UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE

Marko Kovačić

Vidik moči v procesu oblikovanja politike mladih na Hrvaškem

The Aspect of Power in Youth Policy Formulation in Croatia

Doktorska disertacija

Ljubljana, 2020

UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE

Marko Kovačić

Mentor: izr. prof. dr. *Damjan Lajh*
Somentor: red. prof. dr. *Zdravko Petak*

Vidik moči v procesu oblikovanja politike mladih na Hrvaškem

The Aspect of Power in Youth Policy Formulation in Croatia

Doktorska disertacija

Ljubljana, 2020

Acknowledgements

Just as governance, writing this dissertation was a collaborative process, thus I owe my gratitude to number of people who were guiding me, advising me, and encouraging me throughout the process.

I would like to thank my family; mom, dad, brother and Valentina for continuous support and understanding.

I am also thankful to a family I have chosen, to Baketa and Boris for being with me when I needed them.

Moreover, I owe my gratitude to all my colleagues from the Institute for their encouragement and support. Thank you for all the kind words and methodological guidance!

Someone said that a life without friends is worth very little, therefore I would like to thank all my close friends for backing me up and providing joy in the most miserable time of dissertation writing. Guys, you know who you are!

A big thanks to my supervisors Damjan Lajh and Zdravko Petak. I know it wasn't always easy with me, but, hey, at least you will remember me!

Lastly, thanks to Internet, especially google scholar, thanks to coffee for keeping me awake, and anonymous YouTube uploaders for various funny clips they posted, which helped me in maintaining my sanity during these long years!

Univerza v Ljubljani
Fakulteta za družbene vede

Kardeljeva ploščad 5
1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija
telefon 01 58 05 120

I Z J A V A O A V T O R S T V U
doktorske disertacije

Podpisani **Marko Kovacic**, z vpisno številko **21120970**, sem avtor doktorske disertacije z naslovom: **Vidik moči v procesu oblikovanja politike mladih na Hrvaškem [The Aspect of Power in Youth Policy Formulation in Croatia]**

S svojim podpisom zagotavljam, da:

- je predložena doktorska disertacija izključno rezultat mojega lastnega raziskovalnega dela;
- sem poskrbel/-a, da so dela in mnenja drugih avtorjev oz. avtoric, ki jih uporabljam v predloženem delu, navedena oz. citirana v skladu s fakultetnimi navodili;
- sem poskrbel/-a, da so vsa dela in mnenja drugih avtorjev oz. avtoric navedena v seznamu virov, ki je sestavni element predloženega dela in je zapisan v skladu s fakultetnimi navodili;
- sem pridobil/-a vsa dovoljenja za uporabo avtorskih del, ki so v celoti prenesena v predloženo delo in sem to tudi jasno zapisal/-a v predloženem delu;
- se zavedam, da je plagiatorstvo – predstavljanje tujih del, bodisi v obliki citata bodisi v obliki skoraj dobesednega parafraziranja bodisi v grafični obliki, s katerim so tuje misli oz. ideje predstavljene kot moje lastne – kaznivo po zakonu (Zakon o avtorski in sorodnih pravicah (UL RS, št. 16/07-UPB3, 68/08, 85/10 Skl.US: U-I-191/09-7, Up-916/09-16)), prekršek pa podleže tudi ukrepom Fakultete za družbene vede v skladu z njenimi pravili;
- se zavedam posledic, ki jih dokazano plagiatorstvo lahko predstavlja za predloženo delo in za moj status na Fakulteti za družbene vede;
- je elektronska oblika identična s tiskano obliko doktorske disertacije ter soglašam z objavo doktorske disertacije v zbirki »Dela FDV«.

V Ljubljani, dne 5. 02. 2020.

Podpis avtorja:



SUMMARY

The Aspect of Power in Youth Policy Formulation in Croatia

With the uplift of governance as a paradigm in policy studies, various characteristics of policy-making changed. More actors started to be present in the policy arena, the dominant modus operandi became horizontality, whereas participation, inclusiveness and transparency became pivotal characteristic of the policy-process. Thus, today, it is inevitable to deny the relevance of various non-state actors in the policy-making process (Cassey, 1998; Kustec-Lipicer, 2006; Petek, 2012). Despite this change and tremendous grow of literature in this field certain aspects of governance remain unclear. On of these aspects is the role of power as a variable in explaining the contemporary policy-making process. A number of authors point out the paradox in contemporary political science, on the one hand the variable of power is one of the main components in the field, however in policy science lately it became les and less popular (Huxham and Vangen 2005) Therefore, in order to understand specific attributes of contemporary policy-making, the *concentration* of this dissertation is on power in the pre-decision-making process within the specific governance context. The *goal* is to explore the multitude of actors[1] in governance related to the understanding of the decision-making process and to identify mechanisms they use in order to create a specific public policy. In other words, the *research question* of this study focuses on conceptualization of power as a variable in contemporary policy context, or more concretely on levels of actors' power exertion in the process of formulating youth policy in Croatia. Using interdisciplinary approach and interpretativist point of view this dissertation explores contemporary change in public policy and suggests new models for better understanding of the decision-making process.

In the thesis, I seek to explore conditions required for using power as a variable. Consequentially, the dissertation wishes to discover how is power being manifested in policy-making within the collaborative governance setting and who in fact has the power. It is argued that one may use power to understand contemporary policy-making if using it from the interpretativist point of view because this theoretical paradigm is complementary to modern-day societal and political sphere. Additionally, another condition for conceptualizing power is if policy formulation is used as a locus. Due to systemic and inherent characteristics this pre-decision stage of the policy process, where various actors discuss alternatives and craft policy proposals, is an adequate locus for assessing power. These theoretical questions are explored extensively and arguments related to these conceptualizations are offered. It is argued that power should be observed as a perception of actors, or as in the dissertation is used the term attributed influence. Based on extensive literature review on power and governance, I argue that power is a concept that is subject to interpretations of different actors and so far, there

[1] In public policy literature there is no generally accepted consensus on the difference between policy actor, policy player and there is relatively vague distinction in reference with policy stakeholder. Even though I elaborate the terminological debate about these terms in the 3rd chapter, to begin with, it should be mentioned that policy actors and policy player are in most cases used Interchangeably. Some researchers (Tangney 2015) distinguish policy players as being those involved in policy development at all levels of governance (including quangos and consultants), from policy makers (those with a democratic mandate - i.e. politicians) and policy stakeholders to those not directly involved in policy development but with a stake in its proceedings (e.g. NGOs and third sector organisations). As I will demonstrate later, in this dissertation a term policy actor will be used as a generic concept.

is no unanimous consensus on mechanisms for objective measuring of power. Keeping this in mind, as the argument goes, due to the fact that there is «no objective truth somewhere over there» the only thing one could do is to focus on the perception of actors. The attributed influence is operationalized in two additional variables – the quality of argumentation and the degree of preference attainment. Therefore, my original contribution to knowledge is the power matrix to be used in policy formulation in collaborative settings for assessing the power of actors.

Building on propositions of the argumentative policy analysis, actors in the policy formulation present their position and resources to other involved stakeholders thus resources and discourse legitimacy become two aspects of quality of argumentation. On the one hand, there is the aspect of resources which include: knowledge/expertise of a specific policy field/problem, information about circumstances related to a policy field/problem and financial resources actors might use to get additional information, knowledge, public support. On the other hand, the discourse legitimacy refers to the link between society (or a specific group in society) and a policy actor. More concretely, if a policy actor can present its interest as relevant for society one will have better starting position at the collaborative governance setting. Another part of the power matrix is the degree of preference attainment - method employed *ex post* which advocated the comparison between all starting positions of actors and the outcome. This proposed matrix allows researchers to conceptualize actors' behaviour and make conclusions on power patterns. As policy formulation is a platform where different stakeholders gather to decide on the most appropriate solution for a concrete societal or political problem, it is argued it is the most appropriate stage for assessing power. This would mean policy actors would employ different means and techniques (as presented in the previous section) to persuade other actors why exactly their idea is better. If the assumption is that all involved actors want to solve the problem on the benefit of society, it is safe to assume that argumentation would be a strong factor influencing the decision. However, my understanding is slightly different. It is argued that perception of actors is even more important because only having financial resources, ability to argue effectively, information and knowledge (four features of my understanding of resources) is insufficient without taking into consideration meaning other actors attach to involved participants.

In order to contextualize and employ aforementioned argumentation, in the empirical part of the dissertation, the proposed matrix is used to analyze youth policy in Croatia. Reasons for choosing youth policy are following: Firstly, governance is a term that appeared in the mainstream political science literature in the last 30 years, and the same is true for the introduction of youth policy. This means that youth policy evolved simultaneously with the emergence of governance within the policy framework and thus has been under the severe influence of governance. In other words, due to congruent appearances, those two influential concepts have many similarities. Secondly, Croatia is an example of post-socialist society and state, meaning that the influences of previous regimes are still significant and visible. However, with the accession to the EU in 2013, a substantial amount of good governance practices has been adopted. This interesting mix of influences rebuttals the widespread notion in governance and policy literature that consensus prevails over contention and demonstrates obvious gaps in the literature. Moreover, in much of the related literature, Croatian youth policy is often considered to be less contentious (Buzinkic, 2009). However, it is argued that the pursuit of various interests is ubiquitous in Croatian policy, and, in turn, influences the overall polity. If this dissertation shows that power matters and is quite influential in

shaping a seemingly favorable public policy, it could lead to the argument that the examination of power may be likewise applicable to other policy fields.

The procedure for empirical application of the argument was following: by using the idea of political ethnography consisting out of qualitative content analysis, focused interviews and participant observation, I described, analyzed and deconstructed two processes of youth policy-making in Croatia. This dissertation therefore contains studies of policy formulations of National Youth program-making and Youth Act making, two distinctive and in nature different processes.

The two analyzed processes of youth policymaking are rather similar. In both processes, for instance, The Ministry of Social Policy and Youth created an enabling environment for effective participation of various relevant actors and designed an atmosphere beneficial to a consensus-oriented process. In addition, in terms of the participating actors, the process was educative, meaning that the participants learned important lessons and claimed they would apply them in the future. In terms of the coordination of the process, both policy formations were described as chaotic and highly uncoordinated. The Ministry simply did not have the resources or competence to guide the process successfully. This was particularly exemplified in the second process of the Youth Act formation, where two participating respondents described it as being a hands-off state of affairs, despite the participant actors clearly showing their need to be guided. One of the reasons behind this divergence between actor expectations and experiences is the novelty of the participatory process. As explained in the second chapter, Croatia is a country where participation is not a part of the legacy in public administration. Until recently, policy processes were top-down affairs, therefore, state officials still have trouble achieving a balance between coordination/intervention and laissez faire observation. Even though this might seem irrelevant, it is, in fact, of great importance. Participating actors spend their time and other resources towards the process, and in the end, feel frustrated that their involvement is not appreciated nor their participatory objectives met. If we again take a look at the conceptualization of collaborative governance and the governance approach as such, we will see that the role of the state is to steer. However, steering is a habit which is learned through practice before it can be successfully navigated.

Content-wise, the two policy formation processes were completely different. On the one hand, the National youth program process went smoothly, since the content reflected all the participating actors' points of view, whereas the formation of the Youth Act, was characterized by diverse attitudes, motivations and ideas. The process of the Youth Act formation demonstrated that the state is not powerful enough to pass a law without the support and involvement of other relevant stakeholders. This challenges the argument of the unlimited or great power of the state. Despite this finding, it should not be used to generalize other policy processes or the actors' roles within them. This analysis was conducted on one specific policy field within a particular national context, which does not mean that the same conclusion could be applied to other policy-making processes in Croatia and elsewhere. Nevertheless, this empirical study demonstrates that power is indeed is a fluid resource that can be increased or decreased due to perception and which is not absolute but relies on a number of actors and factors to achieve its ends." ….

This thesis started asking the following research questions: *Under what circumstances in the contemporary policy-making processes can we discuss and use power? How is this power being manifested, and who has it?* In addition, three hypotheses derived from the research questions were proposed:

- In order to plausibly use power in the contemporary policy-making processes, one should adopt its interpretative understanding.
- The policy formulation stage is an adequate locus for assessing power structures of the involved policy actors.
- In the subsystem of youth policy in Croatia, civil society organizations will exercise relevant factors more effectively than other policy players and position themselves as the most powerful policy actors.

The study further indicated that the study of policy formulation in a collaborative governance framework through the application of the interpretative approach to power is a viable modus operandi in the contemporary policy-making process. The study successfully argued that power manifested in terms of perception of actors' influence (attributed influence) and that using attributed influence as a variable of policy analysis is a pragmatic method. The combination of the argumentative approach and the degree of preference attainment disclosed that in the context of Croatian youth policy, the state is less powerful than a civil society organization, namely the Croatian Youth Network.

Placing all this in the framework of youth public policy in Croatia, certain conclusions about the institutional architecture can be made:

1. Croatian youth policy-making is inadequately developed. The state is not effective in balancing its role, thus it leaves responsibilities to civil society actors.
2. There is a considerable asymmetry of power between the state and the non-state actors which creates instability in the policy process and negatively influence the youth sector.
3. It is evident that state officials do not have enough capability in contributing successfully to the content of youth policy nor to the organization of public policy methodology; therefore, there is room for improving their knowledge and skills.
4. The positive characteristics of youth policy-making, such as relying on the evidence-based approach, inclusiveness, consultations with relevant stakeholders, and participation should be institutionally protected and promoted among other state authority bodies/policy departments.

After processes are analyzed and compared, it is concluded that power indeed is a viable variable in public policy studies. Moreover, the proposed matrix is an adequate mechanism to study youth policy. This dissertation showed that in the process of youth-making in Croatia civil society actors are more powerful than the state actors due to their ability to employ characteristics stipulated in the power matrix constructed for the purpose of this dissertation. Not only that, civil society actors in the field of youth turned out to be vet actors without which the stat cannot construct neither implement youth policy. This finding is particularly important in the context of collaborative governance practice and vas amount of literature arguing in favour of prevailing importance of the state in decision-making processes.

KEY WORDS: governance, policy actors, power, policy formulation, youth policy

POVZETEK

Vidik moči v procesu oblikovanja politike mladih na Hrvaškem

Istočasno z uveljavljanjem pogleda na upravljanje kot paradigme političnih študij, so se zamenjali tudi načini političnega upravljanja. Čedalje več različnih akterjev je začelo vstopati v politično prizorišče, način delovanja je postal horizontalen hkrati pa so ključne značilnosti poitičnega procesa postale sodelovanje, vključevanje in transparentnost. Zato je danes nemogoče zanikati pomen različnih nedržavnih akterjev v političnih procesih (Cassey, 1998; Kustec-Lipicer, 2006; Petek, 2012). Navkljub tej spremembi in ogromnm porastu raziskovalne literature na tem področju, ostajajo določeni vidiki vladanja nejasni. Eden vidikov je vloga moči kot spremenljivke v razlagi načina ustvarjanja sodobnega političnega procesa. Številni avtorji poudarjajo paradoks sodobne politične znanosti: po eni strani, funkcija moči kot spremenljivke je ena glavnih komponent tega področja, vendar pa zadnje čase postaja čedalje manj popularna v sodobni politični znanosti. (Huxham and Vangen 2005). Da bi razumeli značilnosti sodobnega procesa oblikovanja politik, je *fokus* pričujoče disertacije na tistih procesih, ki predhodijo procesom odločanja znotraj določenega konteksta vladanja. *Cilj* je raziskati možičnost[2] akterjev na področju upravljanja, povezanih z razumevanjem procesa odločanja, ter opredeliti mehanizme, ki se jih uporablja za oblikovanje določene javne politike. Z drugimi besedami, *raziskovalno vprašanje* te študije se osredotoča na pojmovanje moči kot spremenljivke v kontekstu sodobne politike oziroma, bolj natančno, na ravni moči akterjevih dejanj v procesu oblikovanja mladinske politike na Hrvaškem. Z interdisciplinarnim pristopom in iz interpretativnega vidika, disertacija raziskuje spremembe v sodobnih javnih politikah in predlaga nove modele za boljše razumevanje procesa odločanja.

V disertaciji se raziskujejo pogoji, ki so nujni za uporabo moči kot spremenljivke. Posledično, pričujoče delo je poskus odkrivanja načinov manifestacije moči v političnem odločanju v okolju horizontalnega upravljanja ter kdo dejansko ima moč. Trdi se, da je sodobno politiko možno razumeti, če se na moč gleda iz interpretativnega vidika, saj ta teoretična paradigma dopolnjuje sodobne družbene in politične sfere. Drugi pogoj za konceptualizacijo moči je upoštevanje procesa oblikovanja politike kot izhodiščne točke. Glede na sistemske in strukturne značilnosti te predodločilne faze političnega procesa kjer različni akterji razpravljaljajo o alternativnih političnih predlogah, je ta faza ustrezna kot izhodiščna točka za ocenjevanje moči. Ta teoretična vprašanja so obširno raziskana in so na voljo dani argumenti v zvezi s konceptualizacijami. Trdi se, da je na moč treba gledati skozi zaznavanje moči samih akterjev, oziroma, kako jo oni zaznavajo pri drugih ali pa pripisujejo drugim akterjem. V disertaciji je za to uporabljen izraz pripisani vpliv. Na podlagi obsežnega pregleda literature o moči in upravljanju, trdim, da je moč koncept,

---

[2] V strokovni literaturi ni splošno sprejetega soglasja o razliki med političnim akterjem in političnim igralcem ter deležnikom. Sicer pa se deležnik bežno razlikuje od pričujoči dve. V 3. Poglavju disertacije so v terminološki razpravi bolj podrobno pojašnjeni pričujoči trije termini. Vselej je potrebno naglasiti, da sta termina politični akter in politični igralec v literaturi večinoma medsebojno razmenljiva. Določen raziskovalci (Tangney 2015) razlikujejo politične igralce kot tiste, ki sodelujejo pri oblikovanju politike na vseh nivojih upravljanja (vključno s političnimi igralci in svetovaci) od oblikovalcev moči (tistih z demokratskim mandatom - npr. politiki) in deležnikov do tistih, ki niso direktno povezani z političnim razvojem razen, da se udeležujejo v enem delu razvojnega procesa politike (NVO in organizacije tretjega sektorja). V nadaljevanju disertacije bo termin politični akter uporabljan v generičnem pomenu

ki je predmet interpretacije različnih akterjev ter da ne obstaja soglasje o mehanizmih za objektivno ocenjevanje moči. V nadaljevanju argumenta in glede na to, da "objektivne resnice nekje tam ni», ostaja le osredotočanje na to kako moč dojemajo udeleženci. Pripisani vpliv je operacionaliziran skozi dve dodatni spremenljivki - kakovost argumentacije in stopnja preferenčnega dosega. Torej, moj izvirni prispevek je matrica moči, ki se uporablja za ocenjevanje moči akterjev pri oblikovanju politike v sodelovalnih okoljih

Na podlagi predlogov analize argumentacijske politike, akterji v predodločilnih procesih predstavijo svoja stališča in sredstva ostalim sodelujočim deležnikom ter tako viri in diskurzna legitimnost postanejo dva vidika kakovosti argumentacije. Na eni strani so viri, ki vključujejo: znanje/strokovnost na določenem področju politike/na področju določene problematike, informacije o okoliščinah, povezanih s področjem politike/določeno problematiko in finančnimi viri, katere akterji lahko uporabijo za dodatne informacije, znanja, podporo javnosti. Na drugi strani pa je diskurzna legitimnost, ki se nanaša na povezavo med družbo (ali posebno skupino v družbi) in političnim akterjem. Bolj določeno, če politični akter predstavi svoj interes kot pomemben za družbo, bo imel boljši položaj v okolju horizontalnega upravljanja. Drugi del matrice moči je stopnja preferenčnega vpliva - metoda *ex post*, ki primerja med začetnimi stališči vseh akterjev in končnim izzidom. Matrica omogoča raziskovalcem koncipianje akterjevih obnašanj in izvajanje sklepov o vzorcih moči.

Predodločilni proces je skupna platforma različnim deležnikom, kateri se zbirajo za odločanje o najbolj primerni rešitvi za konkreten družbeni ali politični problem in je zaradi tega najbolj primerna faza za ocenjevanje moči. To pomeni, da politični akterji uporabljajo različne načine in tehnike (kot je predstavljeno v prejšnjem poglavju), da bi prepričali druge udeležence, zakaj točno je njihova ideja boljša. Če predpostavimo, da vsi vpleteni akterji rešujejo problem v korist družbe, je varno predpostaviti, da bi argumentacija bila močan dejavnik, ki vpliva na odločitev. Vendar pa je moje razumevanje nekoliko drugačno. Trdim, da je dojemanje akterjev še toliko bolj pomembno, saj imeti le finančna sredstva, zmožnost za učinkovito argumentiranje ter imeti informacije in znanja (to so štirje načini mojega razumevanja virov) je nezadostno brez upoštevanja pomenov, katere si akterji medsebojno pripišejo drug drugemu.

Da bi kontekstualizirali in uporabljali prej omenjeno argumentacijo, v empiričnem delu disertacije je predlagana matrica uporabljena za analizo mladinske politike na Hrvaškem. Razlogi za izbiro mladinske politike so naslednji: upravljanje je izraz, ki se je pojavil v mainstream politični in znanstveni literaturi v zadnjih 30 letih, enako velja tudi za uvedbo mladinske politike. To pomeni, da sta se v političnih okvirih mladinska politika in pojem upravljanja razvila istočasno ter je od takrat naprej mladinska politika bila pod velikim vplivom upravljanja. Zaradi vzporednosti njunih nastopov imata ta dva pojma veliko podobnosti. Drugič, Hrvaška je primer postsocialistične družbe in države, kar pomeni, da so vplivi prejšnjih režimov še vedno pomembni in vidni. Vendar pa je z vstopom v EU, v letu 2013, bilo sprejetih precej dobrih praks upravljanja. Ta zanimiva mešanica vplivov zavrača razširjeno dojemanje, da je dogovor/soglasje tisto, ki prevladuje nad nasprotovalnimi argumenti v upravljanju in politični literaturi, čemur so priča tudi očitne vrzeli v literaturi. Hkrati se mladinska politika na Hrvaškem v večjem delu omenjene literature, pogosto šteje za manj sporno (Buzinkic 2009) vendar pa je prizadevanje za različne interese vseprisotno v hrvaški politiki, kar tudi vpliva nazaj -na splošno državno ureditev. Če ta disertacija pokaže, da moč šteje in je zelo vplivna pri oblikovanju navidezno ugodne javne politike, bi to lahko pripeljalo do trditve, da je takšen prikaz moči prav tako veljaven za druga področja v politiki.

Postopek empirične uporabe argumenta je bil naslednji: z idejo o politični etnografiji sestavljeni iz kvalitativne analize vsebine, usmerjenih intervjujev in opazovanja udeležencev, sem opisal, analiziral in dekonstruiral dva procesa mladinske politike na Hrvaškem. Disertacija zato vsebuje študij političnih formulacij Nacionalnega strateškega plana mladinske politike in Mladinskih zakonov - dveh, v naravi, različnih procesov.

Oba analizirana procesa ustvarjanja mladinske politike sta si precej podobna. Pri obeh postopkih je Ministrstvo za socialno politiko in mlade ustvarilo ovirajoče okolje za vključevanje različnih pomembnih akterjev. Vzdušje je bilo spodbujajoče le za ustvarjanje soglasja. Z vidika sodelujočih akterjev, je postopek bil poučen, saj so udeleženci trdili, da so se naučili pomembnih lekcij, katere jim bodo uporabne v prihodnosti. Glede na koordinacijo postopka, sta bila oba politična procesa opisana kot kaotična in zelo neusklajena. Ministrstvo preprosto ni imelo sredstev, ali sposobnosti za uspešno vodenje procesa. To je bilo še posebej ponazorjeno v drugem postopku nastajanja Mladinskega zakona, kjer so sodelovali anketiranci in je opisana kot država "hands-off" zadev, kljub temu da so akterji pokazali potrebo po vodenju. Eden od razlogov tega razhajanja med pričakovanji in izkušnjami akterjev, je v tem, da je horizontalno sodelovanje kot postopek novost. Kot je pojasnjeno v prvem poglavju, Hrvaška je država, kjer horizontalno sodelovanje ni del zapuščine v javni upravi. Do nedavnega so bili procesi politike zadeve, ki so potekale od zgoraj navzdol, zato imajo državni uradniki še vedno težave, z doseganjem ravnotežja med koordinacijo / intervencijo in laissez faire opazovanjem. Čeprav se morda to zdi nepomembno je dejansko zelo pomembno. Sodelujoči akterji ulagajo svoj čas in druge vire v process, na koncu pa se počutijo frustrirano, ker njihova udeležba ni cenjena hkrati pa tudi njihovi cilji niso doseženi. Če si še enkrat ogledamo pojmovanje horizontalnega upravljanja in trenutnega procesa upravljanja, bomo videli, da je vloga države usmerjanje. Vendar, usmerjanje je navada, ki se jo je treba naučii s prakso, preden se lahko uspešno pluje.

Vsebinsko sta si bila ta ustanovitveno-politična procesa povsem drugačna. Po eni strani je Nacionalni strateški plan mladinske politike šel gladko, saj njegova vsebina odraža stališča vseh sodelujočih akterjev, po drugi strani pa je značilnost ustvarjanja Mladinskega zakona bila prav različnost stališč, motivov in idej. Proces nastajanja Mladinskega zakona je pokazal, da država ni dovolj močna, da bi sprejela zakon, brez podpore in vključevanja pomembnih deležnikov. To izpodbija trditve o neomejeni ali veliki moči države. Vendar ta ugotovitva se ne sme uporabljati za posploševanje drugih političnih procesov, ali vloge akterjev znotraj njih. Ta analiza je bila izvedena na enem določenem področju politike in v posebnem nacionalnem kontekstu, kar pa ne pomeni, da bi lahko enak zaključek veljal za druge procese oblikovanja politik na Hrvaškem in drugod. Kljub temu pa empirična raziskava dokazuje, da moč dejansko je spremenjiv vir, ki se, glede na zaznavanje, lahko poveča ali zmanjša ter ni absolutna ampak odvisna od številnih akterjev in dejavnikov za dosego njihovih ciljev. "....

V tej tezi so zastavljena naslednja raziskovalna vprašanja: *Pod kakšnimi pogoji v predodločilnih procesih sodobne politike se lahko pogovarja o moči in se jo uporablja? Kako se ta moč kaže, in kdo jo ima?* Poleg tega so bile predlagane tri hipoteze, ki izhajajo iz raziskovalnih vprašanj:

• Da bi pravilno uporabljali moč v sodobnih procesih oblikovanja politike je nujno sprejemanje njenega interpretativnega razumevanja.

• predodločilna faza političnega procesa je primerna izhodiščna točka za ocenjevanje struktur moči akterjev, ki sodelujejo v politiki.

• V podsistemu mladinske politike na Hrvaškem, bodo organizacije civilne družbe izvajale pomembne aktivnosti bolj učinkovito kot drugi politični akterji ter se pozicionirale kot najmočnejše med njimi.

Študija je pokazala, da je študija oblikovanja politike v okvirju horizontalnega upravljanja s pomočjo interpretativnega razumevanja moči ustrezen način delovanja v procesu oblikovanja sodobne politike.
V študiji je uspešno potrjeno, da je moč dojeta odvisno od zaznavanja akterjevega vpliva, ki mu je pripisan od ostalih akterjev (pripisan vpliv) ter, da je razumevanje in uporaba tega pripisanega vpliva kot spremenljivke v pragmatični politični analizi, ustrezna metoda pričujoče analize. Kombinacija argumentacijskega pristopa in stopnje preferenčnega doseganja je razkrila, da je država v okviru mladinske politike na Hrvaškem manj močna kot so organizacije civilne družbe, in sicer Hrvaške mladinske mreže.

Vmeščanjem vsega zgoraj omenjenega v javno mladinsko politiko na Hrvaškem, pridemo do določenih zaključkov o institucionalni zgradbi le-te:

1. Mladinska politika na Hrvaškem ni ustrezno razvita. Država ni učinkovita v izvajanju svoje vloge zato prelaga obveznosti na sektor civilne družbe
2. Neravnovesje izmed moči države in moči nedržavnih akterjev je značilna in, provzroča nestabilnost političnih procesov ter negativno vpliva na mladinski sektor
3. Pri državnih uslužbencih je očitno pomanjkanje zmožnosti, da bi uspešno prispevali k napredku vsebine mladinske politike kot tudi k metodologiji organizacije javnega sektorja.
4. Pozitivne značilnosti predodločitvenega procesa mladinske politike na Hrvaškem, kot so sklicevanje na preizkušene pristope, vključevanje, posvetovanje z ustreznimi interesnimi skupinami, in sodelovanje bi morale biti institucionalno zagotovljene in spodbujane.

Po koncu analize in usporejanja procesov, zaključeno je, da je moč dejansko funkcionalna spremenljivka v javnih političnih študijah. Hkrati pa je predlagana matrica ustrezen mehanizem raziskovanja mladinske politike. Disertacija je pokazala, da so v procesih oblikovanja mladinske politike, akterji civilne družbe močnejši od akterjev države zaradi večje zmožnosti, da opravljajo značilne aktivnosti določene v matrici moči, katera je bila ustvarjena za potrebe pričujoče doktorske disertacije. Akterji civilne družbe so se na področju mladinske politike izkazali za izredno sposobne akterje brez katerih država ne more ne sestaviti, ne izvajati mladinske politike. Ta ugotovitev je še bolj pomembna v kontekstu udejanjanja horizontalnega upravljanja kot precejšnjega deleža v literaturi, v kateri je zagovarjanje dominantnega pomena države v procesu odločanja bil prevladujoč.

KLJUČNI POJMI: mrežna vladavina, mladinska politika, policy akterji, moč

Table of contents

LIST OF ABRREVIATIONS

CSO	Civil society organization
CYN	Croatian Youth Network
EU	European Union
H	Hypothesis/hypotheses
HRK	Croatian kuna
N	Sample size
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NYP	National Youth Program
OMC	The Method of Open Coordination
PO	Participant observation
RIA	Regulatory Impact assessment
SEE	South Eastern Europe

1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

For me, writing is a love-hate relationship.

- Larry Wall

This thesis seeks to explore some well-known but also more arcane concepts. Hence, the content will cover and delve into concepts such as power, governance, actors and policy formulation. As would any public policy discipline, this thesis is, in fact, concerned with building a better future of a society facing a number of challenges as it faces the demands of the future. Most importantly, this thesis is about young people and the future they face and will be required to navigate within the social, political and economic structures of their society.

Ever since the discipline of public policy started emerging as an independent identity emancipated from the stronghold of academic political science and practical economics researchers in public policy have been mainly focused on solving societal problems. This rather practical orientation defined the parameters of the discipline and set its trajectory for development. Public policy is a three-fold discipline, states Colebatch (2006). On one hand, it forms the priority check-list of a certain country looking to solve its domestic issues (*authorized choice*), and secondly, it can be understood as a social construction where relevant stakeholders give meanings to certain phenomena and advise on issues that need to be solved. Lastly, and most relevant to this thesis, is the view that public policy is an outcome of the structured interaction among various actors who have different and/or conflicting interests and ideas on how to organize a community life and solve certain problems.

Contemporary tendencies in science include interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches as desirable in the study of research problems. Ever since Laswell described public policy as a multi-disciplinary approach (1971), researchers started using insights from various disciplines to solve societal or political issues and propose the most adequate solution for given problems. This study is not an exception to that rule; hence it contains insights from political science, sociology and anthropology in order to explain the nature of contemporary policy-making. Likewise, it offers a richer and more comprehensive understanding of one facet of public policy.

In the following dissertation, I seek to explore this interaction among public policy actors. I am primarily curious to know how we can conceptualize the relationship between two types of players- state actors and non-state actors- and how we could further highlight the importance of this relationship as an essential intersection in political science and public policy. Despite the fact that academic literature in this field tackles certain actors' strategies in policy-making (Beyers, 2008) and uses power as a variable (Shore and Wright, 2003), what it doesn't examine is the nature of power play in policymaking when it comes to governance. Often, these studies on power did not follow changes that had occurred in the public policy discipline (a tendency towards more horizontal policy-making, interpretivism, and pluralism of actors). Therefore, the existing literature fails to provide an answer to the question of whether power is still a relevant concept in the conceptualization of contemporary policy-making. Consequently, the objective of this thesis is to investigate what, out of a number of concepts, ideas, models, and theories presented in the public policy literature, is the most comparable to the notion of power and what potential additional considerations we need to employ if we want to operate with power today. Differently stated, I am interested in exploring the potential and the dynamics of power in contemporary public policy. What puzzles me the most and what I seek to determine is which conditions should be satisfied before power can be included as a relevant concept in the governance-related understanding of policy-making.

In order to uncover the dilemma, this dissertation consists of three main thematic pillars, which are further divided into nine chapters. After the introduction and methodological remarks where main propositions of the study are stipulated and research methodology, research questions and relevance for the field of study explained, the attention will turn to the investigative parts of my dissertation. In the first section, which consists of two chapters, one on governance and the other on policy actors, I will provide the context of contemporary policy-making. In these two chapters, I shall likewise offer an extensive literature review, which aims to highlight the changes public policy process is going through in contemporary democracies, with a particular emphasis on the role of actors in the decision-making process. This segment of the thesis will therefore answer the question of **why** I undertook such research and address the deeper need for change in the policy-making processes and the necessity for more refined approaches.

Once I contextualize the research problem, the second part of the dissertation will deliver my arguments about the nature of power. In chapters 5 and 6, I propose the position that power is a complex concept, which can be operationalized as attributed influence. As I mention in Chapter 5, my view is that the only way we can use power as a variable in public policy, is if we understand it as an interpretative category. I develop this argument further in the 6th chapter where I claim that policy formulation is a stage in the decision-making process where power conceptualized in an interpretative manner can be assessed. The second part of the thesis thus focuses on the question of **what** is power and **how** we can assess it as a concept.

The last building block is the empirical investigation of the power question and its practical implementation in public policy outcomes. I will take a close look at youth policy in Croatia and attempt to analyze the findings by using the analytical framework stipulated in previous chapters. Consequently, the last three chapters will deliver results from the empirical study conducted for the purpose of this doctorate. The study mainly investigates power structures and dynamics involved in the processes of youth policy-making in Croatia. This last pillar of inquiry answers the question of **who** has the power in youth policy-making process in Croatia.

Figure 1.1: **Thesis structure**

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">INTRODUCTION</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Chapter 2:
Methodology</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">I THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td></tr>
<tr><td>Chapter 3:
Governance</td><td>Chapter 4:
Policy actors</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">II ARGUMENT</td></tr>
<tr><td>Chapter 5:
Power</td><td>Chapter 6:
Policy formulation</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">III EMPIRICAL PART</td></tr>
<tr><td>Chapter 7:
Youth policy in Croatia</td><td>Chapter 8:
The policy formulation case study - data presentation and discussion</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Chapter 9:
Assessing the power in youth policy-making</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">CONCLUSION</td></tr>
</table>

As seen from the above roadmap, I started my research from the interpretative paradigm. I decided to choose this epistemological tradition, because I believe, perception, analysis and interpretation in contemporary policy-making can explain reality much better than so-called objective notions. The turn toward the interpretative approach in public policy became popular when researchers realized that the dominant paradigm of rationalism and methodology of positivism couldn't adequately reveal motives and true intentions behind actors' behaviour within a social and political setting. The focus on context, discourse, narration and the analysis of language (features of interpretative policy analysis), on the other hand, is more complementary and relevant than the bottom-up approach in public policy, which was the prevailing policy discourse in the late 20th century. As I will illustrate in the second chapter, despite all its downsides, the interpretative turn in public policy had contributed to a better understanding of the policy-making process and placed focus on phenomena relevant to the 21st century.

Despite the fact that I will introduce youth policy at a later stage of the dissertation in the empirical section, in order to assure a structured coherence of the thesis, all concepts delivered in earlier chapters are contextualized in reference to youth policy. Therefore, when policy actors are discussed in the 4th chapter, for instance, only those policy actors relevant to youth policy are being examined in detail.

Chapter 2

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

There is no best way to make art, but there are a lot of better ways.
- Darby Bannard

Deciding on the appropriate methodological framework when dissecting contemporary (youth) policy is a challenging task. Of course, one's decision depends largely on the research question and the goal of the study; however, there are some other relevant factors that influence the overall process of (youth) policy creation. For the purpose of this topic and dissertation, in youth studies, one of its biggest advantages, fluidity and eclecticism, could turn into a nightmare for a researcher. In the light of this, research design and the choice of methodological tools are particularly relevant, if the whole array of youth policy features were to be encompassed, phenomena adequately operationalized and the complexity of the end result thoroughly analyzed. Hence, youth policy, as a policy field, is relatively uncodified in its process and often addled with education, labour, or other similar policies. Those similar and related policy areas certainly have a common goal – to advance youth welfare- yet the focus and methods of achieving those objectives differ vastly. That being the case, research design in youth policy should follow distinctive attributes associated to youth policy, namely the mix of inclusiveness, horizontality, cooperation between various actors and sectors, and the balanced individual and social development of young people (Kovacic, 2015; Williamson, 2002). Likewise, studies in youth policy are, just as is characteristic of youth policy in general, usually interdisciplinary in nature (Williamson, 2002). Even though the focus of this dissertation is on the methodological process of creating implementable youth policy, the sociological factors cannot be ignored, particularly if the main influential variable is the construct of power, which is the case in this study.

This chapter on methodological approaches to (youth) policy creation is divided into three sections, jointly creating a coherent roadmap for the understanding of the focus and the objective of the study, as well as for the ways of accomplish them. In the first section, research goals along with the standard methodological requirements such

as the research question and the corresponding hypotheses are being presented, explained and contextualized. Since the desired premise of a PhD dissertation is to offer "an original contribution to the science" (Dunleavy, 2005, p. 11), the second section of this thesis will do just that, proposing original conclusions their relevance and the justification for the ideas being argued. Keeping in mind the imperative of contributing to both the theory and the practice of the policy science field the dissertation is meant to fulfill, this section will particularly examine and elucidate the importance of originality and methodological soundness of the individual argument. The third section of this chapter is dedicated to the in-depth study of research tools. Apart from a mere theoretical explanation of research methods, I will argue why selected qualitative methods are most appropriate for this type of research design, and in doing so, offer a far-reaching understanding of the process of (youth) policy-making (in Croatia).

Acknowledging that youth policy takes into account various political and environmental complexities, the one thing we can attempt to do here is to follow Rhodes' (1997, p. XV) assertion that for every complex issue there is a simple solution, and maneuver our way around his complementary remark that this solution, "… is usually wrong".

2.1 Research design

The *concentration* of this dissertation is on power in the pre-decision-making process within the specific governance context. The *goal* is to explore the multitude of actors[3] in governance related to the understanding of the decision-making process and to identify mechanisms they use in order to create a specific public policy. In other words, the *research question* of this study focuses on conceptualization of power as a dependent variable in contemporary policy context, or more concretely on levels of actors' power exertion in the process of formulating youth policy in Croatia. As it will be demonstrated in the dissertation, the governance concept is currently one of the prevailing ones in the field of public policy (Peters, 2001), however due to its

[3] In public policy literature there is no generally accepted consensus on the difference between policy actor, policy player and there is relatively vague distinction in reference with policy stakeholder. Even though I elaborate terminological debate about these terms in the 3rd chapter, for the start is should be mentioned policy actors and policy player are in most cases used Interchangeably. Some researchers (Tangney 2015) distinguish policy players as being those involved in policy development at all levels of governance (including quangos and consultants), from policy makers (those with a democratic mandate - i.e. politicians) and policy stakeholders to those not directly involved in policy development but with a stake in its proceedings (e.g. NGOs and third sector organisations). As I will demonstrate later, in this dissertation a term policy actor will be used as a generic concept.

omnipresence and ambiguity, governance has become a sort of ubleha term. The problem with governance and its policy network framework is that it focuses on cooperation and consensus and can hardly explain the role of change (Petek, 2012). In other words, it lacks the precision to be an adequate independent variable. Possible solution for this problem lays in fact that there are numerous subcathegories of governance, for instance good governance, multilevel governance, network governance etc. that describe a specific constellation of policy-making process. Even this increases analytical value of the governance as a concept there are still issues in applying this concept in the analysis of specific policy issues. This is particularly the case in the post-socialist countries, where public administration has still not adopted all the attributes of governance and where the actual *modi operandi* is still the mix between verticality and horizontality. Since, as it will be presented in the 4th chapter, various actors involved in the policy process have their own interests, the policy network/governance approach is inadequate in explaining contemporary policy-making in post-socialist contexts. Therefore, this study wishes to discover the ways of how to use power as a variable in explaining the influence and the position of actors in a policy-making process. As a result of the primary intention, this thesis will analyze the instruments, mechanisms and resources of policy actors when it comes to their influence on policy creation as well as to examine how they are perpetuated in terms of stakeholder arrangement within the policy formulation stage of the policy-making process[4]. In order to do so, it is necessary to identify key actors, understand their unique motivations and see what means they use for influencing policy formulation. Due to its specific features that will be explained in the next chapter, in this dissertation I use collaborative governance, a specific mode of governance as an analytical framework for the analysis of youth policy. Hence in the chapter on governance, collaborative governance will be explored more thoroughly, however – briefly - it can be said it is a specific policy constellation where people are being constructively involved "across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished" (Emerson, 2011, p. 2).

[4] In Chapter 6, features of policy formulations are going to be described in details, however it is relevant to point our that whereas agenda setting is a policy stage where policy problem is being defined and set on the policy agenda, policy formulation is understood as a stage to generate "options about what to do about a policy problem" (Howlett 2011, p. 29)

In other words, this dissertation will attempt to show how policy is being formulated within the complex interaction between state and non-state actors and to illuminate the extent of power different actors involved in the process of policy-making are using to put their priorities on the agenda of the policy formulation stage. In formation of youth policies, there are usually several core non-state actors, such as civil society organizations and experts, each enriching the polity with their roles, characteristics and interests[5]. As stated, those actors possess different types of skills and are interested in particular aspects of a developing policy, and therefore, they use contrasting methods to push their interests forward. Public policy literature, particularly on the EU policy, recognizes three modes of interaction between policy actors, namely bargaining, arguing and acquiescence (Beyers, 2008). Whereas "bargaining means that actors make statements on resources to be exchanged in order to gain a particular benefit (e.g. a subsidy, a favourable regulation or help with policy execution)" arguing refers to "on policy ideas, the nature of these ideas and (supportive or critical) arguments. Basically, arguing means that actors try to induce changes in the factual beliefs or preferences of others" (Beyers, 2008, p. 1194). Acquiescence is the third mode of interaction and the only one that is non-communicative. It is in fact the situation in which a collectively binding solutions are being imposed hence it is "characterized by strong hierarchies in terms of resources and formal decision-making capabilities" (ibid, p. 1196). Taking into account aforementioned differentiation, this dissertation goes beyond just identifying strategies of various actors, moreover it tries to identify, analyze and interpret power patterns and their relations with the general policymaking consequentially.

Certainly, cooperation between actors is possible and desirable; however, in reality, actors often cooperate nominally or do not cooperate at all, as illustrated by the schism between academics and politicians in the policy context. Nevertheless, in this dissertation, I wish to mainly highlight the characteristics of those actors that are relevant in fostering the most effective participation of non-state actors. Further, I will analyze conditions for these actors' power dynamics and present a comprehensive conclusion of the relation between state and non-state actors.

[5] Previous research has shown that within youth policy in Croatia, only these two groups of actors have substantial influence on youth policy-making. (Kovacic 2015)

Figure 2.1: Schematic of the research objective



Having presented the focus of the dissertation, the *research objective* then comes down to the following:

Under what circumstances in contemporary policy-making processes we can discuss and use power? How is this power being manifested and who in fact has the power?

In the following section, I am offering **three** hypotheses in order to emphasize the proposed research objective, to answer the research question and to propel this study into the desired direction[6].

H1: *In order to plausibly use power in contemporary policy-making processes, one should adopt its interpretative understanding.*

Explanation: With the uplift of governance paradigm, and particularly collaborative governance practices, a space for different and various non-state actors opened to be involved in the process of decision-making. This newly established actors' constellations

[6] In qualitative research, hypotheses have a different role than in quantitative research and most of qualitative researchers within political science argue they are irrelevant (Researchgate, 2012). For instance, Samspor (2012) in his *A Guide to Quantitative and Qualitative Dissertation Research Explicitly*, states that «Some dissertation research, such as qualitative research, does not use hypotheses. [...] Begin the research design section by simply restating the research questions to help the reader to better associate the research questions with the research design. » Hence, if they are still used, they have a role of guidlines for research, rather than assumptions, which require testing as in quantitative research. As explained in The Yeshiva University Faterhood Project (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003, p. 3), «The traditional approach, often referred to as quantitative research, leads to hypothesis-testing research, whereas the qualitative approach leads to hypothesis-generating research». In that regard, I agree with Matlerud (2001) that «The qualitative researcher's task is to explain, and maybe question, the hypotheses as ingredients of the preconceptions and as reflections, rather than applying procedures for testing them». Thus, even though in this dissertation I use term „hypothesis" they are understood more in terms of guidlines channeling discussion in a specific direction.

call upon revising conventional public policy approaches that were used to analyze processes inherently different from the new one. One of these approaches is certainly the interpretative. Interpretative approach to policy analysis advocates for greater focus on meanings, discourses, horizontality, negotiations and perception. Even though one cannot claim interpretativsim in public policy is monolith, aforementioned characteristics are generally accepted as prevailing. So why is this approach appropriate for the study of contemporary policy-making and understanding of power as a variable in policy-making process? I understand policy mostly as an outcome of social interaction, so to use Colebatch's claim (2006). I argue, in the polity where there is a number of different actors, negotiation, arguments and interpretation of actors' position the most plausible way to understand how policy is being made is by interpreting aforementioned characteristics. Hence, rational approach that heavily relied on the vertical, top-down approach to public policy, proved not to be salient in contemporary societies. Contrary, the imperatives of pluralism, inclusiveness and horizontality have become, at least nominally, almost uncountable. As a result, in such societal and policy context, I believe it is correct to use approach (to analyze power) that build upon these traits. Interpretative approach will therefore allow greather focus on power relations and better immersion in the motives and agency in whole of the relevant actors.

H2: *The policy formulation stage it is an adequate locus for assessing the power of the involved policy actors.*

Explanation: Policy formulation, with its specific structural characteristics, is a locus where the power of actors is evident, and therefore, recognizable. The policy formulation stage of the public policy cycle is a stage, defined by Sidney (2007, p. 79), which "involves identifying and/or crafting a set of policy alternatives to address a problem, and narrowing that set of solutions in preparation for the final policy decision." Since government already makes a selection of actors based on procedures stipulated by governance principles and depending on policy types, it is to be expected that within policy formulation, consensus and agreement will be the main impetus for formulating policy. However, if this assumption is to be accepted, it remains unclear why some policies did not evolve into the further stages of the policy process. In this dissertation, I argue that within the collaborative governance framework, in the policy formulation stage, there is a power play which determines the progression of the decision-making process. Additionally, this power play is particularly present in polities where

governance postulates have not been internalized adequately. As it will be described in chapter 4, power is a concept that must be introduced in the analysis of policy formulation in order to understand the overall cycle of creation of youth policies, particularly in the post-socialist context. Youth policy is a specific type of public policy with a number of notable features[7]. Using Lowi's classification of public policies (1972; 1988) youth policy as a subcategory of public policies, falls into redistributive policies. These types of policies focus on promoting equality among various social groups by governmental redistribution of welfare from one social group to another. Youth policy as such is characterized by the wide involvement of different actors in the process of its formulation and implementation thus it is adequate for the topic of this dissertation.

H3: *In the subsystem of youth policy in Croatia, civil society organizations[8] will exercise relevant factors more effectively than other players and position themselves as the most powerful policy actors.*

Explanation: It is possible to operationalize power into resources actors use, and through quantifiable measurements, compare their performance and influence. By comparing all actors involved in youth policy-making on the basis of power employment, a detailed analysis of this subsystem is possible. Policy actors, no matter how horizontal and inclusive the polity they compromise, have their interests that they seek to propagate. In order to do that, they use resources to spread their influence (in the field of youth policy, knowledge, mobilization support and implementation potential are key leverage points of power). Based on the insights from the literature (Buzinkic, 2009; Kovacic, 2015), in Croatia, civil society organizations are important players in the public policy arena; however, there have been no studies which can demonstrate how important they are overall. To put it in policy speak, it is important to see the extent of government's "steering, not rowing" (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), especially in the case of post-socialist polities.

[7] In Chapter 7 all features, specifities and characteristics of youth policy are explained and analyed accordingly.

[8] Understood as entities that are non-market and nonstate and outside of the family, characterized by self-organization of people to pursue shared interests in the public domain. (Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness 2008)

Figure 2.2: Graphic representation of the theoretical design



Given these conclusions, if we accept the above-mentioned assumptions, it remains clear why Croatian youth policy is an adequate case study for research design of this sort. I will be dealing with this predicament in the next section of this chapter.

2.2. Methodological justification of the selected case and the research methods

As stated, the goal of this study is to introduce the concept of power in the policy formulation stage of the policy process in order to increase the analyticity of the good governance approach and to see how (youth) policy (in Croatia) is created. One of the imperatives for doing that is to explain why case study of Croatian youth policy is a reasonable choice in the context of the proposed research design.

A case study is defined as a "detailed examination of an aspect of historical episode which is used to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events" (George and Bennett, 2005). Some of the advantages of case study research are, as claimed by Yin (2013), that it focuses on a contemporary phenomenon within the context of a real-life scenario, and that it is suitable for studying complex social phenomena. I argue that a public policy research question, characterized by eclecticism (youth policy), concepts that are inherently complex (governance) and phenomena which have direct consequences on real-life scenarios (power) is optimally studied by using the case study design. Additionally, the case study design answers the

questions of “how” and “why” something occurs, which are exactly the fundamental questions of this dissertation.

There are several types of case studies that are often employed depending on the aspect of the case a researcher wants to observe. Since the goal of the study of Croatian youth policy is to support development of the public policy theory, I argue that the explanatory case study, as defined by Baxter and Jack (2008), is the most appropriate approach to apply to this dissertation. This study is commonly used to accomplish more than the surface understanding of a particular situation; it provides deeper insight into an issue or helps to refine a theory. The case is of secondary interest; it plays a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of something else. The case is often observed in depth, its contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed- all because it helps the researcher pursue a related interest. In order to design a case study of Croatian youth policy, two units of analysis are going to be taken into account. The first case of observation is the process of drafting the Youth Act; the second process relevant to this case study is the process of creating the current National Youth Program in effect from 2014 to 2017. Within those two processes of policy creation, all relevant aspects of the archetypal Croatian youth policy have been present (for an elaborate argument, please see chapter 7), and thus, it allows us to inductively draw certain conclusions.

One question, possibly a crucial one, has still not been answered, how would and why would Croatian youth policy reveal that the variable of power should be more central when analyzing public policies in the collaborative governance setting? There are three arguments to support why choosing the power variable is a sound methodological choice. Firstly, governance is a term that appeared in the mainstream political science literature in the last 30 years (chapter 2 is dedicated to the evolution of these concepts), and the same is true for the introduction of youth policy. This means that youth policy evolved simultaneously with the emergence of governance within the policy framework and thus has been under the severe influence of governance. In other words, due to congruent appearances, those two influential concepts have many similarities (for more on this, please see chapter 6). Secondly, as mentioned, Croatia is an example of post-socialist society and state, meaning that the influences of previous regimes are still significant and visible. However, with the accession to the EU in 2013, a substantial amount of (good) governance practices have been adopted. This interesting mix of influences rebuttals the widespread notion in governance and policy

literature that consensus prevails over contention and demonstrates obvious gaps in the literature. Differently put, in Croatian context policy actors do not cooperate always as expected thus their dynamics and interaction is relevant to study as it diverges from the average. However, in much of the related literature, Croatian youth policy is often considered to be less contentious (Buzinkic, 2009). Due to this mixture of consensus-oriented and contentious policy-making systems Croatia is certainly an interesting case worth studying it. Thus, I believe that the pursuit of various interests is ubiquitous in Croatian policy, and, in turn, influences the overall polity. If this dissertation shows that power matters and is quite influential in shaping a seemingly favorable public policy, it could lead to the argument that the examination of power may be likewise applicable to other policy fields.

2.2.1. Research methods

The case study research design requires a dense description of a concrete phenomenon or a situation, thus it is necessary to use research methods that will provide a comprehensive insight into the dynamics and the structure of the selected cases. For the purpose of this dissertation, three qualitative research methods are going to be used - namely text analysis, participant observation and focused semi-structured interviews of the political elite. All these three methods can be considered as a part of meta qualitative approach called *political ethnography*. This meta approach, which is in fact a hybrid between cultural anthropology and political science, "commonly includes a continuum of procedures for collection of evidence, from intrusive to unobtrusive: in-depth interviews, conversation, participant observation, passive observation of interaction, covert observation of interaction, inobtrusive observation concerning residues and consequences of interaction" (Tilly, 2006). Political ethnography, as argued by Baiocchi and Connor (2008) is a relative novelty for the social sciences and it is "based on close-up and real-time observation of actors involved in political processes" (139) with the goal to better understand the behavior of actors, the meaning of their agency and uncover the practicalities of political action. (ibid). Taking it into consideration, together with the research objective of this study, I argue there are three research methods the most adequate to carry out the research, namely – document analysis, qualitative interviews and participant observation. Political ethnography will, therefore, allow an insight 'from within' to make sense of power relations in a youth policy environment. As used for the deep understanding of power, political

ethnography will help in identifying and better analysis of power relations between civil society actors, academic community and governmental officials and assist in illuminating structures these relations create. As political ethnography allows immersion of the researcher in the subject matter which is one of principles of this dissertation's structure, it is believed this method is an adequate solution within this methodological framework. However, why is this meta-methodological approach innovative or in other words why do not I use the combination of three methods? The answer lays in the argumentation. In chapter 5 I will present the power matrix which will rely on the matter of attributed influence or auto-perception of the power of actors. In order to identify auto-perception of power and interpret it, it is necessary for me to immerse into a policy reality and to identify structural and dynamic elements of it. If I want to investigate behavioral patterns of different policy actors and how they are perceived from other actors I need to be able to participate as one of them. The goal of a researcher in this type of research is to find a way to build "close-up and real-time observation of actors involved in political processes" (Baiocchi and Connor, 2008: p. 139) without worrying about objectivity. The density of data and logical coherence of the narrative are therefore conducting the validation of the results. Furthermore, it is necessary for me to become a reflexive participant in a context where there is a convergence of subjectivity and objectivity into transcendent complexity of power relations. In order to do this methodologically sound I use notions from political ethnography which allow me to have a blurry line between myself as a observer and myself as a subject of observation.

The analysis will be qualitative in nature and will provide *document analysis* insight on the institutional architecture of youth policymaking. Famous qualitative policy scholar Yanow explains the importance of document analysis in public policy research. She claims that "Documents can provide background information prior to designing the research project, for example prior to conducting interviews. They may corroborate observational and interview data, or they may refute them, in which case the researcher is 'armed' with evidence that can be used to clarify, or perhaps, to challenge what is being told, a role that the observational data may also play" (Yanow 2007, p. 411). In this study, documents are analyzed by using propositions from the qualitative content analysis (Bernard and Ryan, 2009). The tools this method of analysis provides can be "all sort of recorded communication (transcripts of interviews, discourses, protocols of observations, video tapes, documents...)" (Mayring 2000). As

the argument goes, “Content analysis analyses not only the manifest content of the material—as its name may suggest. Becker and Lissmann (1973) have differentiated various levels of content, the themes and the main ideas of the text act as primary content; the contextualized information acts as latent content. The analysis of the formal aspects of the material belongs to its aims as well. As outlined below, content analysis streamlines text into a communication blueprint within which it defines the aims of analysis. This is expressed by Krippendorff, who defines content analysis as “the use of replicable and valid method for making specific inferences from text to other states or properties of its source" (1969, p.103) (Mayring, 2000)

For the purpose of the dissertation, the documents to be analyzed include drafts of the Act on Youth and the National Youth Program, action plans of relevant actors, reports by various ministries, civil society organizations and experts, and minutes from meetings. In total 28 meeting minutes will be analyzed (15 from the National youth program process and 13 from the youth act process), 7 notes (4 from the first and 3 from the second process), and 5 governmental dicsisions (3 from the national youth program process and 3 from the youth act process). The end result would be the identification and assessment of the environment of the policy-making process and an overview of the institutional dimensions of youth policies in Croatia. It would also highlight the mapped perception of the influence of various stakeholders.

In addition to text analysis, *participant observation* (PO) is the second method to be scrutinized for the sake of the stipulated research question. Participant observation is a qualitative method employed when a researcher becomes a member of the group by fully embracing its skills and customs for the sake of complete comprehension (Spradley 1980). In one of the most popular books on qualitative methodology, Denize and Lincoln’s *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*, the aim of participant observation is described as to examine a social setting from the perspective of a participant. Furthermore, participant observation has its roots in anthropological studies, explain Iacono, Brown and Hotham (2009), “where researchers would travel to faraway places to study the customs and practices of less known societies. It involves participating in a situation, while, at the same time, recording what is being observed.” The comparative advantage of the PO is that it can “uncover the latent occurring of which actors involved might not be aware at the first place” (Becker and Geer 1957, p. 29) and thus it can contribute to the denser and richer data on some event, system or tradition.

At the moment of writing this dissertation in Croatia, the Youth Act and the National Program for Youth 2014-2017 were in the process of being constructed. According to the standards and rules, an expert working group that consists of various policy actors has been formed in order to contribute to drafting the most important issues and topics for young people in Croatia. I was one of the members of the working group formed to draft the Youth Act. In addition, as a researcher, I was further involved in the process of contributing to the National Program for Youth 2014-2017; thus, I was able to witness for myself the dynamics of the policy-making process. Both processes were excellent platforms for observing the power relations between various actors in the youth policy field. Indeed, it will be beneficial to include participant observation in order to get a comprehensive depiction of the position of actors in youth policy field in Croatia. This intention is in line with Morse's understanding of the aim of participant observation where he claims that a duty of a researcher is to collect rich details from the natural environment and to report on findings (1998). Even though it is not very common to use participant observation as ongoing research modality in public policy Iacono, Brown and Hotham (2009) report in favor of the practice:

> Professional practice is a process of problem setting and problem solving. Practicing managers are called upon to manage problematic situations characterised by indeterminacy, uniqueness and instability. Schon (1991, quoting Ackoff, 1979) appropriately terms such situations '*messes*'. The best professionals are able to make sense of these '*messes*', discern patterns, identify deviations from a norm, recognize phenomena and adjust their performance. Such processes may be intuitive, tacit, and unconscious. The author terms this '*reflection-in-action*'. The art of management is '*science in action*', so that practicing managers may become developers of management science (Schon, 1991). The researcher in this position acquires an in-depth and first- hand insight into a real-world setting.

Those authors point out that a major criticism of participant observation is the "potential lack of objectivity, as the researcher is not an independent observer, but a participant, and the phenomenon being observed is the subject of research. The notion of participant observer does presuppose a degree of emotional detachment from the subject matter, the clear objective of the researcher being the conduct of the research." (ibid). Raymond Gold (1958) developed typology of the range of roles one may play as a participant observer. He claims there are four types of observers: *the complete participant* (insider, fully part of the setting), *the participant as observer* (researcher gains access to a setting by/for non-research reason), *the observer as participant* (minimal involvement in the social setting being studied), *the complete observer* (a

researcher does not participate in any kind of activity within the social setting). Due to the fact I was appointed to expert working groups as a youth researcher, due to my expertize in the field of youth and in order to contribute processes, being the observer was secondary to my mission, therefore my role, according to Gold was the *participant as observer*.

In order to address the bias danger, two steps were undertaken in my personal case, firstly, all stakeholders were alerted in the beginning of the proceedings (or at the stage where I started to be involved) that I might use my own experience and observations for academic and research purposes. Secondly, since most of the participants agreed to be interviewed later on, they all understood and gave their consent to the use of both the interviews and data collected from participant observation in my PhD dissertation. In order to minimalize emotional involvement, during processes I consulted twice with senior youth researchers at the Institute for Social Research in order to clearly discern what is the function and what are the limits of the academic community within the policy process - a community whose approach is so embodied in my own thinking and views. I am quite aware this desire to eliminate bias does not make my insights value-neutral; however, due to the combination of participant observation with two other research methods, this study will have an adequate level of objectivity to draw necessary conclusions on the given matter.

Despite this aspiration for accuracy, the official documents and participant observation may not indeed provide sufficient and adequate insight on the interests behind and the reasons for specific behavior and norms of stakeholders. Therefore, I found it necessary to add an additional source of information through *interviews* with stakeholders (civil society actors, government officials and academic community representatives) on their perception of cooperation with other stakeholders and their participant observations during policy document drafting. Qualitative interview method is one of the most commonly used techniques in qualitative research. It is used in case studies, in action research, in grounded theory studies, and in ethnographies (Myers, Newman 2007). The available literature states that qualitative interviewing is an approach whose main purpose is to collect the information on certain phenomena or events through conversation with knowledgeable subjects (Berg, 1995). Combination of participant observation and qualitative interview is not uncommon in anthropology and sociology. Becker and Geer (1957), Cicourel (1964) in their studies on participant observation and consequentially Ilić (2015) in his interpretation of Cicourel's argument,

state examples and benefits of combining these two qualitative methodological techniques. As argued, some of benefits include richer data, better contextualization, and more rigid methodological postulates as a research outcome. In this study, I used a specific type of qualitative interview method– the focused elite interview.

The elite interview method is a qualitative interview commonly used in political science. The goal of this interview method is to find out what the aspirations and opinions are of key (policy) actors that would point the researchers to what is/was happening behind closed doors and to discover the private side of the political process. Data retrieved from documents and journals can be enriched by uncovering the motives and past actions of politicians in order to get a more coherent picture of certain phenomena that I am interested in exploring. More concretely, in terms of interviews, the data included (but not exclusively) questions related to the perception of the role of civil society in the policy-making process (for both civil society actors and stakeholders), the elite's assessment of the status of youth policies in their respective countries and suggestions for future cooperation. As explained by Merton and Kendall (1946): "The focused interview is designed to determine responses of persons exposed to a situation previously analyzed by the investigator. The main goal is to find out the significant aspects of the whole situation, discrepancies between anticipated and actual effects" (ibid). Since I have explained my exposure to youth policy making in Croatia, my decision was to conduct focused elite interviews to clarify the situation of policy formulation a bit more and to capture the unique perspectives of the involved actors. The study respondents were chosen by the criteria of being involved in the policy formulation stage of the decision-making process. They were divided into three categories, governmental officials, academic community members and civil society representatives. Each of the respondents had been an official member of the working groups of either the Youth Act or the National Youth Program[9]. For the purpose of this study, a total of twelve focused qualitative interviews have been conducted. Each participant was introduced with the topic of this dissertation and had given an oral

[9] Civil society representatives and the members of the academic comunity selected for the interview were chosen on the grounds and the extent of their involvement and demonstrated influence. Since interviews have been conducted after the documentation analysis and participant observation, arguments and nominal position of civil society representatives could be constructed. Government officials chosen for the interview were those with a certain amount of political power, such as heads of units, governmental offices, and a deputy minister. Of all the desired respondents, one government official refused to participate, one academic community member did not see the need for it, while one civil society representative could not find time for the interview.

consent to be included in this study. Consequently, all interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed by using NVivo 11 qualitative data analysis software. It was assured to the respondents that their names were not going to be used in the dissertation but that their sectors would. The main characteristics of the participants are included in Appendix A, which includes an overview of respondents' profiles, and Table 2.1, which shows the distribution of the type of the respondents. In the Appendix B interview questions can be found.

Table 2.1: Elite interviews

Civil society representatives	Academic community members	Governmental officials
4	3	4

When text analysis, qualitative interviews and participant observation are combined together and comments, anecdotes and examples of 'uptake' or influence are recorded, this provides for an adequate methodology framework for the analysis of this kind. For an elaboration of the methodological techniques used, please see Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Methodological techniques, actors and goals

	WHAT?	HOW?
1	To identify interests of stakeholders; to assess power	**Document analysis** **Interviews**
2	To analyze mechanisms and interests, to asses power – self-evaluation of power + evaluation of power of other actors	**Elite-expert Interviews** ✓ *Academic community members* ✓ *Civil society representatives* ✓ *Representatives of governmental bodies*
3	Youth Act process National Youth Program process	**Participant observation** **Document analysis** ✓ Meetings' minutes ✓ Drafts analysis

2.3. Contribution to the field and novelty dissertation brings to policy science

King, Kohen and Verba (1994) set two criteria to be met by quality scientific research. They suggested that quality scientific study should have a theoretical value in terms of introducing a new model/framework or using an existing one in a novel manner and practical usage. These two criteria are especially important in policy studies. Public

policy, as one of the most applicable areas of political science, can balance its theoretical dimension with a practical orientation. Youth policy is particularly acceptable for the analysis proposed in this dissertation because it is inherently eclectic (consists of different policy areas, it is cross-sectoral and includes various actors) and because it has hasn't been favored by the political sphere for a number of years.

The novel theoretical contribution of this dissertation is that it comprehensively analyses the *modus operandi* actors in the process of policy formulation and through the angle of power as they maneuver the state apparatus. Since approaches using governance as a concept focuse on power insufficiently, this dissertation attempts to see if this should be the normative case in the future. Furthermore, this study seeks to contribute to governance literature, because it focuses on the aspect of governance that is not yet adequately researched and which is important for the holistic understanding of the governance concept. The innovation facet of this dissertation lies in the fact that it combines various methodological approaches in order to describe and analyze the policy formulation process in a specific polity. With all the important dynamics occurring within the governance paradigm, it is surprising that very few scholars have dealt with them (Turnpenny et al., 2015; Howlett and Ramesh, 2002; Howlett, 2014; Corchan and Malone, 1999), given that there is a vast need for understanding the context and the position of civil society actors in order to have a transparent public policy making process. Hence, the academic relevance to this gap lies in the attempt to evaluate the function of non-state actors and their interaction with state actors. So far, academic literature has identified non-state actors and offered several interpretations of their role in a policy process (Brigha and Varvasovszky, 2000; Howlett and Ramesh, 2002; Birkland, 2001). This dissertation has a normative orientation and argues that civil society organizations are key stakeholders in policy outcomes, elucidating further what it means for government to steer, not row. In addition to this, policy formulation is being reconceived as a merger with the governance perspective in the policy process (Turnpenny et al., 2015). The policy formulation is further applied to the study of non-state actors in a specific policy context. Lastly, and possibly most importantly, dissertation introduces interpretative argument in study of power within the contemporary policy/making processes. Even though literature (Fisher, 2007) discuss the interpretative turn in public policy, most of texts do not operate with power. therefore, in this dissertation, I seek to explore the potential of studying power from the interpretativis perspective within the governance setting of decision-making process.

Using interpretativism will supplement the existing knowledge in the study of both actors and policy formulation in a way to allow immersion into their *modi operandi*. Those gaps in literature are, as I argue, adequate justification of the relevance of this dissertation and its possible contribution to public policy as a discipline.

The study of youth policy, as one of the subcategories of social policy, might offer a model for the study of other social policies if this and other research propels it in that direction. Since multiplicity of actors is one of the characteristics of public policies, the actors' characteristics and function then become relevant for understanding the whole policy-making process. Therefore, it may be possible to apply the proposed model given in this dissertation for better insight on the relations between actors and clearer understanding of the process of social policy creation.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of innovation presented by this dissertation is a methodological one. Indeed, in this work, I intent to use certain aspects of anthropology in order to describe and analyze a policy process. One of the methods being used in this dissertation- participant observation- is not widely used in policy studies, particularly in the pre-decision stages (Stubbs 2014); therefore, it will be a unique approach to discerning the landscape of youth policy. Certainly, there are scholars using anthropological approaches and methods in policy studies, such as ethnography (Yanow, 1996; 2009; Clarke, Bainton, Lendvai, Stubbs, 2015; Dubois, 2009); however, from my own inquiry, it became apparent that none of them use participant observation as a method for understanding the policy process in a specific policy field. This being said, it is important to argue why the participant observation method as such is an appropriate, original method for this topic. I believe that by merging participant observation insights and policy analysis, one can attain understanding of the motivation and *modus operandi* of actors, which states a lot about the applications for a more comprehensive study of policy actors. Moreover, participant observation allows one to understand the differentiations in power leverage among the involved actors and to observe in real-time the construction of a policy process at play.

From a practical point of view, this specific policy area involving the public and youth has still not been academically explored. To date, there had not been elaborate, policy-aimed research on the youth sector nor to inquiry in the youth's role in contributing towards Croatian policy outcomes. However, this alone is not a sufficient reason for initiating this dissertation topic. In Croatia, more than one million Euros per

year[10] is being allocated to civil society public-interest projects (Kovacic, 2016), yet both the citizens and the decision makers vaguely know the outcomes of their work. Furthermore, in the last three to four years, youth issues had started to become of greater importance in the political discourse; therefore, it is necessary to assess which issues are relevant to youth and why they become relevant in the first place.

Table 2.3: Elements innovation brings into the field of public policy analysis

Theoretical Novelty	• Introduces the variable of power from the interpretative point of view in the governance literature • Enables denser description of (collaborative) governance which will decrease vagueness of the governance concept and increase its analytical value; • Illuminates the understanding of the policy formulation process within the governance understanding of policy-making by it as a way to conceptualiza power of actors; • Contributes to literature by focusing on the strategies and the power state and non-state actors use in the policy formulation process; • Analyzes and examines the concept of power as a interpretative undertake in the policy formulation process, which had not been done before; • Compares various non-state actors in the pursuit of turning their goals into agenda, without delving into lobbying literature; • Youth policy analysis helps initiate wider social policy analyses by serving as an applicable model
Methodological originality	• Using political ethnography as a method in policy analysis; • Triangulation strictly within the qualitative framework of research methods
Practical Contribution	• Youth policy as a field has not been studied within the public policy framework; • Evaluation of the work of civil society organizations; • The analysis of the priorities in the Croatian youth policy, which has profound influence on 18.6% of the population of Croatia

[10] For the year 2015, in the state budget for the item „youth policy“ was allocated 8.269.436,00 HRK (1.091.275,93 Euros)

Chapter 3

GOVERNANCE - HOW TO UNDERSTAND IT?

Things changed, people changed, and the world went rolling along right outside the window.

— Nicholas Sparks, Message in a Bottle

To start writing a chapter on governance, its development, changes over time, trends that characterize its study, the number of critiques and its role in the contemporary policy discourse is harder than it might seem. Governance is one of those fashionable concepts, which is widely used by various scholars and which covers a vast number of different ideologies. It ambitiously seeks to provide convenient analysis of all current trends. Governance is a catchphrase, often heard at conferences, think-tank discussion forums, thesis and dissertation defences and civil society meetings. Hence, it is a term preferred by many representatives of international organizations, policy analysts, politicians and students of political science. To sum up, if you find yourself in political, economic or social science academic circles, there is a high probability that you will encounter this all-pervading concept.

Every now and then, a new "buzzword" appears in academic circles. Most of the time, these words are attached to some societal issues that are prevalent at the time, such as recession, political capital, information society, capacity building or stakeholders. In the last twenty to twenty-five years, *governance* has gained enormous popularity as a dominant buzzword thrown around enthusiastically to validate ideas and hypotheses on the workings and interconnectedness of systems that explain the changing state of world affairs. This vague, omnipresent term has been a part of mandatory vocabulary in published papers of political science and public policy academia since the early 1990s and still pervades as a quite fashionable concept (Hewitt Alcantara, 1998; Peters, 2001; Treib, Bähr, Falkner, 2005). Rhodes (2000) argues that governance is now everywhere and appears to mean anything and everything. Scholars have been analyzing the mere concept of governance, writing chronologies of its development, mapping various actors within governance theory, trying to understand whether the role of the state is weakening or just transforming etc. All of this suggests at least four things; firstly, concepts that were used decades ago do not have explanatory

power to describe current trends in politics, public administration and public policies; secondly, this precisely explains that we are witnessing a transformation of the approach in public administration management and policy studies; thirdly, that change is important enough to be analyzed in detail; and finally, practice influences academia more than vice versa.

If all of the above is as simple as stated, you might wonder why I argue it is hard to write an analytical text on governance. There are several reasons for this claim. The first is the fact that knowledge on governance is not codified. As the case is with every metaconcept, governance is being used for many different aspects of political science, capturing different dimensions of a polity. This, by all means, reduces its analytical power to what Sartori (1970) argues as "stretch concept". Even though as it will later be presented more thoroughly, there are some (Kersbergen, Warden, 2004) arguing this can be used to create "a bridge between disciplines", it is necessary to have clearly defined terms for specific aspects of political and social life in order to achieve maximum possible precision and to improve the value of policy analyses. In addition, the problem with undefined and vague terms, especially those that are often being used in policy discourse, is the danger of erroneous implementation pathways. When concepts are used vaguely by the decision-makers, there is a possibility they will be understood differently, which could impact implementation of policy outputs and outcomes. Finally, having precisely defined concepts that are used as a foundation for analyzing and explaining other more complex and/or more specific dimensions of a system helps with greater accuracy of data. Without the consensus of understanding that one concept means exactly what it means, cognition, which derives from the study and analysis of that concept, is in danger of being transgressed. Due to all of these reasons, it is necessary to have a clear categorical apparatus. In this chapter, I aim to offer my understanding of the concept of governance as a ground for analysis I will undertake in the second part of this dissertation.

Governance, or the nexus of "regimes, laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goals and services" (Lynn, Heinrich and Hill, 2001, p. 7), has started to capture the interest of policy and political scientists during the second half of the 20th century. Frederickson (2004) claims that one can be grateful to Harlan Cleveland for the first usage of the word 'governance' in 1970, alluding that Mr. Cleveland said that

what people want is less government and more governance[11]. With this exclamation, Cleveland ignited the focus shift of policy and political science scholars from the process of transforming vertical, state-centric system of public administration into a more horizontal, inclusive and open horizontal decision-making scheme. Based on the relevant literature (Peters, Pierre, 2000; Pierre, Peters, 2005), it can be argued that there are two pillars of the same argument that elucidate the emergence of governance as a practice in the public sector. The first one is the domestic and relates to citizens' demands, while the second places the focus on the private sector and relates to issues in the international context.

Democratic government is about people. This simplistic notion might seem redundant, however, in order to portray social, political and historical circumstances that have let to the proliferation of governance in political science and public policy discourse, it is necessary to keep in mind that democracy has always been and always will be focused on citizens who are the only true sovereign agents. L. Diamond (2004) points out four key elements that outline democratic government, namely, a political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections; the active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life; protection of the human rights of all citizens, a rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens. In the representative type of democracy, where citizens elect their legal representatives, citizens expect that the government will take care of their needs and create a fitting environment for their welfare. This appeal, although not very modern (it had started in the 19th century), has become more articulated after World War II. Over time, citizens were expecting their governments to provide more services, and consequently, the state apparatus become larger. In their analysis of empowered participatory governance, Fung and Wright (2003, p. 3) contextualize the emergence of governance by arguing that the tasks of the state have become more complex and the size of polities larger and more heterogeneous due to requirements of representative democracy as well as techno-bureaucratic administration. Consequentially, the state, according to some authors (for example Birch, 1984), started to have more problems delivering all services required by its citizens. Birch, in his text on overloaded

[11] Even though the word governance is not new, it originates from Middle English word *governaunce* (which is derived from Old French or more precisely Medieval Latin word *gubernantia)* from around 1325-75, Frederickson here thinks on so-called "new governance", characterized by heterarchy rather by hierarchy, creating horizontal modes of governance among multitude of actors" (Smismans 2008).

governments and ungovernability, explains that the concept of 'overload' was introduced into the vocabulary of political science in 1975 in two publications, which appeared almost simultaneously in the United States and Britain. One was by Michel Crozier in a report on the governability of democracies entitled *The Crisis of Democracy*; the other was by Anthony King in *Political Studies* (135). Birch claims that both authors started with the same hypothesis, that there had been a fast expansion in public expectations about what benefits could be provided by governments in Western democracies, that many of these expectations had inevitably been breached, and that the result was a serious decline of public confidence in the government. (ibid).

Public demands require making partnerships in service provision between public administration and other non-state actors. Governance thus assumes government is just one of the actors that is important for effective and efficient output of production. Kooiman (1993) writes that there is no single actor who has the knowledge resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally, while Peters and Pierre similarly conclude that the state actually loses the capacity for direct control and replaces that faculty with a capacity to influence (1998, p. 226). Governments ultimately realize that due to demands made upon them which they cannot meet, they require reliable partners in order to maintain (or regain) their efficiency in results delivery. This argumentation is in line with the central argument of the proponents of mostly neoliberal ideology, which proposes that governance is a necessary shift from the bureaucratic state to the hollow state[12] (Salamon, 2002, Rhodes, 1997; Milward and Proran, 2000).

Complementary logic comes from the economical point of view. While citizens demand bigger coverage of state's services and want better provision of social rights, the private sector, enabled by a consolidated liberal economy, started to claim its right to influence policy-making. Economic flows have become independent from state regulation and the traditional concept of government as a controlling and regulating entity of society and economy is argued to be outmoded (Bekke, Kickert and Kooiman, 1995). As the argument goes, the public sector is excessively clumsy and bureaucratic, which results in inefficiency, whilst the private sector, aimed with the for-profit agenda, is more efficient. Due to these major differences, it is necessary to fuse the best elements of implement some features of the private sector into governmental procedures and

[12] The hollow state is a metaphor for the increasing use of third parties, often nonprofits, to deliver social services and generally act in the name of the state (Milward, Provan 2000)

allow other stakeholders to participate in the policy-making process (Peters and Pierre, 1998). This view, supported by the paradigm of new public management[13], has become popular in the realm of public administration studies.

Literature on this topic started to grow rapidly, therefore, Stephan P. Osborne (2010) divided literature on governance into five different areas, (1) socio-political governance; (2) public policy governance; (3) administrative governance; (4) contract governance and (5) network governance. As stated earlier, governance is a concept widely used by government officials, civil society practitioners and political scientists and is most generally defined as the "development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public [voluntary] and private sector become blurred" (Stoker, 1998, 1). The pivotal value of democracy is equality; analogue governance rests on equally involved actors in a political process. It focuses, according to Stoker (1998), on governing mechanisms which do not rest on resource allocation to the authority and sanctions of the government. Governance thus assumes government is just one of the many actors important for effective and efficient output of production, which is summarized in Peters and Pierre's text as an argument that the state actually loses the capacity for direct control and replaces that faculty with a capacity to influence (1998, 226). Therefore, one of the key concepts in the analysis of governance is interdependence of actors. Hence, Kooiman and Van Vliet (1993, p. 64) suggest, "the governance concept points to the creation of a structure or an order which cannot be externally imposed but is the result of the interaction of multiplicity of governing and each other influencing actors". In other words, quoting Rhodes (1997), "governance is mutual resource dependency". Governments understand that due to all the demands made upon them which they cannot meet, they require reliable partners in order to maintain (or regain) their efficiency in service delivery. This argument is in line with the arguments of mostly neoliberal ideology, which states that governance is a

[13] New public management (NPM) is a topical phrase which originated in the 1980s to describe how management techniques from the private sector are now being applied to public services (Lane, 2000). It refers to, as Hood (2000) argues, to "lessening or removing differences between the public and the private sector and shifting the emphasis from process accountability towards greater element to accountability in terms of results (94). From this, it follows that the new public management theory is symbiotic with and based on a neo-liberal understanding of State and economy. Without going into details, one can said that new public management and governance have some common features, however it should be careful not to identify one with another, more concretely NPM implies specific types of management tools which operate within the propositions of governance (Ewalt 2001).

necessary shift from the bureaucratic state to the hollow state (Salamon, 2002; Rhodes, 1997; Milward and Provan, 2000). In the first chapter the general idea behind the concept of governance is being presented.

The chapter consists of four sections that cover five aspects of a theoretical framework that will together create a coherent unit.

In the *first* section, I explain contextual and historical circumstances that have led to the creation of governance as a concept in policy studies and focus on collaborative governance as a concept that is currently prevailing in public administration and policy studies. Here, the development of the concept and its relation to everyday life is also being presented. Extrapolated from the relevant literature, I offer requirements a system should have in order to be considered as part of "governance" framework. Hence, the section is about the reaction of policy science on the concept of governance as well. Here, deliberative policy analysis and new focal points of research such as the role of power, language and symbols are being presented.

In the *second* section, the role of policy stage model in new governance related understanding of public policy is being examined. Since the critiques of the policy cycle model are being articulated relatively loudly and one suffers from reductionism and simplicity, (Evertt 2003) it was necessary to explore the role of the policy cycle and how to conciliate its influence within the governance framework.

The *fourth* section is dedicated to the study of methodological challenges of the governance approach, particularly deliberative policy approach, and its contemporary critique. In this section, above-mentioned reasons why it is necessary to have precise governance terminology is explored in greater detail and relevant policy literature on this is presented.

The *fourth* section refers to the models of governance as a response for the lack of analyticity. Since governance is vague and often not so understandable concept, it is necessary to explore its varieties. In this section collaborative governance, as a prevailing approach in this dissertation is being investigated and studied more detailed and arguments for the usage of this specific mode are being presented.

3.1. Public policy and governance, a development

For the start, there are two terms that should be separated no matter how closely associated. On the one hand, there is policy science, a strictly academic discipline that focuses on the "knowledge of the policy process and of the relevance of knowledge in the process" (Lasswell, 1970). The other concept is policy analysis, an applied technique (1981, p. 35) which, according to Dunn, "uses multiple methods of inquiry and arguments to produce and transform policy-relevant information that may be utilized in political settings to resolve policy problems." These two terms, even though varied in their processes, have a great influence on one another and together create a collective understanding of policy. R. Mayntz pointed out that policy research is not primarily concerned with the application of the analytic theory, but rather with the detailed and differentiated understanding of the internal dynamic of policy-making (Mayntz, 1983). As it will be presented in this section, various types of policy analyses have developed within policy studies and vice versa[14].

The evolution of policy studies began after World War II alongside other major trends in the field of political science. On the one hand, the sphere of political science, supported by the behavioral revolution[15], started to focus more on quantitative methodology in order to ensure its quest towards empirically sound data and objectivity and insist on causality as a pivotal objective. On the other hand, policy science (or policy analysis) evolved to place greater attention on solving societal problems. Relying on the philosophy of American pragmatism (Torgesten, 1995), policy science was not ignoring its partiality towards values[16]; moreover, it directed its emphasis towards democratic values and a strong focus toward better societal objectives (Lasswell and Lerner, 1951). Hence, in his texts from that period, Laswell pointed out the strength of

[14] One can say that policy analysis is the unit of analysis of policy studies. This approach will be used in the continuation of this text.

[15] "The traditional approach of political science was concerned with the purpose, nature, and organization of the 'state,' stressing humanistic, ethical, and philosophical perspectives. The traditionalists shared a preference for intensive case studies and other qualitative observations in which inferences were derived on the basis of subjective norms and values. Although little consensus exists about the exact characteristics of the so-called "behavioral revolution" in political science, the scientific method of the behavioralists emphasizes the collection of observable data and the use of statistical analysis based on many recorded cases. Behavioral political science claims to be "value-neutral" in the sense of separating fact from value and describing political phenomena without judging their goodness or morality" (Gale, 2008)

[16] Authors such as Elmore (1987) conceptualize public policy as a realization of pragmatism in public affairs.

the multidisciplinary approach, which is the use of multiple methods[17] and utilization of global perspectives in solving societal problems (Petković, 2008).

Discrepancy in the approaches between the supposed neutral focus of political science in explaining social, political and economic phenomena and the practical, problem-solving orientation of policy studies has been an issue for more than 50 years. Policy scientists had been arguing that professional knowledge should be put into use in order to aid the societal, economic and political development of communities. However, this line of argumentation has its pitfalls. As Petković (2008, p. 6) claims, over time, critics of this approach started becoming more articulated in claiming that policy science has betrayed its own democratic vision and shifted its direction towards technocracy. As the argument goes, policy solutions and proposals have often focused on cost-benefit analysis, while ignoring various actors and contexts of problems. Since the 1980s, there has been a number of texts explaining the abandonment of the top-down, rational choice conception of politics. At the same time, they have been advocating for more flexible understanding of the policy-making process. Petković (2008) summarizes two streams of critiques towards the traditional notion of policy science. He supports Hal Colebatch's (2004) argument about the discrepancy between societal reality and polity practice. Public policy is not only what government decides to do or not to do, but rather the interplay between the vertical and horizontal dimensions. In other words, Colebatch refuses the conception of powerful government as the only important actor and introduces other stakeholders as relevant in the decision-making process. Similarly, Lindblom (1990) criticizes the *modus operandi* of social sciences, which he feels is undemocratic in its nature. This author claims that policy analysis should abandon its focus on the technocratic problem of resource allocation and include citizenry in the decision-making process.

[17] One disclaimer has to be mentioned here. Even though Lasswell (1951) writes that policy science has to be open for various methods in the introduction of this book, he by all means was a proponent of quantitative methodology and empirically oriented approach. This approach has been almost indubitable way of understanding public policy for many decades. One of the reasons for that is the duality of disciplines that public policy holds. As Colebatch writes (2004), in the academic world, the dominance in the policy field is political science, while in practice, it is economics. Nevertheless, since practice always influences theory, public policy is not the exception of that rule. Due to the dominance of economics in practical decision-making by utilizing quantitative methodology, it likewise has great influence on the methodology and theory of public policy, within political science, and on promoting the role of quantitative methodology and rational approach on policy-making.

Backed by the post-behavioralist, epistemological orientation [18] (or so-called interpretative turn) in political science, proponents of this type of approach to policy-making emphasize the role of language, symbols, power and context when crafting policy analysis and argue for an alternative approach to policy, one that features variations of greater citizen participation (as opposed to a technical approach that focuses on the decision-making of the removed elites) and that is often described as "participatory policy analysis" […] or "deliberative democracy". (deLeon and Vogenbeck, 2007, p. 10). Hence, theorists (Schneider and Ingram, 1997; Fischer, 2003; Schneider and Ingram 2005) have contended that sociopolitical context and the individuals within it are a function of a social construction, thus the deliberative democracy model (complementary to the governance paradigm) becomes even more essential, as the participatory parties try to forge an agreement (deLeon and Vogenbeck, 2007, 10).

The abovementioned critiques are uniquely relevant in the case of understanding the role of multiple actors within the governance process, as explained in the previous section. The trend advocating for relevance of multiple actors in the policy-making process has propelled the policy science sector to revise its current theoretical provisions and to adopt its research tools to accommodate a more democratic and deliberative polity in order to be able to explore it to a greater extent. In other words, governance as a phenomenon had become the central issue in policy studies, which requires the advancement of approaches, methods, theories and the development of concepts that would adequately encompass the whole complexity of this phenomenon. Taking into consideration this change that was taking shape in policy studies and polities, Bingham, Nabatchi and O'Leary (2005, p. 552) made a case by claiming that "although scholars have studied the transformation of governance through globalization, devolution, and networks, and they have argued for a greater role in governance for the public, practitioners have developed a rich diversity of processes that use negotiation, mediation, facilitation, citizen and stakeholder engagement, deliberation, collaboration, and consensus building within the statutory frameworks reviewed here." They conclude

[18] Grdešić (1995, p. 16) in his book *Političko odlučivanje* addresses post behavioralism in political science as an approach being focused on results and outcomes rather than just a process. For him, in post-behavioralism, contextual variables are more than just 'background research' and political economy is becoming a relevant factor in the analysis of actors, structures and processes. Hence, post-behavioralists believe values should not be neglected and advocate in favor of research method diversification.

that practitioners have brought about this innovative understanding of governance, which should be studied by incorporating more groundbreaking research tools.

In order to understand this claim better, we should take a look at some of the most prominent writings of policy scholars on new trends in governance studies. Osborne (2010) argues that public policy governance is the way "policy elites and networks interact to create and govern the public policy process" (Osborne, 2010, p. 6). However, in order to more accurately present the policy understanding of governance, perhaps it is best to take a step back first and contextualize governance within the theoretical framework. In 1999, Elinor Ostrom introduced three levels of specificity found within theoretical work, framework (identifies elements needed for more systematic analysis), theories ("enable the analyst to specify which elements of the framework are particularly relevant to certain kinds of questions and to make general working assumptions about these elements") and models ("make precise assumptions about a limited set of parameters and framework") (Ostorm, 1999, p. 40). Governance, a term whose core is eclecticism of actors and relationships, would classify as being a framework. Therefore, it is pivotal for an effective policy analysis to not misinterpret governance as a one-dimensional concept. However, it is more important to understand its individual elements, the links between them, and the overall effect of their connections on societies. Moreover, it is likewise important to understand who the actors are that comprise a polity and how its structural elements changeover time depending on various incentives.

In my understanding, and based on comprehensive literature review, there are three foci of public policy governance, the multiplicity and the background of actors involved in policy-making, the differentiation of the level of governance (subnational, national, or supranational) and the variation of policy instruments used in the governance context.

As stated earlier, the concept of governance implies that there is greater number of actors involved in the process of policymaking. While Jessop (2004) views the policy arena as an "unstructured complexity", Kenneth (2008) warns that the policy arena has become visibly more crowded (4). This change does not only take into account the question of the number of actors involved, but also their specialization. In this complex take on policy-making, public and private stakeholders work together in collective forums with public agencies and engage in consensus-oriented decision-making. In policy science, this is known under the name *collaborative governance* (Ansell and

Gash 2007). Richard and Smith (2002) describe governance as "descriptive label that is used to highlight the changing nature of the policy process in recent decade [adding that] it sensitizes us to ever-increasing variety of terrains and actors involved in the making of public policy" (p. 3). Governance as an ideology tends to eliminate the monopoly of the executive in the policy-making process by introducing various actors into the policy arena. By giving non-state actors the right to participate, governance aims to influence a more participatory and transparent way of creating policies. The prevailing approach in the study of governance within public policy is a policy network approach. Policy networks are usually defined as stable, non-hierarchical links between public administration and civil society (Petek, 2012).

There are three levels of governance depending on the institutional framework where policy-making is being made, namely subnational, national and supra-national. Policy texts focus more so on national and super-national levels than the subnational level. Here, it is worth to mention the different understandings of governance in the United States and Western Europe. As Pierre and Peters (2000) claim, in Western Europe, governance is viewed to be more about the involvement of citizens in the policy-making process, while in the United States, governance's focus is on the effective and efficient decision-making process. This differentiation is perpetuated by the type of state – the hollow state in the Anglo-Saxon tradition or the enabling state, which originated in the Nordic countries (Petek, 2012, p. 112-113). As of lately, a number of texts have been dealing with the nature of European governance (Caporaso and Wittenbrinck, 2006; Heritier, 2001; Eising and Kohler-Koch, 2004; Börzel, 1997; Scharpf, 2001). Caporaso and Wittenbrinck (2006) argue that European governance is a novel mode of governance, which is open, deliberative, informative and consensual. Perhaps the most visible mode of the European governance is the open method of its cooperation, whose goal is to involve civil society in the policy-making process (della Porte and Nanz 2004) and to eradicate strong legal abidingness.

The last facet of the policy-oriented perception of governance is the usage of policy instruments. Even though policy instruments are often analysed as "peripheral in the understanding of public policy [and] little explored by academic analysts" (Lascoumes and le Gales 2007, p. 1), they make an important addition in the general understanding of governance. A public policy instrument constitutes a device that is both technical and social and which organizes specific social relations between the state and those it addresses according to the representations and meanings it carries. It is a

particular type of institution, whose technical purpose is to carry out a concrete conception of the politics/society relationship, sustained by elements of regulation. (ibid, 4)

To sum up, governance as an approach focuses on the process of managing, not controlling, and proposes theoretical and methodical responses to the emerging shifts in policy-making, where policy outputs are not simply a result of only two actors (politics and public administration), but rather of the interaction between politics, public administration, private sector and civil society (Petak, 2008, p. 445-46). The emergence of governance concept had tremendous impact on the development of political science thus Peters (2008) claims the early understanding of governance is closely related to functionalist approach. Peters furthermore argues that with the development of governance the focus of political scientists, and particularly policy scholars focused on functional need to understand steering within the democratic decision-making process. This notion evolved into one of the most important distinctions relevant for political science – difference between government and governance (Rhodes, 1997). The question of differentiation between these concepts stayed a central analytic question for scholars concerned with governance (Peters 2008, p. 4).

Keeping this in mind, within the last 25 years, several schools of thought were developed, whose mission was to, contribute to the better understanding of societal reality by expanding the mainstream methodological and conceptual focus. Thus, within policy literature, a plethora of terms such as interpretative policy analysis, deliberative policy analysis, participatory policy analysis, discursive policy analysis and argumentative policy analysis had found their place. Although these concepts are far from being interchangeable, one can place them under the same umbrella, since actors play a central role in all. Whereas in the classical policy analysis the principle idea was to explain and analyse the process of decision-making, the nature of outputs and evaluation of policies, the current approaches, such as participatory policy making o deliberative policy making, acknowledge non-state actors as relevant stakeholders and focus on structural characteristics of their behaviour, interaction and influence on the policy-making process.

In this respect, what impacts did the interpretative turn have on public policy approaches?

The interpretative turn in public policy influenced the focus of policy scientists and practitioners. Arguments, discourses and stories have become the objects of interest (Petkovic 2008). Moreover, interpretative analysis has shifted the focus on the power and the relationships between actors in order to investigate deeper into how policy is made or should be made. Fischer (2006, p. 223) reminds us that "policy analysis thus emerged to inform a 'rational model' where rational decision makers are seen to follow steps that closely parallel the requirements of scientific research. Decision makers empirically identify a problem, and then formulate the objectives and goals that would lead to an optimal solution." However, this logic suffered from severe limitations, and thus the authors (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Hawkesworth, 1988) challenged the role of policy analysts as "rational" players, since they primarily focused on qualitative results and offered its implications in terms of being more so about engaging the political processes of policy deliberation than in providing answers or solutions to the public problems facing contemporary societies (Fischer, 2007).

Hence, Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) have expanded the concept of deliberative policy analysis, referring to the so-called "argumentative turn" and arguing in favour of going beyond the positivists' understanding of public policy. This approach focuses on the so-called policy communities where ideas, values and interests are placed at the center of policy inquiry, "respecting diversified, even conflicting, interpretations of the policy and its context by stakeholders" (Li, 2015). Deliberative policy analysis, as the name suggests, analyses deliberation between actors and by using mostly qualitative methods, uncovering the possibilities of synergy between "local knowledge" and expertise in order to support "collaborative problem solving and consensus building" (Li 2015, p. 2). Additionally, for policymaking, this means not simply enabling straightforward inclusion of those affected by public policy in the domain of policy formulation, decision-making and administrative implementation, but also the search for alternate ways of involving the many 'others' that are affected by it in less direct ways. (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). Furthermore, Hajer and Wagenaar offer the following explanation on the implications of consensus decision-making, "We thus try to grasp analytically what this means for our understanding of politics and policymaking, of the relationship between state and society, of our possibilities of collective learning and conflict resolution, and of the nature and role of policy analysis in all this." (p. 6)

Closely related to notions of deliberative policy analysis is argumentative policy analysis. Majone (1989) in his book *Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion* emphasizes the role of arguments in policy analysis and argues that a policy process goes beyond mere rational decision-making. Majone furthermore calls upon the focus on arguments and rhetoric as integral characteristic of policy analysis and advocates for understanding of public policy-making as practical and community based discipline. In addition to the deliberative and argumentative policy analysis discussed thus far, there are also a number of related analysis practices in the policy field, such as the discursive policy analysis (Fairclough, 1992), the narrative policy analysis (Roe, 1994) and the participatory policy analysis (Forester, 1999; Fischer, 2000; Durning, 1993). Without going into the details of each of those approaches, what is relevant for this dissertation is to call attention to various responses of policy scientists on the topic of governance.

This rather big shift from the classical rationalistic understanding of policy analysis pushed through two very important aspect relevant for the societal and political sphere in a contemporary life. Firstly, proponents of interpretative policy analysis introduced the idea policy-making should be embedded in diversity of its publics. Such stronger orientation on link between policy-making and diverse social groups that got the legitimacy to participate in policy-making is, argue, one of defining principles of contemporary democratic regimes. Therefore, this legitimizes interpretative policy analysis to be relevant and useful approach in modern public policy analysis. Secondly, interpretative policy analysis focus on so-called collective entities (Petkovic, 2008). Collective entities such as traditions, narrations, discourses and worlds of lives are essential segments of interpretive policy analysis. On the one hand they depend on a certain social setting, they are constructed based on actors' perception and intersubjectivity, however they exist independently from the individual in their raw conjures. From my point of view, this finding is particularly important because it reminds researchers to be sensitive for difference, but also to comprehend those certain human universalities. The relevance of this duality lays in the political sphere of contemporary life where sovereignty and call for national particularities is important and present in the public sphere, while at the same time there is an imperative of unity and cooperation[19]. In such a delicate time, interpretative analysis which compromises

[19] The current situation in the European Union is cetranly a good example. While the dominante discourse at the EU is unity, collaboration, cooperation and togethernes, at the same time there is a proliferation of calls for nationalism, particularity, and distinctiveness.

between these two ontological stances might be useful in offering acceptable policy solutions.

As it will be illustrated in the third and fourth chapter, even though new approaches in policy analysis focus on power, they still remain limited in the interpretation of its perpetuation within the governance structure. In other words, prominent policy scientists engaged in the new wave of policy analysis such as Fischer, Hajer, Wagenaar or Yanow, or even Foucault and Dryzek, brilliantly explain the structure of policy analysis, the societal context and the methodology of the processes, but do not offer a plausible conceptualization of the distribution of power within the new paradigm of policy-making. Hence, what lacks is the actual explanation of concrete, implemented policymaking, particularly as it relates to the theory of how actors behave in such unpredictable circumstances. Interpretative policy analysis offers better provisions for the analysis of contemporary policy processes in terms of power, however it still lacks coherent and valid matrix to be used for analysis. In order to fill this gap in the literature in the 5th chapter I am proposing a solution for this issue.

The aspect of policy analysis whose influence is impossible to avoid is the prominent policy cycle model of public policies. This approach, developed by Harold Lasswell (1956), had seven phases[20] at the beginning, which later transformed into stages. The policy cycle as an approach for understanding policy-making is certainly one of the most influential approaches in the whole policy science framework. However, it has faced pretty severe critics, and therefore, Lasswell's pivotal contribution to the study of public policy is not without its faults. Thus, it leaves us to speculate about its role in contemporary policy-making and if any of its aspects can be utilized in an environment where networks and horizontality dictate the policy-making process.

2.2. Policy stage model in a new, collaborative, policy environment

There are very few models and approaches that have had such a great impact on the development of a discipline as had the policy cycle or policy stage model. This simplified version of a real-life scenario public policy process that was initially proposed by H. Lasswell, has had several upgrades and variants over time in order to boost its validity and proximity. The versions developed by Brewer and deLeon (1983),

[20] Original Lasswell's stages were, intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal

May and Wildavsky (1978), Anderson (1975), and Jenkins (1978) are among the most widely adopted ones. Today, the concrete differentiation between agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation (eventually leading to termination) has become a conventional way to describe the chronology of a policy process (Werner and Wegrich 2007, p. 43). Nevertheless, in almost all of those stages of the policy model, three main phases can be detected, namely, pre-decision, implementation and evaluation of a policy. The policy stage model, no matter how many levels it has and no matter how it was understood over time within the policy process, it was and still is, the focal point in almost every policy analysis. As Werner and Wegrich explain, "according to such a rational model, any decision-making should be based on a comprehensive analysis of problems and goals, followed by an inclusive collection and analysis of information and a search for the best alternative to achieve these goals" (p. 44).

However, the critics have been vocal and have directed some severe critiques to the policy stage model. P. Sabatier and H. Jankins-Smith argue that it is not a causal model at all, and it does not allow setting hypotheses that can be empirically checkable; likewise, it is imprecise and is based on implicit, top-down perspective rather than a bottom-up approach and is determined largely by legal perspective, without taking societal context into consideration (deLeon 1998). Additionally, "Everett (2003) argues that the model represents a revision to the classic rational paradigm of policy making, which emphasizes formal procedures and ignores the complex, value-laden nature of the policy process, as well as the primary role of political power in determining the direction of public policy. Because of this, the policy cycle model is allegedly impractical and inappropriate for most cases of decision making" (Howard, 2005, p. 3). Additionally, the policy cycle framework, according to Werner and Wegrich (2007, p. 56), ignores the role of knowledge, ideas and learning in the policy process as influential and independent variables affecting all stages of the policy process.

Keeping all this in mind, the policy cycle model's relevance for explaining the general perspective of policy-making, still poses the question of the utility and justification of the policy cycle use, particularly within the governance setup.

Certain authors agree that the policy cycle framework still has a lot to offer. Bridgeman and Davis (2003), for example, agree with this argument and claim that its biggest value in the realm of policy and public administration studies is that it helps public servants make sense of the policy task (p. 98). In their publication on the policy

cycle model, Werner and Wegrich (2007) summarize its role in contemporary policy science by arguing the following, "the policy cycle perspective will continue to provide an important conceptual framework in policy research, as long as the heuristic purpose of the framework is considered and the departure from the hierarchical top-down perspective and the receptivity for other and new approaches in the wider political science literature is taken into account" (p. 57). Werner and Wegrich definitely have insight into the relation between the policy cycle model and governance, "the whole debate on (new forms of) governance and the development from government to governance builds on results of and debates within policy research […]. Research on implementation has prepared the ground for the governance debate by detecting non-hierarchical modes of governance and patterns of co-governance between state and social actors, and through the recognition of the crucial role of civil society (organizations) for policy delivery. [Hence,] in terms of democratic governance and from the perspective of public administration research, it remains of central relevance in which stage which actors are dominant and which are not" (p. 57-58).

In the following dissertation, I agree with Schlanger (1999), who highlights the openness of the cycle perspective for different theoretical and empirical interests in the field of policy studies. Therefore, the policy stage model will be used as a proxy for the assessment of the role and power of actors in the policy process. As I will argue in the third chapter and even more thoroughly in the empirical part of this study, the policy stage model, if complemented by the contemporary insights on the structure and dynamics of the public policy process, can keep its heuristic value. It can help illuminate various aspects of the policymaking process that are still inadequately analysed and described, and in that capacity, be assistance to both policy practitioners as well as to policy scientists.

As evidenced by this section, governance is rather fashionable concept that are being used in various appropriate contexts when describing different aspects of a polity. At the beginning of the new millennium, Blatter argues, (2012, p. 3) "the term governance was one of the favourites in the race to claim the title of the most widely used term in the social sciences. In fact, on the Internet governance received clearly more hits than the term globalisation, which dominated the social science discourse during the 1990s". Working uses of the term "governance" conjure a variety of positive interpretations. But, sometimes these positive elements do not necessarily fit together in any meaningful way. This statement, in short, summarizes the next section of this

dissertation, where methodological challenges and the critique of governance are being postulated in order to get a clearer and more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. The main question is, does the concept of governance meet the criteria of a scientifically valid construct that may be used to explain a certain component of the societal and/or political reality?

3.3. Methodological challenges and the critique of governance

Just as every fashionable concept has its proponents, it also has its critics. Governance is certainly not an exemption to that rule. There is a substantial body of literature that explains the downsides of using governance as an all-pervading policy concept.

The publication which vividly explains problems with the contemporary understanding of the governance concept is written by Kerspergen and Van Waarden. In their conclusion of this text from 2004, they conclude that there are many questions unanswered when it comes to governance and urge political scientists and policy practitioners to avidly focus on them. More specifically, Kerspergen and Van Waardenstate, "there is no consensus on which set of phenomena can properly be grouped under the title 'governance', while at the same time the significance of the topic is well appreciated by most researchers" (p. 166). In addition, when explaining the role of actors, they argue that "it is assumed that actors in these networks are self-interested, but that they also have an interest in community-friendly behavior", however there is no empirical evidence for this claim (p. 151).

Indeed, according to Rachel Gisselquist (2012), good governance would be a great example of a poorly constructed concept for an introductory course in social science methodology. She reminds us of what makes a concept valid by citing political scientist John Gerring, who in his 1999 article, spelled out eight criteria of "conceptual goodness" that provide a useful framework for academics and practitioners. Four of these criteria, as Gisselquist argues, are especially relevant here. First, the concept of "governance" lacks parsimony. Unlike good concepts, (good) governance has endless definitions, and we always require the details of each to understand if we are talking about the same thing. In addition to this, "good governance" lacks differentiation. Well-governed countries often look like functioning liberal democracies, for instance, and it is not clear how they differ from one another. Thirdly, argues Gisselquist, "good governance" lacks coherence. Its many possible characteristics — from respect for

human rights to efficient banking regulations — do not clearly belong together. And finally and most importantly, from the Gusselquist's point of view, "good governance" lacks theoretical utility. It confuses rather than aids in the formulation of theory and the related task of hypothesis testing, since the concept is so fluid that analysts can easily define it in the way that best fits their preconceived understandings and data summaries.

Similarly, there are a respectable number of authors claiming governance is a "stretch concept" (Sartori 1970) that does not inform much. Hence, scholars resent its imprecision and wooliness, arguing governance is a fashionable concept that does not bring anything new to the public administration studies (Fredericson 2004). Moreover, the critiques point out, governance's need for existence itself is predicated upon the notion that a system is faulty. The criticism is further placed on the fact that the concept is partially centred on non-state institutions. With its focus on networks, it lacks precision in explaining the process of change, and particularly the role of power relations. Furthermore, governance fails to deal with diversity and the pattern of inclusion (ibid).

In order to evade some of methodological downsides of governance, it is important to understand that governance is meta-theory of framework, as claimed by Ostrom (1999). Thus, researchers in the field of public policy, public administration and more generally political science have developed more specific models that would explain the reality better, or as Peters (2008, p. 4) says, "the lack of agreement about what governance actually means has been addressed in part by adding various adjectives to the basic concept". In continuation some of these models are being listed and two of most famous presented more detail.

3.4. Models of governance, collaborative governance - prevailing approach but something is missing

If public policy (or policy science) is the study of the policy process, it is necessary to see what new pathways it created and how the whole theoretical and methodological systems have been developing in sync with the change that is occurring in reality. In the next section, I will bring some rudimental overview of the approaches related to governance that are popular in contemporary public policy literature and which encompass the most important concepts relevant to the study of policy processes.

Kersbergen and Waarden (2004), in their text on governance contextualization, summarize different approaches to classification of governance types and distinguish

nine different versions of governance, namely, good governance, governing without government I, international relations[21], governance without government II, self-organization, economic governance (with and without state), markets and their institutions, good governance in the private sector, cooperative governance, good governance in the public sector, new public management, governance in and by networks, in general, network governance II, multilevel governance, network governance III, private – from hierarchies to networks. Ahrens (2002, p. 59) summarizes governance principles into four pivotal features that encompass and explain the abovementioned technical divisions. He points out responsibility, predictability, participation and transparency as principles that assure adequate management of public resources without acknowledging privileges and influence of various actors involved in the governance network. Since the State exercises greater influential power rather than sheer control, this provides room for various types of governance systems to emerge within polities. In order to "reflect the need for central steering the context of a more decentralized and devolved world of political action" a term meta-governance was coined (Peters, 2008, p. 6). This is in fact the governance of governance or the attempt to provide some cohesion and coordination among decentralized processes. Peters delivers more detailed explanation:

> Meta-governance also represents an attempt on the part of many political leaders to reassert the primacy of politics. If networks and other forms of devolved political action are increasingly dominating political life then the connection between voting and policy choices are becoming more attenuated. Political leaders therefore have felt the need to control policy

[21] In many texts, there is a widely used concept of "global governance". It should be pointed out that the academic literature on global governance is well developed and extensive in explaining its substance, context in which it operates and relations with other concepts within the arena of world politics. According to WHO, global governance "refers to the way in which global affairs are managed. As there is no global government, global governance typically involves a range of actors including states, as well as regional and international organizations. However, a single organization may nominally be given the lead role on an issue, for example the World Trade Organization in world trade affairs. Thus global governance is thought to be an international process of consensus-forming which generates guidelines and agreements that affect national governments and international corporations" (www.who.int, 2015). Finkelstein (1995, p. 396) explains, "global governance is governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. In addition, he adds, "global governance is doing internationally what governments do at home".
However, the second part of Finkelstein's explanation has several methodological oversights, starting from the fact he ignores particularities of various countries, overlooks various policy fields and actors working within them and disregards the difference between motivation, interest and characteristics of stakeholders of international and national policy actors. This notion is crucially important because it points to the justification of the topic of this dissertation. As it will be illustrated, there are some implications of global governance which could be applied to the analysis of national polices. However, the nature of policy-making within these two frameworks is still exceptionally different, and thus the analytical apparatus for the analysis of national policies (in the case of this dissertation, social policies) should be developed by taking into consideration those differences.

> without necessarily undermining some of the efficiency and legitimation gains achieved by using the devolved and marketized methods of governing

In the light of the existence of various types of governance, Rhodes (2000, 55-60) tries to summarize distinctive characteristics of governance and their application in the public administration realm in order to contribute to policy literature, thus he argues there are seven applications, the new public management or managerialism; good governance, as in efficiency, transparency, meritocracy, and equity; international and interjurisdictional interdependence; non-government driven forms of socio-cybernetic systems of governance; the new political economy, including shifting from state service provision to the state as regulator; and networks.

3.4.1 Policy networks and governance and network governance

The fashionable approach in study of governance within public policy is a policy network approach and the idea that "the basic conviction of network governance is that self-organizing networks of societal actors are better suited to coping with the complexity of contemporary governing demands than are hierarchical mechanisms (Peters 2008, 4). Policy networks are usually defined as stable, non-hierarchical links between public administration and civil society (Petek, 2012). Marsh and Rhodes (1992) define policy networks as a meso-level concept that links the micro-level of analysis, dealing with the role of interests and government in particular policy decisions, and the macro-level of analysis, which is concerned with broader questions about the distribution of power in modern society. According to Van Waarden (1992, 32), major dimensions of policy networks are, (1) actors, (2) function, (3) structure, (4) institutionalization, (5) rules of conduct, (6) power relations and (7) actor strategies. Since research question of this dissertation is focused on the power relations and actors strategies, it is necessary to demonstrate why previous understanding of this phenomenon is not academically sound. Van Waarden (1992, 36) in his text mostly analyses state-business relation and argues "a specific distribution of power is not only a characterization of a network, but may also be a motor for structural change". However, he fails to explain two features of state-non-state actor relation. The first one is the analysis of all those actors that are not guided by the market principle (such as some civil society organizations) and secondly he does not offer any thorough explanation of the effect of difference in behavior of actors on the policy process. Even

in the continuation of his text where he conceptualize actor strategies by explaining that all involved actors "create and/or use networks to satisfy their needs, interests and goals, and they develop strategies to manage their interdependencies" (1992, p. 37) he fails to offer the plausible explanation of which strategies of actors are more effective in the process of policy-making. Truth to be told, he elaborates the process of structuration of policy networks but stops once the policy network has been created. In other words, what this author does is providing us an analytically sound structural description of actors' constellation but does not provide us with information on how different actors, depending on selected strategies, influence further decision-making process.

Even Marsh and Smith (2000) who devoted their whole paper on different ways policy networks operate and how do various ways of operation influence policy outcome, do not explain why one actor is successful and other is not (p. 6). Hence, they introduce resources of power and very briefly stating "actors' skills" however do not elaborate those terms nor they link them with the overall structure (p. 7). David Toke (2000) tried to save policy networks defending them from the criticism of being "just a heuristic device" by focusing on the analysis of actor resources. Even though he illustrated the change of approach of actors within the UK renewable energy policy under the UK government of New Labour, he still did not operationalize resources and *modi operandi* of actors in order to understand their real power once they are involved in the policy process. Thus, a question of operationalization of actors' resources remains to be unanswered. Braithwaite (2003, p. 312) argues that policy networks can be seen as an example of 'many unclear separation of powers' in that the several interests in a network can act as checks and balances on one another. Galston (2006) went the furthest in his analysis of political feasibility, interests, and power where he operationalized power actors have on the factor of knowledge and supported that by the case study of health policy change in the US. However, even in this text, it has not been showed how can knowledge be distributed among actors in the governance setting nor how it corresponds to other resources actors may have. To sum it up, the majority of authors agree that policy networks as a concept are "too static" and they do not explain behavior of actors adequately (Richardson, 2000).

The conceptualization of governance would not be complete without introducing type of governance heavily promoted by international organizations – good governance.

3.4.2. Good governance

Derived from the idea that the state should involve various stakeholders when making decisions, in the last 20 to 25 years, international organizations have started advocating for good governance as a principle for effective and responsive public administration apparatus. Just as the case with governance, good governance is an elusive objective. Rachel Gisselquist (2012), in her text on conceptualization of good government among international organizations, argues that good governance means different things to different organizations, "not to mention to different actors within these organizations." She also differentiates two main streams in conceptualization of good governance. One is advocated by the World Bank and The International Monetary Fund and points out the economic dimension of good governance. These institutions "address economic institutions and public sector management, including transparency and accountability, regulatory reform, and public sector skills and leadership" (ibid). Other organizations, as Gisselquist continues, such as the United Nations, the European Commission and The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), are more likely to highlight democratic governance and human rights.

In her analysis of the term good governance, Nanda (2000, p. 269) writes, "More recently, donors, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United States, are increasingly insisting upon performance and good governance as a prerequisite for aid, a practice called "selectivity." Nanda explains that good governance appeared on the World Bank agenda in the early 1990s and supports that assertion with the statement from the former chief economist of the Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, who acknowledged a shift toward "broader objectives, entitling more instruments, than was the case earlier". Hence, The World Bank's emphasis has been on the economic dimensions of good governance as an important dimension of the estimation of the state's capacity to effectively use development assistance (p. 272-3). In addition to these conclusions, Nanda turns critical towards IMF's blurry priorities when it comes to governance. She states that "it was not, however, until 1997 that the IMF fully articulated its governance policy," however, she appeals that "unlike the Fund's current practice, decision-making at the Fund about the direction of its governance agenda in each country must be responsive to the country's cultural and political traditions, preferences, and sensitivities" (p. 279). Lastly, the United States policy on development requires governments to fight corruption, respect basic human rights, embrace the rule of law, invest in health care and education, follow responsible

economic policies, and enable entrepreneurship to be eligible for the US developmental assistance (ibid, p. 279).

Despite variance in definitions, in principle, there is an understanding and a ubiquitous consensus of what good governance incorporates. Expanding on this awareness, the concept of good governance has been refined by the work of the former Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 2000/64, the Commission identified the following key attributes of good governance:

- Transparency
- Responsibility
- Accountability
- Participation
- Responsiveness (to the needs of the people) (www.ohcr.org 2016)

Coupled with the contemporary inclusive tendencies in political science and public policy studies, governance has become an unavoidable concept both in the analysis of modern public administration and of public policy. For this reason, numerous international research institutes, policy centers and think tanks have developed sophisticated and even not so sophisticated indicators of governance. Good governance indicators are an eclectic set of measures covering a wide range of governance topics (Williams 2011). There are three that are most favored and widely used. In its *The Worldwide Governance Indicators project*, The World Bank analyses governance according to six dimensions, voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. *The Sustainable Governance Indicators* is a cross-national survey of governance in the OECD that identifies reform needs and forward-looking practices. It includes two main categories, democracy and management indexes, each consisting of a number of more substantial factors. In addition to these two surveys, there is *The AGI Data Portal*, which "consolidates information on actionable governance indicators, provides a one-stop-shop platform to navigate these indicators and their documents and offers customized tools for data management, analysis and display."

This in-depth venture into various approaches to understanding of good governance by international organizations demonstrates why this concept has become so popular in the last 20 to 25 years. By using conditionality based on the pursuit of good governance, international developmental organizations, which are one of the greatest sources of funding for the consolidation of democratic and economic structures in developing

countries, are imposing their political and economic agenda. (Killich, 1997; Stokke, 2013; Santiso, 2001; Baylies, 1995). Thus, the concept of good governance has spread and is omnipresent in policy discussions and debates all over the world. This notion is particularly important due to the influence of the good governance concept not only on development outcomes, but also on the changing characteristics of polities. The change of international financial or economic institutions' orientation from the mere economic course towards the practice of political management demonstrates the organizations' focus towards influencing policy outcomes and polity issues in general (Perko-Šeparović 2006). In addition to this, in the Western societies, a notion of deliberative democracy started becoming more popular. This concept of democracy grasps the idea of how democratic citizens and their representatives can make justifiable decisions for their society in the face of the fundamental disagreements that are inevitable in diverse societies (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Deliberative democracy focuses on deliberation among various groups, as is promoted by the contemporary understanding of democracy. Since the essence of deliberative democracy is to be inclusive and respect the rights of each stakeholder, it is complementary with the notion of good governance and is therefore often mentioned in governance discussions.

In spite of this, as it will later be presented, the question remains about the true understanding of good governance and the level of adoptability of its principles in developing countries. In other words, in this context of juxtaposition between the intention and the reality of adopting good governance (in a post-socialist context, for example) there is a incompatibility; on the one hand, there is a foreign donor agenda influence, which suggests that good governance is an important feature of the democratic policy-making process, and on the other hand, there is the presence of non-democratic legacy, which is not suited to this new way of conducting policies and politics. Due to the fact that democratic institutions are relatively and are hardly consolidated, rules and procedures of their governance are often misinterpreted or not introduced adequately (Ahrens, 1999). This leads to a conclusion that only some features of good governance can be implemented, which consequently results in a hybrid regime that encompasses certain aspects of good governance and retains other aspects of pre good governance regimes. In light of this hybrid policy-making in a post-socialist reality, polities do not always fulfil all good governance criteria when communicating with various state and non-state actors. Due to that, it is important to

take power into consideration when studying good governance principles because it exposes policy actors to the critical assessment of their role and behavior.

The difference between concepts of good governance and governance might seem blurry, however academic literature distinguishes those two concepts with conviction. Authors such as Rhodes (1999, p. X) or Perko Šeparović (2006, p. 136) claim that *governance* is a neutral term that has the following characteristics, it is a network wider than the state and which also includes non-state actors; it characterizes a reality where borders of the public, the private and the civil sectors are becoming more unclear and more fluid; and, within its network, there is a permanent interaction with the interchange of resources and bargaining of interests. Even though the State does not have a sovereign position, it can indirectly govern the network. When it comes to good governance, its approach demonstrates the evolvement of public management practice to treat individuals as citizens, and not as mere clients. These individuals have the right to demand responsiveness and accountability from public administration and expect their rights to be respected. In good governance, issues such as participation and transparency are as equally important as effectiveness and efficiency. More concretely, prominent EU scholars on governance such as Börzel et al (2008, p. 5) argue that good governance, particularly in development studies, "tends to be equated with governance often without providing a clear definition of either concept". The difference is seen, as they explain, in the normative implications good governance brings. Whereas governance is seen more as an institutional constellation, good governance has deeper normative implications towards transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, responsiveness, sound financial management, fighting corruption and so on. (ibid, p. 6).

Building on good governance, European Union, of the most essential policy actors, but as well as the significant object of policy analyses, conceptualized governance in its specific way.

3.4.3. European governance – multilevel governance

European governance was mentioned earlier, however it was not explained in depth. In the European context, a term European governance is inevitable when conceptualizing governance as such. Since of 1999/2000 the discourse on European governance can be tracked as omnipresent in the social sphere thanks to Romano Prodi and his appeal to fundamentally redefine European decision-making process. Authors such as Shore (2009, 2) claim European governance has become "central policy priority

and organizing principle for the European Union, one that its leaders now claim to be 'central to the effectiveness of the EU'." The climax of its popularity occurred in 2001 when the White Paper on European Governance was adopted "with the aim of establishing more democratic forms of governance at all levels – global, European, national, regional and local" (European governance - A white paper, 2001). Advocating for greater transparency, legitimacy and participation of different stakeholders in the process of the European decision-making process, European governance has become a concept describing new mode of governance complementary to good governance paradigm.

The European governance paradigm is a response to criticism the EU is facing the democratic crisis, democratic deficit and with the lack of accountability, participation and transparency. Coupled with aforementioned reason, Schout and Jordan (2002) list additional four reasons why the debate on European governance is present and relevant in today's EU. They argue: (1) "the workload of the Commission has increased considerably due to the widening and deepening of EU policy" (pp. 3), (2) due to increased diversity of newer member states (those from the 2004 accession) the flexibility of EU institutions should have been increased as well. Furthermore, authors believe that (3) "policies have become more interwoven, requiring greater coordination. In short, interdependencies can no longer be managed centrally but demand greater coordination, both horizontally across policy sectors, but also vertically between the EU and its member states" (pp. 6), and banally that (4) the Commission cannot be immune to fashionable concepts as governance.

The European institutions are pivotal agents in the process of the European decision-making thus it was necessary to make them closer to the EU citizens. The idea of the European governance was to make EU citizens more involved with various policy processes. Keeping this in mind, the today's European governance paradigm relies on the idea of multi-levelness which encapsulates the concept – multi level governance (MLG). Mark and Hoodges (2004) originally conceptualized this mode of governance by describing day-to-day functioning of the European Union. Hence, it can be said MLG "emerged as a vertical arrangement and a way to convey the intimate entanglement between the domestic and international levels of authority" (Stephenson 2014, p. 818). Peters (2008) similarly, sees the MLG as the attempt to understand governing patterns "in the early 21st century involv[ing] interactions among multiple levels of government, as well as interactions between the public and private sectors"

(6). Hence, he continues, that "the multi-level governance approach also points to the extent to which the contemporary State has been disaggregated and the linkage between the structure of states and the governance being provided" (6). A vast number of papers on MLC suggest this concept is anything but one-dimensional, moreover Stephenson summarized "the five 'uses' and 10 'focal points' […], distinguishing between original, functional, combined, normative and comparative uses of the MLG literature" (ibid, p. 833).

Without going into further details, one concept within the European governance paradigm requires closer examination - the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The OMC in the European Union may be described as a form of a 'soft' law. It is a form of intergovernmental policy-making that does not result in binding EU legislative measures, and it does not require EU countries to introduce or amend their laws. The OMC is principally based on,

- jointly identifying and defining objectives to be achieved (adopted by the Council);
- jointly established measuring instruments (statistics, indicators, guidelines); benchmarking, i.e. comparison of EU countries' performance and the exchange of best practices (monitored by the Commission). (OMC 2015)

Youth policy, as a subject of this dissertation, as it will be demonstrated in chapter 7, is being made through the OMP process.

Despite the fact that all governance variants hold value in different political and societal spheres, I will concentrate on collaborative governance, a concept that particularly stands out in various policy texts, as well as governance in and by networks. In the following paragraphs, the contours of collaborative governance, as an important concept in the contemporary policy and public administration science texts, will be presented and its relevance for the topic of this dissertation explained.

3.4.4. Collaborative governance[22]

Discussions on greater involvement of citizens and/or other stakeholders in decision-making process started in the late 20th century with the uplift of governance paradigm. There are many different classifications of citizens' involvement in policy-making process, but Fung (2006, 69) claims there are three most relevant approaches, communicative approach via advice and consultation, co-governing partnership (citizens join governmental officials to develop strategies for public actions) and direct authority (authority allows citizens to control, plan or implement sublocal development projects). Collaborative governance as a concept is perpetuation of the second approach and according to some authors (Jun, 2002; Fredrickson, 1991) can be considered to be the new paradigm for governing democracies. Before presenting collaborative governance itself, it would be wise to define collaboration. Gray (1989) sees collaboration as "a process of joint decision making among key stakeholders who work together to make joint decisions about the future of their problem domain." Even though definition constructed in this manner suggests collaboration is an empirical question (what does 'stakeholders of a problem domain' mean and how to explain it theory-wise?), collaboration as a variable started to be present in public policy and public administration texts to explain varieties of things, resulting with the concept of 'collaborative governance'.

In the mid-1990s a concept of collaborative governance started appearing the policy literature more often. At first, it seemed as just another concept within political science that describes some particular aspect of horizontal policymaking. However, over time, more and more scholars started to use collaborative governance to describe contemporary policy-making and analyze dimensions it comprehends. It has been said before that due to the lack of government's institutional capacity and due to the proliferation of knowledge and increased complexity of society, a government cannot address and solve problems unilaterally and it is bounded to collaborate with other stakeholders if effective and adequate policies want to be achieved. Collaborative

[22] The biggest part of this section is predominately based on two texts. On the one hand - Ansell and Gash's text *Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice* (2007) in their text analyzed 137 empirical cases of collaborative governance and offered their model based on available literature till 2007. On the other hand Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2012) in their text «An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance» tried to expand the understanding of collaborative governance as a response to Ansell and Gash.
Even though, the section is supplemented with other relevant papers covering the topic thses aforementioned papers are still considered to be focal points for the study of governance from the public policy perspective (based on number of citations for the entry collaborative governance).

governance, Ansell and Gash claim, emerged "as a response to the failures of downstream implementation and to the high cost and politicization of regulation" (2007, p. 544). In the late 20th century, it started to be evident that adversarial and managerial models of policy-making and implementation needed to be supplemented with some new notions relevant for the new context.

Ansell and Gash offered their definition and conceptualization of collaborative governance. They present it as a concept which encompasses following aspects, "A governing arraignment where one or more public agencies[23] directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public program or asset." As authors point out, there are six different criteria emphasized within this definition, the forum is initiated by public agencies or institutions, participation in the forum participants engage directly in decision-making and are not merely "consulted" by public agencies include non-state actors, the forum is formally organized and meets collectively, the forum aims to make decisions by consensus and the focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management (Ansell and Gash 2007, p. 544-545). This type of governance has an aspect of formality that distinguishes collaborative governance from more casual relationships of agency-interest group.

This definition differentiates from governance in a way that collaborative governance is only that type of governance in which public and private actors work collectively and use particular processes to establish policies. Hence, while within wider concept of governance cooperation is not well defined, in collaborative governance *conditio sine qua non* is a two-way communication or so-called multilateral deliberation. Thus, all stakeholders must be directly engaged in decision-making. Introducing various requirements and conditions in order to define specific type of governance, has supported argument that governance is only a framework (Ostrom 1999), while specific models of it may be theories or models, depending on precision and profundity of the description/conceptualization. Ansell and Gash's (2007, p. 547-548) further conceptualization of governance continues by offering distinguishing features of collaborative governance and common similar concepts within public policy and/or public administration studies. In the Table 3.1 can be found their argument

[23] The term "public agency include, public institutions such as bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, and other governmental bodies at the local, state, or federal level" (Ansell and Gash, 2007, p. 545)

summarized in order to fit this chapter. Booher (2004, p. 44) pointed out several criteria for authentic collaborative governance practice. He claims that only if appropriate organization, tools and methods are being used, and there is a facilitated leadership and deliberative space free of cohesion one can call some decision-making process – collaborative governance. This author adds: "authentic collaborative practice usually requires professional expertise for guidance" (ibid). If we would translate that to public policy language and state-stakeholders dimension, the state should guide in terms of coordinating by using available expertise and insights in order to involve all stakeholders in the decision-making process in a meaningful way.

Table 3.1: *difference between managerialism, corporatism, associational governance, policy network, public private partnership*

Managerialism – public agencies make decisions unilaterally or through closed decision process, typically relying on agency experts to make decision	**Collaborative governance** requires that stakeholders be directly included in the decision-making process
Corporatism – tripartite bargaining between peak associations of labor, capital and the state	**Collaborative governance** is wider concept that implies the inclusion of a broader range of stakeholders, often act a representational monopoly over their sector
Associational governance – generic form of governing with associations	**Collaborative governance** does not need to include formal associations, for instance civic initiatives or regular citizens are appropriate stakeholders
Policy network – for more on policy networks please refer to section 2.4.1.	While policy networks may be informal and remain largely implicit, **collaborative governance** refers to an explicit and formal strategy of incorporating stakeholders into multilateral and consensus-oriented decision-making process.
Public-private partnership – goal is to achieve coordination and may simply represent an agreement between public and private actors to deliver certain tasks. Collective decision-making is secondary.	**Collaborative governance** is focused on achieving decision-making consensus and an important variable is institutionalization which may not be the case with public-private partnership.

Source: Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 547-548)

Based on 137 academic case studies on collaborative governance, Ansell and Gash (2007) built a model encompassing its key variables and their relationship wishing to stress common and frequent variables across cases. Their model consists of four broad variables, starting conditions, institutional design, leadership and collaborative process. Ansell and Gash (2007 p. 550) explain logic of their model:

> *Collaborative process* variables are treated as the core of our model, with starting conditions, institutional design, and leadership variables represented as either critical contributions to or context for the collaborative process. *Starting conditions* set the basic level of trust, conflict, and social capital that become resources or liabilities during collaboration. *Institutional design* sets the basic ground rules under which collaboration takes place. And, *leadership* provides essential mediation and facilitation for the collaborative process. *The collaborative process* itself is highly iterative and nonlinear, and thus, we represent it (with considerable simplification) as a cycle.

Based on their analysis, Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 551-561) came to the following ten conclusions that cooperation and coordination between government and stakeholders is the most important variable for collaborative governance on which should be put the biggest emphasize:

1. If there are significant power/resource imbalances between stakeholders, such that important stakeholders cannot participate in a meaningful way, then effective collaborative governance requires a commitment to a positive strategy of empowerment and representation of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders.

2. If alternative venues exist where stakeholders can pursue their goals unilaterally, then collaborative governance will only work if stakeholders perceive themselves to be highly interdependent.

3. If interdependence is conditional upon the collaborative forum being an exclusive venue, then sponsors must be willing to do the advance work of getting alternative forums (courts, legislators, and executives) to respect and honor the outcomes of collaborative processes.

4. If there is a prehistory of antagonism among stakeholders, then collaborative governance is unlikely to succeed unless (a) there is a high degree of interdependence among the stakeholders or (b) positive steps are taken to remediate the low levels of trust and social capital among the stakeholders.

5. Where conflict is high and trust is low, but power distribution is relatively equal and stakeholders have an incentive to participate, then collaborative governance can successfully proceed by relying on the services of an honest broker that the respective stakeholders accept and trust. This honest broker might be a professional mediator.

6. Where power distribution is more asymmetric or incentives to participate are weak or asymmetric, then collaborative governance is more likely to succeed

if there is a strong ‘‘organic’’ leader who commands the respect and trust of the various stakeholders at the outset of the process. ‘‘Organic’’ leaders are leaders who emerge from within the community of stakeholders. The availability of such leaders is likely to be highly contingent upon local circumstances.

7. If the prehistory is highly antagonistic, then policy makers or stakeholders should budget time for effective remedial trust building. If they cannot justify the necessary time and cost, then they should not embark on a collaborative strategy.

8. Even when collaborative governance is mandated, achieving ‘‘buy in’’ is still an essential aspect of the collaborative process.

9. Collaborative governance strategies are particularly suited for situations that require ongoing cooperation.

10. If prior antagonism is high and a long-term commitment to trust building is necessary, then intermediate outcomes that produce small wins are particularly crucial. If, under these circumstances, stakeholders or policy makers cannot anticipate these small wins, then they probably should not embark on a collaborative path.

As a response to Ansell and Gash’s conceptualization of collaborative governance, Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2012, p. 2) proposed slightly less restrictive definition of collaborative governance. They argue collaborative governance should be defined as follows: “The processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished”. This framework for understanding collaborative governance is “broader as commonly seen in literature”, “it integrates numerous components of collaborative governance—from system context and external drivers through collaborative dynamics to actions, impacts, and adaptation” and “it organizes several variables into a multilevel framework, enabling further analysis of the internal dynamics and causal pathways of collaborative governance and its performance.” (ibid)

Furthermore, Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh’s conceptualization of collaborative governance goes beyond Ansell and Gash’s formal, state-initiated arrangements and as these authors argue: “it encompasses ‘multipartner governance,’ which can include partnerships among the state, the private sector, civil society, and the community, as well as joined-up government and hybrid arrangements such as public-private and private-social partnerships and co-management regimes” (2008, p. 3).

Building on this argumentation and Integrative framework for collaborative governance is proposed consisting out of three nested dimensions: general system context, the collaborative governance regime and its collaborative dynamics and actions (ibid, 5). Despite fairly well articulated and elaborated model which these authors proposed to examine and understand collaborative governance, coupled with Ansell and Gash's conceptualization, collaborative governance as a concept "continues to suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity and consistency" (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh, 2012, 23). Hence, even these authors appeal researchers to focus more on features uncovered by either of two focal papers on collaborative governance. One of these features is hinted in the Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh's paper and in the continuation, I am building on their idea.

3.4.5. Collaborative governance in the context of this dissertation

Ever since H. Laswell proposed his definition of policies as "Who gets what" and suggested it is all about "the power of the public sector to allocate goods and services among the members of a society" (Peters 2008, 1), the public policy literature danced around concept that would grasp the relationship between different stakeholders that jointly make decisions. Structured and directed ways of solving societal issues thus became known as public policy and within it, the concept of governance emerged as collective decision-making process. As seen, governance is a concept widely used and analyzed in political science and public policy to the extent that a number of scholars express scepticism of what does governance really means (Peters, 2008; Kerspergen and Van Waarden, 2004). In order to solve the problem with this omnipresent concept, a substantial number of adjectives have been added in front of governance to increase its analytical value. One of these terms is collaborative governance. I argue the collaborative governance approach is, among all governance modi, the most adequate for the study of Croatian youth policy, however in order to fit the analysis even better it requires the enactment of power into the framework.

In the context of this dissertation it is particularly interesting to take a look at authors' insights on power. They point out two aspects of power/resources, firstly, they emphasize the importance of power balance among stakeholders and secondly the relevance of resources (skills and expertise) for effective participation in decision-making. These two arguments seem plausible at first, however the problem with them is that Ansell and Gash do not offer conceptualization nor definition of power, influence

or resources. Hence, they're are falling into a trap many other policy scientists writing on power have fallen – uncertainty of what power actually means. Even in text these two authors are quoting and based upon they are building their argumentation line (Gray, 1989; Warner, 2006; McCloskey, 2000) there is no adequate conceptualization of power. Moreover, even if power is vaguely described, there is no sound methodology of how this influence/power is assessed. From the listed texts we do not know if concepts of power, influence are the same or there is a difference between them. Furthermore, on cannot tell if authors consider 'resources' as a synonym for power and conceptualize power only in terms of 'resources'. The idea of power is present in Booher's (2004) conclusion where claims that even when collaborative practice is done correctly, "changing traditional governance is still a daunting task" because all policy players are entering into a policy arena guided by their interest.

After I presented (some) important approaches to the study of governance, I am required to argue why I have decided to use collaborative governance as an approach for the topic of youth policy in Croatia. As we have seen, collaborative governance is a trending topic in the literature, however it is present at the policy level as well. Most of democratic countries use (features of) collaborative governance in their decision-making architecture because they believe policies designed throughout this approach would be most beneficial for society. Due to the prevalence of this concept in the real life I seek to explore if it is adequate for the analysis of youth policy and if so, how to employ it. From the literature review on collaborative governance it is evident collaborative governance requires direct involvement of actors into the policy-making processes and tends to create stable formal stakeholder constellations. Croatian youth policy, as it will be demonstrated in the 7th chapter stipulates this as its goals as well. In addition to this, collaborative governance literature puts emphasize on societal actors (for instance civil society organization) just as youth policy. Whereas network governance and good governance focus more on the structural composition of decision-making, collaborative governance pays more attention to actors which is in line with the goal of this dissertation.

Despite the fact that, this topic is fashionable, some aspects of it stay unexplored, particularly the matter of power. From my point of view, literature on collaborative governance still has not offered plausible explanation and operationalization of power within its context, despite using the concept of power repeatedly. Power of actors thus stays vaguely elucidated which causes collaborative governance and actors' theory to

be analytically inadequate to grasp the social and political reality. Due to those reasons, I argue it is justified to explore collaborative governance in details focusing on power of actors within this concept. There is a claim that governance have taken a place of power in policy science (Haajer, 2003). More directly, as argued by Hewson and Sinclare (1999), the power has been neglected in the governance literature. Due to that and since "the concept of power is of the utmost importance to understand and explain policy practices" (Arts and Tatenhove 2004, p. 340), the argument of this dissertation is that we should focus more on the power in order to understand collaborative governance (particularly in post-socialist states and societies) better. Although, there is a vast policy literature focusing on power, actors' resources and policy instrument, it lacks the link with the governance. The assumption is that if more focus put on power, governance will increase its analyticity and will be able to explain policy creating rather than just describe it (Hill, 2010, p. 60-62). Hence, from the theoretical point of view, governance as a concept lacks analytical power.

If understood as a synonym for a network constellation in policy-making, as was discussed in the literature review, governance misses to interpret change as well as the detailed structure of actors' characteristics. In other words, it is quite difficult for governance, as a concept, to be understood as an independent variable, but should rather be understood as a theoretical model providing a context for understanding a specific policy-making process. Thus, governance is relegated to a partnership with other methodological and/or theoretical approaches in order to increase its proximity and adequacy for the study of contemporary policy processes. In addition to these critiques, it can also be concluded that governance is not a theoretical model, but rather, a policy framework for explaining current trends in public administration and has no predictability power.

3. 5. Final remarks

The pace of changes in the realm of political science in the 20th century is astounding. These changes were marked by not only the complex relationships within international relations, which led to world wars, democratic transformations, economic paradigm shifts and socio-political evolutions, but also by another factor that was remarkable- the perception on the way policy-making should and could be done. For centuries, government, the embodiment of the state, had a pivotal and fundamental role

in the process of making decisions. Political theorists have praised the role of government in assuring stability and security of the social system, while other actors often held a relatively marginal role. However, this paradigm completely changed in the late 20th century. The principle of horizontality had taken a more prominent role and had started to become a desirable objective in public policy and public administration sectors. A number of various actors that obtained the opportunity to actively participate in the process of policy-making has culminated in the production of new structural patterns that resulted in novel institutions with unique approaches, relationships and stakeholders. The role and function of these new institutions were now to be studied, analyzed and explained by the policy scientist.

Governance, as reviewed in this chapter, is a term simultaneously used by and for different organizations. It is one of those omnipresent concepts that has acquired its popularity both in the academic sphere as well as in the "real life" policy practice. In the light of the literature review, I believe that the core of the governance conceptualization is the change in behavior of the actors. Governance holds the idea of enabling diverse actors to participate in the processes in which they have interest. Hence, it is, from my point of view, the quintessence of a democratic political ideal. Since the behavior of actors is constantly and unpredictably changing, the structure in which actors are operating is changing as well, and this structural metamorphosis (and here I am referring to Giddens' theory of structuration (1984) is, in turn, influencing the actors in a symbiotic and cyclical fashion. This reciprocal interaction creates a complex nexus of decision-making loci where new agencies and alliances are being created, culminating in the imminent transformation of a polity. However, even though this change might seem self-evident in a consolidated, democratic environment where inclusiveness is one of the highest priorities, the facts are not that simple.

How governance, with all its variations, specifically collaborative governance, is channelled into deliberative policy-making, is yet to be explored. Literature review on governance presented in this chapter had confirmed that there are no unanimous understandings of what governance represents as a concept, nor is it operationalized adequately enough to offer analytically sound evidence for an empirical policy analysis. As explained by many academics, similar and linked phenomena still do not account for the whole complexity of a given issue. This rather harsh assertion is not without credibility if we accept the argument that bringing governance into the context of the democratic decision-making process is almost a paradigm switch, to use Kuhn'

language (2012). Governance, deliberation and (to some extend) equality of various stakeholders in polities have repercussions on various aspects of political and social life, and therefore, require careful and structured examination of their effects on the political and social environment. Policy-making in this new paradigm stopped being "simply about finding solutions but also creating processes for collective action and problem solving that generate trust among the actors" (Booher 2004, p. 34). However, despite the emphasize on trust-building there are some unanswered questions related to the relationship among stakeholders.

In this dissertation, the focus that will be explored is the role of power and the interaction of power with the newly positioned policy actors within the policy-making process. Power, the concept that has occupied the literature of political science and sociology for a whole last century, has experienced its devaluation in importance in the 21st century and has been replaced with more neutral terms, like cooperation or capacity. Despite this, there are still questions to be answered in order to clarity and understand the role and the function of the policy-making system in contemporary democracies. I argue that without power as a dependent variable, it is still impossible to explain why and how policies are being created. Starting from the assumption that all actors have their relevant interests, in my opinion, it is not always possible to reconcile those interests. What follows from this is that here has to be someone (or something) who will always be in a better position. Thus, it is foremost necessary to observe relations between nominally equal stakeholders in the steps of the policy process and within the framework of power. In addition, as it will be demonstrated in details in the next chapter, there are almost no publications available on the relations between various non-state actors. Even though the government as the saying goes "steers and does not row" the policy process, it is still a necessary element of analysis that brings insight into the interactions and the relationships of non-state actors. Hence, the focus of the next chapter is on these actors and how relate to the youth policy framework of this dissertation and all in order to coherently show the contemporality of a policy-making process.

Chapter 4

POLICY ACTORS – WHO DOES WHAT, AND WHY?

Actors are agents of change.

- Alan Rickman

Although this aphorism by late Alan Rickman does not refer to an actor in a policy terms of speaking, it can be applied into the public policy context as well. Actors are indeed, as argued in this dissertation, the principle agents of change.

Structure and agency are key understanding mechanisms within social science. The concepts and their functional approach attempt to answer the question of action; for example, how is it that I can do what I want with others when their goals are different and often incompatible with mine? Prominent social scientists, including Giddens and Archer, have suggested that the 'Structure-Agency' question is the most important theoretical issue within the human sciences. This discourse has been slower to make an impact on the political science field than on other social science disciplines, yet it has been argued that structure-agency questions should be recognized as central to the way we study politics (Cobrun, 2016).

It can be argued that there is no 'escape' from issues of structure-agency. Hay argues (1995, p. 198), "every time we construct, however tentatively, a notion of social, political or economic causality we appeal, whether explicitly or (more likely) implicitly, to ideas about structure and agency." The structure and agency can be regarded as foundational to the solid understanding of social sciences; it has at its base a fundamentally normative question, which humans have posed for a long time,.; are we free to act as we please, or are we shaped and governed by forces of imposed structures? No one would truly argue that structures control us completely, but that we are neither completely free in today's post-modern world.

The 'agency approach' is sometimes linked with the concept of methodological individualism, which argues that the only reality we can grasp is the deeds/actions of individuals and not groups. The approach suggests that structural forces such as hegemony cannot be treated as an organic phenomenon; since they are intangible, we can say nothing provable about them. This implies an epistemological conclusion that

we cannot look at groups to explain the behaviour of individuals. The agency approach is therefore a quite limiting approach to certain methodological needs confronting social science research. Giddens (1984) suggests that the actor is an embodied unit, and as such, a possessor of causal powers that she may choose to employ to intervene (or not) into the ongoing sequence of events in the world. This characterizes her as an agent. Giddens "…define[s] action or agency as the stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world." (ibid) The definition is complementary to the concept of agency where a person or an agent "could have acted otherwise." This conception of the agent ties agency to power. Agency approaches see the individual as an atomized and positing agent involved in a voluntarist modus operandi to human action. They argue that the context in which an individual lives is pluralistic, that social power is spread among groups, and that no single group dominates. The way to circumvent this complexity, therefore, is to look at what the individual tells us – namely, that there is an onus of reflexivity, which the individual could salvage by being able to account for and be aware of the reasons and implications of their actions. This approach also pays attention to time. History is taken to be the outcome of freely enacted choices and self-determined deeds, as exemplified by the "great man" view of history, which sees figures like Napoleon, Hitler, Mussolini, Margaret Thatcher and George W. Bush as agents that changed the course of history solely on the basis of their free will.

Extreme versions of this thinking hold that explanation of this is beyond human understanding. Critics of this agency approach claim that it verges on the metaphysical, although the alternative structural approaches are at the opposite extreme- too simplistic and one-dimensional in their perspective. Individualists would argue that we are greatly endowed as human beings to influence our surroundings, while the structural approach theories specifically deny the individual such influence over its environment. This is an overview of the agency approaches, which are often lumped together with conservatism, which claims that all of us are equipped with intrinsic freedom and that we succeed or fail by our own qualities and actions.

Structure is essentially an explanation of the social/economic/political context in which an action occurs. Structuralists deny that the individual actor is the ultimate architect of his or her social reality, placing the individual's role in a specific context as of sole importance in creating social paradigms. The key concepts to this understanding are emplacement and embodiment. A structural approach is often

associated with the political left and theorists of such thinkers as Smith and Marx. It argues that because conditions change through time and space, the "great man" theory can't work. Structuralist approaches recognize that there are specific conditions which produce human actions or behaviour. Essentially, individuals are believed to not be independent of their environments but acting as a result and through the constraints and structures in which they exist. Behaviour is then not a result of free will but a product of structural factors. In positing reasons for behaviour, one is then evoking a structural approach, explaining action according to the structure/context in which it takes place.

A structure approach would stipulate that individuals are situated actors in their environments, and as a result, defined in their health outcomes, opportunities, life possibilities, as well as emplaced in terms of lifestyle, conditions, etc. Our actions therefore respond to the various structures in which we are situated.

No current theorists would argue that either the agency or the structure approach is completely in control of our behaviour, although much is still influenced by the debate that most people today hold the view that agency and structure are enmeshed together[24]. "Giddens in the form of what he calls 'Structuration' theory has set out to try and transcend the dualism of structure and agency. His basic argument is that, rather than representing different phenomena, they are mutually dependent and internally related" (McAnulla 1998). By this reasoning, structure can only exist through agency and agents have the necessary 'rules and resources' between them which facilitate or constrain their actions. These actions, in turn, can lead to the reconstitution of the structure, defined as rules and resources, which will then likewise, affect future action. Thus, we have a close synergetic relationship between structure and agency. Giddens' metaphor for this is that rather than being distinct phenomena, structure and agency are,

[24] For the last thirty years, political science and sociology have been confronted with the idea of new institutionalism. Ever since March and Olsen (1984) have presented their new ideas of how institutions can shape political life, scholars have been conceptualizing and analyzing this «new institutionalism». New institutionalism in fact redefined institutions in terms that an institution started to be observed as «a web of interrelated norms -- formal and informal -- governing social relationships. It is by structuring social interactions that institutions produce group performance, in such primary groups as families and work units as well as in social units as large as organizations and even entire economies». (Nee and Ingram 1998, 19). Within political science, new institutionalism falls into three cathegories, namely rational choice institutionalism, sociological/normative institutionalism and historical institutionalism, each of them stressing out particular aspects of agency-structure debate. New institutionalism turned out to be relevant not only for political science, economics and sociology but for public policy as well. Understanding contemporary public policy throughout the perspective of new institutionalism in facts alludes the interplay of regular patterns of political behaviour in the context of rules, norms and practices. In other words, new institutionalism is a approach which combines both agency and structure approach in a wide and comperhensive way, thus it is almost impossible not to build upon its legacy when studying contemporary policy processess.

in fact, two sides of the same coin. As such, we can hold the supposition of the mutual interplay structure and agency. As Taylor (1993, p. 124) argues: "…this conception is the most distinctive feature of 'Structuration' theory, yet a feature which serves crucially to undermine the theory as a whole." This approach combines the best features of the agency and the structure approaches - the actor is situated, but not devoid of will and agency. This emphasises reflexivity and assumes a high degree of self-awareness on the part of the actor, but also allows for the influence of structures and the awareness of emplacement.

Structuration theory is Giddens' attempt to bridge the "gap" between theories which place emphasis on either structure or agency at the expense of the other. Structuralism represents one extreme on a social science theory continuum, in which social structures such as class, gender or race are rendered as systems which have been so pervasive throughout time, that people nowadays have little or no choice but to operate within them. At the other end of the continuum, there is an emphasis on the subjective individual, where structures act as ephemeral backgrounds; they are relative and secondary to agency. These extremes can be characterized as "systems without actors" in the case of the former, and "actors without systems" in the case of the latter. Giddens explains the relation between these two extremes by offering a 'theory of structuration', which, "…provide[s] an account of human agency which recognizes that human beings are purposive actors, who virtually all the time know what they are doing (under some description) and why. At the same time [they have to understand that] ...the actions of each individual are embedded in social contexts 'stretching away' from his or her activities and which causally influence their nature" (Giddens, 1984, p. 256). Grasping the recursive nature of social practices - the duality of structure – is, according to Giddens, the key to understanding the necessary interplay of all the factors in constructing a viable theoretical framework.

The reason why this chapter, titled *Policy Actors*, began with the elaboration of the agency and the structure theories is because it is, from my point of view, an excellent introduction to the central issue of this dissertation, which is, essentially, how policy actors use available resources in order to formulate structural impact. In the following chapter, a review of policy actors and their impact on policy will be presented. In the previous chapter on governance, it was highlighted that governance is, in brief, the proliferation of actors and their greater influence on the policy process. This chapter will start with the analysis of those actors by focusing on the more specific context of

social policies (above all, on youth policy). The first section of the chapter focuses on the contextualization of policy actors within policy science. Their position within the policy context will be presented and various approaches within actors' theories will likewise be offered. This contextualization will be followed by the categorization of the actors. Starting from the difference between individual and composite actors (Scharf, 1997) and followed by the differentiation between state and non-state actors (Cahn, 2012, Colebatch, 2006; Hill, 2010; Kustec-Lipicer, 2006), the section seeks to provide a coherent insight into the function and the characteristics of various state and non-state actors. After a prolific description of particular actors in the realm of a particular public policy, namely youth policy where governmental, civil society and academic experts will be presented, the chapter will conclude with the prevalent gaps in the existing literature on the study of policy actors. The conclusion will mark a transition to the successive chapter on the role of power in the policy process and ways it is exercised in the new (governance) understanding of policy-making.

4.1. Policy actors, conceptualization

With the proliferation of the governance paradigm, various actors interested in the policy process or its outcomes started to be greatly drawn to being a part of this process. This had, as seen in the previous chapter, resulted in fostering the creation of new rules within the policy. The role, position, function, task and possibilities of all actors had changed accordingly and policy actors have started to be studied in the context of cooperation, negotiation, deliberation, debate, argumentation, and coordination. However, as it will be demonstrated in this chapter, all those approaches that emphasise horizontality and consensus have turned out to be inefficient. This is particularly the case in post-socialist contexts, where certain features of old practices should be re-introduced, as the argument of this dissertation indicates.

Before starting to categorize the features of the main policy actors, some terminological remarks concerning agency characteristics should be pointed out. There are several terms, similar in meanings, which are often used interchangeably in texts when it comes to agency in public policy. In literature, there is no unanimous differentiation among terms such as policy stakeholders, policy actors and policy players. Even though some researchers (Tangney, 2015) distinguish policy players as being those involved in policy development at all levels of governance (including quangos and consultants), from policy makers (those with a democratic mandate - i.e.

politicians) and policy stakeholders to those not directly involved in policy development but with a stake in its proceedings (e.g. NGOs and third sector organisations), this differentiation should be understood more so as a by-product of the variations in policy traditions of the authors' respective policy fields, which can lead to scholars using a singular concept in a different manner[25].

Policy stakeholders are defined as individuals, groups and organizations who have an interest in (stake) influencing the actions and aims of an organization, project or policy direction (Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000, p. 239). They can be both governmental and nongovernmental, for profit and non-profit. Stakeholders within the public sector often involve the involvement and power of citizens in the decision-making processes. In their text *Comparative Analysis of Stakeholder Engagement in Policy Development*, Helbig et al (2015, p. 3-4) interpret Donaldson's and Preston's (1995) understanding of stakeholder theory by defining four aspects of the theory. The first aspect is descriptive and is used to describe the nature of a corporation. The second aspect is instrumental, and is used to investigate the relationship between stakeholder management and the achievement of the objectives of a corporation. The third aspect is normative and argues that interests of different stakeholder groups are legitimate and of "intrinsic value". Lastly, the fourth aspect is managerial and examines how stakeholders are managed in firms. Unlike policy actors, policy stakeholders despite their interest, have only few means to influence decision-making or the system (or they do not have means at all) (Enserink et al., 2010, p. 80)

As illustrated by this shot preview, different concepts are being used to describe similar phenomena – that of organized interests of various actors internal or external to the state that wish to influence policy development. Taking into account everything stated in this section thus far, in the continuation of this dissertation, the unifying term used to describe such entities will be "policy actors", due to the prevalence of this term in the literature and the encompassing meaning associated with it. In other words, all after-mentioned categories of entities engaged in the policy process can be placed under the umbrella term – policy actors (or policy players).

[25] For the purpose of terminological clarification and discussion, I posted the following request on the social networking site for scientists and researchers - ResearchGate, "Is there any substantial difference between policy actors and policy players? Reference on terminological difference would be highly appreciated."
Each participant in the discussion had his own conceptualization. Even though this was not a form of research with a representative sample, it indicates the lack of consensus on this topic within the academic community.

According to Brugha and Varvasovszky (2000, p. 240), policy scientists have long been aware of the importance of organized groups (or individuals) in the policy process. The authors further stipulate that these groups have also been interested "in the proper way of their categorization, assessing their interest and power which influence, and therefore impact on, particular policies" (ibid). Focus on actors thus may have beneficial impact on understanding policy-making in its essence. In the Table 4.1 there is a list of possible contributions of actor analysis to policy activities. Since the focus of this dissertation is to comprehensively explore one policy area's stage of the policy-making process, particularly having in mind power as a variable, an approach focusing on actors is a plausible decision for that exploit.

Table 4.1: Benefits on actor analysis

Research and analyze	Mobilize knowledge and information from a broad actor base, which is likely to improve the quality of the problem analysis
Design and recommend	Create ideas for alternative strategies and tactics by mapping options and interests of different actors. This helps to identify common ground and shared fundamental values, to identify ways in which different actors can contribute to these shared values, and to identify needs and possibilities for compensation or mitigating measures to satisfy particular actors
Advise strategically	Assess the feasibility and potential to implement policy options, by mapping the positions, interests, resources, and relations of actors, providing insight into the opportunities and threats that actors pose for problem solving
Mediate	Map conflicts, identify potential coalitions of actors, and propose a road map for a negotiation process, including agenda items and participants in various stages of discussion
Democratize	Ensure that all the important actors are included in the policy process, and/or that their views and concerns are incorporated in the problem analysis. From a normative point of view, this supports a more legitimate problem analysis
Clarify values and arguments	Include the full range of values and arguments in a problem analysis, which aids a problem analysis that is recognized and accepted by different parties, offering a better basis for agreement and cooperation concerning policy options

Source: Enserink et al. (2010, p. 80)

In order to understand the position, type and relevance of actors in public policies, one has to be aware that the type of organization and its characteristics are the instruments in which policy domain is shaped. In policy literature, the term used for this scenario is policy arrangement. As argued by Arts and Tatenhove (2005, p. 341), "the definition of a policy arrangement allows for analysing substance and organization as well as change and stability of policy making at different geographical and

administrative levels." The substantial and organizational characteristics of a policy arrangement, as the argument goes, can be analyzed on the basis of four dimensions, policy coalitions[26], 'rules of the game', policy discourses, and resources (ibid). As clarified beforehand, policy actors are an inseparable part of public policy analysis; however, the literature on policy actors, even though diverse and rich, still leaves room for a more structured and holistic approach to policy actors' characterization.

That being said, various definitions of policy actors generally do not differ much in encompassing the essence of this phenomenon. Enserink et al. (2010) in their book on policy-making in multi-actors environment describe an actor as "a social entity, a person or an organization, able to act on or exert influence on a decision." (p. 79) Hence, they add that their assumption is that no individual single actor is able to act solely and unilaterally in imposing their interest to others but that cooperation is needed in order to solve a policy problem. M. Cahn begins his relatively basic analysis of policy actors in the US context (1995, p. 199) by stating, "policy actors are those individuals and groups, both formal and informal, which seek to influence the creation and implementation of these public solutions". This rather straightforward definition of policy actors, despite the complexity of this area within policy science, manages to pinpoint the quintessence of their role and intentions. Kustec Lipicer (2006, p. 29) argues that policy actors or policy players are a crucial part of policy analysis and, delving deeper than Cahn, claims that different actors participate in different policy stages.

The starting point of a deeper understanding of policy actors can be detected in the distinction between the individual and the composite players, a concept proposed by Scharpf (1997). He claims that on the one hand some policy actors have the ability to act independently in order to achieve desired policy goals, but at the same time and in most cases, it would be impossible to explain the decision-making process if we were to investigate the reasons behind the action of every single individual taking part in the

[26] "A *policy coalition* consists of a number of players who share resources and/or interpretations of a policy discourse, in the context of the rules of the game. As a consequence, these coalitions identify (more or less) similar policy goals, and engage in policy processes to achieve those goals. In doing so, some coalitions may support the dominant policy discourse or rules of the game, while others might challenge these (*supporting* versus *challenging* coalitions). Given this definition, the concept of policy coalition is broader than for example Haas' conception of 'epistemic community' or Wengers' conception of 'community of practice', which particularly focus on the role of experts and learning in policy processes (Haas 1990; Wenger 1998). " (Arts and Tatenhove (2005, p. 342)

process. Therefore, it is necessary to try and understand when an action can be allocated to a greater common than the acting individual, to that which we can call a composite or collective actor (Dente, 2014). Composite policy players must cooperate within the polity in order to accomplish their aim. Thus, as Petek (2012) argues, the terminology behind composite actors encompasses the constellation of individuals whose goal is to coordinate themselves and produce common policy goals. For a collective actor to do so, it must have a general preference made up of various inclinations of its members, which may oftentimes different from one another. As Dante claims (2014, p. 32), for this collective actor to be a viable player in policy outcomes, it must meet the following conditions (Scharpf 1997, p. 60–66),

1. There must be a form of self-interest at the level of the major unit, meaning that the conditions for its survival, autonomy and development must be clear;
2. Those who act on behalf of the collective actor must be aware of and respect any formal or informal rules;
3. There must be a minimum collective identity shared by the members, which would make it easier to define the preferences of collective actors in a decision-making process.

Kropi (2001), building on Scharfs argument, claims that the preferences of composite actors are not simply a reflection of self-interest, but rather stem from common characteristics of identification. This author suggests that it is more likely that composite actors constitute individuals with shared norms and identities. In addition, Scharf (1997) conceptualizes both individual and collective actors as being motivated by their separate interests, which they seek to utilize to influence the course or the outcome of the policy process. Additionally, the actors are characterized by their preferences (which may change through persuasion), perceptions of the problem to be addressed (which may change through learning), and capabilities – the resources present at their disposal (p. 42-43).

One of the most important characteristics of policy actors is their attachment to the state (Petek 2012, p. 92; Kustec-Lipicer 2006, p. 28-29). Within policy science, there is a clear distinction between state actors (also known as formal) and non-state actors (in literature, terms non-state and non-formal are used interchangeably)[27]. While the

[27] Again, Petek (2012) collected different classifications of actors from public policy literature, so she points out that some differentiate state actors and those outside the state (such as Grdesic); others see state and society as two main factors for differentiation (Pierre and Peters), while some operate with

formal actors' jurisdiction is territorially limited, their behaviour is based on the notion of sovereignty, in that they possess autonomy in their actions and have the power of cohesion/repression. On the other hand, the non-formal actors emerge from the private sphere, with no territorial or state jurisdiction, and are predominately active as civil society, non-profit organizations and think-tanks). Both of those actors share the common principle of interest as a criterion for participation in policy development. They use their resources (for more on resources and actors' power, please see the next chapter) to drive and deliver policy outcomes. However, due to vastly different functionalities and methods of participation (as well as the goals they are pursuing), both actors have distinct roles to play depending on the stage of the policy process. Ana Petek (2002), in her dissertation, summarized Birkland and Howlett and Ramesh's categories of actors in order to demonstrate the loci of three categories of actors - society, between society and state and state (table 4.2). As the chart below illustrates, most of the policy players reviewed were allocated in either formal or non-formal categories, which confirms their relevance in the public policy discourse. Even though here we find both categories s consisting of three sub-categories ("in", "outside", and "between" state and society) to show the complexity of policy stakeholders, many other policy texts offer only two categories – state and non-state actors - due to issues of pragmatism and quality analysis (Grdesic, 1995).

categories of state/public and private actors (Compston). Apart from those, I found additional categories of policy actors such as official-unofficial differentiations that can be found in some reports (Spandou 2012), as well as system vs. non-system actors (Coburn, 2005).
From my point of view, there is a difference between (non-)state and (non-)institutional actors. While I understand state actors as those that have the legitimacy as a result of the law and the constitution and are part of the state apparatus, "the institutional actor" is a wider category that encompasses all actors involved in a policy process. Hence, a non-state actor can be an institutional one if it is a part of a policy process. In addition, I argue it makes more sense to understand formal actors as those who have a higher level of structure and organization, while non-formal actors have less structure and are mostly comprised of individuals, civic initiatives, coalitions and social movements. However, this dissertation does not have the intention to be a terminological benchmark, and due to the limited word number, this argument will not be elaborated on in details. Instead, formal actors will be used as a synonym for state actors.
No matter which categorization we accept, the idea is that formal, state or institutional actors should represent the interests of the whole society, while the non-state actors have the luxury to promote particular values and agendas.

Table 4.2: Comparison of categories of actors

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Birkland</th><th colspan="2">Howlett and Ramesh</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Formal actors</td><td>Legislative</td><td rowspan="2">Elected officials

Legislative
Executive</td><td rowspan="2">Actors located in the state</td></tr>
<tr><td>Executive
President/government
Public administration
Agencies</td></tr>
<tr><td>Courts</td><td>-------</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">Non-formal actors</td><td>Individuals</td><td>Voters</td><td rowspan="2">Actors between the state and society</td></tr>
<tr><td>Political parties</td><td>Political parties</td></tr>
<tr><td>Interest groups</td><td>Interest groups</td><td rowspan="3">Actors located in society</td></tr>
<tr><td>Research organizations</td><td>Research organizations</td></tr>
<tr><td>Media</td><td>Mass media</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Petek (2012, p. 125)

It is often claimed that state (or formal) actors have exclusive right to formal decisions (Hill, 2010; Sabatier, 1999; Kustec-Lipicer, 2006; Petek, 2008). Even though this argument is in its essence correct, it is relatively reductionist from the point of view of contemporary governance understanding of the decision-making process. As seen from the previous chapter, even though the state (actors) have the mandate to make decisions, they cannot do that solely on their own, due to limited resources they possess. Within the governance framework, state actors are bound to cooperate with non-state actors in order to produce policies beneficial for the whole society, which by *de facto*, limits their decision-making monopoly. Nevertheless, Kustec-Lipicer (ibid) is right when she argues that state actors' decisions have effects on the whole population of a certain country and due to that, their behaviour has to be guided by specific procedures of transparency and predictability. The main goal of state actors, as the argument goes, is to assure welfare of its constituents; however, the downside of the state apparatus is bureaucracy and its perpetuation of rigidity, inefficiency and sluggishness. Another feature of formal or state actors is their duty, or legal obligation, to create public policies, which, according to both Birkland (2001) and Howlett and Ramesh, 2005) influence the activity of the legislative, the executive and the judiciary branches.

Non-formal (or non-institutional/ non-state) actors are the second category of relevant players within the policy process. Even though they do not have legal duty to participate in the decision-making process, they have every right to do so, according to some concepts, such as collaborative governance. As shown in chapter 3, in order to have more sustainable, effective, and just policies, non-state actors are vital in the

policy process engagement. Good governance requires a plethora of actors participating in the process in order to construct better policies. Petek (2002, p. 127-128) analyses four reasons why non-formal actors participate in decision-making process, which were originally postulated by Donahue and Zeckhauser (2006). He argues that sparse governmental resources, limited productivity of state actors, issues with information acquisition for formal actors and legitimacy in terms of need for support of non-state actors are the essential reasons why a government would open a policy arena for a wider circle of stakeholders. In addition to those reasons, Hill (2005) points out that non-state actors (he calls them non-system actors) are particularly influential and necessary when policy discourse becomes complex. By demonstrating this assertion with the example of education policy, Hill argues that non-system actors help in acquiring changes to outdated policy practice and translating sometimes abstract policy to an implementable adaptation. As seen in Table 4.2, there are various kinds of non-formal actors. In order to clarify the complex reality of non-state policy actors, a brief presentation of some of the main features for each group is in order.

Interest group researchers have trouble agreeing on unanimous definition of the interest group[28]. Most narrow definition of an interest group is – any group actively trying to "influence the distribution of political goods" (Berry, 1977, p. 10) or to be more precise, it reference with the topic with this dissertation "influencing the formulation and implementation of public policy" (Grant, 1989, p. 9). In other words, the goal of interest groups is to affect government policy to benefit themselves or their causes. Interest groups strive to sway public policy and have a relatively large but common set of tools or tactics to promote group interests with policy makers (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Kollman, 1998). McDaniel, Sims and Miskel (2001) summarize what many of their predecessors have stated regarding interest groups, by claiming that "interests are not simply valued conditions or goals such as money or safety; they are created when private values come into contact with government" (p. 95). Hence, the authors continue, "interest groups refer to membership organizations, advocacy organizations not accepting members, businesses, other organizations or institutions, or any association of individuals, policy actors or groups, whether formally organized or not, that try to influence public policy."

[28] For better conceptualization of interest groups, please see Baroni et al. 2004.

Moreover, the term *policy entrepreneur* is used by Kingdon and Thurber (1984, 21; p. 104) to describe actors who use their knowledge of the process to further their own policy ends. They "lie in wait in and around government with their solutions at hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to their advantage" (Kingdon, 1984, 165–6). This expression has usually been used by Cairney (2015) in his conceptualization of policy entrepreneurs, where he explains how "Mintrom and Vergari […] use 'entrepreneur' in a similar way to Kingdon (someone selling ideas) and to rational choice (someone solving a collective action problem) to explain change within the advocacy coalition framework. For example, coalitions are born when entrepreneurs frame issues to encourage members with common beliefs to coalesce around an issue." Based on their analysis of relevant literature, Mintrom and Norman (2009) argue that there are four distinctive characteristics of policy entrepreneurs, namely traits that display social acuity, define problems, build teams, and lead by example, in order to achieve policy changes (2009, p. 651).

Regarding the position of an actor in a policy process and its influence, there are several terms being used to describe them. One of them is *critical actor*. Those are "actors that are either important for their 'power of realization' or for their 'blocking power'. [Differently put,] the actors that a problem owner cannot ignore" (Enserink, 1993). *Veto players* is a category of critical actors often mentioned in various political science texts. One of the most straightforward definitions of veto players is one provided by the greatest authority on veto players, George Tsebelis (2000, p. 442), who claims that individuals or collective decision-makers whose agreement is required for the change of the status quo are called veto players. What can be concluded from this definition is that these types of players overcome the statehood criterion. In other words, we can find veto players among both state and non-state actors. Political scientists have had a great interest in veto players due to their role in influencing the stability of a system and their capability to bring about policy change. In his analysis of veto players, Tsebelis (2000) concludes that "as the number of veto players in a political system increases, policy stability increases" (p. 446) and that "if the ideological distance among veto players increases, policy stability increases, that is, the winset of the status quo shrinks" (1995). The concept of veto players and critical actors is inseparable from the notion of power, thus it cannot be investigated without taking into consideration various resources with which different policy players operate. This notion will be elaborated

further in the next chapter. However, before we immerse deeper into understanding policy players' influence, it is needed to identify and densely describe relevant stakeholders. In order to do that, one other theoretical category of actors should be introduces, namely dedicated actors. If an actor is affected by clear costs or benefits, or in other words, if the existing policy problem and/or policy solution have an effect on that actor one is called *dedicated actor (*Enserink et al. 2010, p. 98). Contrarily, "if an actor does not experience any clear costs or benefits, or if costs and benefits seem to negate each other, this actor will be less likely to try to influence the problem analysis and the choice and implementation of a particular solution. In such cases, we are dealing with a 'non-dedicated actor'. (Enserink et al. 2010, p. 98). Since the focus of the dissertation is on youth policy[29], in addition to the state, there are two groups of policy players that will be investigated in more detail than others, namely, civil society organizations and experts within the academic community, while other possible stakeholders are going to be evaluated more superficially.

4.1.1. State in the policymaking and the issue of accountability

The role of the state in a policy-making process is of course, to bring new policies in order to solve some societal, political and/or economic problem. State actors, have therefore *per se* duty to the society to propose and implement policy measures from which the society would benefit. In political science, elections are considered to be a link between the state and society as citizens elect their representatives to run a country in a certain direction. Here, the issue of accountability becomes relevant, as representatives are being held responsible through elections, explain Johannsen and Krašovec (2017, p. 47). By relying on Taylor, Johannsen and Krašovec (2006) explain this classical notion has been supplemented by the extra-parliamentary opportunities and additionally they compare and contrast models of responsiveness and responsibility by stating neo-corporatism, majoritarian-pluralism, and personalist politics as relevant governance models for understanding the issue of accountability. But what is the general role of the state in contemporary policy-making?

Over time, the role of the state in the process of making decisions has been changing. As described in the third chapter, with the emergence of governance and

[29] In Chapter 7 titled *Youth Policy in Croatia*, there is an extensive elaboration why civil society organizations and academic community are the most relevant stakeholder in youth policy. The criterion of their choice is based on the social participation approach – identification of key actors to the extent they psrticipste in activities relsted to a policy issue (Enserink et al., 2010, p. 85).

realization that some societal and/or political problems are rather too complex, the state had to focus on the collaborative modi. Different actors got the access to the policy/making due to their particular characteristics which are needed in a specific case. Colebatch (1991) understands policy as a nexus which consists out of three pillars – authority, order and expertise. Authority means the right to produce legitimate policy outputs, order refers to institutions that are devoted to an issue policy wants to tackle and expertise is a knowledge on a specific issue. In other words, Colebatch the conception of powerful government as the only important actor and introduces other stakeholders as relevant in the decision-making process. As a result, the state and non-state actors create collaborative relationships where the former can achieve specific policy goals with assistance from the latter, even while pursuing their own interests (Rhodes 1988).

4.1.2. Civil society

With the emergence of good governance and the policy network approach (see chapter 3), civil society has gained more attention as a policy actor to an extent that some authors such as Matthew Cahn claim that policy is "a result of institutional processes influenced by non-institutional actors" (Cahn 2012, p. 203). However, in order to understand its role in the policy-making process, it is important to elucidate this vague and omnipresent concept[30]. In the next section, the concept of civil society is further investigated, while in the next chapter, resources and mechanism used by civil society actors are being explored in more details.

The term civil society usually refers to the 'state-society' relations of a regime. It is considered to be a sphere in which active citizens reside along with the basic principle of freedom of association and solidarity. The division of all social spheres into three main sectors dates back to the Middle Ages where the emergence of that conceptual separation can be tracked back to the distinction between the *oikos* and *polis* in ancient Greece. Manfried Riedel (1991) claims that the term civil society is a literal translation of the ancient Greek term *politike koinonia,* which eventually evolved into the Latin version *societas civilis*. He further emphasizes that the modern comprehension

[30] Some parts on conceptualization of civil society have been borrowed from a master thesis, *An Assessment of the Role of Civil Society in the Democratic Consolidation, A Comparative Analysis of Croatia and Serbia,* which a candidate defended at the Central European University in June 2011, as well as from another candidate's master thesis, *An Analysis of Croatian Civil Society, Coordination as a Prerequisite for Efficiency,* defended in September 2011 at the University of Zagreb.

of civil society is particularly different from the antique understanding. In the case of the latter concept in ancient Greece and Rome, thee term was used to describe the domain of free citizens where citizens were actively participating in policy discourse and politics- making. One of the best chronologies of the civil society development was given by Mary Kaldor et al. in their book *Global Civil Society, An Answer to War* (2003). In this book, Kaldor offers five different versions of civil society that correspond with specific historical periods and the social ideas prevalent within them.

The first concept is civil society as *societas civilis*. This concept encompasses the rule of law, zone of civility and reduction of violence. This concept stipulates that it is impossible to separate state and civil society because civil society as an area of policy-making is different from the uncivil society (entities which use violence) or the state of nature. This was the historical state of ancient Greece and Rome, where the idea of civil society can be found in their reverence to the consent theory. The second conception of civil society is grounded in Marx's and Hegel's texts. This bourgeois version of civil society is a product of the expansion of capitalism, where the main actors are the market, individuals and social organizations. Here, all present organizations were counterbalances to the state. The third concept - the activist concept of civil society was described in Kaldor's book and is inherent in the social milieu of the 1970s and the 1980s. This concept is described as post-Marxist and utopian in its relation to civil society. Its features can be summarized as a quest for redistribution of state's power in order to increase the level of democracy, as well as to spread the necessity of political participation through the mechanism of social movements. Furthermore, the fourth version (neoliberal) of civil society, characteristic of the United States of America, is a version of *laissez-faire* politics where there is a tendency in decreasing state's power. Civil society then serves as a set of citizens' associations that help other citizens in solving problems and that replace some state functions (especially in the area of social protection). The last concept of civil society has postmodern character. In this version (which is present today), the main underlying principle is one of tolerance. Civil society is then an arena of pluralism, deliberation and different identities. In this stage of civil society development, there is a distinction between civil and uncivil society. Bearing in mind the historical development of the idea of civil society, we have arrived at a contemporary understanding of this concept. There are numerous definitions accepted in literature, and therefore I will present some of the main ones that emphasize different aspects of civil society.

John Keane, a famous contemporary English philosopher, views civil society as an ideal-type construction that describes a complex and dynamic sphere of non-governmental organizations that have the tendency to be nonviolent, self-organized and auto-reflexive. Those organizations have a specific relationship with the state, which frames their actions (1998). Habermas (2002) proposes the criterion of deliberation in the public sphere as a key feature of civil society, while Gramsci offers a neo-Marxist perspective of civil society as an independent area of interaction between state, market and people, in which people are fighting against the hegemony of the market and the state (Pavlović 2009). CIVICUS defines civil society as "the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market where people associate in order to advance common interests." Additionally, civil society can be defined as "any grouping that assumes representation of collective interests can be claimed as part of civil society, or civil society can be defined as the totality of civic engagements citizens commit to join in the polity" (Tusalem 2007, p. 363). A more precise (and commonly accepted) definition is proposed by Kopecky and Mudde in their article *Rethinking Civil Society* (2003), where they state that civil society is a set of organizations that operate between the state, the family (individual or household) and the economic production (the market or corporations). Hence, civil society is independent from the state and the economy financially and does not aim to occupy the state; rather, it tries to influence it.

Perhaps the most comprehensive, concise and analytically appropriate definition of civil society for this thesis is one coined by Philippe Schmitter. According to him, "civil society can be defined as a set or system of self-organized intermediary groups that, 1) are relatively independent of both public authorities and private units of production and reproduction, that is, of firms and families; 2) are capable of deliberating about and taking collective actions in defence or promotion of their interests or passions; 3) do not seek to replace either state agents or private (re)produces or to accept responsibility for governing the polity as a whole; and 4) agree to act within pre-established rules of a 'civil' nature, that is, conveying mutual respect" (Schmitter 2003; 240). In addition to this detailed description, it is important to note the different manifestations of civil society. From the analysis so far, we have seen that civil society is a vague and broad concept, but we have not been presented with real manifestations of its influence in the society. There are two forms of civil society – social movements and civil society organizations. Social movements are a type of a solidarity quest in which a group of people aspires to change some social or political issue. This term,

introduced in the glossary of political sociology by Lorenz von Stein, became very fashionable in the last decades of the 20th century. In contrast to social movements, civil society organizations, which often take the form of non-governmental organizations, are more institutionalized forms of civil society in action. The Council of Europe defines non-governmental organizations as voluntary, self-governing bodies or organizations established to pursue non-profit-making objectives of their founders or members, and which are characterized by a certain degree of stability and a particular institutional structure. In other words, the difference between civil society organizations and social movements is the degree of stability and the level of institutionalization. As Andrew Arrato came to understand, this distinction is fluid and mobilization always seeks at least some institutionalization (Arato, 1996).

All these definitions are important, because they show complexity of the term *civil society* and its relevance for understanding the events that occurred in Croatia and Serbia at the end of the 20th century.

Briefly outlined, there are four major functions of civil society, namely representation, socialization, subsidiarity and the watchdog function. The *representation function* is one in which civil society organizations articulate interests and preferences of citizens, and represent them to the government or other executive agencies. The second function of civil society is *socialization*. Civil society is an arena for learning the virtues important for the maintenance of democratic principles, such as tolerance and collaboration. In the last fifteen years, the concept of social capital has become very popular in the social sciences. Robert Putnam defines social capital as, [the] connections among individuals [defined by] social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them." (2001) In that sense, social capital is closely related to what some have called "civic virtue." The difference is that social capital calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a network of reciprocal social relations. Essentially, a society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital (Putnam, 2000, p. 19). Scholars consider non-governmental organizations as factories of social capital due to their ability to solve or/and understand the problems that concern citizens. The function of *subsidiarity* is vital for democracies as well. Governments, due to the grand scope of their work, do not have the time or resources (both in terms of knowledge or people) to ensure that all welfare needs are met for their citizens, therefore they transfer their responsibilities to civil society organizations (CSOs). That way, various problems are

solved at the lowest possible level due to the trust governments place on the competence of CSOs. The last function is the *watchdog* function, in which civil society supervises the government, making sure that what they do is in line with democratic practice. Civil society can and often does challenge the abuses of executive or legislative authority, and has an active role in minimalizing arbitrary policies imposed by the state. (Schmitter, 2003)

We could say, given all its functions, that the concept of civil society can be observed from two perspectives, the negative, liberal tradition, which supports limiting state's power on social activities, and the positive tradition, which supports the idea of many independent points of self-organization in which people solve their own problems and deliberate about how to increase their welfare.

Given the plethora of policy problems and the available mechanisms to solving them, policy research emphasizes three levels of characterization for clearer understanding of civil society's approach to problem-solving, the macro, the meso and the micro levels. Civil society is one of the key actors in understanding the meso level. According to Hudson and Lowe (2009, p. 11), "[m]eso-level analysis is the middle part of policy process. It deals with how policies come to be made, who puts them on agenda, and the structure of the institutional arrangements in which policy is defined and eventually implemented". Civil society is considered to have a pivotal role in the meso-level analysis due to the fact that it aggregates interests of citizens and organized influences of the policy process. Furthermore, Hudson and Lowe explain that the "meso-level is thus characterized by two distinctive features, the use of middle-range theories to explain the policy process from the moment a social problem is identified – following a various stages of design and implementation and the emphasize on the cultural/historical explanation for how the welfare states of countries differ" (Hudson and Lowe 2009, p. 12).

A. Petek (2012) summarizes five categories of civil society activities. The first group is reserved for entities focused on collective interests in the economy, such as unions, employers' associations, peasants' associations or commerce chambers. In addition to them, there are professional associations whose goal is to regulate their own professions. Many organizations emerged from the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, such a feminist groups; peace, human rights and ecological organizations are currently gaining traction as a backlash to recent wars, social inequalities and global warming issues. The fourth category is allocated to social, service-delivery

organizations with strong orientation towards care; finally, the very vague “the rest” category encompasses sports clubs, leisure activity providers and cultural associations. In terms of public policy analysis, it is worth mentioning the differentiation between public interest groups and special interest groups (Birkland, 2001). While public interest groups focus on advocating for public good, special interest groups are more oriented towards specific interests of their members (here, unions and professional organizations are the best representatives).

In democratic societies, civil society organizations, together with experts, unions and political parties should be involved in the decision-making process through consultation and expert advice, and this is exactly the key to the governance and the policy network approach. However, with the transformation of the decision-making process, the *modi operandi* of the civil society organization (at least declaratory) has changed. Sørensen (2002) argues that new actors that got the opportunity to participate in policy-making were forced to leave their particular interests outside the polity and, at least nominally, started to claim to advocate for the public good. Thus, it can be concluded that both the government and civil actors needed to adapt to a new reality, as Casey (1998, p. 22) firmly points out:

> The intervention of NGOs as policy actors must be founded upon a solid base of political and cognitive legitimacy; i.e., they must have the capacity to demonstrate that they have a broad political base and that they are experts in the theory and practice of the policy in question. They must also have the ability to "play" the game of participation. […] Cooperation is articulated through commissions, advisory boards and other formal channels of liaison, consultation and oversight as well as other mechanisms, such as public hearings, which allow actors to comment formally on legislative and administrative proposals.

Civil society organizations, as explained by Kochler-Koch (2010) are not involve in the process of policy-making as representatives, but their potential is more their active participation. In the continuation of this dissertation, particularly in the next chapter, I challenge this statement. Even though I agree the criterion of voice is more important than representation, but, as I will argue, civil society organizations, particularly initiatives and networks, often successfully use the argument of their membership in order to create an impression of their power in the process of policy-making. This of course brings us to the question of accountability of CSOs. M. Novak (2017) in their

text on civil society organization's accountability elaborate Kaldor's differentiation on accountability by claiming there are two types of accountability when it comes to CSOs – "Procedural accountability (internal, functional or management accountability), which refers to the responsibility for resources, and moral accountability (external, strategic, political accountability), which refers to the receivers and beneficiaries of services provided by CSOs" (Novak, 2017, p. 131). According to this author, civil society organizations, in order to increase the trust in civil society, should be taken accountable because they do not solely represent "their members but also beneficiaries, funders, supporters and donors" (ibid, p. 141).

So the question raises - how to assure legitimacy and trustwordyness of the policy process if there is a problem with accountability of certain actors? According the governance framework, it is the duty of the state to involve in policy-making organizations which expertise can be beneficial for the process. However, this is not enough. State also has an obligation to involve organizations with proven track record in the specific area, as well as those who comply certain democratic principles. In other words, organizations that comply with the legislative framework, transparently publish their donations and inform the public on their work are supposed to be considered more adequate for the involvement in a policy-making process. Due to these arguments, it is necessary to have quality act on civil society organizations, which would stipulate relevant and necessary requirements civil society organizations should meet in order to, assure moral accountability.

4.1.3. Experts, researchers, academic community and scholars

The proliferation of stakeholders involved in the policy-making process has brought another category of actors into the spotlight. Experts, scholars, researchers, academics- or the academic community, as academics are sometimes called-, are type of policy stakeholders who have different roles from other actors involved in the policy-making process due to their specific specialization and responsibility in a society. In the next few paragraphs, the main characteristics and *modi operandi* of these policy players will be presented in order to build an argument for the necessity of introducing the power-centered approach into the decision-making process as a crucial step towards understanding youth policy-making.

More recently, one of the trends in policy-making has been the utilization of the so-called *evidence-based policy making* method. The main idea behind it is that policy

“should not be guided by 'dogma', but the knowledge of 'what works and why'. It follows, with a certain inevitability, that the kind of knowledge/evidence that policy makers need is, 'to be able to measure the size of the effect of A on B'” (Parsons, 2002, p. 46). Evidence-based policy-making is defined as “discourse or set of methods which informs the policy process, rather than aiming to directly affect the eventual goals of the policy” (Sutcliffe and Court, 2005, p. iii). It is more rational, precise and logical methodology, because it is believed that “policy which is based on systematic evidence is seen to produce better outcomes” (ibid). Petak and Petek (2009) in their text on problems of policy formulation in Croatia are grasping the evidence based policy approach by taking over Sanderson’s conceptualization and they are claiming evidence-based policy approach is a “prerequisite aimed at achieving enchased ‘results and improving public services (deliver) and producing better policies rooted in evidence-based analysis, well designed and capable for successful implementation.” (Petak and Petek, 2009, p. 61-62) This view understands the role of the research community to act as guides rather than influencers. This notion is complementary to Hawkesworth’s (1998, p. 191) idea that the goal of policy analysts is to illuminate the contentious dimensions of the policy question. Here, academics fuel the process with their expertise and knowledge grounded in research, yet do not have a direct interest in influencing the outcome. This understanding of the policy process is anchored in the more rational approach to policy-making, rather than the argumentative tradition. As it will be later shown, this approach is rather reductionist and, from my point of view, simplifies the policy making process too profoundly.

Over time, critics have pointed out the difficulties of applying research to tangible policy-making. This opinion has become so widespread, that it had almost became mainstream to claim that policy-making is fed by academic research. However, the many attempts to apply research to policy, as argued by Trostle, Bronfman and Langer (1999, p. 104), “have suffered from unrealistic expectations, unclear definitions, and a lack of comprehension of the policy-making process”. The authors claim that the studies reporting low rates of utilization of research “have been criticized for using narrow definitions of utilization, and for paying too little attention to actual decision-making processes” (Patton et al., 1977, p. 144). In order to thoroughly investigate the models of research utilized in the policy-making process, the concept of research itself requires definition. Trostle, Bronfman and Langer describe research “as a structured process of collecting, analysing, synthesizing, and interpreting (explaining or

describing) data to answer theoretical questions not visible in the data themselves" (1999, p. 104). The authors go further by defining research as a structured form of communication used to share knowledge, a collective of data and theory.

Furthermore, Trostle, Bronfman and Langer (1999, p. 104) succinctly summarize Weiss' seven general models of how research is used to formulate policies or guide decision-making. These can be grouped, as the authors argue (ibid), within three basic approaches:

> The *rational approach* includes what Weiss calls 'knowledge-driven' and 'problem-solving' models. This approach represents the conventional thinking of researchers (and many others), the policy process is inherently rational; participants in the process will use research if it exists; and they will commission research if a decision requires it. Two other models proposed by Weiss (the '*political'* and the '*tactical'*) can be grouped into a strategic approach to making policy. This approach conceives research as ammunition to support predetermined positions or to delay decisions. The other three models proposed by Weiss ('interactive', 'enlightenment', and 'intellectual pursuit') can be grouped into an enlightenment or diffusion approach which emphasizes that both research and policy-making take place alongside other social processes. Research is sought from, and emerges from, many sources, and plays a role in sensitizing policy-makers to the presence of problems as well as an informative role in presenting solutions.

In its guidelines for transferring academic research into policy-making objectives, the British *Government Office for Science* elaborates the role of researchers by claiming that, "they can help ensure policy decisions are based on the most up to date information. They help innovation in policy by bringing a range of valuable external viewpoints and fresh perspectives. They bring extra rigor to decisions, as they can ask and answer difficult questions and challenge and defend complex answers. Finally, they may also help bridge skills gaps in specialist analytical and data handling roles." (Government… 2013)

Additionally, as stated in the introductory remarks, in understanding the role of policy-making actors, evaluating the context of the policy environment and process is likewise crucial. In Trostle, Bronfman and Langer's text on healthcare policy-making (1999), *Research and Policy in Mexico*, two models that bridge the relationship between research and the rest of policy-making segments are presented. The authors claim that in the first model, civil society constitutes two prevailing actors. Indeed, within civil society, there is a sub-group of interest groups, which act to influence policy, and within each interest group, we can likewise find corresponding researchers. As the argument goes, interest groups and decision-makers exert mutual influences. Further,

Trostle, Bronfman and Langer claim, “some interest groups like the church or private industry belong exclusively to civil society. Some, like Health Ministry personnel or legislators, belong to the State, while others, like researchers in State-sponsored research institutes, belong to both.” Another model depicting the relationship between researchers and policy formulation sees them as two independent processes which can meet at various intersections. “These possible contacts between the two processes are moments of opportunity for the participants in each process to learn from or contribute to the other. The main challenge in applying research to policy consists of learning to create or recognize these moments of opportunity, and then acting efficiently to take advantage of them” (Trostle, Bronfam and Langer 1999, p. 105). The authors explain that the research process “includes phases of idea generation, design, data collection analysis, and application”. Since the point of research is to generate new ideas and new projects, research might range from returning to earlier stages of re-investigation to using research findings towards policy application. Research application, in turn, can also yield new research ideas and designs. Furthermore, the policy process undergoes a similar course of evolution. Trostle, Bronfman and Langer (1999, 105) argue that “when needs or problems arise that might be resolved through policies, information about those needs and problems is collected or presented from different sources” In the light of this, interest groups exert pressure at various stages, “they influence what types of needs are recognized and which are ignored; they influence what types of decisions are made, and what types of policies emerge” (ibid). As in the research process, some pathways of the policy-making process go back to more information gathering before policies are enacted. There are times when some decisions cause a search for extra data and new discussions, while other decisions go on to yield policies. The authors conclude that policy-making is ultimately a revisionary and cyclical process where “new policies ultimately create new interest groups and new policy challenges”.

These explanations of the role of research in the policy-making process are rather simplistic, however they capture the main essence of the link between knowledge gathering and policy creation.

4.1.4. The media

There have been a substantial number of discussions on the role of media in the policy-making process both within media and policy studies. Such texts predominately focus on illuminating the complex relationship between different segments of the public policy process and the role of media in a democratic society. Jones (1977) pointed out ten possible media contributions to the policy process, (1) anticipating problems in advance of public officials, (2) alerting the public to problems on the basis of official warnings, (3) informing the public of the stakes the competing groups had in solving problems, (4) keeping various groups and the public abreast of competing proposals, (5) contributing to the content of policy, (6) deciding the tempo of decision making, (7) helping lawmakers decide how to vote, (8) alerting the public to how policies are administered, (9) evaluating policy effectiveness, and (10) stimulating policy reviews. Additionally, as shown by Olper and Schwinner (2009), some important findings from this literature suggest that: "access to mass-media empowers people politically and, as such, increases their benefit from government programs […] (p. 3)."

Broadly speaking, there are two stages of a policy process where media as policy actors have a relevant role. Agenda-setting as one stage in the policy process has been widely studied in media and communications research (Van Aelst, Thesen, Walgrave and Vliegenthart, 2013). This research focuses on two aspect of agenda-setting. Foremost, it investigates the role of the media in shaping public opinion and indirectly influencing public policy, in addition to mapping and analyzing media groups in terms of their influence on a policy outcome. Another stage of the process is issue-attentiveness. The mass media may not define the nature or direction of policy change, but it can certainly steer attention towards certain policy domains over others, claims Soroka, (2012, 2). Same authors assess that the "impact of media on policymakers is very similar to what Cohen famously observed about the public, namely, that the mass media "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (Cohen 1963, p. 13) (ibid).

With the evolution of social media within the landscape of a more democratic world, the media environment changed drastically. Not only did information start being more accessible and rapidly available but the structure of it changed as well. Within the digital world that was now open to billions of people in the world, messages need to be more compact, simply phrased and more interesting in order to catch the attention of

the public. This influenced policy-making, because the public could now be informed about policy outcomes that were instituted in real time without almost any delay. Additionally, the proliferated number of social networks have demonstrated to be very useful as platforms for interest mobilization, however it remains unexplored what the mid- to long-term consequences are of relying on this type of media to shape public view of the general policy process.

Even though there are some additional policy texts (Sorka, 2012) that go beyond the issue of attentiveness and policy framing, their argumentation is still not convincing enough to accept the notion that the media is an equally influential policy actor in the stages of policy making after agenda setting. In other words, the role of media in the later stages of policy process might be important, however within youth policy research (Kovacic 2015), it is verified that the role of the media is still more influential in the pre-decision making stages of the policy cycle. Therefore, the media's role in the context of Croatian youth policy will be understood as such without further elaboration.

4.2. Final remarks

In contemporary democracies, the nature and *modus operandi* of the tasks conducted by facets of public administration and public policy have constantly been changing, reshaping, critically examining and modernizing. However, despite these evolving factors, there still are and always will be some fixed contributory elements, namely actors, and institutions. In this chapter, it had been demonstrated that the interaction of those segments is crucial for a successful policy analysis to emerge. Indeed, the chapter has shown that with the introduction of good governance within public administration and public policy, non-state actors started receiving more attention. Even though good governance and policy networks can adequately describe structured interaction of various actors, they fail when the interaction becomes more complex. In other words, and this will be elaborated in details in the next chapter, governance, particularly within youth policy, does not offer sufficient analytical tools for the creation of public policies. As Hill argues in his explanation of policy networks, the tools provided by governance are more descriptive than analytical in nature (2010, p. 60-62).

Why is this relevant? As reviewed in this chapter, apart from the state, many various non-state actors got the opportunity to participate in the creation of public policy. This has resulted in more quality policies; likewise, it has brought more interest

into the policy-making process. Policy players have their own unique interests and that is the reason why they choose to participate in the process. As Osborne and Gaebler remarkably (1992) described, the government's role is to steer through those interests and deliver the best policies for the whole society. However, the main problem with the governance literature is explaining the significance of the contentious moments in the policy-making process. Most literature in the field of public policy often disregards the possibility of conflict interest, thus does not offer plausible solutions for policy creation. In other words, if there are various stakeholders (the state being one of them) with many different interests, it is not enough to offer one-dimensional and general descriptions. On the contrary, it is important to embrace the possibility of conflict, learn what tools are the most appropriate to overcome it and what path to take to create the best possible outcome from the given situation. It is logical to assume that in order for actors to pursue their interests, they are going to use various mechanisms, including power, to achieve their goals. Hewson and Sinclair (1999) concluded in their analysis of governance that the notion of power is often neglected. Even Hajer (2003) argues that governance is a discourse that is widely accepted among policy circles and which has impacted power relations within them.

However, the concept of power is not only vague and omnipresent, it is a subject of various interpretations. In the next chapter, I am exploring varieties this concept throughout the perspective of relevant social sciences. The examination of different facets of power and presentation of various points of view on this concept, introduces us to the matrix for assessing power. I argue that policy-making process should be observed through prism of perception and therefore build my argumentation line on the interpretative turn in policy analysis. Using this approach not only it allows reader to get the idea on the structure dynamics of youth policy making, but it also enables richer, denser and more meaningful understanding of policy actors as such and their strategies for influencing policy process. In the following chapter the key point on power conceptualization is being presented which will later be used in the empirical analysis of youth policy in Croatia.

Chapter 5

THE CONCEPT OF POWER

All things are subject to interpretation whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth.

- Friedrich Nietzsche

Contemporary social sciences and humanities face series of question. Often compared with natural sciences, social science faces criticism of being imprecise and not "scientific" enough. Without going into epistemological debate on relevance and its methodological foundation, there are several justifiable critics regarding contemporary social science. One of them is certainly the matter of validity. Are we describing, measuring, assessing, evaluating and interpreting what we are claiming to do? Validity can be broadly defined as a degree to which a concept measures what it is supposed to measure. Since social scientists operate with rather abstract concepts and terms, it is evident that the matter of validity is one of the most significant issues among social scientist today. In the previous chapter we have seen that there is no general consensus on terminology regarding policy actors; while some authors use policy actors other will, for the same entities, use a term policy player. What should be kept in mind is that the concept 'policy actor' is rather unabstract and relatively easy to operationalize, however this cannot be said for concepts such as 'good', 'agency', 'democracy', freedom' or 'love'. One of those concepts, which are tricky to define and/or conceptualize, is a concept of power.

This omnipresent and vague concept is constituent part of various social studies' analyses and it is used describe different aspects of reality. It has been used in sociology, political science, law and anthropology, as well as in psychology, educational sciences, philosophy and linguistics to describe – something. Depending on the tradition of a certain filed, and the extent of preciseness of author, researchers have been using it in different ways, often as a self-evident notion. Of course, throughout social science history there have been authors who offered their view on power wishing to unify it and make it more concrete, however still today various texts in various social sciences

have different conceptualization of power. Political science (and consequently policy science) is no exception of that rule.

Discussions on power have been one of central questions in the 20-century political science. Over history there has been numerous attempts by some of the most prominent names within field, such as Marx, Weber, Dahl, Arendt, Giddens, Foucault, Parsons, Mills, Mosca, to conceptualize and define power. All of them and many more have focused on different aspects but trying to comprehend the mere essence of power. This quest demonstrates the importance of this concept, but its vagueness as well. Lukes (2005) questions whether power needs a definition since there are so many different approaches to it. Adamovic (2011) goes so far that she compares power with the conceptualization of fundamental philosophical concepts such as 'good' or 'love'. She continues and claims that the concept of power is not transparent nor homogeneous which is the reason why theoretical approaches of power are so undetermined.

Agreeing with Lasswel's notion (1950, p. 75) that the conception of power is probably the most fundamental in whole political science and Aron's (1996) and Arend's (1991) argument that 'political' is the most important realization of power, I argue that power is, despite all praiseworthy attempts, still inadequately explored notion, particularly in the policy science[31]. In the light of the stated, this chapter aims to offer a review of selected literature on power relevant for the topic of dissertation, with a particular emphasis on power in decision-making process. After revealing what has been written on power, I am pointing out a gap in the literature (inadequate conceptualization and operationalization of power in a policy process) and offering my own understanding of the concept.

Therefore this chapter consists of four sections; *firstly* and overview of selected thoughts on power from the fields of sociology and political sociology is presented as a sort of theoretical contextualization, in the *second* section greater focus is put on political science and public policy and the way those discipline perceive power in a policy-making process, more specifically in (collaborative) governance process. The *third* section concerns on the anthropological understanding of power and public policy. Since anthropology of public policy has recently become popular in studies of governance and decision-making process, it is necessary to present its points of view

[31] Here, I am not claiming there are little texts, research and elaboration on power, I argue that power is present in political science, however within policy science there is a lack of areas where it has been studied.

on the key concept of this dissertation. Lastly, the *fourth* section deals with the development of the argument relevant for this dissertation. In the fourth section I will offer my understanding of power upon which research on youth policy in Croatia is going to be conducted.

5.1. Sociology and political sociology on power

Kalanj (2010, p. 191) points out that in the study of power two disclaimers should be taken into account. Firstly, the concept of power is a crucial concept in sociology and other social sciences (political science, anthropology, law) and secondly power is a concept with multiple meanings. One may say that most concepts in social studies and humanities have multiple meanings, however not all concepts are equally important. Due to its relevance, the concept of power motivates scholars to examine, study and explore its varieties and conceptualize it as good as possible.

According to Kalanj (2010) pluralism of theories that deal with power can be put into three categories. Hence, he argues, there is *demonic-mystical* understanding of power (the power is the attribute of medicine men, gods, kings etc), *realistic-pessimistically* way of conceptualizing it (power is the only way of interaction between people, we fight, we constantly seek for more power) and the third category is a *reflexive-analytical approach* (power exists, it is a social fact and should be critically evaluated in order to understand it). This categorization of power is a sound beginning for its conceptualization, however it does not offer us analytical precision necessary for rigorous study of phenomena related to it.

In order to understand power within the contemporary policy-making setting, there are certain authors who are unavoidable when it comes to the study of power[32]. This history of modern political thought is indivisible to the concept of power. From Hobbes' Leviathan and natural state where homo *homini lupus est*, Locke's philosophy on government, freedom and toleration to Machiavelli's prince, power is inseparable element in their analyses. The situation has not changed in more contemporary writings of social scientists.

[32] It is quite obvious that it is impossible to cover all authors who wrote on power, thus before I focus on power in policy-making process, in order to contextualize power, I am going to focus on elements that I believe to be important in the context of this dissertation, namely, political power (Weber), interest (Lukes, Dahl), faces of power (Lukes), theory of structuration (Giddens), ubiquitousity (Wrong, Foucault), agency (Giddens, Foucault) and attempts of categorization of forms of power (Haugaard).

Karl Marx is certainly one of classics of sociology. Among other conceptualization, he offered his point of view on power. He believed there is a limited amount power in society, which can be held by one person or group at the time. In line with his critical perspective, these groups are the working and ruling class. In capitalism, the ruling class holds the power and exploits the working class. Based on Marx's argument that study of power inseparably means its relation to class domination in capitalist societies and the idea that power is in fact focused on class domination rather than as a purely interpersonal phenomenon, *Lukes* developed his understanding of power. The power, as Lukes suggests (1974) has three dimensions, the *first* face of power "involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation". Thus, those who win majority are the most powerful actors in society[33]. The *second* face of power originates from the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1970, 44) and focuses on agenda setting. Hence, those actors in society who control the agenda in terms of "A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A." The third face of power regards to non-decision, those who manipulate others to do something they might not actually want to do by changing what they want are in fact the powerful ones.

Max Weber, a social scientist who had a tremendous impact on the development of sociology and political science, had slightly different understanding of power from Marx. For Weber, power is, together with class and status, one of three components of the theory of stratification. Hurst, in his analysis of the three-component theory of stratification explains: "Weber argued that power can take a variety of forms. A person's power can be shown in the social order through their status, in the economic order through their class, and in the political order through their party. Thus, class, status and party are each aspects of the distribution of power within a community." (Hurst 2007, 2020). While at Marx power originates from the economic relations,

[33] This Lukes understanding of the power is in line with *Dahl's* pluralistic perception of power, one of the most prominent authors in political science in the 20th century – R. Dahl (2005). He, in its classic study *Who Governs*? looked at who made important decisions in New Haven. He drew conclusions about who had power by examining known preferences of interest groups and comparing them with policy outcomes. His study showed that resources were distributed unequally. While some subjects were rich in some resources, they were likely to be poor in others. Hence, they use various techniques make other actors accept their priorities.

Weber introduces a pluralistic notion to the study of power. Even though Weber admits that in the modern capitalist world economic power is the predominant form, he objects by claiming that the emergence of economic power can be the consequence of power existing in other grounds. Hence, he understands the power as the "ability of an individual or group to achieve their own goals or aims when others are trying to prevent them from realizing them. "(Weber, 1999) By offering this definition, Weber shows that social, structural or historical circumstances may be the basis for power. Uphoff believes that despite the focus of Weber's definition is on *the ability to achieve objective despite resistance*, 'probability' and 'basis' should be highlighted because those terms are "crucial for making the concept less ague" (Uphoff, 1989, p. 299). He argues:

> The first term addresses whether or not power exists as something in its own right. Various leading writers have considered it a conceptual advance to affirm that power is *not a thing but rather a relationship*. Yet according to Weber, a statement about power is only a statement about a relationship, i.e., about a probability, not a certainty, someone will be able to achieve his objective. Weber never says "power exists" or even that it is a relationship. He defines it only as a probability. To be more specific, one must examine the *bases* of those relationships in which power is reported.
> (ibid)

Authority, a concept often relating to power, in Weberian sense means a legitimate power, or the right to expect compliance. Uphoff puts it as: "the probability that a command with a specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons, despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which that probability rests" (1989, p. 301). Probably the most influential theorist of power in the late 20th century is *Michel Foucault.* His understandings of power can be found in his two pieces *Discipline and Punish (1977)* and *The History of Sexuality (1980).* Sadan in her analysis of M. Foucault, Sadan (2004) claims, "Foucault was influenced by Weber and Marx, but unlike them did not feel committed to a comprehensive analysis of organizations or of economic aspects, he chose each time to analyze a different social institution." For the star it should be noted that Foucault thought that there is no need to develop a theory of power. He believed there is no objectivity of the researcher and need for standing outside the social order.

Foucault believes power is inseparable from interaction. However, he sees power as "not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed

with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society." Foucault (1980, p. 93). For him, power is not wielded by individuals nor classes nor institution, it is dispersed, subject-less as "elements of broad strategies but without individual authors. Further on, power is present in every moment of social relations, it is not necessarily repressive, negative, but also positive. Power, in Foucault's view is inseparable from knowledge, hence his term power/knowledge is taken from Nietzsche's ideas about the connection between knowledge and power. Foucault writes on discourse as well and argues it is a channel through which knowledge and subjects are constituted, hence "power relations are dependent on culture, place and time, and hence Foucault deals with power discourse in contemporary Western society" (Sadan, 2004, p. 57). Power, for Foucault, is not intentional, meaning individuals' intentions have little bearing on this conceptualization of power. Gaventa (2003) argues: "in this interpretation of power, the diffuse nature of power effectively transcends the bi- polar power/powerlessness division." Foucault claims that the split between structure and agency is effaced, in other words, both structures and agents are constituted by and through power.

The concept of *governmentality* is certainly the most popular when it comes to Foucault's philosophy. He argues that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them. However, this is only one aspect of the governmentality, another one refers to, comprehensive sense geared strongly to the older meaning of the term and adumbrating the close link between forms of power and processes of subjectification." (Suman, 2012) Hence, the concept of governmentality "links technologies of the self with technologies of domination, the constitution of the subject to the formation of the state; finally, it helps to differentiate between power and domination." (ibid)

Anthony Giddens developed its approach as a continuation of authors before him, but also as a critique at Foucault's understanding of power. He develops his understanding of power within the theory of structuration believing that the aspect of *agency* in relation to power is a crucial for comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. Giddens, in his conceptualization of power (1979) relies heavily on the notion of agency. He views power as actors' capacity to achieve their goals in situations where the presence of others is necessary for achieving those goals. In other words, for Giddens power is a tool produced by the interaction among actors that may be used to achieve actors' goals. It is a part of a complex social practice, in which human agency

has structural qualities, while the social structure inherent to human activity creating it and ensuring its continuity. The power is in a central place of this duality of structure - social structure and the human agency, two factors which build and activate the social relations. As Sadan (2004, 68) explains, for Giddens "the social structure makes possible the human activity, and also limits it—by means of laws, rules and resources, and also by means of human practices that are part of it. It is human agency that creates the social structure—it establishes it, consolidates it, and also changes it while it acts". It can be said that duality of structure combines two separate approaches, the idea of power as a voluntary human activity, and the idea that power is structural, and hence is more a quality of the society than of particular people (Hajer, 1989).

Part of his theory derives from a critique of Lukes and the rejection of the idea that power and interests are linked:

> People are not always inclined to act in accordance with their own interests.... The concept of interest... has nothing logically to do with that of power; although substantively, in the actual enactment of social life, the phenomena to which they refer have a great deal to do with one another. (1979, p. 90)

However, following Lukes, Giddens advocates 'attempting to overcome the traditional division between 'voluntarist' and 'structural' notions of power' (ibid, 91). Furthermore, Giddens is very much influenced by Foucault, but unlike Foucault he sees every "individual as possessing knowledge and even consciousness, and in this he is the most optimistic among the theorists of power." (Sadan 2004, p. 76).

Considering already mentioned authors (and some others), Haugaard (2003) argued there are two general way of seeing power. On the one hand there are theorists who have "primarily viewed power coercively, individuals get each other to do things which they would not otherwise do through the threat or use of physical sanctions or inducements – punishment or reward. This point of view is typical for Weber, Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, Wrong, Pogi and Mann, and "those working within the realist tradition in International Relations" (p. 88). The other school of thought argues that power is an outcome of the creation of social order which goes beyond coercion. This power can be exercised, as the argument goes "as 'power to', 'power over', in the interests of all, contrary to their interests, for collective goals or solely for selfish ends" (p. 88). Authors such as Luhmann, Barnes, Giddens, Arendt and Lukes are representatives of the other approach. With those two categories in mind, Haugaard proposes seven forms of power (table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Forms of power

Forms of power	Example
Power created by social order	Causal predictability created through the reproduction of meaning; theorized as structuration and confirming- structuration
Power created by system bias	Order precludes certain actions, destructuration
Power created by systems of thought	Certain acts of structuration are incommensurable with particular interpretive horizons
Power created by tacit knowledge	'Power over' based upon social knowledge that is not discursive. Empowerment through the transfer of knowledge from practical to discursive consciousness
Power created by reification	Social order has to appear as non-arbitrary
Power created by discipline	Routine is used to make actors predictable through the inculcation of practical consciousness knowledge
Coercion	Natural power as a base, violence and coercion as a substitute for the creation of social power

Source: Haugaard (2003, p. 109)

In short, Haugaard tried to find a common ground among different authors who were writing on power and offers his understanding of this phenomenon. He claims that social power is not an accident category, yet a very structured concept. The origins of social order arise from social structures which support social order throughout reproduction of meanings. More concretely, "a society gives actors a capacity to do things which they could not otherwise accomplish if they were not members of society. In general, agents derive their capacity to do things from two sources, nature and society" (ibid, p. 89). The natural power "presupposes knowledge of nature's regularities as manifest in cause and effect, while social power is premised upon predictability in social life". Haugaard continues, "at its most basic, the added capacity for action which actors gain from society derives from the existence of social order. If social life were entirely a matter of contingency, social power would not exist. If actor A has no capacity to predict the actions of B, then A would be both unable to exercise social 'power over' B (power which B resists) or 'power to' (a capacity for action which B supports)." (ibid, p. 90)

This short overview of selected conceptions of power has supported the claim that different authors focused on different aspects of power. Nevertheless, in order to build an argument relevant for this dissertation, another dimension of power should be

inspected in details - power in decision-making process. In the continuation some relevant conceptions of power within policy process are being presented as an introduction for the presentation of the approach of this dissertation.

5.2. Public policy and political science: power in decision-making process

Policy-making process itself is a core business for policy scholars thus for them it is important to uncover its principles and understand what makes it as it is. As seen from the previous section and Giddens' and Foucault's notions, actors influence on creating reality hence their activity is important to study. However, to focus only on how agency interacts with the structure or how actors create reality in the context of decision-making process would be reductionistic. Therefore, we should take a step back and explore varieties of means actor have and the way they are using them against or in favour of each other. Hence, I argue that, in order to uncover characteristics of policy process, we should take a look at the power in a policy process. It is thus important to see what authors relevant in the field of political science and public policy have discovered in their attempts to contextualize and conceptualize power addressed in the previous section. In other words, it is necessary to see the application of concepts of power stipulated in the previous section in the field of policy-making.

In the context of political science there are two functions of power; power as a unit of research where its implications and consequences are being studied, and the second function is power as a constituent element of political science. Grdesic (1995, p. 43) writes that the second function implies that political science is basically about studying and describing the source, character, application, control, distribution, maximization and limitation of power. Further on, he cites Lasswell who argues that political science is a science on power. Studies on political power, according to Grdesic, can be categorized into three main streams,

1. Approaches focusing on the one who holds the power;
2. Definitions focusing on the agency; processes, relations between actors;
3. Approaches origin from the object of power, one upon whom the power is being exercised

Different authors use different approaches, however they all agree that in order to have power there has to be some kind of relationship, whether among actors or between social structure and actors. Distinction between faces of power has been one of central questions in political science and often referred as unavoidable in the analysis

of power. As we have seen in the previous section, Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz and Lukes are authors often associating with faces of power. Hay (2002) summarized three faces of power and presented them in a compact chart (Table 5.2). Here can be seen that the conception of decision-making and the way it is being studied, differentiates depending on what is the point of view of power.

However, faces of power are only one categorization of theories of power. Arts and Tatenhove (2004) were more precise than Grdesic so they took a minutely look at numerous definitions of political power and based upon them, tried to summarize some of the most common categorizations of power. Thus, they present following (Arts and Tatenhove 2004, p. 343):

> Some define power in terms of having resources or *dispositional power* (money, knowledge, personnel, weapons, reputation, etc.), while others define it in terms of achieving outcomes, or relational power (e.g. A influencing B); some consider power in mere *organizational terms* (organizations, resources, rules, bargaining), while others consider it in *discursive terms* (knowledge, story lines, discourses, deliberation); some relate power to conflict-oriented zero-sum games, or *transitive power* (A achieves something at the cost of B), while others relate it to social integration and collective outcomes, or *intransitive power* (A and B achieving something together); and some situate power at the level of the *acting agent* (the swimming fish), while others situate it at the level of *structures* (the water putting pressure on the fish) (Clegg, 1989; Brouns, 1993; Hajer, 1995; Goverde et al., 2000). In addition, different authors distinguish different dimensions in the concept of power, one face, two faces, two levels, three dimensions, three circuits, etc.

Table 5.2: Faces of power in the context of decision-making process

	One-dimensional view	Two-dimensional view	Three-dimensional view
Proponents	Dahl, Polsby, classic pluralists	Bachrach and Baratz, neo-elitists	Lukes, Marxists, neo-Marxists and radical elitists/pluralists
Conception of power	Power as decision making	Power as decision making and agenda setting	Power as decision making, agenda setting and preference shaping
Focus of analysis	The formal political arena	The formal political arena and the informal process surrounding it (the corridors of power)	Civil society more generally, especially the public sphere (in which preferences are shaped)
Methodological approach	Counting' of votes and decisions in decision making arena	Ethnography of the corridors of power to elucidate the informal processes through which the agenda is set	Ideology critique – to demonstrate how actors come to misperceive their own material interests
Nature of power	Visible, transparent and easily measured	Both invisible and visible (visible only to agenda setters), but can be rendered visible through gaining inside information	Largely invisible – power distorts perceptions and shapes preferences; it must be demystified

Source: Hay (2002)

Based upon their insights, those two authors claim "in general, political power has to be regarded, on the one hand, as the ability of actors to mobilize resources in order to achieve certain outcomes in social relations, and, on the other, as a dispositional and a structural phenomenon of social and political systems." Therefore, they offer their definition of power as "the organizational and discursive capacity of agencies, either in competition with one another or jointly, to achieve outcomes in social practices, a capacity which is however co-determined by the structural power of those social institutions in which these agencies are embedded." (2004, p. 347)

In the light of all this, Brugha and Varvasovszky (2000, p. 240) claim it can be said that political scientists have viewed decision-making process as determined by how power is structured based on:

- *Elitism* (power is concentrated in the hands of influential few; Lasswell, Bachrach and Baratz)

- *Pluralism* (power is distributed among various groups; Lindblom, Dahl)
- *Marxism* (power is distributed among classes and the state is the instrument of class power; Marx, Lukes, Gramsci)
- *Corporatism* (state has the power to overcome the conflict between labour and capitalism; Schmitter, Siaroff, Lipjard)
- *Professionalism* (power is concentrated in the hands of professional elites who may give preference to their own interests over those of the public they serve; Chambers; Lauder, Light, Marshall)
- *Technocracy* (governing using principles of scientific rationalism; Lowi, Olson, Lindbloom, Radaelli)

In the governance related understanding of polity, where there are lots of actors who pursuit various interests, power as a variable should not be ignored. The topic of power in policy studies is often associated with one specific approach of studying policy-making – stakeholder analysis. Stakeholder analysis is focused on questions about the position, interest influence, interrelations, networks and other characteristics of stakeholders, with reference to their past, present positions and future potentials explain Brugha and Varvasovszky (2000, p. 239). Even though this method has been used mostly to support project management within the corporate sector, its implications have proven to be rather important for contemporary understanding of a policy-making process. As previously pointed out, looking only at policy networks in the study of policy actors has a limited potential to explain policy changes if it is not complemented by an analysis at the lower level in terms of actor properties (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992, p. 196). Stakeholder analysis brings into the study of policy process perceptions, values and resources as vital components of contemporary policy-making process. Together with the network level, aforementioned components allow one to understand and analyze decision-making process in details. Stakeholder analysis thus helps us understand how interests of stakeholders are being channelled into objectives.

However, in order to get an analytically sound concept of power which could increase the level of validity and preciseness, we should take a look at methodologically, one of the most challenging tasks in political science – operationalization of power.

Robert Dahl in his text *The Concept of Power* (1957) argues that due to ambiguous nature of the concept of power, it is unlikely "anything like a single, consistent, coherent, 'Theory of Power', not for some considerable time to come) (p.

202). Hence, he tries to uncover "primitive notion" that lies behind the concepts of power, authority, influence and control[34]. As Dahl points out, the main problem with power is not to determine its existence, but to make comparisons. This notion is the exact substance of this dissertation. In order to compare the level of power among policy actors described in the previous section it should be evident and clear what to look for when analyzing 'power'. There are vast number of texts that relatively arbitrary compare different entities claiming that X is more powerful than Y, however the problem with those texts is that power is not defined adequately, nor indicators and constituent elements of power are stipulated. Baumgartner and Leech (1998) claim that the area of measuring and comparing influence and/or power is an area of "confusion in literature" (p. 25). March (1955) argues that in terms of measuring influence "there is lacking not only obvious unit of measurement, but even a generally feasible means of providing rankings" (p. 434). Influence or power thus remains the question being "exceedingly difficult to answer" (Loomis and Cigler, 1995).

Before I introduce my argument on how to assess power of actors more adequately, there are two questions based on the existing literature I need to answer in order to demonstrate the insufficiency in current approaches to power. Firstly, I am curious to know what to concentrate on or in other words how authors have been operationalizing power so far. Secondly, I must take a look at the existing approaches of how was it proposed to measure power. This methodological aspect is particularly important because it allows one to compare its approach with others and overcomes potential flaws in its methodological design.

What?

Dahl (1957; 2003) in his attempt to operationalize power argues that power is relationship which includes base, means, amount and scope. He claims that the base of an actor's power consists of all resources – opportunities, acts, objects that one can exploit in order to affect the behaviour of another. Means are defined as instruments which allow behaviour of others to be altered. It is more active category than base and includes treats and treats as *modi operandi*. If power is seen as relationship between A and B, the Scope consists of B's response, while the Amount can be represented by a probability statement (the chances are 9/10 that if the A promises something to the B,

[34] Dahl writes that he will be using terms influence, control and power interchangeably and at the same time he accepts Weber's explanation of term Authority (p. 202).

the B will comply). Purdy (2012, p. 410) elaborates certain Dahl's points and among other aspects, argues that resources are important in operationalization of power. She claims resources include tangibles such as financial resources, people, technology, and supplies and intangibles such as knowledge, culture and capabilities. Prudy believes that in collaborative processes organizations and individuals use resources to influence other participants by rewarding them for support or compliance or by punishing them for dissension or noncompliance (2012, p. 411). As we have seen power and authority are closely linked, thus Prudy (2012) claims that the determination of who may participate in a certain stages of policy process can be considered power as well.

Keeping this in mind, next logical question is how to determine, assess or evaluate the existence of power, therefore I am moving to the methodological notions of study of power.

How?

Literature shows that there are three most common and widely accepted ways to measure power, process-tracing, assessing attributed influence and gauging the degree of preference attainment (Dür 2008, p. 560).

Process-tracing is the most frequently method used to measure interest group influence in EU. This method reveals the casual mechanism of a certain process; "scholars scrutinize groups' preferences, their influence attempts, access to decision-makers, decision-makers- responses to the influence attempts, the degree to which groups' preferences are reflected in outcomes and groups' statements of (dis-)satisfaction with the outcome" (Dür 2012, p. 562). This method, even thou useful to uncover steps in decision-making and influence of certain actors, has a series of problems which often cannot be overcome even in well-designed studies (ibid, p. 563). Process tracing is problematic due to trouble with data collection (it is difficult to collect all empirical evidence that would be sufficiently rich to cover all steps of causal process). Hence, scholars using process-tracing unduly rely on interviews and text analysis, methods often not adequate for assessing power. In addition, in process-tracing studies there is often no yardstick which would tell us what "influential" or "powerful" actually means. In process-tracing studies, researcher often avoid inference about influence from the level of interest group activity (too much weight is given to the level of interest group activity), and since process-tracing is mostly small-N method it is almost impossible to generalize upon that.

The attributed influence method is about the perception. Researchers use interviews or surveys to ask participants to assess the level of power or influence of themselves and other participants. Despite its simplicity and popularity, this method has its drawbacks. Firstly, this is only perception of power and/or influence, not the real state of affairs. Secondly, if influence or power is not defined adequately there is a danger that different actors will understand those concepts differently. Moreover, self-estimations can be biased both towards exaggeration of influence and a playing down of the influence. Lastly, respondents often refer to generic influence without pointing out potential differences from one issue to another meaning that the conceptualization of power is incomplete.

The third method is *assessing the degree of preference attainment*. In this method, as Dür explains, "the outcome of political process are compared with the ideal points of actors" (2012, p. 566). The influence or power of an actor is determined based on the distance between an outcome and the ideal point of an actor. This is done by interviewing the participants and text analysis of documents, such as position papers, meeting minutes or policy act drafts. One of the biggest advantages of this method is it can detect influence or power even if nothing happens, for example if lobbing is secret. Additionally, this method is suitable for large-N studies and the advantage in contrast to process-tracing is that errors made in assessment of actors' influence in specific cases will cancel out across many cases. Since this method does not imply dichotomous aspect (influence yes or no) it pictures more comprehensive picture of the power constellation. On the other hand, the determination of preferences is a critical problem because of the biases participants have and inability to verify it with others. When assessing the degree of preference attainment, it is often difficult to control alternative explanations that might have led to a specific outcome. Hence, this method does not uncover the actual process so researcher does not know what was actually happening in the process of achieving of the outcome. Lastly, this method does not offer plausible definition of what success actually is. If an actor is successful on 20% of the issue and unsuccessful on 80% it does not uncover the salience of an issue (Dür 2012, p. 659).

As we have seen from the overview of afore-mentioned methods, each of them has some serious disadvantages which do not allow us to make precise conclusions on the issue of actors' power and influence. Given the fact that solutions which literature suggests for overcoming problems with measuring power are relatively simple and inadequate (Dür 2012), for instance triangulation (Dür and De Bievre, 2007; Arts and

Verschuren, 1999) or large-scale data collection (Mahoney, 2007). Before I propose the matrix for assessing power in the next few paragraphs I am presenting insights on power from the perspective of anthropology, a discipline which acquired its popularity within public policy studies relatively recently.

5.3. Anthropology in public policy as *Deus ex machina?*

We have seen that power is an omnipresent concept in social sciences and political scientists, sociologists and public policy/administration scholars try to comprehend it, conceptualize it, operationalize it and understand it using their specific insights characteristic for their disciplines. Anthropology is another discipline that deals with power. As a discipline whose focus is on the study of humanity in all its aspects, particularly vast variety of social practices and cultural forms, anthropology in 20th century started to be more concerned with the notion of power. This specific subfield named political anthropology, concerned mostly with the structure of political systems and their variations depending on culture, is inseparably focused on power relations in a certain context. Even though political anthropology is "late specialization" as Vincent (2000) claims, it has brought some interesting insights into the study of power within political systems.

Early works in political anthropology included topics such as colonialism, indigenous populations etc., however, with the development of this discipline aforementioned topics evolved towards concepts such as domination or resistance with an aim to identify modern forms of power (Abu-Lughod, 1990). In the 1980s and 1990s political anthropologists focused more on issues such as globalization and transnationalism trying to identify relevant entities which possess power and their relationship with subordinate ones. Foucault once again played an important role in developing political anthropology. Authors using their point of views or criticizing them have "enlarging the horizons of anthropological analysis of modern state power, and not simply towards considering the role of institutions beyond government in the narrow sense in forging hegemony – a perspective also associated with Gramsci's 'extended concept of the state' (Gledgill, 2010, p. 14). Interpreting Foucault it can be seen that in 20 years there seems to have been an "unvoiced shift away from the Weberian distinction between Power and Authority" (Cheater, 2003, p. 2). If this is true, aforementioned conclusion suggests "ongoing loss of state authority to both sub-national and global organizations" (ibid). As shown in the previous sections, Foucault

differentiates "central 'regulated and legitimate forms of power' and 'capillary' power at the 'extremities' (1980, p. 96), which perhaps refracts somewhat differently Blau and Scott's (1963) older distinction between a 'formal' organisation and 'informal' relationships underpinning its operation" (ibid). Hence, political anthropology shifted from studying states as focal points in study of power towards study of civil society organizations and other participants within political arena. Perhaps this is best summarized in Ortner's (1995, p. 177) appeal that anthropologists need to concentrate on studying 'real people doing real things'.

One of such concentrations is summarized in anthropology of public policy. Authors writing within this tradition argue that the idea of policy is as central to the development of applied anthropology as the concept of culture has been to the anthropological profession as a whole' (Chambers, 1985, p. 37–8). Therefore, anthropologists who study public policy see policies as inherently and unequivocally anthropological phenomena. From this point of view, policies belong to and are embedded within particular social and cultural worlds or 'domains of meaning' (Shore, Wright and Pero 2011, p. 1). This means that cultural particularities and social difference are pivotal aspects when analyzing public policies and that every analysis of those should take into consideration different discourses and webs of meanings. Public policies are contested rather than objective, claim proponents of this point of view and they argue that public policies are new yardsticks around which social group organize themselves. (ibid). Policies are, as the argument goes, new spaces for creating interpretations of governance, policy and decision-making.

This line of thought is complementary to postpositivist approach to public policy known as argumentative turn, an idea elaborately explained in Chapter 3. On the one hand, anthropology of public policy challenges a policy cycle approach claiming that it is much too technical and does not correspond to reality where actors shape and design their reality in much chaotic and disorganized way. On the other hand, "critics within policy studies argue that their discipline is still largely dominated by a rational systems model which, according to Gordon, Lewis and Young, has a 'status as a normative model and as a "dignified" myth which is often shared by the policymakers themselves' (Shore and Wright 2005, p. 12). As explained earlier, I understand this criticism and accept it, however I argue it is impossible to ignore the legacy and analytical scope of policy stage model. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, for me the policy stage model is more of a guideline rather than analytical model.

Benefits of observing public policy from the view of anthropology is that it puts actors and their intentions, behaviours and meanings in the center of analysis. Such point of view gives us denser description of policy players and offers a distinctive picture of whole policy process. Anthropologists of public policy (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2006; Fischer, 2003) recognize the importance of rhetoric, language and persuasion and, by taking those dimensions into consideration, interpret the meaning of public policies for society but as well for the actors involved in the policy process. Policy language and discourse, Shore and Write suggest, provides a key to analyzing the architecture of modern power relations (2005, p. 10). This aspect is particularly important because it emphasizes the bond between the State (one who makes public policy) and Society (entity on which public policies apply) and calls for better cooperation and collaborative decision-making. As demonstrated earlier, collaborative governance is exactly what anthropology of public policy advocates for; an arena where public policies are being created on the ground of benefit for all involved actors in the process. Anthropology of public policy redefines two disciplines, public policy and anthropology because as Reinhold (1994, p. 477–9) explains it "calls 'studying through', tracing ways in which power creates webs and relations between actors, institutions and discourses across time and space".

Since the idea of anthropology of public policy is to uncover deeper meanings public policies have, conventional public policy methodology is simply inadequate for this undertaking. If one wants to analyze how actors' ways of being and doing are being framed (Foucault's idea of *dispositif*) or processes by which actors come to internalize, embody and become habituated to those structuring frameworks (Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*) (Shore, Wright and Pero, 2011, p. 11), more participatory and engaging methodology should be used. With the emergence of this idea, participatory methodologies such as ethnography started to play more crucial role in the study of public policy. Only by being 'on the spot' anthropologist can see, understand and later interpret actors' intentions, moves, behaviours and relationships with other actors. One of famous examples of that is Feldman's 'non-local ethnography'. Feldman, wishing to study migration policy, located himself in the office concerned with the EU migration policy to study the process of its development in regard to security, employment, development and human rights. By participating in various meetings and observing actors' *modi operandi*, Feldman tried to understand actors' policy worlds and appreciate their believes. Despite the benefits this method brings (incredibly rich data),

the challenge is to maintain sufficient critical distance to be able to keep asking fundamental questions about how actors conceptualize policy world and what it means for theoretical debates (Shore, Wright and Pero, 2011, p. 15). Therefore, pivotal in those types of methodology is to balance between 'an insider' and 'an outsider' in order to be able to reflect on issues which are relevant for a researcher.

In addition to participants' observation, classical analysis of policy texts has experienced its rebranding. Policy texts are observed as cultural texts. Shore and Wright (2005, p. 12) elaborate it: "They can be treated as classificatory devices, as narratives that serve to justify or condemn the present, or as rhetorical devices and discursive formations that function to empower some and silence others."

No matter what method is used, one concept can hardly be neglected, namely *discourse*. There are numerous interpretations of this concept, however I will not go deeply into them yet I will accept Shore and Wright's conceptualization of it. They argue discourse is "configurations of ideas which provide the threads from which ideologies are woven" (ibid, p. 14). In other words, for the purpose of this dissertation, the discourse will be understood as a power of defining. Therefore, one who has the power to define what problem is and how it reflects into society is more powerful.

The evolution of social anthropology into a discipline that studies cultural domains which are defined more broadly than before (for instance policy-making can be a cultural domain), becomes valuable in research focused on actors such this one is. As a result, it is worthwhile to include it in the study of power within the policy formulation.

5.4. Matrix for assessing power

Light motive of the matrix I am about to explain is summarized in the following statement, *power is perception of the influence.* Hence, there is no actor who has power *per sé*. One becomes powerful depending on circumstances and due to others perceives one as powerful. Sometimes one actor may be powerful in one situation, but in some other one may not be characterized as powerful, ergo power is basically the perception of one's influence in a specific situation.

Building on political science, sociology and anthropology tradition, I am offering my own matrix for assessing power of policy actors principally within the collaborative governance framework. Collaborative governance, as shown in Chapter 3 is "a process of joint decision making among key stakeholders who work together to

make joint decisions about the future of their problem domain" (Gray, 1989). Before I introduce it, there are several disclaimers I would like to offer.

First of all, it should be pointed out that this power operationalization certainly is not the most comprehensive. In the process of developing it I have been guided by Dahl's idea that it is not likely to produce "anything like single, consistent, coherent 'Theory of Power'" (1957, p. 202) because, due to its complexity and omnipresence, the "definition of power is useful in the context of particular piece of research" (ibid). Thus, my conceptualization of power, even though comprehends insights from three most prominent disciplines dealing with power (sociology, political science/public policy and anthropology), is to some extant limited to boundaries of specific fields of public policy, political sociology and political anthropology. To put it more concretely, the idea is to contribute to better understanding of power by looking at it from the more eclectic angle where interpretativism plays an important role. Thus, the intention of this matrix is not to offer a new theory of power, but to systematize existing body of knowledge. As Huxham and Vangen warn, there is no coherent body of literature on power in collaborative settings" (2005, p. 174). Power as a vague concept, as we have seen in this chapter, means all and nothing, thus I argue it is necessary to systematize existing approaches into an understandable template which would be used to understand actors' positions in policy process better. Thirdly, due to the fact public policy has been changing (vertical → horizontal; rational → interpretative; top down → bottom up; exclusive → inclusive; public administration → anthropology) new insights on the nature, structure and dynamics of the policy process are more visible and present in the academic discourse. However, despite vast body of literature there are very little texts offering encompassing point of view, taking into account all relevant changes and new frontiers. Lastly, the matrix for assessing the power of actors is to be understood more as a reliable proxy rather than an exact indicator. Building on the tradition of interpretative policy analysis, I am more interested in meaning of power for participants and observers rather than exact indicators of it. I argue that power is a concept which is subject to various interpretations and conceptualizations, however I don't see this as a problem. I argue that power exists only in a specific time at the specific place and because of that it should be analyzed in reference to a specific context, thus the intention of objectively measuring of power is only one of legitimate strategies. The other approach which I will be using in this dissertation focuses more on interpretation of power, therefore in order to conceptualize and assess power in that

manner analyze its presence and influence on the concrete policy, as well as its dimensions in a specific decision-making setting.

From my point of view, there are two dimensions one should take into consideration when assessing the power of actors in a specific decision-making process, namely, quality of argumentation and the degree of preference attainment (see Figure 5.1). The former is built from the aspects of resources and discourse legitimacy, while the latter is simply measuring how many inputs there are in outcomes. These two dimensions of power are interdependent create the attributed influence of an actor which makes a story of power of actors in a decision-making process. Despite the lack of precision in a positivistic way of speaking, due to the fact it comprehends the most relevant insights from the literature, I consider this matrix to be a plausible tool for analyzing and interpreting the power of actors. Based on the input from the social anthropology and its intersection with policy studies, I propose the following matrix:

Figure 5.1: The matrix for assessing power



In the next paragraphs additional explanation of each aspect is offered.

5.4.1 Attributed influence

As demonstrated in the preview of theories of power, power is a concept which is subject to interpretations of different actors. So far, no unanimous consensus on mechanisms for objective measuring of power has been achieved because of the imperative of the context and perception. Due to that, I argue that perception of actors is difficult yet possible to assess and furthermore that this is, in combination with other aspect of the matrix, enough to get a sufficient insight on the power constellation in a policy arena. As anthropological point of view teaches us, the matter of power is the matter of interpretation and understanding of meaning. There is no objective truth "somewhere over there" which waits to be discovered. Actors are those who create reality and attach meanings to different aspects of it.

Power is no exception. Weber defined it in terms of probability, Dahl, Foucault and Giddens point out relationship between actors and their mutual perception, all concepts impossible to define and operationalize in order to be true for all social and political situation. Therefore, in this dissertation I argue power is a concept which cannot be universal. One can offer conceptualization of power, however, due to ambiguity of the concept one cannot offer a universal definition. The basis of analysis of power should be observed depending on actors' perception of their influence and their interpretation of the situation. By introducing attributed influence dimension of assessing power, one is actually getting perception of actors on the power of others. Nevertheless, despite the fact one is not getting a real picture of power with this method, yet this notion is particularly important. If actors' perception of power is known, this will influence actors' behavior because the power is nothing more than actors' intention to pursue one's interests. In other words, even if we would have power that is objective, measurable and persistent, we would not be any closer to predict actors' behaviour because we would still need to measure actors' perception in order to anticipate their behaviour.

If we accept this assumption, the next logical question is how this perception is being built? I argue there are two factors influencing the perception of power:

1. Quality of argumentation which includes the usage of resources and discourse legitimacy and
2. The degree of preference attainment

4.4.2. Quality of argumentation

Let's be reminded on Chapter 3 and the argumentative turn in policy analysis where deliberation between actors and the quality of arguments used in policy discussions is being examined (Li, 2015). Also, in Chapter 3 the idea of argumentative policy analysis (Majone, 1989) was introduced. Similarly, I argue that one of the aspects of power is the quality of argumentation actors use in order to defend or advocate for their positions/objectives[35]. Dente (2014) introduced distinction between content-oriented goals of actors and those which are process oriented. While the first term refers to the generally accepted idea of the actors' goals (preferences as regards the problem itself and/or the solution to adopt), the latter category is about relations with other actors. Dente (2004) states that the goals of policy actors often "have nothing to do with the problem, but are essentially linked to their relations with the other actors. The alternative solution they tend to prefer is not chosen on the basis of its capacity to meet the need, the demand or the opportunity at the basis of the decisional process, but for the consequences it has on resources and on other participants' positions" (p. 34). The differentiation is particularly interesting in the context of power investigation in decision-making because it stresses out the variable of relation between actors.

This notion reminds us on argumentative turn described in the 3rd chapter. Argumentative analysis, which focuses on the study of language, arguments and framing procedures, is complementary to features of collaborative governance. Fischer (2006) supports this claim by adding that studying persuasion and justification play important roles in the decision-making process because it provides us richer data than just strictly technical, rational, investigation of the policy process. Starting assumption of the type of argumentative approach I am advocating for in this dissertation is that actors recognize that "do not have solid answers to the questions under discussion, or even a solid method for getting the answers" (ibid). Therefore, policy process is reduced at the exchange of various points of view. Fischer (2006, p. 227) explains the principles of such policy debate:

> […] each party would confront the others with counterproposals based on varying perceptions of the facts. The participants would organize the established data and fit them into the world-views that underline their own arguments. The

[35] There is a difference between interest and objective. While former refers to actors' aims in a general context, objectives indicate actors wish to achieve in a certain situation. In other words, objectives are interests translated into specific terms.

> criteria for accepting or rejecting a proposal would be the same grounds as those for accepting or rejecting a counterproposal and must be based on precisely the same data. Operating at the intersection where politics and science confront practice and ethics, both policy analysts and decision makers would explore and compare the underlying assumptions being employed.

Actors, as the argument goes, present their position and resources to other involved stakeholders. There are two aspects of building argumentation line within policy-making process, one focusing on resources and another focusing on perceived link with the rest of society. I argue that participants build their arguments around those two aspects in order to position themselves as relevant (or crucial actors). This approach goes beyond resource-based understanding of power[36], and puts bigger emphasize on perception and building of meaning which is in line with the argumentative turn in policy analysis.

Resources. I argue, in the collaborative governance practices where participants have been selected due to their track record and/or insight on the policy problem, resources *per sé* play secondary role. Even though they are important, involved participants have more-or-less similar resources, yet the real question is how do they frame them and present them to other involved actors. This statement does not undermine the fact some actors are richer than some other or that knowledge is irrelevant, it just points out the relevance of convincing argumentation.

Prudy (2012, p. 410) claims resources include tangibles such as financial resources, people, technology, and supplies and intangibles such as knowledge, culture and capabilities. Kok (1981) lists following resources, information, knowledge (and skills), manpower, money, authority, position in the network, legitimacy, and organization. Based on the literature review, it is safe to say that within collaborative governance practice following resources are relevant for assessing the real influence of actors:

- Knowledge/expertise of a specific policy field/problem;
- Information about circumstances related to a policy field/problem;
- Financial resources actors might use to get additional information, knowledge, public support

It is assumed that all participating actors will use available resources in order to achieve their objectives and consequently interests. However, what cannot be ignored is the perception of resources usage. I believe, it is secondary what resources one

[36] Resource-based understanding of power refers to actor's ability to deploy means which would help one to accomplish their objectives.

possesses; it is more important how one argues it will use the resources one has. In other words, even though objectively one actor may have less resources if one knows how to present and/or persuade other actors that his position is more relevant due to resources one has, one will in the eyes of other be more influential. This is in line with the starting assumption that power is context dependent. Having resources (a fact) means one thing in one situation and another in some other context. Depending on the way resources are presented, one actor builds its reputation against other participants who start seeing it as powerful or less powerful.

The other aspect of argumentation is discourse legitimacy.

Discourse legitimacy. This aspect refers to the link between society (or a specific group in society) and a policy actor. Discourse legitimacy is basically legitimacy actors have when/if they act on behalf of values or norms of a society (Prudy, 2012, p. 411). This discursive element of power is, Prudy continues, the ability to manage meaning by influencing how information is presented. Differently put, if s policy actor can present its interest as relevant for society one will have better starting position at the collaborative governance setting. Here, features such as communication with the public and the presentation of results of this communication or ability to treat with discontent of a public in case actors' solution is not accepted are substantive elements of discourse legitimacy. In collaborative governance where private and public stakeholders are bounded to cooperate, one who can prove or persuade that represents society better or more is in more beneficial situation than the other.

From my point of view, just the quality of argumentation involving the usage and perception of resources and discourse legitimacy is insufficient for building a perception of a successful actor. Since policy-making is in its essence about producing policy, the output of this process cannot be ignored when actors and/or researchers investigate concrete decision-making process, therefore, I argue, another part of the equation is to take a look at the product of the process and employ the degree of preference attainment as a second dimension of building attributed influence.

4.4.3. The degree of preference attainment

One of the most reliable (and most conservative) methods for assessing influence of actors is the degree of preference attainment. This method is employed *ex post* and it suggests comparison between all starting positions of actors and the outcome. In collaborative governance practices interests and objectives of actors are often

detectable at the start because actors are being invited into a policy process based on their results and track records. This allows researcher to compare starting positions with outcomes and assess power. However, this is only one aspect of it, another one is more interpretative. Actors in the process of formulating policies can easily assess their position and their influence, as well as influence of other involved actors. If substantial amount of suggestions coming from other actors is being accepted as a conclusion of the whole working group, this actor will enjoy better reputation and power will be attached to it.

Together two described dimensions of this matrix, this create a general impression of actor's power.

In Chapter 3 we have seen that the argumentative turn in public policy has become fashionable due to the fact that with the proliferation of actors in policy process, understandings regarding policy issues have multiplied. Greater focus on meanings, deliberation and mutual understanding of various perspectives has become overriding principle in policy analysis. Taking this into account, the approach which encompasses actors' perception and relatively objective observable features of actors' modi operandi is plausible for assessing power. Drawbacks of attributed influence approach stipulated in the previous sections of this chapter are overridden with the dimensions of resources, discourse legitimacy and assessing how much inputs there are in outcomes of the policy process. Even though matrix proposed in this dissertation does not provide the construction of new analytical elements, yet it combines the existing ones in new light, it still offers new perspective in the study of public policy. Furthermore, the proposed matrix for assessing power in policy process despite it does not gives us straightforward answer on how much power one actor has, allows us to conceptualize actors' behaviour and conclude on power patterns. Additionally, this enables relatively plausible comparison among actors in the decision-making process, however there are certain requirements that need to be met.

Due to the fact the matrix for assessing power heavily relies on interpretation of actors it is obvious that rigorous methodological techniques are necessary to get as data as precise as possible. Therefore, in order to use presented matrix, it is suggestible to use triangulation. Qualitative methodological techniques such as interviews, ethnographic methods and focus groups with participants of a policy process are most convenient to discover what was happening in the process of decision-making. Additionally, one should not disregard the analysis of the policy text in order to confirm

or rejects notions acquired from afore-mentioned techniques or use it as a starting point for interviews and/or focus groups. In this dissertation, three methods for assessing the perception of actors are being used, policy texts analysis, interviews and participant observation. Investigating the same or very similar notions of the policy process with three different methods, comprehensive narrative about policy formulation is being told.

5.5. Final remarks

In this chapter, the concept of power was inspected by using insights from sociology, political science and anthropology. The chapter indubitably demonstrated that power is a complex, omnipresent, vague and challenging concept that requires distinctive attention from the one who wants to study it. The history of social thought is full of various interpretations of the concept of power, and despite of numerous texts conceptualize it, there is still no one universally accepted definition of it. Hence, it is unlikely to operationalize it and study it in a positivistic way. Because of that, this dissertation stems from the interpretativist way of understanding power. I argue that power is perception, meaning that if we accept this notion, we should discuss power in terms of how actors perceive it. The context, policy field and constellation of actors, I believe, channel our understanding and conceptualization of power.

In order to assess power in collaborative governance, I offer a matrix consisting of four elements, attributed influence, resources of actors, discourse legitimacy and the degree of preference attainment. General idea is that if one wants to assess power, one should ask actors what power means/is. This perception of power is being created by two additional elements – quality of argumentation in regard to resources of actors (presentation of: knowledge, information, argumentation and financial resources) and discourse legitimacy (link society-involved policy actor) and the ration between starting positions of actors (their interests) and outcomes. Those two dimensions combined influence on the general perception of the power of actors.

Keeping this in mind, it remains to see how to concretize aforementioned and where to apply the presented matrix. My opinion is that, a policy formulation stage is a stage where relevant is being distinguished from irrelevant and actors use their resources to channel direction of a policy process in order to set aims, thus a great platform for assessing power of actors. Since, so far there has been very few texts that link governance and power and explain the relationship between them, particularly in

post-socialist states, this dissertation tends to elucidate this relationship and by doing so, increase the analytic value of the collaborative governance as a concept.

In the next chapter, facets of contemporary policy-making will be examined through the premise of the main argument of this dissertation, that in order to understand (youth) policy-making, the governance perspective should be given a bigger voice as a key actor and wield more power. As the argument goes, policy formulation is a proxy for such undertaking and by the study of power within the governance context, our understanding of the role of the many actors will be more complete and analytically sound.

Chapter 6

POLICY FORMULATION AS A POWER ARENA

The world is your playground.

- Nicole Williams

Ever since the policy stage model for explaining the public policy process was proposed, there have been debates on the relevance of the individual analysis of the different stages of the process in terms of the overall decision-making process. In those debates, not only have the individual stages been analyzed, interpreted and explained, but the notion of "relevance" has also been scrutinized. Researchers steeped in the empirical political science framework of quantitative epistemology would ask how this 'relevance' could be operationalized, measured and inferred in order to be assessed. Qualitative researchers would be more so interested in the contextual notions of relevance- how actors relate to other factors of the policy process and how the process is shaped from their perspective. Nevertheless, relevance of certain stages within the policy framework is of interest to a number of scholars and given the multitude of perspectives, it is likely that there will not be a unanimous agreement of 'the' most relevant stage in a policy process.

Keeping in mind that countless researchers argue in favour of examining only certain stages of the policy process, I decided to undertake a literature review and determine which stages have been the least examined and written about[37]. Through this endeavour,, my research has shown that policy formulation is the stage of the policy process that is the least explored. This is supported by some acclaimed researchers in the field of policy analysis. For starters, Turnpenny, Jordan, Benson and Rayer (2015) argue that policy formulation is "arguably one of the most poorly understood of all the policy process stages" (p. 6), whereas Hagrove (1975) describes policy formulation as a "missing link" in the analysis of the policy process. Building on that, Wu et al (2010, p. 47) recognize that policy formulation "is critically important but relatively

[37] This literature review is not a part of this study due to space limitation and logical coherence of the dissertation. However, I do have plans to elaborate on it, polish it up, and publish it as an article following the defense of this dissertation.

inscrutable stage of the policy process". Additionally, despite the fact that literature on policy formulation has expanded significantly in the last three decades (Turnpenny, Jordan, Benson and Rayer, 2015, p. 6), Howlett, Perl and Ramesh (2009) express surprise over how little systemic thinking exists about policy formulation in their textbook on public policy. They add that most of insights are rather anecdotal and pedagogically suspect.

The rationality behind criticism of lack of systematic thinking can be found in several arguments, starting from the fact that at the beginning of the public policy field, the focus was more so on implementation rather than process formulation and improvement. This approach had powerful influence on the development of the discipline and the construction of the argument that policy formulation is less subject to theoretical examination and more appropriate for empirical considerations (Howlett et al., 2014). This argument further expounded from the perception that for the study of the policy formulation stage, one might need insights from other disciplines, such as sociology or anthropology, that traditionally have not been linked with public policy like disciplines of economics, public administration and law. The third reason why the policy formulation field of study is underdeveloped might be because it is quite intangible. While in agenda-setting, one is confronted with a problem to identify, in the implementation stage, there are clearly defined procedures and tools. Likewise, in the evaluation stage one can easily see the product, while in the policy formulation stage, the question of "how to solve the problem" stays undefined. Choosing between alternatives has its functional importance in the current times; however, in the past, theoretical constructs were not perceived as being as important as generating something concrete. All this background material has given me additional impetus to venture and start exploring policy formulation as a potential supplement to the governance approach in order to understand contemporary and post-socialist youth policy-making process and outcomes

In the methodology chapter of this dissertation, hypotheses were given and stipulated; one of them is that policy formulation is an adequate locus for assessing power, since it is a stage concerned with "generating options about what to do about a policy problem" (Howlett 2011, p. 29). Thus, in this stage, as the argument goes, actors that participate in policy formulation are choosing the most adequate solution to a policy problem, bearing in mind their potential role in the continuation of the policy process and the gains they may receive if a particular solution is selected. In this chapter,

the argument supporting this claim will be introduced and elaborated on. It is claimed that policy formulation, within the scope of governance understanding of the decision-making process, can be described in terms of *collaborative governance* - a framework that "brings public and private stakeholders together in collective forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision making" (Ansel and Gash, 2007, p. 543). In chapter 3, collaborative governance was mentioned only as one of the potential modes of understanding of the governance process. However, in this chapter, the concept will be further developed and contextualized within the policy formulation stage of the decision-making process. It will also be argued that by only using power as a dependent variable, collaborative governance (and consequently, policy formulation) can be adequately explained. If this is so, as I will argue, the use of the concept of power is essential in order to understand how policy actors participate and interact with one another. In other words, this chapter explores to what extent policy formulation in the governance setting is, in fact, power play.

Power, probably the most prevailing concept in political science in the 20th century, has experienced attentive decline at the end of the century, in conjunction with the upsurge of methodological horizontality and governance. The literature of political science, political sociology, public policy and international relations shifted its focus from top-down and vertical power-related approaches towards a horizontal, linear and equality-based approaches, placing a greater center of attention on consensus and agreement and lesser on the contentious aspects of decision-making. The same goes for the concept of power. Hewson and Sinclair (1999) and later Aarts and Leeuwis (2010) found that "power issues are neglected not only in literature […] but also in daily practices of interactive policymaking" (p. 132). In the light of those findings, the following chapter consists of two complementary sections.

The *first* section centers on policy formulation that takes into account previous notions of its analysis and which will be critically inspected within the context of the governance approach. Here, different approaches to the study of policy formulations are examined and contextualized for the particular topic of this dissertation. After the review of the most relevant features of policy formulation, a theory behind collaborative governance will be presented and explained in terms of its relevance to policy formulation. In the *second* section of this chapter, I will systematize two concepts of collaborative governance- policy formulation and power- into a coherent unit in an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of the argument behind the

first assumption stipulated in the methodology chapter. In other words, I propose a unique argument on policy formulation as a foundation for assessing power in order to further explore its ramifications on youth policy-making in Croatia.

6.1. Policy formulation: from an ugly duckling to beautiful swan

The policy process can roughly be divided into three meta-phases: pre-decision, implementation and post-decision. In the pre-decision phase, the main activity is to identify problems and arrange a suitable platform for the implementation and decision-making activities to come. In the post-decision phase (monitoring and evaluation), proxies are set up for the new policy and the effects and impact of that policy are further investigated. The policy formulation stage precedes the pre-decision stage of a policy process where, as Sidney argues, alternatives to address the problem are being identified and crafted and solutions narrowed (Sidney 2007). Michael Hill (2009) finely advances the difference between agenda setting and policy formulation as the two sides of the same coin, by explaining that the former stage is about *where* to go, while the latter is about *how* to get there (p. 171). It can be safely stated that policy formulation is a planning stage for solving problems in a policy process, which is crafted by assessing various options and solutions. Petak and Petek (2009, p. 59) claim that since "that phase includes the estimation of alternative options in the implementation of policy, therefore [it] is regarded as vital in the making of the policy itself". They further add that policy formulation is "the key phase in policy-making before the policy is legitimised" (ibid). Perhaps Hai Do's (2013) summary of the idea of policy formulation is the most thorough. He reminds us that the focus of policy formulation is embedded in the work on the subsystem, advocacy coalition, networks, and policy communities (Weible and Sabatier). The policy formulation process was taken up in the agenda-setting works by select researchers from 1995 to 1998 (Kingdon and Birkland); however, the policy formulation process is exclusively executed in the policy communities and policy networks (Howlett and Ramesh, 2002) (p. 3).

The present trend prevalent in the discussions on policy formulation is *policy design*. The genesis of this concept dates back to the mid 20thcentury, the era of rationality when potential causes of failure in implementation were explained in terms of failures in formulating effective policies. Howlett (2014) claims that the sole focus on the economic considerations of the implementation tools led to separation of formulation from implementation, which ignited "the origin of modern design studies"

(191). Paralleling the causal approach, in which implementation outcomes are seen as a direct consequence of formulating policies, policy design approach tries to perfect the policy-making process and influence decision-making overall. Even though the design approach did take into consideration the pre-decision stage of the policy process, it mainly prioritized implementation as a focal point, and embraced reductionism, disregarding external influences on the policy-making process and the role of policy actors. Nevertheless, researchers in the arena of policy design have embraced new insights of deliberation, political environment and policy tools and have continued to "hope to improve the process of designing policy alternatives. They propose that improving the search for, and generation of, policy alternatives will lead to more effective and successful policies" (Sidney, 2007, p. 80).

Today, work on policy design "aims to identify aspects of policy making contexts that shape policy design" (ibid). Papers on policy design usually rely on"institutional theories that suggest laws, constitutions, and the organization of the political process channel political behavior and choices. That is, institutions shape actors' preferences and strategies by recognizing the legitimacy of certain claims over others, and by offering particular sorts of opportunities for voicing complaints[…]" (Sideny, 2007, 81). Other work focuses on discourse and dominant ideas. Capano and Lipi (2005) argue that the current debate on policy design[38] "includes the policy mixes by which policy makers perceive and decide which instruments have to be selected. In the recent literature, the instruments seem to be addressed by an ongoing scientific propensity to examine the presumed emergence of 'new' tools in governing beside to the 'old' ones already embodied in former classifications" (4). However, policy design can be thought of as an ideal-type, as M. Howlett argues (2014, p. 193), and before we address this issue and offer a potential solution, it is necessary to take a closer look at the mere nature of policy formulation. This further investigation of policy formulation

[38] For better insight into the concept of policy design and the change in perception of policy design, review the paper, *From 'Old' to the 'New' Policy Design; Design Thinking beyond Markets and Collaborative Governance* by Michael Howlett. In this paper, Howlett (2014) argues that "both globalization and governance studies of the period ignored traditional design concerns in arguing that changes at this level predetermined policy specifications and promoted the use of market and collaborative governance (network) instruments. However, more recent work re-asserting the role of governments both at the international and domestic levels has revitalized design studies" (p. 187). Hence, Howlett claims that the "traditional ways of thinking about policy instruments and policy design are useful but out of date" and that "The real challenge for a new generation of design studies is to develop greater conceptual clarity and the methodological sophistication needed in order to sift through the complexity of new policy regimes, policy mixes, alternative instruments for governance, and changing governance networks and link these to a deeper theory of design" (p. 199-200).

uncovers features inherent to this specific stage, namely policy tools or options, participants, and their models of influence. A new policy design school of thought takes into consideration governance shift in policy-making; however, it lacks "methodological sophistication and conceptual clarity" (Howlett, 2014, 1999). Additionally, the context in which policy tools are being used should be better explained, particularly in regards to influence and/or power in order to grasp complexity of contemporary policy-making.

In the upcoming section, I will explore all three features of policy formulation in order to arrive at a comprehensive insight of this stage of the public policy process and to pave the groundwork for the discussions on power conceptualization in the section to come.

6.1.1. Policy tools options

In their explanation of policy formulation, Corchan and Malone (1999) claim that this stage can be summarized with a simple question- "what is the plan?" (p. 46). In order to achieve the best possible solution for a policy problem, we need to assess and evaluate different options for solving this problem. Various actors involved in this stage, based on their interest and specializations, might have different ideas of the best ways to achieving policy objectives. Thus, policy formulation is a "critical phase", claimed by Sidney (2007). Here, pathways and the destiny of the whole policy process are being determined, which has wide implications not only on the policy process, but on the part of society to which this public policy is directed. Wildawsky, a key public policy investigator, argues that policy formulation is about the understanding of the relationship between "manipulable means and obtainable objectives", which is inevitably "the very essence of public policy analysis." (1987, p. 15)

The policy formulation stage of the policy process is, in fact, a decision-making arena where various options on how to solve a concrete problem are presented, assessed and contextualized. In their description of the policy design, Kraft and Furlong (2007, 98) argue that there are five successive steps in their description of the policy design: (1) the definition and analysis of the problem; (2) the generation of alternatives related to a policy problem; (3) the development of the criteria for future policy evaluation; (4) the estimation of alternative solutions; and (5) a decision about what policy option is the most effective solution to the problem the political community faces. This ideal type of a categorization might serve as a viable starting point, but it disregards several points

which are central to this dissertation. Foremost, the fifth step of Kraft and Furlong's description is impaired by reductionism, which is, as the argument goes, inherent to most authors who write on policy formulation, given that it disregards the characteristics of agency. In other words,, in order to understand what is actually happening in policy formulation, it is necessary to take into account the interests and tendencies of actors engaged in the process. Even though those interests are oftentimes complementary to the needs of the political community, they can also the interests can be jeopardized by different restrictions, particularities or short-sightedness of involved parties. It is therefore reductionist to observe policy formulation exclusively as an arena for solving community needs and problems. That being the case, it is necessary to examine the distinct participants within the policy formulation stage, their role in the contemporary policy-making process and how these attributes lead to behavioural outcomes.

6.1.2. Participants, models of influence and formulation tools

In the prevailing literature on policy formulation, it is not rare to refer to the concept of 'policy advisory system' (Banfield, 1980; Jann, 1991; Craft and Howlett, 2012). Policy advisory system literature focuses on the "nature and kind of advice provided by decision-makers and see them as originating from a system of interacting elements" (Craft and Howlett, 2009, 79). Within this scope of subject-matter, little is known about the non-institutional actors of policy advisory systems (Hird, 2005), since most scholars focus on the knowledge utilization in government (Dunn, 2004; Peters and Barker 1993, Hoppe and Jeliazkova, 2006). However, as Craft and Howlett write, "it is [still] not clear in any given situation which actors are likely to exercise more influence and prevail over others in a formulation process" (2012, p. 81). They continue that the "understanding of the structure and functioning of policy advice systems" as well as "detailed specification of the nature of their interactions in terms of amount of influence" is required (ibid). In my perspective, in addition to the requirements expressed by Craft and Howlett, it is important to first define that influence, then to distinguish power from the influence and finally to increase the number of empirical findings in various policy fields that would shed more light on the position and constellation of policy actors in the policy formulation process. One of the main questions in the context of policy formulation is, "who are the policy formulators?" Sidney (Sidney 2007, 79) compares agenda-setting and policy formulation and argues

that “we expect fewer participants to be involved in policy formulation than were involved in the agenda-setting process, and we expect more of the work to take place out of the public eye.” Given the assertion that there are fewer actors in policy formulation and the process is more private, it highlights the importance of actors in this stage and begs the question of how this opportunistic context motivates actors’ agenda, and in turn, policy formulation outcomes.

In policy literature, there are two prevailing schools of thought. The first, *the location-based model*, emphasizes the position of actors and whether they are inside or outside the government, where a key determinant of influence is proximity to decision-makers. Within this model, there are three sets of actors, ‘proximate decision-makers’, ‘knowledge producers’ and ‘knowledge brokers’. The proximate decision-makers refers to consumers of policy analysis and advice – those with the actual authority to make policy decisions. As Craft and Howlett argue (2012, p. 82), knowledge producers are “located in academia, statistical agencies and research institutes who provide basic scientific, economic and social data upon which analyses are often based and decisions made”. The knowledge brokers are a category of actors who serve as “intermediaries between the knowledge generators and proximate decision-makers, repackaging data and information into usable form” (ibid). Verschuere (2009), Lindvall (2009) and Craft and Howlett (2012) claim that knowledge brokers play a key role in the formulation process, since they can translate distant research results into usable forms of knowledge to be consumed by proximate decision-makers.

Indeed, this knowledge broker categorization of actors, even though it serves a useful emphasis, has a few core limitations. The first one is that it cannot be applied to all policy areas, because knowledge is not always the most important independent variable when it comes to participant selection. For instance, whereas in social policies the number of actors involved is higher, although there are some groups which cannot be accounted for in this category (such as persons with disabilities that are often involved in the policy formulation process not necessarily due to their knowledge, but as citizens with specific interests), policies emerging from the traditional state departments like foreign policy or defence policy (Compston, 2009) are often restricted to wider public participation. The government here may or may not choose to grant a higher degree of freedom to other policy actors with regards to the goals to be pursued and the means to be employed (Howlett, 2014, p. 190). Even if public participation is granted, agencies such as the national security agency, often use these knowledge

facilitation occasions as a means to solicit advice or as opportunities for indoctrination into their official point of view (Rouke 1984, p. 54). Secondly, the location-based model neglects to take into account "how and to what degree governments were able to control actors located internally or externally to government who provided them counsel" (Craft and Howlett 2012, 82). In other words, the extent to which decision-makers can "expect proffered advice to be more or less congruent with government aims and ambitions" (ibid) might be as equally important as the geographical location, if not more. In plain English, content matters as well. The importance of content in policy formulation that goes beyond just the notion of location was elaborated by Halligan (1995), who claimed that the "dimension of 'government control' should be introduced in the analysis of policy formulation". He started observing policy advice less as an exercise in knowledge utilization, and more as a specific part of the larger policy process. This interpretation gave more importance to external actors located outside of polity borders.

It has long been known that, ever since Wildavsky coined the phrase 'speaking truth to power' that this power was a manifestation of the state, and therefore, policy analysts were to present their insights, knowledge, opinions and understandings to the state. However, as seen in chapter 3, with the insurgence of the governance paradigm, the policy-making process has changed to become more fluid, polycentric and open to multiple actors (see table 6.1 for conceptualization of the two aforementioned approaches). With the increased presence of multiple actors in the process of policy-making, the role of governmental officials has become more coordinative. Hence, political power is now dispersed, where government steers but no one knows who exactly rows policy analysis. So, how does this new constellation of actors interfere with the mere process of policy-making?

Table 6.1: Two idealized models of policy advising

Elements	Speaking truth to power of ministers	Sharing truths with multiple actors of influence
Focus of policy-making	Departmental hierarchy and vertical portfolios	Interdepartmental and horizontal management of issues with external networks and policy communities
Background of senior career officials	Knowledgeable executives with policy sector expertise and history	Generalist managers with expertise in decision processes and systems
Locus of policy processes	Relatively self-contained within government, supplemented with advisory councils and royal commissions	Open to outside groups, research institutes, think tanks, consultants, pollsters and virtual centers
Minister/deputy minister relations	Strong partnership in preparing proposals with ministers, trusting and taking policy advice largely from officials	Shared partnership with ministers drawing ideas from officials, aides, consultants, lobbyists, think tanks, media
Nature of policy advice	Candid and confident advice to ministers given in a neutral and detached manner Neutral Competence	Relatively more guarded advice given to ministers by officials in a more compliant or pre-ordained fashion Responsive competence
Public profile of officials	Generally anonymous	More visible to groups, parliamentarians and media
Roles of officials in policy processes	Confidential advisors inside government and neutral observers outside government Offering guidance to government decision-makers	Active participants in policy discussions inside and outside government Managing policy networks and perhaps building capacity of client groups

Source: Craft and Howlett (2012, 86); adapted from Prince (2007, p. 179)

In the light of the described changes, and in line with Eichbaum and Shaw's notion of distinguishing substantive and procedural advice[39] (2008), Connaughton (2010, p. 351) had developed a set of role perception distinctions. She claims that there are four general advisory roles within policy formulation/implementation – *Expert, Partisan, Coordinator,* and *Minder*. She believes that policy actors can be categorized based on

[39] *Substantial* (substantive?) advice is characterized by short-term crises and fire-fighting advice and evidence-based policy-making (political parties, parliaments, interest groups, pollsters, deputy ministers, judicial bodies, agencies, boards, international organizations) while *procedural* advice is pure political and policy process consultation as well as medium to long-term steering advice (political peers, executive office, political staff, external crisis managers, community organizations, lobbyists, media, think tanks, academic advisors and blue ribbon panels. (Craft and Howeltt 2012, p. 91)

the criteria of *communication* (a two-dimensional concept which varies from technical/managerial to political in nature) and *policy formulation/implementation* dimension (whose purpose ranges from policy advice to policy steering). Her classification looks like this,

Experts = technical/management + policy advisors

Partisan = political + policy advisors

Coordinator = technical/management + steering facilitators

Minder = political + steering facilitators

In their analysis of this model, Craft and Howlett (2012, p. 89) write:

> While these distinctions re-invent some aspects of discredited politics vs. administration dichotomies, her analysis of the activities of these different actors is based, significantly, not upon whether advice was partisan or administrative, but rather whether it involved substantive on-the-ground policy formulation/implementation activities – ranging from ‘‘policy advice’’ to ‘‘policy steering’’ – or more procedural ‘‘communications’’ functions, which could be ‘‘technical/managerial’’ or ‘‘political’’ in nature.

Craft and Howlett point out that the Connaughton model has limitations because, even though it distinguishes between content in terms of substance and process, it fails to provide mutually exclusive differentiation of two concepts. The authors further illustrate their criticism by claiming that “substantive advisory activity that falls in the ‘expert’ category could simultaneously be ‘partisan’ or procedural types of policy advisory ‘roles’ such as ‘coordinator’ could arguably be both expert and partisan in nature, for example.” (ibid, p. 90)

The points often overlooked in the analyses of policy formulation are mechanisms or techniques policy actors use in their attempts to achieve policy goals. Policy tools and instruments exist in all stages of the policy process; however, the most visible are instruments for implementation such as regulations, subsidies, taxes or voluntary agreements (Hood, 1983). Howlett (2000) argues that a second category of implementation instruments has recently been identified, and he calls them procedural tools. These include education, training, provision of information and public hearings. The common denominator of these instruments is that they seek to affect outcomes indirectly throughout the policy process. Together with these two categories of policy tools, there is a third kind that. Radin (2013) and Turnpenny Jordan, Benson and Rayer (2015, p. 3) conceptualize as so-called analytical tools, or tools which have largely remained outside of the mainstream policy research. These analytical tools became

known under the name ‘policy formulation tools’, since their task is “the collection of as much information and data as were available to help decision-makers address the substantive aspects of the problem at hand” (Radin, 2013, p. 23).

In 2015, Turnpenny, Jordan, Benson and Rayer edited a book entitled *The Tools of Policy Formulation,* which analyses various approaches to utilizing policy formulation tools and explains the most common ones. In it, they argue that in contemporary policy-making, policy tools have become more important due to complexity of governance perspectives. In the preface, they list the most important policy tools and state the following Turnpenny, Jordan, Benson and Rayer (2015, p. xiv):

> This book includes tools for forecasting and exploring the future (for example, scenarios), tools for identifying and recommending policy options (for example, cost–benefit, cost-effectiveness and multi-criteria analysis) and tools for exploring different problem conceptions and frames (for example, participatory brainstorming). These tools have typically been developed to perform a different set of tasks, namely collecting, condensing and interpreting different kinds of policy relevant knowledge.

In the last two decades, one major concept emerged within the policy discourse which explains the behaviour of policy actors. Precisely, it is the concept of *policy appraisal* that builds on the three relevant aspects of contemporary public policy-making, namely *governance*, *administrative capacity* and *effectiveness.* It also contributes to understanding the concepts of *theoretical presumptions* and *legitimacy standards*, apparently neutral elements embedded in public policy (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007). Focusing further on policy appraisal, we can get better insight on the shifts taking place in governance, and gain more understanding of the capacities present within public administration for effective policy implementation. Policy appraisal can likewise place g emphasis on legitimacy, accountability and justification of public action (Turnpenny, Radaelli, Jordan and Jacob 2009, p. 641). However, what is policy appraisal really? According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “policy appraisal is a systematic way of bringing evidence to bear on alternative policy options, weighing up costs, benefits, their distribution between different parties and over time, uncertainties and risks, as a way of assisting the development of policy” (2008, p. 3). The idea behind policy appraisal is to make the most effective use of the evidence that is available, assessing areas of ignorance and uncertainty and devising strategies for handling these uncertainties (ibid).

Contemporary policy science, at least the part that deals with policy formulation, should expand its interest and focus and go beyond sole description of actors' relationships and dynamics. Not only is it that policy had changed in its structure and function over time, but that actors had started using tools and techniques deriving from power and influence in a different manner, resulting in new outcomes to be studied by policy scientists. As Sidney (2007, p. 80) points out, when writing on changes occurring within policy science, "research considers particular policy tools and trends in their use, as well as their underlying assumptions about problems and groups. As scholars answer such questions, they consider the array of interests involved and the balance of power held by participants, the dominant ideas and values of these participants, the institutional structure of the alternative-setting process, more broadly the historical, political, social, and economic context." In other words, it should be taken into account that "during the formulation stage, policy analysts will typically have to confront trade-offs between legitimate public demands for action, and the political, technical and financial capabilities to address them" (Turnpenny, Jordan, Benson and Rayer 2015, p. 6). In policy literature, texts on policy formulation focus on factors that influence how actors craft alternatives; however, very little has been written on the operational mechanisms that actors exercise in an attempt to achieve their goals. This assertion is further supported by the following claim by Turnpenny, Jordan, Benson and Rayer (2015, p. 20): "the tools literature has often lacked a sense of human agency and, as noted above, the policy formulation literature tended to ignore the tools being used." All of these findings lead us to the conclusion that policy formulation is about power (Schattschneider 1960), its manifestation and its ability to influence others. As Schattschneider reminds us: "...the definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power" (1960, p. 68).

6.2. Policy formulation as a locus for assessing power

In the previous chapter, a matrix for assessing power has been presented. In order for the matrix to be applicable in variety of situations, the general assumption is that power is determined contextually. I argued that due to the complexity of the phenomenon, one could hardly offer a general definition that is plausible and universally applicable in its operationalization. In order to contextualize power in the contemporary understanding of the policy process where arguments, understanding and meaning play an important role, I proposed a model that predominantly focuses on

perception of influence. As the argument goes, if a power is dependent on a certain situation and a given context, it can only be explored within those limits; therefore, only the actors involved are relevant in assessing it. In other words, from my perspective, power is not an inherent characteristic of someone; one's power l depends on the perception of others. In the light of that and in order to assess someone's power, we must not disregard mutual relationships and actor dynamics, because only this interplay of attributes, motivations and interests can offer us plausible conceptualization of what constitutes power and how it evolves and is utilized.

In several occasions so far, features of collaborative governance have been mentioned; the most prominent being direct involvement of policy actors, meaningful participation, an enabling environment for substantial deliberation and orientation towards consensus. Collaborative governance, a trendy concept in various policy texts, places greater focus on cooperation between different policy actors and the diverse aspects of their behaviour within the context of decision-making. In the next few paragraphs, I will explain why policy formulation is exactly the best stage for assessing power by placing forth the argument that policy formulation is, in fact, a collaborative governance proxy.

Literature review on policy formulation demonstrates that it is a platform where various stakeholders gather to decide on the most appropriate solution for a concrete societal or political problem. Hence, policy formulation is the important stage of the policy-making process where institutional and non-institutional actors meet. In policy formulation, these actors are gathered to create a specific public policy, contributing their respective experience, insight on a certain problem, knowledge and capacity to design a public policy initiative. Whether it's within the government or the state, an actor who has the authority to invite other actors and to build a policy arena always desires to collaborate with the most competent and useful actors in order to collectively produce an effective public policy, which would adequately tackle an existing problem in society.

Policy formulation as such is designed to make an inventory of potential policy solutions and to evaluate on the appropriateness of each. In other words, policy actors in the policy formulation stage propose solutions and jointly assess the positive and negative aspects of each in order to propel the most promising into consequent policy stages. However, what interests us mostly is how they do it. I argue that policy actors often have different views on certain policy areas, and therefore, different objectives in

regards to a policy problem. This would mean that policy actors employ different means and techniques (as presented in the previous section) to persuade other actors why their idea is sounder. If the assumption is that all involved actors want to solve a specific problem for the benefit of society, it is safe to assume that argumentation would be a strong factor influencing the decision. However, my understanding is slightly different. I argue that the perception of actors is even more important, because having financial resources, ability to argue effectively, information and knowledge (the four features that form my understanding of actor resources) is insufficient without taking into consideration the meaning other actors attach to the involved participants.

Most recent research shows that policy formulation is (Turnpenny, Jordan, Benson and Rayer, 2015) a crucial stage in the policy process. This is precisely where the most relevant decisions are made that will later influence how concrete policy problems are solved. If policy formulations are set up in a way to respect the principles of inclusiveness, expertise and participation, it generates collaborative governance at its finest. As it is demonstrated in chapter 3, collaborative governance is, in fact, imagined as a part of mutual cooperation of actors whose aim is to achieve consensus. However, the matter of particular objectives and interests always arises, and actors do not want to miss out on a chance to influence the decision-making process. In the later stages of the policy process (monitoring and evaluation), actors may play a role, but the rules of the game are more complex. Policy has already been designed specifically so that actors could implement or evaluate it. I argue that policy formulation is indeed the most suitable stage of the policy cycle to evaluate actors' interests and how they influence policy outcomes. Therefore, taking into consideration all that has been said about collaborative governance, I believe that policy formulation is the best locus for assessing power of actors.

Certainly, the aforementioned statement is true only in a state and policy regime that operates under the principle of collaborative governance. Only then, the matrix presented in the previous chapter could be applied as a tool for actor analysis.

6.3. Final remarks

Collaborative governance, just like policy formulation, has become a subject of interest among public policy researchers across the world. Those two concepts, which share a main characteristic of cooperation among various actors, are not sufficiently explored. In this chapter, I will present the main features of policy formulation, stating

its characteristics, various approaches towards its study and controversies researchers are facing when examining this stage of the public policy process. Policy formulation is a stage in the policy process where that which is relevant is separated from that which is irrelevant; therefore, it is a critical stage in the decision-making process. Actors involved in the process of policy formulation, as seen in the prior exploration of actors' strategies, use means they have at their disposal and try to present their point of view in the best way possible. Due to this, the policy formulation stage is important for the purposes of study, since it is the last place where objectives of actors may be implemented into the design of a public policy. I argue that policy formulation is the preeminent way to study power dynamics of actors, since it is defined by certain rules. Indeed, it is a platform for actors' interplay and formulation of power structures.

It is particularly important to take a closer look at the process of policy formulation through the perspective of process-oriented goals (Dente, 2014). In other words, I demonstrated that in the policy formulation process, if we accept the notion of power as was described earlier, it is more important (or at least equally as important) as the relationship between policy actors. Despite the fact that actors wish to solve certain problems, they also want to influence the decision-making process by imposing their ideas in order to serve their motivations and achieve their objectives as much as possible. Due to this propensity for actors to engage in self-serving behaviour, policy formulation offers exactly the stage where this can happen. The government usually wishes to hear various perspectives in order to solve a certain policy problem, and non-state actors will use this opportunity to deliberate and propose their ideas as viable solutions. Only the policy formulation stage, with its particular characteristics (a place for deliberation, collaboration and achievement of consensus), offers a safe platform for state and non-state actors to work together towards a common purpose. As demonstrated in this chapter, the policy advice approach, which has been comprehensively expounded in the literature is inadequate for the contemporary understanding of policy-making. Plenty of concepts and *modi operandi* related to policy formulation do not observe this stage from the point of view of interpretative policy analysis. Instead, I offer an interpretation in which the power of policy debate is adequate enough to be taken into consideration when one studies policy formulation patterns. Policy formulation, from my own perspective, thus becomes a podium where actors wish to present themselves and their ideas in a best possible manner for the purpose of solving policy problems and assuring benefits for themselves. Taking into

account the conceptualization of power elaborated on in chapter 5, policy formulation becomes a power arena of attributes, values and agendas

In the light of this, the next part of this dissertation will present a case study of a Croatian youth policy. I intend to test notions stipulated in the first six chapters by looking at the process of youth policy-making in the Croatian national context. This empirical part of dissertation will offer richer understanding of the contemporary decision-making process and support or undermine theoretical propositions I have offered so far.

THE EMPIRICAL PART

The empirical part of the dissertation is divided into three chapters. The first, chapter, is a conceptualization of youth policy in Croatia. As youth policy in Croatia has not yet been adequately explored, by policy researchers, sociologists, political scientists, it was important to begin with a systematic examination of the policy, polity and politics of this specific field in details, in order to undertake the real policy analysis. Without understanding key actors and institutions in this policy field it would be impossible to comprehend the more complex power relations present in the policy formulation arena. Hence, following the logic of the theoretical part, the last two chapters focus on two theoretical aspects presented earlier – policy formulation (chapter 8) and power (Chapter 9). Thus, chapter 7, which is relatively broad, is followed by the chapter where two units of analysis are presented and analyzed in regard to the theoretical framework. Therefore, the two processes in Chapter 8 – the making of the National youth program and the Youth Act making – are densely described and put in the context of policy formulation. The chapter uses content, actors' perception and process, three analytical categories, to dissect policy processes and to offer a plausible explanation of the policy formulation in the youth decision-making sphere. The last chapter of this dissertation focuses on power as an essential variable in this study. By comparing two processes and applying the power matrix presented in the previous text, this chapter links research questions and hypotheses and finally answers the query of who in fact has the power in the youth policy-making in Croatia.

Chapter 7

YOUTH POLICY IN CROATIA

The duty of youth is to challenge corruption.

- Kurt Cobain

Although quoting Kurt Cobain in a doctoral dissertation on public policy might seem a bit odd, his saying is quite in line with the argument of prominent researchers in the youth policy field. For example, Garrido and Requena (1996) claim that the role of young people is to be creative, vanguard and unconventional. They argue that young people cease being young once they are fully integrated into society. Thus, their social role is to be a questioning and a corrective agent- a powerful catalyst for democratic and social change. However, in order for young people to exercise their transformative ideas and express their originality, in a contemporary understanding of the democratic system, they have to have support. This is where the role of youth policy comes into play. Its main objective, as it will be argued and elaborated in this chapter, is to create an enabling environment both for the individual and for the overall social development of young people, which is mediated by the imperative of supporting youth rights and inclusion of youth in the decision-making processes that (in)directly impact their lives.

Chapter 7 consists of three sections[40]. In the *first* section, an overview of youth policy theory is presented and evaluated. By introducing contemporary scholars within the fields of sociology and political science of youth, as well and their views on youth issues, the chapter will examine the contemporary views shaping youth policy. This overview will be accompanied by the evaluation of the realities of the Croatian youth policy and polity and finish with the discussion on the institutional architecture of this field of social policy.

In 2011, during the general elections in Croatia, the political coalition *Kukuriku - Alliance for Change* won and for the first time in Croatian history, the country had elected a ministry that contained the word "youth" in its name. By merging social policy with youth issues, the stakeholders of youth policy in Croatia (youth civil society

[40] This chapter mainly follows the structure of the authors' text named *Politika za mlade u Hrvatskoj – anatomija jedne javne politike,* which was published in the book *Demokratski potencijali mladih u Hrvatskoj* (Ilisin et al, 2015, p. 269-299) as one of the conditions stipulated in the bylaws of the doctoral program the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.

activists and the academic community) have carefully but favorably greeted this symbolic move. They were under the impression that young people in Croatia would finally get the attention they deserve. For the first time, there was an opportunity to consolidate the youth sector, which was merely a branch of other ministerial sectors of education, veterans and family issues, social policy and public administration. Since these changes took place in 2010, the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth[41] managed to pass several important decisions, normative acts and laws that have defined the youth sector policy significantly[42]. Although not all of the decisions of the Ministry were commended by stakeholders, leading to the blocking of some decisions by certain non-state actors, it is safe to say that today, the Croatian youth policy has clear objectives.

The political reality in Croatia demonstrates the differentiation of particular players and concepts in the decision-making process, such as – institutions, actors, power, political context and decisions. There are very few publications in the realm of public policy in Croatia that do not begin by differentiating between policy, politics and polity. Those three terms, although uncharacteristic for the political science tradition of the South East European (SEE) region, have become inseparable concepts in the analyses of political processes, because their meanings are fundamental to the understanding of the role of public policy. While polity refers to the political environment where decisions are being made, the concept of politics has a relational function, in that it is related to actors and the impact of their interaction on the decision-making process. The third term, and the most important for this analysis, is *policy*. It is one of the most complex concepts to define since it is one of the most broadly used and can be interpreted in more than 30 different ways (Hogwood and Gun, 1983).

The essence of youth policy is the support and nurture of the personal development of young people with the focus on the promotion of widely accepted social norms, active participation in society and politics and social inclusion of socioeconomically deprived youth groups. This type of a compartmentalized framework of public policy has its advantages, but also applicable disadvantages. The positive aspects of this approach are that it is possible to take a closer analysis and a

[41] Even though today's name of the ministry in charge of youth is the Ministry for Demography, Family, Youth and Social Policy (changed in October 2016), in the timespan covered by this dissertation the aforementioned Ministry was called Ministry of Social Policy and Youth thus the former name will be used in order to contribute the authenticity of the historical moment.

[42] Since 2011, two governments changed, however «youth» in the name of ministry remained. At the time of writing this dissertation (December 2016) the ministry in charge of youth policy is called the Ministry for Demography, family, youth and social policy.

more detailed look at the policy area, which results in more adequate and quality policies for young people. Additionally, cooperation between large numbers of policy actors that is characteristic of eclectic social policies like the youth policy often produces creative and more sustainable policy recommendations. On the other hand, there is a danger of the dispersion of responsibility among various state subsidiaries and this, as a result, makes funding difficult given the complexity of the factors that make up the policy. Lastly, concepts used in eclectic policy areas, such as "participation", "inclusion", "development", lack applicable and operative functionality and, are often relegated to rhetoric rather than sound policy objectives.

In Croatia, youth policy directly impacts approximately 18% of the population, and according to the National Youth Program and the Act on Youth Advisory Boards young people are defined as a cohort between the ages of 15 and 30. This population is diverse in its social and political values, its professional and educational aspirations, and its social opportunities (Ilisin et al. 2013). Due to such a wide-ranging influence, functional outcomes within the youth policy framework are necessary, so that they would impact those who really need them. In general, the Croatian youth policy can be described as a contemporary policy, which is characterized by responsiveness and inclusivity as it aims to create an enabling environment for its target population. Hence, due to the adequate level of related issues that intersect, the participation of various social groups in its creation, its focus on the evidence-based approach, as well as the choice of issues it covers, it is evident that the Croatian youth policy is complementary to the EU practice (Kovacic 2015). However, there are still numerous problems within the Croatian framework that are perpetually being ignored, and which, as a result, is leading to poorer outcomes of the Croatian youth policy. In order to understand the impact of all the actors and their relation to the structural characteristics and the nature of youth policy in Croatia, it is necessary to present the overall theoretical conceptualization of youth policy and to place it in the policy context.

7.2. What is Youth Policy?

In Chapter 3, some basic provisions of public policy theory had been presented. Ana Petak (2012), in her text on public policies in Croatia, argues that the scope of social policies in Croatia includes policies on health, social well-being, pension, education, housing, women, national minorities and family. Looking at this typology and taking into consideration the objectives of social policies, a conclusion can be

drawn. Social policies are prescriptions for desired outcomes that are aimed towards specific social groups and which allocate social resources in order to foster integration or welfare of these specific groups. Although youth policy does not exist as a part of the Croatian social policies infrastructure, today it deserves to find its place in that cluster. Youth policy, as it will be argued and demonstrated in the next several paragraphs, is a constituent part of many social policies and is, both in Croatia and elsewhere, growing into a relevant and recognized policy area on its own terms[43].

When discussing "youth" as a term, one often overlooks its complexity by understanding it merely as a demographic category. The term "youth" is an extremely socially and politically loaded term (Reiter 2008, 19), and the way we conceptualize and approach it can have long-term consequences not only for youth as a social subgroup but also for the society as a whole. There are numerous texts written on youth and policy issues (Davies et. al. 2009; Youniss and Levine 2009; Dalton 2011; Marzana et. al. 2012; Persson 2012; Sloam 2012), but there are very few publications directed precisely at youth policy. There is still a deficit of research with sound policy methodology that can analyze youth policy and approach it as a distinct public policy area of interest.

Most publications that bring up aspects of youth policy discuss issues such as the political participation of youth (Bessant, 2004; Forbig, 2005; Checkoway and Gutierrez, 2006; Checkoway, 2010), social inclusion of young people (Cartmel et al. 2003; Barry, 2004; Weil et al,. 2005; MacDonald and Shildrick, 2007), volunteering (Jones, 2005; Haski-Leventhal et al., 2008; Marta and Pozzi, 2008), youth culture (Amit-Talai and Wul, 1995), youth health (Perry et al., 1985), employment (Gregg, 2001; Neumark and Wascher, 2004; Breen, 2005), youth informing practices (Chelton and Cool, 2007) and other related topics. Howard Williamson (2002) formulated the concept of "5 C's" as a tool for youth policy interpretation (and potentially assessment). He argues that with the help of the simple analysis, one can get an overview of a specific youth policy. Namely, the five C's or components of youth policy are, *coverage*, a notion linked to service provision and the key challenge of accessibility; it is concerned with a number of quite different issues, policy issues, social groups and geographical

[43] The importance of youth policy is certainly exemplified by the example of the new Canadian prime-minister Justin Trudeau, who appointed himself as a minister of youth in his government (Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and Youth), and by that act, he sent a powerful message that youth policy is a policy field of great importance.

reach. *Capacity* is linked to questions concerning political will (and political stability), legislative requirements and effective structures for delivery. *Competence* addresses the practice of delivery and questions of professionalism. *Co-ordination* relates to the ways in which, both vertically and horizontally, youth policy activity produces coherence and complementarities. And, self-evidently, the human and national resources available (*cost*) have a huge impact on the likelihood of policy aspirations being converted into effective practice for the young people towards whom they are directed (p. 7-8).

In order to understand the essence of youth policy, there are certain characteristics worth pointing out[44]. From the policy perspective, youth policy is indeed an *eclectic* policy field, which is one of its most important characteristics. It does not only encompass decisions that are directly aimed towards young people, but it also considers policy initiatives of other policy areas that influence young people (Williamson, 2012, p. 15). Contemporary European youth policy has been mostly stipulated in the EU Youth Strategy (2010-2018). In this strategic paper, there are eight areas that comprise youth policy: participation, volunteering, social inclusion, education and training, health and well-being, culture and creativity, employment and entrepreneurship and youth in the world. From this list, it is evident that youth policy is relatively hard to codify because it deals with a number of areas that do not fit the status quo of the mainstream state/ministerial policy work. The other characteristic of youth policy is that it spans many sectors and actors. Youth policy is a par excellence policy field that is of interest and responsibility to a plethora of state and non-state actors. As it was pointed out earlier, on the one hand, responsiveness and adequacy in generating policy outcomes flourish in this type of a wide framework, because it allows for the appropriation of various actors. On the other hand, dispersion of responsibilities among actors can create a complex infrastructure that could become a smouldering and persistent problem. For that reason only, it is important to assure an effective system of policy coordination.

The way to assure effective youth policy outcomes is to establish a public administration body that would be entrusted with the task of coordinating youth policies. Such an institution can take the form of a ministry, a government's office or agency, or it can be an inter-sectorial body in charge of monitoring youth policy. This type of an

[44] Characteristics of youth policy have been adopted from the text written by F. Y. Denstad's *Youth Policy Manual, How to Develop a National youth program* (2009).

institutional model is presented in Schizzerrotto and Gasperoni's (2001) analysis of youth policy types in Europe, where they argue that variations in youth policies can be detected on the grounds of institutional design. In other words, there are countries in Europe that have clearly defined institutions with jurisdiction over youth exclusively, while other countries link youth policy with other policy areas (for instance, education), and yet a number of countries have no official body in charge of youth policy. Furthermore, research has shown that there is a positive correlation between the level of consolidation of the youth sector and the effectiveness of youth policy outcomes (Kovacic 2015). Furthermore, heterogeneity of youth policy is a direct consequence of the heterogeneity of young people as a population. Young people differentiate based on various criteria, such as whether they live in a rural or an urban area, their education levels, their employment status, their role in society, their social class affiliation, their political values, their family status, etc. Indeed, the heterogeneity factor is one of the biggest challenges of formulating an effective youth policy. In order for a youth policy to ensure an enabling environment for the successful integration of youth into society, it has to be oriented towards the whole population of youth, while taking into consideration all the above-mentioned differences. It is easy to assume that it is not possible to encompass the entire youth population of a certain country with measures and objectives of a single public policy, however, the craft of policy-making is to find that appropriate middle-ground that benefits the majority of the population.

Policies of that complexity have to be transparent and be agreed upon by all the policy stakeholders. One severe fallacy in youth policy-making is to ignore the voice of the youth. This is why undertaking the consultative approach with the respective constituents and formulating an assessment of the needs of communities are two essential imperatives in the realm of youth policy. Closely related to this is the evidence-based approach. Youth policy should be based on empirical insights of young people and their experiences, just as any other specific policy should take into consideration the opinions and needs of their target groups. Apart from the research perspective, an evidence-based approach in youth policy utilizes direct practical-experimental insight. In other words, in order to ensure the efficiency of youth policy outcomes and their maximum applicability, it is essential to take into account a rigorous methodological needs assessment of the target population and practical insight from youth practitioners and young people.

The other approach towards quality assurance in youth policy is to link all levels of influence. This means that it is necessary to have a two-way communication channel between the local, regional, national and European (and even international) constituents in order for the outputs of youth policy to be oriented toward the needs of young people at an existing level. Subsidiarity, one of the founding principles of the EU, gives jurisdiction to the authorities of lower administrative-political levels for resolving problems within their administrative capacities. Translated into youth policy language, this means that some objectives of youth policies, such as the organization of leisure time, can be more successfully organized and achieved at the local level rather than the national level. In addition, a national youth policy, apart from the imperative of coherence with local levels' competencies, should be in line with the normative acts, recommendations and guidelines of the European youth policy. Only the complementarity of outcomes and methodology for the study of youth policy can enable the exchange of best practices and learning from failures between countries in the process of youth policy-making.

Youth policy, began to flourish as a concept in policy documents in the 1990s. V. Ilisin (2003, 42), in her text on the political participation of youth as a focal point of youth policy, argues that the foundations of European youth policy were set in 1970 when the first European Youth Center was opened and continued with the establishment of the European Youth Forum in 1979. This claim is in line with Denstad's claim that the students' protest in 1969, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist attack on the US in 2001 have had a great impact on the Council of Europe's approach to youth issues (2009, p. 22). Despite the Council of Europe's recognition of the importance of youth policy, concrete steps towards creating a relevant agreement as a part of the EU agenda only occurred in 1993 with the Maastricht Agreement, which stipulated in its article 126 the EU's dedication to the development of young people's welfare and their preparation for adulthood and the labor market. With the ratification of the Maastricht Agreement, as Coles (2005) explains, it became evident that the EU youth policy was to be an extension of a greater social policy termed as an "agenda of change for the 21st century" (p. 100). In light of these developments, it can be said that there are two corresponding youth policy approaches in Europe, one by the EU and the other by the Council of Europe.

Comparatively, the EU has a more traditional approach to youth policy-making in order to achieve two objectives,

- To provide greater and equal opportunities for young people in education and the job market; and
- To encourage young people to actively participate in society (EU youth strategy).

In order to achieve the abovementioned objectives, the open method of coordination is being used. Within the OMC framework, the so-called structured dialogue with young people[45] has evolved as the most prominent technique for youth policy creation. Apart from this main pillar of policy creation, other features of youth policies include its youth programs for which the EU allocates a substantial amount of funds in order to achieve its objectives. For instance, for Erasmus+, the most popular education program in Europe, as well as for other youth and sport policy areas, 14.7 billion Euros had been allocated for the 2010-2014 period. In terms of the Council of Europe, its youth policy is based upon the idea of co-management. In order to achieve wider and greater youth participation, this mechanism insists on the inclusion of young people and representatives from youth non-governmental organisations in committees alongside government officials who then work together to work out the priorities for the youth sector and make recommendations for future budgets and programs. These proposals are then adopted by the Committee of Ministers, the Council of Europe's decision-making body. The *modus operandi* for these proposals is then recommended to be implemented at the national levels of each of the CoE's member states. Apart from this cooperation that characterizes its function, CoE invests funds in training, seminars and other forms of non-formal education in order to develop capacities of young people and youth representatives. Here, European youth centers in Budapest and Strasbourg play an immense role in opening and fostering dialogue among youth policy stakeholders. In 2003, the Council of Europe gathered a group of experts to formulate the common ground for youth policy objectives. It was concluded that the European model of youth policy should be in line with the following guidelines,

[45] *Structured Dialogue with young people* serves as a forum for continuous joint reflection on the priorities, implementation, and follow-up of European cooperation in the youth field. It involves regular consultations of young people and youth organizations at all levels of EU countries, as well as the dialogue between youth representatives and policy makers at EU Youth Conferences organised by the Member States holding the EU presidency, and during the European Youth Week. It is conducted around the current thematic priority at both the national and EU level. A national consultation of young people and youth organisations is conducted in all Member States during the 18-month cycle of Structured Dialogue. (Structured Dialogue, 2015)

a) To invest purposefully in young people in a coherent and mutually reinforcing way, whenever possible through an opportunity-focused rather than problem-oriented approach
b) To involve young people both in the strategic formulation of youth policies and in eliciting their views about the operational effectiveness of policy implementation
c) To create the conditions for learning, opportunity and experience which ensure and enable young people to develop the knowledge, skills and competencies to play a full part in both the labor market and civil society
d) To establish a system for robust data collections, both to demonstrate the effectiveness of young policies and to reveal the extent to which 'policy gaps' exist in relation to effective service delivery to young people from certain social groups, in certain areas or certain conditions
e) To display a commitment to reducing such 'policy gaps' where they demonstrably exist

From these examples of the EU and the CoE objectives, it is evident that youth policies at the European level are convergent and rather defined policy areas. Encouraging and supporting political participation is the focus of both organizations, hence they share a common understanding of youth values and perspective for the future of European youth[46]. There is yet another feature shared by the two youth policies. According to a clause stipulated in their policy documents, neither the EU nor the CoE have formal mechanisms that would legally bind their member states to implement the youth policy. Since youth policy uses mechanisms of the so-called "soft law", which consists of recommendations and guidelines, it is then no surprise that there are great differences in youth policy implementation and outcomes on the European continent.

In their report, *Study on the State of Young People and Youth Policy in Europe*, Schizzerotto and Gasperoni (2001) propose that models of European youth policies be based on countries' welfare systems[47]. *The Universalistic Model* (or Scandinavian) of

[46] Shared beliefs are not surprsing, given that there are joint bodies present, which aim to foster youth policy. *The EU-CoE Youth Partnership* stems from the close relations that the Council of Europe and the European Commission have developed in the youth field over the years since 1998. The overall goal is to foster synergies between the youth-oriented activities of the two institutions. The specific themes are participation/citizenship, social inclusion, recognition and quality of youth work. Today, the co-operation mainly focuses on better knowledge of youth, knowledge and evidence-based youth policy and practice, and promotion of youth work (EU-CoE…, 2015)

[47] "The reasons for the different national youth concepts in Europe are complicated. It has been suggested that it might be the result of different historical inspirations for youth policy, the original German concept

youth policy is characterized by being comparatively new, there are no dedicated youth ministries and specialized youth sectors are either small or non-existing. In spite of the long tradition of well-developed welfare states in this region, the civil society plays a major role in youth policy implementation, and therefore, the state and institutions from the civil society co-operate in preparing and implementing youth policies. Apart from the social, psychological and economic focus of most youth policies, the major aims of youth policy are autonomy and independence.

The Mid-European Model of youth policy is characterized by its long traditions. Youth is perceived as a vulnerable social group that must be protected, promoted and supported. In this model, the strong commitment towards youth work and youth policy manifests itself in dedicated youth ministries, in powerful youth directorates and major youth sectors. This model of youth policy is institutionalized to a high degree and well-established within a legal framework.

The model of youth policy of the British Isles is based on a long tradition of *community-oriented* youth work, but traditionally, public interference in youth work has been limited, and although the trend is towards more a more co-ordinated youth policy, even today this model is characterized by a strong community emphasis. This emphasis is evident when the implementation of youth policies is "delegated" from the state to the civil society. The dominant image of youth is "youth as a problem" and the most important problems are the social exclusion of youth, the prolonging of the youth period and the societal participation of youth. This model of youth policy is influenced by the minimal welfare state of the British Isles, but the growing problems with social exclusion of youth in recent years have given rise to further development of this liberal model.

The Mediterranean Model of youth policy is characterized by being relatively new on the scene. Within this model, the Third Sector and the involvement of local authorities are rather weak, meaning youth policies are centralized on a national and state level and are mainly implemented by the state. Also, in this model, the rate of participation of youth in organizations is low but growing, and the strengthening of this kind of participation is a major goal of youth policy. (p. 104-107)

'Jugendlichen', which includes both children and youth and which might have inspired all German-speaking countries while Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries may be more influenced by the American concepts 'adolescence' and 'teenagers' (Stafseng, 2000a)". (Cited in Schizzerotto and Gasperoni, 2001)

Those simplified models of youth policy should be understood only as provisional due to the complexity of the policy area. In reality, countries generally combine various features of different models. However, it is certainly the case that countries in the EU understand youth policy in different ways.

The common concerns shared by all European countries are the issues and problems they are facing in youth policy-making. *The World Bank Development Report* (2007) identified three reasons why it is so difficult to have an effective and highly functional youth policy. The first reason is that it requires cooperation between various sectors. The matter of communication and coordination between sectors is never simple and often becomes very complicated. One of the dangers of defective communication is that it decreases the coherence of the policy area, which may result in misunderstandings and questioning of the relevance of youth policy as a separate policy area. Secondly, young people are not always involved in the creation and implementation of youth policies. Even though the EU and the CoE insist on the importance of that involvement, it is often in contradiction with the traditions of many countries, especially new democracies. Youth is not perceived as a relevant factor, and thus it is not included in the decision-making process. The third reason for the subpar outcomes of youth policies is the lack of good practices that characterize them. Since the benefits of youth involvement are not very prevalent in the public and/or political discourse, decision-makers do not recognize what good it can bring to national progress. This neglect of the youth voice is further fostered by the media and the public sphere, who often portray youth as a problem, rather than a catalyst for solutions and progress.

All these reasons may be an important factor in undermining the role of youth, however, the lack of political will is still the one most likely given as valid reasoning behind excluding youth as a relevant factor in policy-making. It is perfectly understandable that young people are a marginalized social group with less social and political power (Ilisin, 2014). This reasoning is why political elites are not motivated to deal with youth or to systemically invest in their welfare. The conflict theory in sociology (Giddens, 1976) would interpret this scenario as one where political elites who govern do not recognize the need for transformative youth policies because it suits them to have young people they can control. Young people are not veto actors (Tsebelis, 2002) since most of them do not vote; therefore, limited social resources are not channelled towards the youth but towards those groups that might help elite actors

sustain their positions. Despite the role of these special interests and the popular image that youth is a non-valid actor in national progress, it is my understanding and the opinion of many policy actors that is optimal to have a nominal youth policy in order to have social peace; however, this process should not be costly or require much effort. Youth is thus seen as a social group without a true influence on the national policy-making processes (Ilisin et al, 2013) but also with limited influence at the EU level (Laine and Gretschel, 2009). All the presented factors in this section that undermine the role of youth are the fundamental reasons why youth policies in new democracies do not produce adequate, effective, efficient and just results. These claims are relatively often addressed in different youth research studies (as shown in Lavrič, Tomanović and Jusić, 2019).

In the next section, we contextualize youth position in society and politics into a Croatian policy environment.

7.3. Croatian youth policy

As an academic discipline in Croatia, public policy has a very modest tradition. In his analysis of public policy in the Croatian Political science Review, K. Petkovic (2013), discusses three waves of the discipline's development. Prehistory, as he calls the period between 1964 and 1986, is characterized by Marxism - a rudimental approach to public policy analysis. The second wave of policy development is the period between 1987 and 1999, which Petkovic contextualizes as a period of the consolidation of the discipline, while the last wave (2000-2013) is characterized by theories and concepts in public policies, sectorial policies, European and comparative policies. Regarding youth policy specifically, there is a dearth of academic focus and research. Vlasta Ilisin (2003) writes about political participation and youth policies in the wake of the making of the National Youth Program in 2003. In addition, Ilisin, Potockin and Mendes (2003) link youth policy with education in their text. Furthermore, there is a more recent collection of students' papers on youth policy edited by A. Petak, A. Kekez and Z. Petak (2006), as well as Nikola Bukovic's 2008 comprehensive text on youth policy in Croatia, where he analyses youth policy through the lens of network management. In 2015, a book entitled *Demokratski Potencijali Mladih*, was issued by the Institute for Social Research and Center for Democracy and Law Miko Tripalo, where I had the privilege to publish a chapter on youth policy. Based on the review of those texts, it can be concluded that publications on youth

policy in Croatia only partially cover the subject and have very limited use of policy methodology.

There are two fundamental aspects of the public policy overview – normative acts and actors. Without the interaction between those two features, public policy overview would be incomplete. While the review of normative acts and the way they are conducted demonstrates objectives and the *modus operandi* of a certain public policy, the representation and the analysis of actors gives us the insight on power distribution and special interests existing within a specific policy area. In the following section, a historical context of normative acts in the field of youth will be presented, while the role of the current National Youth Program (2014-2017) and the Act on Youth will be mentioned briefly. The reason for this decision lies in the fact that the whole next chapter will cover the process and the context of the program and the act's making, which is the focal point of this dissertation.

After normative acts, relevant actors and the interaction between those two categories are presented, and I will present the argument why is this specific constellation in line with the provisions of collaborative governance approach.

7.3.1. Normative acts

In today's youth policy landscape in Croatia, there are several normative acts that construct youth policy. The National Youth Program (NYP) is a key policy document in the youth sector. Its goal is the advancement of activities in the public administration and the public institutions that help young people improve their lives and optimally integrate into society (NYP 2014-2017, 18). Apart from the NYP, there is also an Act on Youth Advisory Boards, which is a document that regulates youth participation in the decision-making processes and governs the public affairs at the local and regional level, including the informing of young people and consulting them on decisions that have an impact on their lives. Other acts[48], even though enacted to regulate aspects of youth lives, have demonstrated that they have only a secondary capacity to impact youth policy objectives.[49]

[48] Act on Volunteering, Act on Student Councils and Other Students Associations, Act on Education in Elementary and High Schools, Act on Vocational Education, Act on Science and Higher Education, Act on Civil Society Organizations, local and regional youth programs, the Government's decision on establishing the Youth Council, Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan, etc.

[49] This assumption is provisory and it is not the product of any scientific research, however, if their content correlates with the goals of youth policy, it is evident that only the Act on Youth Advisory Boards

In the political sphere, public policy methodology has slowly and very recently started to penetrate the Croatian public administration. With the implementation of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), adoption of *The Code of Practice on Consultation with the Interested Public in Procedures of Adopting Laws, Other Regulations and Acts,* trainings for public officials at the National School for Public Administration and implementation of policy methodology towards the process of passing various normative acts, the role of public policy has become relatively important in contributing to the contemporary democratic system in Croatia. In addition to that, youth policy is becoming more integrated. The beginnings of youth policy in Croatia can be found in the establishment of the National Institute for the Protection of the Family, Motherhood and Youth in 1994. This office initiated its work only three years later under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Work and Social Systems and operates youth services as one of its administrative units (Ilisin 2003, 53). The importance of this institution lays in the fact that it was in charge of the drafting of the first National Youth Program from 2003 to 2008. The process of drafting started in 2001 with the founding of the expert working group[50]. Soon after, NYP was voted into the Parliament in 2002, and the government adopted it in 2003.

When the first National Youth Program was adopted, a need for a monitoring body that would regulate the implementation and broadly overlook and coordinate youth policies in Croatia emerged. Thus, in 2003, the Croatian government founded the Youth Council. Even today, this governmental body consists of civil society and private sector representatives, public officials and experts. In the summer of 2009, the second National Youth Program (2009-2013) was adopted[51]. The analysis of the second NYP demonstrates that the document lacks "elements of the purposive change,

and National Youth Program focus on youth as a primary beneficiary, while other above-mentioned acts treat young people as an extension of some other primary focus- such as schools, volunteering and so on.

[50] As Buzinkic (2009, 26) writes, the composition of a working group is set up to uncover the injustice of the whole process. There were 31 working group members, 25 of them were public officials and only six civil society representatives. Communication was, as Buzinkic argues, one-directional, which, in the end, motivated the civil society representatives to stand up for their rights, to advocate for the interests of the youth sector and to critically address problems in the transparency of the whole process. Youth civil society representatives, claims Buzinkic, did not want NYP to be just a copy-paste type of an existing document.

[51] Civil society representatives that were members of working groups in drafting this NPY, filed a petition with four requests to the Ministry of Family, Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity, which was in charge of this project. In those requests, they demanded a public campaign, which would familiarize the public with the NYP, greater resources and inclusion of youth issues within the state budget, the implementation of the monitoring and evaluation system for youth policy and comprehensive public deliberation with young people about the content of the NYP. (Buzinkic, 2009, p. 26)

innovative alternatives and capital investments, mostly in fields of youth employment and active participation" (Buzinkic 2009, p. 24). Hence, there were no public discussions about the NYP and even the voting in the Parliament was purely procedural without much discussion. Although Croatia did have a policy framework for youth policy, together with the governmental body in charge of the coordination of the policy, it lacked inclusiveness and concrete outputs in its implementation. Since the state was not interested in youth policy (or that interest was merely nominal), this prompted the civil sector to consolidate and invest in capacity-building in order to position itself as an important actor in the youth field. In Chapter 8, the continuation of this story will be presented with the example of the drafting process of the contemporary Croatian Youth Program from 2014 to 2017.

As stated before, the *Act on Youth Advisory Boards* is another important proxy for the youth policy situation in Croatia. Youth advisory boards serve as an important link in supporting youth in political participation and contribute direct resources for the protection of their interests. In her paper, Ilisin (2003,42) describes the importance of youth advisory boards by pointing out the practices of developed Western countries where institutions, such as youth advisory boards, empower young people to be actively involved in political processes. The current *Act on Youth Advisory Boards* (YAB) was voted into practice in 2014, and it is the second act passed on youth advisory issues. The first law was passed in 2007 but it proved inadequate for direct implementation, since it poorly stipulated the relation between advisory boards and the local/regional units (municipalities, towns, counties). Analyzes on youth advisory boards, even though limited in their policy scope, (Kopric 2011, Kopric, Musa and Lalic-Novak 2012; Kovacic and Vrbat 2014) unquestionably demonstrate a high degree of dysfunctionality of the YAB both at the local and the regional levels. A high level of politicization and distrust of youth advisory boards are two characteristics used most often when describing YAB (Kopric, 2011). Additionally, actors on the local and regional level are not well informed on the role and potentials of YABs. Thus, in their paper on political competency and political participation of Zagreb youth, Kovacic and Vrbat (2014), show that even in the Croatian capital, a modern hub where access to information is available to most of the population, young people "do not know what YAB is nor how one gets elected". In questions aimed at the youth regarding their jurisdiction, not one individual answered correctly. Coupled with Kopric's analysis of

the local public administration (2011), which does not have the capacity for YABs, it is evident that this segment of youth policy in Croatia is still greatly underdeveloped.

On the one hand, the culmination of discontent aimed at YABs and civil society organizations has resulted in a new Act on Youth Advisory Boards. And even though this new law brought positive facets such as an obligation for all local and regional units to have an official appointed for YABs, the possibility for a youth initiative to suggest a candidate for YAB, mandatory meetings between mayors and YAB presidents at least once every three months, increase in the term of office/mandate of YAB from two years to three years, there are still issues present with regulations that are inconsistent with community needs. Some of those issues include the absence of sanctions for local/regional units who do not have or provide support for the existence of YAP, undefined concepts and terms regarding youth policy that can be found in the legal text (youth initiative, youth organization, an organization for young people, etc). In addition, it is unclear why only Zagreb is able to operate YABs on the level of neighbourhoods, while other Croatian cities and towns that also have the system of sub-municipal self-government cannot. Finally, in the legal framework, it is not specified for how long a call for candidates should be publicly available, and there are no regulations on the education level for YAB (potential) members. Despite these shortcomings, the Act on Youth Advisory Boards can be viewed as a positive step forward and a substantial contribution to the consolidation of youth policy in Croatia.

Lastly, just a few words on the process of drafting the Act on YAB. From my point of view, the process of drafting and passing this law is a decent contribution to the development of youth policy in Croatia. The Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, a ministry that is in charge of this Act, had followed all the necessary steps stipulated in *The Code of Practice on Consultation with the Interested Public in Procedures of Adopting Laws, Other Regulations and Acts*. This included forming and following the RIA protocol, founding an expert group for the drafting of the Act, online consultations with interested members of the public, face-to-face dialogue in four biggest cities in Croatia (Zagreb, Split, Osijek, Rijeka) and willingness to change the draft according to feedback received in the drafting processes. Despite this elaborate process, problems arose once the draft entered the parliamentary procedure, where it was changed drastically. Most of the obligations for the local and regional units were cut in hopes of decreasing the scope of their work. In the current text of the Act, there are no sanctions for the local and regional units that do not establish YAB. Additionally, the

institute for temporarily budgets for YABs in those local/regional units where YSBs are established after September 30, a due date for budget passing, was eliminated (CYM 2014) along with some other minor provisions that favored youth rather than politics. Compromises in favour of public administration show an insufficient amount of political will directed towards regulating youth issues. It also demonstrates the lack of capacity and power of the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth to defend the draft and to assure a more benevolent environment for youth. By actors failing to make progress in legitimizing the necessity of YSBs in youth policy development, the political momentum was lost, and even though this Act resulted in several beneficial outcomes, it was unable to influence the youth field in a way that would prove most useful for young people.

7.3.2. Actors

As discussed in Chapter 4, the role of policy actors in the policy process is crucial to understanding the dynamics of the decision-making system within a certain socio-political landscape. The distinction between state and non-state actors, and within non-state actors, between civil society organizations and experts, is key to understanding youth policy in Croatia.

State actors

The constellation and the role of state actors in Croatia are rather hard to determine in a simplistic manner that corresponds to the current state of affairs reality. On the one hand, the consolidation of responsibilities which the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth has undertaken in terms of coordination and direction of youth policy, is apparent. Even though within the abovementioned ministry there is only one service that deals with a variety of youth issues[52], shifts towards a more coherent and rational youth policy field are actively being pursued.

However, a few problems still undermine this path to progress. The first one is that due to political and economic shifts, there is a constant flow of different officials in charge of youth policy. At one point, there were only two individuals in charge of the state youth policy initiatives in Croatia. This had since changed, and nowadays,

[52] The administrative structure of the Croatian ministries is as follows, at the head of the ministry, there is a minister who has one deputy minister. Assistant ministers lead and administer directorates that consist of one or more sectors, while the administratively lowest unit is comprised of service officers.

there are five people designated to the task. Although, in order for this administrative unit to be able to respond to all the challenges presented by youth policy demands on the Ministry, according to some estimations, that number should be tripled[53]. Coupled with the lack of administrative capacities, there is a fundamental gap in expertise and competencies among officials in carrying out effective youth policy outcomes. Due to the high turnaround rate of the staff at the Ministry, there is a visible deficit of expertise among the officials. In one respect, formal education in Croatia (higher education institutions) still does not offer satisfactory educational programs in public policy for social science students that do not study political science, thus bureaucrats are entering into the public sector unequipped with competencies of how exactly the system functions. Simply put, the existing education programs for state officials do not offer any specialized knowledge in the realm of social policies, least of all youth policy. The result of this skill deficiency is a dire need for extensive training once an official is appointed to a specific field. Consequently, since individuals entering a certain policy sector within ministries in Croatia have limited opportunity to acquire knowledge and skills on relevant issues, they are required to learn from their colleagues and through daily job experience following their appointment. Ivan Kopric (2007) in his text on education for public administration in Croatia blatantly points out that "Croatia falls behind developed democracies" in terms of professional training, specialized knowledge and university program offerings for (future) civil servants (p. 389-390). Obviously, without the standardization of the learning process and training, officials are prone to oversights and slips, which affects other actors in the sector. This situation slows down the development of a specific policy field, and particularly youth policy, which is considered to be a complex and fast-changing policy area.

The second problem when it comes to policy actors is the weak interest of other public sector stakeholders in youth issues. There is a general perception among state officials that youth policy as such is not as relevant to national progress as other types of social policies. Unless there is a burning problem, such as youth unemployment, youth policy is considered to be a soft policy area, meaning that ministries and agencies, apart from the one in charge of youth, would actively try to avoid responsibilities concerning youth issues that are under their jurisdiction. Support for this claim can be

[53] This is the information provided in interviews for the purpose of this PhD dissertation by two individual experts on youth policy. For more on methodology, please see Chapter 2.

seen in both National Youth Program processes, which is the topic of this dissertation. When the current *National Youth Program* (2014-2018) was in the process of development, representatives of two ministries closely related to issues of youth representation and education had been trying to minimize the potential responsibilities this program would place on their institutions. This statement was confirmed in interviews with governmental officials (Respondent 9 and 10) who were aware that youth policy is not on the top of the agenda of ministries other than the one in charge of youth policy. One interesting example, which will be described further in the next chapter, is the story involving the process of NYP creation when one ministry's representatives protested against the responsibilities prescribed to the ministry, not knowing that during the process of NYP draft-making, their colleague was a member of the working group that drafted that particular policy measure. Additionally, in the process of youth act drafting, the representative of the ministry in charge for education openly advocated against the regulation of youth work, which was a policy area in joint domain of the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports (MES), the Ministry of Labour and Pension System and the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth. The reasoning behind this is that there was simply not enough administrative capacity at the MES to cope with such a complex issue during that time. This 'lack of administrative capacities' argument was not only used in the debate on youth work but on many different occasions, as exposed in the meeting minutes. In order to perceive this problem more clearly, the example of the Youth Council would be fitting. As explained earlier, this governmental body gathers representatives of various stakeholders of youth issues[54].

From the insight of studying the meeting's minutes, it is evident that formal actors are mainly unwilling to accept responsibilities, and if they do accept them, they try to minimize the scope and pace of suggested activities. Apart from that, there is a prevalent turnaround among representatives from state institutions and, as interviewed members of this Council point out, the miscommunication and information gaps among old and new members from the same institutions are widespread. This tendency

[54] Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, Ministry of Science, Education and Sport, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour and Pension System, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Crafts, Ministry of Construction and Physical Planning, Ministry of Regional Development and EU funds, different governmental offices, Office for Cooperation with NGOs, Office for Human Rights and national minorities issues, Office for Gender Equality, Association of Cities of the Republic of Croatia, Association of Municipalities of the Republic of Croatia, Association of Counties of Republic of Croatia, representatives of academic and research institutions and youth civil society representatives.

towards active avoidance of responsibilities in youth policy decision-making is beginning to influence the organizational structure of the government (Kransdorff 2006), which is highly noticeable in the process of policy-making. Hence, given the example of the creation of the *Youth Act*, the prevailing argument from the representatives of Ministry of Social Policy and Youth concerning initiatives in the civil sector is that they did not want/could not include in the legal text a clause that would make other ministries change their agendas in order to support youth development.

Apart from the already listed formal actors, two more entities are relevant to the youth policy outcomes, namely the Committee on the Family, Youth and Sports of the Croatian Parliament and the local governmental units. The former, as stipulated in the Standing Orders of the Croatian Parliament, "shall establish and monitor the implementation of policies, and in procedures to enact legislation and other regulations, it shall have the rights and duties of a competent working body in matters pertaining to,

- Marriage, the family and guardianship, and special protection of children, motherhood and young people;
- The quality of life of young people and their participation in all societal activities;
- The protection of children and adolescents from all forms of addiction;
- Family planning and demographic renewal […]" (Sabor, 2015)

However, despite the ambitious jurisdiction, the Committee on the Family, Youth and Sports of the Croatian Parliament did not position itself as a relevant youth policy stakeholder. Moreover, one of its major contributions in the period of 2011-2015 was limiting youth rights, which were stipulated and guaranteed in the first draft of the Act on Youth. Finally, Kopric (2011) and Kopric, Musa, Lalic-Novak, (2012) warn that local government units have severally limited administrative capacities in performing their constitutional and legal duties. Youth policy, which is partially dictated by local governance, therefore, cannot be efficiently implemented. Local government usually does not have the resources or the political will to enable the existence of such policy initiatives (Kovacic, 2015). Concretely, the absence of YABs and local action plans concerning youth has severe consequences on youth policy and young people in general. Additionally, vertical communication between the national government and local

government is often defective, which results in the frequent situation where local government units do not know which policies to prioritize nor how to begin to enact them. (Kovacic, 2015).

Non-state actors

When discussing non-state (non-formal or non-institutional) actors involved in youth policy in Croatia, in accordance with Colebatch's criteria (2004), there are several that are significant enough to be mentioned and analyzed. In theory, the most important stakeholders in youth policy are young people themselves. As the primary beneficiaries, they will be directly affected by the outcomes of poor or beneficial policies. However, young people are not only relevant in their role as beneficiaries. In the previous sections, it was pointed out that youth policy-making supposes the active involvement of youth in the process of the creation of youth policies. In this respect, young people are co-creators of decisions and policies that concern them directly. In Croatia, however, young people do not believe that their voice matters. Empirical findings (Ilisin, Spajic-Vrkas, 2015; Kovacic, Vrbat, 2014; Ilisin et al, 2013) show that young people are indifferent towards politics and that the level of their participation in politics and society is very low. Table 7.1 shows young people's perception of their influence on the decision-making process at different administrative levels.

Table 7.1: Youth's influence perception

To what extent do you influence decisions?	Not at all	Little	Much	Very much
At work/school	34,8	36,7	20,6	8,0
In your family	4.3	29,0	47,7	19,0
Among your friends	2,9	25,9	46,4	14,8
At the community level (town, municipality)	58,8	31,8	7,1	2,3
At the county level	81,6	13,2	3,7	1,5
At the national level	84,6	10,7	3,2	1,5

Source: Ilisin and Spajic-Vrkas (2015, p. 171)

As seen, in general, young people do not have the perception that they can make a difference in their society. They believe they are least influential at the national level and the level of counties and towns, while they assume they have the most influence within their families and among friends. This finding is very interesting because it demonstrates a failure of interest in the role of the youth advisory boards' system that

exists at the national and municipal levels. However, when young people are asked what are their reasons for the low rate of youth participation (Ilisin and Spajic-Vrkas 2015, 171), they point out that their peers find politics unjust, which deters them from engaging in the decision-making process (80,4%). Hence, for approximately 78,4% of them, politics is boring, while the third most prevailing answer for apathy is the perceived discrepancy among decision-makers' and young people's priorities (2,8%). Those results are no surprise if we place youth in the context of their actual political competency. The lack of systemic civic education in schools, the dominant culture of subjectivism, parochialism rather than participation and the limited support from the state to engage in policy-making result in apathy and disinterest in the young (Kovacic and Vrbat 2014; Kovacic 2014; Kovacic and Horvat 2016). Yet, not everything is so hopeless.

Juxtaposed to the disorganization of individual youth that account for a number of interests and perspectives, in the interview, one non-state actor has demonstrated a high level of interest and capacity to influence various stages of the decision-making process over time, namely youth organizations. Contemporary youth organizations in Croatia began to develop in the early 1990s, in the midst of war and within the Anti-war Campaign Croatia movement. In the paper on the development of youth work in Croatia, Buzinkic, Culum, Horvat and Kovacic (2015) argue that youth work can be considered as a birthplace of contemporary youth organizations in Croatia. The authors claim, "since independence in the early 1990s, Croatian youth work was happening as a part of broader civil society initiatives and organizations. At the time, peacebuilding activities, youth initiatives, and non-formal education had been opposed to the state values". In addition, as the authors state that "youth work and youth workers' emphasis on promoting peacebuilding and strongly criticizing the war, as well as challenging dominant narrative (as Croatia was seen only as a victim of the war, without questioning any of the governmental decisions or the atrocities the Croatian military committed), has been the *modus operandi* of Croatian youth work." Accordingly, as the argument continues, there was a lack of funding and political support from the state for various youth work programs. Youth work, therefore, continued as a practice within the broader civil society and grew within those structures. From these developments, one of the most influential civil society organizations (not only in the field of youth) was created – the Croatian Youth Network.

Buzinkic et al, (2015, p. 41) explain that the first serious "gathering of a majority of youth organizations happened in 2002 when the Croatian Youth Network was established as a program exchange and an advocacy coalition. Bringing together most of the active civic, peacebuilding, cultural, media activism, environmental and other youth organizations, the Croatian Youth Network gathered these main actors to ensure continuous support in youth development". Hence, the authors argue that "the network was established in 2002 by 28 youth organizations aiming at encouraging continuous cooperation in the improvement of conditions for the development of youth activism and youth work in Croatia. All of those organizations shared the same dedication to advocacy and creating just and concrete youth policies that would enable the development and sustainability of youth organizations." It is important to point out that "mobilizing organizations and individuals to advocate for youth policy in Croatia remained one of the primary foci in the past decade (ibid)". As a result of this, there was a newly established national youth umbrella organization for advocacy; the first national youth policy framework had been created. Today, the Croatian Youth Network represents an alliance of 73 youth CSOs acting as the National Youth Council in the Republic of Croatia. Due to its inevitable advocacy orientation and the influence it has on youth policy-making, it fulfils all the necessary criteria to be characterized as an advocacy coalition (Sabatier, 2000). More concretely, the Statute of the CYN[55] in the article 1 stipulates that the role of CYN is to advocate and promote youth interests. The fact that this is the first task stipulated in the statute discovers the importance of advocacy orientation of the CYN. Moreover, in terms of their influence, the CYN is the Croatian grant holder for the process of structured dialogue and as such is the only non-state actor that has direct access to the national steering group for the structured dialogue. With this position, the CYN can directly shape and coordinate the process as they are the ones managing the grant for all activities within the framework of structured dialogue. In the continuation of this chapter, a more detailed advocacy practice of this organization will be displayed.

In addition to young people and youth organizations, there is indeed another non-state stakeholder in youth policy – the academic community or experts[56]. This

[55] http://www.mmh.hr/files/ckfinder/files/STATUT_MMH2015_usvojen.pdf

[56] Youth policy texts add the media and political parties' youth wings to the list of non-state actors. However, in Croatia, this is redundant. Data acquired from interviews with state officials, civil society representatives and youth researchers suggest that youth wings of political parties in Croatia do not have any impact on youth policy, nor do they show interest in the youth decision-making process at the

policy actor, as seen in Chapter 4, has a specific task in the process of decision-making. In Croatia, there are very few researchers whose focus is youth, thus the policy framework is not adequately developed. The focal point of youth research in Croatia is the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb (IDIZ), where empirical research on youth has been conducted since the mid-20th century. By utilizing mostly the quantitative research method, over the years, researchers have created a respectable corpus of knowledge on the attitudes, values, problems, behavioral patterns and social structures of young people. Interdisciplinary research that includes sociological, pedagogical, psychological, economic and political insights has served as a starting point for various policy documents[57]. Valuing the philosophy of longitudinal research, IDIZ has managed to prevent the reductionism of young people as a mere demographic category or as a population worthy of study only in terms of how it relates to the educational system. Vlasta Ilisin (2014, p. 84) claims that over the years, cooperation and collaboration between the Institute and various other institutions and organizations interested in youth welfare have flourished. She outlines the role of EU institutions, Council of Europe committees, as well as governmental bodies and institutions of local government, as partners in the process of influencing young people's lives for the better.

Apart from IDIZ, there are other notable research institutions that in a smaller scale of their research scope also study young people, namely the Institute for Social Sciences Ivo Pilar (where valuable studies on youth subcultures have been produced), Zagreb University's Faculty of Political Science, Faculty of Law, and Study of Social Work, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (Department of Pedagogy), Faculty of Education and Rehabilitation Sciences, and the Faculty of Teacher Education and the University of Zadar. The difference between these branches of academia and various institutes and IDIZ is that only IDIZ works solely on issues concerning youth, while the abovementioned institutions mostly focus on aspects relevant to their disciplines (for instance, addiction prevention, elementary-school students' performance and so on).

national level. The situation with the media is somewhat different. While mainstream media doesn't seem to impact public opinion on youth issues, independent media circuits are closely related to the civil society, thus sharing their values and interests. However, in doing so, they fail to broadcast their vision of reality, but rather transmit one already constructed by their allies. (Rotar-Zgrabljic, 2015). Due to those insights, independent media's role in the process of youth policy-making will be analyzed alongside civil society organizations.

[57] Three national youth strategies and two local youth programs, in addition to numerous projects aimed to develop youth policies in specific contexts.

To sum up, the youth research community in Croatia, even though small in number, is producing concrete results that are being used in various policy processes[58]. In the next two chapters, the role of the policy youth experts will be presented and examined in more detail.

7.4. Final remarks – youth policy in Croatia as a collaborative governance practice

Young people make up only 18,6% of the whole population of Croatia (according to the 2011 census). Judging by their opinions and characteristics, they are similar to other post-socialist young people (Kovacic, Dolenec, 2018), mostly uninterested in politics and political participation, with a family background and social status that determines a higher risk of social exclusion, they are politically incompetent, they do not have high levels of trust in political institutions and their leisure is spend in self-focus rather than their society/community. The role of the government in those circumstances is to create an enabling and supportive environment in order for young people to be more active, more informed and more willing to participate in matters that are important to their communities as well as in the policy-making process. In this respect, youth policy has a fundamental role to play in fostering youth participation and livelihood outcomes through a set of objectives and legal frameworks in order to protect and nurture youth welfare. Croatia is here particularly interesting due to inquisitive cohabitation of the post-socialist leftovers and contemporary public administration reaches (Perko-Šeparović, 2006)

In the third chapter, provisions of collaborative governance have been presented including actual involvement of different policy actors in the decision-making process. Collaborative governance refers not only to the formal but also to the informal relationship between the state, civil society, and other policy actors in order to solve a problem or to enchase the development of certain parts of society (Ansel, Gansh 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2012). In table 7.2. the criteria for collaborative governance proposed by the aforementioned two groups of authors are put in the context of youth policy to argue that Croatian youth policy-making can be considered

[58] For example, the Institute for Social Research was contracted to conduct three studies on young people for three national youth programs. All the findings were used in the preamble of every chapter in order to identify problems and develop measures for tackling them. In addition to this, the same institution conducted the evaluation of the NYP 2014-2017, and the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law did an expert elaborate on youth advisory boards which served as a starting point for making a new Act on youth advisory boards in 2014.

collaborative governance. Table 7.2 undoubtedly shows Croatian youth policy-making meets all the criteria for collaborative governance, thus it is justified to analyze it by using this approach. Apart from this, youth policy, as mentioned in Chapter 2, emerged at the same time as governance thus it has been developing simultaneously and with mutual influence. This argument is explored in more detail in the next chapter where different processes of youth policy-making are analyzed and interpreted concerning notions of collaborative governance and power conceptualization matrix presented in Chapter 6.

This chapter outlined the set of problems and determents in solidifying and amplifying the desired outcomes of Croatia's youth policy. Likewise, it had presented contemporary sets of actors and decisions working to enable youth development. Hence, both institutions, as well as normative acts, have a symbiotic role in creating desirable outcomes for youth. Actors are nominally interested in youth issues, while normative acts stipulate steps and the concrete approach for empowering young people. As a result of their cooperation, a vibrant civil sector had emerged that has been advocating for youth rights for a long time. One can say that youth policy nowadays is in a state of resurrection, not because of political factors, but rather as the result of many converging variables.

Table 7.2: Croatian youth policy as a collaborative governance practice

Criteria for collaborative governance	**Croatian youth policy-making meeting criteria**	**Support**
The forum is initiated by public agencies	Yes	National Youth Program, Act on Youth and Act on Youth Advisory boards are initiated by the Ministry as seen in chapters 7 and 8.
Participants in the forum include non-state actors	Yes	All decision-making processes in Croatia include non-state actors (Kovačić 2015).
Participants engage in decision making and are not merely ‘‘consulted’’	Yes	Respondents at interviews conducted for the purpose of this dissertation unanimously claim participants in youth policymaking actually contribute to processes.
The forum is formally organized	Yes	According to the Croatian Act on Regulatory Impact Assessment and The Rules of Procedure of the Croatian Government, all decision-making processes should follow a specific set of rules and steps.

The forum aims to make decisions by consensus	Yes	Even though there is no official instruction about consensus, in two youth decision-making processes I participated this was the practice.
The focus of the collaboration is on public policy or public management	Yes	According to the Croatian Act on Regulatory Impact Assessment and The Rules of Procedure of Croatian Government all decision-making processes follow public policy and/or public management provisions

In order to deepen the understanding of youth policy and to comprehend its dynamics better, the next chapter will present the results of the empirical research prepared for the PhD dissertation. By specifically focusing on two specific processes, which were crucial to youth policy evolution in the last decade, a policy process overview will be offered and an answer to the power dynamics of youth policy in Croatia provided and analyzed.

Chapter 8

THE POLICY FORMULATION CASE STUDY: MAKING OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH PROGRAM AND THE YOUTH ACT

Creating problems is easy. We do it all the time. Finding solutions, ones that last and produce good results, requires guts and care.

- Henry Rollins

Youth policy in Croatia, just as in many other Western democracies, is receiving more and more attention. After the realization that assuring an enabling environment to young people is an investment in the future of a given society, these countries started developing different procedures and norms to create adequate policies for solving youth issues and enchasing their individual and social development. These procedures include the introduction of regulations on how to develop different legal acts, how to include various stakeholders into the decision-making process and how to assure adequate involvement of citizens in the policy-making process. Youth policy, not being an exception to this, is a subject of those procedures. As we have seen in the previous chapter, it focuses on actors and legal acts relevant to youth development.

This chapter and the following one discuss the youth policy case in Croatia, however, each of the chapters focuses on two different aspects of the analysis. The idea of chapter 8 is to analyze policy formulation in order to set the ground for the analysis of power in chapter 8. Therefore, in this chapter where policy formulation is seen as a locus for evaluating various ideas proposed by the stakeholders, we analyze the process with the goal to build a solid argumentation line. As stated earlier, one of the hypotheses stated at the beginning of this dissertation is to assess if policy formulation is an adequate locus for assessing power in youth policy-making. In order to do that, one needs to provide a detailed overview of relevant policy processes, hence chapter 8. Given the fact that I use a methodological meta-approach of political ethnography, chapter 8 can be considered to use ethnographic terms – a thick description of the content (Geertz, 1973). Holloway described a thick description as "referring to the

detailed account of field experiences in which the researcher makes explicit the patterns of social relationships and puts them in context." (Holloway, 1997).

In chapter 7, I presented a legal framework of youth policy in Croatia and stated that there are two highly important legal acts derived from it (the National youth program and the Youth Advisory Board Act). As mentioned earlier, in order to understand the dynamics of youth policy in Croatia, another (failed) process should be taken into consideration – the process of making the Act on Youth. In this dissertation, I focus on the two processes exploring the varieties of power among policy actors - the creation of the National youth program and the creation of the Youth Act. One might ask why I decided to choose these two processes. There are three reasons for this methodological decision. First, the criterion for the decision was relevance. I decided to take into consideration the processes which would be most favourable for the development of the topic. Due to that, choosing to analyze the impact of the National youth program as a key youth policy document in Croatia that dictates the direction of this policy field is essential. Hence, in the process of making the National youth program there were numerous actors involved, and this allowed me to closely observe the process with regards to power relations. Additionally, the National youth program went through a policy process with generally positive outcomes. On the other hand, the making of the Youth Act was not as successful as the process failed and the youth act was never passed. The general idea of the Youth Act was to define and conceptualize what constitutes as youth and youth-related in Croatia. As such, it had the potential to be the most important document stipulating normative solutions for youth policy in Croatia. The process of Youth Act creation also involves examining relevant actors, which is suitable for the analysis and topic of this dissertation. Unlike the processes of the crafting of the National youth program and the making of the Act on Youth Advisory Boards, Youth Act creation was not successful in terms of its mission, as it was not passed. Specifically, the process of creating the Youth Act failed to generate a successful blueprint of what an impactful youth policy looks like. Williamson (2002) in his text developed a road-map for creating successful youth policy. He argues that meaningful participation of all involved policy-actors, their cooperation and clearly stipulated objectives are elements of a successful youth policy-making process. Despite that, I find it relevant to include the Act in the analysis in order to see whether its outcomes could be explained by the power variable. Methodological justification for the selection of the two aforementioned processes can be found in Mill's method of

difference. This methodological model supposes a "comparison of a case in which the effect occurred and a case in which the effect did not occur revealed that only one prior circumstance was present in the first case but not it the second" (Kemerling 2011). By observing two similar policy processes where one resulted in the successful adoption of a legal act, and one failed in delivering a normative act, I seek to understand the factors that contributed to the differences of these outcomes. Lastly, the third reason for choosing the Act on Youth and the National youth program is pragmatic. In both of these processes, I had participated as a policy actor – a member of the academic community; therefore, I had the opportunity to observe the processes directly, allowing me to get comprehensive insights into the relationship dynamics between actors[59].

This position of a reflexive participant sometimes causes confusion on the role – where does a participant end and a researcher begin, however in the ethnographic literature this does not seem to be a problem. By paraphrasing Moeran (2009: 140) the only thing that is important in the so-called "organizational ethnography" is to provide the reader with as much information possible for them to be able to construct the narrative. Due to this reason, this empirical chapter is descriptive in its essence while chapter 9 offers a more conventional policy analysis.

Before I present the two processes and in order to demonstrate how legal acts are being prepared in Croatia, I am going to present a roadmap of the policy-making process in Croatia. Overall, this case study chapter will consist of four sections. The first section will demonstrate the policy and legal framework for producing legal acts in Croatia. In the second section, I will investigate the process that went into the making of the National youth program. What will follow is the creation of the Act on Youth. Each of these two presented cases will be analyzed through the same criteria, which will include a thorough description of the context and actors, the development process, the diverse perspectives of policy actors collected through my interviews with them and lastly, my own participant insights.

8.1. Legal framework for act-making in Croatia

There are two types of legal acts important to this dissertation, namely an act and a program. While a law is defined as "any written or positive rule or collection of

[59] In the process of creating the Act on Youth Advisory Boards, I only participated as an expert in the counselling process, but not in the policy formulation stage.

rules prescribed under the authority of the state or nation, as by the people in its constitution" (dictionary.com), a strategy is "a description of a process and it answers the question: How do we get there from here within the available time and money resources, including people and expertise?" (Masson and Shariff, 2010, p. 441). Nomotechincally speaking, a strategy is a policy which suggests a lower level of obligation, while an act serves as an obligational instruction for human behaviour. What is similar for both of those acts in the Croatian context is that they are adopted by the Croatian Parliament, and in most cases, proposed by the government (graphical preview of this procedure can be seen in Figure 8.1).

A standard procedure for making an act or a legal act in Croatia follows the following steps. First, a state administration body at the central level provides preparatory actions for the process of act-drafting. What follows is the work of an expert working group that deliberates and crafts various alternative clauses to the act. At the coordination stage, the government state bodies whose jurisdiction is related to the content of the act give their opinions and recommendations and send the preliminary version of the act to the cabinet where additional deliberation on the proposal is conducted. The last step of this stage is a meeting of the Government, where the act is rejected or adopted and sent to the Parliament. Once the act reaches the Parliament, there are two readings of the bill, after which a plenary assembly is conducted where all MPs vote on the bill. The last step of the act construction stage is the signature of the President of the Republic.

Figure 8.1: The governmental and parliamentary procedure for legal acts-making



The following chart is created based on the information provided on the official website of the Croatian Government

In order to meet the requirements of smart law-making[60], roughly two stages of creating legal acts can be identified. The first one entails the process of drafting a legal act before it reaches the Parliament. The second stage is the parliamentary procedure of passing this act. In this dissertation, I am concerned with the first phase, and therefore,

[60] Agreements at the level of the EU aim to improve the way the EU legislates and to ensure that EU legislation better serves citizens and businesses. It should make the EU legislative process more transparent, open to stakeholder input and easier to follow (Better law-making agreement 2016)

in the continuation of this chapter, I will further dissect the stages that legal acts need to pass in order to be presented in the Croatian Parliament.

8.1.1. Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) in Croatia

According to the Croatian *Act on Regulatory Impact Assessment* and *The Rules of Procedure of Croatian Government*, in the processes of all normative and planning act formulations, the state administrative bodies are required to conduct a procedure of regulatory impact assessment [61] . According to the Act on Regulatory Impact Assessment, regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is defined as "a procedure for adopting decisions on regulations based on evidence and collected relevant data, which will serve as guidelines for choosing the best solution for adopting regulations or taking non-normative activities and measures" (Article 2). Furthermore, the Act constitutes a provision which states that: "regulatory impact assessment analyses the positive and negative impacts of regulations on the respective economic sector, including the financial impact, the area of welfare, the area of environmental protection and an outline of the fiscal impact, parallel with consulting the public and interested parties" (ibid). The RIA procedure is particularly important from the perspective of public policy, because it introduces principles of public policy analysis into the process of decision-making. Systems based on RIA are therefore much easier to analyze using public policy methodology, and hence, they allow researchers to compare and critically evaluate the process of making decisions.

Romic and Vajda Halek (2014), in their text on the state of affairs and perspective of RIA in Croatia, critically examine the process by pointing out that the procedure of RIA starts with the drafting of the proposed testimony. As the authors explain: "these are the various analyses of the existing and desired states, access to theses, drafting proposals on non-normative solutions, identification of desirable and undesirable effects, conducting consultations with inter-ministerial bodies and interested stakeholders. The draft proposal of the statement then goes to the consultation with the public" (p. 886). What follows is the submission of the proposal with comments and suggestions from the public to the appropriate authorities for their review. Taking into consideration these opinions from respective authorities, the

[61] RIA is mandatory for all regulations stipulated by the annual plan of normative activities.

professional bearer[62] then drafts a proposal testimony and is required to "obtain the proposals and comments from the public and of the interested public (886)". In fact, this stage is the foundation of policy formulation, since the professional bearer in the process of drafting establishes the working expert group, whose goal is to prepare a draft to be sent to a public hearing. The regulation proposal and testimony, after being accepted or rejected given the suggestions and opinions of the public, is once again submitted to the appropriate authorities for a review, and after their consensus opinion, to the Legislation Office for approval (ibid). Once the Legislation Office approves the document, it is then submitted to the government for the governmental procedure presented in Figure 8.1.

The RIA procedure in Croatia is complicated and officials are inadequately prepared for its implementation. Banic (2006) in her texts argues that "Inconsistency and incoherence in the implementation of regulatory impact assessment have dissolved the original solid regulatory impact assessment procedure." (p. 949) Furthermore, she points out that state bureaucracy is not adequately informed about the relevance and methodology of the RIA. Despite that, the initiative is "perceived as positive steps towards greater transparency and a better representation of the data on the websites of ministries" (Romic and Vajda Halak 2014, p. 890). Moreover, RIA is a process which introduced the principles of public policy-making into the Croatian government's administrative system. The sole fact that legal acts are being evaluated on the criteria of their societal impact is a great step towards contemporary policy-making. However, this aspect of the Croatian public administration is inadequately explored. There is almost no empirical data present on the effectiveness of RIA and its influence on policy change. Another problematic facet is figuring out which stages of RIA are not effective enough and where additional effort is needed in order to assure a high calibre policy-making process. Taking these arguments into consideration, the rest of this chapter will deal with youth policy-making and the process of policy formulation characterising it.

In Chapter 6, where policy formulation was conceptualized as a power arena where an inventory of potential policy solutions is being done and the appropriateness of each is being evaluated, it was demonstrated how policy actors in the policy formulation stage propose solutions and jointly assess the positive and negative aspects of each in order to propel the most promising ones into consequent policy stages. Policy

[62] An administrative body in whose jurisdiction is the drafting of a certain act.

formulation in the Croatian context can be understood as a process that unfolds in an expert group. At this stage, potential policies are being deliberated and crafted and appropriate solutions are chosen. Despite that fact, there is a possibility that some aspects of the specific policy will be changed in the later stages; however, since most of the content produced in this stage ends up becoming enacted, we can easily argue that expert working groups are to be considered the heart of policy formulation in Croatia (Petak, 2013).

In the next two sections, I will present the two aforementioned Croatian case studies exemplifying the diversity of outcomes of the policy formulation process: the unique processes delineating the creation of the Youth Act and the National Youth Program. After offering a dense description based on document analysis, participant observation and focused interviews, I will introduce empirical data into the power matrix blueprint presented in chapter 5 (Figure 5.1). More concretely, as power is associated with attributed influence, I seek to examine the quality of argumentation (supported by resources and discourse legitimacy) and the degree of preference attainment, the two building blocks of my understanding of power. Each of the discussed processes is subjected to the same analytical method, in order to achieve an accurate comparison. As presented earlier, this triangulation of qualitative methods where the emphasis is on the immersion of a researcher in a specific political domain, which stems from the tradition of anthropology and is called political ethnography, will uncover the agency *modi operandi* and help in identifying specific patterns, in turn helping us assess the power in this specific case study. Political ethnography in the process of youth decision-making in Croatia will thus help us reveal the so-called "grey zone of politics" (Auyero, 2007), or to be more precise – help us in mapping the meanings of interactions between stakeholders, which is in line with the interpretative policy analysis, as stipulated in the methodological chapter.

Therefore, in the continuation of this chapter, I will not only compare the two Croatian youth policy processes but will also extrapolate factors relevant to explaining the power relations among policy actors and their influence on the dynamics of the policy subsystem.

8.2. The making of The National Youth Program 2014-2017

The National Youth Program, active from 2014 to 2017, was created to act as a legal strategy. To clarify the definition, strategies are planning documents that

determine a state's position and vision in a specific policy field. Strategies are planned steps of enforcement that aim to develop or solidify certain societal, political, economic and other national realities in order for a society to advance and fulfil its potential. In general, all national youth strategies have more or less similar goals, as stipulated in the Irish example: "The aim of the National youth program is to enable all young people to realise their maximum potential, by respecting their rights and hearing their voices, while protecting and supporting them as they transition from childhood to adulthood." (Department of Children and Youth Affairs of Ireland 2015). Croatia has a relatively recent tradition of developing policy records within youth policy, with the current National Youth Program being the third in a row. Furthermore, as specified in the previous chapter, the inceptions of youth policy existed before 2003 when the first National Youth Program was adopted, however, their levels of quality are a different story altogether.

The existing National Youth Program spans a three-year time period and encompasses relevant actors and their roles in order to ensure the aggregation of a cohesive environment for the development of young people. According to the National Youth Program, the main goal of this strategy is to strengthen the activities of the central state authorities and other public institutions so that they can enable a quality life for young people and help them in the fulfilment of their needs and requirements (NYP 2014, 18). Hence, the overall objective of this policy document is to ease and optimize the social integration of young people into adulthood. In light of these goals, the National Youth Program follows EU standards and guidelines as stipulated in the *EU Strategy for Youth – Investing and Empowering*, and it is divided into eight chapters:

- Education, professional development and training in the context of life-long learning
- Employment and entrepreneurship
- Health and health protection
- Social protection and social inclusion
- Volunteering
- Active social and political participation of youth
- Youth in the European and global context
- Youth and culture

The first chapter of these guidelines is an introduction with data presentation acquired from a quantitative research conducted for the purpose of the National Youth Program assembly, entitled *Needs, Problems and Potentials of Young People in Croatia*.

So far, every national youth program was preceded by a quantitative research on youth problems, perceptions, desires, values, and behaviours. This National Youth Program is no exception. Relying on the suggestions of the European Union and taking into account the best practices of the Council of Europe, the first stage of creating a national youth program should be the acquisition of empirical data on young people. Using this evidence-based approach increases the chances that public policies will be based on the actual needs of a population. Likewise, this approach minimizes the chances of possible political influences and unjustified policy measures. The research for this national youth program was conducted in 2013 based on a nationally representative sample (N=2000) of a cohort of young people aged 15-29. The sample was constructed using a probability sampling method in three phases and upon completion, an assessment was conducted in order to attain gender and age median of the sample. The research was conducted by two university professors and Croatia's leading experts on youth issues – Vlasta Ilišin and Vedrana Spajić Vrkaš.

The results obtained from this research were supplemented by statistical data from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics along with other relevant academic insights on young people. They were then used in the process of policy goals setting and agenda building. Incidentally, the current national youth program, apart from consisting of seven chapters, has 40 policy measures and 118 tasks, the implementation of which is entrusted to 17 state authority bodies. Comparing it with the National Youth Program that operated between 2009 and 2013, where there were also 7 priority areas, 52 objectives and 53 measures, this current version of the National Youth Program seems much more realistic and workable. In addition to this, the results of the interview analysis show that all interviewed actors believe the current national youth program is superior in content, coherence and objectives than previous such programs.

In the introductory text of the policy document (2014, 18), four novel aspects of this version of the national youth program are stipulated. *Firstly*, as claimed, this is the first time a youth strategy relied exclusively on the principles of evidence-based policy-making. So far, only some features of this approach were used; however, this text is entirely dependent on statistical and other empirical data. *Secondly*, the active participation of young people in the process of writing the youth strategy is emphasized. As explained, young people participated en masse in the assembly of the policy research; they participated in the expert working group and gave their opinions through public hearings. *Thirdly*, the novelty of this national youth program is found in the fact

that it served as an operative document rather than a declaratory one. The previous two versions of national youth strategies were megalomaniac texts with colossal amounts of policy measures that read more like a wish list than actual enforceable guidelines. The *final* innovative principle of the current National Youth Program 2014-2017, as exposed in the text, lies in the fact that its creators implemented quality assurance mechanisms. Hence, for every policy measure and its respective task "apart from bearers, collaborates, and dues, clear output and result indicators are set" in order to enable viable evaluation of what has been achieved at the end of the period this program covers (2014, 19). In addition, the system of placing indicators allows for a more efficient oversight on budget spending and increases the responsibility of bearers.

Nevertheless, these novelties should be understood conditionally. After analysing the process and the content of the aforementioned strategy one can see that not all of the declaratory innovations were indeed present. Hence, the National Youth Program 2014-2017 does not rely entirely on the evidence-based approach. When comparing data from the research intended for the creation of the NYP and the objectives and measures in some chapters (predominantly in the chapter Youth in the European and global context) a discrepancy between the research results and content is obvious. More concretely, in a questionnaire there is no mention of the relevance of the UN, UNESCO, and Council of Europe for young people (three measures at the NYP) nor are they asked about their intentions for participation in these organizations. Furthermore, research topics do not cover the European Youth Card, even though it is also one of the measures in the aforementioned chapter. In addition to this, data related to the international context of Croatian youth (such as mobility experience) is not used in the NYP, either in the introductory remarks or in the objectives or measures.

Another problematic statement is that this version of the national youth program is operational rather than a declaratory one. If read carefully, one might see an abundance of indicators linked to tasks; furthermore, if these indicators are analyzed it is evident that in most of the chapters there is no unified differentiation between indicators of results and indicators of outcomes even though the NYP insists on those two categories. This might seem like just a technical problem, however, if analyzed thoroughly one might see that these two categories of indicators are nothing more than additional tasks and activities. Having said this, the current NYP consists of many more activities for the governmental bodies to implement in the three-year time period, which jeopardizes the feasibility of their implementation. This notion also affects the whole

quality assurance system relying on indicators. Hence, if the indicators are not set adequately or concretely (for instance "The Republic of Croatia will open an additional 20 youth-friendly public institutions in culture NYP, p. 69) the monitoring of the Program will be virtually impossible.

The National Youth Program 2014-2017 covers a three-year time span because it is estimated that this is the optimal period for the implementation of short term and mid-term policy decisions when it comes to youth policy (Kovacic 2015). The previous enforced national youth strategies in Croatia had covered a period of five years; however, due to the changing nature and needs of the youth sector because of new challenges young people face, it was settled that five years was simply too far ahead into the future for effective planning and adequate youth policy outcomes. Moreover, from my point of view, a three-year span allows state administration to plan and coordinate its activities more efficiently and produce action plans that are more feasible in regards to other ongoing agendas.

The formation process of the National Youth Program 2014-2017 began in May 2013 with the appointment of the expert working group for the draft-making process by the Vice President of the Croatian Government and the Minister of Social Policy and Youth, Ms. Milanka Opačić (Odluka o osnivanju i imenovanju Radne skupine za izradu Nacrta prijedloga Nacionalnog programa za mlade od 2014. do 2017. godine). In a document specifying the appointments of the working group, it is stipulated that the group had a duty to make a draft of the national youth program by December 31st, 2013. The decision further appointed the Directorates for Youth and International and EU Affairs, together with the Secretariat of the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth to be in charge of implementing the draft into concrete programmatic outcomes. The provisionary document also envisioned eight subgroups that will eventually become 8 chapters of the National Youth Program 2014-2017. Into each subgroup, five experts were appointed - two state administration representatives in charge of the implementation of goals within the topic of the subgroup, two civil society representatives and one academic community representative. In total, 40 people were appointed to make a draft of the document using a variety of resources and their expertise. This constellation of subgroups confirms the assumption that the process of youth policy-making embraces the features of collaborative governance presented in chapters 3 and 7.

At the first meeting with all appointed participants, Assistant Minister for Social Policy and Youth, Ms. Maja Sporiš[63], pointed out that the responsibilities of each subgroup are as following: to analyze strategic documents relevant to a specific policy subfield that the specific subgroup is in charge of, to make an analysis of the subfields in their jurisdiction from the National Youth Program 2009-2012, and to make recommendations based on the research reports for years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. Likewise, the subgroups were to research the recommendations of the research found in *Needs, Problems and Potentials of Young People in Croatia* and draft policy measures concerning their policy subfield[64]. Besides the substantial amount of information, an action plan was also presented to the working-group participants (see Table 8.1). As is apparent from the table, the whole process was set up with lots of optimism. It was very ambitious to expect that participants would have so much time to produce complex policy analyses, particularly because no compensation was given to them for their efforts[65]. Indeed, this action plan reveals another interesting discovery, namely that the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth anticipated that the end of the policy formulation process would be in April 2014, after which it would be submitted for governmental approval. This is a bit unusual, given that the National Youth Program has the year 2014 as its starting year, meaning that almost half of the first year would already be lost. In other words, the National Youth Program would - if all deadlines are met - be operational for only two and a half years and not three as originally stipulated. This can indicate a frivolity of the bearer and perhaps an inability to organize the process more rapidly in order to respect deadlines and the scope of activities. Also, since academic insights suggest three years to be the optimal time scope for youth strategy implementation (Williamson, 2002; Kovacic, 2015), we can point to the

[63] In the near future, Ms. Maja Sporiš will be promoted to the Deputy-Minister for Social Policy and Youth: thus, every time I mention her, I will point out her title so that a reader can know in what capacity she served in that context.

[64] The involved actors were instructed to use the following methodological framework:

The name of the policy measure	Bearer	Due date	Implementation indicators

[65] Due to national budget cuts, the working group participants were not paid for their contribution to the process of act-making. However, it was envisioned that the working group meetings and analyzes would be done during standard working hours. Unfortunately, this system is discriminatory towards the civil society representatives, because civil society funds itself from the projects completed by these constituents. Instead, civil service participants employed at the project have to record their work activities in time-sheets, and activities such as crafting the National youth program are usually not 'acceptable' conditions for compensation. On the other hand, representatives from the academic community and/or state authority bodies have proceedings in their job descriptions that allow such processes to be a part of their daily work and compensation.

Ministry for the lack of proper preparations and oversight. Ultimately, the Croatian government adopted the National Youth Program on October 9th, 2014.

Table 8.1 – Action plan of the National Youth Program 2014-2017

Activity bearer	Tasks	Dues
Expert working group	National Youth Program 2009-2013 analysis	15 September 2013
	Strategic document analysis	15 September 2013
	Defining of priorities for the National Youth Program 2014-2017	1 November 2013
	Drafting policy measures for the National Youth Program 2014-2017	30 November 2013
Committee	First draft	31 December 2013
Ministry of Social Policy and Youth	Public hearing/ public consultation	Beginning of January 2013
	Drafting of submission to the competent authorities of the opinion	Mid-February
	Acceptance/rejection of opinions and suggestions	Beginning of March 2014
	Submission to the Government	End of March 2014

Source: Notes from the 1st meeting of the expert working group (2013)

During their first meeting, each area subgroup was supposed to elect its chair. Out of the eight subgroups chairs, only two of them were academic community representatives and six of them civil society representatives. Interviews conducted with the involved participants reveal that there were very few volunteers for this position. In most cases, subgroups agreed that these civil society representatives are "more knowledgeable of the subject" and thus should be chairs. A respondent from the Volunteering subgroup explains how their chair was chosen:

By consensus! [laugh]. *There was no specific voting system. Anamarija was a logical choice because, at that time, she was involved in various committees on volunteering (not only at the Ministry). Let's say she was the most knowledgeable.* (Respondent 1).

This information is relevant because it suggests that from the very beginning other involved actors perceived civil society representatives as more interested in the process. Even though the process of choosing the chair was not contentious, it still

implies that policy actors had more trust in civil society representatives who were to coordinate the process and organize the area subgroup to deliver the most effective policy output. The task of the chair was to convene meetings and coordinate the writing process of all involved stakeholders. However, there is another reason why the chairs held such importance. As I will demonstrate in the next paragraph, all chairs were to be appointed to another very important government body.

In August 2013, by the decision of the Vice President of the Croatian Government and the Minister of Social Policy and Youth, Ms. Milanka Opačić, the Draft-making Committee of the National Youth Program 2014-2017 was selected, named and appointed (Odluka o osnivanju i imenovanju Povjerenstva u okviru rada Radne skupine za izradu Nacrta prijedloga Nacionalnog programa za mlade od 2014 - 2017, 2013). Its task was to consolidate and finalise texts from the subgroups and propose a final draft ready for a public hearing. Just as it was the case with the expert working groups, the Directorate for Youth, International and EU Affairs, together with the Secretariat of the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, was in charge of coordinating the process and providing technical support to the committee. In the committee, there were a total of 13 participants: two representatives of the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, four representatives of academic communities and seven representatives of civil society. It should be noted that in addition to the 13 representatives, all area subgroup chairs were likewise appointed to this committee, thus the reason for disproportionality among sectors' representatives. The committee divisions and their respective processes can be seen in Figure 8.2. By choosing the pyramidal structure, the Ministry emphasized two points. Firstly, that the inclusiveness of the process does not end at the appointment of the process, but rather that it indeed is the modus operandi. And secondly, that in theory the division of labour was well imagined and substantial. However, in order to assess the true effects of this, the implementation itself should be taken into consideration, thus, in the next section, this process is being deconstructed and analyzed. Moreover, as described in the second chapter, qualitative data analysis is about the "search for patterns in data and for ideas that help explain why those patterns are there in the first place" (Bernard and Ryan, 2009, 109). Therefore, based on the qualitative content analysis of the documents and interviews in the Croatian case study, there are three categories the variables encompass, namely *the process*, *the perception of the roles* and *the content*. As we continue, each

of these factors will be described and interpreted in regards to insights from participant observation[66] and the theoretical framework set earlier in the text.

Figure 8.2: The partition of the process



8.2.1. The process

Before the policy formulation process was set to take place – the work conducted in a working group (the Draft-making Committee of the National Youth Program, 2014-2017) and area subgroups, the Ministry contracted two main researchers to conduct research which would serve as the foundation for the policy formulation stage. Built upon these research findings, the Ministry, together with the researchers, formulated guidelines for the area subgroups. This preparatory phase was the first step in the actual policy-making process.

It has already been demonstrated that this specific process of forming the National youth program differed primarily in its organization and structure from the previous program variants. The most current process is perceived as more inclusive, more participatory and integrative in its nature. The reason behind such a democratic

[66] According to Creswell (2013), during participant observation, it is recommended to use a protocol when collecting information in order to organize research and make it coherent. The protocol of the PO for this study is available in Appendix C, and focuses on three main elements: *persuasion and discourse construction* (actors' argumentation), *the degree of preference attainment*, and *alliances depending on positions*.

and collaborative process is the role and impact of civil society. Both state and civil representatives point out that civil society, and more specifically the Croatian Youth Network, advocated for a participatory and inclusive process that was to be enacted in the course of preparations of the National Youth Program. Here, the influence of civil society and youth influence on public authorities is evident and reckoned to be positive/useful based on statements from both formal and non-formal actors.

After discussing with our members, the CYN approached the Ministry with the suggestion of how to make the process of drafting NYP better. This time they listened. (Respondent 5)

If the terminology from the proposed power matrix is used, this is one of the dimensions of preference attainment or one of the aspects of power. As "meaningful inclusiveness" in the youth policy-making in Croatia was the goal of the Croatian Youth Network as stipulated in the Position paper on National youth program back in 2012 (mmh.hr, 2012) one can track this policy position easily. On the other hand, the inclusiveness of the Ministry in the previous processes was not so substantial. This was confirmed by Respondent 5 (please see the previous extract of the interview) and even by a ministry representative – Respondent 8. Therefore, based on the Degree of preference attainment from the description of the power matrix, one can see that the new more inclusive methodology was used for the aforementioned process which was the goal of the civil society representatives from the start. Moreover, this policy turn of the ministry from the more closed and less inclusive process of writing the previous NYP towards this more inclusive process clearly demonstrates one of the power aspects of civil society. In general, stakeholders involved in the process believe that the foundation for the whole process was set successfully in terms of the choice of actors, the academic/research quality and the balance between the types of participating actors. An explanation from a Ministry representative on what seemed to be the guiding principle for choosing actors to participate in the process supports the claim of a balanced representation of selected actors[67]:

[67] This refers to the expert working group part of the National Youth Program 2014-2017 draft-making process.

For us, it was important to have a balance between the representatives of public authorities and the civil sector in all working groups. In addition, it was crucial to get the most relevant state authorities for each particular policy topic.
(Respondent 8)

This finding, supported by the perception of involved stakeholders, is important not only because it shows the power of civil society but also because it supports the argument proposed in chapter 7 that youth policy-making in Croatia is in line with the principles of collaborative governance. Collaborative governance as such in its essence includes communication, active listening, and consensus. Active and meaningful participation of institutional and non-institutional actors in the process of writing the National youth program has been normalized as a part of the youth policy-making process, thus it can be observed and analyzed from the perspective of collaborative governance. Moreover, I argue, the whole *process* of writing the National youth program was consensus-oriented and without major conflicts. This is supported by a number of respondents in their interviews. For instance, Respondent 3 states that the process of making NYP was "easy-going, smooth and easy to follow", Respondent 8 states that one "does not recall any problems within the process apart from the late arrival of the research results". Furthermore, Respondent 2 claims that [she] got the feeling the Ministry took most of the recommendations from the research while the civil society was on board with them". Content-wise, issues that arose in the process were solved amiably and rapidly by discussing them; interestingly enough, the analysis does show that if two points of view conflicted, proposals from the civil society would be accepted significantly more often. For instance, there was a discussion on the length of the chapter on culture and creativity where the representatives of the Ministry believed it was too comprehensive while most of the area subgroup led by the civil society representative, claimed it was necessary due to its importance and the underdeveloped area of youth culture. Arguments proposed by the civil society representatives went in the direction of how important culture is for youth development and that in cases of such great importance it is necessary to put aside the principle "less is more". Additionally, a researcher seconded the proposal and as a result, the chapter on culture is page-wise longer and more elaborate than some other chapters. This overview of the discussion and its result clearly demonstrates the openness of the Ministry to a healthy argument and the willingness to slacken their position upon the quality of that argument. Thereupon, it is no surprise that under those circumstances,

particular policy actors claimed that because of this collaborative process, they were further motivated to associate with other relevant actors and start thinking of the future potential for cooperation.

Another important finding regarding this collaborative stage of the process is the lack of a unified and efficient coordination of the process. As explained, the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth was in charge to ensure the coherence and the compliance of the process. The idea was that the expert working group should be in charge of the overall coordination and compilation of materials delivered from various area subgroups. Even though this structure seemed plausible, in practice, it proved to be chaotic. Here are some testimonies supporting this very claim:

The whole process was uncoordinated. There was a lot to do and lots of structuring was needed, however, due to a lack of competence of the Ministry representatives and their general activity overload, the process got out of hand.
(Respondent 5)

The overall framework of the participating actors was adequately initiated and therefore could serve as a model for future processes. Yet this specific process involved a dose of chaos in terms of unclearly communicated goals, imprecise methodology and blurry terminology.
(Respondent 2)

The process was participatory, but it was chaotic in terms of meeting deadlines. The main researchers were late with the delivery of research findings… there were some administrative complications. We [the subgroup] *were supposed to finish the process in September 2013. But in the end, we finished in December 2013.*
(Respondent 1)

The aforesaid extracts from the interviews demonstrate that despite the generally positive perception of the inclusiveness of the process, the Ministry, which was supposed to set and coordinate the policy arena failed to assure the adequate level of coordination. This is of particular importance from the perspective of the theory of policy formulation and collaborative governance. As shown in chapters 3, 4 and 6, the role of formal actors in the process of decision-making which follows stipulations of collaborative governance, is to design the arena in which the policy-making is going to

happen and to coordinate different interests, points of views and insights of all actors involved. Even though this role might seem frivolous when compared to the exclusivist pattern of vertical top-down policy-making in which the role of the government is more profound, it stills poses a challenge to assure the smooth flow of the process and the quality of the resulting policy proposal. Therefore, the role of the state, in terms of its power, should not be analyzed throughout anything more than these three features: the content the government manages to implement in the policy proposal, the inclusiveness of the process and ability to coordinate the process that had been set up. In other words, if a state successfully pushes its objectives, goals, measures, tasks, and activities in the NYP, if it assures that the relevant policy actors participate in the decision-making process and if the tasks of each actor are well defined and fulfilled within the time-line, one might say the government (or the Ministry as its representative) is successful in exercising its power.

Despite the delay in the delivery process, there were no other glitches with the expert working group and subgroups. As collaborative agendas were nearing deadlines, materials from the working groups were delivered rather late, which generated anxiety among the representatives of the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth. Consequentially, this created pressure on the area subgroups to deliver concrete outputs in order to end the stagnation of the process. This is important to note because it demonstrates the influence of the state in the process and over participating actors. We will explore the (perceived) power of the state in the next section.

Before we start analysing the role of participating actors, one relevant discovery shared by almost all respondents should be pointed out. In general, there is a prevailing opinion that the process of forming the National youth program provided a learning experience for all stakeholders. Taking into account the positive and negative aspects that arose during the collaborative deliberation stage of policy-making, academic community members, civil society representatives, as well as state representatives, perceive this stage of the process as largely positive. Moreover, on a number of occasions during the process, different actors pointed out that the lessons learned from this process were going to be applied in the forthcoming processes in order to ensure greater democratic outcomes and transparency.

8.2.2. Role perception

Sociology teaches us that a societal role is expected behaviour of an individual occupying a particular social position (Linton 1936, cited in Haralambos and Holborn 2002). However, what is more important is that sociology, psychology and interpretative approach as a theoretical paradigm can teach us that in some cases, the perception of an individual's role is more important than one's actual role. In line with this dissertation's argument, it is precisely the perception of an actor in a specific social or policy setting that determines the power of the actor. In order to understand and identify the power of the actors in the context of youth policy-making in Croatia, it is likewise important to examine the mutual perception of the actors in the process of crafting the National youth program. At this time, I will turn to the analysis of state actors, civil society representatives and academic community members as they regard to role perception.

As explained earlier in the collaborative governance domain, the role of **the state** is not to row, but to steer. The idea is that state actors construct the policy arena and coordinate objectives, interests, and contributions of relevant stakeholders. This rather vague conceptualization of state actors' role leaves room for interpretation and visionary freedom in designing strategies of their behaviour. Representatives of the government still have a great role as architects of the policy arena. As illustrated in the section explaining the construction of the polity in Croatia, it is precisely the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth that appoints relevant stakeholders. This is a rather important factor of influence, although it should be stressed that the interviewed state representatives indicated that the appointments to the expert working group were conducted in consultation with civil society and academic community members. Hence, from the beginning, the process was based on dialogue and open participation of different actors and inclusiveness. Also, as shown in the section 8.2.1., this exact objective was stipulated much in advance, in the positional document of one of the key civil society actors (due to the lack of this principle in the previous processes of writing the NYP) thus by using the domain of the degree of preference attainment - it is obvious the CYN managed to influence and impose their point of view to the Ministry.

In the context of state actors, I can extrapolate three factors from the conducted interviews and my field notes. Firstly, there is a consensus that state actors are seen as the coordinators of the process (which is in line with the propositions of the collaborative governance stipulated in Chapter 3). In three interviews, this arose to be

the most important task of the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth. Moreover, the Ministry, together with the other state bodies involved in the process, is seen as an entity that operates within "the real context" (Respondents 1 and 2). This means that academic community members believe that the state administration understands the importance and implications of youth policy, but, at the same time, is aware of the boundaries and limits of the National youth program. The complexity of the state's perception and role is reflected in the impressions of the civil society representatives. While some describe state institutions involved in the process positively as "coordinative" (Respondent 6), others critique the state as being "without ideas". Another respondent also declared that it is to society's advantage "that someone else is going to do the substantial part of the job [content-wise] instead of them" (Respondent 4). From this data, one can conclude that the ministry indeed did have a limited role due to the specificity of the policy area, actors' constellation and internal capacities of the state. Moreover, it seems the Ministry willingly decided to design the process with the idea to steer it rather than row and let non-formal actors do the greater part of the job. One may argue this demonstrates the power of the state, however, I believe that due to institutional culture and track record arguments such as these are unfounded. In my opinion, and based on the insights from academic texts, the Croatian public administration is relatively 'strong', as Puljiz (2001) writes. Meaning that the state includes other actors in a policy process in a meaningful way only if it is sure it will benefit from it. To put it more bluntly, I argue that the Ministry in this case realized it cannot pull off the process by itself thus including non-state actors was their strategy to produce a relatively quality output. This notion was indicated in interviews with both civil society representatives (respondent 7) and state officials (Respondent 8), both claiming that only the synergy of actors would produce a good National youth program.

Secondly and related to the first point, there is a perception in the academic community and among civil society representatives that the state administration "knows what it does not want (novelties), but does not know what it wants" (Respondent 1). In the next section, I am going to explore the process more thoroughly content-wise, but for now, it is important to understand that the actors in this process generally do not think that the state representatives have innovative solutions nor much interest in drastically changing the direction of youth policy. It is likewise believed that the state actors only wish to stay on the course of the status quo and familiar terrain. The academic debate on the differences between state and non-state actors in terms of

maintaining or changing the status quo is not unfamiliar in political science. Even though some texts highly criticize the administration's orientation on maintaining the status quo (King et al, 1998; Johnsen, 2005), conclusions should not be drawn frivolously. Diamond (2010) compares third sector organizations with the state on the example of refugees and concludes the third sector organizations indeed challenge the status quo, however, this does not mean the aforementioned strategy is always good for the community. In light of these limitations, the statement of one state representative is particularly interesting:

We simply don't have enough knowledge to undertake the whole process by ourselves (Respondent 8).

This statement clearly supports the argument delivered by Kooiman (1993) and Peters and Pierre (1998) that claims that the state loses the capacity to control the whole process in detail due to the lack of resources and the proliferation of tasks and areas the state has to deal with, and therefore replaces this inaptitude with the aim of influencing the policy process instead. This would mean that the government decides to restrain itself from covering every aspect of policy-making and focuses more on sharing responsibility. In other words, it decides to steer, not to row. Respondent 3 described the role of the state actors in the following manner:

The sensibility of the state apparatus on these topics is increasing […] they are becoming aware that just the function is not enough […] their aim should be in creating the enabling environment.

Apart from the lack of capacity, the issue of funding is another argument often used by state representatives as a reason for not deviating drastically from the previous versions of the national youth program. Another interesting circumstance occurred throughout the whole process, and that was the shifting of responsibility from one state authority to another. State representatives would, without exception, refuse to take the lead in the implementation of certain objectives and policy measures, often claiming this would exceed their domain of responsibilities and pointing out their lack of resources. In discussion, expressions such as the following exemplify this hesitancy: "we don't have the necessary capacity to undertake this action", "so far our ministry was not in charge of something like this", "we are simply understaffed for XY" or "my supervisor will not like the fact we agreed to take this as our responsibility". The last expression here also reverberated among the academic community members. Respondent 2 claims that in the process of decision-making, there were clear patterns

of a discrepancy between the street level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980) and higher-level officials. Indeed, during my participant observations, I managed to detect that the state representatives appointed to the process of National Youth Program formation were insecure and seemingly nervous if they were certain that the more innovative proposals (mostly proposed by the civil society representatives) would be accepted and preferred by the public authority they were serving under.

However, the question relevant for the purpose of assessing power is if this unwillingness to accept innovative solutions was important enough for them to be veto actors. In other words, is this strategy of inclination towards the more traditional, existing and established policy solutions realised at the expense of other actors' intents or has the State decided to step outside its proclaimed role of the steersman. In order to answer this, the difference between the existing and the previous national youth strategies should be analyzed. A simple content analysis of these two documents shows that out of seven chapters, 40 policy measures and 118 tasks the existing NYP has, there is a concurrence in 64% of the content. More specifically, both strategies have the same chapter names, 25 identical policy measures, and 76 tasks. This means that more than half of the content of the existing youth program was taken from the previous one, however, I argue that this data does not argue in favour of the power of the government. There are two reasons for that; firstly, the identical chapters are conventional youth policy chapters without which there is no youth policy. In other words, there are some aspects of youth policy such as youth participation, social inclusion or employment which are the determinants of a youth policy as such and therefore are crucial parts of every youth policy strategy. Secondly, some of the concurrent policy measures and tasks were re-institutionalized by non-formal actors and not the Ministry. For instance, the task "recognition and validation of non-formal education" was proposed by the civil society representative due to its importance for the sector and the fact that this measure was not implemented in the previous NYP cycle. To sum up, it seems that the wish of the Ministry to carry on with the existing solutions and policy measures is more of an inclination and exaggeration of the civil society respondents rather than a fact. This is also supported by the persistence of the governmental officials in debates about policy measures. On four occasions during participant observation of the debates on the topic of existing versus new, the ministry representatives indeed stated their wish to carry on with existing tasks but after the first rebuttal from the civil society representatives (on three occasions) and the members of the academic community (once) they withdrew.

This demonstrates that their persistence to re-institutionalize existing policy measures was more of a folklore than their true determination. It can be said that the government officials were not innovators but they were also not veto actors.

As far as the role of **civil society representatives** is concerned, the perception of their function is utterly different. The umbrella term used by one of the interview respondents (2) that could summarize the perceived role of the civil society in this specific process is – innovation advocates. Due to the fact that the civil society representatives work with young people on a daily basis, their insight into young lives and needs was invaluable. According to respondent 2: *As the Youth Association members were arguing for their proposals, it made me think about things I have never thought of before.*

In terms of the power matrix proposed in this dissertation, discourse legitimacy was repeatedly used. The Croatian Youth Network (CYN) often emphasises the fact that they have several dozen civil society organizations in their membership and thus they know, understand and empathise the problems and needs of young people. Obviously, this claim to insight worked, because civil society in this stage of the policy-making process was perceived as competent, capable and knowledgeable. It was interesting to observe the dynamics of discussion during the process. Once any new topic emerged for deliberation, the participating actors foremost turned their attention to the CYN representative, expecting his/her opinion, which would establish a starting point for the overall discussion. Even in the area subgroups where chairs were not selected from the CYN, this often occurred, which undermines the importance of the official actor position often emphasized in public policy literature (Colebatch, 2006). There is no doubt that the Croatian Youth Network was perceived as a focal point for policy-making. The arguments from their representatives would often be supported by the actual societal necessity for a certain measure and would frequently be used in the international and comparative context. This discourse legitimacy argument as described in the power matrix demonstrates that the CYN managed to position itself as a powerful and unavoidable actor, particularly in terms of content and their link with young people. Hence, this perceived authority was also recognized in the interviews, where all respondents unanimously pointed out that they view the CYN to be both a central actor and a veto actor (Tsebelis 2000). Here are a few relevant thoughts on this from the interviewed respondents:

Respondent 4:

In this process, we confirmed that we are the actors they cannot work without. If we wanted to stop the process, we could have.

Respondent 1:

The Croatian Youth Network contributed to the process the most. Their insights, ideas and experience were the most important in our area subgroup.

One might argue that this finding does not reflect on the power of the CYN but rather on the power of the government, but I strongly believe this position is incorrect in the context of the argument proposed in this dissertation. If power is understood as attributed influence (as argued in chapter 5), the perception and interpretation of this influence is a yardstick for power. Hence, the result of this approach is that the behaviour of actors is determined by their perception, meaning that if one is perceived as powerful and influential this will influence the behaviour of others. From the analysis of the stakeholders' point of view extrapolated from the interview, it is evident that other involved formal and non-formal actors did and still do perceive the CYN as pivotal in the process of NYP making. This means the argument of attributed influence is confirmed as their inputs both on the process and the content were tremendous and bigger than that of the other actors, as demonstrated by using the power matrix's segments; discourse legitimacy, degree of preference attainment and resource perception.

It is worth mentioning the common, instinctual perception of the participating civil society representatives. They strongly believed that their role was to clarify the whole idea of youth policy to the other involved actors (Respondent 5). But, at the same time, they felt used by the state administration because of its incompetence and reliance on consultation (Respondent 4).

The last finding about the role of the civil society in this process refers to the differentiation among civil society representatives. According to the interviews and observations of the process, the civil society actors could be grouped into two groups. On the one hand, there were the representatives of the Croatian Youth Network who managed the whole process due to the perception of their legitimate subject authority by the other actors. On the other hand, there were other civil society representatives who have a particular interest only in certain aspects of the process and the potential output. It seems that they simply didn't believe they could achieve ownership of the

process. This supports assertions made by respondent 6, who claims that one's organization was more interested in particular topics of the act than in the whole participatory process and that the bigger interest in the process and youth policy, in general, was left to the CYN. Such finding reminds us of one of the most relevant characteristics of civil society – the pluralism of interests.

The least elaborate respondents in the interviews were the **academic community representatives**. Foremost, it should be stated that the academic community members involved in the process enjoy an indisputable reputation and have a vast authority in the field. Respondents 6, 9 and 10 unanimously confirmed that the reputation of both researchers is impeccable, as Respondent 10 even stated that: "The Ministry was happy to work with them". Thus, it is safe to conclude that there is a common perception of all the respondents that those that belong in this category are the most knowledgeable in the field of youth research and thus understand youth reality in Croatia. This is supported by my findings of participant observation. In all the area subgroups, the participants that were not members of the research community showed great respect and even admiration towards the researchers. They would talk to them very politely, avoid conflict and be open to compromise. What is particularly interesting is the shift in body language. When a state representative would talk to a civil society representative, he/she would be in a relaxed state and would often use colloquial expressions; on the other hand, when a member of the research community would communicate, the tone, dynamics and manner of expression between the two actors would change dramatically. Everything would become more formal and official.

Coupled with this formal approach to collaboration, the role of the academic community members was seen as that of arbiters and interpreters of the research findings. State representatives rely heavily on the research community, but mostly in terms of facilitating the groundwork and expectations for the further steps of the policy-making process. However, academics would also take the role of mediators if the need arises. This role is complementary to the instinctual perception of the actors who claim they became involved in the process "to clear out any uncertainties" (Respondent 2). Moreover, the idea behind academic community involvement was that they have the integrative function to ascertain that conceptually, logically and systemically all the elements of policy generation fit together (Respondent 3). Academic community representatives thus filled the role Hawkesworth envisioned for them - namely, to illuminate the contentious dimensions of the policy question (1998, p. 191). Two

additional characteristics of the academic community members could be interpreted from the process. Firstly, it seems that they are, unlike civil society representatives (CYN), unstructured, particular and unorganized. Often, they would disagree on topics remotely related to the subject and propose solutions without innovative potential. In that sense, they were more similar in dynamics to the state representatives. However, when a civil society representative would respond to their argumentation, they would back off and agree with a particular, favoured argument. In the interview with a CYN representative, I raised the question of the nature of the strategic relationship between the state and the academic community, and I received an answer that indeed, an informal alliance between the civil society representatives and the academic community members had been formed (Respondent 4). More concretely, before the start of the policy-crafting process, as explained by Respondent 4, the CYN representatives initiated a meeting with the academic community members and agreed on certain positions. This event is very important because it once again demonstrates the discourse legitimacy of the CYN and its inclination to influence the course of the process as much as possible. To some extent, this alliance between the civil society actors and the academic community corresponds to some elements of the advocacy coalition (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994).

8.2.3. Content

The actors' influence on the content of the policy objectives represents the third cluster of variables to be examined in this study. So far, I have described the process and explained the perceived actor roles in that process. In the following section, I will analyze the actors that influence the content of the National youth program by (a) presenting the findings of the qualitative analysis of the minutes, the drafts and the final document of the National youth program, and (b) comparing the motivation and priorities of different actors prior to the process with the outcome of the process. In the matrix for assessing power (Figure 5.1), this is labelled as "the degree of preference attainment".

As stated beforehand, the current National youth program consists of seven chapters, 40 policy measures and 118 tasks the implementation of which is entrusted to 17 state authority bodies. In Table 8.2 an overview of priority areas and objectives is presented as a context in which I am going to present the findings of the study.

Table 8.2 - Overview of priority areas and objectives

Priority Area	Objectives
Education, professional training and life-long learning	• Active citizenship and non-violence • Youth work • Competitiveness in the labour market
Employment and entrepreneurship	• Labour market integration
Social protection and social inclusion	• Determining the category "youth at risk of poverty" • Raising awareness among state authorities about different vulnerable groups • Improving the support system for vulnerable youth
Health and social care	• Polyvalent advisory centres • Health education
Active participation of young people in social and political issues	• Enabling environment for youth organizations • Youth in the decision-making process • Quality and availability of volunteer programs
Youth in the European and global context	• Financial support for active participation • Mobility and better representation in IGOs
Youth and culture	• Greater cultural content in formal education • More accessible cultural content • Financial support for cultural activities • Sustainability and stability of places where culture can be exercised • Analytical support

Source: Kovačić, 2016

The analysis of available drafts and meeting minutes showcases that there are very few content-wise discussions outside the area subgroups[68]. These official documents that were provided by the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, highlight

[68] Due to the absence of an obligation that each area subgroup keeps track of discussions and happenings through minutes, it was not possible to analyze and reconstruct their deliberations. However, during the interviews and through the work of area subgroups, I was engaged with several findings delineating the nature of the content of the deliberations. Firstly, respondents described the discussions in area subgroups as «constructive», «substantial» and «competent». Civil society representatives stated that they wanted to facilitate as many objectives as possible into the policy, particularly in areas of activism, education, culture and health. On the other hand, the state actors' representatives highlighted that employment, social protection and education were the top priorities for the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth. The dynamics of work in area subgroups followed this pattern: based on the research, the Ministry would propose a general framework, then civil society representatives commented on it, requested changes or upgrades, and then, in most cases, that final version was accepted. There were some discussions (especially in groups about active citizens and volunteering), but as a rule, only minor revisions on civil society inputs were allowed.

that in most cases, expert group and committee members accepted content-wise proposals from area subgroups without major discussions and with minor changes. Most of the discussions were about technical and methodological issues. Regarding the content, two segments were more elaborately discussed – the matter of youth CSO financing, and the independent media financing. Civil society representatives wanted to institutionalize corporate support and financial subsidies for independent media, while state representatives had their own agenda, not to overload on unachievable policy objectives and measures, which are often stipulated in other normative or strategic documents. From the meeting minutes, it can be seen that throughout the three meetings of the committee (5th of March, 14th of March and 15th of April), institutional support was discussed (after first being deliberated among area subgroup members) and the support for independent media was discussed twice (14th of March and 15th of April). In the end, institutional support was integrated into the final version of the NYP, while support for independent media was not.

Simultaneously, much larger discussions were led about the indicators and deadlines. Since the whole process was delayed, in almost every meeting and every group, the appeal to send documents on time was stipulated. In addition to time management, indicators proposed to area groups were inadequately drafted, so a relatively long discussion was led about the proper approach to fix them. In the end, one member of the academic community was asked to revise and rewrite the indicators to correspond to the policy methodology.

The unit of analysis in the qualitative content examination was the degree of change. I wanted to see how the content was changing over time and whose interventions were the most evident. The analysis showed that content-wise, the degree of change was minimal. There were some changes in structure and format in certain areas of the content, however, once certain objectives and/or measures were proposed, the essence of the information was not changed. More concretely, 12 minutes from the National expert group meetings were analyzed by taking into account the aspect of change. Out of 52 observed cases, only 8 were a subject of discussion in more than two meetings. However, most of these 8 cases (including youth organizations funding, cooperation between formal and non-formal education, the European Youth Card, and long-term unemployed young people) were a subject of minor changes. The same goes for change in meetings, but also only in terms of meetings involving institutional

support, where there were minor changes from the first draft, to the third draft and the final draft. This highlights that the process was mostly consensus-oriented.

Many respondents reveal that during their work in area subgroups, state representatives desired minimal responsibility in the process and minimal modification from the content of the previous NYP versions. The civil society actors, on the other hand, wanted progressive and innovative additions, for instance, the conceptualization of youth work or program funding as opposed to project. It is no surprise youth organizations aimed towards more progressive solutions. Nissen (2012) points out that youth organizations are generally 'progressive community development' (24). Consequently, the current NYP is a result of a compromise between both actors. Whereas the structure of the document is in line with previous youth strategies, and there are no major development objectives that would require greater financial expenses, some content-related changes are more innovative and in line with the wishes of the civil sector. The academic community was not very vocal in arguing any part of this dichotomy. Respondent 1 supported this claim by saying the role of the academic community is to steer the process with academic expertise and its insight on young people. This narrative is in line with the Trostle, Bronfman and Langer (1999) argumentation presented in chapter 4 which states that the academics in policy-making processes act "when needs or problems arise that might be resolved through policies, information about those needs and problems should be collected or presented from different sources" (105) The conclusive discourse behind the current NYP is perhaps best summarized in the following interview statement:

National Youth Program is concrete, it is not a wish list, but it is much better and more innovative than the previous one. (Respondent 2)

Before I write a few words about the degree of preference attainment, one conclusion from my interview process should be pointed out. All interviewed actors stated that they are satisfied with the final version and delivery of the NYP. With several variations in the degree of enthusiasm, most interviewed actors believe that given the quality of the policy's content, it will come to serve its purpose. This claim is supported by Respondent 1: "I would say I am satisfied with the Program. It is not the best one but it will work."

In terms of the assessment of the content of which actors wanted to be a part, and considering the final output, civil society representatives state that their content wishes were predominately represented. According to their assessment, agendas they

wanted to push through generally found their place in the NYP. Respondents further claimed that final measures regarding citizenship education, youth and culture, and active citizenship are identical to their original formats. Also, if the position document of the Croatian Youth Network on creating a national youth program (2012) prior to the mere process, is taken into account and its goals compared with the final version of the national youth program, one could also see their content is rather similar. Even though there are some deviations, the essence of both documents is the same (promoting social inclusion, active participation, sustainable development of youth sector, youth culture and investing in the infrastructure for quality education). This demonstrates that content-wise, in terms of the degree of preference attainment, the CYN did exercise its power. However, the academic community members had different motivations in the process that were unfulfilled. They claim they wanted methodologically sound and evidence-based measures which happened only to some extent. For instance, in the final text adopted by the government, there is no clear distinction between indicators of outputs and indicators of results, furthermore, some goals are not operationalized adequately (for example, the goal to support development of polyvalent youth counseling centers had goals and measures that do not follow the causal line – analyze school dropouts and indicator: number of medical check-ups for early school leavers). As far as the state actors are concerned, they likewise express their contentment with the final policy outcomes and claim that most of their contributions were enacted. This optimism with the document and claims from all actors that their input was accounted for in the NYP suggests two assumptions: a) interests of actors are not drastically different; and b) if there are different interests, they are not mutually exclusive.

The last facet in this content discussion relates to the usefulness of research conducted for the purpose of this policy process. There is consensus that youth strategies should be evidence-based; however, there is a lack of general agreement about the actual utility of research. State actors, on the one hand, praise research and believe it is the essential ingredient to effective policy outcomes. On the other hand, the academic community and civil society representatives have split views. Generally, all believe the research was useful, although civil society representatives believed that the research, as it was conducted for the purpose of the NYP, was too academic and in turn, advocated for a more policy-oriented research approach. The civil society actors likewise commend the usefulness of the conducted research but also agree that a policy-oriented research would have been more appropriate and more useful. Respondent 5

thus argued: “Truth be told, the research was conducted in an academic way, not really taking into account the policy aspect of it. Researchers used the questionnaires they always use and were reluctant to introduce the policy aspects of it… I mean… it was useful… but it could have been more useful”

To sum up, the analysis of the process of crafting the National youth program exposed several relevant findings. Firstly, it uncovered that common perceptions of the power of the state are seriously challenged. Research showed that in the process of creating a youth policy, the state did focus more on coordination rather than on mere content. However, this coordinative role was not executed adequately. Furthermore, research shows that this was a contentious-free and consensus-oriented process, which can be regarded as a collaborative practice. Nevertheless, it is evident that in situations where content or process decision was to be made, the perspectives and input of civil society representatives, or more precisely of the Croatian Youth Network representatives, prevailed in most cases. The reason behind this lies in the perceived competence, discourse legitimacy and in the alliance with the research community that was involved in the process.

In the next section of this chapter, the results of the analysis of the second stage of the process will be discussed. Now, we can take a turn and review the process of Youth Act making.

8.3. Youth Act formation

From the policy perspective, the process of forming the Youth Act was the most interesting policy process concerning youth in Croatia. This two-year process was marked with great turbulences and overturns, and since it involved various actors in different stages of the process, it is complicated to reconstruct, analyze and interpret the entire process. In order to simplify this policy process, Section 8.3 is divided into two substantial parts. In the first part, a timeline of the process and the development of the process are presented based on the reconstruction from participants' meeting minutes and various draft versions of the Act. Here, content is analyzed by using qualitative content analysis features with the emphasis on the perceived roles of the participating actors. In the second part, I offer an interpretation of this policy process. Based on the interviews with participating policy actors and the insights from the process I received as a participant, I will investigate and interpret the power relations

in the context of the proposed theoretical framework and other argumentations in line with this thesis.

In most of the countries of the European Union, an act on youth welfare generally exists (OYED, 2015). Such acts usually stipulate the responsibilities of the government towards young people, but they also list the rights young people have to be full-fledged members of any given society. Youth acts are not the only manner in which youth policy in a certain country can be regulated; however, they are the most widespread. Throughout the EU, three patterns governing the approach to youth acts can be identified (ibid). The first one relates to countries that view young people and children as belonging to the developmental group and formal category. In most cases, the relationship of the state towards these groups is paternalistic. The second category encompasses countries that utilize youth acts primarily as a tool of prevention, specifically as a mechanism of placing sanctions on juvenile offenders. The third category refers to youth acts that focus more profoundly on youth rights and creating an enabling environment for young people. Even though these categories are ideal-type generalities, they are still useful in revealing tendencies of particular countries across the EU. When in late 2012 the process of crafting the National Youth Act was initiated, the idea was that Croatia would fit into the third category of the approaches. This assumption was based on the previous experience of youth policy-making, for instance, Youth act making where during the RIA procedure it was stated that the idea is to contribute to a better environment for young people by involving youth (organizations) in the process. Further into the discussion, a timeline with some critical focal points of the Youth Act creation process will be presented.

8.3.1 Process development

The process that constituted the Youth Act formation started in late 2012 when the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth contracted two national youth researchers and one international youth policy expert to prepare an evidence-based background framework for developing the Youth Act in Croatia[69]. On March 1st, 2013, the expert working group selected to draft the Youth Act was formed by the Minister of Social

[69] The task of contracted researchers included: the analysis of the National Youth Program, the analysis of the framework (thesis) for the Youth Acts, the comparative analysis of the legislation in EU countries regarding youth, recommendations for the content of the Youth Act and the overview of conducted research about youth at the national level in Croatia.

Policy and Youth and the Vice-president of the Government of Croatia, Ms. Milanka Opacic. As postulated by this decision, 16 representatives of governmental institutions and civil society received the mandate to create a final version of the Youth Act by December 31st, 2013 in which all inputs from all relevant institutions and public would be integrated and the document would be ready for the government to be passed. Three days later, additional representatives from the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth had been appointed as part of the expert working group, in addition to one representative of the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports replacing another. Also, amidst this new decision, the deadline for delivery of the first draft was moved to June 30th, 2013. The first meeting of the expert working group took place on March 28th, 2013 when the official schedule and the aim of the working group were presented. In April 2013, two national researchers who analyze the youth sector were also officially appointed into the expert working group[70], and their subsequent research report was delivered to the Ministry in early June. On June 16th, 2013, a thesis outlining the objectives of the Youth Act was sent to public hearings, which lasted for one month. After the examination of comments from the public hearing, the expert working group officiated its work on October 31st, 2013, which concluded in May 2014. The last meeting of the expert working group was on March 20th, 2014, after which public consultations with the youth sector actors took place. The subject of the following analysis is policy formulation, and since it began with the appointment of the expert working group, the primarily scrutinized time period will be between March 1st, 2013, and May 2014. As a researcher, I actively participated in every stage of the process, and I was likewise directly involved in the process of formulating this Act[71]. The variety of actors with expertise in the field which have been appointed by the Ministry and entrusted to

[70] The Ministry of Social Policy and Youth thought it was self-evident that researchers would be members of the expert working group, therefore, they were not included in the appointment decision. Only after we insisted that there be an official written proof giving us participatory status, we were officially appointed one month after everyone else, as representatives of the research community. After our appointment, the expert group consisted of 19 members - two researchers, ten civil society representatives, seven state actors (Ministries of Social Policy and Youth, of Science, Education and Sports, of Administration, of Work and Pension System, and the Governmental Office for Cooperation with CSOs), and one youth consultant who did not end up participating in the process). She sent an e-mail after the first meeting, stating that she did not have time to participate and expressed her mistrust for the process in general.

[71] Just as in the process of the National youth program formation, at the beginning of the process, I informed all the participants that I aimed to study this process and write about it. Even though official confirmations were not signed, oral permission was given. The protocol for participant observation was the same as for the NYP process (please see Appendix C). An example of relevant field notes can be found in Appendix D.

produce a draft demonstrates the governments' orientation towards an open, transparent and participatory policy-making process.

As it is evident from this chronological overview, the whole process started late. The Ministry changed its decision on the appointment three times in one month, which suggests that the coordination and time-frame of the process were not adequate. If we once again accept the hypothesis that the main task of the government in a collaborative governance setting is to steer the process and coordinate it (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), it is evident that this role the state did not fulfil adequately. The fact that the research community members were officially appointed to the working group only after their direct intervention suggests that the process was not coordinated in accordance with good practice standards. In the chapter on policy actors, I demonstrated the importance of involving academic personnel in the process of policy-making by citing Petak and Petek (2009) saying "a prerequisite aimed at achieving enchased 'results and improving public services (deliver) and producing better policies is rooted in evidence-based analysis, well designed and capable for successful implementation." (61-62). The involvement of researchers in the process of making the youth act is absolutely in line with Hawkesworth's (1998, 191) idea that the goal of policy analysts is to illuminate the contentious dimensions of the policy question. Here, academics fuel the process with their expertise and knowledge grounded in research, yet do not have a direct interest in influencing the outcome. Given the fact that the process of youth act formulation was contentious and lots of its features were content-wise unclear, having members of the academic community in the process was even more important.

On the other hand, the composition of the expert workgroup consisting of governmental officials, civil society and academic community representatives, supports the argument of inclusivity of the state in the process of decision-making as a first step in collaborative governance policy-making. As seen from the description of the expert working group process it can be declared that in this initial stage of the policy process, developments were characterized by participation, inclusiveness and collaboration but also tardiness, and lack of coordination. Respondent 7 pointed out his understanding of the initial stage of the Youth act creation: "The process was chaotic. Information about the time-frame and planning the future steps were scarce and I think the Ministry did not do its job when it comes to the preparation of the process".

However, the process was based on an evidence-based approach, where state representatives were responsive, and the public was involved in the formation of the

act and extensively informed about the status of the process. In other words, according to Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh's (2012) interpretation of collaborative governance, one could say this process, in theory, met the criteria for collaborative governance. This process, as we will see in the continuation of this chapter, even though failed at the end, in its essence assured the meaningful participation of a plethora of actors.

The motivation behind Act proposition and content

According to the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth 2013-2015, after multiple consultations with the youth sector, the Ministry decided to form the expert working group for devising the Youth Act that was to regulate the country's youth sector. According to a ministry representative, this was one of the Ministry priorities in the youth sector. The respondent claims the following:

The Ministry wanted a political consensus of all political options regarding the Youth Act (Respondent 10)

Civil society representatives agree with this statement, and when asked to assess the importance of the state if the process, one respondent stated:

The process of creating the Youth Act was the most important thing that could have happened. (Respondent 5)

Yet, an interesting finding is the discrepancy between the perception of state representatives and official documents. As seen from the previous two extracts from the interviews, the creation of the Youth Act was indeed important for the government/Ministry, however when asked additional questions about why it was so important the responses became much vaguer and imprecise. Neither of the respondents could give a clear explanation on the question of why it was decided now, what is the precise vision of the sector once the Act has been passed, what will change in more concrete terms in the relationship between the state and young people. Also, governmental officials did not know how to defend the position that this was supposed to be more the act on youth organizations and less on young people. This discrepancy between the quite elaborate official documentation and the relatively vague and weak argumentation of relevant government officials in terms of the intention for the youth act creation can be interpreted in two ways. These findings from interviews (respondents 8 and 9) with street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980) would not be so peculiar if some of these points were not raised at the RIA protocol. The absence of a clear explanation from the state officials on the necessity to pass this law is an important

finding. This discrepancy between the official documents and points of view of street-level bureaucrats suggests the lack of communication within the Ministry and inadequate preparation of the state officials in charge of coordinating the process. In literature (Bach 2018) this situation falls under the vast category of autonomy of public administration where state officials have different priorities than the actual decision-makers and the problem of policy translation (Stone, 2012) in which vertical flow is not adequately consolidated.

In interviews, when civil society representatives were asked what was the rationale for creating this law, they pointed to the government, claiming the government decided to do so without consulting them. On the other hand, the interviewed state officials claim the initiative came from youth organizations. According to them, youth organizations have been criticizing some of their moves and expressed the wish for making procedures more formal. This opposite view on the process is peculiar not only because it demonstrates different points of view but also indicates miscommunication between two types of actors.

To put it more concretely, the aim of this Act, as stated in the RIA protocol, is "to create circumstances for the active support of young people in their activism, organization, development, and fulfilment of their personal and social potentials" (Draft of the RIA for the Youth Act 2013). According to RIA, the outcomes of this process would be as follows:

- To define various types of youth organizing
- To characterize the nature of youth work and recognize the youth worker as a professional
- To determine sustainable and permanent ways of financing the youth sector through financial subsidies of their programs and projects
- To organize the system of continuous support for youth research
- To define the relationships and models of cooperation between the state authorities, local governments and youth sector representatives

In this elaboration, one provision that will turn out to be very important later on should be indicated. In their reasoning behind creating the Youth Act, the Ministry of Social Policy and the participating youth stipulated following:

“The initiative of forming the Youth Act should not be understood as a top-down process where the state desires to impose certain definitions, legal framework and

methods for the organization of youth associations, but rather as a synergy of stakeholders within a collaborative process with the goal of finding commonly accepted solutions within the youth sector" (Done and schedule, 2013).

It is interesting to note the concurrence of official documents and respondents' points of view in terms of the intention of the Ministry. From that, we can see this intention is two-folded. On the one hand, it was of great importance for the Ministry to pass this act in order to support the organization of the youth sector. On the other hand, representatives of the Ministry stated that they wished consensus with all stakeholders and a collaborative process of Youth act formulation. This notion will be of particular importance for further analysis in the next section of this chapter. To put it more generally, this discrepancy is an indication of the lack of competence in formal matters. If the state representatives could not defend the position of the necessity of the Act after the whole process, it shouldn't be surprising they were not able to defend their positions adequately during the process of formulating this act.

As shown, the process initiation started with the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth proposing the structure and the content of the Act, which would serve as a ground for discussion, criticism, and elaboration. Despite the fact that the Ministry nominally formulated the first draft, it was written based on the consultation and proposals of the CYN and the academic community representatives. This supports the statement from the Respondent 10, representative of the state:

The first draft was just the inception of the process, without any intention to regulate the field without discussion with stakeholders. I mean… we have consulted different actors over the years, and months, and prepared it.

Thus, it can be said that in its framework, the draft was mainly a product of the collaborative action of these three types of actors. At the second meeting, it was mutually agreed that all comments would be sent via e-mail so that the discussions at meetings would be more substantial and productive. From the beginning, there were two topics that generated frustration and discontent in all participating stakeholders, namely a national youth association's definition and the conceptualization of the National Youth Council. However, as time passed, the youth work and financing of the youth organizations became prominent issues but not to the extent of the previous two topics. The reason youth work and financing became so relevant was the fact these aspects diverged from the status quo the most. Given the fact that Croatia at that time did not have youth work regulated and the financing of youth organizations was

exclusively project-based, youth organizations wanted to change it. However, as mentioned before, the state was not willing to make big changes in the whole youth policy architecture, thus, the conflict arose. All other substantial parts of the draft were not contentious and stakeholders agreed upon their conceptualization very quickly.

Before I give a preview of the debates related to youth association/CSO definition and national youth council conceptualization, it is worth pointing out that one of the civil society actors, the Croatian Youth Network, had been operating in the field of youth for 11 years. During that time, even though its status was not defined *de iure*, it still acted as a national youth council, meaning it was a full member of the European Youth Forum. It participated in all relevant policy processes in Croatia and had more than 60 youth organizations as its members. In addition to this, the CYN had extensively developed policies, terminology and an understanding of the youth sector and it has been acting in accordance with this knowledge. According to their representatives and their Statute, they identify themselves primarily as an advocacy organization and have a strong mission to represent their membership. All this is relevant because it demonstrates how consolidated their understanding of the youth sector is. In other words, regardless of the potential normative and terminological solutions the Youth Act would bring, the CYN had its perception of the youth sector and, as it will be presented, their representatives were determined to push it through- no matter what.

What makes the CYN a crucial actor was that they had the final process in their heads. They knew exactly what to place in the Act due to the extensive experience they had. (Respondent 5)

To some extent this was true. By relying on their hands-on experience from the youth sector, vast membership of youth organizations and portraying themselves as resourceful in the sense of possessing information, knowledge, and funds from the EU projects, together with the proactive approach in the early stage of the Act making, the CYN managed to create reputation of a skilful and resourceful actor. This was supported by the governmental officials who at the beginning of the process pointed out the importance of the CYN as a strategic partner in the sector. In addition to the aspects of resources and discourse legitimacy, the CYN organized meetings before the inception of the process with involved stakeholders presenting their aspiration for the Act on youth. With their intention to standardize the funding of youth organizations and define key terms even before the first meeting, the CYN acted proactively and

created a perception of an important and serious policy actor. In other words, it can be said they exercised various tools in order to present themselves powerful and to attribute influence to themselves in order to have a head start in the process. This was particularly important in a situation where there was no agreement among actors within the policy process.

As seen in Chapter 4, with the uplift of the governance paradigm and greater openness for non-state actors (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh 2012), civil society organizations needed to demonstrate their capacity and potential contribution to the policy-making process. In the youth policy-making processes, the CYN indeed did exactly that- tried to position itself as a relevant or even a crucial actor. They used the access to build the influence (Dur, Bievre, 2007) and by doing that assured other actors they have power. The CYN needed to prove to other actors that they still hold the central position in the youth sector in Croatia, particularly because this process of creating the youth act was of their great concern. This act was intended to regulate the sector and content-wise change some propositions of the sector (for example the funding of youth organizations). In times when a tectonic change in the environment happens, acts and exercises of influence are anticipated because one should present oneself as powerful as possible in order to maintain the influence. It is required to build a strategy that would minimize losses and maximize gains; thus, it is important to build a perception of importance. Casey (1998, p. 22) firmly puts it in the following way:

> The intervention of NGOs as policy actors must be founded upon a solid base of political and cognitive legitimacy; i.e., they must have the capacity to demonstrate that they have a broad political base and that they are experts in the theory and practice of the policy in question. They must also have the ability to "play" the game of participation.

The CYN indeed did the aforementioned and made sure everyone knew its importance. Respondents from both government and academic community (interviews 1, 2, 6 and 9) explicitly confirmed the relevance of the CYN in the process due to its experience and influence “on the field”.

As stated, two conceptual matters generated the most contention during the work of the expert working group. Firstly, there was an issue with the definition of youth organizations/associations/CSOs. The draft foresaw the differentiation between the youth organizations and the organizations for youth. The difference would be that the first term encompasses youth-led associations, whereas the second concept incorporates all civil society organizations that have programs for youth. The problem

with this was how to delineate substantial differences between these two categories and still have them function within the rules of legislative drafting. Moreover, the biggest problem for the state actors was how to classify each of these organizations in the register of the CSO. While the civil society representatives advocated for a loose definition, the representatives of the state authorities insisted on a clear and precise conceptualization. When applying the power matrix proposed in Chapter 5 and analysing the quality of argumentation of the two sides involved in this dispute by going through the minutes of the meetings, one can recognize two conflicting aspects within the power matrix – the perception of resources and discursive legitimacy. On the one hand, the Ministry focused on resources or more precisely was arguing that they possess information on how one part of the public administration functions. They were claiming that due to specific procedures the government implements it is impossible not to have strict criteria for differencing youth-led and youth organizations. The strategy was to position themselves as gatekeepers to the register of the CSOs, based on the information they have about how the procedure works. On the other hand, the CYN used the discursive legitimacy argument claiming that, due to the specificity of the sector, the rules for other CSOs cannot be identically applied to youth organizations. Furthermore, they refused to accept "the public administration" argument claiming that the goal of the Youth act was to organize the sector thus it is illogical to use existing rules which so far were not successful in providing the quality framework for the youth sector as such. By rebutting the Ministry's argument the CYN managed to deconstruct the perception of the Ministry as a gatekeeper and information-holder resulting in a better position for the CYN in the process. In addition to this and contrary to the offensive tactic of the CYN, the governmental representatives did not attack the discursive legitimacy argument resulting in the CYN being even more powerful in the eyes of the involved actors. In the end, after several expert group meetings, it was agreed that only necessary modifications would be made, but that the essence of the definitions would be left as the civil society representatives wished them to be. This dispute reveals several important aspects. Firstly, the quality of the argumentation itself is indeed an adequate measure for assessing influence. Secondly, non-formal actors in the policy arena designed by a formal actor can indeed exercise their power; and thirdly, this conflict was a sign that this process, unlike the NYP process, will be more contentious. Leaving this dispute aside, another much more severe and crucial conflict emerged – one about criteria for the national youth council.

The Ministry of Social Policy and Youth once again desired to clearly define the responsibilities and rights of the National Youth Council, and it was evident that they perceived the CYN as an institution that already had those same responsibilities in place and could take on the formal policy role. However, there were three dissenting points to this aspiration. The first was the reluctance of the CYN to be explicitly appointed as the National Youth Council which can be clearly seen from the minutes of the expert working group's meetings. Their arguments were based on the fluid nature of the sector and the possibility that some other organization in the future could have a stronger mandate. The Ministry, on the other hand, aspired to legalize and legitimize the consultations and cooperation they have already established with the CYN[72]. Upon discussion, it was concluded that the Act would not contain the name of the CYN explicitly. The second critical point on the discussion agenda was the imperative criteria for the National Youth Council. It took four meetings to generate a criteria framework that would prove acceptable to state actors and civil society representatives. Not all actors involved could reach a consensus on the necessary requirements for the National Youth Council and the National Youth Organizations in general[73]. More concretely, it was challenging to operationalize the criteria for the national youth organizations. State representatives wanted unambiguous criteria, which were unacceptable to civil society representatives because, from their point of view, these criteria seemed imposing and way too restricting for the autonomy of these organizations. This dispute was not resolved until the end of the process. This takes us to the third critical point – responsibilities and rights. The CYN representatives advocated for a looser approach, where the rights of the National Youth Council would be stipulated and responsibilities broadly listed. However, the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth wanted more concrete and precise responsibilities. They argued that youth policy as a collaborative practice should be jointly created in order to achieve a standardization of responsibilities that everyone would know and could follow. This dispute was also not solved throughout

[72] One of the respondents in the interview (Respondent 10) pointed out that they wanted to see the CYN take the place of the National Youth Council because they needed an organization that was civil-oriented and with liberal points of view in the context of the upsurge of conservativism in the Croatian society.

[73] In brief, the Act anticipated to encompass the objectives of four categories of organizations: youth organizations, organizations for youth (these two sound the same; worded a bit differently to distinguish them), national youth organizations (CSOs that operate at the national level and have garnered influence over a great number of young people) and the National Youth Council (a representative body of young people and youth organizations and the main governmental partner for the creation of a youth policy).

the process. The general problem of these deliberations can be summarized by Respondent 10 with the following:

There was an inherent conflict between the civil society representatives who wanted to incorporate ideas in the document and legal experts [the representatives of the Ministry] *who argued that there is no room for ideas in the Act, or that strategies are more appropriate than ideas.*

To some extent this quote is correct. If notes from the meetings are looked at, it can be seen that the legal experts indeed used nomotechnical argumentation to block certain ideas. For instance, in the minutes from March 20th, a debate between the ministry and the civil society was noted on putting informal youth initiatives in the legal text. The civil society representatives were arguing on the relevance of these kinds of initiatives for the sector while ministerial representatives were reluctant to put it in the law due to the fluidity of the concept and inability to define its legal personality. This example supported by the quote from Respondent 10 clearly demonstrates the conflict between the traditional and innovative aspects of the Act-to-be and once again this dispute can be seen throughout the lenses of power. Here the debate was about resources or their perception in a way that both sides tried to convince the expert working group that the information, knowledge, and expertise of the other actor is incorrect or irrelevant. For the first time, the Ministry refused to deter, moreover they believed this to be a crucial issue in the Act. As Respondent 8 states: "it was important for us to determine the rights and responsibilities of the national youth council so we can rely on them."

Even though this content dispute was frustrating (by mid-December, eight, three-hour meetings were held where topics related to mostly youth organizations, national youth organizations and national youth council were discussed), the major differences of opinion occurred due to procedural discernments.

The last meeting in 2013 was held on December 23rd. After that meeting, basic definitions and conceptualizations were still not agreed upon, and due to the vast amount of time these deliberations took, the policy articles related to youth work and cross-sector cooperation in the field of youth were not discussed at all. On January 14th, the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth circulated a revised draft and asked for comments one day after the meeting was supposed to be held. This document diverged substantially from all previous versions, there were new amendments, the criteria for (national) youth organizations were changed, youth work conceptualization changed

and models of financing were completely revised. An additional problem was that the new policy changes were not supported by any arguments in favour of those changes nor were they amended with notes/explanations/track changes. Thus, it was very difficult to understand the substance of text and the true reasons behind any changes. Troubled by this approach, all expert group members from the civil society and the academic community expressed their discontent to the Ministry. Due to this dissatisfaction among the expert working group, the Deputy Minister for Youth called for a discussion meeting scheduled one week later and promised to explain the reasons behind the changes and why the Ministry decided to implement them. At the meeting on January 23rd, 2014, the Deputy Minister, the Assistant Minister and the General Secretary of the Ministry[74] participated in the meeting and explained the reasons why the Ministry changed the draft so drastically. The primary reason, they claim, was because the process was not moving forward and that after consulting with other state authorities, they decided to change many provisions, particularly one which emphasizes that this Act should not bind other ministries to any responsibilities. In other words, the innovative and progressive part of the draft was almost completely excluded for the sake of the Ministry's convenience and intervention due to time and consensus restraints.

After this meeting took place, on February 7th, the representatives of the CYN informed other participants that the CYN decided not to support the Act creation process any longer and that its representatives will not participate in the work of the expert group. Nonetheless, the process continued, but with dire consequences to the participation of non-state actors. The representatives of the Ministry now began to be much more strict, formal and unwilling to accept much input from other participating actors. Hence, at that time youth work was removed from the draft with the assurance that it would be defined instead in the National youth program. The last meeting of the expert group was held on March 20th, 2014, after which the whole process finalized two months later.

After the meeting with the Deputy Minister, they made an agreement that further consultation would occur in the four largest Croatian cities with the goal of seeking out what the youth sector thinks about the Youth Act. After these consultations

[74] Since that meeting took place, three out of four of the highest-ranked ministry officials participated in every meeting. The reason was, according to Respondent 10, to demonstrate the importance of this process for the Ministry and to speed it up significantly.

were conducted, and results were presented to the public, the process of the Youth Act formation officially concluded[75]. What is peculiar is that the expert group members never received an official document that formally terminated the process.

8.3.2. Process analysis

As understood from the prior process review, the course of forming the Youth Act was drastically different in its character from that of the NYP. Even though the same categories of actors were included, the dynamics and the outcome were completely different. The whole situation proved much more contentious with the Youth Act (even though initially it was consensus-oriented) and the relationship among actors changed in comparison to the previous process. Based on participant observations, which were later confirmed in interviews, the whole process framework could be encapsulated in the relationship between the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth and the Croatian Youth Network. Occasionally, a representative from the Association of Info-centres and an academic community member would join this interplay with their own contributions, but the majority of the process still occurred between the two aforementioned actors.

Provisionally, the process could be divided into three phases.

In the first phase of pre-policy formulation where consultations between the state actors and the civil society representatives were conducted, research was conducted and an initial draft was written. In that phase, the Ministry took on the role of the coordinator as well as the creator of the policy arena. In terms of following the principles of collaborative governance, all the necessary conditions for a smooth and effective decision-making process were undertaken. Moreover, the Ministry clearly defined their intention of creating an Act which would define unclear terms and concepts relevant to the sector[76]. In this stage, the representatives of the civil society (and particularly the CYN), were on board with the idea of creating the Youth Act, since this would be the product for which they advocated for eight years (Respondent

[75] In the consultation report, it is stated that there was no consensus among actors in the sector on the need for the Youth Act. (Analiza sadrzaja zapisnika 2014)

[76] One aspect remained unclear from the beginning to the end of the process. The name of the legal document was 'the Youth Act', however, it was not clear if the proposed policy necessitated an act that would relate to young people as a constituent group or as an organized, formal sector. If the latter is the case, then the name of the act should have been 'the Youth Organizing Act' instead. This question was proposed in the research report and once again during the process; however, the representatives of the Ministry did not provide a unanimous answer.

5). In this stage, the research community took on the role of experts, and by conducting and interpreting the research at hand, gave recommendations to proceed with the process of forming the Youth Act.

The second phase began after a public hearing about the thesis of the Act and with the second meeting of the expert working group in October 2013, which lasted until January 2014, when the Ministry delivered a completely reorganized draft. In this phase of the process, the Ministry was supposed to take the role of a leader and coordinate the process; however, this was not the case. As repeatedly claimed in the interviews I conducted, the process was more *laissez-faire*, because the Ministry did not find the balance between guiding the whole process and letting everything flow unpredictably. In their wish to assure inclusiveness and participation, they overlooked their role as proper officiators, and therefore, the process started to stagnate due to meaningless discussions about rudimentary provisions. On the other hand, the CYN representatives did not want to give up their positions. Here, for the first time, the difference between rights and responsibilities came to light. From the perspective of the state actors, this discrepancy can be summarized by the following respondent:
Civil sectors contend that the spectrum of responsibilities is smaller than the spectrum of rights. (Respondent 10)

During the second phase of the act formation, the biggest substantial contribution to the process was provided by the CYN. This claim is unanimously confirmed in the interviews. As a participant in the process, I can testify that the state representatives were not informed about youth issues in depth nor knowledgeable about how youth policy functioned in practice. On the other hand, the representatives of the CYN flaunted their knowledge and expertise, and frequently used the argument that they were representing "more than 60 organizations" and that they had "11 years of direct experience in the youth sector". Furthermore, it was evident that at that time, the CYN had all three types of resources stipulated in the power matrix - knowledge/expertise of a specific policy field/problem, information about circumstances related to a policy field/problem, financial resources actors might use to get additional information, knowledge and public support.[77] As time went on, the level of frustration escalated due to the slow advancement of the process, which culminated

[77] At that time the CYN was working on a project named 'Zakon je zakon', which was intended for monitoring the Youth Act formation. This allowed the CYN flexibility and financial stability for the participation in this process of Youth Act making.

with changes to the working draft circulated by the Ministry in January 2014. This signalled the beginning of the third phase.

The third phase was characterized by open antagonism between the CYN and the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth. In my opinion, there are a couple of potential explanations of why there was such antagonism. One might be linked with the fact the CYN, which was perceived as the most important actors (interview 10), felt played out. Their representatives pointed that out in interviews by saying "we didn't see the point in continuing this farce" (Respondent 6). The other possible explanation might be that this antagonism was provoked by the CYN in order to sabotage the process when they realized they are losing control of the process.

The CYN representatives decided not to actively participate in the process and began to undermine the necessity and legitimacy of the Youth Act by issuing statements, posting on social media and creating the movie where the necessity of Youth act was challenged. Even though all non-state actors openly expressed their discontent with the new state of affairs, only the CYN decided to recall its representatives from the process. What is particularly interesting is that three non-member civil society representatives were chosen to represent CYN members in the formation process. This demonstrates the disunity among the membership organizations but likewise the faith that the process, despite unexpected turns, should not become wholly corrupted. Personally, I was against the CYN leaving the expert group, because it was argued very convincingly that the new draft was just a working paper. The Ministry, with this unpopular move, desired to change the dynamics in their favour by trying to accelerate the process using a more personalized approach. Once the CYN representatives withdrew from the process, they continued to advocate for inclusive and participatory policy-making practices but they modified the rhetoric and started to seriously doubt the practical necessity of the Youth Act. One civil society representative explains this aftermath by saying:

After the CYN stepped out of the process, they started vocalizing their discontent about the developments, claiming that since the beginning, the process was faulty. Why would they participate in this process, then, if they thought it is inadequate? (Respondent 7)

At that time, the disposition in the youth sector towards the process also changed under the influence of the CYN. The process was portrayed as not necessary, and the legal solution of the youth sector became redundant. The other participant actors were confused and even infuriated at this change of the rhetoric. One of the participants explained:

There is one thing that bothered me the most and that is in line with the hypocrisy of the CYN. At the beginning of our mandate, we had a meeting with the CYN, where the CYN expressed their expectation that this government would pass the Youth Act. When the process started, the rhetoric of the CYN changed, and they were unsure whether we needed a legal solution after all; that culminated with their attitude that the Youth Act was not necessary once they left the expert group. (Respondent 10)

When asked to explain this shift in the CYN's point of view, one of their representatives stated:

I claim responsibly that stopping this process was the most responsible thing that we could have done at that time for the sake of the youth sector in Croatia (Respondent 5)

According to the respondents, the process inevitably slid into chaos, and it was not possible to save it from plummeting further, so the CYN participants did not want to give it any more legitimacy. As they argued further, the whole process for them was a learning process, and as they argued, they realized the youth sector in Croatia was not ready for this scale of institutional resolutions. Nevertheless, the process continued for quite some time; but, as explained earlier, the CYN upheld their scepticism, and after a meeting with the Deputy Minister, managed to extract themselves from the process. This was the end of the process.

In light of these clarifications, this analysis of the process of the Youth Act formation certainly uncovered some interesting things. Firstly, it showed that in the collaborative governance setting, there could be contentious moments. These contentious moments require adequate mitigation among conflicting interests, which did not happen in this process. This finding is in line with the features of collaborative governance proposed by Ansel and Gash (2007), when they say that conflict *per se* is not an exclusion criterion for naming a process collaborative. Secondly, civil society organizations, and particularly the CYN, turned out to be even more powerful than it was anticipated. The process of creating main legislative documents obviously requires the consensus of all actors; however, in the instance of the Youth Act process, this was not the case. This was obvious from the start, the state wanted to create the Youth act while the civil society actors did not see the pressing need for that. Yet, they engaged in the process and by that had given the tacit approval to the process. To paraphrase Leleiko, (1984) they agreed to take or share responsibility for the process when they decided to join in. However, as the analysis shows, the CYN exercised its veto position and that confirmed its position of power. Due to the reluctance of the CYN to continue

the process, the Youth Act was not passed, but not only that, the Ministry was so eager to pass this act that it was even decided to introduce additional consultations with the youth sector in order to please the youth sector representatives, particularly the CYN, and in that way to restore (trust in) the process. Responded 10 explained that in the following way:

For us, it was important to have this act so we decided to invest additional time in face-to-face consultations with youth organizations. Despite the behaviour of the CYN which was not fair or friendly, we contracted them to organize these consultations across Croatia. Even after that, we did not end up with the Youth Act. Now tell me that the Ministry did not do everything it could have.

In the sense of the proposed power matrix, the discourse legitimacy, or the link between the representatives and a sector/society proved to be more relevant than the perception of resourcefulness. If the assumption is that one policy document is needed to organize, support and facilitate the development of a certain sector, the representation of this sector is a strong argument. From the described process of Youth act making it is evident that the CYN used discourse legitimacy which was the argument the Ministry could not argue. Even though they had different points of view on certain issues, as the initiator of the Act, the Ministry simply could not proceed with the process without having an actor which encapsulated the interest of a greater part of the sector on board.

Nevertheless, the cooperation in terms of act creation between the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth and the CYN continued despite their disputes. Another finding about the values of the participant civil society actors is likewise important to note. The CYN decided to boycott the process due to its principles; however, content-wise, the fact remains that the most critical/contentious points of the whole process were those where civil society actors were asked to take over responsibility. It is often claimed that by participating in policy-making actors take responsibility and should do whatever is in their power to produce a quality output (Leleiko, 1984). Also, authors such as Van Der Meer and Edelenbos (2006) or Mathis (2007) advocate for cooperation and communication by emphasizing them as prerequisites for accountability. In the context of youth act making one could argue the CYN decided to evade responsibility when cooperation and communication with the Ministry stopped being as they had imagined should be.

The unwillingness to compromise about civil society autonomy turned out to be the most contentious aspect of the process. Procedure-wise, the Ministry compromised the process; however, this was not serious enough for the other participating actors to boycott the process. This also shows the lack of power in the position of other actors, especially the academic community. Even though they disagreed with the Ministry they remained in the expert working group and at the end accepted the proposed solutions from the side of the Ministry.

Once again, the investigation into this process uncovered that in the youth sector, both the academic community and the civil society share very similar positions and often form partnerships, however, the level of dedication varies. The process was obviously inadequately coordinated and poorly communicated with the participating actors. These reasons, in combination with diametrically opposed viewpoints on the importance resulted in the failure to pass the act. Although, the question remains if this was a good enough reason to stop the process and if a cost-benefit analysis should have been made to see if the decision was beneficial to the youth sector.

Can public policy theory illuminate reasons for the failure in more detail? So far we have seen that collaborative governance requires "partnerships among the state, the private sector, civil society, and the community, as well as joined-up government and hybrid arrangements such as public-private and private-social partnerships and co-management regimes" (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh 2012, 2) but also that conflicts could appear in such settings. Ansel and Gash (2007) explain the following conditions should be met to formulate a quality public policy in a collaborative governance setting:

> Where conflict is high and trust is low, but power distribution is relatively equal and stakeholders have an incentive to participate, then collaborative governance can successfully proceed by relying on the services of an honest broker that the respective stakeholders accept and trust. This honest broker might be a professional mediator.

In the process of youth act making there was obviously a high level of conflict and trust was low, however as is seen from the process preview, the power distribution was not so equal and incentives to participate were diverse. In addition to this, the process did not engage any honest brokers. In other words, the aforementioned process failed to meet the conditions relevant for successful policy formulation.

The same authors propose the second criterion for policy formulation when there are conflicts present:

> Where power distribution is more asymmetric or incentives to participate are weak or asymmetric, then collaborative governance is more likely to succeed if there is a strong ‘‘organic’’ leader who commands the respect and trust of the various stakeholders at the outset of the process. ‘‘Organic’’ leaders are leaders who emerge from within the community of stakeholders. The availability of such leaders is likely to be highly contingent upon local circumstances.

When this is applied to the youth act process it is clear that there was the asymmetry in power but there was no ‘organic leader’. None of the actors took this position and thus the process resulted in failure.

In the next chapter, two of the processes will be compared and a power matrix applied in order to elaborate notions presented in chapters 7 and 8.

Chapter 9

ASSESSING THE POWER IN YOUTH DECISION-MAKING

The power of the lawmaker is in the uncertainty of the law

- Jeremy Bentham

The two policy formulation processes presented in chapter 8 give us a clear picture of the relationship between state and non-state actors in a particular policy field within the collaborative governance setting in Croatia. We have seen the unique relationship between different actors in two relevant youth policy-making processes. The previous chapter thus demonstrated the peculiar partnership of certain actors, however, their power positions need to be more thoroughly analyzed. Therefore, in order to meet the research objective of the dissertation (hence, under what circumstances in contemporary policy-making processes we can discuss and use power? How is this power being manifested and who in fact has the power?), two of aforementioned processes have to be additionally analyzed and compared. This chapter tends to demonstrate the main research purpose of this dissertation – to analytically assess who has the power in the youth policy-making process in Croatia and how is this power being perceived and executed.

Before the analysis in reference to power and, consequently the comparison between two processes is introduced, in table 9.1 the conceptualization of key constructs relevant for this study is pointed out. The table consists of three elements. This table was created based on the aforementioned points presented throughout the whole dissertation. In the first column the construct is being named, the second column gives an explanation that is most appropriate for the topic of this dissertation based on the theoretical discussions in this dissertation, and the third element – remarks – represents additional clarification or an addition to the explanation. All the presented constructs have been elaborated in detail in chapters 3, 4 and 6 thus the role of this table is simply to summarize the most important points relevant for the forthcoming analysis.

Table 9.1: Explanation of the relevant constructs

Construct	Explanation	Remark
Collaborative governance	The processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished	In order to use collaborative governance in contemporary policy-making, power as a variable should be introduced as a relevant aspect
Power	Power is a perception of the influence conceptualized through the anthropological aspect called *the attributed influence*. Hence, attributed influence consists out of: • Quality of argumentation; • The degree of preference attainment	*Quality of argumentation* is operationalized in the following way: - clarity of a message - relevance for the topic - argumentative sufficiency - logical fallacies - support/evidence - persuasion *The degree of preference attainment*: How much of the specific actor's position could be identified in the conclusion/outcome of the discussion?
Policy actor	Organized interests of various actors internal or external to the state that wish to influence policy development	Three most important actors for this study: - governmental officials - civil society - academic community

As it was exposed, assessing power in a public policy is not an easy task to perform. One of the reasons could be the abundance of different definitions of power, another might be the fact that there is a lack of systemic research on power pattern production thus the scarcity of insights on power in policy-making. Nevertheless, power remains a pivotal currency in political science. With the proliferation of actors in the policy arena and multiplication of interests, value positions, behaviours, and mechanisms to influence decision-making, it would be irresponsible to ignore a feature so important as power. For that reason, it is surprising that in the framework of collaborative governance, an outline most appropriate for studying so-called *identity politics* (Petek, 2012) power plays such an insignificant role. Moreover, another modestly researched point is the perception of power. As argued, the perception of one's power in a policy arena affects one's influence, thus the reputational dimension of

behaviour is important for the comprehensive insight into the decision-making processes. In chapter 8, two specific policy-making cases were presented – one of low contentious degree and the other of high contentious degree. In order to assess actors' positions, outputs of these processes and to explain why in a relatively short period, two similar processes have ended diametrically different, I propose an explanation grounded in power conceptualization. I argue that by looking at the aspect of power in a way to see it as a relational and reputational domain, contemporary policy-making can be understood better.

Despite the fact both of processes started in *bona fide*, and as a collaborative setting (as explained by Ansell and Gash, 2007, however with taking into consideration Hewsen and Sinclare's (1999) criticism of the lack of power when explaining segments of these setting), very soon most actors started to position themselves in the hierarchy which was clearly existing in the minds of involved stakeholders. The governmental officials used the advantage of initiating both of the processes, thus perceiving themselves as coordinators, civil society representatives often called upon their discourse legitimacy, and academic community representatives were "hiding" behind statistics and theoretical approaches. This role distribution is not strange as literature in policy studies indeed recognises the aforementioned roles as typical. For instance, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) confirm that the role of the government in collaborative governance settings should be to direct and design the process and a policy arena; Casey (1998) in his analysis on the legitimacy of civil society organizations as policy actors explains that CSOs represent particular societal interests and as for the academic community members, Trostle, Bronfman, and Langer (1999) claim that they act as mediators and knowledge providers.

Nevertheless, this finding from the empirical part is particularly important because it actually negates the proposition that all stakeholders are perceived as being equal. Although nominally we all were, we all thought our share of competence was pivotal and irreplaceable. There are two vivid examples supporting this claim, extrapolated from the two case studies presented in this dissertation. In the first, less contentious process, one of the main topics among civil society representatives during breaks was the outrage about how little government officials knew about the youth sector. Even though the level of communication was civilized, among themselves civil society representatives were convinced that they were more competent than other actors. This attitude was confirmed in interviews by pointing out the experience youth

organizations have in the field "… we have been doing this for quite some time […] communicating with young people and not being stuck in offices" (Respondent 6).

As presented in chapter 8, both academic community members and civil society representatives undoubtedly pointed out the modest content-wise contribution of the government officials during the process of NYP creation. The second example is from the Youth Act making process when, following a governmental official's argumentation against introducing non-formal youth initiatives in the text by comparing them with terrorist cells, one of the academic community representatives lost his temper and shouted: "if you don't want to be here – don't. Let us, who know what this is all about, work and stop sabotaging us!" What is even more interesting is that all of the stakeholders nominally accepted their perceived roles and very rarely tried to step outside their characters. Thus, there existed a general consensus that civil society representatives have the strongest connection to young people; that academic community members have the expertise on young people and that ministerial officials have a better understanding of governmental procedures. This is clearly evident if the minutes from the expert working groups' meeting (examples can be seen in table 9.2.) are studied. Very rarely one of the stakeholders argued from the point of view of another actor, apart from when during the second process the Ministry started using procedural knowledge as an excuse not to include some of the more controversial points in the draft.

Moreover, in the interview with a member of the academic community (Respondent 2), they stated the following about the process of NYP making: "You see, it is not our job to have an opinion on everything. Interpreting research results and methodology is the thing we should be concerned about. That is something not everyone can do." This response clearly supports the claim of self-perceived roles policy actors played just as the two examples presented in this paragraph demonstrate that each of involved actors believed that the feature characteristic for him/her is more important than the other because they believed that playing by unwritten rules is expected and sufficient for their ideas to be implemented into the legal text. All of the above confirms the assumption that, even in a collaborative process, actors believe power and its perception is important. Due to that belief, they stick to their own expertise, knowledge, and strategies, using them in a manner that could assure representation and realization of their interests.

Table 9.2: quotes showing power sources of stakeholders, extracted from minutes

	NYP making	**Youth act making**
Governmental officials	*Morana Makovec, Ministry of Social Policy and Youth warned about problems which may occur in practice when different terminology is used in the process of youth organization funding* (12 February 2014)	*Marina Euinbuchler-Stilinović stated the problem with the 17th article where the National youth council must be defined more clearly with criteria based on the internal procedures of the Ministry of Administration and in accordance with the Act on CSOs*. (12 December 2013)
Civil society representatives	*Anamarija Sočo, Croatian Youth network explained the importance of the Structured dialogue for young people.* (12 February 2014)	*Bojan Smode, The Scout Association Croatia pointed out the relevance of the scouting movement and their experience in international cooperation which can be used when talking about the international perspective within the Act.* (28 March 2013)
Academic community	*Vedrana Spajić Vrkaš emphasized the importance of correctly set indicators when discussing the matters within the youth policy* (14 March 2014)	*Marko Kovačić explained the definition of youth policy and pointed out the relevance of looking at it within a comparative perspective* (7 November 2013)

In Table 9.3, a brief reminder of the two processes is offered in order to dig deeper into the analysis of the two processes, going beyond the finding that looking at power as a variable has merit even in collaborative processes, which empirically supports Purdy's purely theoretical explanations (2012). Based on the thick description of the two youth policy-making processes, table 9.3 provides analytical conclusions of chapter 8.

Table 9.3: Process' comparison

	National youth program		Youth Act
Process	Participatory, inclusive, educative, consensus-oriented, uncoordinated, chaotic		Participatory, inclusive, consensus-oriented, educative, contentious, uncoordinated, chaotic
Roles	**State actors**	Coordination (inadequate), not pivotal	Coordination (inadequate), more audacious than in the NYP process
	Civil society	CYN - veto actor	CYN – veto actor, other CSO representatives – content-wise similar to the CYN position
	Academic community	Mediators, alliance with civil society	Alliance with civil society
Content	No major discrepancies among actors' points of view Academic community – methodology oriented, research interpreters.		Conflict between the state actors and the CYN Academic community – closer to civil society

On the one hand, this table suggests that the processes of making the NYP and Youth Act are rather similar examples of youth policymaking. As illustrated in chapters 7 and 8, youth policy in Croatia fulfils all the criteria of an inclusive and participatory setting where relevant stakeholders are included in a largely meaningful way. Despite the fact the one policy-making process failed to deliver the output, process-wise it involved both state and non-state actors who had the right to speak freely and inputs from both actors were integrated to some extent in the final version of the document. Furthermore, the two analyzed processes showcase that in the youth policy formation process the evidence-based approach is dominant and that the academic community is as equally involved in the progress as are the state actors and the civil society representatives. And although these two processes share some common characteristics, on the other hand, they also share fundamental points of divergence.

For instance, in both processes, the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth created an enabling environment for the effective participation of various relevant actors and designed an atmosphere beneficial to a consensus-oriented process. In addition, in terms of the participating actors, the process was educative, meaning that the participants learned important lessons and claimed they would apply them in the future. In terms of process coordination, both policy formations were described as chaotic and highly uncoordinated. The Ministry simply did not have the resources or competence to guide the process successfully. This was particularly exemplified in the second

process of the Youth Act formation, where two participating respondents described it as being a hands-off state of affairs, despite the participant actors clearly showing their need to be guided. One of the reasons behind this divergence between actor expectations and experiences is the novelty of the participatory process. As explained in the first chapter, Croatia is a country where participation is not a part of the public administration legacy. Until recently, policy processes were exclusively top-down affairs, therefore, state officials still have trouble achieving a balance between coordination/intervention and *laissez-faire* observation. Even though this might seem irrelevant, it is, in fact, of great importance. Participating actors invest their time and other resources in the process, and in the end, feel frustrated that their involvement is not appreciated nor their participatory objectives met. If we again take a look at the conceptualization of collaborative governance and the governance approach as such, we will see that the role of the state is to steer. However, steering is a habit that is learned through practice before it can be successfully navigated.

The second reason why studying these processes is relevant is because it unravels power patterns. Respondent 7 on the process of Youth Act making thus said: "*…it started to be a waste of time. The Ministry had one job which they couldn't deliver*". This narrative undermines the biggest advantage of the government – the ability to coordinate and direct the process. As other involved stakeholders saw that the government could not do that, their reputation started derogating which influenced the whole process. There was no confidence the Ministry could control the process or that it has the capacity to finish it up. Once the main advantage of an actor is diminished, other actors start to doubt almost everything proposed or suggested by the state actor. As pointed out by the respondent 5: *"the faith in the process was irretrievably deteriorated".*

Content-wise, the two policy formulation processes were completely different. On the one hand, the National youth program process went smoothly, as the content reflected all the participating actors' points of view, whereas the formation of the Youth Act, was characterized by diverse attitudes, motivations, and ideas. In addition to this, the motivation for the creation of the NYP, according to respondents, was much clearer, logical and better explained by the Ministry unlike the process of Youth act creation. Due to specific outcomes, namely, the youth act ultimately not being passed due to the boycott of the CYN, this process demonstrated the dependency of formal and non-formal actors in a collaborative policy arena. In such settings, it is obviously important

for relevant stakeholders to be on board because of the different resources each of them possesses. More concretely, the state demonstrated the lack of power to pass a law without the support and involvement of the national youth council. On the one hand, this challenges the argument of the unlimited or great power of the state and demonstrates a certain amount of accountability. If taken into account that the CYN indeed represents the youth sector (as national youth councils in principle do) to continue the process without them and to pass an Act which does not have the support of the sector would not be politically wise. On the other hand, one could argue that the process of withdrawing of the government from their initial wish to pass the Youth act is actually a demonstration of their power because they recognized the political momentum and by withdrawing from the process managed to buy a sense of social peace. Self-constraining of the state is not an unusual argument in democratic debates, thus there are authors (Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner, 1999) who support this argument by portraying contemporary liberal democracies and their dedication to norms, procedures, and laws without which the very essence of democracy is jeopardized (ibid, 2). Nevertheless, in this process, it was clearly demonstrated that no matter who were the winners, the CYN managed to present themselves as a powerful policy actor and all other actors accepted that as a truism.

Despite this finding, it should not be used to generalize other policy processes or the actors' roles within them. This analysis was conducted on one specific policy field within a particular national context, which does not mean that the same conclusion could be applied to other policy-making processes in Croatia and elsewhere. Nevertheless, this empirical study demonstrates that power indeed is a fluid resource that can be increased or decreased depending on (self)perception and which is not absolute but relies on a number of actors and factors to achieve its ends. If we take a closer look at the power relations in these two processes, we will uncover some significant features of the policy-making process in Croatia.

9.1. The power matrix applied

In order to assess power in collaborative governance, in Chapter 5, I offered a matrix consisting of four elements: attributed influence, resources of actors, discourse legitimacy and the degree of preference attainment. The general idea is that if one wants to assess power, one should ask actors what power means/is. This perception of power is being created by two additional elements – the quality of argumentation in regard to

resources of actors (the presentation of knowledge, information, argumentation, and financial resources) and discourse legitimacy (society-involved policy actor) and the ratio between the starting positions of actors (their interests) and outcomes of the process. Those two dimensions combined influence the general perception of power of the actors. I argued that this kind of a tool is optimal to use in the stage of policy formulation where the relevant is being distinguished from the irrelevant and actors use their resources to channel the direction of the policy process in order to set aims.

The result of gathering data in order to *identify the interests of stakeholders and assess power* by doing document analysis and conducting interviews; *to analyze mechanisms and interests* (via interviews) and in order to *comprehend the processes of Youth Act and National Youth Program making* throughout participant observation and document analysis – can be seen in tables 9.4 and 9.5

Table 9.4 – National Youth Program making – the matrix application

	Governmental officials	**Civil society**	**Academic community**
Quality of argumentation			
Resources	+	+	+
Clarity of arguments	-	-	+
Relevance of arguments	-	+	+
Logical fallacies	+	+	-
Evidence support	-	+	+
Financial resource presentation	+	+	-
Discourse legitimacy	-	+	-
The degree of preference attainment	+	+	-/+

Table 9.4 presents the distribution of elements from the power matrix within the groups of governmental officials, civil society and academic community. Each element of the power matrix was attributed to each target group and marked with one of three symbols; **+** if analysis showed that there the element was present during the process, **-** if a policy actor did not show signs of the element during the process and **-/+** if an element cannot be clearly distinguished[78]. It is evident that there are significant differences based on elements distribution.

[78] The same methodology was applied for table 9.5 and the process of youth act making.

As supposed, there are certain elements that are inherent to a certain policy actor. When comparing actors in terms of *quality of argumentation*, table 9.4 clearly shows that the government scores lower than the research community and civil society organizations. Despite the fact that the process of making the National Youth Program was collaborative and without much tensions, the governmental representatives were often "losing" in discussions. This claim is supported by the statement from the respondent 8 who says that content-wise, they simply could not follow everything so they did not even try to present themselves as knowledgeable. However, what is curious is the abundance of logical fallacies used by the ministerial representatives, thus in table 9.4 this item was marked with + under the category 'governmental officials'. When analysing my field notes based on the protocol created for participant observation, I encountered a prevalence of *post hoc ergo propter hoc* and the slippery slope fallacies.

For example, in terms of the *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, a number of state actors when presenting their argument started by identifying the problem. In continuation, when they started elaborating their points of view, it was not uncommon for them to amplify the notion of causality. For instance, in the working group on culture and creativity, in a discussion on culture programs funding, state officials often used the argument that young people visit theatres more because the national budget for youth culture is higher, disregarding potential other reasons, such as better PR of the cultural institutions, better cooperation with schools and greater focus of theatres on younger audience. Even more interesting is that the academic community representatives pointed that out, which certainly did not contribute to the reputation of the state actors.

In Appendix C, one can find a protocol for participants' observation consisting of several elements used for data gathering. Here, in order to illuminate the position of actors in respect to the quality of argumentation, I will focus on two elements, namely Relevance for the topic and Resource usage. Participant observation exposed that state officials were in some cases explaining and arguing in favour of some point, however, that point was remotely linked to the substance, thus the – in table 9.4. for governmental officials under this category. For instance, when there was a discussion on youth health in a working group, a governmental official, instead of arguing pro or contra to health education, started a long expose on how other countries do not have health education proposed by the health experts. Even though one might say this was a fair point, the problem was that this particular governmental official did not engage in a debate about the substance (the relevance for Croatian youth, type and content of health education

etc.) but focused more on an aspect very little connected with the whole idea. Resource-wise, the process was relatively well established. All of the actors demonstrated certain levels of expertise. For instance, governmental officials were very well equipped with procedures and financial constraints, civil society organizations mostly used experience and academic community data. These insights from observation were confirmed in the interviews with representatives of each group.

Thus, *discourse legitimacy* or the link between society and the organization is the characteristic of civil society organizations. This was pointed out several times throughout the process, as observed during the process. When arguing and trying to explain their positions, civil society representatives would often appeal their membership or their day-to-day communication with young people (discourse legitimacy). This would, from their point of view, give them relevance and, more importantly, relevance to their arguments. Once civil society representatives realized discourse legitimacy is the feature unique to them – it started to be one of their most powerful weapons in discussions. Furthermore, almost no actor tried to attack this legitimacy, as presented in section 8.3. In the interviews, representatives of youth organizations confirmed that one of their biggest advantages in comparison with other actors (not necessarily involved in this process) is their insight on the youth sector and everyday communication with young people. Being the only policy actor involved in the process of making NYP which had direct dealings with young people, youth organizations indeed had a legitimacy no other actor had and thus were perceived as important. The same goes for expert knowledge and the academic community. The perceived monopoly on interpreting data from research boosted the researchers' position so they would almost always be presenting data or some theoretical propositions.

When it comes to the degree of *preference attainment*, the general structure of the National Youth Program followed the EU youth strategy and most of the objectives and measures from the side of the Ministry and civil society were included in the final text. The academic community representative (Respondent 2) pointed out one's discontent (moderate content) with the final text due to the absence of a volunteering chapter. Other respondents who participated in the process expressed their content with the ratio of what they wanted in the first place and what they got at the end of the process. When it comes to the civil society representatives, one can track the percentage of the content implemented in the final text due to the existence of the position paper

on making a youth program. The CYS published a paper in 2012, in which they described their vision of the process and expressed what should a new youth program contain. If the degree of preference attainment approach is applied to this, one could see a high level of concurrence in terms of objectives, measures, and activities, thus in table 8.4, there is a + for civil society organizations under the category degree of preference attainment. This shows that civil society representatives, and particularly the CYN, indeed managed to advocate successfully for their interests which indicates their level of power in the whole process.

To sum up this process, as is seen in table 9.4, the civil society representatives in comparison with governmental and academic community representatives presented their resources slightly better and used the advantage of discourse legitimacy in order to build a better position. The general perception of all involved actors is that in this process the civil society actors indeed were a vital part of the process and that their contribution was invaluable. Neither the academic community nor governmental officials had any negative comment on the civil society representative, as opposed to *vice versa*. This all confirms the implacable reputation of the civil society representatives and confirms the hypothesis that the civil society representatives indeed can exercise their power better in the collaborative governance setting.

In the process of making the Youth act, the situation is somewhat different. As presented in table 9.5, the civil society representatives were once again using the discourse legitimacy card in discussions. Unlike the first process, this one was much more contentious and positions were much stronger. For example, it was not unusual to hear statements like this: "If you don't want to be here – don't. Let us, who know what this is all about, work and stop sabotaging us!" (Respondent 1) or to find this quote at minutes: "Morana Makovec, Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, expressed her worry with the behaviour of the CYN and their sabotage of the process" (minutes, 12 March 2014). This kind of language, behaviour, and discourse diverges to a great extent from the process of NYP making.

Table 9.5 shows the general perception of actors is much lower than in the previous process. Actors did not believe each other thus their reputation and power perception were relatively low. Due to diverse epistemic positions and *modi operandi*, it is impossible to rely on the interviews because each of the actors had its own perception of what had happened. Therefore, from the point of view of government, the Croatian Youth Network blocked the process because they did not want responsibilities,

only rights. This notion is particularly interesting because the CYN did exactly what they were accusing other ministries of – avoiding responsibilities. In a policy-making process, each actor is taking responsibility for a certain element in the process when they agreed to join the process. As seen in chapter 3 collaborative governance requires not only rights but also responsibilities. Ansell and Gash (2007) in their conceptualization of collaborative governance address this issue by pointing out the need that every actor has a meaningful contribution to the policy-making process in order for it to result in a quality public policy. In addition to this, authors such as Der Meer and Edelenbos (2006) or Mathis (2007) advocate for cooperation and communication and placing them in the center of accountability debate. In other words, the relevant literature on actors' participation in policy-making processes undoubtfully shows the need for taking responsibility once policy actors joined the policy-making process, however, this literature mostly focuses on state-actors. There are very few texts that go beyond state-actors and unorganized citizens when it comes to taking responsibility for the policy-making process (for instance, Miller, 2013 on the example of development policy or Hesselmann 2011 on the example of global health governance). But the question becomes even more complicated if the issue of accountability of the civil society organization is raised. Fox (2000) thus in her text on accountability writes the following: "NGOs usually lack a clearly-defined constituency, so defining their accountability processes is inherently problematic. They may be accountable to universal ideals of democracy, justice, or environmental sustainability, as many claim – or not, as some external critics argue. NGOs tend to zealously defend their autonomy, so who decides whether they are accountable to their ostensible goals, and who sets the standards?" (p. 12). In this dissertation, the need for further conceptualization and analysis of taking responsibility and accountability of all involved actors in the policy-making process emerged.

On the other hand, the Croatian Youth Network believed that the cause for the blocked process was the behaviour of the Ministry for Social Policy and Youth. The third actor, the academic community representatives, blame a lack of communication and behaviour of both the aforementioned actors. Due to conflicting points of view, I relied on document analysis and insights from the participant observation. The result of the combination of these methods is the information in table 9.5

Table 9.5 – Youth Act making – the matrix application

	Governmental officials	Civil society	Academic community
Quality of argumentation			
Resources	+	+	+
Clarity of arguments	-/+	-/+	-/+
Relevance of arguments	-	-	+
Logical fallacies	+	+	-
Evidence support	-	+	+
Financial resource presentation	+	+	-
Discourse legitimacy	-	+	-
The degree of preference attainment	-/+	+	-/+

There are three elements in table 9.5 relevant for the power analysis, namely – the quality of argumentation, discourse legitimacy and the degree of preference attainment. Just as in table 9.4 a **+** marks the existence of a characteristic, a **–** the absence and **-/+** the inability to assess.

According to the documents, clarity and relevance of arguments were relatively low. For instance, in the minutes from February 20th, 2014, out of 7 articles discussed at that meeting (nb. 2, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 33) the expert working group concluded that four of them needed additional clarification and elaboration from the actors proposing them. Most of the discussants were repeating themselves (for instance the CYN in debates on youth organizations' funding and definition of a national youth organization, as can be seen in the minutes from December 5th and 12th, 2013; the academic community members – the minutes from meetings on November 7th and 14th and December 12th, 2013). The process that lasted for more than two months demonstrates distrust among the actors and their competence because no actor wanted to accept the arguments of the other. Respondent 10 illustrated that by stating the following: *There was an inherent conflict between the civil society representatives who wanted to incorporate ideas in the document and legal experts* [the representatives of the Ministry] *who argued that there is no room for ideas in the Act, or that strategies are more appropriate than ideas.*

At the meetings of the expert working group arguments were often blurred by emotions so the whole process was exhausting and time-consuming. Very soon it became clear that the stakeholders were not listening to one another but rather

discussing with themselves – I have listed situations such as these in my field notes. In situations like this, it was difficult to assess the power only through the quality of argumentation because this quality was modest or non-existing thus the mark -/+ was put in the table under this category. Emotions as factors in policy-making processes are not strange and are not a surprise. Barnes (2008) in his text on deliberative forums in the context of policy-making argues: "[emotions] represent a legitimate and important contribution to the process of making and assessing social policies and that deliberative forums should be judged on their capacity to encompass such expression. […] Emotion cannot be ruled out of order and public officials cannot claim that good manners dictate that strong feelings be left at the door" (p. 477). However, the problem becomes when emotional outbursts become more prevalent than the quality of argumentation, a situation that happened in the process of youth act making. Losing control was not immanent only for state and civil society representatives but it was also present among academic community members. Engaging in discussions with the sole purpose of debating and putting data aside, strategies that were not characteristic in the first process, took place in this one. In addition to this, I would like to point out another aspect of the quality of argumentation – logical fallacies. Unlike the first process where there was the prevalence of *slippery slope* and post *hoc ergo propter hoc*, in this process both governmental and civil society representatives very often used the Straw man fallacy (please see table 9.5)[79]. It comes as no surprise that this is a case because, as demonstrated earlier, it seemed that policy actors involved in the process were more interested in debating than in achieving something substantial. Respondent 10 in the interview pointed out that: "at one point I got the feeling I was in a debate club". These ongoing and constant debates can be interpreted as a form of power play. When policy actors realized the process was disturbed by the lack of trust and content-wise unproductive, debating over irrelevant issues (for example conjunctions) was the way how they wanted to exercise their power.

In terms of discourse legitimacy, the situation was similar to the process of making the national youth program. Youth organizations were often pointing out that they know the situation on the field and that this gives them legitimacy to talk on behalf of beneficiaries of a potential law – young people. This notion was not contested by

[79] „Giving the impression of refuting an opponent's argument, while actually refuting an argument that was not presented by that opponent" (Downes, 2016)

any other actor thus the only + in the table under the discourse legitimacy goes to youth organizations.

The most objective way to assess the power relations was to take a look at the degree of preference attainment. As stated, governmental representatives wanted this law, while the civil society representatives and academic community members were much more reluctant. One can conclude that the starting positions on a need for an Act can determine the behaviour of actors during the policy formulation process. As the Croatian Youth Network actively sabotaged the process (from their point of view due to the behaviour of the Ministry) which resulted in the process being paralysed and later ceasing, I compared only these two starting points: who of the actors really wanted the Act and who did not - the Croatian Youth Network left the process as the winner. However, not everything is so one-dimensional. Representatives of the ministry stated that one of the reasons they initiated this process was the need for the law which arose in consultations with the youth sector. Due to the fact that the CYN, who indeed represents the sector, denies the truthfulness of that statement and states that they were against the Act from the start, it is impossible to objectively confirm these positions and adequately assess the starting positions. Nevertheless, the fact that from the start it was obvious that two very powerful policy actors have different starting points could have indicated impending trouble in the policy-process.

However, the claim that the civil society representatives were more powerful is supported by the analysis of the actors' position. From the minutes (5th of December 2013; 12th of February 2014) it can be seen that, substantively, there was no difference in the positions of the civil society and the academic community. This alliance, formed at the beginning of the process at the initiative of the Croatian Youth Network, demonstrates the ability of this actor to influence the process even outside the formal proceedings in order to be more powerful in the process of policy formulation. This strategy should not come as a surprise as it is in line with understanding CSOs as policy actors (Casey, 1998).

To sum, the process did not result in the youth act which was the goal of the government. However, is it safe to say that power-wise the position of the state actors was worse than that of the actors who did not want the youth act from the start? In my opinion, it is. On the one hand, passing this law would mean regulating the youth field, predominantly youth organizations funding, youth work and institutional architecture. At first sight that might be beneficial for youth organizations as they would have

financial security, a framework for one of the most important issues in youth policy (youth work) and a defined relationship between the state and youth civil society organizations. However, on the other hand, one might argue that just passing the law would not change anything. Croatia has rich experience in normative optimism (Baric, 2010), meaning it often passes laws, strategies and other policy documents without a real wish to implement it. Normative optimism in its essence is a reductionist approach where it is believed that the proliferation of normative acts will solve societal problems. I argue that this can be applied to the analysis of the youth act and that there are two reasons why this would be so. Firstly, I argue that despite there being existing youth policy documents in Croatia, their implementation is insufficient and I support this by pointing out two examples. Both the Act on Youth advisory boards and national youth strategies failed to produce the desired outcomes. In 2018 there were only 21% of local and regional self-governing units that had youth advisory boards, despite the legally binding regulation saying each unit should have it (Izvjestaj… 2018). A second example is the national youth program; the evaluation of which showed that only 36,44% of measures were implemented (Baketa, 2017). In other words, just the fact there is an act on something related to young people does not necessarily mean it is useful. Secondly, the literature on youth policy documents (Williamson, 2002; Kiilakostki 2018) clearly states that there are various institutional architectures, depending on youth policy tradition, public administration structure, diversity of youth organizations and needs of young people. Kiilakoski (2018) in his analysis on youth work put Croatia in the third category where regulation is non-existent but points out that this is not bad per se as there are lots of youth work providers regardless of the lack of regulation. If these two arguments are applied to the analysis of youth act-making, I strongly believe that in 2013 there was no need for youth act. Based on the interviews with academics and civil society representatives, at that time, according to them the sector was not ready to have a youth act, especially because it worked perfectly fine without it (Kovacic, 2014).

10 CONCLUSION

There are particular concepts in social sciences that are widely used in different disciplines. Such concepts, notions, and methods are generally applicable, while at other times, they depend heavily on the context. In the latter case, it is important to note that these concepts become generic signifiers that every researcher can accommodate to his or her environment, method and approach. As a consequence, the fluidity of such concepts increases and they gain the potential to become vague, undefined and imprecise. The social sciences are loaded with such phenomena, which are often called "stretched concepts" (Sartori 1970). Some of these concepts include ‘governance', ‘power', ‘policy', ‘civil society', etc. This dissertation operated with all of them, attempting to partly provide a better explanation of them and to situate them in the context of the changes occurring in public policy and public administration. More concretely, the idea of the dissertation was to show how a specific public policy is being formulated within the complex interaction between state and non-state actors and to establish the extent of power different actors involved in the process of policy-making are using to put their priorities on the agenda of the policy formulation stage. In light of this, the research question posed to illuminate the relationship between various policy actors, policy formulation, governance, and power was: under what circumstances in contemporary policy-making processes can we discuss and use power? How is this power being manifested and who in fact has the power?

With the expansion of the governance paradigm, most of the policy and political science research focused more on other concepts (such as cooperation, influence, networks), often discarding power as a concept and inadequately linking it to new theoretical models, approaches, and frameworks. Thus, the idea of this dissertation was to uncover conditions that would allow power to be used in the contemporary analysis of the policy process. To guide us through the process, three hypotheses were set:

1. In order to plausibly use power in contemporary policy-making processes, one should adopt its interpretative understanding.
2. The policy formulation stage is an adequate locus for assessing the power of the involved policy actors.
3. In the subsystem of youth policy in Croatia, civil society organizations will exercise relevant factors more effectively than other players and position themselves as the most powerful policy actors.

These three hypotheses suggested this dissertation would use the interpretivist approach in order to analyze power perceptions of state and non-state actors involved in the formulation of youth policy in Croatia. Given the fact that for the purpose of this dissertation public policy (making) was understood as an outcome of social interaction (Colebatch 2006), I argued that in the polity where there is a number of different actors, negotiation, arguments and interpretation of actors' position, the most plausible way to understand how policy is being made was by interpreting aforementioned characteristics; thus the interpretivist approach. Furthermore, policy formulation understood as a category that "involves identifying and/or crafting a set of policy alternatives to address a problem, and narrowing that set of solutions in preparation for the final policy decision." Sidney (2007, p. 79) is a stage where power play happens. Since the government already makes a selection of actors based on procedures stipulated by governance principles and depending on policy types, it is to be expected that within policy formulation, consensus and agreement will be the main impetus for formulating a policy. However, if this assumption is to be accepted, it remains unclear why some policies did not evolve into the further stages of the policy process. Lastly, due to the fact that academic research on youth policy in Croatia and beyond is relatively scarce, and even more so on actors' constellations within it, and that existing research (Williamson, 2002; Buzinkic, 2009; Kovacic, 2015) points out the importance of civil society organizations, it was logical to assume that they would have a prominent role in the process of youth policy-making.

In order to accept or reject the working hypothesis, this dissertation was divided into two building blocks. In the first one, the theoretical, relevant literature on concepts, theories, and models that are relevant to this research topic was analyzed. Provided that, I also realized that 'governance' is indeed a popular phenomenon among policy researchers and that there is no unanimous definition of how it should be framed. Not only that, but I also found that there are numerous approaches to governance and that various types are used to explain certain aspects of a social or political reality. Once I stumbled upon 'collaborative governance', I realized that this was the most precise functionality of the governance term to build my argument upon. That being the case, I set out to explore an assortment of literature on policy actors, which further helped to develop the foundation of this thesis. In the second section, I analyzed 'power' through the perspective of interpretivism and proposed a unique solution for its conceptualization by using fundamental methodologies of political science,

sociology, and anthropology. Further on, I conceptualized power in the context of policy formulation and concluded that due to the structural characteristics of policy formulation, one can use it for assessing the power of actors. This can be done with the aid of a power matrix, which is based on the interpretative approach to actors' resources and roles. This analysis of power within the policy formulation framework was tested in the second building block of my dissertation, where I applied this power matrix towards the analysis of youth policy in Croatia. The results showed that out of all the actors involved, a civil society organization had the most power in Croatian youth policy formation. As such, the understanding of the policy formulation process within the youth collaborative governance framework was extrapolated in this dissertation. The study also enabled a more comprehensive description of (collaborative) governance, which was to decrease the vagueness of the governance concept and increase its analytical value. In addition to the concepts of governance and power, in this analysis, different state and non-state actors were compared based on their resources and other characteristics, which is a rarity in literature. But what does all that mean in terms of the research question and proposed hypotheses?

In terms of the *first* hypothesis, the analysis showed that it is possible to use the interpretative approach for the analysis of contemporary policy processes and their relation to power. This assumption is, due to the specific nature of the methodological framework, true only for the study of youth policy, however, the analysis doubtfully showed that attributed power can be a useful tool for assessing positions of formal and non-formal actors. By using the meta-approach of political ethnography, this dissertation provided rich data on meaning and interpretation of agency thus illuminating how power patterns in a youth policy area occur, how they change and what influences their existence. It was verified that in circumstances with lots of interest embodied in the number of entities who have the right to participate in the policy formulation, political ethnography and interpretivism provide much richer data than, for instance, positivism or rationalism. The interpretative approach based on thick descriptions of the content (Geertz, 1973) which were extrapolated from the data obtained from participant observations, interviews and qualitative content analysis, uncovered subtle patterns of interactions among policy actors and their interaction with the policy-making outcome. In other words, this dissertation even though in some points a bit unorthodox demonstrated that there is a certain value in using interpretativism when assessing the perception of power in the policy arena.

The second hypothesis refers to the potential for power analysis in the policy formulation stage of the decision-making process. Provided a vast number of references on policy formulation, one of the most under-researched stages of the policy process (Wu et al, 2010; Hagrove 1975; Turnpenny, Jordan, Benson and Rayer, 2015) in this dissertation it was shown that it is as an adequate locus for assessing power. Policy formulation, if combined with collaborative governance allows researchers to study the interaction of actors as they at that stage and in this setting should have a relatively equal amount of power to push their ideas further in the decision-making process. Policy formulation thus becomes an arena where different strategies of both state and non-state actors can be reflected upon and their power assessed. With the uplift of (collaborative) governance, it becomes even more important and adding the power variable *de facto* increases the analytical value of governance as a framework. For that purpose, in this dissertation, the power matrix was constructed under the assumption that power is the perception of influence and it consists out of the following elements: attributed influence, quality of argumentation, resources, discourse legitimacy and the degree of preference attainment. From my point of view, with the aid of this power matrix, which is based on the interpretative approach to actors' resources and roles, this dissertation brought better understanding of the policy formulation process within the collaborative governance framework.

In regard to the third hypothesis, this dissertation with the combination of the argumentative approach and the degree of preference attainment disclosed that in the context of Croatian youth policy, the state is less powerful than a civil society organization, namely the Croatian Youth Network. This notion is particularly important because it opens an array of questions on the real role of the state and how to boost its capacities to produce quality public policies. Despite the fact that this study was a snapshot of a political moment and is limited to one policy field, it certainly poses new questions on the relevance of elements that contribute to the power perception of various stakeholders. The dissertation undoubtedly demonstrated that there is a considerable asymmetry of power between the state and the non-state actors which creates instability in policy process and negatively influences the youth sector. The inability of the state to follow the needs of young people, non-existing potentials and mechanisms for assuring quality development and ignorance about the solutions necessary for creating an enabling environment causes a discrepancy between the state and non-state actors. As non-state actors, due to discourse legitimacy and the abundance

of resources in youth policy, propose solutions that might be beneficial for young people, the state interprets these solutions as a vanguard and tries to maintain the status quo as much as possible. This creates conflict between the two types of actors which in the end results unfavorable for the targeted population – the youth.

Apart from these findings, the study investigated some other related phenomena. Firstly, during the analysis, the question of the relation of the state towards the status quo emerged. The analysis showed that the Croatian public administration has an inclination towards maintaining status quo and other policy actors involved in the process of youth policy-making (academic community and youth organizations) prefer change. This academic debate is not unfamiliar as the administration's orientation on maintaining the status quo was criticised by a number of authors (King et al 1998; Johnsen, 2005). However, conclusions should not be made frivolously in a binary way; government bad – civil society good. Namely, because some other texts (for instance Diamond, 2010) compared third sector organizations with the state on the example of refugees and concluded that the third sector organizations indeed challenge the status quo, however, this does not mean the aforementioned strategy is always good for the community. In other words, maintaining the status quo is not necessarily a bad thing as the well-being of a community should be taken into account for a proper quality evaluation. Yet, this issue in the context of youth policy-making uncovered one other point – the problem of policy translation. As seen in the analysis, in the process of making the youth act there was a clear problem in communication between higher state officials and street bureaucracy which was in charge of managing the process of youth act formulation. The fact that the street bureaucrats had problems explaining the need for the youth act indicates a possible problem of policy translation. As conceptualized by Stone (2010) in one of its aspects, it occurs when higher chambers or cabinets do not transmit the message on a certain issue to the lower chambers. This problem of traveling of ideas can later on, as seen in the text, derogate the perception of state officials' power in the eyes of other involved policy actors.

Furthermore, an interesting point on the legitimacy of civil society organizations turned out to be a compelling feature of the analysis. In a number of academic texts, the legitimacy of the state is vastly elaborated (Majone, 1999; Skogstad, 2003), however, there is a lack of text focusing on a quality conceptualization of CSO legitimacy. With the uplift of the governance concept and openness of policy-making processes for different policy actors, researchers started to focus much more on the

rights of non-state actors rather than on their responsibilities. This being said, texts on the role of civil society organizations and their legitimacy point out several interesting features that were (dis)proved by this study. For instance, Kochler-Koch (2010) claims civil society organizations are not involved in the process of policy-making as representatives, but that their potential is more their active participation. Even though in a strictly formal sense civil society organizations are not legal representatives, only legalistic understanding of representation is reductionist. The analysis of Croatian youth policy showed that representation, defined in terms of discourse legitimacy, had a great influence on other actors and brings a certain amount of power to (youth) civil society organizations. This analysis demonstrated that presentation and perception can have a great influence on the actors' constellation and the outcome of a policy process. Another aspect is accountability. Given the fact the CYN decided to quit the process and that one of their power building elements was discourse legitimacy, the question is to what extent can one non-formal actor which builds its reputation (and power consequently) be trustworthy if it decides to leave the process. Academic literature here talks about the responsibility of all involved actors for the production of quality public policies (Leleiko, 1984). Also, authors such as Van Der Meer and Edelenbos (2006) or Mathis (2007) point out the relevance of communication and advocate for resolving potential conflict among policy actors by communicating. In the youth act-making process, this indeed did not happen thus it resulted in the failure of the process. Nevertheless, conflicts, even though at first sight unusual in collaborative governance are shown to be existent both in theory (Ansel and Gash, 2007) and practice (youth act making). Theory (Ansel and Gash, 2007) sees a solution for conflict in honest brokers or organic leaders, neither of whom the contentious process analysed in this study had.

In addition to this, some interesting ramifications for the Croatian (youth) policy-making were raised.

On the other hand, youth policy-making in Croatia possesses certain positive characteristics. The positive aspects of relying on an evidence-based approach, inclusiveness, consultations with relevant stakeholders, and participation should be institutionally protected and promoted among other state authority bodies/policy departments.

This being said, this study showed that youth policy in Croatia is ambiguous in the following way. According to Denstad (2009, 29), a youth policy should have the following objectives:

1. To invest purposefully in young people in a coherent and mutually reinforcing way, wherever possible, through an opportunity-focused rather than a problem-oriented approach;
2. To involve young people both in the strategic formulation of youth policies and in eliciting their views about the operational effectiveness of policy implementation;
3. To create the conditions for learning, opportunity, and experience which ensure and enable young people to develop the knowledge, skills, and competencies to play a full part both in the labour market and in civil society;
4. To establish systems for robust data collections, both to demonstrate the effectiveness of youth policies and to reveal the extent to which "policy gaps" exist in relation to effective service delivery to young people from certain social groups, in certain areas or in certain conditions;
5. To display a commitment to reducing such policy gaps where they demonstrably exist.

Comparing this analysis with the realities of the Croatian youth policy, it can be concluded that the National youth program and the Youth Act policy processes meet these stipulated requirements. Nonetheless, our processes undoubtedly suffer from a collaborative dissonance of participating policymakers that is both a reflection of a historical remnant of Croatia's non-participatory state structures and the novelty of attributed influence of civil society power players. In other words, we are on the right track to serving the Croatian youth through successful policy outcomes but we need more time and practice to work out the additional issues of coordination, nature of actors' participation, building a stronger framework of compromise and instituting resource compensation for the actors involved in the process.

Based on the aforementioned notions, I strongly believe this dissertation provides an innovative approach to a specific phenomenon. Not only does it offer an innovative way of conceptualization and understanding the power of policy actors in the policy formulation within collaborative governance but it also analyses and examines the concept of power as an interpretative undertaking. Moreover, it contributes to the literature by decreasing the vagueness of popular public policy concepts such as (collaborative) governance or policy formulation after matching and linking power with them. In the empirical part of the dissertation, qualitative research techniques were used to support hypothetical arguments. Using participant observation as a method in policy analysis is not a common thing due to its inaccessibility and cost. There are very few researchers who had conducted participant observations in the policy formulation stage of the policy-making process due to the relatively restricted access of behind-the-scenes power-players. Furthermore, in this dissertation, an

additional innovative methodology of ‘triangulation' within the qualitative framework was presented. All of these choices and research foci of this dissertation position it as an original and innovative contribution to the youth public policy field.

Surely, just like every study, this one has its limitations. One weak aspect of this study is the comparison between different theoretical paradigms. In this dissertation, I chose interpretivism and supported the choice of that methodological framework with an argument from practice. However, the analytical value of this study could be increased if different methodological approaches would be tested and the most fitting one chosen accordingly. Another limitation is the selection of a case. For the purpose of this study, I decided to focus on youth policy, even though the youth policy process (as delineated in chapters 3 and 8) is not representative of all public policy processes and therefore, a similar analysis should be conducted for other policy fields. Overall, it is important to point out that generalization about the conclusions of this dissertation cannot be made due to the peculiar nature of the topic, methodology, and research.

There are several possible suggestions for expanding this topic. Firstly, it would be interesting to see if some other theoretical paradigm could provide enhanced and richer data and results. Therefore, it would be advisable to conduct similar research using more positivist-oriented approaches. Similarly, as mentioned above, I suggest that the proposed power matrix be used in the study of power in other policy fields in order to obtain results that could be comparable and more efficiently analyzed. Only this would test the actual analytical value of the power matrix developed for the purpose of this dissertation. As already emphasized throughout the thesis, the policy formulation process is the least explored stage of the policy-making process. In that event, I am encouraging colleagues to focus on this specific stage with greater effort and to explore possible impacts of policy formulation on other policy stages. The literature on this matter is relatively limited, thus it leaves a lot of questions unanswered. Furthermore, I strongly advocate for a deeper exploration of youth policy from various perspectives. This field is eclectic, fluid, and highly relevant in terms of social, political and economic transformation. It is likewise inexplicably under-researched. Very few texts explore youth policy-making, even though it is, as this dissertation has shown, an exceptional platform for the exploration of the relationship between the state and non-state actors. Lastly, some other researchers might choose a strategy where there would not be so many thick descriptions and instead, there would be less content available for

more thorough analysis. Even though this would be a legitimate approach, I choose the opposite strategy. From my point of view, because this is, in fact, the first PhD dissertation in youth policy and the first time someone decided to analyze youth policy-making in Croatia it was relevant to set the ground. This dissertation's goal was to map essential processes, identify the neuralgic point and analyze actors' constellations so it would serve as a starting point for more detailed analysis. In sociology, political science and anthropology thick descriptions are considered to be an adequate research method for writing a thesis (Mutepa, 2016) and valuable sources of new information. Nevertheless, in my future research, I most certainly plan to focus more on specific aspects of this dissertation and explore its implications in more depth.

To sum everything up, this dissertation answered some important questions but opened more avenues of inquiry about the contemporary policy-making in Croatia and elsewhere. Some relevant questions have been answered, and some others have been raised. We have discovered that power seen through the perspective of perception, and located in the policy formulation stage might increase the analytical value of collaborative governance. We have realized that political ethnography indeed is an adequate method of studying the power in the policy process. This dissertation supported the claim that the policy arena has been changing, that non-state actors are more and more important, but it also showed that the state should be more proactive in its new role if it wants quality public policies. With this study, youth policy has been placed hand in hand with other specific policies and it has been systematically studied using policy methodology. On the other hand, we have not gotten the answer if this methodological experiment with power could be applied in some other policy areas. Also, this dissertation did not take into consideration other stages of the policy process which might be equally interesting. Furthermore, this research used collaborative governance as a framework, but an analysis of similar matters using another framework might be worth noting.

Nevertheless, even though we have come to the conclusion of this dissertation, for me, it only marks the beginning of exploring the depths of the youth policy topic. I am genuinely interested in discovering additional aspects of power in policy actors, especially in the context of youth policy-making. For me, young people are a bottomless source of motivation and the best indicator of changes in society. Without studying them, there is no comprehensive understanding of society, politics, and policy-

making. Respectively, I plan to continue this research in order to find even more comprehensive and analytically sound answers about the nature of the contemporary policy-making process and the role of young people within it.

11 Additional abstract

Povzetek

VLADAVINA NA PODROČJU POLITIKA MLADIH NA HRVAŠKEM – ASPEKT MOČI

Istočasno z uveljavljanjem pogleda na upravljanje kot paradigme političnih študij, so se zamenjali tudi načini političnega upravljanja. Čedalje več različnih akterjev je začelo vstopati v politično prizorišče, način delovanja je postal horizontalen hkrati pa so ključne značilnosti poitičnega procesa postale sodelovanje, vključevanje in transparentnost. Zato je danes nemogoče zanikati pomen različnih nedržavnih akterjev v političnih procesih (Cassey, 1998; Kustec-Lipicer, 2006; Petek, 2012). Navkljub tej spremembi in ogromnm porastu raziskovalne literature na tem področju, ostajajo določeni vidiki vladanja nejasni. Eden vidikov je vloga moči kot spremenljivke v razlagi načina ustvarjanja sodobnega političnega procesa. Številni avtorji poudarjajo paradoks sodobne politične znanosti: po eni strani, funkcija moči kot spremenljivke je ena glavnih komponent tega področja, vendar pa zadnje čase postaja čedalje manj popularna v sodobni politični znanosti. (Huxham and Vangen 2005). Da bi razumeli značilnosti sodobnega procesa oblikovanja politik, je fokus pričujoče disertacije na tistih procesih, ki predhodijo procesom odločanja znotraj določenega konteksta vladanja. Cilj je raziskati možičnost akterjev na področju upravljanja, povezanih z razumevanjem procesa odločanja, ter opredeliti mehanizme, ki se jih uporablja za oblikovanje določene javne politike. Z drugimi besedami, raziskovalno vprašanje te študije se osredotoča na pojmovanje moči kot spremenljivke v kontekstu sodobne politike oziroma, bolj natančno, na ravni moči akterjevih dejanj v procesu oblikovanja mladinske politike na Hrvaškem. Z interdisciplinarnim pristopom in iz interpretativnega vidika, disertacija raziskuje spremembe v sodobnih javnih politikah in predlaga nove modele za boljše razumevanje procesa odločanja.

V disertaciji se raziskujejo pogoji, ki so nujni za uporabo moči kot spremenljivke. Posledično, pričujoče delo je poskus odkrivanja načinov manifestacije moči v političnem odločanju v okolju horizontalnega upravljanja ter kdo dejansko ima moč. Trdi se, da je sodobno politiko možno razumeti, če se na moč gleda iz interpretativnega

vidika, saj ta teoretična paradigma dopolnjuje sodobne družbene in politične sfere. Drugi pogoj za konceptualizacijo moči je upoštevanje procesa oblikovanja politike kot izhodiščne točke. Glede na sistemske in strukturne značilnosti te predodločilne faze političnega procesa kjer različni akterji razpravljaljajo o alternativnih političnih predlogah, je ta faza ustrezna kot izhodiščna točka za ocenjevanje moči. Ta teoretična vprašanja so obširno raziskana in so na voljo dani argumenti v zvezi s konceptualizacijami. Trdi se, da je na moč treba gledati skozi zaznavanje moči samih akterjev, oziroma, kako jo oni zaznavajo pri drugih ali pa pripisujejo drugim akterjem. V disertaciji je za to uporabljen izraz pripisani vpliv. Na podlagi obsežnega pregleda literature o moči in upravljanju, trdim, da je moč koncept, ki je predmet interpretacije različnih akterjev ter da ne obstaja soglasje o mehanizmih za objektivno ocenjevanje moči. V nadaljevanju argumenta in glede na to, da "objektivne resnice nekje tam ni», ostaja le osredotočanje na to kako moč dojemajo udeleženci. Pripisani vpliv je operacionaliziran skozi dve dodatni spremenljivki - kakovost argumentacije in stopnja preferenčnega dosega. Torej, moj izvirni prispevek je matrica moči, ki se uporablja za ocenjevanje moči akterjev pri oblikovanju politike v sodelovalnih okoljih

Na podlagi predlogov analize argumentacijske politike, akterji v predodločilnih procesih predstavijo svoja stališča in sredstva ostalim sodelujočim deležnikom ter tako viri in diskurzna legitimnost postanejo dva vidika kakovosti argumentacije. Na eni strani so viri, ki vključujejo: znanje/strokovnost na določenem področju politike/na področju določene problematike, informacije o okoliščinah, povezanih s področjem politike/določeno problematiko in finančnimi viri, katere akterji lahko uporabijo za dodatne informacije, znanja, podporo javnosti. Na drugi strani pa je diskurzna legitimnost, ki se nanaša na povezavo med družbo (ali posebno skupino v družbi) in političnim akterjem. Bolj določeno, če politični akter predstavi svoj interes kot pomemben za družbo, bo imel boljši položaj v okolju horizontalnega upravljanja. Drugi del matrice moči je stopnja preferenčnega vpliva - metoda ex post, ki primerja med začetnimi stališči vseh akterjev in končnim izzidom. Matrica omogoča raziskovalcem koncipianje akterjevih obnašanj in izvajanje sklepov o vzorcih moči.

Predodločilni proces je skupna platforma različnim deležnikom, kateri se zbirajo za odločanje o najbolj primerni rešitvi za konkreten družbeni ali politični problem in je zaradi tega najbolj primerna faza za ocenjevanje moči. To pomeni, da politični akterji uporabljajo različne načine in tehnike (kot je predstavljeno v prejšnjem poglavju), da

bi prepričali druge udeležence, zakaj točno je njihova ideja boljša. Če predpostavimo, da vsi vpleteni akterji rešujejo problem v korist družbe, je varno predpostaviti, da bi argumentacija bila močan dejavnik, ki vpliva na odločitev. Vendar pa je moje razumevanje nekoliko drugačno. Trdim, da je dojemanje akterjev še toliko bolj pomembno, saj imeti le finančna sredstva, zmožnost za učinkovito argumentiranje ter imeti informacije in znanja (to so štirje načini mojega razumevanja virov) je nezadostno brez upoštevanja pomenov, katere si akterji medsebojno pripišejo drug drugemu.

Da bi kontekstualizirali in uporabljali prej omenjeno argumentacijo, v empiričnem delu disertacije je predlagana matrica uporabljena za analizo mladinske politike na Hrvaškem. Razlogi za izbiro mladinske politike so naslednji: upravljanje je izraz, ki se je pojavil v mainstream politični in znanstveni literaturi v zadnjih 30 letih, enako velja tudi za uvedbo mladinske politike. To pomeni, da sta se v političnih okvirih mladinska politika in pojem upravljanja razvila istočasno ter je od takrat naprej mladinska politika bila pod velikim vplivom upravljanja. Zaradi vzporednosti njunih nastopov imata ta dva pojma veliko podobnosti. Drugič, Hrvaška je primer postsocialistične družbe in države, kar pomeni, da so vplivi prejšnjih režimov še vedno pomembni in vidni. Vendar pa je z vstopom v EU, v letu 2013, bilo sprejetih precej dobrih praks upravljanja. Ta zanimiva mešanica vplivov zavrača razširjeno dojemanje, da je dogovor/soglasje tisto, ki prevladuje nad nasprotovalnimi argumenti v upravljanju in politični literaturi, čemur so priča tudi očitne vrzeli v literaturi. Hkrati se mladinska politika na Hrvaškem v večjem delu omenjene literature, pogosto šteje za manj sporno (Buzinkic 2009) vendar pa je prizadevanje za različne interese vseprisotno v hrvaški politiki, kar tudi vpliva nazaj -na splošno državno ureditev. Če ta disertacija pokaže, da moč šteje in je zelo vplivna pri oblikovanju navidezno ugodne javne politike, bi to lahko pripeljalo do trditve, da je takšen prikaz moči prav tako veljaven za druga področja v politiki.

Postopek empirične uporabe argumenta je bil naslednji: z idejo o politični etnografiji sestavljeni iz kvalitativne analize vsebine, usmerjenih intervjujev in opazovanja udeležencev, sem opisal, analiziral in dekonstruiral dva procesa mladinske politike na Hrvaškem. Disertacija zato vsebuje študij političnih formulacij Nacionalnega strateškega plana mladinske politike in Mladinskih zakonov - dveh, v naravi, različnih procesov.

Oba analizirana procesa ustvarjanja mladinske politike sta si precej podobna. Pri obeh postopkih je Ministrstvo za socialno politiko in mlade ustvarilo ovirajoče okolje za

vključevanje različnih pomembnih akterjev. Vzdušje je bilo spodbujajoče le za ustvarjanje soglasja. Z vidika sodelujočih akterjev, je postopek bil poučen, saj so udeleženci trdili, da so se naučili pomembnih lekcij, katere jim bodo uporabne v prihodnosti. Glede na koordinacijo postopka, sta bila oba politična procesa opisana kot kaotična in zelo neusklajena. Ministrstvo preprosto ni imelo sredstev, ali sposobnosti za uspešno vodenje procesa. To je bilo še posebej ponazorjeno v drugem postopku nastajanja Mladinskega zakona, kjer so sodelovali anketiranci in je opisana kot država "hands-off" zadev, kljub temu da so akterji pokazali potrebo po vodenju. Eden od razlogov tega razhajanja med pričakovanji in izkušnjami akterjev, je v tem, da je horizontalno sodelovanje kot postopek novost. Kot je pojasnjeno v prvem poglavju, Hrvaška je država, kjer horizontalno sodelovanje ni del zapuščine v javni upravi. Do nedavnega so bili procesi politike zadeve, ki so potekale od zgoraj navzdol, zato imajo državni uradniki še vedno težave, z doseganjem ravnotežja med koordinacijo / intervencijo in laissez faire opazovanjem. Čeprav se morda to zdi nepomembno je dejansko zelo pomembno. Sodelujoči akterji ulagajo svoj čas in druge vire v process, na koncu pa se počutijo frustrirano, ker njihova udeležba ni cenjena hkrati pa tudi njihovi cilji niso doseženi. Če si še enkrat ogledamo pojmovanje horizontalnega upravljanja in trenutnega procesa upravljanja, bomo videli, da je vloga države usmerjanje. Vendar, usmerjanje je navada, ki se jo je treba naučii s prakso, preden se lahko uspešno pluje.

Vsebinsko sta si bila ta ustanovitveno-politična procesa povsem drugačna. Po eni strani je Nacionalni strateški plan mladinske politike šel gladko, saj njegova vsebina odraža stališča vseh sodelujočih akterjev, po drugi strani pa je značilnost ustvarjanja Mladinskega zakona bila prav različnost stališč, motivov in idej. Proces nastajanja Mladinskega zakona je pokazal, da država ni dovolj močna, da bi sprejela zakon, brez podpore in vključevanja pomembnih deležnikov. To izpodbija trditve o neomejeni ali veliki moči države. Vendar ta ugotovitva se ne sme uporabljati za posploševanje drugih političnih procesov, ali vloge akterjev znotraj njih. Ta analiza je bila izvedena na enem določenem področju politike in v posebnem nacionalnem kontekstu, kar pa ne pomeni, da bi lahko enak zaključek veljal za druge procese oblikovanja politik na Hrvaškem in drugod. Kljub temu pa empirična raziskava dokazuje, da moč dejansko je spremenjiv vir, ki se, glede na zaznavanje, lahko poveča ali zmanjša ter ni absolutna ampak odvisna od številnih akterjev in dejavnikov za dosego njihovih ciljev. "....

V tej tezi so zastavljena naslednja raziskovalna vprašanja: Pod kakšnimi pogoji v predodločilnih procesih sodobne politike se lahko pogovarja o moči in se jo uporablja? Kako se ta moč kaže, in kdo jo ima? Poleg tega so bile predlagane tri hipoteze, ki izhajajo iz raziskovalnih vprašanj:

• Da bi pravilno uporabljali moč v sodobnih procesih oblikovanja politike je nujno sprejemanje njenega interpretativnega razumevanja.

• predodločilna faza političnega procesa je primerna izhodiščna točka za ocenjevanje struktur moči akterjev, ki sodelujejo v politiki.

• V podsistemu mladinske politike na Hrvaškem, bodo organizacije civilne družbe izvajale pomembne aktivnosti bolj učinkovito kot drugi politični akterji ter se pozicionirale kot najmočnejše med njimi.

Študija je pokazala, da je študija oblikovanja politike v okvirju horizontalnega upravljanja s pomočjo interpretativnega razumevanja moči ustrezen način delovanja v procesu oblikovanja sodobne politike.

V študiji je uspešno potrjeno, da je moč dojeta odvisno od zaznavanja akterjevega vpliva, ki mu je pripisan od ostalih akterjev (pripisan vpliv) ter, da je razumevanje in uporaba tega pripisanega vpliva kot spremenljivke v pragmatični politični analizi, ustrezna metoda pričujoče analize. Kombinacija argumentacijskega pristopa in stopnje preferenčnega doseganja je razkrila, da je država v okviru mladinske politike na Hrvaškem manj močna kot so organizacije civilne družbe, in sicer Hrvaške mladinske mreže.

Vmeščanjem vsega zgoraj omenjenega v javno mladinsko politiko na Hrvaškem, pridemo do določenih zaključkov o institucionalni zgradbi le-te:

1. Mladinska politika na Hrvaškem ni ustrezno razvita. Država ni učinkovita v izvajanju svoje vloge zato prelaga obveznosti na sektor civilne družbe

2. Neravnovesje izmed moči države in moči nedržavnih akterjev je značilna in, provzroča nestabilnost političnih procesov ter negativno vpliva na mladinski sektor

3. Pri državnih uslužbencih je očitno pomanjkanje zmožnosti, da bi uspešno prispevali k napredku vsebine mladinske politike kot tudi k metodologiji organizacije javnega sektorja.

4. Pozitivne značilnosti predodločitvenega procesa mladinske politike na Hrvaškem, kot so sklicevanje na preizkušene pristope, vključevanje, posvetovanje z ustreznimi interesnimi skupinami, in sodelovanje bi morale biti institucionalno zagotovljene in spodbujane.

Po koncu analize in usporejanja procesov, zaključeno je, da je moč dejansko funkcionalna spremenljivka v javnih političnih študijah. Hkrati pa je predlagana matrica ustrezen mehanizem raziskovanja mladinske politike. Disertacija je pokazala, da so v procesih oblikovanja mladinske politike, akterji civilne družbe močnejši od akterjev države zaradi večje zmožnosti, da opravljajo značilne aktivnosti določene v matrici moči, katera je bila ustvarjena za potrebe pričujoče doktorske disertacije. Akterji civilne družbe so se na področju mladinske politike izkazali za izredno sposobne akterje brez katerih država ne more ne sestaviti, ne izvajati mladinske politike. Ta ugotovitev je še bolj pomembna v kontekstu udejanjanja horizontalnega upravljanja kot precejšnjega deleža v literaturi, v kateri je zagovarjanje dominantnega pomena države v procesu odločanja bil prevladujoč

12 Sources:

Aarts, N., and Leeuwis, C. (2010). Participation and power, reflections on the role of government in land use planning and rural development. *Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension*, 16(2), 131-145.

Abu‐Lughod, L. (1990). The romance of resistance, Tracing transformations of power through Bedouin women. *American ethnologist*, *17*(1), 41-55.

Adamović, M. (2011). *Žene i društvena moć*. Zagreb: Plejada.

Ahrens, J. (2002). *Governance and economic development, A comparative institutional approach*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Amit-Talai, V.; Wul, H. (1995). *Youth cultures, a cross-cultural perspective.* London: Routledge.

Ansell, C., and Gash, A. (2007). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. *Journal of Public AffairsResearch and Theory*.18, pp 543-571

Arhens, J. 1999. Governance, conditionality and transformation of postsocialist countries. Retrived from: https://scholar.google.es/scholar?q=Ahrens%2C+1999+governanceandbtnG=andhl=esandas_sdt=0%2C5

Arato A. 1996. Civil Society, Transition and Consolidation of Democracy *International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe, Rupture and Continuity*, Paris, France

Arendt, H. (1991) *Vita activa*. Zagreb: Biblioteka August Cesarec

Arts, B., and van Tatenhove, J. (2005). Policy and Power. *A Conceptual Framework Between the 'Old'and 'New'Paradigm, URL, http://www. ru. nl/contents/pages/141634/2002-7. pdf (20.1. 2007).*

Arts, B., and Verschuren, P. (1999). Assessing political influence in complex decision-making, An instrument based on triangulation. *International Political Science Review*, *20*(4), 411-424.

Auerbach, C., and Silverstein, L. B. (2003). *Qualitative data, An introduction to coding and analysis*. New York: NYU press.

Auyero, J. (2007). *Routine politics and collective violence in Argentina: The gray zone of state power*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bach T. (2018) Administrative Autonomy of Public Organizations. In: Farazmand A. (eds) *Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance.* , Cham: Springer

Bachrach, P., and Baratz, M. S. (1970). *Power and poverty, Theory and practice*. Oxford University Press.

Banić, S. (2009). Perspektive procjene učinaka propisa u hrvatskom sustavu državne uprave. *Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava*, 9. (4.), 949-964.

Barnes, M. (2008). Passionate participation: Emotional experiences and expressions in deliberative forums. *Critical social policy*, 28(4), 461-481.

Barry, M. – ed. (2004). *Youth policy and social inclusion, Critical debates with young people.* London, Routledge.

Baumgartner, F. R., and Leech, B. L. (1998). *Basic interests, The importance of groups in politics and in political science*. Princeton University Press.

Baylies, C. (1995). Political conditionality'and democratisation. *Review of African Political Economy*, *22*(65), 321-337.

Becker, H. S. i Geer, B. (1957). Participant Observation and Interviewing, *Human Organization*, 16 (3): 28–32.

Bekke, H. A. G. M., Kickert, W. J. M., and Kooiman, J. (1995). Public management and governance. KICKERT WJ, VAN VUGHT F., Public Policy and Administration Sciences in The Netherlands, London, Prentice Hall, 201-218.

Bernard, H. R., Ryan, G. W. (2009). *Analyzing qualitative data: Systematic approaches*. SAGE publications.

Bessant, J. (2004). Mixed messages, youth participation and democratic practice. *Australian journal of political science*, *39*(2), 387-404.

Better law-making agreement. 2016. Retrived from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/better-regulation/

Beyers. J. (2008), Policy Issues, Organisational Format and the Political Strategies of Interest Organisations, *West European Politics*, 31(6), 1188-1211

Baiocchi, G., & Connor, B. T. (2008). The ethnos in the polis: Political ethnography as a mode of inquiry. *Sociology Compass*, *2*(1), 139-155.

Bingham, L. B., Nabatchi, T., and O'Leary, R. (2005). The new governance, Practices and processes for stakeholder and citizen participation in the work of government. *Public administration review*, *65*(5), 547-558.

Birch, A. H. (1984). Overload, ungovernability and delegitimation, The theories and the British case. British Journal of Political Science, 14(02), 135-160.

Birkland, T. A. (2001). *Introduction to the policy process*. ME Sharpe.

Blatter, J. (2012). *Forms of Political Governance, Theoretical foundations and ideal types*. Working Paper 07). Lucerne, Department of Political Science, University of Lucerne.

Bridgman, P., and Davis, G. (2003). What use is a policy cycle? Plenty, if the aim is clear. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, *62*(3), 98-102.

Booher, D. E. (2004). Collaborative governance practices and democracy. *National Civic Review*, *93*(4), 32-46.

Börzel, T. (1997). What's so special about policy networks? An exploration of the concept and its usefulness in studying European governance. *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, *1*(16).

Braithwaite, J. 2003. On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks, Neglected Dimensions of a Republican Separation of Powers, *University of Toronto Law Review*, 47, 305-61.

Breen, R. (2005). Explaining cross-national variation in youth unemployment market and institutional factors. *European sociological review*, 21(2), 125-134.

Brewer, G. D., and DeLeon, P. (1983). *The foundations of policy analysis*. Dorsey Pr.

Brinton, M. C., and Nee, V. (Eds.). (1998). The new institutionalism in sociology. Russell Sage Foundation.

Brugha, R., and Varvasovszky, Z. (2000). Stakeholder analysis, a review. *Health policy and planning*, *15*(3), 239-246.

Buković, N. (2008). Politika za mlade u Hrvatskoj–kontekst, koncept i ograničenja. *Politička misao*, *45*(2), 113-132.

Bužinkić, E. (2009). Politika za mlade na hrvatski način, u, Bužinkić, E.; Buković, N. (ur.), *Politika za mlade – hrvatska i europska praksa.* Zagreb: Mreža mladih Hrvatske, 9-45.

Cahn, M. A. (1995). The players, Institutional and noninstitutional actors in the policy process. *Public policy, The essential readings*, 201-211.

Cairney, P. (2015). What is policy entrepreneur? Retrived from: https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2015/02/03/what-is-a-policy-entrepreneur/

Capano, G., Lippi, A. 2015. Enlightening policy mix complexity, a typology of actors' choices Retrived from: http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/IMG/pdf/panel_11_s3_capano.pdf

Caporaso, J. A., and Wittenbrinck, J. (2006). The new modes of governance and political authority in Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *13*(4), 471-480.

Cartmel, F.; Biggart, A.; Sweeting, H.; West, P. (2003). *Youth transitions, Patterns of vulnerability and processes of social inclusion.* Edinburgh, Scottish Executive Social Research.

Casey, John (1998). *Non‐Government Organizations as Policy Actors, The Case of Immigration Policies in Spain*. Doctoral Thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Chambers, E. (1985). *Applied anthropology, A practical guide*. San Francisco: Prentice Hall.

Checkoway, B. N.; Gutierrez, L. M. (2006). Youth participation and community change, An introduction. *Journal of Community Practice*, 14(1-2), 1-9.

Checkoway, B. (2011). What is youth participation?. *Children and youth services review*, *33*(2), 340-345.

Cheater, A. (Ed.). (2003). *The anthropology of power*. London: Routledge.

Chelton, M. K.; Cool, C. (2007). *Youth information-seeking behavior II, context, theories, models, and issues* (Vol. 2). Scarecrow Press.

Cicourel, A. V. (1964). *Method and Measurement in Sociology*. New York and London: The Free Press & Collier-Macmillan Limited

Cigler, A. J., and Loomis, B. A. (1995). Contemporary Interest Group Politics, More Than More of the Same. *Interest group politics*, *4*, 393-406.

Coburn, C. E. (2005). The role of nonsystem actors in the relationship between policy and practice, The case of reading instruction in California. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, *27*(1), 23-52.

Cohen, B. C. (1963). *The press and foreign policy*. London: Routledge

Colebatch, H. (2004). *Policy*, Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti. Biblioteka Politička misao

Colebatch, H. K. (2006). What work makes policy? *Policy Sciences*, 39(4), 309-321.

Compston, H. (2009). *Policy networks and policy change, putting policy network theory to the test*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Creswell, J. W. (2013). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches*. London: Sage.

Croatian Youth Network (2014). Priopćenje o Zakonu o savjetima mladih –

http://www.mmh.hr/hr/vijesti/priopcenje-za-javnost---zakon-o-savjetima-mladih

Dahl, R. A. (2005). *Who governs?, Democracy and power in an American city*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dalton, R. J. (2011). *Engaging Youth in Politics. Debating Democracy's Future.* New York / Amsterdam: International Debate Education Association.

Davies, I.; Flanagan, B.; Hogarth, S.; Mountford, P.; Philpott, J. (2009). Asking questions about participation. *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, 4(1), 25-39.

De la Porte, Caroline and Nanz, Patrizia. The OMC – a deliberative-democratic mode of governance? The cases of employment and pensions. *Journal of European Public Policy* 11,2 April 2004, 267–288

deLeon, P., and Vogenbeck, D. M. (2007). The policy sciences at the crossroads. *Public administration and Public Policy*. *125*, 3.

Denzin, N. K. i Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.) (1998). *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*. Thousand Oaks, London i New Delhi: SAGE.

Denstad, F. Y. (2009). *Youth Policy Manual How to develop a national youth program.* Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing.

Dente, B. (2014). *Understanding policy decisions* (pp. 1-27). New York: Springer International Publishing.

Diamond, L., Lecture at Hilla University for Humanistic Studies January 21, 2004, "What is Democracy"

Diamond, J. (2010), Challenging the status quo: the role and place of Third Sector organisations, *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, Vol. 30 No. 1/2, pp. 8-16.

Do, Hai, P. (2013). Policy formulation in developing countries. Retrived from: http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/IMG/pdf/panel_11_s1_hai_phu_do.pdf

Donahue, J. D., and Zeckhauser, R. (2006). Public-private collaboration. *Oxford handbook of public policy.* Oxford University Press, 496-525.

Donaldson, T., and Preston, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation, Concepts, evidence, and implications. *Academy of management Review*, *20*(1), 65-91.

Dunleavy, P. (2005). *Kako napisati disertaciju, kako planirati, skicirati, pisati i dovršiti doktorsku disertaciju*, Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti – Biblioteka Politička misao, Zagreb.

Durning, D. (1993). Participatory policy analysis in a social service agency, A case study. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 12(2), 297-322.

Dür, A. (2008). Interest groups in the European Union, how powerful are they?. *West European Politics*, *31*(6), 1212-1230.

Dür, A., and De Bièvre, D. (2007). The question of interest group influence. *Journal of Public Policy*, *27*(01), 1-12.

Eising, R., and Kohler-Koch, B. (Eds.). (2004). *The transformation of governance in the European Union*. London, New York: Routledge.

Elmore, R.1987. Instruments and Strategy in Public Policy, *Policy Studies Review*, (7) 1, 174-186.

EU Youth strategy 2010-2018. – Retrived from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX,52009DC0200andfrom=EN

European governance - A white paper, 2001. Retrived from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX,52001DC0428andfrom=EN

Emerson, K., Nabatchi, K. Balogh, S. (2012). "An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance". *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*. 22 (1): 1–29

Enserink, B., Kwakkel, J., Bots, P., Hermans, L., Thissen, W., and Koppenjan, J. (2010). *Policy analysis of multi-actor systems*. Eleven International Publ..

Everett, S 2003 'The Policy Cycle, Democratic Processor Rational Paradigm Revisited?' in *The Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 62(2)

Fairclough, N, 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge: Polity Press

Fischer, F. (2003). *Reframing public policy, discursive politics and deliberative practices, discursive politics and deliberative practices*. Oxford University Press.

Fischer, Frank, 2000. *Citizens, Experts, and the Environment, The Politics of Local Knowledge*, Durham and London: Duke University Press,

Fischer, F. (2006). Deliberative policy analysis as practical reason, Integrating empirical and normative arguments. *Handbook of public policy analysis, Theory, methods, and politics*, 223-236.

Fischer, F., and Forester, J. (1993). The argumentative turn in policy and planning. Durham*: Duke University Pres*.

Finkelstein, L. S. (1995). What is global governance?. *Global governance*, 367-372.

Forbig, J. (2005) *Revisiting Youth Political Participation.* Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing.

Forester, J. 1999. *The Deliberative Practitioner, Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Frederickson, H. George. 1991. Toward a theory of the public for public administration. *Administration & Society* 22:395–417.

Frederickson, G. (2004). Whatever happened to public administration Governance, governance everywhere. *Institute of Governance, Public Policy and Social Research*. Working paper.

Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punish, The birth of the prison*. Vintage.

Foucault, M. (1980). *The history of sexuality. Volume one, An introduction*.

Fung, A. (2006). Varieties of participation in complex governance. *Public administration review*, *66*(s1), 66-75.

Fung, A., Wright (2003). *Deepening democracy, institutional innovations in empowered participatory governance*. London: Verso.

Gale, T. 2008. Political Science, Behavioral – Retrived from: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3045301973.html

Galston, W. A. (2006). Political feasibility, interests and power. *The Oxford handbook of public policy*, 543-556.

Garrido, L., Requena, M., and de Revenga, D. (1996). *La emancipación de los jóvenes en España*. Ministerio de Trabajo e inmigración.

Gaventa, J. 2003. Power after Lukes, An overview of theories of power since Lukes and their application to development. Retrived from: http://www.powercube.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/power_after_lukes.pdf

Giddens, Anthony. Classical social theory and the origins of modern sociology. *American Journal of Sociology* (1976), 703-729.

Giddens, A. (1979). *Central problems in social theory, Action, structure, and contradiction in social analysis.* Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Giddens, A. (1984). *The constitution of society, Outline of the theory of structuration*. Cambridge, Polity Press

Gisselquist, R. 2009. What Does "Good Governance" Mean? http://unu.edu/publications/articles/what-does-good-governance-mean.html (11 August 2016)

Gledhill, J., 2000. *Power and its disguises, anthropological perspectives on politics*. 2nd ed. London, Pluto Press.

Global governance, 2015. Retrived from: http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story038/en/

Gold, R. L. (1958). Roles in Sociological Field Observations, *Social Forces*, 36 (3): 217–223

Government's Office for Science. 2013. *The Government Chief Scientific Adviser's* Guidelines on the Use of Scientific and Engineering Advice in Policy Making. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/293037/10-669-gcsa-guidelines-scientific-engineering-advice-policy-making.pdf (29 January 2016)

Gray, Barbara. (1989). *Collaborating, Finding common ground for multi-party problems*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Grdesic, I. (1995). *Političko odlučivanje*. Zagreb: Alinea

Geertz, C. (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

Gregg, P. (2001). The impact of youth unemployment on adult unemployment in the NCDS. *economic journal*, 111(475), 626-653.

Guttman, A., and Thompson, D. (2004). Why deliberative democracy. *Princeton, Princeton UniversityPress*.

Haas, E. B. (1990). *When knowledge is power, three models of change in international organizations* (Vol. 22). Univ of California Press.

Habermas, Jürgen, 2002., Postnacionalna konstelacija, Otkrivenje, Beograd

Hajer, M. A. (1989). *City politics, Hegemonic projects and discourse*. Avebury.

Hajer, M. A., and Wagenaar, H. (2003). *Deliberative policy analysis, understanding governance in the network society*. Cambridge University Press.

Haralambos, M. i Holborn, M. (2002.) *Sociologija - teme i perspektive*. Zagreb: Golden Marketing

Haski-Leventhal, D.; Ronel, N.; York, A. S.; Ben-David, B. M. (2008). Youth volunteering for youth, Who are they serving? How are they being served?. *Children and Youth Services Review*, 30(7), 834-846.

Haugaard, M. (2003). Reflections on seven ways of creating power. *European journal of social theory*, *6*(1), 87-113.

Hawkesworth, M. E. (1988). *Theoretical issues in policy analysis*. Los angeles: SUNY Press.

Hay, C. (1995) Structure and Agency, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds) *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hay, C. (2002). *Political analysis, a critical introduction*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Héritier, A. (2001). New modes of governance in Europe, policy-making without legislating? *MPI collective goods preprint*, (2001/14).

Helbig, N., Dawes, S., Dzhusupova, Z., Klievink, B., and Mkude, C. G. (2015). Stakeholder engagement in policy development, observations and lessons from international experience. In *Policy Practice and Digital Science* (pp. 177-204). Springer International Publishing.

Hesselmann E. (2011) The Limits of Control: The Accountability of Foundations and Partnerships in Global Health. In: Rushton S., Williams O.D. (eds) *Partnerships and Foundations in Global Health Governance*. International Political Economy Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan

Hewitt de Alcantra, C. (1998). *Uses and abuses of the concept of governance*. UNESCO/ Oxford, Blackwell papers pp 105-113

Hewson, M., and Sinclair, T. J. (Eds.). (1999). *Approaches to global governance theory*. Los Angeles: Suny Press.

Hill, M. (2005). *The Public Policy Process*. Essex, Pearson Education Limited

Hogwood, B. W.; Gunn, L. (1984). *Policy analysis for the real world*. Oxford,

UK: Oxford University Press.

Hirschman, A. O. (1997). *The passions and the interests, Political arguments for capitalism before its triumph*. Princeton University Press.

Holloway, I. (1997). Basic Concepts for Qualitative Research. London: Blackwell Science.

Hood, C. (1995). The "New Public Management" in the 1980s, variations on a theme. *Accounting, organizations and society*, *20*(2), 93-109.

Hood, C. (2000). *The art of the state, Culture, rhetoric, and public management*. Oxford University Press.

Howard, C. (2005). The policy cycle, a model of post‐Machiavellian policy making? Australian Journal of Public Administration, 64(3), 3-13.

Howlett, M., Ramesh, M., and Perl, A. (1995). *Studying public policy, Policy cycles and policy subsystems* (Vol. 163). Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Howlett, M. (2014). From the 'old'to the 'new'policy design, design thinking beyond markets and collaborative governance. *Policy Sciences*, *47*(3), 187-207.

Hudson, J., and Lowe, S. (2009). *Understanding the policy process, analysing welfare policy and practice*. Policy Press.

Hurst, C.E. (2007). *Social Inequality, Forms, Causes, and Consequences*. Boston MA, Allyn and Bacon

Huxham, C., and Vangen, S. (2013). *Managing to collaborate, The theory and practice of collaborative advantage*. London, New York: Routledge.

Ilić, V. (2015). Uloge promatrača u empirijskim istraživanjima u društvenim znanostima: neki prijepori. *Revija za sociologiju*, *45*(3), 279-309.

Ilišin, V. (2003). Politička participacija mladih i politika prema mladima, Hrvatska u europskom kontekstu. *Politička misao,* 40(3), 37-57.

Ilišin, V. (2014). Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu 1964-2014. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu.

Ilišin, V.; Mendeš, I.; Potočnik, D. (2003). Politike prema mladima u obrazovanju i zapošljavanju. *Politička misao*, 40(3), 58-89.

Ilišin, V.; Bouillet, D.; Gvozdanović, A.; Potočnik, D. (2013). *Mladi u vremenu krize / Youth in the Time of Crisis.* Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Ilišin, V. (2014). Studenti i politika, pragmatizam bez iluzija, u, Ilišin, V. (ur.), *Sociološki portret hrvatskih studenata.* Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu, 221-290.

Ilišin, V.; Spajić-Vrkaš, V. (2015). *Potrebe, problemi i potencijali mladih u Hrvatskoj* (istraživački izvještaj). Zagreb: Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih.

Jenkins-Smith, H. C., Sabatier, P. A. (1994). Evaluating the advocacy coalition framework. *Journal of public policy*, *14*(02), 175-203.

Jenkins, W. I. (1978). *Policy analysis, A political and organisational perspective*. London, M. Robertson.

Jessop, B. (1995). *The Regulation Approach, Governance, and Post-Fordism, Alternative Perspectives on Economic and Political Change?* Economy and society

Jessop, B. (2004). Hollowing out the Nation State in Kennett, Patricia (ed.) *A Handbook of Comparative Social Policy*. Massachusetts, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

Johannsen, L. and Krašovec, A., 2017. Democratic critique and development: In search of responsiveness. *Teorija in Praksa*, *54*(Special Issue), pp.45-59.

Johnsen, Å. (2005). What does 25 years of experience tell us about the state of performance measurement in public policy and management? *Public Money and Management*, 25(1), 9-17.

Jones, F. (2000). Youth volunteering on the rise. *Women, 34* (40.3), 29-6.

Jun, J. S., ed. 2002. *Rethinking administrative theory: The challenge of the new century*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Kalanj, R. (2010). *Ideologija, utopija, moć*. Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk.

Kaldor, M., Anheier, H., and Glasius, M. (2003). *Global civil society*. Cambridge: Polity.

Keane, J. (1998). Civil Society, old images. London: *New Visions*.

Kemerling, G. 2011. Casual Reasoning. Retrived from: http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e14.htm

Kennett, P. (2008). "Introduction, governance, the state and public policy in a global age" Kennett, Patricia (ed.). *Governance, globalization and public policy.* Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

Kersbergen, K. V., and Warden, F. V. (2004). Governance as a Bridge Between Disciplines, Cross-Disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in Governance and Problems of Governability, Accountability and Legitimacy. European Journal of Political Research, 43(2), 143–171.

Killick, T. (1997). Principals, agents and the failings of conditionality. *Journal of international development*, *9*(4), 483-495.

King, C. S., Feltey, K. M., & Susel, B. O. N. (1998). The question of participation: Toward authentic public participation in public administration. *Public administration review*, 317-326.

Kingdon, J. W., and Thurber, J. A. (1984). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies* (Vol. 45). Boston, Little, Brown.

Koiman, J. (1998). Social-political governance in J. Koiman (ed.) *Modern Governance*. London: Sage pp 1-9

Koiman, J and Van Vilet, M (1993). Governance and Public management in K. Eliassen and J. Koiman (ed.) *Managing Public Organizations*. London, Sage

Kochler-Koch, B. (2010): Civil Society and EU Democracy: 'Astroturf' Representation? *Journal of European Public Policy* 17 (1): 100–116.

Kollman, K. (1998). *Outside lobbying, Public opinion and interest group strategies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kopecký, P., and Mudde, C. (2003). Rethinking civil society. *Democratization*, *10*(3), 1-14.

Koprić, I., Musa, A., and Novak, G. L. (2012). *Europski upravni prostor*. Zagreb: Institut za javnu upravu.

Koprić, I. (2010). *Analiza Obrasca o provedbi Zakona o savjetima mladih.* Zagreb: Ministarstvo branitelja, obitelji i međugeneracijske solidarnosti.

Kovačić, M.; Vrbat, I. (2014). „Znam da ništa ne znam", politička kompetencija i politička participacija među mladima u Zagrebu. *Suvremene teme,* 7(1), 56-76.

Kovačić, M. (2015). Politika za mlade u Hrvatskoj – anatomija jedne javne politike. u Ilisin, V., Gvozdanovic, A. and Potocnik, D (ed.) *Demokratski potencijali mladih*. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu, Centar za demokraciju i pravo Miko Tripalo.

Kovačić, M. (2016). *Country sheet on Youth Policy in Croatia*. Partnership between the European Commission and the Council of Europe in the Field of Youth. Retrived from: http://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/1017981/9038134/Croatia_country-sheet_2016.pdf/7bf8faa6-405d-40b7-9fc4-3ac014a86b49

Koprić, I. (2007). Suvremeno obrazovanje za javnu upravu. *Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva: časopis za politologiju,* 4(1), 375-395.

Kransdorff, A. (2006) *Corporate DNA*, Furnham: Gower Publishing

Kuhn, T. S. (2012). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. University of Chicago press.

Kustec Lipicer, S. (2006). Tipologiziranje policy igrača u Europskoj Uniji, dileme i perspektive. *Politička misao*, (04), 25-46.

Ewalt, J. A. G. (2001). Theories of Governance and New Public Management, links to understanding welfare policy implementation, paper prepared for presentation at the *Annual Conference of the American Society for Public Administration*, Newark

Laine, S., & Gretschel, A. (2009). Whose arena is the EU youth policy? Young participants' involvement and influence in the EU youth policy from their own points of view: Case of the EU Presidency Youth Event in Hyvinkää, Finland. *Young*, 17(2), 191-215.

Lascoumes, P. and le Gales, P. (2007). Introduction, Understanding Public Policy through Its Instruments—From the Nature of Instruments to the Sociology of Public Policy Instrumentation. *Governance, An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*. Vol. 20, No. 1, (pp. 1–21).

Lane, J. E. (2000). *New public management*. Taylor and Francis US.

Lasswell, H. D. (1950). *Politics, Who gets what, when, how*. New York, P. Smith.

Lasswell, H. D., Lerner, D., and Fisher, H. H. (1951). *The policy sciences, Recent developments in scope and method*. Stanford University Press.

Lasswell, H. D. (1970). The emerging conception of the policy sciences. *Policy sciences, 1*(1), 3-14.

Lavrič, Miran; Tomanović, Smiljka; Jusić, Mirna (2019) *Youth Study southeast Europe*. Berlin : Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Leleiko, S. H. (1984). Professional Responsibility and Public Policy Formation. *Alb. L. Rev.*, 49, 403.

Lindblom, C., 1990. *Inquiry and Change, the Troubled Attempt to Understand and Shape Society*, New York: Yale University Press, New Haven and London and Russell Sage Foundation,

Li, Y. (2015). Think tank 2.0 for deliberative policy analysis. *Policy Sciences*, *48*(1), 25-50.

Lipsky, M. (1980). Street level bureaucrats. *New York: Russell Sage Foundation*.

Lowery, D. (2007) Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying, *Polity* 39(1), 29–54.

Lukes, S. (1974). *Power, A radical view*. London and New York: Macmillan.

Lukes, S. (2005). Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds. *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, 33(3), 477-493.

Lynn Jr, L. E., Heinrich, C. J., and Hill, C. J. (2001). *Improving governance, A new logic for empirical research*. Georgetown University Press.

MacDonald, R.; Shildrick, T. (2007). Street corner society, leisure careers, youth (sub) culture and social exclusion. *Leisure studies*, 26(3), 339-355.

Mahoney, C. (2007). Lobbying success in the United States and the European Union. *Journal of Public Policy*, *27*(01), 35-56.

Majone, G. (1999). The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems. *West European Politics*, 22(1), 1-24.

Majone, Giandomenico, 1989. *Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process*, New Haven i London, Yale University Press.

Malterud, K. (2001). Qualitative research, standards, challenges, and guidelines. *The lancet*, *358*(9280), 483-488.

May, J. V., and Wildavsky, A. B. (1978). *The Policy Cycle*. Beverly Hills: BH Press

Mayntz, R. (1983). The conditions of effective public policy, a new challenge for policy analysis. *Policy and Politics*, *11*(2), 123-143.

March, J. G. (1955). An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence. *American Political Science Review*, *49*(02), 431-451.

March, J. G, Olsen, J. P. 1984. The new institutionalism, organizational factors in political life. *American Political Science Review*, 78 (3), 734–49.

Marsh, D., and Rhodes, R. A. W. (1992). *Policy networks in British government*. Clarendon Press.

Marsh, D., and Smith, M. (2000). Understanding policy networks, towards a dialectical approach. *Political studies*, *48*(1), 4-21.

Marta, E.; Pozzi, M. (2008). Young people and volunteerism, A model of sustained volunteerism during the transition to adulthood. *Journal of Adult Development*, 15(1), 35-46.

Marzana, D.; Marta, E.; Pozzi, M. (2012). Social action in young adults, Vo- luntary and political engagement. *Journal of Adolescence,* 35, 497-507.

Mathis, A. (2007). Corporate social responsibility and policy making: what role does communication play?. *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 16(5), 366-385.

Mayring, P. (2000). Qualitative Content Analysis *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung. Forum, Qualitative Social Research*, *1*(2), Art. 20,

McDaniel, J. E., Sims, C. H., and Miskel, C. G. (2001). The national reading policy arena, Policy actors and perceived influence. *Educational Policy*, *15*(1), 92-114.

McAnulla, S. (1998). The Structure-Agency Debate and its Historiographical Utility, The Utility of Structure, Agency and Discourse as Analytical Concepts. *University of Birmingham, at, http,//www. psa. ac. uk/cps/1998/mcanulla.*

McCloskey, Michael. 2000. Problems with using collaboration to shape environmental public policy. *Valparaiso University Law Review* 34,423.

Mutepa, R. M. (2016). The process of writing a constructivist dissertation: A constructivist inquiry into the meaning of pregnancy for African American women infected with HIV. *SAGE Open*, 6(1),

Merton, R. K., and Kendall, P. L. (1946). The focused interview. *American journal of Sociology*, 541-557.

Milward, Brinton and Provan, Keith (2000). Governing the Hollow State. *Journal of Public Administration. Research and Theory* 10,2, pp 359-380

Mintrom, M., and Norman, P. (2009). Policy entrepreneurship and policy change. *Policy Studies Journal*, *37*(4), 649-667.

Moeran, B. (2009). From participant observation to observant participation. In Sierk Y, Yanow, Wels, and Kamsteeg: *Organizational Ethnography: Studying the Complexity of Everyday Life*. London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2009 139-155.

Morse, J. M. (1998). Designing Funded Qualitative Research, in:. Denzin and Lincoln (eds). *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*. Thousand Oaks, London i New Delhi: SAGE, str. 56–85

National Youth Program 2014.-2017. Retrived from*:* http://www.mspm.hr/novosti/vijesti/nacionalni_program_za_mlade_za_razdoblje_od_2014_do_2017_godine

Nanda, V. P. (2006). The "good governance" concept revisited. *The ANNALS of the American academy of political and social science*, *603*(1), 269-283.

Neumark, D.; Wascher, W. (2004). Minimum wages, labor market institutions, and youth employment, a cross-national analysis. *Industrial and labor relations review*, 57(2), 223-248.

Nissen, L. B. (2011.) Community-directed engagement and positive youth development: Developing positive and progressive pathways between youth and their communities in Reclaiming Futures. *Children and Youth Services Review* 33 (2011), 23-28.

Novak, M. 2017. Whis is organized civil society? The population of civil society organizations in Slovenia. *Teorija in Praksa*, *54*(Special Issue), pp 127-144

Open Method of Coordination. 2015. Retrived from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/open_method_coordination.html

Ortner, S. B. (1995). Resistance and the problem of ethnographic refusal. *Comparative studies in society and history*, *37*(01), 173-193.

Osborn, Stephen. (2010). *The (New) Public Governance, a suitable case for treatment?. The New Public Governance*. London and New York: Routledge

Ostorm, Elinor (1990). *Governing the Commons, The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Actions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Osborne, D., and Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing goverment. *How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector, New York, Plume*.

Parsons, W. (2002). From muddling through to muddling up-evidence based policy making and the modernisation of British Government. *Public policy and administration*, *17*(3), 43-60.

Pavlovic, V. 2009. *Civilno drustvo i demokratija*, Beograd: Sluzbeni glasnik.

Peters, G. (2008). Governance Through the Political System, Making and Implementing Policy. *Paper presented en International Political Science Association (IPSA), Canada.*

Peters, B. G., and Pierre, J. (1998). Governance without government? Rethinking public administration. *Journal of public administration research and theory*, *8*(2), 223-243.

Perry, C. L.; Gri n, G.; Murray, D. M. (1985). Assessing needs for youth health promotion. *Preventive medicine*, 14(3), 379-393.

Petak, Z.; Petek, A.; Kekez, A. (2006). *Politika prema mladima u Republici Hrvatskoj. Primjena analize javnih politika u radovima studenata Fakulteta političkih znanosti.* Zagreb: Udruga za građansko obrazovanje i društveni razvoj–DIM.

Petak, Z. (2008). Javne politike i problemi modernog upravljanja. *Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava*, *8*(2), 443-462.

Petak, Z., Petek, A. (2009). Policy analysis and Croatian Public Administration, The Problem of Formulatinf Public Policy. Politicka misao 46 (5) pp. 54-74)

Petek, A (2012). *Transformacija politike prema osobama s invaliditetom, primjena policy mreža*. Doctoral dissertation, Zagreb: FPZG

Peters, G and Pierre, J (1998). Governance without government, Rethinking Public Administration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 8(2), pp 223-243

Perko-Šeparović, I. (2006). *Izazovi javnog menadžmenta, dileme javne uprave*. Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga.

Petak, Z. 2008. Javne politike i problemi modernog upravljanja. *Hrvatska javna uprava* 8(2),443-462

Petak, Z. (2013). Policy pristup u hrvatskoj javnoj upravi. *U: Musa, A, 4. Forum za javnu upravu.* Zagreb: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung i Institut za javnu upravu (pp. 7-25).

Persson, M. (2012). Social network position mediates the e ect of education on active political party membership. *Party Politics*, 18(1), 1-25.

Peters, G. (2001). *Agenda-Setting in the European Union*. London and New York: Routledge.

Petkovic, K. (2008) *Interpretacijska policy analiza Tumačenje javnih politika i deliberacijska demokracija magistarski rad*. Zagreb: Fakultet Politickih znanosti

Petković, K. (2014). Javne politike u povijesti časopisa Politička misao od 1964. do 2013., kako izgledamo u ogledalu poddiscipline? *Politička misao,* 51(1), 11-38.

Puljiz, V. (2001). Hrvatska: od pasivne prema aktivnoj socijalnoj državi. *Revija za socijalnu politiku*, 8(1), 1-18.

Purdy, J. M. (2012). A framework for assessing power in collaborative governance processes. *Public Administration Review*, *72*(3), 409-417.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone, the collapse and revival of civic America*. New York.

Riedel, M. (1991). Društvo, građansko. In *Građansko društvo i država*, ed. Pokrovac Zoran. Zagreb: Naprijed.

Reinhold, S. (1994). *Local conflict and ideological struggle, positive images'* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Sussex).

Reiter H.; Astala, S.; Brandtner, G. M.; Jovanovic, A.; Kuhar, M.; Williamson, H.; Zubok, J. (2008). *Youth policy in Latvia*. Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg.

Researchgate, 2012. *Hypothesis in Qualitative Research I am curious to know if it is possible to test hypothesis using a qualitative approach? If yes, what are the advantages and limitations? (I always thought quantitative is the best way for hypothesis testing). What do you think?* Retrived from: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Hypothesis_in_Qualitative_Research

Rhodes, R. A. W., 1997., Foreword by Professor R. A. W. Rhodes, in Kickert, W. J.M./Klijn, Erik – Hans/Koppenjan, Joop F.M., *Managing Complex Networks*, SAGE Publications, xi-xvii.

Rhodes, R. (1997). *Understanding governance, policy networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability*. Maidenhead and Philadelphia, Open University Press

Rhodes R. (1988). *Beyond Westminster and Whitehall*. London: Unwin Hyman

Rhodes, R. A. (2000). The governance narrative, Key findings and lessons from the Erc's Whitehall program. *Public administration*, 78(2), 345-363.

Richards, David and Smith, Martin. 2002. *Governance and Public Policy in UK*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Romic, D., Halak, Z. V. (2014). Regulatory Impact Assessment in the Republic of Croatia – situation and Perspective. *Challenges of the Knowledge Society*, 880.

Rotar-Zgrabljic, N. (2015). Neprofitni mediji kao demokratska snaga mladih u, Ilisin, Govzdanovic, Potocnik (ur.) *Demokratski potencijali mladih*. Zagreb, Institut za drustvena istrazivanja i Centar za demokraciju i pravo Miko Tripalo.

Sabatier, P. A. (2000). T*eories of the Policy Process*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.

Sadan, E. (2004). Theories of power. *Empowerment and Community, Planning*, 32-71.

Salamon, LM. (2002). *The tools of government, A guide to the new governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Santiso, C. (2001). World Bank and good governance, good governance and aid effectiveness, the World Bank and conditionality. *Geo. Public Pol'y Rev.*, *7*, 1-137.

Sartori, G. (1970). Concept misformation in comparative politics. American political science review, 64(04), 1033-1053.

Schwartz-Shea, P., and Yanow, D. (2013). *Interpretive research design, Concepts and processes*. London, New York: Routledge.

Shore, C., Wright, S., and Però, D. (Eds.). (2011). *Policy worlds, Anthropology and the analysis of contemporary power* (Vol. 14). London: Berghahn Books.

Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games real actors play. *Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*, *55*.

Scharpf, F. W. (2001). Notes toward a theory of multilevel governing in Europe. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, *24*(1), 1-26.

Schedler, A., Diamond, L. J., & Plattner, M. F. (Eds.). (1999). *The self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Schizzerotto, A.; Gasperoni, G. (2001). *Study on the state of young people and youth policy in Europe*. Milan, IARD.

Schneider, A. L., and Ingram, H. M. (1997). *Policy design for democracy*. University Press of Kansas.

Schneider, A. L., and Ingram, H. M. (2005). *Deserving and entitled, Social constructions and public policy*. Los Angeles: SUNY Press.

Schmitter, P. C. (2003). Democracy in Europe and Europe's democratization. *Journal of Democracy*, *14*(4), 71-85.

Schout, A., and Jordan, A. (2005). Coordinated European Governance, Self‐Organizing or Centrally Steered?. *Public Administration*, *83*(1), 201-220.

Shore, C. (2009). *European Governance, or Governmentality? Reflections on the EU's System of Government* (No. p0037). University of Bath, Department of European Studies and Modern Languages.

Shore, C., and Wright, S. (Eds.). (2003). *Anthropology of policy, Perspectives on governance and power*. London, New York: Routledge.

Skogstad, G. (2003). Legitimacy and/or policy effectiveness?: network governance and GMO regulation in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10(3), 321-338.

Sloam, J. (2012). New Voice, Less Equal, e Civic and Political Engagement of Young People in the United States and Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 20(10), 1-26.

Smismans, S. (2008). New modes of governance and the participatory myth. *West European Politics*, *31*(5), 874-895.

Soroka, S., Lawlor, A., Farnsworth, S., Young, L., Ramesh, M. H., Fritzen, S., and Araral, E. (2013). Mass media and policymaking. *Routledge handbook of the policy process*, (Part IV), 204-215.

Sørensen, E. (2002). Democratic theory and network governance. *Administrative Theory and Praxis*, *24*(4), 693-720.

Stephenson, P. Twenty years of multi-level governance, 'Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2013, 20 (6), pp.817-837.

Stone, D. (2012). Transfer and translation of policy. *Policy studies*, 33(6), 483-499.

Stokke, O. (Ed.). (2013). *Aid and political conditionality*. London, New York: Routledge.

Stoker, Gerry (1998). Governance as theory, five prepositions. *UNESCO/ Oxford, Blackwell papers* pp 17-28

Structured Dialogue with youth. 2015. Retrived from: http://ec.europa.eu/youth/policy/implementation/dialogue_en.htm

Suman, N. 2012. Anthropology of Power. Retrived from: http://sumananthromaterials.blogspot.hr/2012/11/anthropology-of-power.html

Sutcliff`e S, Court J. (2005) Evidence based policy making, What is it? How does it work? What relevance for developing countries? *Overseas Development Institute*, London.

The EU-CoE Youth Partnership. 2015. Retrived from: http://pjp-eu.coe.int/en/web/youth-partnership

The World Bank Development Report (2007). http://www-wds.worldbank.org/

external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2006/09/13/000112742_ 20060913111024/Rendered/PDF/359990WDR0complete.pdf (11 August 2016)

Taylor, M. (1993) 'Structure, Culture, and Action in The Explanation of Social Change, in W.J.Booth et al (eds), *Politics and Rationality*, Cambridge University Press, p.124.

Tilly, C. (2006). Afterword: Political ethnography as art and science. *Qualitative sociology*, *29*(3), p. 409-412.

Toke, D. (2000). Policy network creation, the case of energy efficiency. *Public administration*, *78*(4), 835-854.

Torgerson, Douglas, 1995. Policy Analysis and Public Life, The Restoration of Phronēsis?, u, Farr, James, Dryzek, John, Leonard, Stephen (ed.), *Political Science in History. Research Programs and Political Traditions*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 225-252.

Treib, O., Bähr, H., and Falkner, G. (2005). *European Governance Papers*. Brussels: EU publishing

Trostle, J., Bronfman, M., and Langer, A. (1999). How do researchers influence decision-makers? Case studies of Mexican policies. *Health policy and planning*, *14*(2), 103-114.

Tsebelis, G. (2000). Veto players and institutional analysis. *Governance*, *13*(4), 441-474.

Tsebelis, G. (2002). *Veto players, How political institutions work*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Turnpenny, J., Radaelli, C. M., Jordan, A., and Jacob, K. (2009). The policy and politics of policy appraisal, emerging trends and new directions. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16(4), 640-653.

Tusalem, R. 2007. A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third- and Fourth-WaveDemocracies. *International Political Science Review*. 28 (3), pp. 361-386

Uphoff, N. 1989. Distinguishing power, authority and legitimacy, Taking Max Weber at his word by using resources-exchange analysis. *Polity*, 295-322.

Yin, R. K. (2013). *Case study research, Design and methods*. New York: Sage publications.

Youniss, J.; Levine, P. (2009). *Engaging young people in civic life*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.

Van Aelst, P., Thesen, G., Walgrave, S., and Vliegenthart, R. (2013, June). Mediatization and the Media's Political Agenda-Setting Influence. In *CAP Conference in Antwerp*.

Van Der Meer, F. B., & Edelenbos, J. (2006). Evaluation in multi-actor policy processes: accountability, learning and co-operation. *Evaluation*, 12(2), 201-218.

Vincent, J., 2002. Introduction. In, J. Vincent, ed. *The anthropology of politics, a reader in ethnography, theory and critique*. Malden, MA, Blackwell, 1–25.

Waarden, F. V. (1992, March). On the persistence of national policy styles and policy networks. In *A Study of the Genesis of their Institutional Basis, paper, to be presented at the conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics in Irwine, California*.

Warner, Jeroen F. 2006. More sustainable participation? Multi-stakeholder platforms for integrated catchment management. *Water Resources Development* 22 (1), 15–35.

Weber, M. (1999). *Vlast i politika*. Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk i Hrvatsko sociolosko drustvo

Weil, S.; Janen, T.; Wildemeersch, D. (2005). *Unemployed youth and social exclusion in Europe, learning for inclusion?*. London: Ashgate.

Werner and Wegrich (2007) Theories of the Policy Cycle, in Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller and Mara S. Sidney (eds) *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis, Theory, Politics and Methods*, 43–62.

Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice, Learning as a social system. *Systems thinker*, *9*(5), 2-3.

Williams, G. 2011. What Makes a Good Governance Indicator? http://www.gsdrc.org/document-library/what-makes-a-good-governance-indicator/

Williamson, H. (2002). *Supporting young people in Europe, principles, policy and practice, the Council of Europe international reviews of national youth policy 1997-2001-a synthesis report* (Vol. 1). Council of Europe.

World Bank – Retrived from: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/EXTMNAREGTOPGOVERNANCE/0,contentMDK,20513159~menuPK,1163245~pagePK,34004173~piPK,34003707~theSitePK,497024,00.html

Youniss, J.; Levine, P. (2009). *Engaging young people in civic life*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.

Index

Appendix A

LIST OF INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS

Interview 1
Academic community representative
Interview in Zagreb on September 1, 2015

Interview 2
Academic community representative
Interview in Zagreb on July 31, 2015

Interview 3
Academic community representative
Interview in Zagreb on September 2, 2015

Interview 4
Civil society representative, Croatian Youth Network
Interview in Zagreb on April 6, 2015

Interview 5
Civil society representative, Croatian Youth Network
Interview in Zadar on May 7, 2016

Interview 6
Civil society representative
Interview in Zagreb on September 3, 2015

Interview 7
Civil society representative
Interview in Split on August 27, 2015

Interview 8
Ministry of Social Policy and Youth representative – street level bureaucracy
Interview in Zagreb on September 4, 2015

Interview 9
Ministry of Social Policy and Youth representative – street level bureaucracy
Interview in Zagreb on September 3, 2015

Interview 10
High-level state official, Ministry of Social Policy and Youth
Interview in Zagreb on August 8, 2015

Interview 11
High-level state official, Governmental Office for Cooperation with CSOs
Interview in Zagreb on June 6, 2015

Appendix B

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Nacionalni program za mlade 2014.-2017.

1. Kako biste opisali proces izrade NPM-a (inkluzivan-ekskluzivan; participativan-nedovoljno participativan; dobro koordiniran-kaotičan; jasan-nejasan)
2. Koje aktere biste istaknuli kao važne u procesu izrade NPM-a?
3. Po Vašem mišljenju je li bilo aktera koji su se posebno isticali po utjecaju na kreiranje sadržaja?
4. Možete li istaknuti najvažnije karakteristike koje su uspješni akteri u procesu kreiranja NPM-a imali?
5. Kako biste procijenili ulogu eksperata (pripadnika akademske zajednice i konzultanata) u procesu pisanja NPM-a?
6. Kako biste procijenili ulogu predstavnika civilnog društva u procesu pisanja NPM-a?
7. S kakvom motivacijom ste ušli u proces izrade NPM-a? Jeste li imali unaprijed postavljene ciljeve i ideje za koje ste se nadali da će biti prihvaćene?
8. Jeste li zadovoljni Vašim doprinosom procesu? Jesu li Vaši projedlozi prihvaćeni i našli svoje mjesto u završnoj verziji dokumenta?
9. Jeste li zadovoljni završnom verzijom NPM-a?

Zakon o mladima

1. Kako biste opisali proces izrade ZoM-a uzimajući u obzir i naputke Kodeksa savjetovanja sa zainteresiranom javnošću u postupcima donošenja zakona, drugih propisa i akata? Je li proces bio inkluzivan-ekskluzivan; participativan-nedovoljno participativan; dobro koordiniran-kaotičan; jasan-nejasan?
2. Koje aktere biste istaknuli kao važne u procesu izrade ZoM-a?
3. Po Vašem mišljenju je li bilo aktera koji su se posebno isticali po utjecaju na kreiranje sadržaja?
4. Možete li istaknuti najvažnije karakteristike koje su uspješni akteri u procesu kreiranja ZoM-a imali?
5. Kako biste procijenili ulogu eksperata (pripadnika akademske zajednice i konzultanata) u procesu pisanja ZoM-a?
6. Kako biste procijenili ulogu predstavnika civilnog društva u procesu pisanja Zom-a?
7. S kakvom motivacijom ste ušli u proces izrade ZoM-a? Jeste li imali unaprijed postavljene ciljeve i ideje za koje ste se nadali da će biti prihvaćene?
8. Jeste li zadovoljni Vašim doprinosom procesu? Jesu li Vaši prijedlozi prihvaćeni i našli svoje mjesto u završnoj verziji dokumenta?
9. Mislite li da je odustajanje od donošenja ZoM-a (bilo) oportuno za sektor mladih?

Appendix C

PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION PROTOCOL

Policy process	National Youth Program ☐ Youth Act ☐
Date	
Type of meeting (regular, special, thematic)	
Participants	
Argumentation	1. Quality of arguments • clarity of a message • relevance for the topic • argumentative sufficiency 2. Logical fallacies • yes/no 3. Support/evidence • yes/no
Persuasion	1. Did one actor persuade other to change its opinion? To what extend? 2. How did it happen? What resources were used (knowledge, authority, expertise etc.)
The degree of preference attainment	1. How much of the specific actor's position could be identified in the conclusion/outcome of the discussion?
Alliances depending on position	2. In the discussion, could similar positions of actors be identified based on their argumentation or point of view?
Other relevant remarks	

Appendix D

FIELD NOTES – EXAMPLE