of motivation in the country. It took the Federal Assembly twenty five hours to draft the resolution. The uneven share was most evident between developed and undeveloped republics; primarily there was an issue with the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. SIV recommended that contributing sources should be raised for 20%. The undeveloped republics' delegations rejected the government recommendation, and demanded the rise of 34%. The Macedonian representative Negre Novakovski stated that "in case we would not be granted the raise we demand, all of us living in this country are not going to be equal; some will be able to spent more, some less" (Rabrenović 1984, 8). It took hours of debate to come to a compromise, and finally it was agreed that the rise would go to 30%.

Till the last moment it was not certain whether the Resolution would be drafted as the Serb delegation made the last demand considering the Belgrade Investment bank, *Investbanka*. This bank granted regional republican illiquid banks loans, landed by the foreign banks; the sum which "amounted to 200 million dollars" (Ibid., 9). The Serb delegation basically blackmailed the Assembly, threatening that until this problem is not solved "the Resolution for 1984 will not be accepted" (Ibid.). Also threatening to block the 1984 Resolution was Croatian delegation, which demanded the larger rights on the export of oil from the oil company INA. "In order to settle its debt of 264 million dollars (...) as the whole economy of the republic dependent on the export" (Ibid.). SIV refused to help Croatian oil company and the republican delegation, claiming that "it did not foresee (INA's export) in this years energetic balance for the country" (Ibid.). In the end, SIV found weak compromises (more on its own disadvantage) as with all the previous demands.

On the international level, the context for *unfinished state* such as SFRY is crucial for understanding its own demise. Considering the Cold War period, "Tito's regime was based on the political culture of bipolar world; in other words, the culture of threats coming form the East and West. Chaotic domestic and instable foreign policy relations on the territory which has for too long been divided between the empires, experienced frequent liberation and civil wars that brought certain peoples to the brink of extinction, were the real basis for the undividable rule, and imposing the illusion of the 'state of emergency' in relatively secured periods became a standard ideological formula for disciplining the subjects" (Kuljić 2005, 49). As the II Cold War changed these patterns, and transformed the conventional Cold War behavior so did the new international culture influence the changes in domestic culture. Westad noticed that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in the socialist countries, as well as in

the decolonized III World, economic decay in many cases was precondition for identity crisis of the complete political system. “When a state – which used freshly invented national identity as a basis of its legitimacy – faces undisputable failure in economic sense, it is absolutely logical to expect from some groups to begin resisting both state policy and the identity; the identity which represents such a policy and the state” (Westad 2009, 378). This would in the post-Tito era emerge in the form of ethnic upheaval of Kosovo Albanians in Serbia’s Autonomous Province of Kosovo in 1981.

The year 1986 is crucial; by the time the II Cold War ended and US and USSR entered a third phase of détente, which would ultimately lead to the collapse of Socialist bloc in 1989, the internal subjective forces began expressing their discontent with the system. That year in Serbia the scandal surrounding the SANU Memorandum expressed popular dissatisfaction with the constitutional arrangement of SFRY, namely with Serbia which was divided in three territorial parts: ‘inner’ Serbia with two autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo. The document emphasizes that “the weaknesses that were present in our state model are more and more visible – all nations are not equal: the Serb nation is refused a right of its own state” (8. Sednica CK SK Srbije 2007, 105). The whole project was evolving around Dobric Ćosić, prominent Serbian writer and the most influential academic in SANU, who would be the first public figure to express the dissatisfaction not with the system and its (dys)functional structure but with the SFRY state as such, launching the thesis that ‘Serbs win in wars and lose in peace’.

That same year, at the initiative of Central Committee of LC Croatia the so-called ‘Zagreb agreement’ was reached, which considered the official name of the language in the republic. In the Constitution of SR Croatia, Article 138, it was stated that “in the Socialist Republic of Croatia the Croatian language is in use – the standard form of language used by Croats and Serbs in Croatia, called Croatian or Serbian” (Ustav SRH 1986, 270). That was the year when The XII Congress of the League of Communists’ Youth of Slovenia took place. Its resolution openly provoked the JNA. The cultural expression of newly formed national interest that did not correspond with the official policy line, was the call for unity with the ‘cultural space of the Central Europe’. It was primarily because the “Slovenes had since the beginnings; during World War I and later imagined Yugoslavia as a democratic, federative state of equal nations” (Nečak 1992, 8).

In their initial phase, these changes were not necessarily nationalist, but rather popular-cultural developments within social life of each republic independently. What is though

significant is that further formation of republican identity-interest would not be sustainable within the dysfunctional structure and a delegitimized system of a SFRY unit. Thus, only with the collapse of the Socialist bloc, when the final 'external mode' of legitimization was lost, the republican political elites find it feasible to dissolve the state.

The II Cold War context and the interaction of SFRY within international system through the analyses of objective and subjective forces in the crisis demonstrated that the causes of the country's collapse were purely internal. In SFRY as in Eastern Europe the II Cold War created an economic crisis that through rationality crisis (party bureaucratization) led to the questioning of legitimacy of the party and the state structure as a whole (the departure of Tito in SFRY, as well as constant leadership changes in USSR further supplemented the crisis with the absence of the 'charismatic' element of legitimacy). The system and identity crisis inevitably affected the crisis of formation of interest and that reflected the overall foreign policy concept of these socialist systems.

As Christopher Cvičić noted, the "plain truth was that the strong glue made up of several ingredients, which had kept post-1945 SFRY together, had dissolved during the 1980s;

1. Tito, the charismatic leader and a skillful political manipulator of different groups and nationalities whom British historian A.J.P. Taylor had aptly compared to a Habsburg emperor, had died in 1980.
2. SFRY's economic prosperity, based on massive external assistance in the 1950s and 1960s and in the 1970s on a massive borrowing spree (and with Tito acting as the country's apparently irresistible credit card) had ended.
3. The sense of external danger from the East that had helped forge a sort of national unity in 1948 and maintain it for many years afterwards had disappeared in the late 1980s, making it possible for the peoples of SFRY to start looking for other arrangements and alignments without fear of opening the door to the Red Army and the KGB." (1993, 75).

5 The result of the crisis: the collapse of the state

As with neo-realists, so is with the constructivists that the state is seen as the basic unit in the international system. The definition of the state belongs to the field of political science; however, here we will mention two features that Wendt sees as pivotal for understanding the state in IR. First, “(...) the state is seen as an *organizational actor*. (...) (and) second is that this actor is seen as ontologically independent of society” (Wendt 2009, 199). The latter point Wendt bases on Weberian tradition, according to which the state as an organizational unit provides a society with two basic functions: internal order and external defense, with the emphasis on the nature of its rule as being not dependent conceptually on society.

5.1 SFRY as an ‘unfinished’ state

Max Weber wrote that “like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence” (Weber in Curtis 1981, 427). Furthermore, Wendt defines the state through the combination of three separate traditions: already mentioned by Weberian; Marxist (where state and society should be observed as part of the structure); and Pluralist (who deny the state as such, calling it a group of individuals running the government). Wendt writes that “(...) the essential state has five properties: (1) institutional-legal order, (2) an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, (3) an organization with sovereignty, (4) a society, and (5) territory. (1) is the Marxist’s state-as-structure, (2) and (3) the Weberian’s state-as-actor, and (4) Pluralist’s state-as-society, (5) is common to all three” (Ibid., 202). The consequence of the system and identity crisis of the late 1980s was that post-Tito’s SFRY basically lost either in part or completely all of these characteristics (of course, apart from the *territory*, which would be lost with the final collapse in 1991).

5.1.1 The form: institutional failure

The Marxist’s concept basically considers the form of the structure, how it is constituted and how the power distribution is organized. “Regardless of the particular distribution of political authority, (...) state structures are power structures that both regulate the behavior of pre-existing subjects, and constitute who those subjects are and what they are empowered to do. State structures are usually institutionalized in law and official regulations” (Ibid., 203). In terms of the *institutional-legal order*, SFRY’s domestic system relied on the so-called ‘three

pillars' or integrating factors: (1) the institution of the president, Josip Broz Tito; (2) the army, Yugoslav Peoples' Army, *Jugoslavneska narodna armija* (JNA); (3) and the party, LCY. The theory of institutional 'three pillars' that held the system together was presented by Stjepan Mesić at the ICTY during the trial of Slobodan Milošević. Mesić explained that SFRY "as a federation, can be envisaged and thought of as a chain, a chain in which the republics and provinces were the links linking up the chain (...) if you do away with one of the links, the chain is no longer able to function, in other words, the Federation ceases to function" (Stjepan Mesić as witness on Milošević trial, 2010).

In the institutional power-structure of SFRY, as in any autocratic-egalitarian system, human agency played a significant role and in this case that was the figure of president Tito as the main actor, decision-maker and mediator between various institutional interests, relaying his authority on coercive institutions; primarily on the secret police and the army. Prior to Tito's death the CIA Estimate warned that "Tito can be reasonably confident that his successors will not follow USSR or Chinese precedents and launch the process of 'de-titoization'. On the contrary, he can probably rely on his successors both to profess and to feel a strong loyalty to most of the basic tents of 'titoism'. However, he has recently introduced new decision-making procedures that will make it extremely difficult for this loyalty to find expression in effective leadership" (Yugoslavia after Tito, 2010). The disappearance of what Bilandžić calls the 'personal union' between the government (SIV) and the party (LCY,) created a power diffusion in the 'center'. The party disappeared in January 1990 at the failed XIV Extraordinary Congress of LCY, which was abandoned by Slovenian and Croatian republican delegations. Considering Tito's institutional position of President, the succeeding body – the eight-member Presidency comprised of representatives of six republics and two autonomous provinces – proved to be of very little importance for the system integration.⁷¹

In the constructivist sense of identity-interest formation on the international level, what makes one state a state apart from the structural aspect presented by Wendt, is the need to "preserve and further its physical security, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem" (Zehfuss 2002, 42). In the case of SFRY, during the Tito era all these aspects were satisfied through emphatically independent conduct of both internal and foreign policy. As we have already mentioned, one of the key aspects of independence was i.e. the strong currency; Tito till the end did not allow devaluation of dinar. The economic crisis and the adjustment to the

⁷¹Since May 1991 it entered a state of paralysis as the Serb bloc (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina) blocked the regular election of the Croat representative Stjepan Mesić to the post of President of Presidency.

realities of the international economy made this element disappear. Autonomy was established thorough the independent foreign policy within the NAM. After 1979, what constructivists would call 'positive identification' in the security sense, also disappeared as the NAM began to weaken with the intensification of the II Cold War. The collective self-esteem of society was something that was systematically done by the party's top-down pressures with the replacement of newly created myths (supported by scientific socialism) with the traditional paradigms (discussed in sub chapter 4.3.1.).

Finally, the last element of SFRY's independence – that of the physical security – was the JNA, the only institution left to represent the system. The reason why the JNA had such an important role in the society was primarily because Tito probably saw in it the most important integrating factor of the multi-ethnic society (based on the myth of the victory in World War II) and key element of the country's independence (along with currency, economy, unique socialist ideology and foreign policy). This was evident from the "autarky of the military industry as a long-term basis for the state's independence; i.e. the means given from the state budget for the army were never discussed in the Federal Assembly; the military-economic complex contributed to the armaments with 80%, thus producing the most modern and technically advanced weaponry not only for domestic purposes but for the export as well" (Kuljić 2005, 178). JNA was an institution that did not only encompass the military field. "JNA employed nearly 150 000 people, of which 50% were active strictly in the military service. The industry of armaments and other goods, whose production centers were mostly situated in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1990 comprised of 53 companies with around 80 000 employed, and in cooperation with more than 1000 other companies. Major trade was with the III World, which on a yearly basis amounted to 2 billion dollars" (Viro 2009, 133). Common phrase of the 1980s was that the JNA was the *Seventh Republic* in the Federation, as it was actively participating even in the socio-economic sphere of the country; i.e. the so-called *Green Plan* with which the JNA was developing its own agricultural production.

Where Marxist tradition meets Weberian is exactly on the conceptual nature of structure; one thing is that it is independent from the society, but more importantly it has the right to use force to maintain itself. "This translates into two key functions: the maintenance of internal order, which involves reproducing the domestic conditions of society's existence; and provision of external defense, which protects the integrity of those conditions from other states" (Wendt 2009, 203-04). This aspect relates specifically to the JNA; and its role of the

integrating factor in society, and whose questionable popular authority claimed the right to maintain the post-Tito structures.⁷² As an *organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence*, JNA proclaimed to be the defender of Tito's heritage and socialist system. Prior to his death, Tito said that "there are those who write that one day Yugoslavia will disintegrate. Nothing like that will happen because our army will ensure that we will continue to move in the direction we have chosen for the socialist construction of our country" (Gow 1997, 13). This statement was taken as a testament, which transformed JNA into a political force, even though the army by definition is an 'obedient' institution. Therefore, by being the only legal power-center in the decaying state system, in the terminal stage of the state's crisis in 1990, JNA had to deal with a far more complex issue than just defend the state. Or as Miroslav Hadžić noticed, "in the JNA the determination to preserve socialism was stronger sentiment than that of the state *raison* and interest. This resulted in the long term confusion of facts: state reason – the defense of territorial integrity and unity of SFRY – was reduced to preserving socialism in SFRY at any cost, thus instead of leading the state, the party decided to follow (its own) party policy" (Hadžić 2001, 101).

The II Cold War had a major impact on the JNA's perception of international relations and its idea of how to secure SFRY from the possible aggression. Significantly, after Tito's death and despite the constant fear of USSR's intervention, JNA concluded that the Socialist bloc was in a defensive mode, while the Western powers, the US and NATO were on the offensive. JNA's general Martin Špegelj confirmed these positions.⁷³ He wrote that "the leadership of the JNA correctly estimated that the Warsaw Pact did not represent a military threat any more. But their conclusion that the West was now an eminent threat was, however, wrong. The Army decided to shift its strategic defense position from the southeast to the west (towards Croatia and Slovenia)" (Špegelj 2001, 86). In May 1982, at the military seminar held in Belgrade and chaired by the Secretary of Defense Branko Mamula, the JNA top leadership concluded that the strategic shift of SFRY defensive forces to the northwest (Slovenia and Croatia) was necessary. It led in 1985 to the reorganization of the Territorial Defense, which carved up the republican system of defense and disbanded republican armies by introducing 'military districts', corps and brigades.⁷⁴ The seminar's conclusions were that "the

⁷² JNA's authority was ridiculed throughout the 1980s. For example, in 1983 the Slovenian satirical weekly magazine 'Pavliha' openly criticized the JNA for being an incompetent institution.

⁷³ Špegelj would become the Croatian Minister of Defense during the years 1990 and 1991.

⁷⁴ Accepted by the Federal Assembly in 1987, the reorganization of Territorial Defense made the strategic position of Croatia tremendously difficult and gave advantage to the JNA to control three-thirds of its territory in 1991.

multinational companies were ruling the world, the arms race was destroying USSR's power, and the shift in the balance on the international level was moving against the USSR. (...) There was a threat that SFRY might be forced into the Western zone of influence and end up under the Western domination." (Ibid., 70).

After Tito's death, SFRY was a power-diffused state, which negatively reflected on the position of the coercive apparatus. By definition, *the constitution of monopoly on organized violence* comes specifically from effects of state centralization. According to Wendt, these effects are twofold, "first the coercive agencies of the state must be *non-rival* in the sense that they do not settle their disputes (for example, over budgets or jurisdiction) by force" (Wendt 2009, 205). This rivalry would by the late 1980s evolve and span the secret service, police and the army mostly over constitutional issues (the right of Slovenian and Croatian republics to succeeded), and would be determined primarily according to the national lines. Secondly, "coercive agencies must be *unified* in the sense that each perceives a threat to others as a threat to itself, so that all defend against it together. In IR this is known as 'collective security', in which actors define their individual security in terms of the collective, on the principles 'one for all and all for one'" (Ibid.). Even though SFRY was not a member of the Warsaw pact, the unofficial personal agreement between Tito and Brezhnev from the 1970s guaranteed collective security of SFRY. When the Warsaw pact dissolved in the late 1980s, SFRY further lost domestic legitimization on its monopoly on violence.

Considering the secret police, it was a significant actor in all of the socialist states, which Verdery calls "the producing system, which is parallel to the producing system of goods; a business of producing papers with either truthful or false histories of the individuals who were subjugated to the party rule" (2005, 49). The organized violence in the international context witnessed in the 1980s erosion of suppression, was common to all of the Socialist bloc states of that period. As Lynch and Lukić have noticed that "typically missing was the genuine continuation of the systematic state-terror policy. In comparison, both a post-stalinist and post-titoist political course could have either proceeded beyond the extent of the terror system or accept the changes and face serious prospects of collapse" (Lynch and Lukić 1996, 9). Specifically considering the SFRY intelligence service, it transformed parallel to the transformations of the JNA and that is according to the national lines. Josip Manolić, the head of the SFRY's interior ministry (1960-65) and the head of the Croatia's Office of Defense of Constitutional Order in 1991, explained that "it is impossible to separate the destiny of the intelligence and counterintelligence (KOS) from that of the JNA, thus we (were in 1991)

witnessing its complete collapse. However, we should take under serious consideration too, that a large part of the cadre would have joined the new intelligence structures as there is always a danger that those who *serve* will seek new *commanders*” (Manolić 1995, 135). In 1991, KOS and intelligence services were symptomatically suffering from the same diffusion that was in the federal system – Croatian part would form its own secret service and counterintelligence, while in Serbia the situation was far more complex as the State Security *Državna bezbednost* (DB) would be offering double loyalty; to Milošević and his agenda, and to the JNA and the Federal government.⁷⁵

On the final two elements: the *organization with sovereignty* and *a society*, SFRY would prove to be the unfinished and ultimately failed state. The state as an *organization with sovereignty* was in the case of SFRY a major issue – the question was where did *the power-center with sovereignty* lie? Constitutional form of limited sovereignty the republics enjoyed (guaranteed by the 1974 constitution) and the disappearance of institutional-charismatic bondage (death of Tito in 1980) made SFRY a power-diffused structure. Considering the sovereignty itself, Wendt writes that “sovereignty is not about *de facto* freedom of action relative to society, or ‘state autonomy’, but about being recognized by society as having certain powers, as having *authority*” (Wendt 2009, 206-07). With this lack of authority, what appeared in the political structures of SFRY as a result from the confusion and the decade long crisis was exactly this ‘freedom of action’, which would result in the rise of nationalistic tendencies.

Zoran Đinđić observed the SFRY case (based on the cultural-historic theory of Oswald Spengler) as the mineralogical process of pseudo-morphosis, according to which there is an evident disproportion (in the case of crystals) between the ‘form’ and ‘content’. Đinđić, thus asks, “is not SFRY as a state an *empty* form, fulfilled with the uncontrolled content (i.e. nationalism), which would, if it could, create its own form, but was not able to do so due to the historic-political conditions that forced it to adjust to given realities?” (Đinđić 1988, 6-7). The power diffusion became evident during the economic crisis, concrete crisis in social conditions where the party, local republican party organizations and the government (SIV) had no common solutions, and were constantly on a collision course considering different

⁷⁵ Even though their actions were synchronized initially (both wanted to preserve SFRY), the agenda of the secret service and KOS-JNA in Serbia was different. DB would be acting strictly on Milošević’s commands, forming volunteer units through its paramilitary wing the Serbian Radical Party, and sending it to Croatian front, thus on most cases disobeying their JNA superiors. That there was internal conflict in the intelligence milieu in Serbia can be seen from the fact that the head of KOS Aleksandar Vasiljević would in 2003 at the Hague Tribunal testify against Milošević.

issues on most occasions. Thus, in a Weberian sense the *state* as an *organization with sovereignty* is, according to Đinđić, a problematical core element of SFRY structure, as he concludes that “the basic characteristic of (...) SFRY statehood is division between the *state* and *sovereignty*” (Ibid., 12).

The sovereignty from a legal perspective was difficult to achieve, especially if we consider that the real power lay in the decision-making of human agency – Tito, after whose death it was difficult to transfer the power and freedom of action to one agency alone. Leslie Holmes, therefore noticed that “following Tito’s death, the SFRY authorities attempted to move further towards legal-rationality, particularly in the form of regularized leadership change” (Holmes 1997, 51). This was achieved in a successful transfer of presidential power from the departed leader to the eight-member Presidency, which Bilandžić praised as the most “successful and peaceful transfer of power” of all the previous cases in socialist states (Bilandžić 1985, 14). However, the problem of the new declared society’s formula ‘after Tito comes Tito’, was the already existing economic crisis, which according to Holmes created serious trouble “before legal-rationality had had much opportunity to establish itself as a long-term form of legitimization” (1997, 51). Finally Holmes concluded that this led to “traditional ethnic rivalries (...) with groups blaming each other for their deteriorating circumstances” (Ibid.).

According to Wendt, “(...) each state has its own rules which the members of its own society are expected to follow. To say that states and societies are internally related in a state-society complex means that not only is the state constituted by its relationship to society, but so is society constituted by the state” (Wendt 2009, 210). SFRY society was pluralist; ethnically and religiously diverse. This pluralism was ‘administrated’ within the federal structure. As Đinđić notes, the diverse society in SFRY belonged to the federal system “which emerges in the diverted course: the autonomous political units do not unify to comprise the state, but rather in the already existing state they are emerging as politically autonomous” (Đinđić 1988, 28). The distinct nations within the republics would achieve their political autonomy specifically with the 1974 constitution, which constituted the power distribution from the ‘center’. “Only as ambassadors (of their respective republics) in ‘federal Belgrade’ or as uncompromising traders in the Federal Assembly, the local politicians (and in these conditions all of them were local) could ensure their status. The problem, however, was that such a distribution of power eased its own legitimization (because there are no more fictive supervisor, against whom the political rebellion of regional political groups could be generated), but did not make it functional” (Ibid., 29).

The power of republican party organizations was not, however, based on any specific ‘national’ interest, but rather on the immediate ‘party interest’. “The decentralization of power – which was necessary but not in such a shape – brought about the formation of pseudo-state units, which were in a majority of cases only nominally states, but in reality they were half-private owned administrative organizations, comprised of patronage and cronyism” (Ibid. 31). The result was that in the situation of grave economic hardship, inevitably each of the eight constituent units (six republics and two autonomous provinces) felt exploited by the other. According to Adamović, the answer was that “many of these problems could have been dealt with had the SFRY more promptly begun its transition towards a market economy – if it had changed the property structure, established a convertible currency, and developed an open economy model” (1995, 151).

The reason why there were no steps taken towards such a process was that “politocrats in all the former republics of SFRY tried to delay and postpone transition toward market economy for one obvious reason: a faster transition to a more evenly mixed ownership within a market economy would inevitably increase the pressure for transition to a new political system, from authoritarian, one-party control, toward multi-party system” (Ibid.). To that end, the politocrats, as Adamović calls them, would eventually turn to nationalistic platform, and use other republics as scapegoats to accuse them for their own difficulties. According to Đinđić, these politocrats “had no state-administrative ethics (without which there is no state), professional competences, nor stable mediators for circulation of local interests. Thus, these creations (the republics), with few exceptions strongly resemble the territorial-political units of the feudal era” (1988, 31). When the trend of democratic revolutions swept through the Eastern Europe and brought political pluralism, the consequences of such party’s policies became evident – the most advanced SFRY’s republics Slovenia and Croatia demanded transition towards full free-market economy based on con-federal model of sovereign states. Expectedly, Serbia would adopt contrary program to economic development, as it saw in con-federalization the possibility of national fragmentation.

5.1.2 The content: the rise of nationalism

Since 1979 and the beginning of the II Cold War, there were numerous examples of a popular breaking from the Cold War ideological bloc bondages and returning to the tribal, religious, ethnic-national paradigms (this was especially the case with the Muslim countries), but also in the context of a dysfunctional and power-diffused state system such as SFRY. The Serb-

Albanian conflict in Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo thus can be viewed in a completely different perspective from the previous cases. Before the 1981 demonstrations there was a three-day major uprising of Kosovo-Albanians in 1968, which was crushed by the JNA intervention. The affair with the leaking of the SANU Memorandum in 1986, and which is commonly perceived as a blueprint for the dissolution of SFRY, was also not the new phenomenon. In 1977 there was the so-called 'Blue book', which was also condemned by LC Serbia.⁷⁶ The Serb-Albanian ethnic conflict over Kosovo was an ongoing problem ever since the end of World War II in 1945. The Cold War system and the SFRY structure froze the conflict which was during the Tito era. Thus, the change on the macro-level that made the objective crisis reshape the internal context necessarily had to change the perspectives of the Serb-Albanian conflict.

The 1974 constitution introduced double standards, for it introduced two different categories: the 'working people' and 'nations and nationalities', which were both granted sovereignty. Thus, "it would not be the working people but the nations and nationalities' 'sovereign rights' in the political focus; in other words, the power would move from the federal level onto the Republics and Autonomous Provinces" (Lapenna 1982, 22). In that context, the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo was the first outbreak of ethnic violence in the post-Tito SFRY. Kosovo was the economically worst-off federal unit which through the 1974 constitutional framework of the self-managing system achieved *a de facto* republican status. Autonomous provinces were guaranteed by the 1974 constitution to practice sovereignty; Serbia's assembly could have participated but could not have vetoed nor objected to the decisions made by the provincial assemblies of Vojvodina and Kosovo. What led to the inter-ethnic conflict between ethnic Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo was, however, what Huntington called, "the demographic change in Kosovo" (Huntington 1999, 320).

Kosovo population statistic showed that in 1961 there were 964.000 ethnic Albanians, while in 1981 this number grew to 1.584 000. According to the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study in 2001, "around 88 % of the population is ethnic Albanians, Serbian population accounted for 7 %, while other ethnic groups together were estimates about 5 % of the general population. Other groups include Muslims (Bosniacs).1.9 % of. Roma 1.7 % and Turks 1 %" (World Bank Living Standards..., 2010). In SAP Kosovo "GDP was 8.8% in the period 1956-64, but fell to 0.4% in the period 1980-84" (Cohen 1993, 31). The national

⁷⁶The 'blue book' was Serbia's party leadership in 1977 attempt to resolve the issue of it autonomous regions with other republics. The approach was a failure and rejected by all republics.

dissatisfaction was in the large part a response to the economic inequality, as “only 12 percent of the total population had jobs in the social sector, and the unemployment rate was three times the SFRY average, at well over 40 percent. It was the case of uneven development on the grand scale” (Benson 2001, 137). On the other hand, the special autonomous right to use the Albanian language instead of Serbian/Croatian made it impossible for the majority to search for jobs elsewhere. Thus “(...) the only domain in which Albanians used their Serbo-Croatian language was only during their military service. It was therefore not surprising that their discontent should take a political turn, in the form of the demands for a separate republic” (Ibid.).

In March 1981, around 20 000 Kosovo-Albanian students in six cities protested demanding the Kosovo-Republic, the seventh republic within the federation.⁷⁷ In April 1981, the SFRY Presidency proclaimed the state of emergency in Kosovo, and later that month, the Central Committee (CC) of LCY held the XX Session on ‘The Activates of the Enemy and Counterrevolutionary Forces in Kosovo’. In the following two years a whole series of sessions of either Central Committee of LCY or CC League of Communists of Serbia took place, to discuss ‘unity and community’ between Serbia and its provinces. The official policy of LC Serbia and LCY was to solve the question of the ‘irredentism’ of Albanians in Kosovo within the framework of mainstream Marxist-Leninist formulas; labeling the demonstrations of 1981 a ‘counterrevolution’; calling for ‘brotherhood and unity’ between Serbs and Albanians; and constantly evoking the values of self-management. They believed that separatism was a ‘negative tendency’ that manifested itself in society primarily due to the horrible economic conditions. However, when the Platform of LCY on Kosovo was agreed that November, the member of CC Dušan Popović warned that Serb nationalism, as a reaction to the Albanian nationalism, might turn into an overall threat to the system. Popović said that “we are witnessing the reemergence of the old well known hot-spots of nationalism in other parts of the country (...). These phenomena are not spontaneous, but the proof of reemerged forces of Serb nationalism. More often we hear that Aleksandar Ranković and Dobrica Ćosić were right regarding Kosovo (...) In opposition to the parole of Albanian nationalists: Kosovo-Republic! Serb nationalists demanded the liquidation of Autonomous Provinces. Thus, in our conclusions we need to consider the growth of Serb nationalism (...) which grows on the fertile ground of etatist-bureaucratic relations” (Srbi i Albanci 1989, 108-09).

⁷⁷ The initial cause for the student strike was bad conditions of the food service at the university.

Nationalism of the Albanian majority in Kosovo was an ongoing issue ever since Serbia incorporated the region during the I Balkan War in 1912. After Kosovo was liberated in late October 1944, an armed uprising of Albanians immediately broke out and was crushed between February and May 1945 by the 52nd Division, personally formed by Tito.⁷⁸ On July 10, the Regional Peoples' Committee of Kosovo and Metohija passed a Resolution, which officially placed the Kosovo region under Serbian constitutional jurisdiction and proclaimed Albanians a nationality (*narodnost*) within the Kosovo autonomous province. At the beginning of April 1945, Tito told the Albanian delegation that the "Albanian people need to know what kind of Yugoslavia we are creating. They need to know that they will be part of this new community and become completely equal to others. In the new Yugoslavia, Albanians will be granted all the necessities that make the nation (*narod*) a nation" (Ibid., 14). Tito's agreement with the delegation of Kosovo Albanians was in fact a granting legitimacy for the future demands on the independent republic, based on the controversial *Bujanovo Promise*.⁷⁹ According to some sources, Tito apparently told the Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha in 1946, during his visit to Belgrade where they signed the treaty of SFRY-Albanian friendship, that "Kosovo was always Albanian and the day will soon come when the Yugoslav communists would give the Kosovo province back to Albania" (Judah 2002, 57). In the Serb public perception it was thus believed that the 1974 constitution, which carved Serbia into three territorial units, was the final step into realization of the promise Tito gave the Albanians after World War II.

The formation of The Marxist-Leninist Group of Kosovo (which organized the protests in 1981), was a form of political expression of the Albanian younger generation for a separate republic, which was supported by all means by the Albanian secret service. The Marxist-Leninist Group was allegedly formed by one of Fadil Hoxha's (Kosovo LC leader) agent Bia Voxhi. "She lived in Kosovo, and began contacting her brother in Albania who was closely connected to Enver Hoxha. Together with Dimitrije Jović and Boro Ćulafić, the three of them

⁷⁸ The uprising led by Shaban Pallusha against the new communist rule brought together the Nazi-sympathizers in the Second Prizren League, Balli Kombetar, SS Skender Division and Enver Hoxha's communists.

⁷⁹ The Conference of the Peoples' Liberation Committee at a village of Bujanovo held between December 31 1943 and January 2 1944, and which came to be remembered as the so-called *Bujanovo Promise*, is the first cornerstone event in understanding Kosovo's Albanian future strive for independence. The Conference, led by Albanian, Serbian and Montenegrin communists, concluded that the "Versailles" Yugoslavia was an imperialistic creation ran by and for the Serbian bourgeois, which systematically oppressed other nations-Kosovo Albanians among others. Thus, the conclusion of the Conference resolution explicitly stated that Albanians, like other Yugoslav nations be able to determine their own future through the right of self-determination and ultimately secession. Despite the abandoning of the Bujanovo Conference Resolution with a new Regional Assembly of Kosovo Resolution on July 9 1945, the *Bujanovo Promise* would remain one of the main arguments for Kosovo-Albanians demanding a Republic.

formed the Marxist-Leninist Party of Kosovo, which operated under the influence of the Interior Ministry of Albania” (Bulić 1990, 5).

At the beginning of 1984, the local Belgrade radio station aired an interview with Bajrusha Gjemali, one of the condemned leaders of the Kosovo-Albanian Marxist-Leninist Party of Kosovo in the well know trial in Serbia. His explanation of the Kosovo-Albanian dissatisfaction with the system portrayed the popular opinion of the time, claiming that “(...) our goal is the unification of all ethnic Albanians in one country. I hold the view that the Kosovo-Republic would not threaten the integrity of our existing state, therefore, we are not attacking nor do we want to bring down the existing system” (Milošević 1984, 13). When asked what is wrong with the present conditions in the system and why does he believe the Kosovo Albanians are not equal, Gjemali answered “(...) beacues we can not be equal if we are not economically equal (...) without economic equality there is no national equality” (Ibid.). The usage of language here is also significant. In the early phases, the Kosovo Albanians did not use the terminology that was specifically ‘theirs’, but in order to legitimize their demands they also used the terminology of scientific Marxism. The accusations made by the two reporters of the radio program, that the Group proclaimed in their pamphlet *Pararoja* (The Vanguard) the Kosovo-Republic to be an ethnically clean state as a precondition for Great Albania, Gjemali replied that such accusations are “reactionary and fascistic” (Ibid.).

The early signs of the rising Serbian nationalism as a reaction to the Albanian separatism were exposed in 1983, at the funeral of Aleksandar Ranković, which was attended reportedly by around 100 000 people. While Ranković was the head of the secret service UDBA (1945-66), there were regular cases of harassment of the local Albanian population. The VI Extended Plenum of CC LC Serbia in 1966 – at which Ranković was sacked – concluded that the province counted “around 100.000 dossiers, and of those, 50.000 were coming directly from UDBA” (Srbi i Albanci 1989, 78). According to Branko Horvat, “since 1953 – when the Balkan Pact was signed with Turkey (...) – up until 1966, around 231,000 people were deported to Turkey. And 80% of them were Albanians, who prior to deportation had to undergo the degrading procedure and declare themselves as Turks” (Ibid., 85). Thus, the massive attendance of Ranković’s funeral was commented on as a ‘demonstration of Serb solidarity’; their strong expression of how they view the ‘Kosovo problem’ and the overall support for the ‘unitary SFRY’.

In January 1986, a local Serbian journal *Književne novine* published the petition of 2000 Serbs and Montenegrins, demanding an immediate attention of LC Serbia to their ‘difficult position

in the SAP Kosovo'. From the following month onwards, organized groups of Serbs and Montenegrins would routinely visit Belgrade and protest (as was the case on June 27, when the large group protested in front of the SFRY Assembly during the IX Plenum of LCY on the Kosovo issue). On a regular basis they would meet with the President of Presidency of Serbia Ivan Stambolić. Finally, the culmination of Serb dissatisfaction with the situation in Kosovo and overall constitutional position of Serbia within SFRY was expressed in the Memorandum written by the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, which was leaked to the press in September 1986.⁸⁰ Ivan Stambolić condemned the Memorandum stating that "this document was the indictment of not only the leadership and the policies of the LC, but of the whole social system. He also said that according to the so-called Memorandum, Serbian people have nothing else to do but to rebel, because everybody, supposedly, hates them and that SFRY was nothing else but their Golgotha; in Kosovo, Vojvodina, Croatia, Bosnia and everywhere else." (Lalović 1989, 119). It was clear however to Stambolić that the need for the constitutional changes was necessary.

The Serbian leadership was preparing to publicly announce the immediate need for the constitutional changes in relation to its provinces on the Federal level. Relying on the proposition made by the SFRY Presidency in January 1987 which called for a change of the 1974 constitution, Stambolić in his discussions with Kosovo-Serb protestors gained popular legitimacy. That July Stambolić announced at the Central Committee of LC Serbia meeting the necessity of constitutional reform which will be discussed soon. There he said that the proposition for the change of the 1974 constitution will be brought and discussed by Serbia on the federal level. However, the events that took place two months later, in September during the VIII Secession CC LC Serbia changed the political course of the Serbian party politics. Milošević, by placing the Kosovo issue in the focus of the discussion as a problem which the present political elite was not prompt enough in settling, took over the leadership of LC Serbia through the initiated fall of Stambolić and the head of the Belgrade party organization Dragiša Pavlović (Pavlović 1988, 313-318). The role of the media in the rise of Milošević in the Serbian LC was crucial (Marković 2002, 211-221).

Slobodan Milošević's rise to power should be seen as a chain of accidental events. In the first half of 1980s, Serbia's top two political figures of the old generation Petar Stambolić and

⁸⁰SANU Memorandum was written by the commission composed of prominent Serbian intellectuals: Pavle Ivić, Antonije Isaković, Dušan Kanazir, Mihailo Marković, Miloš Macura, Dejan Medaković, Miroslav Pantić, Nikola Pantić, Ljubiša Rakić, Radovan Samardžić, Miomir Vukobratović Vasilije Krestić, Kosta Mihailović, Ivan Maksimović, Stojan Čelić, Nikola Čobeljić

Draža Marković, who both helped Tito purge the liberal party leadership in 1972, began a power struggle in the LC (Vladislavljević 2004, 191). Stambolić backed his position by relying on a younger cadre, represented by his nephew Ivan Stambolić. When in 1985 Ivan Stambolić entered the local party Presidium, he ignored Tito's heritage of 'collective leadership'. Personally managing the LC politics and "by using the power of his office, he ignored the informal practice of broad consultation in the leadership about nominations for key posts (...)" (Ibid.). Thus, despite the strong opposition in the party, Stambolić would personally arrange the appointment of Slobodan Milošević as the new head of the regional party Presidium in 1986. Stambolić's consolidation of power and Milošević's rise in party *nomenclatura* came at a time of regular protests of Kosovo-Serbs in Belgrade. Backed by the popular support of Kosovo-Serb protestors, Stambolić would during 1986-87 prepare to take the Kosovo issue on the federal level, and needed Milošević's full support. Acting on his orders, it was by pure chance that on his two visits to Kosovo in April 1987, Milošević would promise faster resolve of the Serb problem in Kosovo, accidentally launching himself in the public perception as the first politician in Serbia ready to stand up for the Serbs.⁸¹

When Milošević took over the control in Serbia's LC in September 1987 he was supported by the JNA structures. It was no accident that at the same day (23 September) when Milošević overthrew his opponents, Minister of Defense Branko Mamula and the top army leadership held a session discussion the possibility of the military coup. The demand for the faster reaction to the escalating situation in Kosovo could have been satisfied only by removing the main obstacle: the bureaucratic system. The weak state system, the power diffusion in the 'center' and the overall process of system and identity crisis, matched with the rising street nationalism, made it possible for a new Serbian leadership to implement radical changes.

5.1.3 The Anti-bureaucratic Revolution: the collapse of the state system

We have previously explained the problem of the bureaucratization of the party politics – the rationality crisis caused by the economic crisis – as a major cause for the decay of popular legitimacy of the regime. Milošević's Anti-bureaucratic Revolution of 1988-89, the so-called 'happening of the people', relied on street protests as a popular expression of the dissatisfaction with the highly bureaucratized old party cadre in SAPs Vojvodina and Kosovo

⁸¹ That Milošević's popular rise was a pure chance can be seen from the chronology of his trips to Kosovo that April: on the first visit he approached both sides equally by praising 'brotherhood and unity' in his speeches. On his return to Belgrade, his wife would make pressure on him to take the more firm position, and side with the Serbs (Death of Yugoslavia, episode I). Few days later, he returned to Kosovo and proclaimed that 'no one should dare to beat' the Serbs, openly siding with the one side in the conflict.

and Socialist Republic of Montenegro, where Milošević installed his own loyal cadre by overthrowing the old one. At the CC LCY meeting on January 30, 1989, Milošević said that “things that cannot be changed institutionally, and they must be changed because people don’t like them or they lasted for too long, will be changed uninstitutionally. It’s always been like that in any society” (Milan Kučan as a witness on Milošević trial, 2010). The anti-bureaucratic character of Milošević’s revolution had maybe one, if not the only result – the centralization of the state apparatus around the dominant Serbian nation. By installing Milošević’s loyal subjects in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro, Serbia would dominate the federal institution of the Presidency and the LCY. Milošević tried “similar attempts in Slovenia and Croatia that were unsuccessful because the Slovenian party leadership, and later Croatian, realized the full danger that threatens their republics” (Malešević 2004, 280).

The year 1990 marked the final stage of the gradual collapse of SFRY by losing both the *internal* and *external* levels of legitimacy support and the system collapse. *Internally*, the LCY dissolved on January 22 as the Slovene and Croatian delegations left the session during the XIV Extraordinary Congress.⁸² The collapse of the party in a one-party system meant not only delegitimization of the complete system, but the inevitable replacement with an alternate model: pluralism. Vladimir Goati made a large contribution with his empirical study which he conducted by sampling 4361 members of LCY prior to the XIV Extraordinary Congress. His analysis showed that there were two major tendencies – centralist and pluralist. Centralist was favored by a majority of Serb delegates while the pluralist was favored by Slovenian and Croatian members (Goati 1993, 389-399).

Parallel with such a process was the loss of the *external* support for legitimization as the ‘velvet revolutions’ overthrew the socialist order in Eastern Europe. Slovenia and Croatia followed the international trend by holding the first parliamentary free elections in April, while Serbia and Montenegro held the free elections later that year. The elections were held in the following order – Slovenia April 8, united opposition DEMOS won 55% of the seats. Croatia April 22, opposition Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won 41, 5% (but thanks to the majority the electoral system won 193 out of 365 seats). Bosnia and Herzegovina November 18, three national opposition parties won; the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) 86 seats; the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) 72; and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 44. Macedonia November 25 (second round), opposition VMRO-DPMNE won with

⁸²The cause for the Slovenian delegation's withdrawal was pressure from the Serbian delegation to block all Slovenian proposals.

37 seats (LC Macedonia 31 seats). And finally Serbia and Montenegro December 26, Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) won a majority of 192 out of 250 seats (Montenegro was the only country where the League of Communists remained in power). (Marković 2000, 6-9)

Milošević officially opposed the propositions of the newly elected democratic governments of Slovenia and Croatia to reorganize SFRY as a con-federal state of sovereign nations and defended the unitary federation (restructured through the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution). New governments in Slovenia (under Milan Kučan) and in Croatia (under Franjo Tuđman) realized the international context of the decaying socialist order. To them the crisis in SFRY could be solved only through the further liberal reforms of the 1960s and 1970s that would lead to the pluralist political union (con-federation) of the sovereign republics. On June 30, the Croatian Parliament proposed amendments to the Croatian Constitution with which Croatia would cease to be a 'Socialist Republic'. The President of the Parliament Vladimir Šeks said that "state sovereignty of Croatia in the union with other republics could be achieved only on the con-federal grounds, as a framework for union of sovereign states" (Marković 2000, 7). On July 2, the Slovenian Assembly drafted a Declaration on state sovereignty of Slovenia. "Slovenian initiatives considering the intra-national and social relations within the SFRY by the end of the 1980s were all failures. The idea to arrange the state according to the con-federal model, which was also known as the asymmetric federation that would ultimately become the state of sovereign peoples was dismissed" (Nečak 1992, 8). In other words, the Slovenes saw such political concept as part of the modernization process in the context of moving towards the Western democracies, and which they advocated but did not achieve in the process of "creating first and second Yugoslavia" (Ibid.)

This act was condemned few days earlier, on June 26, during the session of Assembly of Serbia. On that session (where it was decided that special measures would be imposed on Kosovo) concern was expressed about Slovenian and Croatian propositions for a con-federal model, because Serbia proposes "a constitution of federation as a democratic union of states, pluralist, and with private ownership (...) but if other nations do not desire SFRY as a federation, all options are opened" (Božić 1990, 3). In opposition to Slovenian and Croatia, Serbia would be the first republic to draft its new constitution in September 1990 which confirmed the achievements of the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution, stating that the "Republic of Serbia is a democratic state of all its citizens (...) two Provinces lost the attributes of statehood, and are transformed into units with territorial autonomy" (Marković 2000, 8).

Furthermore, the new constitution addressed one important element which basically declared Serbian independence from SFRY, as article 72 explicitly states that “The Republic of Serbia introduces and secures: sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and its international position and relations with other states and international organizations (...) defense and security of the Republic of Serbia” (NKRBIH Bosanski kongres, 2010).

Serbia was thus the first republic to act in a secessionist way. Nevertheless, Milošević officially presented himself as the defender of an integrated SFRY and opposing the ‘secessionist’ Slovenian and Croatian government. Asked by a BBC journalist in August 1991, does he aspire to achieve a greater Serbia, Milošević answered “No, it is not so. We want to keep SFRY and that is all” (Serbian President Interviewd..., 2010). However, his government began practicing sovereignty on the territory of the republic without any consultation with other republics.

In late 1990, the head of SIV Ante Marković was informed that the Serbian government and the Serbian National Bank had broken into the monetary system, and that “it had transferred 18.2 billion dinars to the Central Bank of Serbia for its purposes without any coverage. That was” according to Marković “daylight robbery, pure and simple. And it shook the very foundations of SFRY” (Ante Marković as a witness on Milošević trial, 2010). The decentralized structure of the federal system enabled the new Serbian government a possibility to nationalize firms on its territory as well. The Croatian oil company INA is a good example. It was composed of nine BOALs within the whole of SFRY. In September 1990, the workers of the six INA BOALs in Serbia organized referendums to separate from the company’s ‘center’ in Croatia.⁸³ Even though “these separations were illegal in context of Milošević’s preparations for war and the creation of a centralized state, no one dared to question the ‘spontaneous’ workers’ decisions to block all relations with their company leaderships from the so-called separatist republics” (Cvitić 2010, 33).

The reaction to the rising Serb nationalism and human rights violations in Kosovo was expressed in the popular urge within Slovenia and Croatia to further disassociate from SFRY, based on the newly constructed perception that Serbian Orthodoxy and nationalism were the same part of the state-centralist ideologically propagated by Milošević, equal with the eastern-like USSR. Thus, according to Benson “the ‘velvet revolutions’ in Eastern Europe paved the

⁸³The BOAL was situated in Belgrade, which after separating from the Croatian firm, was followed by the BOALs of Novi Sad, Kraljevo, Svetozarevo, Niš and Priština.

way to a relatively smooth incorporation of the Catholic periphery of the Soviet empire within the ambit of the European Community and NATO, adding the new sense of urgency to the efforts of Croatia and Slovenia to ‘disassociate’ themselves from the SFRY federation” (2001, 156). The necessity of these two republics to distance themselves from SFRY would bring the remaining influential and integrating institution of the SFRY to the stage: the JNA. As the LCY disappeared in January 1990 and the republics were in a deadlock, with the beginning of 1991 JNA would take on the role of the major political force, called to protect ‘Tito’s heritage’ and the ‘traditions of the revolution’.

However, in order to understand these internal processes that would eventually lead to the armed conflict in 1991 and the collapse of the state, we have to set the new context for the post-II Cold War order, the last détente between US and USSR that led to the collapse of Socialist bloc and the end of the Cold War bipolar system.

5.2 The international context: the end of the Cold War (1989-91)

The victory of liberal capitalism over one-party socialism in 1989-91 was possible primarily because of the results of Reagan’s crusade in the early 1980s. The element of coincidence in this process should not be underestimated. Vladislav Zubok claimed that “it was Reagan’s luck that his presidency coincided with the generational change in the Kremlin, that is, with the exit of the old guard and the rise of the Westernized ‘enlightened’ apparatchiks around Mikhail Gorbachev” (Zubok 2010, 111).

Gorbachev’s foreign and domestic policy in this period was simple – in order to finance the domestic economic reform *Perestroika*, the expensive exercising of Brezhnev’s Doctrine should have been abandoned. Apparently, during the funeral of his predecessor in March 1985, Gorbachev reportedly told the summoned leaders of Eastern Europe that “the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ no longer applied” (Brown 2010, 253). Furthermore, this would not just mean abandoning the doctrine that held the empire intact in Eastern Europe and the withdrawal from Afghanistan, but also the end of the expensive support for Moscow loyal regimes in the III World. “Gorbachev’s attitude began to change in 1987 and by mid-1988 he had reached the view that the governments of Eastern Europe should be left to govern as they wished, without outside interference (...), (thus) the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty was finally thrown overboard” (Fowkes 1995, 171). Gorbachev publicly proclaimed on the

Plenum of the IX Party Congress in May 1988, that Eastern European “countries are free to choose their own social system” (Ibid.). This paved a way to pluralism in the next two years.

5.2.1 The re-emergence of international anarchy?

What the US president George H. W. Bush (1989-92) considered to be the beginning of the ‘new world order’ or what Fukuyama called the ‘end of history’ in the late 1980s (Fukuyama 1992), was the prevail of liberal democracy and market economy over the ideological bipolar structure of the Cold War. The monetary shock in the international financial order, technological superiority over the USSR, the debt crisis of the III World and the adjustment policies supported by theoretical, ideological and intellectual traditions of liberalism made the victory possible. When it came to Eastern Europe, policy of ‘differentiation’ made further contribution to the overall success. However, for the neo-realists the period of 1989-91 would simply be described as the re-emergence of international anarchy. Rosenau claims that with the prevail of a liberal-democracy of the western type at the end of the Cold War, the ‘new world order’ never even slightly appeared. According to Roseanu “(...) at best there was an attempt to contain the ever growing uncontrolled disorder, while political turbulences becomes the post-Cold War significance” (Rosenau in Meyers 1999, 7). According to Waltz and the neo-realists, “the international systems are ordered based on the principle of its members’ sovereign equality and it is therefore de-centralized and anarchic. Since there is no supreme power that is entitled to command, the parts of international political systems stand in relations of coordination. Anarchy, in this account, then becomes the main (and the only) ordering principle, which is held as a constant” (Minaev, 2010).

If that is the case, constructivists are right to ask that “if anarchy is a constant and the states are functionally similar then; what explains variation in international structure and thereby generates varying outcomes” (Ibid.)? The answer lies in the differentiation of the complex nature of the international system. The international environment was too complex and diffused to simply state that it was the ‘international anarchy’ that came to dominate the system at the end of the Cold War. From the constructivist aspect, we have to draw the line between two spheres of international interaction – the sphere of interaction where international anarchy broke out, and the one where the liberal-democratic ‘new world order’ prevailed. It must be emphasized that dismissing the elements of political-economic integration and ideological concepts of the ‘new world order’ can be problematic, because specifically through the systemic contextualization we can notice that the West’s prevail in

the Cold War resulted in its deeper bonding and integration (i.e. from European Community to European Union), while the international anarchy overtook mostly the Cold War 'losers'; and ideologically SFRY belonged into that group. That is what Senghaas calls the contemporaneous of non-contemporaneously; "internationalization, trans-nationalization, globalization of economic, social and cultural interconnection on the one hand and on the other defensive demarcation, disintegration, fragmentation of political institutions and interconnection of relations" (Senghaas in Meyers 1999, 9).

If we consider this context that relates to the so-called 'borderline' or 'peripheral' zones, in other words the post-socialist and post-colonial space, we will see that in the systemic sense there is a certain pattern. After the collapse of the USSR – the centre of the Socialist bloc power – on these bordering areas "there were more wars fought than ever before since the World War II ended" (Meyers 1999, 10). Thus, in such a context SFRY was no exception. Furthermore, this perspective supports the argument presented by Charles Kegly (1991), that the bipolar structure of the Cold War system was basically the preservation of the 'un-peaceful peace' among the nuclear powers. The end of such a peace system would leave only the un-peaceful structures behind; domestic ethno-national and religious violence within or among the units. Of course, this does not presuppose that the roots of the conflicts are equal, but that there was a certain level of plausibility that with the decay of the international system the space in crisis would be prone to disintegration and war.

Considering the 'defeated' 'center', in the second half of the 1980s, the USSR under Gorbachev began rethinking its foreign and domestic policy, which was at some instances perceived as an attack on Brezhnev's heritage. But by being so it largely contributed to the peaceful dissolution of the Socialist bloc. Observing the shift in USSR foreign policy under Gorbachev in the late 1980s, Robert Legvol asked – "Why now? Why, when only a few years ago USSR policy seemed so menacing in its rigidity? Part of the answer lies in the fact that radical circumstance often stirs radical change, and the USSR circumstance these days is surely radical" (1989, 82). However, the international system breakdown would have opposite effect on the SFRY's permanent crisis system. So far much has been written on the diplomatic failures of the international community in managing the SFRY crisis. James Gow (1997) and Carol Hodge (2007) made probably the greatest contribution in the scholarly analyses of the West's mismanagement and failed attempts to prevent the armed conflict. The view of this dissertation is that the reasons why the international community did not succeed in preventing the crisis escalate into armed conflict was primarily due the perception that was being

systematically built throughout the Cold War. That was a view of SFRY that had its specific place in the bipolar structure and which was altogether internationally an important subject. Therefore, the West approached the SFRY crisis with the completely wrong formula – integrated SFRY, pluralist system and peaceful solution to the crisis using diplomatic mediation.

5.2.2 SFRY-US interaction at the end of the Cold War

Despite economic and political realities, the US continued to support SFRY, based on the well established myth that SFRY was somehow important to the US in that area, and promoted their relations on the basis of *traditional* understandings. However, after the Polish government dissolved the Solidarity Movement in 1981, the US refused to grant further loans and blocked further financial support of Eastern Europe, placing Poland in the focus of the new Western strategy towards the Socialist bloc in economic terms. The NSDD Nr. 75 explicitly stated that the Reagan administration objective is to “carefully discriminate in favor of countries that show relative independence from the USSR in their foreign policy or those that show a greater degree of internal liberalization” (75, 2010). Here, the Reagan administration had exactly “two countries in mind – SFRY and Poland, respectively” (Kengor 2006, 169). By 1989, when the communist system began to collapse “SFRY was in a certain way placed back in the context of Eastern Europe, where Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia already had much more dynamic political and economic systems and were better prepared for the reform and democratization; and were at the same time strategically more important, thus becoming considerably more interesting to US foreign policy” (Kovačević 2007, 43). What was the position of SFRY in the US perception at that stage, especially if we consider that the most of the East European socialist countries began their own internal economic and social reforms?

On October 9, 1989, SFRY’s PM Ante Marković traveled to Washington to meet with the US president George H. W. Bush to discuss the domestic SFRY crisis. Also during that meeting, Bush and Marković discussed the democratic transformations in Eastern Europe. According to Jovan Vejnović, Marković’s political adviser Bush was very interested in discussing the political problems SFRY was faced with, making the US’s position clear on two important points. First, “SFRY is a specific case in relation to other Eastern European countries, and that is the reason why it is so interesting to the US. (It must be emphasized that at that point nobody could have predicted the collapse of USSR)” (Interview with Kopač, 2010). Second

important point made at the meeting was Bush's insisting that SFRY with "its specific social, multi-national and economic system will serve as an example of how to implement a successful reform and achieve transformation of Eastern Europe (Bush mentioned that several times during the discussion)" (Ibid.). That means that the US saw SFRY as a role model for the states breaking from the Socialist bloc.

SFRY's independent model of socialism, which has been an objective of US strategy in the Eastern European area since the early 1950s, would finally complete its role in helping the process of Eastern European democratization process. To that end, at that meeting Bush openly offered a "strong support (through economic means) to SFRY's unity and territorial integrity" (Ibid.), however, also mentioning that that support would mean "SFRY's own transformation; democratization and market economy, which was nothing irritating considering that such a suggestion went hand in hand with Marković's own program of economic and social reform" (Ibid.).

The reform that would lead towards democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe was also intended for SFRY. The NSDD Nr. 133 document stated that "the U.S. policy will be to promote the trend toward an effective, market oriented SFRY's economic structure" (133, 2010), which shows that the main US foreign policy actors and decision-makers did not fully consider the domestic repercussions – namely nationalism – which democratization and economic liberalization might produce in SFRY. The idea of SFRY as a traditional US ally would formulate an interest that the state should be preserved in order to present a model of democratization to Eastern Europe, by ignoring the fact that the SFRY structure could not survive without a one-party system due to the loss of internal legitimacy.

The contradicting political approach, which approved the integrated SFRY but disapproved of the socialist system, was expressed in November 1990 with the passing of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Law 101-513 in the US Congress. It threatened to cut all aid, trade, credits and loans to SFRY within six months; "provided that this section shall not apply if all six of the individual Republics of the SFRY have held free and fair multiparty elections and are not engaged in a pattern of systematic gross violations of human rights" (FOAL 101-513, 2010). This was the main issue; support for the federal government was conditioned by *multiparty elections* which either brought to power (Tuđman in Croatia) or confirmed in power (Milošević in Serbia and Kučan in Slovenia) republican governments that were on a collision course over how to decompose the state.

Another important element that contributed to the lack of US's firm stand towards the SFRY crisis was the obvious ignorance of the main decision-makers. In his last year as president in June 1988, Ronald Reagan wrote in his diary a short comment, "Rioting in Yugoslavia against Communist party" (Brinkly 2007, 622). This note referred to the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution in Serbia. In order to bring down communism at any price, the US did not consider the main threat to the integrity of SFRY's state system – nationalism, which reemerged (starting with the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo) in the context of the international trends of rising tribal, ethnic and religious sentiments as the result of the II Cold War. When George H. W. Bush became president, his lack of interest for SFRY matched his ignorance (he was more preoccupied with the collapse of the USSR, unification of Germany and most importantly the US's military intervention in Iraq). This can be seen from Bush's discussions with Brent Scowcroft, his National Security Adviser. "Scowcroft always had an impression that Bush was distancing himself from the Balkan issues. Bush was confused with the complexity of the problem, always asking same questions which side was which; who were the Bosnians, who were the Bosnian Serbs, who were the Muslims, who were the Kosovars, and who were Croats and Slovenes (...). It was almost a ritual – Bush would first read the intelligence reports from SFRY, and then he would ask Scowcroft 'Could you now please explain to me what is going on here'" (Halberstam 2002, 43-44).

SFRY's last ambassador in Washington in the late 1980s, Živorad Kovačević correctly noticed that the US is responsible for the collapse and armed conflict in SFRY insofar "for doing *nothing*, in other words they were not ready to take decisive steps with which the process of dissolution would be placed under control" (2007, 81). However, SFRY's Federal leadership did not even count on the political interference of US to resolve the crisis, but hoped that the crisis could be overcome only within the political framework of integration with the EC.

5.2.3 SFRY and the European Community

EC took over the role of the crisis manager in resolving the SFRY crisis in the period 1990-91. This was welcomed by the US Secretary of State James Baker, who stated that it was a test for Europeans to see for how long and how far they could operate as a united and great power (Baker 1995, 636-37). Even SFRY's Secretary of foreign affairs Budimir Lončar argued that the primary role in resolving the SFRY inter-republican conflict should be given to the European Community, for the crisis can only be resolved within the context of SFRY-

EC political integration and there were three main arguments why the SFRY federal leadership under the new PM Ante Marković wanted to give EC primacy over the crisis: “1. Institutional relations have already been established with the EC, and the SFRY leadership openly opted for moving towards Europe. 2. Internally; the US was widely perceived and understood as a Cold War superpower. 3. Externally; the US was preoccupied with the I Gulf War, the unification of Germany, the process of collapse of the Socialist bloc and the elections at home” (Interview with Lončar, 2008). However, Europe itself did not have a common approach towards the SFRY crisis.

As the East and West Germany began their unification, Germany’s political actions were under strong suspicion from other Western states (namely Great Britain and France), who feared internal German revisionism and the overthrow of the international order, as Germany had already done with the Versailles system in the 1930s provoking the World War II. The often debated German support for Slovenian and Croatian independence (the argument of Susan Woodward, 1995) should be observed in this context. Unified Germany was seen as supportive of Slovenia and Croatia in order to reestablish its dominance in Central and Eastern Europe through its concept of *Kleinmitteleuropa*. However, the Germany did not initially give Slovenia and Croatia the support for independence. Quite the contrary, the German government followed the EC official foreign policy approach of supporting integrated SFRY. By July 1991, German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher “was not at all preoccupied with the internal SFRY crisis and the main reason was the good relations between Bonn and Belgrade, which Genscher had been building since the early 1970s” (Libal 2004, 16). The motivation behind the approach of supporting an integrated SFRY was ‘finding a peaceful solution to the SFRY crisis’. Therefore, on February 19, 1991, the “German Chancellor Helmut Kohl sent a letter to SFRY’s PM Ante Marković in which he gives ‘full support to SFRY unity with high hopes for a peaceful political dialogue and no use or threat of use of force in order to develop new forms of co-existence between the republics in SFRY’” (Ibid., 17).

The aggressive policies of Milošević and JNA towards Slovenian and Croatia would make a change in the opinion of the German leadership. Realizing the real cause of the crisis in SFRY, Germany would insist on recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. If the whole Europe would follow their proposition of recognition, JNA and the new/old communist elite in Serbia would realized that their political goals would meet opposition from the international community. When in late June 1991 JNA invaded Slovenia (after it proclaimed

independence), Gensher found legitimization for his support of Slovenian and Croatian independence, by stating that “the actions of the JNA relieved the German leadership of any obligation to unified SFRY. However, even now Gensher did not show readiness to consider recognizing Croatia and Slovenia, but rather talked about the preventing JNA’s aggression against the Slovenian people as the priority of European diplomatic efforts” (Ibid., 30).

Great Britain and France favored unified SFRY at all costs, and were reluctant to recognize Slovenia and Croatia even in the late 1991, when the whole international community recognized Serbia and JNA as the aggressors. Great Britain saw in Milošević a natural ally, as he was officially defending the unified SFRY. For example, when Slovenia was invaded by JNA in late June 1991, the session of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) took place few days later to discuss the crisis situation. Milošević and JNA were openly supported by Douglas Hurd, British foreign minister, who after 34 votes against one (SFRY’s representative) condemned JNA’s action as aggression, stated that “CSCE functioning is questionable and a little can be achieved through it, so we should not rely much on this organization” (Hodge 2007, 33).

The question remains what would have been the reaction of Great Britain to SFRY crisis had its PM Margaret Thatcher not step down from office in 1990. Thatcher saw the aspirations for national self-determination of Slovenian and Croatian people (with their wish to introduce free-market economy) within the framework of her own ideological belief system. Thus, she was highly critical of her successors and Western governments’ reluctance to recognize these two republics. Thatcher wrote that “they (Europe) had made three crucial mistakes. First, they tried to preserve the unified SFRY even though it was obvious that it was impossible. This only contributed to the JNA’s view that the international community would not intervene when it attacks the succeeding republics. Second, the international community imposed an arms embargo on the whole of SFRY, which made it impossible for Slovenes, Croats and Bosnians to defend themselves against a much stronger aggressor. Third, the attempt to objectively divide the guilt among the conflicting parties, even though it was clear who was the victim and who was the aggressor, made the West to a certain extent a coconspirator in this crime” (Thatcher 2004, 259).

Unlike the US, which wanted to preserve SFRY based on the Cold War myth, Great Britain and France had a whole range of reasons from economic to those deeply ideational that had to do with the traditions of their foreign policies. According to Thomas Froeschl “one of the important reasons why Europe, and especially Great Britain and France, were politically

dedicated to preserve SFRY at any cost – even though the outbreak of violence first in Slovenia and later in Croatia proved that the common state was impossible – was because of their perception of Yugoslav state as their own historical success, which they as the Entente Alliance supported in its creation in 1918, and are, thus historically responsible for it” (Froeschl lecture, 2004). To some extent ignorance also played the role but not as much as in the case of the US. However, much more practical reason for support of SFRY’s integriton lay in the fact that SFRY “was the main trade route between Greece and the other parts of the EC. (...) Whereas US aid was 5 million dollars, the EC had large scale aid and trade involvement: in addition to the EC’s own links (800 million pounds aid over five years and a 40% share of SFRY’s exports) it was also co-coordinating the Group of 24 industrial nation’s aid programme of 3, 6 billion pounds” (Gow 1997, 49).

Another important element was the fear of international anarchy. Europe was at that point close to discussing a creation of a deeper Union at Maastricht. The collapse of the international constellations in 1989-91 made them fear that the rules according to which the international society functioned ever since the end of the World War II were off. Their own project of European Union would have found itself within the international anarchy and the SFRY crisis were a threat too close to their own security. Thus, most of the European politicians felt very conservative when it came to SFRY; they wanted to preserve the state in order to preserve the old equilibrium. Above all, the possible secession of Croatia and Slovenia would present a danger to CSCE principles, on which contemporary Europe was based. The “worry for the United States and Western Europe was that Croatia’s and Slovenia’s secession would set a precedent for secessions elsewhere – in the Soviet Union with many attendant nuclear complications, but also in Western Europe (in France, Spain, Italy, and, of course, Britain). Allied to this was the fear that the breakup of SFRY would plunge the whole of South-Eastern Europe into a crisis by reopening a number of old territorial disputes centering on Kosovo and Macedonia and involving most of SFRY’s immediate neighbors, as well as Turkey” (Cviić 1993, 77).

The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gianni de Michelis said that “not to touch the borders was a formal attitude more than anything (...). It was a substantial position for a very simple reason and not very clear in Belgrade and Zagreb but extremely clear to us – if we started to admit then that the new Europe could be born by changing borders, Europe itself would have blown up” (King’s College Archive, 2007). Same holds for Great Britain, whose defense minister John Nott stated on numerous occasions that the British support for SFRY “was

primarily conditioned with their own experiences with the Northern Ireland” (Hodge 2007, 32). Therefore, “what was going on in SFRY in 1989-90 was for the West, quite simply, the wrong crisis (one of disintegration in an integrating Europe) at the wrong time (when it had to cope in Europe with the aftermath of Germany's unification and dramatic changes in the USSR and in the Middle East with Iraq) and in the wrong place (the Balkans, which had ceased to be a region of high strategic importance). The status quo in SFRY was what its immediate neighbors, too – from Austria and Italy to Albania and Greece – were keen to preserve” (Cviić 1993, 77).

SFRY was a state that was dependent on the bipolar international structure. It began to transform and internally decay with the changed balance in the bipolar structures during the II Cold War. As the international system crumbled in 1989-91, SFRY's domestic crisis could have been prevailed, as the Federal leadership saw it, only if there was an incorporation or integration of SFRY into another structure. The NAM was losing on international relevance since 1979; the Socialist bloc began to gradually collapse after 1989; therefore SFRY leadership found its natural path towards the system's integration in the European Community. EC had two objectives: the unified SFRY and finding peaceful solution to the crisis. As the integration into a larger structure began with the unification of Germany – the Democratic Republic of Germany being the first Socialist bloc state to enter the EC – Austria took on the leading role in the integrating process.

Fritz Hoess, the Austrian ambassador in US, managed to attract a large number of US companies to invest into opening Eastern European markets throughout Austria, which was presented “as a *gateway to Eastern Europe*” (Eichtinger and Wohnout 2009, 208). At the beginning of 1989, Austria's foreign minister Alois Mock met with the Hungarian PM Peter Medgyessy to discuss the formation of the regional forum, known as the Quadragonal (comprised of Austria, Italy, SFRY and Hungary, and soon to be joined by Czechoslovakia and Poland). The regional group was formed on November 11, 1989 – a few days after the fall of the Berlin Wall – by Mock, Medgyessy, Lončar and Italian foreign minister de Michelis. Alois Mock was one of the first European politicians who recognized the nature of the SFRY crisis, thus “all his diplomatic effort were focused on integrating SFRY into European Community. Already between 1987 and 1989, Mock with the Norwegian government, proposed a joint initiative for creating a special EFTA fund for SFRY (...) Mock further proposed the invitation to Serbia to join the Working Group of Danube Countries in 1990” (Ibid., 213).

Lončar officially proposed SFRY for candidacy for EC membership already in December 1988. The candidacy was publicly addressed during the session of Councils of Europe, which met with the SFRY federal representatives on a yearly basis. The proposition was originally given by EC commissioner Claude Cheysson (from Jacques Delors Commission responsible for Mediterranean and South-Eastern Europe) with the guarantee to Lončar that “the proposition would be backed with the support of foreign ministers from Italy (de Michelis) and West Germany (Gensher; who chaired that session of the EC Council of Ministers)” (Interview with Lončar, 2008). The session ended with the conclusion that EC ministers would consider the proposition at the informal dinner that followed. After dinner Lončar was in the spotlight, giving his speech on his government’s ambition to join the EC. Yet, he met with resistance from some ministers present. The argument *against* rotated over the issue of the internal SFRY crisis, which was precisely Lončar’s main contra-argument and answer; because of internal problems (the Kosovo problem) it would be of utmost importance for the federation to move towards EC integration. Within the European economic and political structure, the EC would have stronger political influence on local events, thus sending a message of encouragement and initiative for further development and reforms. At the meeting Lončar said that “even though we are witnessing the crisis; it is the crisis itself that can help us take a radical turn towards pluralism in our already determined political and economic orientation” (Ibid.). However, the emphasis had to be given towards a successful EC integration.

By the time SFRY entered its final phase of existence in 1991, the EC High Commissioner Jacques Delors adopted the view that the only solution to the SFRY crisis was exactly what figures like Mock and Ločar had been advocating since late 1988; a full association of SFRY with the EC in order to avoid the armed conflict. Delors visited Belgrade in May 1991 (at the time of the constitutional crisis caused by Borisav Jović, and pro-Serb fraction, which blocked the routine election of the Croat representative Stjepan Mesić to the post of chairman of the collective eight-member Presidency). The purpose of Delors visit was to hasten the process of ‘association’ of SFRY with the EC. The talks were held on two levels. The first level was the federal level where Delors met both the PM Marković and Lončar. The common solution was reached without any major obstacles.

However, on the second level at the meeting with the heads of the republic, Delors met with strong opposition to any solution proposed to the SFRY problem. In order to achieve a faster transition of the SFRY economic system and its ultimate association with the EC, Delors was

willing to grant 5 billion dollars to Belgrade. Each republican leader had a reason for refusing the package and these interests were all based on national particularity. “Kučan’s main argument was that SFRY came to the point of political crisis where even economic recovery could not save its integrity; Milošević refused the package saying that financial aid is not necessary, for SFRY will either remain centralized or there will be no country at all (Bulatović, president of Montenegro more or less followed the same line of reasoning); Tuđman (according to Kiro Gligorov) stated that his only interest is an independent Croatia” (Ibid.). The only republican leaders to accept the package were Gligorov and, although reluctantly, Alija Izetbegović (Bosnia and Herzegovina). The effort of the EC Commission failed.

Finally, the reforms that were implemented in SFRY under Marković seemed successful in comparison to the spontaneous collapse of socialist systems throughout Eastern Europe in 1989-91. PM Marković was basically achieving economic and political liberalization through the synchronized reformist program with the western leaders. The crisis of the system in Eastern Europe were perceived as a much larger issue than those in the SFRY, for SFRY was viewed as a country adjustable to reforms and social changes (the processes of ongoing reforms between the early 1950s and the late 1970s proved a long tradition of changes). USSR’s collapse was perceived as a much larger threat and danger than the SFRY crisis, which Gorbachev himself confirmed in a discussion with Lončar, when on one occasion he told him that “what is happening in SFRY is nothing compared to what will soon happen in Russia” (Ibid., 2008).

The use of force was not contemplated. “This had a lot to do with the example of what had then been happening in Eastern and Central Europe. The reluctance of Mikhail Gorbachev to use force to preserve the Soviet sphere of control there had fed the fatal Western illusion that everybody had come to share its belief in the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy and its fundamental revulsion against the use of force” (Cvijić 1993, 76).

The crisis in SFRY was seen by the international community as just another natural process of change from socialism to a market economy. Together, these two partial approaches made the international community, especially Europe, unable to detect the root of the problem on time, and ultimately deal with it. It was of outmost importance to have a strong justified opinion (based on facts) and, finally, a united approach. Europe had neither.

5.3 The high probability of the armed conflict in SFRY

In order to understand why the armed conflict turned to be the final solution to the domestic SFRY crisis, we have to analyze the actions of the human agency. To do so, we first have to detect the main centers of power. The dysfunctional and power diffused state system, which was in a perpetual state of rationality crisis for a whole decade, around 1990 crystallized four subjective forces that were to determine the change of the SFRY system and structure:

1. 'Western republics' Slovenia and Croatia that aspired market economy, political pluralism and Euro-Atlantic integration as a foreign policy objective. SFRY's decade long crisis can be solved by transforming SFRY into the union of sovereign states (which was after all guaranteed by the constitution).
2. 'Eastern republics' Serbia and Montenegro that aspired self-managing market economy and one-party political system as a traditional heritage of the revolution; foreign policy objectives were not clear but seemed to lean towards the USSR.⁸⁴ Their view of SFRY system and structure developed in two phases. First phase (1988-90); SFRY should remain intact federation under the leadership of the eight-member presidency, half of which was (as a result of the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution) under the Serb bloc control. Second phase (1990-92), their political objective was shortened-SFRY, which would encompass all Serbs to live in one state.⁸⁵
3. The federal leadership: SIV under PM Ante Marković and the JNA. Their objectives were diffused considering the inter-republican dispute, foreign policy (government was leaning more towards the West, while the army to the East) and the economy (Marković introduced liberal reforms and aspired market economy, while the army wanted to preserve the socialist self-management). Their common interest, however, was to preserve unified SFRY.
4. International community: European Community and the US, who supported the introduction of market economy, process of democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration (basically the copy of Slovenian and Croatian political programs). On the

⁸⁴ Borisav Jović, Serb representative in the eight-member presidency made no secret that he and Milošević planned to make a contact with the top army leadership in Moscow, in order to invite Red Army to intervene in SFRY in case Slovenia and Croatia break from SFRY (Death of Yugoslavia, episode II). Furthermore, the role of Milošević's brother Borisav Milošević should not be underestimated, as he was the ambassador to USSR, thus being Milošević's direct contact to the USSR leadership.

⁸⁵ This objective of shortened-SFRY only officially lasted up until 1992, because in April that year Milošević proclaimed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; the act which de facto meant recognition of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. That does not mean, however, that his support of Serb political leaderships in their quasi states in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to create Great Serbia did not continue up until the end of the war in 1995.

other hand, based on the well established myth from the Tito era, the international community wanted to preserve the unified SFRY. As the crisis would aggravate in 1991, their objectives would also become diffused by internal contradictions.

The failed XIV Extraordinary Congress of LCY in January 1990 was a turning point in Milošević's political career. From that moment on Milošević realized that Slovenes and Croats were determined to oppose his vision of SFRY at any cost (the vision of the state in which he saw himself as the possible Tito's successor by dominating the eight-member presidency). Thus, the strategy was changed. If Slovenes and Croats decided to break up from SFRY, Serbia would not object but would demand the equal right on self-determination for the Serbs, which would mean that 12% of Serbs in Croatia and 34% in Bosnia and Herzegovina (two thirds of Croatian and roughly 60% of Bosnian territory) should be joined with Serbia. In order to realize this plan of shortened SFRY/greater Serbia, Milošević first had to gain legitimacy abroad by publicly defending the unified SFRY; and second, he needed a force to implement his plans. The only force capable and available was the JNA. Thus, Milošević entered an unnatural alliance, characterized by mistrust and intrigue, with the only institution left defending the unified SFRY. The top JNA leadership under the Secretary of Defense Veljko Kadijević was in no position to calculate; they needed to side with Milošević primarily because the army, despite its institutional independency, was still a coercive agency, thus needing a commander. Milošević, the official defender of unified SFRY, was therefore the only logical political choice.

Because "there were little chances for the agreement (among the republics) on decomposing the state, the result was that the modus of the disappearing SFRY state directly depended on the behavior of top army leadership" (Hadžić 2002, 21). In that sense, as Milošević was determined by all means to ethnically restructure SFRY, including force, the JNA became the tool in the service of certain policy. The agency that was obliged to defend the state and its constitutional order eventually became responsible for the armed conflict and the explosion of ethnic violence. Or as James Gow noticed, the "disintegration of the state did not necessarily mean war, even if, as in the case of SFRY, it entailed evident characteristics of social unrest. There was a clear distinction between unrest and war. The essential part of that distinction was the role played by organized armed forces in the service of political aims" (1997, 31). To implement and prepare the army for the intervention, JNA leadership would by 1991 systematically clean the non-Serb cadre, which by that time was altogether weak. "In the high

officer core Serbs made up 60, 1 %; Croats 12, 6%; Slovenes 2, 8%; Muslims 2, 4%; Montenegrins 6, 2 %; Macedonians 6, 3%; Albanians 0, 3%; Hungarians 0, 7%; Yugoslav nationals 6, 7%; the rest 1, 6%” (Viro 2009, 134).

In the process of the SFRY disintegration in 1991, JNA had primarily an existential interest in preserving the state. “On a general principle, JNA could not have avoided the destiny of collapsing SFRY – disbanding the state would consequently manifest in the disbanding of the army” (Hadžić 2002, 21). Furthermore, according to Bilandžić, “not only did the JNA see socialism and the integrity of SFRY as being in jeopardy, but also the existence of a professional military class which was facing massive unemployment; and here we are talking about the few thousand people losing their jobs” (2001, 138). In the political sense, JNA was not entirely relying on Milošević, as the general core founded their own political party, League of Communists – the Movement for Yugoslavia.

The crucial period, when it became obvious the JNA was prepared to use force, was in January 1991, when JNA was on the alert for military intervention in Croatia to overthrow its government. The JNA leadership drafted *The present situation in the world and SFRY and the immediate tasks of the JNA*; an open call to use military force. The cause for the alert was the illegal arming of the Croatian interior ministry, whose police forces were labeled by the President of Presidency Borisav Jović (Serb) as “paramilitary units, that had to be disarmed” (Đikić 2004, 106). According to the Croatian representative in SFRY Presidency Stjepan Mesić “President of Presidency Borisav Jović under the direct control of Slobodan Milošević and his marionettes from Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo, had a following plan: to provoke a state of emergency, thus granting a mandate to JNA to neutralize all armed forces (interior ministry and territorial defense) in both Slovenia and Croatia” (Ibid., 125).

JNA’s perception was that behind secessionist policies of Slovenia and Croatia was a larger Western conspiracy, responsible for the collapse of Socialist bloc. JNA declaration states that “in the realization of their fundamental strategic commitment to the overthrow of the idea of communism and Socialist option, Western scriptwriters have achieved significant results but not the final goal. They have not succeeded in overthrowing communism in any country where the revolution was autochthonous. This is why the strategists of anti-Socialist raid have been forced to regroup their forces and seek new directions and modes of attack” (The present situation..., 2010). In relation to Slovenian and Croatian proposition of con-federation, JNA concluded that “SFRY can only be a federation” (Ibid.) Considering the political life in SFRY, JNA leadership emphasized that “everything must be done in order to make the

League of Communists – the Movement for Yugoslavia the main political force in SFRY and the point of convergence of all the left-oriented political parties, associations, and organizations in the next 5 or 6 months” (Ibid.). Finally, on the point of Croatian interior ministry, JNA concluded that firm action should be undertaken. “This means, first of all, eliminating the ruptures made in the unity of the armed forces and disarming and liquidating paramilitary organizations in SFRY. The realization of this task will establish basic conditions for a peaceful resolution of the crisis and for a democratic transformation of the SFRY society. At the same time, it will represent a decisive defeat of the nationalist-separatist policy and practice and encourage the forces committed to the preservation and development of SFRY on Socialist foundations” (Ibid.). Therefore, the intervention was announced in the document with a proclamation of a “high degree of combat readiness” (Ibid.)

By the late 1990, JNA leadership took the hostile stance towards the Slovenian delegate in the Presidency, Janez Drnovšek, threatening him with a possible intervention in Slovenia as well. Drnovšek recollected that on October 2, 1990, there was a furious debate in the Presidency. “I denounced the JNA leadership for destroying any chance of agreement or dialogue with Slovenia through its blind, inflexible aggravation, and said that this could only lead us into conflict. If they would show more understanding, more willingness to negotiate, to communicate, rather than simply rejecting out of hand any Slovene initiative, then agreement could still be possible and we could find a way to rescue some form of common state” (Drnovšek, 2010). Realizing that Milošević was behind the uncompromising position of the JNA, and that their willingness to use force was a realistic threat, Drnovšek and the Slovene and Croatian interior ministries began preparations for the eventual attack. On January 20, the Slovenian minister of defense Janez Janša and the interior minister Igor Bavčar met with their Croatian colleagues Martin Špegelj (defense) and Josip Boljkovac (interior) in Zagreb, to discuss the joint plan in case JNA intervenes and disarms Croatia and Slovenia. The conclusion of the meeting stated that, if JNA intervenes “both republics shall proclaim full independence (...) block all financing of the federation (...) appeal to all citizens of both republics to leave the service in JNA” (Boljkovac 2009, 222-223).

Even though the Secretary of Defense Kadijević was under Milošević’s political influence, the large number of top military figures in the JNA (those who truly remained loyal to the principles of Titoism), were not. Therefore, despite the political alliance with Milošević, part of the JNA high-ranking officials (primarily Chief of staff Blagoje Adžić) opted for the arrest of republican leaders Kučan, Tuđman and Milošević, and restoring order through military

junta that would grant more power to federal institutions and their own party, the League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia. The idea of a military coup against the republican leaderships was not new, and has been JNA's object of interest ever since Tito died.⁸⁶

If there ever was a possibility of preventing the armed conflict and at least temporarily preserving the united SFRY state, than it was on January 24-26, 1991, when the democratically elected leaders (Tuđman, Kučan and Milošević) were holding the Presidency session in Belgrade. The arrests would be justified by presenting a forged videotape showing Croatia's Minister of Defense Martin Špegelj discussing illegal arming of Croatian police forces. That the arrests were highly probable can also be seen from Tuđman's reaction who, just prior to leaving for Belgrade for the Presidency meeting, told his reluctant inner circle that he is going to be arrested by JNA (Death of Yugoslavia, episode II). However, the arrests were never made. Kadjević wrote that on January 26 there was a sudden change in Tuđman's attitude towards his negotiating counterparts due to unconditional US support for Croatia's secession. Tuđman was encouraged as "in this turn-out events US ambassador Zimmerman played the key role – he explicitly stated that the West will defend the young Croatian democracy, while to us (JNA) it was said that the West would never accept any sort of JNA intervention against Croatia (...)" (Kadjević 1993, 112). Thus, he concludes that the "last chance for a peaceful dissolution of SFRY was lost" (Ibid.).

Considering external factors, it was true that the US did manage to prevent military intervention in Croatia through public pressures, (even though the SFRY Presidency played the key role in blocking the proposal).⁸⁷ It is a fact that on January 17 1991, the US ambassador Zimmerman handed over the memorandum to SFRY Presidency which stated that "the United States strongly oppose any sort of use of force, pressures or use of violence that would block the democratic reforms (...)" (Jović 1995, 253). However, there was hardly any 'support for a young Croatian democracy' in a sense of supporting independence. Bush's administration clearly stated that a unified SFRY was their foreign policy interest. In October 1990, Bush met with the President of Presidency Borisav Jović, stating that "the US fully supports unity, independence, territorial integrity of SFRY (...)" (Jović 1995, 197-200). Furthermore, in December 1990 Zimmerman would personally advise Washington to rejected

⁸⁶ In 1987, during the CC LCY meeting of JNA on September 23 (the day Milošević took over the LC Serbia), the secretary of defense Branko Mamula declared "that we have to prepare our public with the possibility of JNA's firm lunge if we decide so" (Mamula 2000, 104). The idea to intervene was caused by "the conclusions made, that the party leadership was losing control and the integrity and social order was in jeopardy" (Ibid.).

⁸⁷The voting result in the Presidnecy for military intervention in Croatia was 4:4. The Serb bloc (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Vojvodina) was blocked by the fateful vote of the Bosnia Serb delegate Bogić Bogičević.

Tuđman's appeal for help with technical support of the Croatian police forces (in other words refusing arm deliveries to Croatia) which according to Zimmerman "Croatian police would use to oppress the local Serb population" (2007, 53).

Therefore, what Kadijević wrote was a simple attempt to justify his future actions. The point is that it was not the US that prevented the arrests, but Kadijević himself. According to the JNA general Blagoje Grahovac, it was the chief of counterintelligence service (KOS) Marko Negovanović, "who dismissed the coup by asking 'why should we arrest comrade Slobodan (Milošević)?'. His 'question' was basically their approval of Milošević's policy. Consequently, if Kadijević did not arrest Milošević, neither would he arrest Tuđman or Kućan. Therefore, there was no possibility of the arrests to take place" (Interview with Grahovac, 2010). Kadijević, as his predecessor Branko Mamula noticed, was politically so much deluded by Milošević that he subjugated the top army leadership to his cause and therefore in the long run "lost all the moral and political strength (...)" (Mamula 2000, 209). The coup would more than anything work in favor of preserving SFRY, therefore the question remains to what extent the West favored this option.

The US position towards the military coup has never been clearly explained. In November 1990, the US ambassador to SFRY Zimmerman approached SFRY's foreign minister Lončar with the CIA analysis from the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which warned that in the period of the following eight months SFRY will head towards collapse, with the only possibility of preventing such a process by JNA staging a military coup. Zimmerman emphasized that the State Department rejected these estimates and qualified them as an overreaction by intelligence, which to some extent can be observed as a quiet approval for the JNA coup" (Interview with Lončar, 2008). More than US, Great Britain showed signs of quiet approval for the JNA intervention. Once JNA intervened in Slovenia (after it proclaimed independence) in June 1991, and despite that this was an open aggression, Great Britain would continue to object in the EC against the foreign intervention. Foreign minister Douglas Hurd would state in the House of Commons that "We and our European partners have repeated our readiness, if necessary, to help in every negotiation to find the peaceful solution to the SFRY crisis. However, it must be the SFRY's factors that will decide on military arrangements in their own country" (Hodge 2007, 34). Such statements, especially in the context of the superior strength of the JNA over the Croatian and Slovenian forces, could only seem to Milošević and Kadijević "as a green light for the continuation of war" (Ibid.)

Milošević disclosed his true agenda on January 24, two days prior to the never-attempted arrests, at the separate meeting with Kučan. There, Milošević approved Slovenia's secession from SFRY. Kučan said that "it was more than obvious that Serbs would not insist on Slovenia staying in SFRY. We the Slovenes said that we want a right on our own state. Milošević repeated that the same right should be reserved for Serbs as well; that is 'all Serbs in one country'" (Silber and Little 1995, 113). In other words, this 'shortened-SFRY' without Slovenia (and Croatia, with an amputated 1/3 of its territory; Krajina and Eastern Slavonia regions where Serbs made up a majority), would be achieved through military intervention of JNA. Kadijević accepted the concept for all *Serbs to live in one state*. When the Hague Conference eventually in the late 1991 recognized Slovenia's and Croatia's right to succeed, based on the findings of the Badinter Commission, Kadijević would accuse the US and Germany for intentionally destroying SFRY due to higher geopolitical reasons, unintentionally admitting his support of Milošević's concept of a shortened-SFRY. Kadijević wrote that "for them (Germany) it was necessary to break SFRY into small states; without any possibility of not only creating a shortened-SFRY, but also without any possibility of creating a unified Serb state that would encompass the whole Serbian nation from all Yugoslav territories, because even such a state in the Balkans would represent an obstacle to (Germany's) imperial ambitions" (Kadijević 1993, 26).

Kadijević however was not a Serb nationalist. As Stjepan Mesić noted, Kadijević "only wanted to find a sponsor for the army, and he sided with Milošević simply to preserve it (...)" (Đikić 2004, 133). Whether preserving a unified or shortened (Serb-dominating) SFRY, Kadijević in an agreement with Milošević opted for a military solution. In late 1990, top JNA leadership concluded that the "situation in the country cannot be resolved without clear and firm use of force in order to avoid civil war and through democratic means (...)" (Jović 1995, 265-6). It is unclear what was meant by the 'use of force' through 'democratic means', but determination to use force was evident. After the events of January 1991, another attempted coup would fail on March 14, again blocked by the Presidency.⁸⁸ Two days later, Milošević would publicly announce "I ordered the mobilization of reserve core and an emergent forming of Serbian military units. (...) Serbia will not recognize any new decision coming from the Presidency any more" (Đikić 2004, 130). After Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed independence on June 25 1991, JNA intervened triggering the armed conflict in Slovenia (the so-called Ten-day War which Slovenian Territorial Defence won).

⁸⁸The coup would fail again due to the Presidency status quo caused by the raised hand of the Bosnian representative Bogić Bogičević.

Defeated, JNA withdrew from Slovenia to the territories held predominately by Serb population in Croatia (the regions of Krajina and Eastern Slavonia) where the armed conflict broke out between Croatian police forces on the one side, and JNA and the Territorial Defense (comprised exclusively of Serbs) on the other. This would be the part of the plan of creating a Serb-dominated 'shortened-SFRY' with the help of the JNA. The coercive agency that was supposed to be protecting the constitutional order was at the same time violating that same constitution, by carving up SFRY along the national lines, as the article 5 of the Constitution explicitly states that "the frontiers (...) may not be altered without the consent of republics and autonomous provinces" (1989, 28).

Since 1990, the weight of the future conflict was to be found in the distrustful alliance between Milošević and JNA. Using his Machiavellian skills, Milošević managed to avoid the possible military coup and arrest and gain unconditional support from the top army leadership for his political purposes. Even though his interests and objectives were completely different from those of the JNA, both he and JNA had a common interest – to use military force. JNA thought that by relying on Milošević's political power it could prevent Slovenian and Croatian secession by force. Milošević, on the other hand was using Kadijević to start the intervention, embarrass JNA in Slovenia, and then use it in Croatia (and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina) for his own agenda of creating a single state for all Serbs to live in. In this hidden political conflict with JNA Milošević won. The JNA was not only losing legitimacy domestically (even among the Serb nationalists), but externally – shelling the Old city of Dubrovnik that was on UNESCO's World Heritage list resulted in wide international condemnation. "The EC, on the basis of reports from the EC Monitoring Mission identified the JNA as the chief offender and swiftly reacted; on October 6, 1991 it set the deadline of midnight on October 7 for a truce after which SFRY's trade agreement would be suspended, ending all trade" (Gow 1997, 56). Furthermore, Zimmerman recollects how Kadijević and JNA leadership "supported the failed military coup in USSR against Gorbachev. And there was even evidence that Kadijević was supporting Saddam Hussein; on numerous occasions the JNA was breaking the UN embargo by selling arms to Iraq" (1997, 111).

To conclude: JNA's perceived role about Self in the context of the failed SFRY state can be explained as a misinterpretation with consequences, or as Florence Hartmann noticed, "the army had a choice between saving SFRY by losing communism, or saving communism by losing SFRY" (2002, 88). The reason why it was possible for the JNA to use force in Slovenia and trigger a full scale interethnic conflict that would have a spill-over effect in Croatia

(1991-95) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95), was because the external forces had misinterpretations of their own, and did nothing to prevent it. The constructed myth of SFRY's international prestige and importance played a decisive role. The reputation of Tito's era was unchallengeable and unquestionable; his legacy made the unfinished and failed SFRY state an important factor in the eyes of international leaders. This false impression was further supplemented by SFRY's latest international activities (i.e. in 1989 SFRY chaired the NAM for the second time; the creation of the Quadragonal forum of Central European states etc.), thus giving a false impression that the country was still internally stable, preserving its non-bloc stance to a still existing USSR. Some documentation, like the previously mentioned Zimmerman's memorandum from January 1991, explicitly states the unconditional US support for the SFRY's *independence*, which in this case referred again exclusively to the 'independence' from the USSR and the Socialist bloc. USSR dissolved on December 26, 1991 and already on January 15, 1992, EC decided to begin the process of recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Fifty states would recognize two republics (their independence and territorial integrity) in the first instance.

For Milošević it was important to have a *de facto* control over the Croatian territories that JNA had occupied after its withdrawal from Slovenia, and of the rest of what was left of SFRY. He knew that international communism was defeated in the Cold War and that the only way his concept might win approval from international actors was to advocate the liberal concept of the 'right on self-determination'. The ideologically indoctrinated JNA that defended the internationally defeated order was at the same time the embarrassment and the grave danger for Serbia's regime. JNA's fiasco in Slovenia and Croatian city of Vukovar in late 1991, made it easy for Milošević to liquidate the remaining Titoist structures in the system. Veljko Kadijević and his Chief of staff Blagoje Adžić resigned from their posts in February 1992. In May JNA was transformed into the Yugoslav Army. Milošević would officially recognize the external loss of legitimization of SFRY and in April his government would proclaim the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprised of Serbia and Montenegro. Milošević's self-proclaimed successor state had no structural or system relations to the previous form, nor was its identity-interest formation adjusted to the new post-Cold War settings of international society.

Conclusion

This dissertation tried to demonstrate that the international context represents an inseparable element when analyzing the SFRY crisis and collapse. The theoretical approach of constructivism, which broke away from the methodological positivism in research and conventional neo-realism that advocates the materialist power distribution among states as a nature of relations, offered us the new paradigms to introduce the new perspective on the issue. The ‘constructed social reality’; the ‘identity-interest formation’; the ‘myth building’; the ‘perception of human agency’ and the ‘cognition of relations based on the distribution of ideas’ were some of the paradigms analyzed on both micro and macro level of relations. Constructivist theoretical approach helped us to set the international context (II Cold War), in order to understand the trends and influences that contributed to the SFRY internal crisis. By setting the context (what was the II Cold War; who were main actors; what the ideological, economic and political objectives were, and what the nature of the interaction among units was); we managed to analyze the certain internal process within SFRY. Thus, this dissertation made the following explanations on its premises.

SFRY played an important strategic role for the US in the Eastern Europe. After being expelled from Cominform in 1948, SFRY was offered the US support (not only in economic but in military sense as well) whose purpose was to ‘keep Tito afloat’, in order to present his regime as an attractive model of independence to the Eastern European states. Intellectual efforts behind the self-managing ideology should be viewed in this context: to create an alternative system to the state-centralized apparatus of the USSR based in Moscow. However, the gradual process of decolonization after Bandung in 1955 weakened the bipolar structures and eased the bloc strains on SFRY. Thus, the prospect to form the Non-aligned bloc with India, Indonesia, Egypt and Ghana was opened to SFRY. Even though NAM became the main source for Tito’s carefully constructed myth of SFRY’s international relevance and respect for being the factor of stability, SFRY primarily remained the buffer-zone financially dependent on the US and energetically on the USSR. Furthermore, the ‘balance of fear’ that during the ‘rigid phase’ of the Cold War (1945-53) created a stalemate between the blocs, offered SFRY an advantage of political balancing between two blocs.

Because SFRY’s identity was based on the anti-bloc stances, self-management represented a political synthesis of the bipolar structure; the system was a combination of a mild market economy in a decentralized state structure with the plan under the supervision of the party. *Deetatization* of the 1960s (which continued well into the 1970s, and the introduction of the

1974 constitution which made SFRY a de facto con-federal state, but under strong party supervision) represented the peak of SFRY's identity formation; the decentralization of the state apparatus in the socialist one-party system. Based on the identity-interest formation, this system was also feeding the Self on the criticism of the Other, which was manifested through the highly ideologized official condemnation of 'imperialism' (western capitalism) and USSR's bureaucratized centralism, which served the purpose of internal popular legitimacy. The Enlightened concepts of individual freedom (which capitalism supposedly suppresses) could be possible, according to Kardelj's work, only through the self-management. Considering the criticism of the state centralized USSR, SFRY's rectified socialism was the system relaying on the true traditions of Marxism-Leninism; *the withering of the state* and the *free and associated labor* were through self-management put into practice. Through the constructivist notion of identity-interest formation, we analyzed the elite/party leadership's behavior (Weberian tradition; elite is independent of society), according to their perception of the external processes (struggle against neo-imperialism and for self-determination) and how this was reflected in their attempts to solve the national question.

As we can see, SFRY's political identity and interest were formed in the specific international context. SFRY would therefore enter the crisis once these international structures on which SFRY was dependent began to change in 1979. Even though it was primarily the new arms race between the US and USSR, the II Cold War was an intellectual, ideological and political reaction initiated by the right wing elites in the West (Thatcher, Reagan). The factor of international economy played a decisive role. Since the end of World War II, through the UN organization and international law, the relations among the states and societies have been (with relative success) regulated (i.e. the aggression by the means of war is outlawed etc.). The only sphere of states' relations that has not been regulated throughout the Cold War and where 'international anarchy' prevailed was that of the international economy. Thus, the neo-realist and neo-liberal debate of the late 1970s proved neo-realist point, considering the importance and the role of the state. The state (in this case the US) made a power-shift from the international organization (UN) to the international financial organization (Bretton Woods institutions), to use it as a means for achieving its own foreign policy goals. The main purpose of these organizations was to assist indebted planned-economies and III World countries, whose economies were crushed by energetic crisis and monetary shock of 1979, to meet their obligations through the program of the *adjustment* – a first step towards introducing the market economy. Once liberalization begins in the economic sphere through adjustment, the

society would inevitably demand pluralism (this phenomenon was evident from SFRY's experience, when the reforms of the mid-1960s provoked popular uprisings in 1968-71).

As the balance had shifted on the international level, post-Tito's SFRY was unable to define its own interest. This was primarily because the international structures upon which the SFRY identity was kept intact (the NAM and the bipolar status quo) began to fade. That the changes on the international level placed SFRY into the context of the crisis of the East European real-existing socialism had to do mostly with the LCY's own decision to block further liberalization that began in the mid-1960. As our research showed, the problem was in SFRY decision-making elite alone. The role of Bretton Woods institutions, namely the IMF and overall US foreign policy towards indebted SFRY was not the cause for the country's collapse. The help of IMF and other financial institutions (the 'Friends of Yugoslavia') was enormous (especially the 1984 package). As we have presented in figures, giving bigger loans to undeveloped southern parts of SFRY (Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo) was with the purpose of equalizing the unequal share in the federation. The much criticized IMF's policy-regime towards SFRY was not exclusively 'theirs', the 'imperialist'. It was basically identical program to what the government under Milka Planinc had drafted in the *Long-Term Stabilization Program*, the draft of governmental measures to cure the economy. The only difference was that the IMF insisted that the responsibility for the debt should be placed in one institution, the central bank in Belgrade, which the party elite saw as an attack on self-management as its 'revolutionary tradition'. The anti-business climate (i.e. the 1978 Law on Joint Investments) was not only a unique phenomena in dealings with the US (seen as imperialistic and the one 'that should not be trusted') but with USSR as well. For example, the payments for oil and energy (upon which SFRY highly dependable during the energetic crisis) were not met. And while USSR did not protest (due to its desperate need for allies in the II Cold War), SFRY did not even justify its actions, constantly evoking its distrust of USSR due to the 1948 expulsion from Cominform and the threat of invasion.

Unlike the Eastern European Socialist bloc during the II Cold War (especially Poland, whose government was refused all the US aid after the abandonment of Solidarity Movement in 1981), SFRY was treated as a respected partner of the Western bloc. The economic help that was granted to SFRY was in large part stimulated by the 'traditional' view of SFRY as a strategically important country that opposes Socialist bloc (in the tradition of the 1950s strategy). Intelligence reports such as National Security Decision Directive documentation as well as the correspondence between US embassy in Belgrade and Washington, shows us the

US unquestionable dedication to preserve the stability and ‘independence’ of SFRY. There were no ‘imperialistic’ tendencies towards SFRY. The US and IMF’s adjustment program did target the international socialist order with the purpose of undermining political systems in the Socialist bloc and the III World, but it can not be said for the SFRY. Self-management and the decentralization of the system were the processes implemented by the party during the two decades long process of reform. The reason why SFRY could not internally reform was exactly the same reason why it fell into the context of the Eastern Europe. Instead to continue further liberalization, and accept market economy, the government was incapable to act due to constant party interventions; bureaucratization of policy; diffusion of power not only federal level but among the republics etc. As USSR had around 800 ministries, so did SFRY have thousands of SIZ-s and BOALs. Dysfunctional power structure – as we have explained using the Habermas model – created the crisis of the system, which turned into the crisis of identity.

System crisis evolves around the economic crisis first. It only becomes the rationality crisis if the state administration is not able to offer choices for resolving the problem. In this case; bureaucratization; party’s bans and restrictions; import instead of export and investments based on ideological premise that heavy industrialization leads towards socialist utopia were the chief elements that led to the rationality crisis of the SFRY state. When system crisis evolve into legitimacy crisis is when the structure popularly loses legitimacy due to its incapability. We presented seven modes of legitimacy that SFRY lost in the course of the 1980s crisis. However, all these modes were of internal nature. Those that consider the legitimization of external nature were in the SFRY’s case strong until the outbreak of armed conflict in 1991. External support of legitimacy for SFRY was strong as a consequence of the foreign ‘constructed myth’ of SFRY international importance, which was systematically built since the early 1950s. This proved to be the major factor that contributed to the country’s turbulent collapse.

It would be inter-ethnic conflict between Serbs and Albanian in Kosovo that would politically destabilize the weak bonding structure. The purpose of Anti-bureaucratic revolution in 1988 was not to re-centralize the state in the sense that it would move towards the USSR model of high state centralization (Milošević was never opposed to introducing market economy or pluralism), but to make a federal structure domestically flexible – considering borders of federal units – for all Serbs to live in one state. Final result was the failed ‘constructed reality’ that moved society in a direction of dissolving the state. By 1991, when it became obvious that SFRY would inevitably dissolve (due to impossibility to reach political agreement over

the model of federation – con-federal vs. federal – between Slovenia/Croatia and Serbia); the main actors, the US and EC fought with all their political influence and strength to preserve the state. On the one hand there was the US that opposed force and supported democracy, not realizing that an integrated SFRY was possible only through force, military coup and preserving the socialist one-party system. On the other hand there was the EC, which was convinced that the only thing necessary to solve the domestic SFRY crisis was diplomatic mediation. Due to the variety of reasons (traditional, economic, lack of information, CSCE principles, etc.), the US and EC approached the SFRY crisis with a contradicting formula – integrated SFRY with democracy at any price. Thus, they were not being able to understand that SFRY can not exist without one-party system. Popular will to dissolve the state in all the republics was democratically expressed in 1990 democratic elections. The attempt of JNA as the remaining legitimate institution of the failed state to use force was officially declared in late 1990. In order to preserve unity and in alliance with Serbia, JNA was the key factor in triggering the violent conflict first in Slovenia, and later in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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Summary (in Slovenian)

SFRJ in mednarodni odnosi

Notranja in zunanja politika ter stabilnost in integriteta multietične Socialistične Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ) so bile v veliki meri pogojevane z mednarodnimi odnosi. V mednarodnem bipolarnem sistemu Hladne vojne (1945-1989) so se obdobja krize kazala v družbenopolitičnih procesih oziroma v stabilnosti SFRJ.

Mednarodna kriza osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja v obdobju novega zaostrovanja odnosov med Združenimi državami Amerike (ZDA) in Zvezo sovjetskih socialističnih republik (SSSR), ki jo poznamo pod pojmom II. Hladne vojne (1979-1985), je vplivala na obstoječi družbeni sistem ter skupaj z razpadom vzhodnega socialističnega bloka (1989-1991) ter dogodkom, ki so se iztekli v medrepubliških in medetničnih spopadih, ki bodo prerasli v vojne, označila razpad državne skupnosti SFRJ. Z namenom, da bi se ugotovila narava krize in končni razpad države v kontekstu mednarodnih odnosov, sloni disertacija na naslednjih predpostavkah:

- 1) SFRJ je bila enopartijska socialistična država. Navznoter je svoje antiblokovsko identiteto in interes definirala s samoupravnim sistemom (tip socializma, ki je nasproten kapitalizmu, čeprav sprejema nekatere oblike tržne ekonomije, zavrača visoko centraliziran in zbirokratiziran državni aparat planske ekonomije, vendar ohranja enopartijski sistem). Državni interes je bil oblikovan na osnovi identitete, ki se je konstruirala na družbeni percepciji (videnju) bipolarnega koncepta kapitalistično – komunistične delitve, antiimperializmu ter sistematičnim vsiljevanjem strahu pred zunanjim sovražnikom (predvsem strahu pred možnostjo sovjetske vojaške intervencije).
- 2) SFRJ je gradila svojo identiteto in interes na ugodnem strateškem in geopolitičnem položaju med dvema blokoma ter na aktivni zunanji politiki. SFRJ je po prekinitvi odnosov z Informbirojem in Stalinom leta 1948 kot pomemben strateški partner zahoda v vzhodni Evropi prejela ekonomsko in vojno pomoč s strani ZDA. Ne dolgo po Stalinovi smrti leta 1953 se tudi prične popravljati odnos s SSSR. Leta 1960 pa postane SFRJ ena od voditeljic Gibanja neuvršenih (GN), članice katerega so predstavljale tudi 2/3 članstva v Združenih narodih (ZN).

- 3) Ob izbruhu II. Hladne vojne leta 1979 zaradi sovjetske invazije v Afganistanu, vstopi mednarodni bipolarni sistem v novo oboroževalno tekmo ter v stanje permanentne krize, ki bo vplivala tudi na SFRJ. Ekonomski in finančni sistem postane v tem času glavno polje interakcije v mednarodnih odnosih. Z izbruhom dolžniške krize tretjega sveta in socialističnih držav (ter tudi SFRJ) se izoblikuje eden od ključnih vzrokov razpada socialističnega sistema.
- 4) Razlogi, zakaj je SFRJ doživela usodo socialističnega bloka konec osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja, tičijo v dejstvu, da je sprejemala politične odločitve in sprejemala identične modele v reševanju krize osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja kot druge države vzhodne Evrope. Politične elite SFRJ so se ob birokratizaciji partijske politike upirale nastavkom liberalnih reform (ki so se začele z deetatizacijo leta 1966, vrhunec pa doživele s sprejetjem Ustave leta 1974) in gibanju h konfederalnemu modelu s tržno ekonomijo.
- 5) Kriza mednarodne socialistične ureditve je v SFRJ pripeljala do notranje atrofije sistema – *krize sistema* (h kateri spadajo ekonomska kriza in kriza racionalnosti) in v drugi fazi *krize identitete* (kriza legitimnosti in motivacije). SFRJ je bila na koncu osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja nefunkcionalna država, z difuzno strukturo moči in z vedno bolj šibko legitimnostjo.
- 6) Stabilnost SFRJ je omogočal skonstruiran mit akterjev Hladne vojne, da je SFRJ važen strateški in geopolitični partner zahoda pri obrambi pred SSSR. V času II. Hladne vojne so ta mit v pretežni meri še vzdrževale tuje velesile z interesom nadaljnje mednarodne podpore posttitovskim političnim elitam, pri čemer so podcenile vse večjo moč nacionalizma kot važnega notranjega deintegracijskega dejavnika.
- 7) Razpad SFRJ je bil sočasen z razpadom socialističnega bloka. Razlog, zakaj je SFRJ za razliko od SSSR razpadla po vojaške poti, leži prav v konstrukciji mita o pomenu SFRJ za mednarodne odnose, s katero so zunanji dejavniki dajali podporo strukturi in sistemu, ki pa je izgubil svojo legitimnost. Nezmožnost notranjega soglasja, vedno večji nacionalizem in nesposobnost vladajočih partijskih elit, da nadaljujejo z liberalnimi reformami, je dodatno pripomoglo k tragičnemu epilogu SFRJ.

Mednarodni odnosi so torej sestavni del celovitega razumevanja kompleksnosti krize in razpada SFRJ, četudi je bil za krizo in razpad izključno odgovoren notranji in ne zunanji dejavnik. Za to analizo smo uporabili konstruktivistično teorijo mednarodnih odnosov.

Zakaj uporaba konstruktivistične teorije v analizi razpada SFRJ?

Konstruktivizem se je v teoriji mednarodnih odnosov pojavil kot posledica razpada sistema Hladne vojne. Teoretska premišljanja konstruktivistov (ključni predstavniki: Alexander Wendt, Nicolas Onuf, John Ruggie) so nasprotovala tedaj uveljavljenim teoretskim usmeritvam Hladne vojne kot sta bila neorealizem in neoliberalizem. S tem, ko so nasprotovali osnovnim predpostavkam in paradigmam, ki so temeljile na materialističnem razumevanju nekaterih ključnih elementov mednarodnih odnosov (kot so na primer država, ekonomija, vojska in ideologija), je konstruktivizem napravil svoj prvi korak pri lastnem oblikovanju. Sam je namreč naglasil pomen *ideje* kot biti meddržavnih odnosov. S tem pa, ko vzame v premislek in obzir idejni oziroma spoznavni vidik mednarodnih akterjev, uvede nov metodološki pristop v znanstveni obravnavi mednarodnih odnosov.

S pomočjo takšnega pogleda so bili odpravljeni argumenti za samoumevno sprejemanje do tedaj edinih možnih razlag o nujnosti razpada SFRJ – od teorij, da je bila SFRJ kot naslednica versailleske mirovne pogodbe nezaželjena s strani narodov, ki so jo sestavljali, do teorij, ki so trdile, da so stara etnična sovraštva in civilizacijsko nepremostljive razlike katoliških, pravoslavnih in muslimanskih narodov naredile skupno državo neznosno. Konstruktivistična teorija zavrača takšne pristope. A. Wendt (1992), glavni predstavnik konstruktivizma je prvi pokazal na moment anarhije v mednarodnem sistemu: v mednarodni anarhiji, ki je nastala po razpadu SSSR in ob propadu bipolarnega sistema, ni obstajal *a-priori* pogoj za razpad SFRJ. Eden od razlogov, zakaj je prišlo do razpada, je bil v veliki meri odnos ključnih medrepubliških in federalnih odločevalcev, katerih odločitve so bile v pretežni meri pogojevane z idejnim oziroma spoznavnim razumevanjem 'drugega'.

Na notranjem področju izbruha krize, ki je pripeljala do razpada SFRJ v osemdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja, materialni vidiki moči ali neka konkretna zunanja sila niso bile v ospredju. V ospredju so bile procesi idejnih in spoznavnih spopadov partijskih elit okoli vprašanj izhodov iz krize. Torej je šlo za ideološke razprave o nadaljevanju izvajanja liberalnih reform, debirokratizacije politike, ustavnih sprememb in prilagajanja novim pogojem, ne da bi se pri tem odrekli tradicijam titoizma.

Kar se tiče zunanjega dejavnika, je bila ena od pglavitnih preprek pri mirnem razdruževanju federacije in reševanju krize ustaljeno videnje mednarodne skupnosti, po katerem je SFRJ bil pomemben strateški partner zahoda in spoštovan mednarodni dejavnik, ki na čelu GN

prispeva k svetovnemu miru in stabilnosti v svetu Govorimo o mitu, ki so ga izoblikovale ZDA in ima svoje korenine v spopadu Tita in Stalina ter izključitvi SFRJ iz Informbiroja leta 1948, ko pride SFRJ v fokus ameriških geopolitičnih interesov v vzhodni Evropi. Takšno videnje je pripeljalo do napačnega zahodnega pristopa pri reševanju krize v SFRJ med leti 1989 in 1991. Formula tega pristopa se je glasila – SFRJ da – komunizem ne. Zahodni odločevalci in voditelji tako niso bili sposobni na tej osnovi spoznati, da je prav enopartijski socialistični sistem tisti, ki integrira SFRJ kot sistem. Zaradi neupoštevanja tega dejstva, so poglobili krizo, ko so dali formalno podporo enotni SFRJ, ki so jo v federalnem vrhu v Beogradu (v prvi vrsti Jugoslovanske ljudske armade (JLA)) razumeli kot legitimno podporo za uporabo nasilja.

Primeri takšnega pristopa k medrepubliškim odnosom s strani posameznih diplomatov in državnikov so bila neodobravanje in nepriznavanje ustavne pravice Slovenije in Hrvaške, da razglasijo svojo samostojnost (na primer: italijanski zunanji minister De Michelis, ki je dejanje razdruževanja Slovenije in Hrvaške videl kot presedenčni dogodek, s katerim bi bila ogrožena načela KVSE o nedotakljivosti meja v Evropi). Prav tako niso priznavali dejanskega stanja v SFRJ tudi tisti (Nemčija), ki so jih obtoževali, da so neposredni zunanji krivci razpada SFRJ: tako nemški predsednik vlade Kohl kot zunanji minister Genscher sta najprej bila za brezpogojno ohranitev enotne SFRJ (o čemer priča Budimir Lončar (2008), zadnji zunanji minister SFRJ). V ozadju nasprotovanja priznavanja slovenske in hrvaške pravice do odcepitve ameriškega predsednika Georja H. W. Busha in državnega sekretarja Bakerja III. je bil mit o pomembnosti neodvisne SFRJ v vzhodni Evropi iz petdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja, ki sta ga oblikovala takratni predsednik Truman in državni sekretar Dulles, in s katerim so rušili sovjetsko avtoriteto v socialističnem bloku. To trditev lahko podkrepimo z memorandummi, ki jih je pošiljal na vrhuncu krize leta 1991 Warren Zimmerman (1997), tedanji ameriški ambasador ZDA v Beogradu. Konec koncev so predstavniki Evropske skupnosti (EU) na čelu z Jacquesom Delorsom tik pred razpadom in vojno v maju leta 1991 ponudili zvezni vladi (Zveznemu izvršnemu svetu) 5 milijard dolarjev in poseben status pridružene članice EU, kar pa sta odbila republiška predsednika Tuđman in Milošević (Lončar 2008).

Prispevek konstruktivističnega razumevanja mednarodnih odnosov torej seže dlje od splošno sprejetega materialistično/pozitivističnega razumevanja mednarodnih procesov. Prav tako nudi konstruktivistični pristop za razumevanje krize in razpada SFRJ popolnoma nov pristop k analizi, ker je

- prvič razširil dosedanje definicijo osnovnega subjekta analize mednarodnih odnosov – države, in
- drugič v zakladnico znanstvenih spoznanj je prispeval predstavljanje vzajemnih odnosov 'identitet in interesov' v družbi ter na mednarodni ravni.

Država: osnovni subjekt analize

Država je predstavljala osnovni subjekt analize za vse prevladujoče teoretske usmeritve od nastanka discipline mednarodnih odnosov. Glavna vsebina nasprotovanja prevladujočih smeri neorealizma in neoliberalizma ni bila država kot taka, ampak njena narava delovanja v mednarodnem sistemu. Tako imenovana III. velika razprava neorealistov in neoliberalcev leta 1979, kateri je za povod služila knjiga utemeljitelja neorealizma Kennetha Waltza (1979) *Teorija mednarodne politike*, se je vodila v pretežni meri okoli paradigmatskega in ne teoretskega pristopa k državi. S teoretskega zornega kota je država tako pri neorealistih kot pri neoliberalcih definirana v weberjanskem pomenu *oblasti ene skupine ljudi nad drugo skupino ljudi s pomočjo legitimne uporabe nasilja*. V razpravi je prevladal neorealistična smer argumentacije; odnosi med državami so temeljili na moči, država se naslanja na lastne potenciale (*self-help*) in še naprej prevladuje stanje nezaupanja med državami ne glede na njihovo vse večjo ekonomsko in finančno medsebojno odvisnost. *Raison d'Etat* (državni razlog) se je celo med neoliberalci razumel na materialnih osnovah gole državne moči: politične, vojaške in ekonomske.

Za razliko od večine postpozitivističnih teorij, ki začnejo prevladovati ob koncu Hladne vojne, konstruktivizem ne zapušča osnovnih paradigmatskih predpostavk neorealizma in neoliberalizma. Tako kot ostali predstavniki konstruktivizma tudi Wendt (2009, 202-5) jemlje državo kot osnovni subjekt mednarodnih odnosov. Vendar pa konstruktivisti na novo povežejo vse do sedaj pomembne teoretske tradicije definiranja države in da bi pokazali na vso kompleksnost pojma, državo definirajo kot sistem, ki združuje dve najpomembnejši tradiciji: marksistično in weberjansko (Wendt 2009).

SFRJ je bila enopartijska socialistična država, v kateri so vsi vzvodi oblasti bili povezani z institucijo predsednika, torej s Titom. Po mednarodni uveljavitvi SFRJ po spopadu z Informbirojem leta 1948 je Tito sam definiral in izvajal zunanjo politiko. Identiteta in interes sta bila definirana glede na pristop do blokov ter znotraj GN (politika miroljubnega sožitja) na vzajemnem odnosu s samoupravno identiteto enakopravnosti vseh *narodov in narodnosti*

znotraj SFRJ. V svoji notranji politiki se je Tito naslanjal na vojsko in tajno policijo (webrovska in marskistična tradicija), kar je bilo porok varnosti centralizirane oblasti (Kuljić (2005) opaza, da sta vdanost in podpora vojske bila enkratna med avtokratskimi in diktatorskimi režimi dvajsetega stoletja). Na drugi strani je bila SFRJ kot državna struktura decentralizirana. Čeprav so se vzvodi oblasti nahajali v rokah predsednika (Tito), partije Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije (ZKJ) in armade (JLA), je sama struktura države funkcionirala po decentraliziranem sistemu preklapajočih se suverenosti in difuzne moči na republiški ravni (z začetkom reforme *deetatizacije*, decentralizacije in padcem Rankovića leta 1966 in vse do ustavnih sprememb leta 1974), na sistemski ravni s kompleksnim modelom temeljne organizacije združenega dela (TOZD) in samoupravne interesne skupnosti (SIS) ter na ekonomski ravni z Zakonom o avtonomnosti bank v odnosu do Centralne banke v Beogradu, ki je bil izglasovan leta 1977.

Z notranjepolitičnega zornega kota je razlog za krizo in razpad SFRJ ležal v neusklajenosti državnega vrha (Tita, partije in vojske) z decentraliziranim sistemom (republik, TOZD-ov in SIS-ov), v katerem so republike razvile vzporedni oziroma avtonomni sistem oblikovanja lokalnih identitet in republiških interesov, ki konec osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja prerastejo v nacionalni interes. Zato predstavlja Titova smrt leta 1980 resnični začetek krize glede na to, da je bil Tito do svoje smrti edini arbiter znotraj decentraliziranega sistema različnih in včasih tudi nasprotujočih se interesov.

Od uvedbe samoupravljanja leta 1952 je bila namreč specifičnost identitete SFRJ tradicija dolgoročnih reformskih procesov. Nekatere oblike svobodnega tržišča in vse večje zmanjševanje kontrole državnega birokratskega aparata, s čimer bi se naj omogočila zdrava ekonomska gibanja v družbi, so bile uvedene še v teku reforme 1963 – 1966. Deetatizacijo ni torej vsiljeval noben zunanji dejavnik ali mednarodni trend, ampak je bila izključna odločitev partijskega vrha s Titom na čelu in partijskim teoretikom Kardeljem.

Z zunanjega zornega kota opazovanja države je pojav nove desnice (teacherizem v Veliki Britaniji in Reaganovi konzervativci v ZDA) prvič pripeljala pri političnih elitah do prekinitve kontinuitete v intelektualnem razumevanju odnosov Hladne vojne. Nova generacija je za razliko od svojih predhodnikov dajala naglas na zmanjševanju državne kontrole in na popolnoma svobodno tržišče. Ideje o liberalizaciji trgov, deregulaciji in prilagoditvam Tretjega sveta (tako imenovana *adjustment policy* MMF) so povzročile slabitev države SFRJ ter njene moči v westfalskem pomenu besede. Globalizirana ekonomska ureditev postavlja v prvi plan moč transnacionaliziranega kapitala in investiranja. Z zornega kota partijskih elit v SFRJ je

bilo s postopnim globaliziranjem tržišča neposredno ogroženo razumevanje države kot takšne: kot akterja enotnosti v realističnem pomenu (avtarkičnost in samozadostnost ekonomije, kar je prakticirala SFRJ), totalitarnem vodenju (v podobi ene osebe, Tita) in v vojaški moči (mit o JLA kot tretji vojaški sili Evrope). Povezava dveh različnih konceptov bo najbolj prišel do izraza po Titovi smrti, ko ZKJ nastopi kot uradni čuvar Titovega nasledstva in ne dovoli nadaljnjih reform. Posebnost SFRJ v času Hladne vojne je bil prav v tem, da je prva začela z liberalizacijo trga in deetatzacijo kot procesoma, ki jo bo med komunističnimi režimi začela šele Kitajska leta 1978 po Maovi smrti. V tem smislu je bila Reagonova ideologija (četudi kapitalistična) bližja samoupravnim ideologijam kot vse preostale ideologije drugih socialističnih režimov.

Podpora ameriške vlade je bila s čisto ideološkega zornega kota usmerjenega k reformskim silam v SFRJ (in reformam predsednika vlade Anteja Markovića v času pred razkrojem države), katerih reformska tradicija deetatzacije je trajala zadnjih dvajset let. Vendar je povezava koncepta nadaljnje liberalizacije in močne westfalske države pripeljala do tega, da je partija (kot je opazil Jović (2003)) postala tako konzervativna, da je zaradi svojega ideološkega razumevanja države blokirala vsak poskus reforme, s čimer je krizo iz leta v leto samo poglobljala. Ko socialistični režimi v vzhodni Evropi pričnejo propadati, pričnejo republiški interesi v SFRJ vedno bolj postajati nacionalni interesi. Z drugimi besedami: omenjena konceptualna povezava na ravni republik dobiva obliko nacionalnega vprašanja. Nadaljnja liberalizacija svobodnega trga bi vodila do asimetrične federacije ali zveze neodvisnih držav, idejo oziroma proces katere sta zaradi ekonomskih razlogov zagovarjali Slovenija in Hrvaška. Z druge strani pa začne srbska ZK zagovarjati močno centralizirano državo, saj so v procesih decentralizacije videli nevarnost delitve srbskega nacionalnega telesa, ki je bil številčen na Hrvaškem, Bosni in Hercegovini, Črni Gori in v avtonomni pokrajini Kosovo.

Konstruktivistični predpostavki identitete in interesa

Konstruktivistični predpostavki identitete in interesa morda na najboljši način kažeta na sistem (ne)funkcioniranja SFRJ kot države. Razlaga države skozi njeno identiteto in interes pomeni razložiti njeno videnje mednarodnega sistema, s čimer lahko tudi pojasnimo njeno obnašanje znotraj teh istih struktur mednarodne anarhije. Da bi razumeli družbeno ozadje delovanja določenega akterja/države znotraj strukture, je torej nujno potrebno analizirati 'državni interes'. Z idejo, da interes oblikuje družbena interakcija, se Wendt in konstruktivisti

bistveno oddaljijo od neorealistov. Tako trdijo, da interes (in v skladu s tem delovanje države v mednarodni anarhiji) ne temelji na razumevanju materialnega (preprosti distribuciji moči in ravnotežju sil med državami kot edini resnični značilnosti strukture mednarodne anarhije), ampak na *ideji* – torej na videnju 'drugega'. Konstruktivizem poudarja, da ne obstaja *a-priori* naravna zakonitost pri obnašanju držav ali vnaprejšnja determiniranost, po kateri bi naj delovale države (kar bi se naj vezalo na zgodovinsko 'enoznačno pot' v družbenih odnosih): da torej ne moremo odkriti zakonitosti v obnašanju držav. Obnašanje držav je v resnici nedoločeno glede na lastno identiteto, ki se razlikuje od države do države. Kako se bo določena država obnašala v mednarodnih odnosih je odvisno od njene identitete (ki ni podedovana, tako da ne obstaja na primer nasledstvo identitete Kraljevine Jugoslavije in SFRJ). Na takšni predpostavki je izgradil Wendt svojo osnovno tezo, da je 'anarhija tisto, kar države ustvarijo iz nje'. To pomeni, da sta konflikt in sodelovanje akterjev v mednarodnih strukturah odvisna od njihove identitete.

Model dialektike identitete in interesa je najbolj primeren za razumevanje določenih procesov, ki pripeljejo ne samo do vojn med državami, ampak tudi v primeru razpada države same, kot je primer s SFRJ. Konstruktivisti trdijo na podobnem primeru SSSR, da je do razpada te države prišlo na prvem mestu zaradi spremembe interesov partijskega vodstva. Wendt (2009, 129) ekonomski krizi in pritiskom vojske navkljub postavlja prav spoznanje partijskega vrha, da je njihova politika glavni vzrok problemov v državi in kot pglavitni dejavnik razpada SSSR.

Kakor pravi Onuf (2002), postaja konstruktivistična teorija primerna teorija prav zaradi svojega obojestranskega odnosa zunanjih in notranjih dejavnikov. Če namreč vzamemo, da sta kriza in razpad SFRJ bolj stvar notranjega kot zunanjega dejavnika, in če samo ime *konstruktivizem* izhaja iz ideje, da je družbena resničnost v svoji osnovi konstrukcija različnih videnj družbe in njene politične elite, je potrebno proučiti, kako je prišlo v okviru sprememb na mednarodnem področju do spremembe oziroma do razpada ene družbene konstrukcije socialistične družbe. V tej disertaciji je predstavljena analiza uradne dokumentacije (na primer Program ZKJ 1958), v kateri se vidi frazeološka analogija med borbo proti neoimperializmu in pravic malih narodov do samoopredelitve z notranjim ravnotežjem manjših narodov (Črnogorcev, Muslimanov, Albancev) z večjimi narodi (najprej s srbskim). Titov diskurs (Dedijer, 1978) govori prav o tem: kako je samoupravna identiteta, ki se je ob zavračanju razredne razlike in neenakopravnost *narodov in narodnosti* oblikoval skozi

zunanjepolitični interes emancipacije dekoloniziranih narodov kot vzpostavljajočega okvira GN, v katerem je bila SFRJ ena od vodilnih članic.

Konstruktivizem je v metodološkem smislu fleksibilen. Družboslovci v politoloških raziskavah vse bolj opozarjajo, da postaja gotovo nemogoče razložiti posamezen pojav samo s pomočjo ene discipline. Tako kompleksno temo kot je razpad SFRJ v okviru mednarodnih odnosov je nemogoče razložiti samo s pomočjo enega samega pristopa. Zato je ta disertacija za potrebe pojasnitve SFRJ v okviru II. Hladne vojne uporabila predpostavke tako imenovane sistemske teorije. Za analizo notranjih procesov krize, ki so pripeljali do razpada, je koriščen Habermasov model krize.

Mednarodni okvir: SFRJ v II. Hladni vojni

Za pojasnitev pomena okvira mednarodnih odnosov za analizo krize in razpada SFRJ ponuja sistemski pristop kot pomožna metoda tri ravni proučevanja, ki ga je uporabila tudi ta disertacija v obdobju II. Hladne vojne. Te tri ravni, o katerih je pisal Rosenau (2001) so: 'intersubjektivna' raven, na kateri se oblikuje ideja na osnovi lastnega videnja, 'bihevioralna raven', to je raven, na kateri se oblikuje in izvaja končno delovanje, in tretja 'institucionalna raven' kot raven, na kateri se nahajajo institucije, s pomočjo katerih se izvaja akcija, na osnovi katere se ustvarjajo odnosi v mednarodnem sistemu.

Prva, 'intersubjektivna raven' oziroma idejna raven je pomembna za analizo videnja ameriškega političnega vodstva konzervativne desnice v sedemdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja oziroma njihovo videnje ameriškega položaja v Hladni vojni. Takratno videnje je bilo, da bodo ZDA izgubile zgodovinsko borbo proti komunizmu. Cel niz dogodkov je govoril temu v prid: kapitalizem je prehajal skozi ekonomsko krizo (stagflacije), za katero se je zdelo, da nima rešitve; vojna v Vietnamu je bila izgubljena; večina dežel Tretjega sveta in GN niso bile naklonjene ZDA z zornega kota ameriške neoimperialistične politike; na politiko detanta se je gledalo kot na politiko popuščanja SSSR; na podpis KVSE leta 1975 se je gledalo kot na izdajo Evrope, ki je bila s tem nesmotrno predana v roke SSSR. V takšnem političnem ozračju prihaja na oblast Ronald Reagan leta 1981, ki bo vzpostavil popolnoma novo doktrino v odnosu do socialističnega bloka in tretjega sveta (Kirckparick, 2010). Z idejnega zornega kota je bilo videnje novega Reaganove vodstva označeno kot vodenje, ki temelji na obnavljanju pozitivnega videnja poslanstva ZDA v svetu kot dežele, ki promovira demokracijo, individualne svobode in pravice človeka.

Druga, 'bihevioralna raven' govori prav o tem delovanju oziroma o zaostrovanju odnosov med blokoma. Konkreten povod je bila invazija SSSR v Afganistanu konec leta 1979. Vendar so v II. Hladni vojni bila vsa sredstva medsebojnih odnosov podrejena ideologiji svobodnega trga, pa so bili tudi Reaganovi dragi vojaški projekti (kot Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in Starwars) bolj psihološke kot vojaške narave. Prejšnjo strategijo oboroževalnega tekmovanja kot strategijo borbe je zamenjala mednarodna ekonomija. Z drugimi besedami: namesto, da bi se ZDA zoperstavile SSSR izključno s tekmovanjem v oborožitvi in tehnologiji, so se zoperstavile z močjo svoje valute. Konvencionalno ravnovesje sile Hladne vojne prav tako ni bila več gonilna sila za zbiranje okoli vodečih blokovskih sil. Vodeča sila so postali partikularni tradicionalizmi lokalnih vrednosti. Liberalni konzervativizem nove desnice, ki je premagal kenziastvo na zahodu, se je prekril s prebujanjem islamskega fundamentalizma na bližnjem in srednjem vzhodu in s tržnimi reformami na Kitajskem, medtem ko v socialističnem bloku in v SFRJ te ekonomskopolitične spremembe povojnih generacij niso prišle do izraza. In tukaj ležijo korenine razpada socialističnega sistema. Na pojave nacionalnega tradicionalizma in na nujnost ekonomskih reform se je gledalo negativno. Še posebej v SFRJ, kjer se je na nacionalizem gledalo kot na grožnjo, ki bi lahko ogrozila enotnost države. Na ekonomske reforme pa se je gledalo kot na napad na samoupravno revolucionarno nasledstvo.

Tretja, 'institucionalna' raven analizira vlogo institucij, ki so odigrale ključno vlogo v dolgoročnem rušenju planskih ekonomij in režimov tretjega sveta pod vplivom SSSR, Mednarodnega monetarnega fonda (MMF) in Svetovne banke (SB). Ko opazujemo 'institucionalno raven' odnosov, se lahko naučimo, kako se strategija ZDA spremeni v trenutku, ko Reagan prenese delovanje svoje zunanje politike z združenih narodov (ZN) (v katerem so ZDA imela zaradi GN zmanjšal manevrski prostor) na institucije, s pomočjo katerih so ZDA lahko učinkoviteje dosegale svoje nacionalne cilje. Preselitev težišča na MMF in SB je imelo še eno ključno vlogo: s tem je bila svetovna ekonomija deregulirana. Polje mednarodnih financ je tako nudilo široko področje delovanja v klasičnem realističnem smislu mednarodne anarhije.

S predstavljenimi (tremi) ravnmi je orisana bit interakcij glavnih mednarodnih akterjev.

Po prvem naftnem šoku leta 1973 in izbruhu energetske krize so se obilni ameriški krediti (s čimer je ameriška vlada reciklirala svoje petro-dolarje) in krediti zahodnih finančnih institucij deželam v razvoju postopoma pokazali kot zelo neugodni. Po drugem naftnem šoku leta 1979 (pogojenim z iransko islamsko revolucijo) so namreč banke nehale dajati kredite, obresti so se

zelo povečale in izbruhnili je tako imenovana dolžniška kriza, ki je najtežje zadela dežele Latinske Amerike, v Evropi pa Poljsko (v kateri je kriza najprej izbruhnili), Madžarsko, Romunijo in SFRJ, v kateri je dolg narasel do leta 1981 na 20 milijard dolarjev. Korumpirane in totalitarne vlade držav v razvoju so s svojo potrošno politiko skušale rešiti dolžniško krizo osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja v pretežni meri na račun svojih državljanov, kar se je na koncu pokazalo kot popolnoma neproduktivno (Westad 2009, Woods 2009, Caryl 2009). Kot izraz rušitve državnih ureditev v deželah tretjega sveta se je pojavil nasilni nacionalizem in religiozni fanatizem. Tako lahko vsesplošne spopade med Albanci in Srbi na Kosovu po albanskih demonstracijah leta 1981 opazujem v okviru prebujanja in izbruha etničnih in religioznih ekstremizmov na Balkanu, bližnjem Vzhodu in vse do srednje Azije.

Odnos SFRJ s ključnimi akterji II. Hladne vojne v veliki meri pojasnjuje notranje razloge krize in razpada dežele. Glavni vzrok krize identitete in interesa je bil ta, da se posttitovske elite niso bile sposobne soočiti z izzivi nove zahodne zunanje politike. V prvi vrsti je šlo za ideološko pogojevano politično stališče in videnje ZDA kot imperialistične sile ter vsesplošno nezaupanje do zahoda (na primer odbijanje pomoči Pariškega kluba, ker so ga sestavljale izključno članice NATO držav (Adamović in Lampe 1990)). Kot je ta disertacija že pokazala, je partija vsako pomoč ZDA odbijala (kot na primer Rockefellerjevo ponudbo, da naredi celostno revizijo finančnega položaja SFRJ (Kopač, 2010)). Prav tako je bila vlada nesposobna spremeniti zapleten Zakon o skupnih vlaganjih, ki je zaviral tuje investicije in ki je onemogočil nekatere od zelo pomembnih projektov tipa INA in Dow Chemical (Gustinčić 1984) ter končno: splošna raven diplomatskega komuniciranja posttitovskih elit (primer diplomatskega škandala finančnega ministra SFRJ Petra Kostića v Washingtonu leta 1981 (Kopač 2010)).

ZDA so na drugi strani obči eroziji posttitovske diplomacije navkljub gledale na SFRJ kot na ekonomskega in strateškega partnerja. Kot se lahko vidi iz niza Reaganovih direktiv (na primer Nationa Security Division Directive (NSDD 2010)), ki odkrivajo njegovo strategijo do socialističnega bloka, so le-te v ideološkem smislu združevale vse idejne elemente ameriške oblasti: ideologijo svobodnega trga, svoboščine in človekove pravice. V vsakem od teh dokumentov, ki so bili namenjeni vzhodni Evropi, se posebej poudarja pomen *neodvisne* SFRJ kot važnega strateškega partnerja. Reagan je celo povsem odkrito govoril v svojih intervjujih, da bi napad SSSR na SFRJ pomenil istočasno vojno napoved tudi ZDA (Buckly 2008). Tudi dopisovanje med ameriško ambasado v Beogradu in Washingtonom kaže na visoko stopnjo zainteresiranosti ameriških finančnih krogov in posameznih politikov (na

primer Lawrence Egelburga, nekdanjega ambasadorja v Beogradu med leti 1977 in 1981 in državnega podsekretarja v Reaganovi vladi kot tudi njegovega naslednika v Beogradu Davida Andersona), da bi aktivno sodelovali pri reševanju notranje krize SFRJ (Adamović in Lampe 1990). Leta 1982 so obiskali Beograd predstavniki Chemical Bank iz New Yorka in predstavili jugoslovanskim bankirjem strategijo odnosa z MMF, zahodnimi vladami in poslovnimi bankami, kar pa je zvezna vlada odbila. Razlogi za nesprejetje predloga ponovno ležijo v konstrukciji resničnosti, ki je v predlogih ameriških 'imperialistov' videla nedopustno vmešavanje v notranja vprašanja SFRJ (Ibid.).

Neučinkovitost posttitovske diplomacije je mogoče opaziti tudi v odnosih do SSSR in je za seboj puščala globoke sledi krize pri definiranju identitete in interesa. Po Titovi smrti leta 1980 se namreč krepi strah pred sovjetsko intervencijo, ki ga lahko razumemo s treh zornih kotov. Na eno strani je imel zahod relativno upravičeno predstavo o SSSR, ki da ima sile in potenciala za napad (invazija v Afganistanu je to predstavo krepila). Na drugi strani se je vodstvo ZKJ (ne brez razlogov) balo mednarodnih spopadov, kar bi lahko ohrabilo nekatere prosovjetske elemente v partiji, da v interesu ohranjanja celovitosti SFRJ pokličejo na pomoč Rdečo armado. Tretja dimenzija nekoliko nasprotuje obema do sedaj predstavljenima videnjema 'strahu pred sovjetsko intervencijo' ali 'zunanjim sovražnikom' (ki se naslanja na 'notranjega'), ki sta bila po Beograjski deklaraciji leta 1965 (zavedno ali ne) oblikovana kot mit, ki ga je Tito v funkciji ohranjanja strahu tako s pomočjo vojske kot tajne policije koristil kot enega pglavitnih dejavnikov integracije SFRJ.

Vendar disertacija kaže, da je v uradnih odnosih med Moskvo in Beogradom obstajalo priznavanje SFRJ kot države in partnerja. Eden od pglavitnih razlogov za takšen pristop je bila nujna potreba Moskve, da ima zaveznike zaradi izgub v tehnološki in vojaški tekmi z ZDA. Prav tako pa je SSSR potrebovala stabilno in močno SFRJ zaradi tega, ker je posttitovska SFRJ še naprej uživala velik ugled kot vodja neuvrščenih in promotor politike miroljubnega sožitja (Orlandić 1982). Potreba po zavezništvu je bila odkrito pokazana med uradnim obiskom ruskega ministra za zunanje zadeve Gromika v Beogradu (Prišl 1982). Splošno nezaupanje je vladalo v odnosih posttitovskih elit do ZDA in do SSSR. Medtem ko so se ZDA v okviru uradne socialistične samoupravne ideologije obravnavale kot imperialistična sila, je bilo videnje SSSR podobno – obravnavana je bila kot komunistična imperialistična sila z od leta 1948 dalje neprestano grožnjo vojaške intervencije. Kot primer je lahko pokazatelj odnos v poplačilu svojih obvez, ki jih je SFRJ imela do SSSR zaradi

oskrbovanja z nafto in plinom – še posebej po energetske krizi leta 1979, ko je še kako postala odvisna od teh dobav (Orlandić 2002).

Do sovjetske intervencije na SFRJ ni nikoli prišlo. Tudi takrat ne, ko je vrh JLA to pričakoval zaradi svojega neuspelega državnega udara proti demokratsko izbranimi republiškim vodstvi v Hrvaški in Sloveniji v marcu leta 1991. Politični vidik strahu od sovjetske intervencije se je na kraju kazal samo na vojaškem področju; v vseh drugih segmentih sta bila SFRJ in SSSR v tesni medsebojni odvisnosti – na primer na ekonomskem področju (Staar 1988).

Odnosi z GN na najboljši način kažejo, kako je prišlo do popolnega kolapsa pri oblikovanju identitete in interesa SFRJ v mednarodnih odnosih. Najprej je GN samo doživljalo krizo, ki je dosegla vrhunec z različnimi delitvami: vojna med Vietnamom in Kambodžo, nesolidarnost energetske najbogatejših neuvrščenih držav v času energetskih kriz in naftnih šokov v sedemdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja z deželami, ki so bile energetske odvisne, ter končno spopad Tita in Castra na VII. srečanju neuvrščenih v Havani ob vprašanju zavezništva s SSSR (ki ga je Castro razumel kot 'naravno'). Iraško – iranska vojna (1980 – 1988) je pokazala vso slabost posttitovske diplomacije. SFRJ je izgubila primat pri posredovanju v krizi, ko je posebna komisija GN v New Delhiju leta 1981 ni uvrstila v program svojega dela. Kakor sta opozorila Milovan Đilas (1980) in Vane Ivanović (1983), je bil vzrok za to v preveč idologiziranem stališču do neuvrščenih, ki ni bil utemeljen na ekonomskih, političnih in vojaškotehnoloških resničnostih II. Hladne vojne. Z drugimi besedami: socialistična SFRJ je z vezanjem na neuvrščene izgubljala na moči v mednarodnih odnosih. To je bila še ena od zapuščin titoizma, ki so jih partijske elite skušale ohraniti, in zaradi česar se bo razvila v kasnejšem obdobju krize na medrepubliški ravni konkretna proevropska orientacija Slovenije in Hrvaške.

Po diplomatskih uspehih pri angažiranju v tretjem svetu in sodelovanju pri podpisovanju KVSE leta 1975, je ekonomska in politična kriza osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja zunanjo politiko SFRJ, ki je do tedaj bila pod Titovim vodstvom prioriteta, potisnila dobesedno na politični rob. V času II. Hladne vojne, ko se iščejo odgovori na nove izzive in zunanjepolitične smernice za na novo nastalo mednarodno okolje, so notranjepolitični spopadi elit v ZK, večanje revščine in obče pomanjkanje zaradi ekonomske krize ter končno izbruh nacionalističnih in etničnih nestrpnosti (z začetkom na Kosovu leta 1981) se v veliki meri prekrili z vsesplošnim upadanjem pomena SFRJ v mednarodnih odnosih kot tudi z njeno vse večjo pasivnostjo. Nesposobnost prilagajanja na novo nastale okoliščine v mednarodni politiki se bodo neposredno odrazile na notranjo krizo.

Notranja kriza in razpad države SFRJ

Za analizo krize je pomembna definicija Juergena Habermasa, ki pravi, *da krize nastanejo, ko struktura nekega družbenega sistema dopušča manjšo možnost reševanja problema kot bi bilo potrebno, da se ohrani ustroj tega sistema* (Habermas 1974, 2010, Korošić 1988). Primer krize v SFRJ v veliki meri odgovarja Habermasovi teoriji prav zaradi tega, ker ni obstajala niti politična volja, da se elementi sistema (ne glede na to ali gre za republike, partijo ali samoupravne enote) avtonomno spreminjajo oziroma prilagajajo kriznemu položaju in da se pri tem ne ogroža struktura. Tisto, kar Habermas poimenuje *strukturno pomembne strukture* v krizi, so nujno drugačne od elementov sistema, kajti struktura mora biti dejavnik, ki usmerja in znotraj katerega se dogaja povezovanje elementov sistema (družbenih subjektov), ki se četudi lahko menjajo, ne smejo izgubiti svoje identitete. Primer krize SFRJ z začetka osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja na najboljši način kaže na točko, v okviru katere je zaradi nasprotujočih se interesov republik na eni strani, na drugi strani partije in na tretji strani zvezne vlade prišlo do postopne izgube identitete, kar se je najbolj kazalo na ohranjanju sistema institucij ter na samoreglativnosti federacije.

Habermasov model klasifikacije krize se zdi najbolj primeren, da z njim opišemo tri področja družbenega sistema, na katerih se lahko pojavi in razvije kriza: 1. ekonomski sistem, 2. politični sistem, 3. sociokulturni sistem (Korošić 1988, 15). Tendencia pojavljanja krize je mogoče razložiti na sledeč način:

Mesto nastajanja krize	Kriza sistema	Kriza identitete
ekonomski sistem	ekonomska kriza	-
politični sistem	kriza racionalnosti	kriza legitimnosti
sociokulturni sistem	-	kriza motivacije

(Ibid.)

Čeprav je bil ta model narejen, da bi se analizirala kriza v kapitalističnih družbah, je uporaba tega modela za analizo za socialistične družbe kot je SFRJ primerna iz enostavnega razloga. Za razliko od kapitalističnih držav so socialistične države planske, kar pomeni, da je državni

nadzor vedno prisoten v ekonomskih procesih. V socialističnih družbah je tako lažje pokazati, kako ekonomska kriza v sistemu prerašča v krizo racionalnosti zaradi državnega (ne)racionalnega razporejanja sredstev za reševanje krize. Zaradi tega so za izbruh ekonomske krize brez obzira za nastanek (kot na primer energetska kriza ali monetarni šok leta 1979, ki je povzročil dolžniško krizo tretjega sveta) odgovorna enopartijska vodstva države. Če torej državno vodstvo neracionalno razporeja sredstva za reševanje krize, je pod vprašanjem legitimnost njene oblasti, s čimer pa *kriza sistema* postane *kriza identitete*. Tekom osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja bo SFRJ šla skoti vse navede faze, sama kriza identitete pa se bo zaključila z istočasnim razpadom države.

Ko gre za oblast v SFRJ (torej za oblast ZKJ in zvezne vlade) je ta disertacija pokazala, da je mesto pojavljanja krize bilo prav znotraj le-te. Titova smrt leta 1980 je prekinila tako imenovano personalno unijo partije in oblasti (Bilandžić 1985). Konflikt med njima je prišel do izraza prav pri vprašanjih reševanja ekonomske krize, ki je bila povzročena z visokim 20 milijard dolarjev visokim državnim dolgom. Od tega trenutka je partija na vsak poskus zvezne vlade in njene predsednice Milke Planinc, da racionalno reši krizo (tudi s predlogi Kraigerjeve komisije), odgovarjala z ideološkimi frazami, organiziranjem nepotrebnih plenumov z neplodnimi razpravami, prepovedmi in restrikcijami. Partijsko zadrževanje reform je spremljala birokratizacija same politike (s konstantno produkcijo resolucij velikega števila federalnih, republiških in tozdovskih teles), kar je dodatno onemogočalo delo vlade (Puhovski 1988, Ramet 2002, Jović 2003, Marović 2006). Razlog, zakaj je SFRJ doživela isto usodo razpada kot socialistični blok, je v tem, da je uporabljala iste metode reševanja krize, ki je vključevala politiko neodpuščanja zaposlenih, s čimer je ustvarjala atrofijo spodbud v družbi (Mazower 2004). Partija je priznala obstoj krize šele leta 1982. Sistematično obstruiranje dela zvezne vlade pa je trajalo do leta 1984, ko je partija pristala na pomoč MMF.

Vloga zunanjih dejavnikov na notranjepolitične tokove v SFRJ je vidna prav na primeru institucije Bretton Woods (MMF, SB) kot tudi drugih komercialnih bank, ki so se zbrale v skupino 'Priatelji Jugoslavije' ali Pariški klub. Partijsko videnje teh institucij kot 'imperialističnih', katerim se ne more verjeti, je oblikoval mit o nevarnosti sprejemanja prilagoditev (*adjustment policy* MMF), s katerimi bi bile ogrožene pridobitve revolucije, samoupravne identitete in titoizma. Vendar je partijsko kritiziranje programa MMF neposredno nasprotovalo vladnemu Dolgoročnemu programu stabilizacije, programsko skoraj identičnima dokumentoma (Stanovnik 1985). Razlika je bila izključno samo v vztrajanju MMF, da odgovornost za prevzemanje dolga prevzame samo ena sama institucija –

Centralna banka v Beogradu. Ta predlog je partija razumela kot poskus zunanjega dejavnika, da vsili recentralizacijo in s tem uniči revolucionarno nasledstvo samoupravnega socializma, po katerem imajo republike avtonomno pravico, da same dvigujejo kredite brez polaganja računov Centralni banki.

Partijsko vpletanje v delo vlade, birokratizacija politike in razlaganje krize z ideološkimi frazami bo pripeljal decentraliziran sistem, kakršen je bila SFRJ, do *krize identitete*. V skladu s Habermasovim modelom to pomeni, da ko govorimo o identiteti, se v prvi vrsti ukvarjamo s krizo legitimnosti. Kako so posttitovske partijske elite začele izgubljati legitimiteto je lepo vidno v začetku osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja na primeru njihovega poskusa reševanja krize.

Disertacija se je v analizi socialistične družbe na osnovi webrovske definicije legitimnosti posluževala delitve na deset modelov legitimnosti Leslie Holmesa (1997), od katerih je sedem notranjega, tri pa zunanjega tipa.

Modeli legitimnosti notranjega tipa:

1. Star tradicionalni model legitimnosti

Gre za model, ki se v primeru SFRJ nanaša na partijsko konstrukcijo nove družbene resničnosti glede na obstoječe tradicionalne obrazce. Z drugimi besedami: simboli NOB, konstrukcija revolucionarne mitologije in znanstvena marksistična terminologija so zamenjali tradicionalne junake in nacionalne mite (Malešević 2004, Stanovičić 2006). Ekonomska kriza in kriza države in racionalnosti so tekom osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja prispevali k slabljenju legitimnosti uradnih simbolov, terminologije in mitologije socialistične in samoupravne SFRJ (Đilas 1982, Malešević 2004, Veredery 2005). Z obnavljanje ideologizacije družbe se je poskušalo še za časa Tita po študentskih nemirih v Srbiji in Sloveniji (1968) ter Hrvaški (1971) z izključno kontraproduktivnimi rezultati (Đilas 1982).

2. Karizmatični model legitimnosti

Ta model je vezan na institucijo predsednika SFRJ, ki jo je imel Tito. Naslanjajoč se v glavnem na Webrove zastavitve, se ta Holmesov model nanaša na Tita kot na integrativni dejavnik (Kuljić 2005), ki je imel moč, da pri svojem sprejemanju odločitev obide vse

ustavnopravne norme (tej trditvi v podkrepitev je znana Titova krilatica *ne držite se zakona kot pijanec plota*). V tem pogledu je pomembno Titovo videnje (kot videnje vrhovne avtoritete) formalnih identitet in interesov ter njegovo videnje države. Vzroki krize se namreč v veliki meri nahajajo v njegovem videnju države, ob tem da je po svoji smrti zapustil kompleksno in nekompatibilno državno strukturo in difuzno oblast. Tri osnovne elemente državne neodvisnosti je videl v močni diplomaciji, čvrsti valuti in močni vojski. Brezpogojno vezanje na neuvrščene, ki pa v II. Hladni vojni vse bolj slabijo, je novo posttitovsko diplomacijo postopoma marginaliziralo in ji jemalo nekdanjo moč. V času krize je bila devalvacija dinarja nujna, vendar so jo uresničili šele po Titovi smrti, saj je on ni nikakor dopuščal. Vojska je kot podpora vsake avtoritarne oblasti predstavljala sistem znotraj sistema. Po Titovi smrti se bo vojska začela vse bolj vpletati v notranja politična vprašanja, saj bo dojemala sama sebe kot legitimnega Titovega naslednika. V kasnejši fazi krize identitete bo JLA leta 1991 posegla po nasilju, ki bo pripeljalo do razpada in vojne.

3. *Racionalni model odločanja*

Racionalni model odločanja črpa svojo legitimnost v komunističnih družbah iz skupine ali posameznika, ki zase trdijo, da imajo prirojeno modrost, na osnovi katere imajo pravico do vladanja. Politične elite s Titom na čelu so imele po II. svetovni vojni v pretežno ruralni in patriarhalni SFRJ možnost razvijanja novih konceptov (na primer bratstva in enotnosti' in samoupravljanja), katere so uveljavili z utemeljevanjem poznavanja znanstvenega marksizma in materialistične dialektike (Malešević 2005). Posttitovske politične elite se niso mogle sklicevati na 'modrost' že s tem, ker niso bile sposobne rešiti krize osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja.

4. *Evdemonistični model legitimnosti*

Pod pojmom evdemonizma v modernem pomenu se skriva razumevanje, da je pravica in dolžnost države, da uresničuje srečo svojih državljanov. Ta koncept se je v socializmu vezal na uresničitev družbene utopije komunizma s pomočjo industrializacije, ki ga državni vrh plansko uresničuje. Ta model legitimnosti predstavlja na splošno dolgoročni problem vsem avtorskim in diktatorskim družbam. S tem, ko avtorski režimi vežejo usodo družbene sreče z napredkom (pri tem pa kršijo vse človekove pravice), doživljajo

kritično točko v trenutku, ko se uresniči določena industrializacija in ko se ustvari neka vrsta srednjega sloja in ko se beleži družbeni vzpon. V tem trenutku se izoblikuje kritična masa, ki ji je ob ekonomskem pluralizmu potreben tudi politični pluralizem (Puhovski 1989, Huntington 1991, Marvall). V SFRJ je ta oblika legitimnosti (da torej država pogojuje družbeno stopnjo sreče) pričela slabeti v šestdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja, ko je SFRJ imela največji bruto nacionalni dohodek v Evropi in so se zaradi industrializacije dogajale velike migracije iz vasi v mesta, na univerzah pa je nastajala nova povojna generacija, ki ji mitološka podoba revolucije in NOB ni mogla imeti istega pomena kot politični eliti, ki je izpeljala revolucijo in jo izoblikovala kot 'družbeni mit'. Prav te univerzitetne generacije so tiste, ki bodo izpeljale študentske proteste v Srbiji in Sloveniji leta 1968 in na Hrvaškem leta 1971.

5. Uradni nacionalistični model legitimnosti

Med komunističnimi deželami je ta model bil prisoten v LR Kitajski. To je model legitimnosti, na osnovi katerega se vladajoča partija (glede na to, da sama nima dovolj elementov legitimnosti) naslanja na moč najbolj dominantnega naroda. Ta model ni bil prisoten niti v SFRJ niti v SSSR. Prav nasprotno: politične elite v SFRJ so še v Titovem času bile prepričane, da so rešile nacionalno vprašanje in da je bilo vprašanje narodov in narodnosti rešeno v širokem polju avtonomnega delovanja temeljnih organizacij združenega dela.

6. Novi nacionalističen model legitimnosti

To je edini Holmesov model, ki ni uporaben za posttitovsko SFRJ. Le-ta se namreč nanaša na sklicevanje državnega vodstva in vodje pri uresničevanju svojih odločitev na same izvore revolucije. V SSSR je ta tip legitimnosti bil prisoten v obliki reforme Perestrojke, s katero se je Gorbačov skliceval na najvišjo avtoriteto Lenina, ko je trdil, da je bila napaka strojena v trenutku, ko so zapustili leninistični koncept novega ekonomskega programa (NEP) v dobro stalinistične kolektivizacije konec dvajsetih let dvajsetega stoletja. Ta model v posttitovski SFRJ ni obstajal iz dveh razlogov: najprej ni obstajalo enotnost vodstva, ampak kompleksni sistem predstavništev na republiških ravneh in na ravni federacije (z osem členim predsedstvom na vrhu), ki se zaradi strahu, da bi spreminjala nacionalno ravnovesje, niso izpostavljala. Vsako individualno

izstopanje bi se lahko hitro označilo z negativnim pojmom 'liderstva', kar je samo po sebi zaviralo vsako politično iniciativo. Na drugi strani pa je bila zgodovina Titove oblasti od II. svetovne vojne do njegove smrti pravzaprav zgodovina reform, ki so se postopoma izvajale od oblike stalinistične oblasti štiridesetih let dvajsetega stoletja do decentralizirane, samoupravne socialistične države z blagimi oblikami svobodnega trga v sedemdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja. S Titovo (neposredno pred tem pa s Kardeljevo) smrtjo pa je prišlo do hitre prekinitve nadaljnjega političnega preoblikovanja družbe. Nov tradicionalni model legitimnosti se ni uspel izgraditi zaradi tega, ker se je partija postavila v izključnega zaščitnika vsega obstoječega (torej je bila tudi proti nadaljevanju reform), medtem ko se vlada ni mogla samoumevno sklicevati na prejšnje odločitve glede na to, da bi v krizi samo nadaljevanje reform in prilagajanj lahko prispevalo k družbenemu izboljšanju.

7. Pravno-racionalni model legitimnosti

Pravni vidik legitimnosti je bil problematičen za vse socialistične režime. SFRJ pri tem ni bila izjema. Problem pravno-racionalne legitimnosti je namreč v tem, ker so se vse institucije, norme in pravila (tukaj se v predvsem misli na ustavo) v službi partijskega uresničevanja družbene utopije komunizma (Dimitrijević 2007). V kolikor socialistični režimi ne uspejo uresničiti ciljev s pomočjo racionalne uporabe državnih sredstev in izgubijo legitimnost, problem uporabe pravnih elementov ne predstavlja samo njihove načete legitimnosti, ampak tudi tolmačenja (na primer: nasprotovanja ustavi iz leta 1974 oziroma pravici republik Slovenije in Hrvaške na osamosvajanje v kontradikciji s pravico JLA, da uporabi silo, s katero bi ohranila integriteto države).

Modeli legitimnosti zunanjega tipa so naštet v nadaljevanju.

8. Model formalnega priznavanja

Model formalnega priznavanja predpostavlja priznanje določenega režima s strani mednarodnih dejavnikov. Režim v SFRJ je za razliko od ostalih režimov socialističnega bloka črpal svojo legitimnost v samostojni borbi proti nacistični okupaciji brez pomoči Rdeče armade. Opozorili smo že na aktivno zunanjo politiko iskanja ravnovesja med

blokoma in mednarodna emancipacija na čelu GN, ki je pripeljala do velike zunanje podpore režimu. Kot smo že omenili, je bil ta tip legitimnosti prisoten do samega konca leta 1991, kar je še dodatno poglobljalo krizo glede na to, da je SFRJ navznoter izgubila vso legitimnost in jo je ohranjal izključno zunanji vidik.

9. Model neformalne podpore

Model neformalne podpore zunanjih dejavnikov vodji in vodstvu (četudi so »zunanji« dejavniki bili nepopularni v SFRJ) je specifičen za SFRJ skozi vso obdobje Hladne vojne. Prav zaradi tega, ker je imel Tito zavidanja vreden mednarodni ugled, ki je bil zgrajen zahvaljujoč lastni borbi (brez sovjetske pomoči) v II. svetovni vojni, neodvisnemu in kdaj pa kdaj tudi konfliktnemu položaju do socialističnega bloka ter na čelu GN (zagovarjajoč prekinitev blokovskih delitev sveta in zmanjševanja jedrske oborožitve), je njegovo priznavanje istočasno minimaliziralo avtorsko obliko oblasti in kršenje človekovih pravic. Od Milovana Đilasa dalje (kot prvega disidenta) in drugih intelektualcev, ki jih je preganjal režim, ni zahod nikoli uradno obsodil te postopke zaradi politične naklonjenosti Titu (Dragović-Soso 2002). Z razpadom komunizma je zahod še naprej dajal neformalno podporo federalni oblasti zveznega izvršnega sveta (vlade). Ta podpora bo imela številne negativne posledice pri mirnemu reševanju krize.

10. Model zunanjega vzora

Ta model se nanaša na JLA oziroma njen ideološki 'vzor' v SSSR, konkretno v vojski, ki je poskušala poleti leta 1991 z vojnim udarom zrušiti Gorbačova in zaustaviti proces razpadanja socialističnega bloka. JLA je z vzgledom v Rdeči armadi vso svojo preostalo legitimnost polagala na eventualno pomoč vojne hunte v SSSR, potem ko bi tudi sama izvedla vojaški udar v SFRJ.

Pomen mednarodnega dejavnika in razpad države

Po Titovi smrti je glavni dejavnik moči v SFRJ predstavljala JLA. Vloga vojske je ključna v razpadu države. Da pa bi dojel vzgibe politike, ki jo je vodila JLA v odnosu do republik (katere rezultat je bil izbruh vojne z napadom na Slovenijo in Hrvaško sredi leta 1991), je ta disertacija predstavila, kako so nekatere osrednje vojaške osebnosti videle položaj po Titovi

smrti in kako so videli vlogo SFRJ v novih mednarodnih odnosih v času II. Hladne vojne (Kadijević 1993, Mamula 2000, Špegelj 2001). Po deintegraciji partije leta 1990 in ideološke delegitimizacije socialističnega gibanja v vzhodni Evropi se je JLA aktivno vključila v politične procese. Z namenom, da zaustavi deintegracijo države, se je soočila z nacionalizmom, ki se je pojavljal v obliki ustavne krize. Ko je končno postala del Miloševićeve nacionalno-centralistične politike, je odigrala pomembno vlogo pri izbruhu vojne s tem, da je dajala novi 'pomanjšani Jugoslaviji' uradni nacionalistični model legitimnosti. Na ta način je razdruževanje federacije postal edini primer deintegracije v vzhodni Evropi, ki se je iztekel v vojno (Gow 1992, Bebler 1992, Popov 2000, Hadžić 2001, Kovačević 2007). Njihovim stališčem in delovanju je ustrezala prav neodločnost in konfuzija mednarodnih dejavnikov. Zunanja konstrukcija mita o pomembnosti neodvisne SFRJ, ki bi naj bila model za uspešno tranzicijo vzhodne Evrope (stališče predsednika Busha (Kopač 2010)), kot tudi izražanje podpore legitimnosti skozi praktično vse tri modele zunanje legitimnosti, so bili s strani JLA dojeti kot odobravanje za vojaški poseg, ki se je začel najprej v Sloveniji, potem na Hrvaškem in se razširil še na Bosno in Hercegovino.

O vzrokih in posledicah razpada SFRJ in vojne, ki je sledila leta 1991, so napisana številna strokovna dela, mnoge študije, analize in novinarski članki. Ta doktorska disertacija je prispevek k razjasnjevanju še enega vidika problema razpada SFRJ: analizi z vidika notranje krize osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja v okviru II. Hladne vojne. V analizah političnih in ekonomskih procesov ter vloge vojske v državi SFRJ je bil posebej izpostavljen bistveni pomen oziroma delovanje mednarodnih dejavnikov in akterjev.

Glede na to, da so se v dosednji literaturi analizirali dolgoročni vzroki krize SFRJ ter njen razpad izključno na osnovi notranjih oziroma zunanjih dejavnikov, je pristop v disertaciji pokazal na njihovo čvrsto povezanost s pomočjo interdisciplinarnega pristopa. Na drugi strani je bila literatura, ki je temeljila izključno na zunanjem dejavniku krize v SFRJ, v pretežni meri pristranska (in smo se soočali z deli pamfletskega in ne znanstvenega značaja). Napredek v teoriji mednarodnih odnosov je omogočil, da naš problem obravnavamo z vidika sodobne konstruktivistične teorije, ki je na povsem nov način osvetlila v znanosti paradigme države, oblikovanja identitet in interesa ter konstrukcijo družbene resničnosti. S tem, ko smo koristili paradigme konstruktivistične teorije mednarodnih odnosov, smo pokazali, kakšen pomen so akterji v razumevanju procesa krize in razpada SFRJ pripisovali mednarodnemu sistemu in njeni strukturi. S tem se je pokazalo na naravo same države in njenega režima kot strukture, ki je bila popolnoma odvisna od procesov na ravni bipolarnih mednarodnih konstelacij.