

**UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE**

Nina Gorenc

**PREDSEDNIŠKO UTEMELJEVANJE AMERIŠKIH VOJAŠKIH
INTERVENCIJ V OBDOBJU 1948–2008**

**(PRESIDENTIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AMERICAN MILITARY
INTERVENTIONS FROM 1948 TO 2008)**

Doktorska disertacija

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Mentor: prof. Cornell W. Clayton

Somentor: prof. Lance LeLoup

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This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of the late Prof. Lance LeLoup, a great friend, incessant inspiration and mentor, to whom goes my profound respect and immense gratitude.

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Namesto tega lista se vstavi IZJAVA O AVTORSTVU

Summary

The present dissertation explores the relationship between the verbal behavior of American presidents when authorizing and justifying the use of military force abroad and the various institutional and attitudinal factors that may explain that behavior. It argues that the words presidents chose when explaining such actions reveals more about them than just their lexical tastes and styles. The dissertation covers different, and partly overlapping, fields of study. Thus it adopts an interdisciplinary research approach; research on presidential power pertains to the discipline of political science; presidential skills in public communication are rooted in communication science; while many of the attitudinal variables used in the study are drawn from the field of political psychology. The research draws upon multiple methodological tools to study presidential communication; historical and contextual analysis, simple quantitative and regression analyses, as well as a traditional linguistic method of research - content analysis.

Research into presidential rhetoric is not new, and politics has always been closely connected with language. Not only because ideas (and ideologies) are expressed through language, but mostly due to the strength of words in persuasion. For a long time, presidents have been judged by their power to persuade, therefore language and the skills of communication rank very high on the list of characteristics that make a successful president. Indeed, Richard Neustadt (1990) famously argued that presidential power is not a fixed commodity under the Constitution but fluctuates based on the ability of presidents to persuade other important actors. Language is thus not only a vehicle for transportation of politicians' ideas, but also an active agent in defining the capacity of a president to effect change and to influence how people understand political reality (Ellis 1998).

It is also true that presidents in the United States operate in a system of checks and balances, in which they must constantly confront oppositional power from the Congress, from the courts, and other institutional actors. Indeed the American constitution specifically divides the war power between the president and the Congress; giving one the power to declare war while making the other the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. At various times throughout the history, presidents have relied upon different legal authorizations for their decision to deploy American soldiers abroad. The two sources of legal authority most frequently used by presidents are the Constitution's Commander-in-Chief Clause and congressional joint resolutions. While some experts argue that the constitutional always requires congressional authorization for the use of military force, presidents have often relied upon their exclusive authority under article II alone to order American troops into conflict and

left Congress out of the process. Thus, in addition to analyzing the types of rhetoric employed by presidents when justifying the use of military force, this dissertation also seeks to understand the factors that lead presidents to choose one form of legal authority for their actions over another.

Numerous factors influence the choice of presidential rhetoric as well as the legal justifications that presidents rely upon to support their actions. In addition to individual psychological and cognitive influences (such as a president's partisan attachments, the complexity of their thinking, or their background and experiences in foreign affairs), there are also various contextual or institutional factors at work (such as the presence of absence of divided government, the president's relationship to the political regime and "political time," as well as international patterns of institutionalized behavior such as the presence of the Cold War for an extended period of time). All of these influences are analyzed in the present work.

The time frame of the research begins with the end of World War II, and the first elected term of President Truman in 1948, and it ends in 2008, with the end of President G.W. Bush's second term of office. Two types of addresses are included in the research; these are state of the union addresses and post military intervention addresses, all together making up the research sample of 43 addresses. Content analysis is used to code the addresses, and justifications for the use of force were grouped in 11 different categories. The main goal of the dissertation is to discern patterns of rhetorical behavior of presidents after a military intervention and to isolate factors that influence it. The research demonstrates that differences between presidents and their verbal behavior following a military intervention are less dependent on party affiliation and other attitudinal factors, than they are on institutional frameworks and social, political and historical context. Presidents of both parties, regardless of their integrative complexity or international experience, have exhibited a surprising degree of rhetorical similarity and choice of legal justification when confronted with similar institutional contexts. This indicates the importance of institutional and contextual restrictions imposed on presidents and teaches us not to expect the impossible when there is a change in presidential administration.

Povzetek

Avtorica se v disertaciji loti proučevanja vzorcev verbalnega obnašanja ameriških predsednikov in njihove odvisnosti od institucionalnih in/ali vedenjskih dejavnikov. Verjame namreč, da predsedniki z uporabo določenih izrazov in besednih zvez, v utemeljitvah svojih odločitev za vojaško intervencijo v tujini, bodisi javnosti, bodisi kongresu, razkrijejo več kot le osebni stil izražanja. Disertacija posega na vrsto družboslovnih področij, ki se med seboj delno prekrivajo, zaradi česar je tudi pristop k analizi interdisciplinaren. Disertacija vključuje področje političnih ved (analiza institucije predsednika), komunikologije (predsedniška komunikacija), jezikoslovja (vsebinska analiza) in politične psihologije (vedenjski in osebnostni dejavniki).

Raziskovanje predsedniške institucije in retorike je v okviru širšega politološkega in družboslovnega raziskovanja dobro uveljavljeno. Pojem retorika se v disertaciji uporablja v ožjem, semantičnem in vsebinskem smislu in ne vključuje diskurzivno stilistične analize. Jezik ne predstavlja zgolj sredstva za prenos političnih vsebin in aktivnega sooblikovalca ideologij, ampak je ključnega pomena v procesu prepričevanja. Ker so bili predsedniki dolgo ocenjevani prav glede na svojo uspešnost prepričevanja, sta bila jezik in spretnost komunikacije umeščena visoko na lestvici lastnosti, ki jih je uspešen predsednik moral imeti. Predsedniška pooblastila ne izvirajo vedno neposredno iz ustave, ampak si jih mora predsednik znati pridobiti in uveljaviti, prav skozi proces prepričevanja (Neustadt 1990).

Ameriški politični sistem umešča predsednika v okvir na tri veje deljene oblasti, ki se med seboj vzajemno nadzirajo. Vojna in z vojno povezane aktivnosti predstavljajo zelo občutljivo področje, zaznamovano z večnim bojem za prevlado med predsednikom in kongresom. Ustava deli vojne pristojnosti med izvršno in zakonodajno vejo oblasti. Kongres je pristojen za objavo oziroma razglasitev vojne napovedi, medtem ko predsednik kot vrhovni poveljnik oboroženih sil vojno dejansko vodi; to kaže, da sta v primeru vojne zakonodajna in izvršna oblast soodvisni in bi morali delovati skupaj. V različnih zgodovinskih obdobjih so se predsedniki sklicevali na več oblik pravne podlage za vojaško intervencijo. Najpogostejša je bila ustava in iz nje izhajajoče posebne pravice predsednika, čeprav stroga interpretacije ustave predvideva kot edino ustrezno pravno podlago prav soglasje kongresa. Le to je lahko izraženo v obliki skupne resolucije obeh domov kongresa, ki pa so jo predsedniki le izjemoma pridobili, oziroma zanjo zaprosili, še pred uporabo sile in vojaško intervencijo.

Naslednja pomembna tema, ki jo obravnava disertacija, je vpliv notranjih institucionalnih dejavnikov na predsednika in njegove govore. Poleg opisanih težav, ki izhajajo iz delitve oblasti, je ameriška politika zaznamovana tudi z močno politično

polarizacijo. Ali ta delitev vpliva, oziroma kakšen je njen vpliv, na predsedniko javno utemeljevanje uporabe ameriške vojske v tujini? Odgovorov je več in vprašanje je precej bolj kompleksno, kot se zdi na prvi pogled. Polarizacija ni samo zunanja in ne pomeni zgolj dvostrankarskega sistema, ampak se kaže tudi v ideološki in svetovno nazorski delitvi znotraj strank in znotraj posamezne veje oblasti. To je posledično razvidno tudi iz različnih vzorcev volilnega obnašanja javnosti, kot tudi iz obnašanja članov kongresa v postopku sprejemanja zakonov, potrjevanja finančnih sredstev in ostalega sodelovanja med vejami oblasti.

Disertacija je časovno omejena z letom 1948 in prvim izvoljenim mandatom predsednika Trumana na eni strani, ter letom 2008 in koncem drugega mandata predsednika G.W. Busha na drugi strani. V analizo je vključenih 43 govorov, ki se delijo na dve skupini. V prvi skupini so redni letni govori o stanju v državi, medtem ko so v drugi skupini zbrani govori, ki so sledili vojaški intervenciji v tujini. Vsebinskih skupin s pomočjo katerih smo kodirali in analizirali govore je 11, rezultati pa so izraženi v odstotnem deležu odstavkov, kjer se pojavljajo posamezna skupina oziroma besede ter besedne zveze iz te skupine.

Temeljni cilj disertacije je bil ugotoviti ali obstajajo vzorci vsebinskih in pravnih utemeljitev, na katere se sklicujejo predsedniki po vojaški intervenciji v tujini in določiti dejavnike, ki na njihove utemeljitve vplivajo. Glavni del analize, ki je temeljila na različnih statističnih metodah obdelave podatkov, je bil namenjen iskanju povezav med razlagalnimi spremenljivkami, kjer je bila določena stopnja prekrivanja pričakovana.

Ob zaključku avtorica ugotavlja, da so razlike med vsebinskimi in pravnimi utemeljitvami predsednikov za vojaške intervencije v tujini manj odvisne od strankarske pripadnosti ali vedenjskih dejavnikov, kot od formalnega institucionalnega okvira ter družbenega, političnega in zgodovinskega konteksta. Predsedniki obeh strank, z visokim ali nizkim indeksom kompleksnega mišljenja, iz različnih kategorij političnega časa, z ali brez mednarodnih izkušenj, so si bili v svojih utemeljevitvah vojaških intervencij presenetljivo podobni. Največje spremembe v predsedniški retoriki so vezane na spreminjanje konteksta v času posameznih mandatov, kar nakazuje, da zgolj zamenjava predsednika v Beli hiši ni zagotovilo za večje spremembe v njegovem odnosu do vojaških intervencij v tujini in hkrati poudarja stabilnost institucije predsednika in njeno vpetost v institucionalni okvir.

List of abbreviations

ADS.....	American Defense Strategy
CIA.....	Central Intelligence Agency
GOP.....	Grand Old Party
HUAC.....	House Committee on UN-American Activities
INF.....	Intermediate Nuclear Force
IRNF.....	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
MAD.....	Mutually assured destruction
NAFTA.....	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCLB Act.....	»No Child left behind Act«
NSC.....	National Security Council
OAS.....	Organization of American States
OEEC.....	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OECS.....	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
PLO.....	Palestine Liberation Organization
PRC.....	People's Republic of China
ROC.....	Republic of China
SACDT.....	Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
SALT.....	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SEATO.....	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SOU.....	State of the Union
UN.....	United Nations, Organization
USA.....	United States of America
USSR.....	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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1 Introduction

Words matter. And words, uttered by the American president at the time of crisis, can influence the events and behavior of Americans and other nations involved in the conflict. The present dissertation aims to study the rhetorical behavior of American presidents, when they justify the deployment of military force outside the borders of the United States of America (USA), and to isolate potential rhetorical patterns presidents recur to at such time. The President of the USA represents the most important American institution. He is not only the Chief of Executive, but also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. However, while the American presidency is often viewed as the apex of power - it is still at the mercy of political pressures, special interest groups, and controllable and uncontrollable societal events. Perhaps change remains the only constant for the President of the United States in this whirlwind of events (Sheehan and Sheehan 2006).

The main method applied to the studying of presidential verbal behavior will be the content analysis. The addresses will be coded and statistically analyzed with quantitative and qualitative methods, and finally the results will be interpreted with regard to their social, political and historical context.

At this point it is important to mention that foreign policy decisions are not made by the President alone. There is a myriad of domestic and international factors and actors, which influence foreign policy behavior and actions. These influences need to be channelled through governmental apparatus that identifies, decides and implements foreign policy. The present dissertation will be focused only on presidents, the crucial decision-makers in the formulation and even more so in the implementation of foreign policy. However, also the President is limited by the Constitution, which divides war related executive powers between legislative and executive, and yet it is the President who decisively shapes the foreign policy decisions, in particular when it comes to the use of armed forces.

The dissertation lies upon three conceptual starting points, namely:

- language cannot be neutral - it reflects and structures our ideologies and world views;
- use of force requires legal authorization and moral justification and,
- in order to advance their agenda, presidents often try to persuade the public and the Congress through their public addresses.

The decision to adopt interdisciplinary approach stems from the fact that research of presidents and presidential powers pertains to the discipline of political science; presidential skills of public persuasion and rhetoric originate in communication science; crises and presidents' decision for and the conduct of war is defined also by their attitudinal features and

decision-making styles (Dyson 2006, 289–306), which are drawn from the field of political psychology; and lastly the main research method is the traditionally linguistic method of content analysis.

Selected public addresses will be coded and semantic groups of justifications will be formulated on the basis of coding results. In order to provide for consistency, only the addresses of the same type will be included in the analysis.

The second level of analysis will study individual authorizations obtained by presidents for the deployment of armed forces in warfare or situations that were likely to lead to warfare. At the outset of this dissertation it is important to mention the institutional context of American presidential system, where powers are divided between the Congress and the President. Until approximately World War I more decision-making power was attributed to the Congress. Later on this tendency changed and shifted in the opposite direction, to arrive to today's situation of both, struggle and cooperation between the two institutions. A divided government with the incumbent of one and the Congress majority of the other party has contributed its share to the making of this relationship even more antagonistic and controversial. According to the Constitution, the Congress has the right to declare war, whereas the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, actually deploys armed forces and makes war.

Political institutions embodying the idea of the separation of powers are therefore more or less fixed structures, originally intended for cooperation and thus prevention of concentration of power in one branch; or at least this is the theoretical representation. The reality today tends to be somewhat different; instead of cooperation, the balance is often far from ideal and in the last decades or in the post Cold War political context, the game has more often been played to the advantage of the President.

The deployment of armed forces abroad is among more sensitive issues presidents have to deal with, and in order to gain support for it, they need the approval by the Congress. The willingness of the Congress is largely limited by the distribution of governmental power across the party lines, international alliances and commitments and many other factors. To increase their chances of success in the Congress, presidents will often publicly explain and justify the reasons and the need for intervention.

The present dissertation offers a comprehensive analysis of presidential justifications and authorizations as gathered from their selected public addresses during and after the Cold War era, namely from 1948 to 2008.

There are three main hypotheses to be tested, and they are:

- International institutional factors determine justifications for military interventions abroad;
- Domestic institutional factors determine legal basis for military interventions abroad.;
- Attitudinal factors determine justifications for military interventions abroad.

The main goals of the present dissertation are; to find out whether presidents rely upon established rhetorical patterns when justifying military interventions abroad; to develop a typology of most common justifications; and to establish the importance of institutional restrictions, attitudinal factors and, international commitments in the situations of possible interventions abroad.

The analysis will consist of selected public addresses (the first public address and the first State of the Union address (SOU) following the intervention; when available, both), and the primary tool of research will be the content analysis. The dissertation therefore represents a contribution to the field of political and communication sciences, since it emphasizes the need for the application of empirical research to the study of presidency and presidential rhetoric, and offers a variety of different methodological tools for their analysis.

2 Literature review and thesis statement

The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of studies on presidency and presidential rhetoric, and to provide an insight into one particular aspect of presidency, namely the presidential rhetorical behavior, in particular when related to the deployment of American military force.

Research in presidency has become a well established sub-field of political, or even broader, social science research, but it was not until the second half of the eighties, when it started to adopt the standards of contemporary political science research, based on empirical, quantitative and not only qualitative research methods (Rhodes et al. 2008, 303). This lack of empiricism was expressed by many scholars of the time. Garry King (1993, 388) bemoaned the fact that »presidency research is one of the last bastions of historical, non-quantitative research in American politics« however, there have also been others, who advocated legal analysis, case studies and theoretically informed historical research (see Fisher 2004; Skowronek 1997). Howell surveyed the state of quantitative research on the presidency and concluded that presidency research exhibited serious deficiencies related to quantitative research, but he remained optimistic in view of the changing trends and an increase of methodological contributions in this sub-field of study. He also stressed the importance of studies that take into consideration also other actors, which share powers with the executive, such as other branches of government, international actors, the public etc., since they all shape presidential actions (Howell in Rhodes et al. 2008, 317).

Fisher (2004, preface) advocates the idea that, particularly at the time of emergency, presidents follow the pattern of concentrating powers and tend to abuse the constitutional framework by excluding the Congress from participation in the exercise of war powers. According to Fisher (2004, preface), the Congress was vested by the framers of the Constitution with explicit control over the initiation and authorization of war, power over foreign commerce, approval of treaties, confirmation of ambassadors, power of the purse, and other authorities over foreign affairs. However, in the post 1945 climate, presidents have routinely exercised war powers with little or no involvement of the Congress, largely authorizing their actions by different United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions or even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) resolutions.

A historically rooted approach to the study of presidency was put forward by the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger jr. (2004, x–xi) who wrote of the »imperial presidency« and followed the growth of presidential power over two centuries, with a special emphasis on how it had served and harmed the Constitution. The term »imperial presidency« derives from the

word »empire« and implies a strong presidency with high concentration of power to the disadvantage of other branches and the Constitution. As Schlesinger writes in his introduction to the Mariner Edition of 2004, the imperial presidency at the time of President Clinton seemed to be finished. At that time also other scholars agreed with this observation and believed that post-imperialism had already begun with the presidency of George W. Bush. However, the goodbye was premature and the come back of the imperial presidency was first to be seen in foreign affairs, a perennial threat to the constitutional balance. Schlesinger claims the legislative and the judiciary have great authority in domestic policy, where they do not hesitate to defend it, whereas foreign affairs represent a different story. Here the Congress and the Courts often seem to lack confidence and are inclined to let the presidents have the authority and the power. The more acute is the crisis, the more power flows to the President.

Most studies on presidency and presidential powers claim that presidents derive their authority from the Constitution. This is undoubtedly true, but it is not the only source of presidential powers. One of most prominent presidential scholars, Richard E. Neustadt (1990), presented a pioneering contribution to the discipline of presidential research and its understanding. He traced presidential influence to three related sources. One was formal powers or authority, vested in him by the Constitution and legal framework. The second source was professional reputation, and the third was prestige, namely the President's public standing and the impression in the public of how well or badly he was doing his job. Presidential success and power in the policy process is likely to increase, if the President is able to influence congressional, media and public attention to issues (Peake 2001, 70). According to Neustadt (1990, 186), »presidential power is the power to persuade, and the power to persuade is the ability to bargain« and the main purpose of this bargaining or persuasion is to convince the other branches of power, most often the Congress, to provide the support for the President's intended actions and plans. It can thus be said that Neustadt's perception of presidential powers extended outside the strictly formal framework of the Constitution and depended greatly on President's rhetorical skills and prestige. Rhodes (2008, 9) claims that Neustadt triggered a »behavioral revolution« by exposing communication, style, personality and reputation as essential elements for a successful persuasion, which in turn represents a keystone of political power and successful presidency. This led to the perception that presidency was not a political institution with its defined structure and rules, but greatly depended upon who »filled the office« (Rhodes et al. 2008, 9), opening the door to the period of personal presidency studies. Rhodes (2008, 10) agrees that »skill in the art of persuasion surely plays some part in political power, (but) it cannot

possibly explain the general growth of presidential power.« Personal presidency studies have slowly been replaced by increasing number of studies in more formal components of presidential power and the perception of the institutional presidency has taken ground. Studies have become more »scientific«, based on theoretical assumptions and empirical methods, but the perception of presidential power as the power to persuade and negotiate has not changed much. Studies of presidential efficiency still revolve around the ability of President to pass his legislative agenda through Congress, which seems to be closely linked with presidential skill of persuasion, communication, and negotiation.

Anderson (1988, 198) believes that, »presidents can become authors of their own legitimacy whether understood in normative or behavioral terms.« He claims that »presidential assertions of power, cloaked in an anti-power rhetoric which formally honors the dominant values of the culture, have created an American state that has served as an extra-constitutional source of presidential legitimacy.«

If Lincoln's interpretation and his application of the war powers are considered, it is clear that he perceived supreme national authority as vested in the presidency, and interpreted the Constitution accordingly. Subsequent presidents have followed his example by attempting to assert power as a revolutionary principle, which constitutes legitimizing defenses for the exercise of extraordinary powers. What is particularly interesting in the example of President Lincoln is his ability to combine rhetoric with divine providence and powers, so as to fit in the cultural environment of the time, permeated with religion, when all problems, including wars, were interpreted as God's punishment for people's sins. Lincoln used this situation to his advantage and aptly incorporated religious elements in his own rhetoric, with the main purpose of persuading the audience (Lincoln 1861).

Anderson (1988, 205) describes the connection between presidential rhetoric and political culture in the United States as paradoxical, since the dominant values of culture, namely liberty, equality, and representative democracy lead to believe that government in itself is not something good and should be limited. However, the same arguments and values that are often found in presidential rhetoric, serve the purpose of expanding or strengthening authority vested in the President and government. Anderson (1988, 210) claims that nearly all wartime presidents followed the example of Lincoln, when claiming their extraordinary power as commanders-in-chief, and protecting their legitimacy by identifying with their predecessors. Presidents have established the right to exercise extraordinary power by rhetorically gratifying the public purposes, which that power controls, and have become the creators of their own legitimacy by asserting their powers through the control of language.

Why rhetoric matters? Rhetoric is commonly believed to be important in politics; however, their relationship is not so obvious and clear. Rhetoric is just words. Politics is about power: dividing wealth, creating and abolishing rights, and making war. Can the choice of words make much difference in such matters? The aim of the present dissertation is to provide evidence in support of rhetorical importance.

To start at the beginning it can be said that Aristotle was the first to define reciprocity of politics and rhetoric (1998; 2004) in his two separate books, *Rhetoric* and *Politics*. The rise and development of rhetorical presidency is also described in the article first published in 1981, written by Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis and Bessette, with the analysis that starts in 1800s, when presidents rarely addressed the public to gather support for some policy, and moves on to the 1900s, the period marked by ever more frequent appearances of presidents, used or meant to prove the efficiency of their leadership (Ceaser et. al 1987). According to Barrett (2004) this article marks the beginning of research on presidential rhetoric by both, the political scientists and communication scientists. Another important contribution to the understanding of presidential rhetoric was put forward by Jeffrey K. Tulis in his book *Rhetorical Presidency*, where he presented a complete review of nineteenth century presidents, and illuminated the traditional norms that had restricted presidential public discourse through time. Tulis (1987) studied rhetorical practice in order to understand the changed leadership role and political order, thus transforming presidential rhetorical studies into a powerful instrument for the interpretation of American politics.

Politics can be perceived as a form of linguistic activity not only because it employs language to inform others about political issues, but because it can help persuade people to adopt courses of action in regard to these issues. Thus it can be said that language is not merely an instrument for describing events, but a constituent part of events and can therefore influence political perceptions in a way that goes beyond its propositional content. Rhetoric refers to speeches and addresses that are effective in the molding of public sentiment. Not every kind of speech can persuade public at large and not every speaker can. The study of rhetoric aims to discover what makes a speech politically effective, in what ways it resembles and how it differs from other types of speech. The media, scholars, and general public alike constantly scrutinize speeches of elected officials and wonder about their honesty, purpose and potential effect. The undoubted truth that politicians sometimes have interests not identical with those of the public is generalized into the dogma that a statesman's words are but a rationalization for his actions, or a screen behind which he can carry out the deeds he could not defend in public.

There has been an increase of the role of image-making, mood-appeal and other techniques of modern advertising in political speech to the exclusion of serious discussion of issues and policies. The chief spokesmen of modern advertising are now being elevated to the highest positions in politics and from them the statesmen learn how to sell their image by pleasing and flattering the audiences. This regards politicians on all levels, including the ones that occupy the highest offices, such as the President of the USA. The institution of American president is of great importance and the definition, which considers appeal as the only or the most suitable criterion for the assessment of presidential rhetoric, is therefore unacceptable. Political speech and presidential rhetoric cannot be judged only by how well they appeal to the audience; they must serve the ends of statesmanship. Another example of President Abraham Lincoln's rhetoric confirms that he was indeed one of the greatest speakers ever to hold the office of the President of the United States. Yet, his failure to persuade the public on several occasions proves that a successful persuasion cannot be the only measure of good rhetoric. In his first Inaugural address he tried to convince the South that it should not secede from the Union.

I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. /.../ Is there such perfect identity of interests among the States to compose a new union as to produce harmony only and prevent renewed secession? Plainly the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it does of necessity fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible. The rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left (Lincoln 1861).

The speech failed. Was it therefore a bad speech? It is quite impossible to find what else he might have said, or how he might have said it that would have convinced the audience, if he did not want to give in on the issue of slavery. The rhetoric alone cannot accomplish certain goals, if the circumstances are not mature enough. Good rhetoric must bridge the gap between what the common good requires and what an unconvinced audience would permit. It succeeds by moving the audience as much as it can be moved, which may not always be sufficient.

Various studies have proven that great and charismatic presidents knew how to speak in order to persuade people and to make them see and understand the president's vision.

Cynthia G. Emrich (Emrich et al. 2001, 527–557) claims that presidents whose inaugural addresses employed rhetoric that was more image-based, rated higher in charisma, and presidents who delivered their most significant speeches using image-based rhetoric, were rated higher in both, charisma and greatness (Murray and Blessing 1983; 1994). Thus it can be presumed that one of the elements needed for a successful presidency is the ability of the leader to verbalize his/her thoughts so vividly, that people can actually see or imagine what can be accomplished. Studies of charisma emphasize strong affective bond between leaders and followers, whereas studies of greatness, quite opposite, underline achievement. Studies of American presidents reveal that leader appeal only shows how well the leader's own motives fit the imagery profile of the times, whereas presidential leadership performance represents something completely different; historians' ratings of presidents show the greatest presidents were those who were least congruent with the followers of their society (Winter 2004, 132). Leaders who share a strong emotional bond with their followers are not always the leaders who take the nation in the direction where they had set themselves, and are therefore not necessarily the ones who achieve great change. However, it could probably be said that such leaders are more successful in persuading the public and obtaining support for their actions. One of the leading scholars on presidential powers, Richard Neustadt (1990) claimed that presidential powers derive from the ability of presidents to persuade the significant others, and are not explicitly provided by the Constitution.

When discussing presidential powers as defined in the Constitution, it should be noted that there exist many different interpretations and speculations about which powers the framers had actually intended to vest in the President. Rhodes (2008, 20) cites the example of President Carter, who delivered a speech at Camp David, in July 1979, where he spoke of a crisis of confidence and was later criticized by one of the guests, a southern governor, who had told him: »Mr. President, you are not leading this Nation - you're just managing the Government.« Rhodes (2008, 20) defends Carter by saying that the framers of the Constitution intended to vest in the President only the power to govern and manage the government, and not to lead the Nation, with the purpose of avoiding the concentration of power. However, also Rhodes admits that the President had to defend national interests and assert them preemptively, and therefore more than just the management of government was implied by the constitutional term »leadership.« By combining the two concepts, namely rhetoric and leadership, the ever so popular term »rhetorical leadership« can be coined. Zarefsky (2008, 3) defines it as »leadership through persuasion«, but also admits the definition fails to reveal the complexities and scope of rhetorical leadership. A myriad

definitions and theories have been developed so far, all trying to address and explain the various aspects of leadership. According to Zarefsky (2008, 5) all or most of the definitions appear to have something in common, and this is the belief that »leadership presents a means whereby a person influences another person or group to achieve a common aim.« Furthermore he believes the concept of leadership to be grounded in the nature and practice of rhetoric.

»Going public«, a term invented by Samuel Kernell (1997), has become one of most common governing strategies of modern presidency. The main reason for it is quite simple-for most of his actions, the President needs support from the Congress, which is not always easy. The success of presidential persuasiveness is largely dependent upon and limited by factors pertaining to institutional and broader socio-political context. When the government is divided, presidential success in governing tends to be better, if there is a substantial public support for his proposal. The strategy of going public implies that politicians, including the President, present their proposals to the people through various public addresses, thus gathering public support and consequently influencing the behavior of the Congress. As Mary E. Stuckey aptly put it: »Presidents can no longer choose whether to engage in public leadership, only what form that leadership will take« (Stuckey in Medhurst 2006, 3). Presidential rhetoric becomes very significant when it persuades us into seeing, what the President wants us to see. This, however, is not an ill-intentioned manipulation by itself; it just implies that President has chosen the right strategy and has succeeded in steering his boat in the direction he had set-whether the direction is actually the best for the country, is a whole different story.

The claim that the strategy of »going public« yields results is shared by many scholars. Kernell (1997) and Hart (1987) provide strong evidence that modern presidents engage in public activities and deliver public addresses ever more frequently, and Ragsdale (1998, 183) shows that the number of public activities that presidents participated in, has increased from approximately 84 addresses per year during the presidency of Eisenhower to more than 300 addresses per year during the first term of President Clinton. It is therefore obvious that presidents »go public« more frequently than ever. However, there is still not enough empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of this strategy, despite the fact that its frequency continues to increase. Nonetheless, a handful of scholars have attempted to empirically test the impact of going public on presidential legislative success (Fett 1994; Hart 1987; Mouw and MacKuen 1992). Yet, these studies suffer from a variety of shortcomings that leave the question of the effectiveness of this strategy largely unanswered. The biggest problem with the studies that exist, in particular Mouw and MacKuen (1992), is that they spend little time

defining and establishing criteria for what constitutes a presidential attempt at going public, a critical point when analyzing hundreds of presidential statements per year. And this is not the only problem. Fett's (1994) study suffers from the use of a limited data set as he only examines the first years of the Carter and Reagan administrations, restricting his analysis to only 36 conflictual issues. Hart (1987) fails to test for a causal relationship between presidential speeches and presidential legislative success. It is probably safe to presume there is some correlation between the increasing frequency and the success of this strategy, otherwise presidents would not have repeatedly opted for this strategy. However, how frequently presidents resort to this method depends greatly on the issue they want to gather support for. The president's ability to persuade the Congress has appeared to be largely determined by the legislative environment of a given administration, such as the size of the president's party in Congress, and not the actions taken by the president himself (Jones 1994). Going public can improve a president's position for bargaining, since public pressure applied to congressmen can bring advantage to his cause. This, however, only functions when issue at stake is already popular with the public and congressmen thus try not to disappoint their voters. When speaking about the issues of prime interest to this dissertation, namely the warfare and the deployment of the military forces of the USA, the situation tends to be more complicated. Warfare has always been a controversial issue and to gather public support and consequently apply pressure to the Congress in support of military intervention can be an arduous task. The main problem is the distribution of powers; who is actually authorized to lead the nation into war? Is it the President or the Congress? The Constitution seems quite clear when dividing war related powers between the President and the Congress, but history with its plethora of different interpretations can provide evidence for the opposite. Chapter 5, which focuses on institutional framework and the separation of powers, will provide an in-depth analysis of this topic and the related controversies.

The relationship between rhetoric and leadership has never appeared very comfortable or convincing, since the ability of politicians to influence people through words has often been considered dangerous. Various types of presidential rhetoric (i.e. inaugural addresses, SOU addresses, farewell addresses, addresses to the nation and others) have been examined and a myriad books and articles have been written on this topic. Not many are based on the empirical, quantitative and qualitative methods, as opposed to mainly narrative studies of modern presidency. This is precisely the ambition of the present dissertation. It aims to provide additional insight into the study of presidential rhetoric, by presenting the empirical

study of presidential addresses related to military interventions abroad, and by establishing a hierarchy of factors (legal and moral) presidents relied upon in their addresses.

3 Theoretical framework and methods

3.1 Political psychology

There are various factors that shape individual presidency, among which the institutional framework, power situation (who controls the Congress), time and international circumstances (foreign crises, war...) and also personal characteristics and style of individual presidents, need to be mentioned. Presidential personality and its characteristics have been widely researched by many scholars of political psychology (Barber 2008; Hermann 1980; 1987; 2001; Hermann et al. 2001), who have examined various individual factors of political figures (e.g. traits, motives, decision-making strategies etc.) and their relation to success or failure in the politics. Integrative complexity (Suedfeld et al. 1992) deals with complexity of information processing and decision making. Complexity considers the structure of one's thoughts, while ignoring the contents, and is defined and measured by two features of communication, namely differentiation and integration. The former refers to the extent to which different perspectives on, or dimensions of, an issue are addressed in communication, while integration reveals how the different perspectives or dimensions relate to one another. Thus, some degree of differentiation of cognitive structure is a prerequisite for the demonstration of integration.

The research aims to prove the relationship between the complexity of thinking and presidential leadership, seeing that complexity of President's thinking could be relevant for his ability to perform successfully. Leadership-especially leadership on such a level-is very complex. A superficial knowledge about international relations would suffice to prove it is not easy to communicate and negotiate with persons from different cultural backgrounds, with different national agendas, often different languages, and subtly different semantic meaning systems (Suedfeld et al. 2006). Thus, it is a useful question to ask how complex presidents' thinking about these and other areas is or can be. Indeed, already previous research suggests that the complexity of political leaders' thinking is extremely important in understanding the leadership outcomes (Suedfeld et al. 1977).

Although many studies examine individual president's integrative complexity or a set of presidents' integrative complexity, there seems to be only one that covers the integrative complexity of all American presidents. Thoemmes and Conway III (2007) examined 41 of the 43 US presidents' integrative complexity over their first four years in office, excluding only two presidents who did not serve long enough to make the SOU speech. They identified a pattern of changes in integrative complexity during the tenure of presidents consistent with

the cognitive manager model, developed by Suedfeld (1992), and provided an overview of the overall integrative complexity scores by president (Thoemmes and Conway III 2007, 203). Results of this research suggest that presidents score higher in integrative complexity at the beginning of their first mandate and lower towards the end of it. This pattern was especially evident in presidents who were later reelected for the second time, whereas it was not so pronounced in the presidents who lost reelection. Analyses also revealed that overall integrative complexity was positively correlated to various interpersonal traits, such as friendliness, affiliation motive, extraversion and wittiness. For the purpose of this dissertation only the data on integrative complexity index of presidents from Truman to G. H. W. Bush were used, as reported in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Mean Integrative Complexity Scores

President	Integrative Complexity
H. Truman	2,09
D. Eisenhower	1,68
J. Kennedy	2,18
L. Johnson	2,10
R. Nixon	2,03
G. Ford	1,87
J. Carter	1,83
R. Reagan	1,90
G. H. W. Bush	2,00
W. Clinton	2,03
G. W. Bush	1,95
Average ¹	1,97

Source: Conway III and Thoemmes (2007, 203).

As can be seen from Table 3.1, of all the presidents included in the present research, Kennedy scored the highest and Eisenhower the lowest in integrative complexity; presidents who scored below the calculated average were Ford, Carter, Reagan and G. W. Bush.

¹ In the original table the average 1,77 was calculated for all 41 presidents.

During international crises the outbreak of war is frequently preceded by a bilateral decrease in the integrative complexity, whereas a unilateral decrease reliably precedes a surprise strategic attack. When decision-making processes that are in the background of negotiations or strategies in international conflicts are studied, it is not easy to draw conclusions on the basis of participants' communications; to draw the line between honest and truthful intentions, distortion, partial truth or even a lie is therefore a very complex task (Suedfeld and Leighton 2002, 585). It is of great importance for those receiving a message to be able to know or assess its truthfulness. Jervis (1970) drew a distinction between »signals«, issued mostly to influence the receiver and make him perceive the sender in a determined way, and »indices«, which are supposed to be accurate communications of sender's intentions.

Another index of this kind can be found in the structure of thoughts that are at the basis of communications, since the structure, which refers to »how people think« and not »what they think«, reveals implicit messages which are more difficult to be manipulated with by the sender. Integrative complexity has been measured and applied in the context of international relations with the purpose of assessing the cognitive structure of communications. Research on how integrative complexity relates to international relations has examined crises, which were resolved by peaceful means (Maoz and Astorino 1992; Raphael 1982; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977; Suedfeld et al. 1977; Tetlock 1985; Tetlock 1988; Walker and Watson 1989), as well as confrontations that led to armed conflict (Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977; Suedfeld et al. 1977; Tetlock 1985; Tetlock 1988; Wallace et al. 1993).

On the basis of these studies and research the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The outbreak of war is reliably preceded by decreased integrative complexity of national leaders and diplomats. No such pattern of reduced complexity was found during crises that were eventually resolved peacefully.

2. Leaders of nations that launch surprise strategic attacks show a significant complexity decrease occurring between 3 months and 2 weeks before the attack. Leaders of the target nation show increased complexity during the month before the attack. Immediately after the attack, their complexity drops to about the same level as that of the attacker (Suedfeld and Bluck 1988; Wallace et al. 1993).

3. Most individuals within the decision-making groups also tend to exhibit lower level of integrative complexity, when war approaches or actually occurs. There are exceptions that may have been caused by individual differences, the situation of the communication (e.g. audience), or both (Levi and Tetlock 1980; Wallace and Suedfeld 1988). In most of the cases,

except in some special circumstances, the leader who bears primary responsibility tends to be lower in complexity than his advisors and subordinates (Guttieri et al. 1995; Wallace et al. 1993).

4. Representatives of nations that are not directly, but only peripherally involved in the coming or actual conflict, and have relatively less at stake, show little or no decrease in complexity (Suedfeld et al. 1977; Wallace et al. 1993).

5. Members of the national elite also change in behavior during periods when their country is at war. Even if they have no important or decision-making function in the government, they nevertheless exhibit reduced integrative complexity in public and also in private communications (Porter and Suedfeld 1981; Suedfeld 1981; Suedfeld 1985).

Communication, high in integrative complexity, is based on the recognition there is more than one valid perspective on an issue, and that different perspectives can be integrated or related. The dominant theoretical explanation for varying levels of complexity is the cognitive manager model (Suedfeld 1992). This model argues that leaders, in the face of major situational stressors, respond by »rationing« mental resources. They substitute less involved, simplified mental viewpoints for more demanding and complex ones. Only after stressors have been eliminated, or a long enough period of time has elapsed so that leaders can adapt to their presence, do complexity levels rise again. It draws analogy between the process of being cognitively involved in problems and a more general method of dealing with stress, which was described by Selye (1956). It stipulates that when an important problem (the so called »stressor«) is first recognized, this triggers alarm reaction and thus mobilizes organism to muster its resources and prepare to deal with the emergency. Cognitively speaking, this is the period of low complexity, which is followed by the resistance phase, when organism applies the available resources and tries to solve the problem. If the individual believes it is necessary to involve a higher level and thus reach a better, more satisfactory solution, complexity increases. If there are too many problems at the same time, if the problem cannot be solved, if the risk of not succeeding seems too high, or if the individual seems to be too tired to deal with the situation, we reach the stage of exhaustion, called also the »disruptive stress.« This is the point when leaders give up trying to solve a problem by the use of complex cognitive processes and reduce them to a less complex, simpler level (Suedfeld et al. 1992). Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977) also compared communications and statements from two crises that ended in war (1914 and the 1950 outbreak of the Korean War) and three peacefully resolved crises (the 1911 Morocco crisis, the 1948 Berlin airlift crisis, and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis). As expected, they discovered that in cases when war was avoided the level of

integrative complexity was higher (Winter 2008, 25–29). Generally speaking, integrative complexity seems to be on a low level at the time of war, and also the attacking nations display a lower degree of complex style just before the outbreak of war, whereas the defending country or the one to be attacked usually increases the level of integrative complexity prior to the attack and then lowers it again when the war has started. This is quite understandable; the attacking country hardens its position and by increasing hostility, complexity decreases. The opposite is true for the country to be attacked, which tries to use all the means and tactics to defer the attack. This correlation is closely linked to causal beliefs of individual political leaders and the relationship of their policies, goals and outcomes; it is known as cognitive mapping. J. Hart (1977, 115–140) used this technique for the analysis of Latin American leaders; it was also applied by J. Hart and F. Greenstein (1977) to study the US presidents Wilson and Eisenhower. All this is due to the premise that decision making process is strongly influenced by the belief systems of decision makers or actors, which can be thus translated for the purpose of this dissertation in the following way: American presidents behaved and reacted in a particular way not solely, but also, on the basis of their individual perceptions, which were filtered through clusters of beliefs and acquired concepts. This process is called »cognition« and it helps individuals make sense of different signals they are getting from the environment. Normal language needs to be translated and coded into causal statements, which enable us to perform cognitive mapping.

Cognitive maps may be recorded through different means, the most common is probably the systematic coding of documents or statements representing individual's beliefs and ideas. This is precisely the goal of present research; namely to test if and how the presidents' internal variables, such as their cognitive style, experience and background, influenced on their selection of justifications for military interventions abroad. It can be said that the truthfulness of politicians' public addresses can be disputable, which diminishes the reliability of all kinds of rhetoric based analysis. The purpose of this dissertation, however, is not to discover how truthful the presidents were in their justifications, but merely to gather the justifications and authorizations they referred to, and explain them with different variables (cognitive style-integrative complexity, divided house, substantial international experience and party affiliation).

3.2 Institutionalism

In order to understand or make an informed prediction about the behavior of a future leader, a broad international as well as national context, together with the distribution of power across

institutional framework, must be taken into consideration. This pertains to the area of institutionalism, or the study of political institutions, including the President. There are two main approaches to the studying of institutions, one that draws upon positive theory and perceives institutions as external agents that exert pressure on political actors from outside, but do not shape their inner motivations and goals (Rhodes et al. 2008); and the other, which draws upon normative and historical theory, conceptualizing institutions as both, external and internal influences on political behavior, motivations and goals of political actors. Probably the best example of this approach is Stephen Skowronek (2008; 1997), who claims that presidential behavior needs to be understood in relation to historically evolving sets of institutions that make up political regimes, what he calls »political time.« To start with the traditional approaches to the studying of institutions, it should be remembered that the »old« institutionalism embraces various approaches, not only the formal-legal analysis of institutions, which according to Rhodes (2008, 91) represents a starting point in the study of political institutions. It represents the analysis of the historical evolution of formal-legal institutions and the ideas embedded in them. Modern American political science is underpinned by positivism, which focuses on comparison, measurement, law-like generalization and neutral evidence (Rhodes 2008, 93). He continues by saying that the study of political institutions is essential element of political science, and that the formal-legal approach to the study is comparative, historical, and inductive. Several studies of institutions have been conducted by employing comparative approach, one of the best examples is Finer (Finer in Rhodes 2008, 95), who conducted institution-to-institution comparative research across countries and located institutional analysis in the theory of the State. Formal-legal analysis is historical; it employs the historians' techniques and studies specific events, time periods, institutions etc.; it is also inductive, because inferences can be drawn from repeated observation of institutions, which are very concrete, objective and based on facts. Rhodes (2008, 103) stresses the underlying concern of most theories is the interplay of ideas and institutions, since they all analyze the historical evolution of formal-legal institutions and the ideas embedded in them. His argument is that old institutionalism continues to be valid, since it is based on historical and philosophical analysis, and focuses on meaning, as the defining feature of interpretive or constructivist approach to the study of political institutions. Thus the interpretive theory rethinks the nature of institutions as sedimented products of contingent beliefs and practices.

March and Olsen (2008, 4-5) claim that institutions are collections of rules and practices that do not change easily, and which empower and constrain actors and make them

act in accordance with the prescriptive rules of appropriate behavior. Approaches to political institutions differ when it comes to how they understand a) the nature of institutions as the organized setting within which modern political actors most typically act; b) the processes that translate structures and rules into political impacts; and c) the processes that translate human behavior into structures and rules and establish, sustain, transform or eliminate institutions.

March and Olsen developed and advocated one of first and more important approaches to the analysis of institutions (March and Olsen 1984; 1989; 1996), where they claim that political behavior is best understood through normative logic of what is appropriate behavior for a specific institution and culture. They believe people behave as they do on the basis of normative standards, learnt through experience and involvement with a certain institution. This has often been categorized as normative institutionalism. »Normative« refers to a concern with norms and values as explanatory variables, and not to normative theory in the sense of promoting particular norms (Lowndes in March and Olsen 2008). Institutionalism emphasizes the endogenous (of internal origin) nature and social construction of political institutions, which represent a collection of actors, structures, rules and operating procedures that enjoy, to some extent, autonomous role in political life. As Weber (in March and Olsen 2008, 7) put it: »Institutions give order to social relations, reduce flexibility and variability in behavior, and restrict the possibilities of one-sided pursuit of self-interest or drives«. However, Weaver and Rockman (in March and Olsen 2008, 7) claim institutions are not static, and that institutionalization represents a multidimensional, changeable and reversible process. March and Olsen (2008) emphasize that histories of institutions are imprinted into their procedures and rules, therefore their internal structures cannot be changed arbitrarily. Weaver and Rockman also observe that the causal relationship between institutional arrangements and substantive policy is complex, therefore political institutions can be expected to constrain and enable outcomes without being the direct cause of public policy (Weaver and Rockman in March and Olsen 2008, 8), or as Schattschneider in March and Olsen (2008, 8) put it, institutions structure politics and governance and create a certain »bias«, they ordinarily do not determine political behavior or outcomes in detail. According to »organization theory«, behavior is shaped by identification and habituation. Members become permeated with their identities and roles in the organization (Simon in March and Olsen 2008, 9). It can therefore be presumed that a president's behavior is less dictated by the institution itself, than it is by his perception of habitual behavior appropriate for the executive and the context. It should however be noted that all institutions are exposed to constant change, which

in part responds to historical experience, but does not necessarily mean a change for the better, which is why March and Olsen (1989) discarded the thesis of »historical efficiency«, implying that changes derive only from the need for a better adaptation to the environment. As Skowronek (2008) found out, environments are populated with different institutions and organizations, based on various sets of principles and rules, and that is why political orders never are perfectly integrated; quite differently, they are subjected to many institutional imbalances, collisions, and conflicts. Another approach to the study of institutions is the »rational choice institutionalism«, which has become an engine of social scientific research (Shepsle 2008, 23), due to its analytical rigor and empirical implications. In the early nineties, rational choice institutionalism was welcomed by many scholars as a powerful theoretical framework that could be most useful in the studying of presidency. A new generation of presidency scholars seemed to embrace this approach, which did not differ so much from historical institutionalism based on case-oriented methodology, with the sole exception of analytical models, a framework in which to embed the historical case to be studied. What the rational choice theory however did change was the shift of analytic focus away from the President and toward decisions regularly taken by the President, since it is much more feasible to construct theory on presidential actions than on presidential personal features. Thus the rational choice theory does not probe for who the presidents are, but rather what they accomplish. Who the presidents are, undoubtedly matters and influences what they accomplish, but the rational choice theory deliberately ignores this part and focuses on strategic environments in which the presidents govern (Howell 2008, 24–25). It can be said that analytical narrative is a form of case study, but it is based on the underlying model that motivates analysis and frames the empirical materials (Shepsle 2008, 34). There are two streams in the rational choice tradition of studying institutions. The first one considers institutions as exogenous constraints, namely external constraints on human behavior, and the second as internal or endogenous, putting the responsibility for the rules of the game on actors themselves (Shepsle 2008, 23–24). Sanders (2008, 39) believes that the study of human political interactions should be put in the context of rule structures and it should be approached sequentially, which is the central assumption of historical institutionalism, that institutional development over time is marked by path dependence. Crises or unexpected confluence of events can exert such pressure upon actors and institutions that they react by changing their behavior or even some rules. Thus it is important to understand historical context and development of an institution, if actions of political players are to be understood. However, as Skowronek (1997) puts it, this is not enough. He stresses the fact that historical

context is not the key factor in determining behavior of political actors, despite the fact that presidents operate within institutional context, which is greatly determined by their predecessors. In his book »The Politics Presidents Make« Skowronek (1997, xi) exposes some timeless qualities and features of executive behavior and four recurring patterns in the politics of leadership, which stretch across the whole of presidential history. Skowronek perceives presidents as agents of political change, continually making and remaking American politics, shaping American political landscape and driving its transformations. His approach is not historically ordered and oriented, but focuses on different patterns that cut across historical demarcations and divisions. While trying to isolate the leadership conditions related to each individual presidency, he discovered that stories of great success were nearly always preceded by failure, thus exhibiting a very interesting pattern in presidential history (1997, 1–18). This prompted him to probe for what presidents of very different historical periods had in common. By comparing leadership efforts and locating the presidents under examination in different structures of action, Skowronek (1997, 1–18) launched the idea that successful leaders did not, necessarily, do more than other leaders; however, they controlled the political definition of their actions and the terms in which their places in history were understood. He claims that presidents are driven by the concern for their reputation, and are determined by the context of their time. Furthermore he distinguishes between “political time” and “secular time”, with the former referring to the historical medium through which authority structures have recurred, and the latter to the historical medium through which power structures have evolved. The concept of political time is based on the idea that not only politicians with their different skills, characters, and attitudes shape the presidency, but also the changing nature political system adds to final outlook of the presidency. Skowronek (1997, 1–18) identifies a president's position in political time by (a) whether the president is affiliated with or opposed to the commitments of the established regime, and (b) whether these commitments of ideology and interest are vulnerable or resilient. Skowronek (2008, 76–78) sees presidential leadership as some sort of a struggle between the individual and the system, where both, the system and the individual change. Situating presidents in political time provides a better measure of the way how political system works, and how leader interact with it. He claims that presidents within the same historical period have to deal with radically different political challenges. John Adams and Jimmy Carter, for example, were both affiliated with a vulnerable political regime (Skowronek labels this »the politics of disjunction«). Presidents from this group (including also John Quincy Adams, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan and Herbert Hoover) are

associated with a set of established commitments that have in the course of events been called into question as failed or irrelevant responses to the problems of the day. They are faced with an impossible situation; to affirm the established commitments implies stigmatizing oneself as a symptom of the nation's problems and failure; and to repudiate them is to become isolated from one's most natural political allies and be rendered impotent. They are in a lose situation, which constitutes the politics of disjunction (Skowronek 1997, 39). Thomas Jefferson and Ronald Reagan share a warrant of "reconstruction" because they came to office unattached to a floundering regime. In the same group are also Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. They shared the most promising of all situations for the exercise of political leadership. Opposition to the old regime was strong and there existed a general feeling that something needed to be done. Each of these presidents intended to draw from past fundamental values (Skowronek 1997, 37). James Monroe, James Polk, Theodore Roosevelt, Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson supported a resilient regime (the »politics of articulation«), while John Tyler, Woodrow Wilson, Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon were leaders who opposed a resilient regime (the »politics of preemption«). The former is associated with more presidents than any other category; they are the innovators who inspire political action with promises to continue the good work of the past, and promote their leadership as constructive rearticulation of the received legacy. They came to power in the wake of a strong reaffirmation of majority party government, and no extraordinary crises distracted them from the business of completing the agenda. They proceeded on the path that had already been traced. The latter refers to opposition leaders in resilient regimes and according to Skowronek (1997, 30–36) represents the most curios of all leadership situations. The presidents from this group are free from established commitments; they interrupt a still vital political discourse and try to preempt its agenda by playing upon the political divisions within the establishment. Their authority is limited by the political, ideological and institutional supports that the old establishment maintains. Their programs are aimed at increasing the interest gap and discontent in the dominant coalition, in order to strengthen their base of support (Skowronek 1997, 41–43). Attached to each of these four categories is a distinctive set of problems of presidential identity and legitimation (Skowronek 2008, 85). Table 3.2 provides an overview of recurrent structures of presidential authority.

Table 3.2 Recurrent Structures of presidential Authority

Previously established commitments	President's political identity	
	Opposed	Affiliated
Vulnerable	Politics of reconstruction	Politics of disjunction
Resilient	Politics of preemption	Politics of articulation

Source: Skowronek (1997, 36).

Skowronek (1997, 9) identified four phases of transformation from interpersonal based presidential strategy to a public support-motivated approach to politics. The four phases are a) Patrician politics (1789–1832), when leaders stood above their interests and governed on the strength of their personal reputation; b) Partisan politics (1832–1900), when leadership functioned as executive patronage to party factions; c) Pluralist politics (1900–1972), in which the rise of bureaucracy and institutional elites demanded serious negotiations between competing interests; and d) Plebiscitary politics (1972–present), featuring more candidate focused presidential campaigns and direct political relationship with the public. Skowronek (1997, 9) claims that presidents engage several institutional orderings simultaneously, when they act. Each ordering has distinct institutional referents and different patterns of change over time, which overlay one another. He thus exposes the layered structure of institutional action and concludes that institutions are not supposed to be studied in the context of isolated historical segments, but with a view to considering different periods and juxtaposing contending forces of order and change. Institutions are perceived as arenas for interplay and reciprocal influence of actors, structures, forces. Skowronek's study of presidency points in the new direction of institutional research, exposing how different sets of power arrangements are juxtaposed within government institutions and how institutional actors, by engaging all these different arrangements simultaneously, continually transform politics (Skowronek 1997, 13–15). The everyday struggle of incumbents for control represents a driving force of structural change, but also indicates that the results of political action are both, planned and unwanted, since presidents engage in so many different sets of rules and orderings.

Various approaches to the analysis of institutions have some elements in common, for example: a) Structures matter; a notion of formal structure, be it parliamentary or presidential, when speaking of government, has persisted across time. For some, this structure is more of a

formalized apparatus, for some, it represents the pattern of values that structures possess and transfer to their members; b) Structures persist, while individuals come and go; such understanding can lead to excessively static conception of institutions and institutionalism on the one hand, while on the other some believe that institutions try to replicate themselves by socializing new members into the existent values of the institution; c) Institutions provide for greater predictability and regularity of human behavior, which is needed for a peaceful and effective political system.

What is of prime interest to the present dissertation is to understand the motives for political behavior over time and the pressures for action and change. There are two types of institutional change to understand and distinguish: external and internal. The former implies internal development of the institution, namely its institutionalization and deinstitutionalization, while the latter refers to change in values and structures that supposedly characterize the institution. Not all institutions are equally institutionalized or have the same formal structure. The newly established ones probably still have to develop their value structure, while they have some formal elements they share with similar institutions elsewhere. Selznick argued (in Peters 2000, 15) that institutionalization implies permeating structure with values, meaning that institution really becomes complete when its formal structure is combined with value system.

To evaluate the level of institutionalization, Huntington (1968, 12–14) developed four criteria of assessment: autonomy, adaptability, complexity and coherence—the more criteria an institution fulfills, the more likely it is to survive and be able to influence its members and their environment. These four concepts can be understood in the following ways; a) Autonomy represents a concern with the capacity of institutions to make and implement their own decisions. If they are not dependent upon another organization or institution, they can be said to be institutionalized. This concept might be operationalized in terms of budget and autonomous sources of revenue; b) Adaptability taps the extent to which an institution is capable of adapting to changes in the environment, or more importantly capable of molding that environment. As with open system approaches to social life, the institution should be able to continue and import the needed resources despite changes in the relevant environment; c) Complexity demonstrates the capacity of the institution to construct internal structures to fulfill its goals and to cope with the environment, and implies the importance of structural differentiation; and d) Coherence represents the capacity of the institution to manage its own workload and to develop procedures to process tasks in a timely and reasonable manner. This

also represents a capacity of the institution to make decisions about its core tasks and beliefs and to filter out diversions from those.

Institutional change is marked by the change of contents, of what institutions do, or what they believe. Institutions influence individuals and make them change and vice versa, individuals exert influence on institutions; there is an ever present reciprocity of influence, and both, institutions and individuals, change through interaction. Political theory should by nature try to analyze and explain political phenomena, and institutional theory aims to do the very same. On the one hand, institutions are identifiable within the political environment; they seem to be associated with differences in behavior of individuals and also differences in the outcome of policies and decision-making. They decrease the variance in political behavior and make prediction easier.

The institution of particular interest to the present research is the executive institution of the American president. Something has already been said about the research on presidency and presidential rhetoric in previous chapter, thus the institutional dimension of presidency will be addressed only. President is a part of the system of separated state powers, and is vested with the executive authority. It seems to be both, very powerful and independent on the one hand, and just as much constrained and supervised on the other hand. However, as Howell puts it »presidents regularly effect policy change outside of bargaining framework. Because of his unique position within a system of separated powers, the President has numerous opportunities to take independent action, with or without the expressed consent of either Congress or the courts« (Howell 2008, 13). The number of presidents' unilateral decisions has been constantly increasing in the modern era, but unilateral presidency at the time of a national crisis is the extreme manifestation of what presidents can do nearly unrestrictedly. Howell (2008, 12-14) states that the power of unilateral action is not mentioned in the Constitution, however, it increases the president's powers and influence so much, that the presidents today do not need to depend on their skill of persuasion, when they want to accomplish something. They often exert power by setting policies on their own, unilaterally, without letting Congress and the courts even near. He continues by saying that unilateral powers are unlike any other powers granted to the President. When applying them the President takes the initiative and does not wait for the Congress to act, since this would limit him to the role of reacting or veto yielding. The second advantage of unilateral action is the lack of need for majority rallying and compromising, since the President actually acts alone. It should be remembered that presidency, as the executive institution, consists not only of the President; however, the line of command and hierarchy is very clear, and the final say

goes to the President. The Congress usually needs a two thirds majority of both Houses to reject the President's proposal. The unilateral presidency therefore represents the antithesis of persuading and negotiation, which had been advocated by personal presidency supporters, such as Neustadt (1990). It was John Locke (Locke in Howell 2008, 16) who first mentioned »prerogative powers«, namely the »power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it.« Locke believed it was essential to grant President such powers, for it was utterly impossible for lawmakers or framers of a constitution, to envisage all future contingencies. Modern presidents have developed a number of policy instruments that can be invoked with reference to »Presidential prerogatives«, the most common being executive orders, proclamations, executive agreements, national security directives and others. When presidents issue an executive order or proclamation, they are not limited by any fixed requirements, but they do, however, alert the attention of Congress and public. If they want to avoid this, they can resort to national security directives, which are in most cases classified (Howell 2008, 16–19). They should be used only when related to national security issues, but as Cooper notes (Cooper in Howell 2003, 18), they can contain a much different content, sometimes also domestic issues the President wants to push through, by hiding them under the mantle of national security. Presidents use the »prerogative« unilateral instruments with high frequency and substantial ease and employ them for the advancement of their policy goals, in internal and foreign affairs. Howell (2008, 23) states that unilateral powers have always been available to presidents, but how often they have and will use them, depends on presidents' ability, skills and disposition on the one side, and the institutional environment in which the presidents operate on the other. It is therefore very important to understand and explain the institutional environment.

3.3 Content Analysis

The present research draws upon the content analysis, which Neuendorf (2002, 32–36) defines as the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics. It is applicable to many areas of research, from the analysis of naturally occurring language, to the analysis of news, political communication and many others. One of the milestones in the analysis of political communication was set by Lasswell, Leites and Associates in 1949, when they wrote *The Language of Politics*, in which they explored the power of propaganda and the quantitative methods appropriate for examining the content of political messages (Lasswell and others 1965). Harold Laswell is considered to be one of the most influential figures in the

development of the systematic study of messages, their content and effects, with a special focus on politically motivated communication. Among his greatest contributions is the development of content analysis as the quantitative technique.

When rhetorical documents, such as speeches, statements, interview responses are coded and analyzed, the researchers' attitude is often skeptical; the question, whether the found characteristics really pertain to the leader or they mainly reflect the ideas of speechwriters, cannot be overlooked. It has been demonstrated that American presidents are mostly, particularly in cases of important speeches, quite involved in the process of speech preparation. However, their involvement is of secondary importance; every speech delivered by the American president represents his policies and attitude, and this is how the public perceives presidential addresses. Thus one of the main assumptions of at-a-distance study is that the president's words represent a reasonable guide to his personality and are reliable enough to predict or interpret significant political behavior and outcomes.

Textual analysis within the social sciences has historically relied on content analysis, which enables quantitative analysis of large numbers of texts in terms of the used words and concepts. This approach, however, has its own limitations, such as time-consuming data preparation, difficulties in relating textual data to other data and lack of a strong theoretical basis (Carley 1993, 77). With the content analysis approach the researchers concentrate on isolated concepts, gathered from the coded text. The main danger is to neglect the meaning of concepts in context and overestimate the importance of concepts retrieved. Van Dijk (Van Dijk 1999, 17) believes that ideologies are typically expressed and reproduced in discourse and communication. In such a triangle of relations, both discourse and cognition are not merely linguistic or psychological objects, but also inherently social. Social cognition is acquired, used and changed in social situations, and discourse is one of the major sources of its development and change. No social actions or practices, and hence no group relations of power or dominance, are conceivable without social cognition and discourse (Van Dijk 1993, 107). Our behavior is guided by models, which represent beliefs (knowledge and opinion) people have about their everyday lives and they also define people's experiences. Models are personal and unique and they are controlled by biographical experiences of social actors and also by social cognitions we share with other members of our group. The combination of individual and social information provides the explanation of relations between micro and macro analysis of society. Models control how people act, speak or write or how they understand the social practices of others (Van Dijk 1999, 20).

On purely linguistic level, Van Dijk (Van Dijk 1999, 25) claims there exists a well known link between sentence complexity on the one hand, and education or social position of speakers, on the other hand. Elite speakers and institutions may restrict comprehensibility of their discourses in this way and, thereby, control access to public discourse, e.g., to political and media text and talk. Kalin Golob (2004, 703–11) emphasizes the importance of style-forming features, which influence on the selection of linguistic means and the final style of the text, such as the intellectual level, education, social environment, open-mindedness, personal disposition and social framework of reference of the author. Subjective style-forming factors are thus those in relation to individual author and influence on author's individual style.

Lexicon is another element of great importance for the analysis of discourse, and lexicalization represents a well known domain of persuasion and ideologically attributed value, as can be seen from the example of euphemism »freedom fighters« versus »terrorists.« When speaking or using language in any other way, we are usually confronted with a variety of words, that refer to the same issue, relation, person etc. Our selection depends on the genre of discourse, personal context (personal opinion, mood...), social context (social relations, level of formality, occasion...) and more. Also political ideas and ideologies are often expressed in differential or even polarized lexicalization of political actors. Context is of utmost importance, and the same word can be used with more completely opposite meanings, e.g. to fight war versus to end war, to endanger peace versus to establish peace. Also lexicon of military and political discourse may distinguish between the »peaceful« nature of arms or military operations and the »warring« or »militant« nature.

A recurrent element of nearly every political discourse is the pattern of ideological control of discourse, together with a positive self presentation of us and negative of the »others.« Strategic argumentation represents another efficient instrument for manipulation of the audience, and powerful arguers have been known to manipulate their audiences by making self-serving arguments more prominent, while other arguments may be left out and ignored (Van Dijk 1999, 29). Van Dijk (Van Dijk 1993, 203–205) also explored the relations between political discourse and political cognition. The relationships between the two are obvious and interesting. He says that political cognition largely deals with the mental representations people share as political actors, and our knowledge about politicians, parties or presidents is largely acquired through various texts and conversations during our socialization, formal education, media and conversation. It can therefore be said that political information

processing can be a form of discourse processing, in particular because a great part of political action is accomplished by discourse and communication (Fairclough 2003).

On the other hand, a study of political discourse is theoretically and empirically relevant only when discourse structures can be related to properties of political structures and processes. It has also been suggested that many genres of political discourse (parliamentary debates, laws, propaganda, slogans, international treaties, peace negotiations, etc.) are largely defined in contextual, rather than in textual terms. Political discourse is not primarily defined by topic or style, but rather by who speaks to whom, of what, on what occasion, and with what goals. In other words, political discourse is especially 'political' because of its functions in the political process (Van Dijk 1993, 225).

3.4 Research goals and steps

3.4.1 Research goals

Research goals of the present dissertation are:

- to develop a typology of most common justifications presidents have employed since 1948;
- to find out whether there exist patterns of rhetorical behavior of presidents when justifying American military interventions abroad;
- to establish the relationship between rhetorical patterns and attitudinal or institutional factors of various types;

Since the dissertation comprises two broad chapters of history, namely the Cold War and post Cold War period, it will be of great interest to see how much the Cold War actually constrained presidents and whether it imposed certain patterns of rhetorical behavior upon them. This will be probably reflected in legal authorizations for the use of armed forces abroad, such as the constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of armed forces and / or congressional approval for the deployment of armed forces in warfare.

3.4.2 Research steps

The present research is based on the sample of 43 addresses (19 SOU addresses and 24 post-military intervention addresses) delivered by 11 American presidents, spanning the period from 1948 to 2008. The addresses were read and their contents analyzed on the basis of previously created coding scheme. Thus obtained data were quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed, hypotheses were tested and results interpreted. The aim of the present dissertation is to identify the causal relationships between different variables or agents and outcomes.

The assumption is that words and phrases people most frequently use, actually reflect important concerns in their communication. Therefore the content analysis starts with word frequencies and the formulation of hypothesis. Quantitative content analysis originates in positivist research tradition and uses deductive approach; it aims to test hypotheses and not to develop them (Neuendorf 2002, 14). Drawing on the existing research, hypotheses, which guided the subsequent decisions regarding methodology (such as the nature of data required for hypotheses testing), were established.

The sample was developed on the basis of time framework of the research and types of addresses to be analyzed. The research opens with the first elected mandate of President Truman in 1948, and ends with the conclusion of the second term of President George H. W. Bush in 2008. The decision to start after the World War II derived from the need for a more homogeneous sample, additionally supported by the media development, which provided the presidents with similar conditions when addressing the public. As for the selection of addresses, only post military intervention addresses and SOU addresses (only the part of SOU addresses related to foreign policy issues) were included. It was important to establish the sample of addresses of comparable length and content, to be able to proceed with the coding. Coding scheme had to be established in advance, prior to the beginning of coding, and it established the categories relevant for hypothesis testing. Some of the categories were subsequently merged to better show the relationships among measures.

The next step was to summarize the findings, and to identify and express the patterns and relationships discovered.

The analysis drew upon different statistical approaches, thus taking into consideration both, the addressed questions or hypotheses, and the nature of the data. It comprised cross tabulation with T-test of independent samples, comparison of means and descriptive tabulation.

The last steps were the testing of hypotheses and the interpretation of results.

3.5 Definition of variables and hypotheses

Variables can be defined as aspects of theory that can change and are therefore part of the interaction within the theory. They can influence the results of a research and they are needed in order to find the unknown qualities or patterns of interest to the research.

Independent variable cannot be changed or altered during the study, and in the present dissertation it is represented by the USA military interventions abroad (from 1948–2008).

Dependent variables are affected by the independent variable. The research is focused on two dependent variables, namely:

- a) Legal basis for the intervention (House or Senate Joint Resolution, Public Law, War Powers Resolution).
- b) Justifications for the intervention (human rights, war, peace, America's interests, America's values, America's responsibility, diplomacy, experience, international alliance, democracy).

Intervening or explanatory variables can alter research results; they are more difficult to control, but they often explain the behavior of dependent variables better than the independent variable does. Intervening variables were divided into »internal or attitudinal«, namely those that are internal to the research subject, and »external or institutional«, which are subdivided into domestic variables and international institutional variables.

Internal-attitudinal variables: cognitive style-integrative complexity, experience.

External-Institutional variables:

- a) Domestic: party alignments in Congress, partisan alliances and regimes, political time and
- b) International: the Cold War / post Cold War alliances and institutional relationships. (Officially the Cold War period did not end until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the first milestone and substantial détente actually happened towards the end of the presidency of Ronald Reagan. His SOU address of 1984 clearly represents it and will be thus used as the point of reference.)

3.5.1 Hypotheses and relations between variables

Once the research question has been formulated, testable hypotheses needed to be defined. Research question is usually not directly measurable by the study, and needs to be broken down into smaller units or hypotheses, which express probable relationship between variables. There are different types of hypotheses, however, the present research is based on directional hypotheses, which are always phrased as a statement and express the effects of an independent or dependent variable. Hypotheses are as specific as possible and include the conditions that reveal the researched behavior (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3: Relations between variables

Hypothesis	Independent variables	Dependent variables	Intervening variables
International institutional factors determine justifications for military interventions abroad.	USA military interventions abroad	Justifications	Institutional / international
Domestic institutional factors determine legal basis for military interventions abroad.	USA military interventions abroad	Legal basis	Institutional / domestic
Attitudinal factors determine justifications for military interventions abroad.	USA military interventions abroad	Justifications	Attitudinal factors

Source: Author's analysis.

3.6 Research methods

Content analysis will be the main method for data analysis. This is a research tool used to identify certain words or concepts in a text, speech, or any other kind of communicative language. The results (the found words, meanings or relationships of words and concepts) are expressed as frequency, they are quantified, analyzed, and subsequently inferences are drawn from the results of analyzed speech or text. To analyze it, a text must be coded and broken down into manageable categories on the level that was decided, be it a word, word sense, phrase, sentence or other, and then examined with the help of conceptual or relational analysis. Conceptual analysis aims to establish the frequency of concepts in a text, where frequency reports how many times a certain word or concept has appeared in the analyzed text, whereas relational analysis aims to go beyond the mere presence, by exploring relationships among concepts in a text (Neuendorf 2002).

Descriptive and explanatory qualitative methods will be used to study and analyse the selected American presidents and cases of American military interventions, which occurred during individual President's term of office. By describing in brief each of the selected presidents, the dissertation will expose the variables that will be later included in hypothesis testing, namely their cognitive style, background, party affiliation. Secondly, the selected military interventions will be presented with their background, reasons for intervention and the rhetoric employed by presidents when justifying the mission will be analyzed. A pattern of

rhetorical behavior across presidents will be probed for, taking into account the different types of addresses, justifications and legal authorizations presidents referred to.

Comparative method will be applied at the end in order to compare the analyzed public addresses delivered by different presidents at different times.

Quantitative part of empirical research will consist of cross-presidential analysis of presidential rhetoric; it will also provide a comparison of justifications and authorizations employed by individual presidents during and after the Cold War, and explain the identified patterns.

4 Institutional context

4.1 Separation of powers

Many theories have tried to explain the relationship between decision making institutions in the USA. The modern perception of the theory on the separation of powers is somewhat different from the one conceived by its spiritual father, Montesquieu (Montesquieu in Cohler et al. 1989). The American system of checks and balances was created to prevent the concentration of power in one branch and at the same time provide for reciprocity of control among the branches of authority. When the President acts independently, he faces real and theoretical chances of being stopped or overturned by the Congress and/or by the courts. So, need he fear judicial interference, when deciding to issue or not to issue an executive order, agreement, proclamation? This is only one of the questions that Howell (2008, 136) poses to himself and the reader, when discussing the institutional foundations of judicial deference. Judicial constraints on executive can be explained with three different scholarly methods; legal pragmatism, which examines when judges withdraw from conflict to protect the legitimacy and integrity of their institution (Bickel in Howell 2008, 137); the new institutionalism, which exposes exogenous and endogenous institutional constraints (Clayton and Gillman in Howell 2008, 137); and assessment of institutional capacity of the courts to resolve different kinds of civil and political disputes and act as agents of social change (Rosenberg in Howell 2008, 137).

There has been a long history of scholarly disputes regarding the distribution of powers within the executive. American Constitution and the Founding Fathers created the system that should provide for some balance and concerted action. »No group has ever thought more deeply about how a free people ought to be governed than the men who wrote the Constitution of the United States« (Adler 1996). The war power is a shared power in the American system of separated powers, and there are different views over how much control the Constitution gives to either the President or the Congress. According to the Constitution, the Congress gets the power to declare war, and the President is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, which implies there should be concerted action of both to make war. According to Anderson (1988, 209–10), there are two tendencies of interpreting presidential legitimacy, namely the doctrine of constitutional prerogatives on the one side and the presidential power to persuade, on the other. Yoo presents the extreme »presidentialist« perspective (Yoo 2002), and Fisher the »congressionalist« perspective (Fisher 2004). Presidents have established their right to rule or to exercise extraordinary power also through

their rhetoric and thus obtain the needed legitimacy for their actions. By the assertion of power and the control of language, the President thus becomes the creator of his own lawfulness. This can be seen particularly in the interpretation and application of war powers. Powers of the President today, as in the past, have largely derived from the Constitution, but times have changed and so has the relationship between the branches (Adler and George 1996, 196).

»Framers' debate on the war power« (Fisher 2004, 283) from 1787 revolted against the vesting of war power in the Legislature, since this would imply slow reactions due to the Legislature's rare, once-a-year meetings. Another objection regarded the problem of a too extended participation of congressmen (all members of the House of Representatives) in deliberations, and favored the participation of a more restricted and expert Senate in the area of foreign affairs. A change of words was proposed, and »declare« replaced the former »make« war, preserving for the executive the right to repel sudden attacks. Another legal document dealing with the issue of war power is the Constitutional Allocation of Foreign Affairs and the War Power (in Fisher 2004, 283), which assigns, among others, the following powers to the Legislative:

- power to provide for the common defense;
- to declare war, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
- to raise and support armies;
- to provide and maintain a navy;
- to make rules and regulations on the land and naval forces;
- to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions;
- to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States and,
- power of the purse (»No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law«).

The Executive is assigned, among others, the following:

- the executive power shall be vested in the President and,
- the President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.

The Constitution therefore reserves an important role in the warfare for the Congress and-in theory-provides for a balance in the distribution of war powers. As history teaches us, reality has often been quite different and a balanced decision making in relation to war, has been more an exception than a rule.

UN Participation Act of 1945 (in Fisher 2004, 283) serves as legal basis for the American participation in actions under the aegis of the UN. Section 6 authorizes the President to negotiate special agreements with the Security Council, which »shall be subjected to congressional approval by appropriate Act or Joint Resolution«, specifying, among others, the nature of facilities and assistance, the numbers of armed forces, the degree of readiness and more. It also exempts the President from asking the Congress for authorization to make available to the Security Council on its call the armed forces, facilities or assistance, in compliance with article 42, Chapter VII, of the Charter of the UN. Article 42 specifies that in the case of unsuccessful resolution of a conflict with peaceful means, e.g. economic and other forms of sanctions, the Security Council may take any kind of action, including the use of force by the UN members, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Different amendments to the Participation Act were adopted in 1949. Section 7 was inserted after section 6, specifying peaceful settlement of disputes and activities aimed at it. Probably one of the most contested legal documents dealing with war powers is the War Powers Resolution from 1973 (in Fisher 2004, 290), a joint resolution of both houses of the Congress. The main purpose of the Resolution was to »fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both, the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations« (Fisher 2004, 290).

Generally speaking, joint resolutions are often used to deal with a specific issue or event of great importance. Between 1955 and 1991 there were several joint resolutions adopted by the Congress to authorize or approve the use of armed forces (Taiwan, Middle East, two Tonkin Gulf Resolutions and the Persian Gulf Resolution), as requested by the President. Some of them were used to justify - at least in part - American participation in a full-scale war.

The definition of concurrent resolution as provided by the Senate is: »A legislative measure, designated »S. Con. Res.« and numbered consecutively upon introduction, generally employed to address the sentiments of both chambers, to deal with issues or matters affecting

both houses, such as a concurrent budget resolution, or to create a temporary joint committee. Concurrent resolutions are not submitted to the President and thus do not have the force of law« (United States Senate 2009).

Whereas joint resolution is defined as: »A legislative measure, designated »S. J. Res.« and numbered consecutively upon introduction, which requires the approval of both chambers and, with one exception, is submitted (just as a bill) to the President for possible signature into law. The one exception is that joint resolutions (and not bills) are used to propose constitutional amendments. These resolutions require a two-thirds affirmative vote in each house but are not submitted to the President; they become effective when ratified by three-quarters of the States« (United States Senate 2009).

In the history of United States there were very few cases when American presidents actually waited for the Congress to declare war and then started warfare (Crabb and Holt 1989, 51), one of the reasons being other forms of »functional declarations« provided by the Congress. Formal declarations of war were actually provided by the Congress only in the case of World War I and World War II, other functional forms-such as joint resolutions of both houses of the Congress have mostly acted in the function of war declaration. Eleven times in its history the USA has formally declared war against foreign nations, and these eleven war declarations referred to five separate wars: the war with Great Britain declared in 1812, the war with Mexico declared in 1846, the war with Spain declared in 1898, the First World War, during which the USA declared war with Germany and with Austria-Hungary during 1917, World War II, during which the USA declared war against Japan, Germany and Italy in 1941, and against Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania in 1942. Some of the instances were extended military engagements that might be considered undeclared wars. These include the Undeclared Naval War with France from 1798 to 1800; the First Barbary War from 1801 to 1805; the Second Barbary War of 1815; the Korean War of 1950–1953; the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1973; the Persian Gulf War of 1991, global actions against terrorists after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, and the War with Iraq in 2003 (Grimmet 2008, 2).

Apart from the Korean War, all other conflicts received some form of congressional authorization, but not exactly a formal declaration of war. There were also other cases involving the deployment of American Armed Forces as part of multinational operations under the aegis of NATO or the UN. The instances involving the use of US Armed Forces abroad are very different in their scope, legal authorization, significance and duration. They

vary from a few sailors or Marines (Reagan-Grenada), landed to protect American lives, to hundred thousands in Korea and Vietnam, and millions in World War II.

It is of particular interest for the present dissertation that presidents sometimes acted without authorization, in some situations they referred to presidential prerogatives as Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, in some cases the Congress provided some form of authorization, and some were formally declared as wars. Since 1973, when the War Powers Resolution was adopted, presidents have usually informed the Congress of a military operation pursuant to War Powers Resolution. Fisher claims (2004, 154) that presidents acted unilaterally mostly when force was applied in short-term operations in relatively isolated areas of the world, which presented limited or low danger of conflict spreading. For military operations in regions posing extreme danger of involving other nations, such as the Middle East, they sought congressional approval in advance, without fully admitting they needed it.

The Korean and Vietnam experience of US military involvement abroad, which were never actually declared as wars, taught Americans to be careful when presidents act in a very unrestricted manner; this was the main reason behind the adoption of the War Powers Resolution. Its purpose was to put a curb on presidential deployment of armed forces in military involvement or in situations where hostilities were very likely to occur without the authorization by the Congress. Since its adoption in 1973, when the Congress reacted to Nixon's ordering of US troops to Cambodia in 1970, the War Powers Resolution has been widely contested by most presidents, for it aimed to give more clout to the Congress in the matters of the war. According to War Powers Resolution the President as Commander-in-Chief is only allowed to introduce armed forces into hostilities following the declaration of war by the Congress, upon specific statutory authorization or when there is a situation of national emergency following an attack upon the USA, its territories, possessions or armed forces. In cases without the declaration of war, the President should report to the Congress within 48 hours from the time of deployment of armed forces. According to the resolution, the President can only engage armed forces for a maximum time of 60 days, if the Congress fails to declare war-this term can only be extended for additional 30 days if officially requested by the President for safe withdrawal of armed forces (War Powers Resolution, US Congress 1973). Nixon vetoed the resolution in October 1973, calling it unconstitutional and an infringement on constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief (Crabb and Holt 1989, 143), but the veto was overridden by both houses and the resolution adopted. Unfortunately the Resolution did not succeed in notably overturning the balance of power to the advantage of the Congress. One of the main reasons was probably the lack of sanctions

provided by the resolution for the presidents who failed to comply with its rules. The only possible sanction was provided by the Constitution, namely the impeachment process, which has not been used more than four times in the history of the USA. John Tyler was the first President against whom bills of impeachment were drawn. Andrew Johnson was impeached, but later acquitted in the Senate and remained in office; Richard Nixon was close to impeachment over the Watergate scandal, but resigned; Bill Clinton was impeached by the Congress, acquitted by the Senate and remained in office (Skowronek 1997, 44; The history place 2009).

The main power of the Congress is thus connected to its right to authorize appropriations; by refusing to financially fund an operation, the Congress can seriously curb the President's powers. Strangely enough, Crabb and Holt claim that »the Congress has been reluctant to use its power of the purse in these matters« (1989, 154). Since late 1960s the Congress has changed its approach to foreign policy issues, and has become quite eager to leave the management of foreign relations to the President, thus providing the needed impetus for the appearance of »imperial presidency« (Crabb and Holt 1989, 59), by usually supporting the policies put forward by the White House. Crabb also claims that the involvement of Congress in diplomatic issues prior to the World War II was minimal, and America was neither interested in, nor willing to dedicate its resources to goals outside its borders. However, when America emerged as a superpower after the World War II, the interest for the adoption of foreign policy started to develop and the isolationist era came to its final destination. The symbolic death of it was represented by President Truman's address to Congress on March 12, 1947, where he presented the policy of containment against expansive Communism, by proposing aid to Greece and Turkey, which would help them resist the Soviet pressure.

The end of imperial presidency and nearly unrestricted role of the President in foreign policy was closely connected with traumatic American involvement in the Vietnam War. The idea of increasing congressional participation in foreign policy issues was based on the belief that this kind of congressional activism could contribute to a more secure and peaceful world and a more constructive role reserved for the USA.

Crabb and Holt (1989, 127) claim that following the World War II, the Congress has clearly paid much less attention to constitutional factors than it has to pragmatic considerations. Major involvements of American armed forces post World War II happened in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq. A special case was represented by Europe, since the USA in 1949 joined 11 other

Western states to establish the NATO, in order to continue with the strategy of Communist containment and on September 9, 1950, President Truman approved a substantial increase of US forces in Europe. Nevertheless, presidents usually did inform the Congress about the deployment of armed forces abroad; Nixon's invasion of Cambodia was one of the few exceptions, which provoked the Congress to the point of adopting the War Powers Resolution. Unfortunately, it failed to achieve its main objective, namely to oblige the presidents to consult the Congress prior to the deployment of armed forces abroad.

Foreign policy is shared by two branches; executive, vested in the President and legislative, vested in the Congress, which can use its power of the purse to control executive activities. On occasions when questions of foreign policy are litigated, the courts treat foreign policy as shared by the Congress and the President. In a decision in 1986, the Supreme Court said it was aware of the »interplay« between statutory provisions and the conduct of foreign relations, and recognized the premier role played by the Executive and the Congress in this field. Statements in some decisions, taken out of context, imply that the President has an especially broad power to invoke executive privilege in the area of foreign affairs and national security. Because the Constitution divides foreign policy between Congress and the President, the two coequal branches must find ways to cooperate and fashion accommodations that meet their mutual needs (Fisher 1988, 151–155).

After the Vietnam war, characterized by the concentration of power in the presidency, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed: »The decade-long struggle in this country over executive dominance in foreign affairs is over. The recognition that the Congress is a coequal branch of government is the dominant fact of national politics today. The executive accepts that the Congress must have both the sense and the reality of participation: foreign policy must be a shared enterprise« (Kissinger in Fisher 1988, 156).

The constitutional authority of Congress to shape foreign policy relies heavily on its power to appropriate funds. In *Federalist*, number 58, James Madison said that the power of the purse represents the »most and effectual weapon with which any can arm the immediate representatives the people, for obtaining a redress of grievance, and for carrying into effect just and salutary measure.« The Constitution places the power of the purse exclusively in the hands of Congress: »No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law« (Madison 1788).

It has often been argued that congressional power of the purse does not represent an insurmountable obstacle, since the executive can find other financial resources, namely private donations and similar. This idea, however, counters directly what the founding fathers

intended and carefully rejected, namely to place in the same branch the power to make and to fund war. Already James Madison warned of the dangers of placing the power to fund in the same hands as the power to go to war. »The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793–1794« matched Hamilton and Madison in the first chapter of an enduring discussion about the proper roles of the executive and legislative branches in the conduct of American foreign policy. Ignited by President Washington's »Neutrality Proclamation of 1793«, the debate addressed whether Washington had the authority to declare America neutral, despite an early alliance treaty with France. Hamilton argued that Washington's actions were constitutional and that friction between the two branches was an unavoidable, but not harmful, consequence of the separation of powers. Madison countered that Washington's proclamation would introduce »new principles and new constructions« into the Constitution. Madison said: »Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws« (Hamilton and Madison 1973). The Constitution exists solely as a »protection against usurpation of sovereign power by those in authority, from who they represent.« Without such protection, »tyranny is the inevitable outcome;« i.e. the very fears of the framers would come true (Redish and Cisar 1991).

To preserve the system of checks and balances and to avoid concentration of power in one branch and to avoid dependence on capital from sources not envisaged by the Constitution, foreign policy must be carried out with funds appropriated by Congress. Allowing foreign policy to be conducted with funds supplied by private parties and foreign governments would open the door to widespread corruption, compromise, and loss of public accountability and transparency. This type of outside financing would fundamentally subvert the Constitution and undermine the powers of Congress as a coequal branch.

The definition of war (and/or peace) is not simple, and there is a whole universe of concepts between the state of peace and the state of war, including small wars or the so-called low-intensity conflicts.

Historically, US military forces have often been deployed around the world under circumstances that could be classified as low-intensity conflict, and the President has often employed military forces for missions that could not be clearly labelled as war; under such circumstances, military forces have been deployed due to some intrinsic or unique capability, availability, or convenience in order to further the US foreign policy. However, it is important

to know that the President nearly always acts upon his constitutional prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief and interprets the situation as such that does not require congressional authorization (Yoo 2002).

The question of Constitutional interpretation of war powers is a highly disputed topic, where outstanding political scientists cannot come to terms. Article II of the Constitution provides the basis and framework for presidential power, and vests the President with the power of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Yoo C. John, Professor of Law at Yale and a leading proponent of pro-executive theory of war powers, advocates a flexible interpretation of Constitutional text, disagreeing openly with the classical and, according to Yoo, »rigid« pro-Congress theory. He argued that the Constitution created a flexible system of war powers, granting substantial initiative to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and provided the Congress with the authority to check the executive through its power of the purse. He emphasizes the constitutional text, which only grants Congress »the power to declare war« and not the power to »authorize hostilities« (Yoo 2002, 1641), which should not be equalized. Yoo opposes the belief that many of the military conflicts involving the USA forces of the last half-century have violated the Constitution, because they lacked a declaration of war or its functional equivalent (Yoo 2002, 1643). However, the theory that supports President's extraordinary powers in the pursuit of public interest was presented already by John Locke in his »Two Treaties of Government« (Locke in O'Brien 2003, 224), where he wrote that sovereign could act in the interest of public good without or even against the prescription of law.

Corwin (in O'Brien 2003, 224) provided the example of President Jefferson, who had purchased the Louisiana Territory in 1803, and President Lincoln at the outset of the Civil War, who had called up state militias, spent unappropriated funds and blockaded Southern parts all without authorization. To borrow the words of Anderson: »Lincoln's interpretation of the war power was bold and imaginative, even brilliant. By combining the powers with his prescribed oath to defend the Constitution, Lincoln claimed authorization to take almost any action necessary to defend the Union« (Anderson 1988, 202). Similarly, President Truman claimed extensive powers during the World War II, and also during the Korean War, when he seized the steel mills, and President Nixon tried to suppress the publication of the »Pentagon Papers« in 1971, to hide the truth about the US involvement in the Vietnam War. In all the described cases, presidents considered their actions of vital importance for the security or even existence of the State.

Inherent presidential powers have been a very controversial issue for a long time. Theodore Roosevelt took the position that inherent power implied doing all that was in the public interest that was not in conflict with the legislation and was not explicitly forbidden (O'Brien 2003, 225). As opposed to this kind of understanding, the President (and later Chief Justice) William Howard Taft believed that inherent powers were limited and had to be traceable to specific grants of power in the Constitution or legislation. Another important difference is usually based on the relation to domestic and/or foreign affairs. The presidential dominance is much clearer in the area of foreign affairs, and as Aaron Wildavsky noted (Wildavsky 1969, 7), presidents were more successful in the control of nation's defense and foreign policies than domestic policies.

Federalist Papers No. 23 and No. 41 present Hamilton's and Madison's position on the role of the President during emergencies and national strife (O'Brien 2003, 225). Hamilton believed that when related to the national defense, powers of the President should be unlimited, »because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed« (Hamilton in O'Brien 2003, 224).

In his argumentation in favor of pro-executive war powers theory, Yoo (2002, 1650) goes back to the writers whom the Framers consulted most when writing the Constitution, and states Montesquieu, Blackstone and Locke as the most respected authorities on the separation of powers and the most cited non-religious thinkers in the political writings of the framing period. He also states that all three indisputably sustained the executive's full powers over the beginning and conduct of war, whereas the legislature's power controlled the funding. Blackstone in particular stated that declarations of war only served to notify the citizens of warring nations that the sovereign had legally sanctioned the hostilities. Yoo concludes by saying that the Constitution does not mandate a specific, legalistic process for waging war, but instead vests the executive and the legislative with different war-related powers, which the President and Congress may use to cooperate or to compete. Yoo finds additional support for his flexible theory of war powers interpretation in the logic of analogy. He says that the Framers could have applied a much stricter and clearer wording and detailed mechanisms, had they felt the need to impose strict war making rules. He continues by revealing the practical implications of such legalistic system that requires congressional authorization of all hostilities. Due to the secret nature and time pressure under which the President usually operates, most wars would be unconstitutional according to pro-congressional interpretation

of the Constitution (Hendrickson 2002). On the basis of such interpretation conflicts ranging from the Korean War in 1950 to the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 all violated the Constitution, since they lacked congressional authorization for the hostilities.

However, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides Congress with the power »to declare war«, thus defining the war-making power as a shared power (O'Brien 2003, 257). The President controls all military operations, but the Congress is empowered »to raise and support Armies«, as well as to »provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions« (O'Brien 2003, 258). Eventhough the Congress has the power to declare war, only few wars have actually been declared, thus building a case in support of presidential dominance in the matter of ordering military forces into foreign countries. O'Brien claims that every 20th century President since Theodore Roosevelt to Bill Clinton has sent American soldiers on missions abroad, without prior having consulted or sometimes even notified, the Congress (O'Brien 2003, 258). Judging from history, the power to restrain President's war-waging authority rests almost entirely with the Congress, and Courts have rarely been seen to question the President's military decisions. A well known example cited by O'Brien dates back to 1863, when President Lincoln ordered a blockade of Confederate ports, despite the fact that only the Congress possessed the authority to call up the militia to suppress insurrections. Only a small majority of the Court upheld the President's decision (O'Brien 2003, 259).

Also the controversies related to the undeclared war in Vietnam were evaded by the Court, despite the challenge this posed to constitutionality of the war. Presidents from Eisenhower to Nixon relied upon their powers as Commanders in chief of the military, and justified their escalation of the war with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, a joined resolution passed by the Congress, following an alleged attack on US ships in the Gulf. Both presidents claimed the Resolution equaled a declaration of war. With the escalation of the conflict, the support by the Congress increasingly diminished, but the curb on funds through legislation proved insufficient, and the struggle resulted in the adoption of War Powers Resolution in 1973.

O'Brien also cites the justification provided by the State Department for President Johnson's War related activities in Vietnam, quoting that:

There can be no question/.../of the President's authority to commit US forces to the defense of South Vietnam/.../. Under the Constitution, the President, in addition to being Chief Executive, is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. He holds the prime responsibility for the conduct of the US foreign relations. These duties carry very broad powers, including

the power to deploy American forces abroad and commit them to military operations when the President deems such action necessary to maintain the security and defense of the United States (Meeker in O'Brien 2003, 260).

Today the need for quick and decisive military action has increased further more. On the basis of congressional behavior in the past, which revealed a clear preference of the Congress to allow the President to lead, by refusing even to apply the power of the purse, it can be presumed that this practice is not likely to change in the future either.

4.2 Polarization of American Politics

In 1984 Rosenthal and Poole published the article »The Polarization of American Politics« in which they claimed that American politics had become much more polarized in the mid 1970s, with Democrats consistently supporting liberal positions and Republicans wholly conservative ones (Poole and Rosenthal 1984). Schattsneider (in Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 87) stated that the American political history seemed to have been written almost completely on the conflict between and within the political parties, acting as a mirror of social and economic conflicts that had divided the country. When they failed to accomplish this task they fell apart and were replaced by new ones. Poole and Rosenthal (1984, 67–69) claim that large sways in history of party polarization have not happened very often, since parties have always seemed to be quite stable in their polarization. If parties want to make policy, they need to win office, which implies, they have to be reasonably balanced; other options are that they need to satisfy their ideology and voters by providing polarized, rather than convergent positions, and that they need to account for the inherent polarization of American political system, based on the separation of powers. A notable policy swing in the liberal direction was induced by the Great Depression (1930s); swings were quite substantial also throughout the World War II, when the Reconstruction had been over and the Democratic Party was experiencing its revival. However, after the World War II the Democratic Party split into northern and southern wing, and the policy swings consequently became less pronounced. The Republican Party control of 80th (1947–48) and 83rd (1953–54) Congress brought some changeability to the politics. Poole and Rosenthal claim that policies between 1954 and 1980 were, generally speaking, quite liberal, and in particular so during the period of Great Society (at the time of Johnson's presidency) and during the Nixon presidency. Poole and Rosenthal (1984) also discovered that policies became less liberal, when Democratic congressional majority was facing a weak President (e.g. Johnson in his last two years, Carter) or a strong Republican (Nixon in his first term or Reagan in his first two years). However, they found out that

chambers were not very responsive to external environment and failed to respond to partisan identity of the President. Poole and Rosenthal believe that homogeneity of parties implies a greater polarization, and consequently also policy swings are more likely to happen. They also discovered another interesting fact, related to the ideological beliefs and positions of congressmen and senators, who tend to keep their positions from the beginning to the end of their mandate and vote accordingly to their liberal / conservative stance (Pool and Rossenthal 1984, 74), the only difference being that exiting members tend to vote less frequently than they did at the beginning of their mandate.

One of the measures of internal party split is the overlap, which shows the proportion of major party legislators, who are closer to the opposing party than their own. This overlap was practically inexistent during the period of complete party polarization, since the Civil war up to 1920s, but started to appear in the Senate in the 1920s, due to a group of Midwestern Republicans, who voted with the Democrats. There was a substantial overlap also in the 1960s, linked to the issue of civil rights for African-Americans, with some moderate Republicans closer to the Democratic Party mean and Southern Democrats closer to the Republican Party mean. After 1979 this overlap decreased again, as liberal Republicans became rare and Democrats more homogeneous. Big changes in party behavior are linked to important events in the history, such as the conflicts over slavery, civil rights, Great Depression. The New Deal coalition is a good example, which brought together Democrats of very different background, uniting white southern segregationists, northern African Americans, progressive intellectuals, union members, the poorest families. All they had in common was the desire to vote for the Democrats, and they did it for various reasons (Kernell et al. 2009, 584–584). On the other side was the Republican coalition united in the opposition to the New Deal, which became the focus of national politics and alignment basis; the Republicans were only able to regain control of the White House in 1952, when they stopped opposing it. On the other side, the Democrats were facing internal problems; they were split by the civil rights issue that did not work for their southern members, and by the Vietnam War. Most of Southern Democrats and blue-collar constituents supported the War, whereas liberal intellectuals strongly opposed it. Democrats were also divided over new economic initiatives, environmental issues and more (Kernell et al. 2009, 585). It has been seen that partisan identities become weaker when issues arise that split party coalitions, and when party line voting declines, ticket splitting increases (Kernell et al. 2009, 593). Party line voting in presidential elections declined between 1950s and 1970s, and the same was true for the House

and the Senate elections during this period, with ticket splitting increasing drastically over the same period (Kernell et al. 2009, 593).

There are many types of political conflicts, but the conflicts produced by the interplay of congressional-presidential relations are the most visible (Shull 2000, 65). It has often been stated that partisan disagreement, and in particular divided government, produce gridlock in policy making (Sundquist in Shull 2000, 65). David Mayhew (1990) and Barbara Hickley (1994) believe that relations between the Congress and the President are more cooperative than conflictual, even during the periods of split control and divided government. As Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997, 552) have proven, split control contributes to a more difficult legislation, since more legislation fails under divided government. Hickley (in Shull 2000, 66) believes this is connected with the issues on the agenda and claims that more cooperation is possible when discussing military interventions than foreign aid, whereas LeLoup and Shull (1999) found both, cooperation and deadlock possible in all policy areas under their examination. However, it is wrong to presume that presidents had the same leverage over Congress and were able to equally direct lawmaking during their periods of unified government (Edwards 1989). Vote controversy is a very important issue, when studying congressional-presidential relations and usually implies the shifting coalitions of legislators. Bond and Fleisher (in Shull 2000, 66) identified three types of votes: partisan, bipartisan and cross-partisan. A lot of scholarly attention was placed on political party and geographic regional split relations and internal or cross-party coalitional alignments (Northern Democrats against Southern Democrats), or there can also be the so called conservative coalition. The latter can be defined as a voting block in the House and Senate consisting of a majority of Republicans and a majority of Southern Democrats, combined against a minority of Northern Democrats (Shull 2000, 150). Judging from the data published in Congressional Quarterly report (in Shull 2000, 80) the coalition reached its highest percentage of victories ever in 1995 with 98,2 percent (Shull 2000, 67). However, divided partisan control of government has become common, and control of the White House and the Congress is usually divided between the parties. This seems to work for the moderate voters, since it is easier for parties to block the other party's more extreme positions and it forces parties into compromise. In fact, ticket splitting has returned to its levels of 1960s and party affiliation still remains the best predictor of how people will vote (Kernell et al. 2009, 595–597).

5 Historical overview of American foreign policy

The main topic of the present dissertation are American military interventions abroad, thus it is important to first understand a broader context of American foreign policy, its challenges, changes, actors and trends since World War II, to be then able to understand the reasons and justifications for the interventions. The aim of this chapter is therefore to present a short overview of American foreign policy since World War II, together with a brief description of main military interventions from the studied period, which are subsequently going to be analyzed in detail in chapter 6.

Nations, just like individuals, perceive the world from their point of reference, which is related to geography, their historical background, experiences and so forth. Also the nations' foreign policy and the many different styles of foreign policy conduct reflect their general worldviews and can thus vary substantially. However, what states have in common is that they react to their environment of coexistence, the state system that surrounds them, and try to learn »the rules of the game« (Spanier 1992, 1) to ensure their survival and to achieve a measure of security. For most of its existence the USA has isolated itself from the European system and developed more on the basis of its domestic experiences. This was also noticed in the American approach to foreign policy, significantly different from that of other great powers, such as the Soviet Union, which played the role of America's antagonist for a long time after the World War II. State systems need a balance of power in order not to break down, and a balance of equilibrium makes victory in a war less probable and more costly. What is also important is the interdependence; the more interdependent the states are, less likely they are to go to war against each other, for they have too much to lose. A balance is understood as the »distribution of power most likely to deter an attack« (Spanier 1992, 2). By contrast, possession of disproportionate power might tempt a state to undertake aggression by making it far less costly to gain a predominant position and impose its will upon other states. This means that fundamental assumption underlying the state system is that members should not be trusted with unrestricted power, since they will be tempted to abuse it, and the best antidote to power on the one side, is power on the other side, as reflected in bipolar distribution of power that marked the Cold War. The USA after World War II faced the world with attitudes and behavior patterns formed by its long period of isolationism from Europe and had to confront the Soviet Union, a state with long experience in power politics (Spanier 1992, 16). During the war and immediately after, the USA and the Soviet Union managed to develop friendly relations that were strengthened by the fear of what their potential clash might have caused in the wake of Germany's defeat. Roosevelt seemed unaware of

incompatibility of the American style of democracy with the totalitarian Communist rule in the Soviet Union. The defeat of Germany created a power vacuum and with expansionistic policy of Stalin, United States soon realized that the »friendly« Soviet Union was about to take over Eastern Europe. After World War II, the world really became a different place. In the dawn of the nuclear age and Cold War, the need for strong presidential leadership in foreign affairs became very obvious (DeConde 2000). According to the presidential scholar Aaron Wildavsky (in LeLoup and Shull 1999, 117), there were two presidencies in the USA, one for foreign policy and one for domestic policy. This assertion shows that policymaking was very different with respect to institutional and political environment, which resulted in substantial imbalances-on the one hand, too much unrestricted power vested in the President when conducting foreign policy, too many obstacles and not enough power for the President in internal, domestic affairs on the other.

The Vietnam War undoubtedly led to the reassessment of presidential prerogatives, since the price for American involvement, which was decided upon more or less unilaterally, by the then President Johnson, resulted much higher and the duration much longer than expected.

The Congress felt it needed more say and above all a chance to curb the presidential power when deciding about foreign policy, in particular about military engagement of American troops abroad. Constitution defines and distributes »war powers« in an ambiguous manner, thus allowing for constant struggle between the President and the Congress over foreign policy control. The Congress plays a significant role in assigning defense appropriations and deciding upon other military issues, which can greatly limit the President's power.

The basis of American foreign policy used to be the policy of non-involvement and nearly isolationism. This changed when Japan bombed Pear Harbor, on December 7th 1941 and after the World War II, isolationism no longer seemed possible or desirable for American foreign policy (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 118). The alliance between the USA and Russia, which existed mainly to defeat Japan, collapsed after the World War II and tensions between the Communist regime and America grew increasingly strong. The Cold War polarized the world in two blocks, which persisted for nearly 50 years.

The USA played an important role in the reconstruction of postwar Europe, for it feared that a subjugated Europe could be an easy pray of Communist Russia. In order for America to feel secure, Europe needed to be strong and stable. Along with the Marshall plan, devised by Truman's State Secretary George Marshall, America adopted the policy of

containment of Russian expansive tendencies. America entered into its first military alliance with the nations of Western Europe, which was countered by Russia and Eastern European countries' formation of the Warsaw Pact.

When the Communist North invaded South Korea, America felt it had to prove its anti-Communist stance and defend South Korea under the banner of the UN. Initial success was followed by a bloody stalemate.

US foreign policy was reflected also in domestic situation; the 50s were characterized by anti-Communist atmosphere, and the victory of Fidel Castro in 1959, who installed a Communist regime in Cuba after the revolution, made Americans even more worried. USA and Russia continued to build their nuclear arsenal and besides the policy of containment, which marked the American foreign policy, the doctrine of deterrence represented the cornerstone of American Defense Strategy (ADS). This doctrine was also known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and implied that both sides would refrain from the use of nuclear weapons since their application would cause unacceptable damage to both. During this period, most decision making fell on the President, who was also held accountable later on. President Johnson, who took American soldiers to Vietnam, was forced to withdraw from presidential race in 1968, because of great public opposition to American military involvement in Vietnam (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 119).

Nixon's foreign policy was based on the unhappy experience of Vietnam War, which he realized was a tactical mistake that cost Americans too much-in terms of money and in particular in terms of human lives. He stressed the importance of indirect military assistance to friendly governments instead of direct military involvement, which became known as the Nixon doctrine. Nixon also pursued the policy of détente with the Soviet Union and China, which greatly improved relations between the countries. Despite all this, the bipartisanship and cooperation between the President and the Congress, which characterized the making of foreign policy in the post war period and continued into late 1960s, witnessed a sharp decline (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 122).

Under the presidency of Jimmy Carter, foreign policy changed even further. Carter believed in greater international cooperation, arms reduction, peace and the protection of human rights, and left an important imprint by succeeding in Camp David agreements and Panama Canal Treaties, which paved the way for peace in the Middle East. In view of the Soviet nuclear arms buildup in 1970s and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, the containment was very difficult, if not impossible. The Cold War tensions broke out again. America boycotted the Moscow Olympics, and when Americans at the Embassy in Teheran

were taken hostage by Islamic fundamentalists, the American weakness became visible to the world.

Ronald Reagan took American foreign policy back to the peak of the Cold War. His aversion to Communism and the Soviet Union was very obvious and he claimed that »Communism's unrelenting assault on human freedom requires that we face up to the need to restore effective deterrence and help our friends« (Reagan 1985). Under the leadership of Ronald Reagan, America invaded the Caribbean Grenada in 1983, after only two days marines were sent to Lebanon, and containment was applied in the form of financial help for Contras in Nicaragua, who opposed the Communist Sandinista regime (Rubner 1985). However, Reagan was open enough to recognize fresh air in the Soviet Union when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, and this marked the unofficial end of the Cold war and consequently, a new distribution of world powers. America responded to positive changes happening under Gorbachev and made significant progress in achieving arms reduction, for example by signing the intermediate nuclear force (INF) treaty in 1987. In a drastically changed situation also the American foreign policy changed, starting with defense spending, which grew out of proportion during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.

Multilateralism and concerted actions under the aegis of the UN gained increasing importance in the globalized world, where economy and foreign policy ceased to exist in their separate realities, but instead started to blend. Former enemies, the Soviet Union and United States, also found themselves on the same side, when they opposed Iraq and Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

American chronic deficit constrained its foreign policy and limited the US response to unexpected international needs. George Bush, the first post Cold War President, led America to the Gulf War, but due to vast international coalition President Bush had gathered, much of it was paid for by the American allies (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 124).

With Bill Clinton the interest shifted from foreign to domestic policy issues, or at least so was expected. However, violations of human rights in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and many other crises prompted the President into action and despite prior criticism related to his lack of experience in foreign policy, his solution to the first two crises was considered satisfactory, whereas the Congress opposed Clinton in the case of Bosnia, thus leaving him to handle the conflict through the UN auspices. Also in some other foreign policy decisions Clinton faced some congressional opposition. Trade was among priorities on Clinton's foreign policy agenda and in the name of peace, freedom and stability, he demanded the power of »fast

track« trade deals overseas. The Congress refused and trade became one of the dividing issues between the branches (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 124).

The making of foreign policy has been a very controversial issue also at the time of President George W. Bush. His initial tactic, of relying upon the advice and experience of former State Secretaries, who served under the Presidents George Bush and Ronald Reagan, was very successful. After the attack on the World Trade Center, the Congress and American people responded favorably to foreign policy proposed by the President, which was also expected. At the time of great danger and insecurity, parties stood united behind the President and the Congress approved the proposed military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of democracy. America was attacked on its soil and this was an unprecedented event, requiring prompt and decisive response. From initial broad international alliance in the War on Terror and the overwhelming public support for military operations against Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush's prolonged presence in Iraq with the rising number of American and allied victims and no obvious improvement of situation, living conditions and democracy in Iraq turned the public away from his policies and President Bush left the office with record low support of only 22 percent of public.

It is obvious that presidents have remained the most important actors in the shaping of foreign policy, whose creation encompasses many activities, such as the recognition of foreign states, stipulation of international agreements, negotiation of treaties, political appointments and, when and if necessary, the use of military force. Divided house is one of the determining factors for the success of foreign policy, and its influence is more noticeable, when a Republican President is in the office. A Democratic Congress will provide more opposition to Republican President on domestic issues, but tend to support him greatly in foreign policy. The same does not happen when the President is a Democrat and the Congress majority is in the hands of Republicans, who equally withdraw their support in domestic or foreign policy issues. The gap in support therefore exists only for Republican presidents, and the phenomenon is decreasing, since also foreign policy is increasingly more subjected to the same political forces as domestic policy, namely the issues of globalization, international environment, economy etc (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 127–129).

Edwards and Wood (1999) and Wood and Peake (1998) challenged the traditional model of presidential predominance in agenda setting, suggesting that presidents were inherently weak agenda setters due to the reactive nature of the office. Wood and Peake examined presidential and media attention to foreign policy over time and found that presidents were responsive to media attention, rather than leading media attention to foreign

policy. Edwards and Wood (1999) expanded this examination of presidential agenda setting to include domestic issues and found only marginal influence by the President. Both studies relied on examinations of highly salient, important foreign policy issues, in particular, Soviet-US relations and the Arab-Israeli crisis from 1984 to 1994 (Peake 2001, 71).

Foreign policy implies international trade, immigration, security issues related to terrorism, environmental issues and many others. It is clear that in such conditions also the President's power tends to be very restricted, and presidential prerogatives, which traditionally appeared in times of crises, have become much more controlled. Foreign policy also implies the negotiation of treaties with foreign nations, where responsibility is clear and not contested-treaty negotiations have been an executive prerogative, with the Senate limited to their approval or rejection. Since approval has not always been easy, modern era presidents have been increasingly turning to executive agreements, which do not require the Senate ratification.

Although the President possesses certain advantages in conducting foreign policy, the role of Congress is increasingly influential and cooperation of the two branches, leading to a joint effort in formulating and conducting foreign policy, is ever more needed. There is not a single model that could completely explain the patterns of foreign policy making. Very much depends on political environment, on economy, on the composition of government, and some meaningful correlation could probably be found also between political outcomes and presidential personality. Scholars are mainly split into those who view political outcomes as mere projections of politicians' personalities, and those who believe personality plays no role in political behavior at all (Winter 2003, 112). Generally speaking, public has mostly considered foreign policy issues of secondary importance and has usually given priority to domestic issues. However, in particular situations, as was the one represented by the attacks of 9/11, when people fear for their safety, foreign policy gets into the limelight and presidential prerogatives are mostly unquestioned.

5.1 Cold War and post Cold War

Prior to World War II American foreign policy was based on isolationism, which was no longer possible after the War ended and foreign policy actually started to compete with domestic policy on the list of America's most important problems (Stanley in LeLoup and Shull 1999, 119). President Truman played an important role in defining America's postwar foreign policy, by announcing that America intended to support and help free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation. On March 1, 1947, President Harry Truman went before

a joint session of Congress to deliver one of the most important speeches in the American history, in which he described what became known as the Truman Doctrine, and called for, among others, a new anti-Communist crusade (Spanier 1992, 42). During and immediately after World War II, anticommunism did not present the main element of American foreign policy and it was not until a good year after the end of the War, when the policy of containment was actually launched. This happened after a number of failed attempts to reconcile differences with Moscow and after continued Soviet pressure and hostile behavior. The consequence was a gradual shift of American policy and public perception from »amity to enmity« (Spanier 1992, 43). It should be noted that anticommunism represented an essential element for the mobilization of the Congress and general public, which were supposed to provide support to the new role of America; Truman's doctrine was based on dichotomy between the free world and Communism, and succeeded in arousing the nation for another foreign policy mission. All of this probably would not have happened, had Truman not exaggerated the Communist threat and the danger of a possible Soviet atomic strike against the United States (Spanier 1992, 43).

American foreign policy has been marked by the contest between the White House and the Congress. Already President George Washington at the end of the eighteenth century complained about the Senate's obstructionism in dealing with England, whereas some legislators were convinced that Washington was only trying to exclude legislators from participating in an important diplomatic undertaking (Crabb and Holt 1989, vii). Woodrow Wilson encountered similar problems, when he advocated American membership in the League of Nations more than a century later, and faced strong opposition in the Senate. Wilson's diplomatic defeat over the Treaty of Versailles had damaging consequences for the USA and the world (Crabb and Holt 1989, vii). Also Lyndon B. Johnson saw his credibility destroyed due to the congressional opposition to US participation in the Vietnam War (Crabb and Holt 1989, vii). American history is full of similar examples connected with this unique feature of American governmental system, in which powers are divided among branches that do not share equal powers and influences in the area of foreign policy. White House has become the centre of foreign policy decision-making, despite the fact that the founding fathers very possibly intended to assign the dominant role in the governing to the Congress. It seems that the maintenance of unity within the executive branch when dealing with foreign policy issues has become a perennial challenge for national leaders (Crabb and Holt 1989, 5).

In the period after the World War II, the foreign policy of the USA has often failed to accomplish its objectives and has even behaved counterproductively, by replacing diplomacy

with force, and negotiations with military solutions. The US identified anticommunism as its principal guide to foreign policy during the Cold War, but similar policies continued also after the collapse and the disintegration of Soviet Union. Since mid-1940s, »national security« has represented the most unifying concept and the most acceptable justification for any kind of action, including military decisions; it has been adopted as the America's »commanding idea« that magically opened all the doors that needed to be open. It represented a mixture of pragmatism and elevated morals (Wander 1984, 347–50). The commitment to Greece and Turkey (Truman Doctrine) presented only the first step in the direction of containing Soviet expansion, since one of the biggest fears was that Moscow would find a way to exploit Europe's post war vulnerability (Spanier 1992, 48). Because the USA could not allow Soviet Union to control Europe, it decided to financially help the struggling post-war European economy, which was made conditional on economic cooperation among the European states, modelled on the American example. The Marshall Plan and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) were the most important results (Spanier 1992, 51). The Marshall Plan was a huge success and Europe was flourishing, but it soon became clear, that the Plan itself would not suffice. The Soviets first stroke on Czechoslovakia and a few months later imposed a blockade on Berlin, trying to dislodge the Western powers. The atmosphere drastically changed and the need for military security became more important than economic revival, which led to the establishment of NATO and the first peacetime alliance. The idea was to prevent eventual attacks on Europe by the fear of risking an all-out war with the United States, which was the basis of the policy of deterrence. Reliance on American air power soon proved too weak, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) surprised Americans by exploding its first atomic bomb in 1949. The second event was the attack of North Korea on South Korea in June 1950 (Spanier 1992, 54). This changed the American anti-Soviet policy into anti-Communist policy.

If containment represented the cornerstone of US postwar foreign policy, the doctrine of deterrence became the cornerstone of US strategic defense policy. The premise was that if neither superpower can destroy the other in a first-strike nuclear attack without suffering unacceptable damage itself, both sides will be deterred from attacking each other. All through this period the containment policy and the management of nuclear weapons mostly remained in the hands of the President (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 121). By the time of Nixon's presidency Americans grew tired of war, and anti-war protests were spreading all over the USA, which partly induced Nixon to prioritize the importance of American military assistance to friendly nations, instead of engaging American forces in direct military intervention. He

also pursued the policy of détente with the USSR and China, but it was not until the Reagan presidency in the USA and the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR, that the Cold War came to its end. The USSR disintegrated into separate Republics, and reforms for the restructuring of Soviet economy, named »perestrojka«, together with the policy of greater openness, named »glasnost«, were on the way (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 123).

The omnipresent background of the Cold War and the Communist threat marked Americans and permeated their way of thinking, their culture, and economy for nearly half a century. When the Cold War ended, America remained somehow disoriented after all these years of black and white reality. The Cold War represented a clear antagonism of democracy to Communism; its end and the demise of the Soviet empire had dramatic implications for US foreign policy. After years of confrontations, the USA and the Soviet Union found themselves united against Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. This was one of the signs of the beginning of multilateralism and of the increasing importance of international organizations, such as the UN (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 123).

Despite the War Powers Resolution and post-Vietnam War attempts to curb presidential influence in the shaping of foreign policy, the President retained many advantages over Congress, such as prime role in international agreement making, in treaty negotiations, in appointment powers and in the deployment of military force (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 127).

LeLoup and Shull (1999) came to the conclusion that Congress increased its influence in post Cold War period and that presidential leadership seemed less likely on issues of great concern to members of Congress. Their prediction went in the direction of increased cooperation between branches, with a continued emphasis on the role of the President. They also discovered that foreign policy agenda remained remarkably stable for a great part of American history, revealing a trend in the direction of international trade, in response to an ever growing globalization of world economy.

It should be remembered that sovereign states firstly think about own benefits, and only later about the needs and challenges of international community, when and if this is advantageous to themselves as well. Also America's foreign policy caters first and foremost for the interests of Americans, and while doing it, tries to avoid conflicts. However, this principle is often forgotten when higher interests are at stake.

The end of the Cold War did not represent the end of problems and conflicts; quite the opposite, it only removed the curtain and exposed many of the problems that were overshadowed by the Cold War. People were made believe America was facing a unique opportunity in the history and they all needed do be prepared for its new role, new challenges

and new ways of response. The most important novelty was the lack of an easily identifiable and tangible enemy; the new enemy became the international chaos and disorder, manifested in different forms. This is why America's isolation was no longer possible and each situation represented a new and separate case. Foreign policy took the form of responding to one case at a time, without patterns and clear rules of play. Domestic issues became top priority, and only those foreign policy problems that could potentially harm America were chosen to react upon. Criteria for the selection of crisis situations were not clear, and the discretion right of presidents and their administrations was exposed (Conley, 2005).

The role of the media with televised images of human rights' violations undoubtedly contributed to public consensus on military interventions that were supposed to alleviate human suffering and bring some justice.

5.2 A brief overview of analyzed military interventions

From historical data and records can be seen that throughout the American history presidents have engaged the US military in armed operations on the basis of different legal authorizations, and have justified their actions with a myriad different reasons and explanations. The legal authorizations they referred to varied from Security Council resolutions, to War Powers Resolution, to the Congressional Joint Resolution and to presidential prerogatives vested in the President by the American Constitution.

The period after World War II witnessed the establishment of the Organization of United Nations, which represented great hopes for a brighter future of the UN (compared to its unsuccessful predecessor, the League of Nations) and the new world order of international relations. When considering the actions of the US military forces under the aegis of the UN, the Truman presidency marked a precedent in many ways. It expanded greatly the use of executive powers, thus enabling the President to avoid the constitutional safety fuse represented by the Congress. Truman and his administration actually rephrased military involvement from »war«, to »police action« (Truman, 1950b), which in itself did not require either the declaration of war, or the congressional authorization. Another strategic move of President Truman in the case of Korean War was to ask for the authorization of the UN Security Council. In the absence of the Soviet Union the veto power was not applied and the Council unanimously condemned the aggression of North Korea and subsequently authorized the use of military force. Thus Korea became the first of many US undeclared wars or police actions, carried out without the consent of the Congress.

However, prior to December 1945, when the Congress adopted the UN Participation Act, which granted the President the authority to make »military forces of the USA available to the Security Council on its call«, presidents were not free to dispatch armed forces when and where they deemed appropriate. In reality, they were not supposed to be free even after the UN Participation Act had been adopted, but already the dissertation's first case study of the Korean War, waged under the command of President Truman, reveals how the Congress was bypassed.

The analyzed interventions were selected from the Report for Congress »Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2007«, prepared by Richard F. Grimmet, specialist in international security. The report was updated in January 2008 and lists hundreds of instances in which the USA engaged its armed forces abroad. The dissertation only includes those interventions that were followed by an explanatory and justifying address, delivered by the President upon the intervention. Table 5.1 presents an overview of military interventions analyzed in chapter 6.

Table 5.1 Military interventions selected for analysis

<p>Korean War 1950–1953</p>	<p>USA responded to North Korean invasion of South Korea by going to its assistance, pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions. US forces deployed in Korea exceeded 300,000 during the last year of the conflict. Over 36,600 US military were killed in action.</p>
<p>Formosa (Taiwan) 1950–1955</p>	<p>In June 1950 at the beginning of the Korean War, President Truman ordered the US Seventh Fleet to prevent Chinese Communist attacks upon Formosa and Chinese Nationalist operations against mainland China.</p>
<p>China 1945–1955</p>	<p>Naval units evacuated US civilians and military personnel from the Tachen Islands.</p>
<p>Lebanon 1958</p>	<p>Marines were landed in Lebanon at the invitation of its government to help protect against threatened insurrection supported from the outside. The President's action was supported by a congressional resolution (The Middle East Resolution, known as The Eisenhower Doctrine) passed in 1957 that authorized US help to Middle East nations in the fight against Communism.</p>
<p>Cuba 1962</p>	<p>On October 22, President Kennedy instituted »quarantine« on the shipment of offensive missiles to Cuba from the Soviet Union. He also warned the Soviet Union that the launching of any missile from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere would bring about US nuclear retaliation on the Soviet Union. A negotiated settlement was achieved in a few days.</p>
<p>Vietnam War 1964–1973</p>	<p>US military advisers had been in South Vietnam for a decade, and their numbers had been increased as the military position of the Saigon government became weaker. After citing what he termed were attacks on US destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, President Johnson asked in August 1964 for a resolution expressing US determination to support freedom and protect peace in Southeast Asia. Congress responded with the Tonkin</p>

	<p>Gulf Resolution, expressing support for »all necessary measures« the President might take to repel armed attack against US forces and prevent further aggression. Following this resolution, and following a Communist attack on a US installation in central Vietnam, the USA escalated its participation in the war to a peak of 543,000 military personnel by April 1969.</p>
<p>Cambodia 1970</p>	<p>US troops were ordered into Cambodia to clean out Communist sanctuaries from which Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacked US and South Vietnamese forces in Vietnam. The object of this attack, which lasted from April 30 to June 30, was to ensure the continuing safe withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam and to assist the program of Vietnamization.</p>
<p>Mayaguez incident 1975</p>	<p>On May 15, 1975, President Ford reported he had ordered military forces to retake the SS Mayaguez, a merchant vessel en route from Hong Kong to Thailand with a US citizen crew which was seized by Cambodian naval patrol boats in international waters and forced to proceed to a nearby island.</p>
<p>Iran 1980</p>	<p>On April 26, 1980, President Carter reported the use of six US transport planes and eight helicopters in an unsuccessful attempt to rescue American hostages being held in Iran.</p>
<p>Libya 1981</p>	<p>On August 19, 1981, US planes based on the carrier Nimitz shot down two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra after one of the Libyan jets had fired a heat-seeking missile. USA periodically held freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra, claimed by Libya as territorial waters but considered international waters by the United States.</p>
<p>Grenada, Lebanon 1983</p>	<p>On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported a landing on Grenada by Marines and Army airborne troops to protect lives and assist in the restoration of law and order and at the request of five members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.</p>
<p>Libya</p>	<p>More serious armed conflict happened in March 1986, when</p>

1986	Libya attacked US planes with missiles and America responded with missiles too.
Panama 1988	In mid-March and April 1988, during a period of instability in Panama and as pressure grew for Panamanian military leader General Manuel Noriega to resign, the United States sent 1,000 troops to Panama. The forces supplemented 10,000 US military personnel already in Panama.
Iraq 1991	On January 18, 1991, President Bush reported that he had directed US armed forces to commence combat operations on January 16 against Iraqi forces and military targets in Iraq and Kuwait, in conjunction with a coalition of allies and UN Security Council resolutions. On January 12 Congress had passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution (P.L.102-1). Combat operations were suspended on February 28, 1991.
Somalia 1992	In December 1992 the humanitarian »Operation Restore Hope« began in Somalia, torn by sectarian wars where humanitarian work of UN was prevented by warring clan chiefs who controlled the access to water and food. Initially greeted by the Somalis, American soldiers soon experienced the horrors of terror, anarchy and tyranny that ruled in that chaotic country. Sent on a humanitarian mission, American soldiers found themselves in the midst of a civil war. They partly succeeded in trying to end starvation, but failed when trying to bring peace and end conflicts.
Iraq 1993	In a status report on Iraq of May 24, President Clinton said that on April 9 and April 18 US planes had bombed or fired missiles at Iraqi anti-aircraft sites that had tracked US aircraft. On June 28, 1993, President Clinton reported that US naval forces had launched missiles against the Iraqi Intelligence Service's headquarters in Baghdad in response to an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate former President Bush in Kuwait in April 1993. In a status report of July 22, 1993, President Clinton said on June

	<p>19 a US aircraft had fired a missile at an Iraqi anti-aircraft site displaying hostile intent. US planes also bombed an Iraqi missile battery on August 19, 1993.</p>
<p>Iraq 1998</p>	<p>During the period from December 16–23, 1998, the US together with the United Kingdom, conducted a bombing campaign, termed Operation Desert Fox, against Iraqi industrial facilities deemed capable of producing weapons of mass destruction, and against other Iraqi military and security targets. Beginning in late December 1998, and continuing during 1999, the US together with forces of the coalition enforcing the »no-fly« zones over Iraq, conducted military operations against the Iraqi air defense system on numerous occasions in response to actual or potential threats against aircraft enforcing the »no-fly« zones in northern and southern Iraq.</p>
<p>Yugoslavia 1999</p>	<p>On March 26, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress that, on March 24, 1999, US military forces, at his direction, and in coalition with NATO allies, had commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to the Yugoslav government campaign of violence and repression against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. On May 25, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress, that he had directed deployment of additional aircraft and forces to support NATO’s ongoing efforts (against Yugoslavia), including several thousand additional US Armed Forces personnel to Albania in support of the deep strike force located there. He also directed that additional US forces be deployed to the region to assist in »humanitarian operations.«</p> <p>On June 12, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress, that he had directed the deployment of about 7,000 US military personnel as the US contribution to the approximately 50,000–member, NATO-led security force currently being assembled in Kosovo. He also noted that about 1,500 US military personnel, under separate US command and control, will deploy to other countries in the region, as our national support element, in</p>

	support of NATO forces.
Terrorism threat 2001	On September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, that in response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the »employment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations. The President noted in efforts to prevent and deter terrorism he might find it necessary to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world. He stated that he could not now predict the scope and duration of these deployments, or the actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the USA.
Afghanistan 2001	On October 9, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, that on October 7, 2001, US Armed Forces began combat action in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda. The President stated that he had directed this military action in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on US territory, American citizens, and way of life, and to the continuing threat of terrorist acts against the USA and American friends and allies. This military action was part of campaign against terrorism and was designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations.
Iraq War 2003	On March 21, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, that he had directed US Armed Forces, operating with other coalition forces, to commence operations on March 19, 2003, against Iraq. He further stated that it was not possible to know at present the duration of active combat operations or the scope necessary to accomplish the goals of the operation to disarm Iraq in pursuit of peace, stability, and security both in the Gulf region and in the USA

Source: Grimmet (2008).

6 An overview of presidencies and analysis of military interventions

Numerous factors influence the choice of presidential rhetoric as well as the legal justifications that presidents rely upon to support their actions. In addition to individual psychological and cognitive influences (such as a president's partisan attachments, the complexity of their thinking, or their background and experiences in foreign affairs), there are also various contextual or institutional factors at work (such as the presence of absence of divided government, the president's relationship to the political regime and »political time«, as well as international patterns of institutionalized behavior such as the presence of the Cold War for an extended period of time). All of these influences are presented in chapter 6, and the description of each presidency is accompanied with the analysis of military interventions abroad under the command of respective presidents.

That the presidency is only as strong as the president lets it to be, and that it should only be limited by the Constitution and the president's conscience, was claimed already by Woodrow Wilson, after he had witnessed the strong presidencies of Grover Cleveland, William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. They made him change his position on the separation of powers, which was originally based on a strong Congress, and a weak President (Greenstein 2000a, 251).

This perception, however, has been changing quite often during the course of history, and presidents have always adapted their style of leadership to their time and their character. One of the greatest scholars on American presidency, Richard E. Neustadt (1990) believes in three main sources of presidential influence: firstly, the president's power to persuade, which is inherent in his institutional role, secondly, the expectations of people regarding his abilities and thirdly, how the public views the president and his actions. This represented one of more popular theories on presidency. Institutional theory was also gaining ground and the personal presidency approach was perceived as having ascribed too much influence to personal characteristics and abilities of individual presidents. After all, presidential institution is vested with executive powers, where personal characteristics are only important to a certain extent. However, cognitive style seems to be one of more important factors of influence. It deals with complexity of information processing and decision making. The research assumption was that complexity of President's thinking could influence his leadership style, since it has often been stated that complexity of politicians' thinking can influence their policies or policy preferences (Suedfeld et al. 1977). It could be therefore presumed that presidential rhetoric reflects the complexity of presidents' thinking; however, the empirical data presented in the following chapters do not provide enough support to prove this dependency.

The present chapter presents a brief summary of presidents' more important personal and political milestones and accomplishments, and places each president in the category of »political time« (the politics of reconstruction, articulation, disjunction, and preemption), developed by Skowronek (1997; 2008), who believes that mastery of political leaders depends above all on how general public perceives systemic political collapse. There has been a recurring pattern of political failures that were followed by success stories throughout the American history. Political paralysis is often followed by the sudden appearance of a masterful politician, who usually happens to be also a great communicator and repudiator. The grouping of presidents into the categories of »political time« will provide the basis for hypothesis testing and will consequently show, whether presidents' similarities really do cut across time, political affiliation and personal characteristics.

6.1 Harry S. Truman, 19(45)48–53 (Democrat), 33rd President

In 1945 Truman entered into office as Vice President, following the death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, but his first elected term started in 1948. His road to presidency was quite unusual, he had no college education and due to his bad eyesight could not serve under arms during the World War I, but as a member and later on commander in the National Guard. He was elected official, county judge, responsible for construction of roads and public buildings and became a very efficient administrator, devoted to sound budgetary practices. Due to the lack of formal education he became an avid reader of history and he developed a belief in the importance of strong leadership and institutional presidency with expansive view on prerogatives of chief executive (Greenstein 2000a, 28-30).

Active in the Democratic Party, Truman was elected a judge of the Jackson County Court (an administrative position) in 1922. He became a Senator in 1934. During World War II he headed the Senate war investigating committee, checking into waste and corruption (White House 2009). When Roosevelt becomes elected for the fourth term in 1944, Truman became his Vice President, but was largely left out of decision-making and information by Roosevelt. On April 12, 1945 Franklin Delano Roosevelt died and Truman became the President (Greenstein 2000a, 28).

Truman believed presidency was sacred and entrusted him only temporarily, and he was determined to pass it on without having lost any of its power or prestige (Schlesinger jr. 2004, 131). At the time it was believed that foreign policy should be centralized in the presidency. Truman was a Democrat and former senator; however, he succeeded in rallying support for his foreign policy initiatives despite the fact that the Congress of 1946 was controlled by the Republicans (Schlesinger jr. 2004, 128).

As President, Truman made some of the most crucial decisions in history. Soon after Victory in Europe Day (when surrender of Nazi Germany was formally accepted, on May 8th, 1948), the war against Japan had reached its final stage. An urgent plea to Japan to surrender was rejected. Truman, after consultations with his advisers, ordered atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the cities devoted to war work. Japanese surrender quickly followed. In June 1945 Truman witnessed the signing of the charter of the UN, established with the hope to preserve peace. In 1947 as the Soviet Union pressured Turkey and threatened to take over Greece, Truman asked the Congress to aid the two countries, enunciating the program that bears his name, the Truman Doctrine. Another milestone of his presidency was

the Marshall Plan, program of post-war reconstruction of Europe, named for his Secretary of State, which stimulated spectacular economic recovery in war-torn Western Europe (White House 2009). The Truman Doctrine was »the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures« (Truman in Schlesinger 2004, 128). Schlesinger believed that Truman's success with Congress on foreign policy was facilitated by the invention of »bipartisan foreign policy«, which had begun with Roosevelt's appointment of Republicans as Secretaries of War and of the Navy in 1940. For Truman, who was confronted with the Republican Congress, bipartisanship was the only solution, implying that national security was ahead of partisan advantage. The bipartisan foreign policy was a necessity; it encouraged crisis diplomacy and escalated public emotion (Schlesinger 2004, 129).

Truman entered the race for 1948 elections with only slim chances of success, but against all expectations won, but soon had to face a big blow for the USA, when the Soviet Union revealed to have developed nuclear weapons (Greenstein 2000a, 35). When the Russians blockaded the western sectors of Berlin in 1948, Truman created a massive airlift to supply Berliners until the Russians backed down. Meanwhile, he was negotiating a military alliance to protect Western nations, the NATO, established in 1949. In June 1950, when the Communist government of North Korea attacked South Korea, Truman conferred promptly with his military advisers. There was, he wrote, »complete, almost unspoken acceptance on the part of everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done. There was no suggestion from anyone that either the UN or the United States could back away from it« (White House 2009).

To engage military forces in Korea Truman did not ask for the authorization of Congress; instead he went directly to the UN Security Council and based his authorization on its consent and resolution. The war, which he termed »police action« prolonged and cost many American lives, so his public support according to the Gallup polls fell to 20–30 percent at the end of his term. Truman decided not to run for another term and left the office to the Republican Eisenhower (Fisher 1994, 743).

6.1.1 Analysis of variables

6.1.1.1 Integrative complexity index

Truman scored 2.09, which is among highest scores from 1948 to 2008 (the highest being 2,18 (Kennedy) and the lowest 1,68 (Eisenhower), placing him well above the average score of post-war presidents (1,77) (Thoemmes and Conway III 2007, 203).

6.1.1.2 Political time category

Truman, just like other presidents of articulation, stood in the shadow of his reconstructive forerunner F.D. Roosevelt and the comparison was a very difficult one for Truman. He had to turn the political legacy of his predecessor into a workable governmental policy, which lacked the appeal his predecessor's reconstructive ideas had. Also the waging of war turned out to be extremely costly for Truman (Skowronek 2008, 100).

6.1.1.3 Political composition of Congress between 1945 and 1953

Table 6.1: Political composition of Congress (1945–1953)

79 th Congress 1945–1947	SenateDem: 56; Rep: 38; other 1 House: Dem: 242; Rep: 190; others 2
80 th Congress 1947–1949	Senate: Rep: 51; Dem: 45 House: Rep: 245; Dem: 188; other 1
81 st Congress 1949–1951	Senate: Dem: 49; Rep: 42 House: Dem: 263; Rep: 171; other 1
82 nd Congress 1951–1953	Senate: Dem: 49; Rep: 47 House: Dem: 234; Rep: 199; other 1

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 206).

6.1.2 Key events between 1945 and 1953

Table 6.2: Key events between 1945 and 1953

1947	Truman Doctrine-first attempt to contain Communism.
	Marshall Plan proposal-aid to Europe in postwar economic recovery.
	National Security Council (NSC) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established.
1948	Truman sends the Congress a 10-point program of ending segregation in public schools and accommodations.
	Truman wins elections for the President.
1949	NATO established by US, Canada and 10 European nations.
	Truman announces the Soviets have perfected an atomic bomb.
1950	Increase in military spending to face Soviet threat.
	Korean War-provoked by North Korean crossing of the 38 th parallel into South Korea.
1951	22 nd Amendment adopted, which limits presidential mandate to two terms.
	MacArthur removed in Korea by Truman over strategy disagreements.
1952	Truman's seizure of steel mills to prevent strike, which is ruled unconstitutional.
	Eisenhower elected President on November 4 th .

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 208).

6.1.3 Military interventions

6.1.3.1 The Korean War (1950)

In 1950 the Congress did not disapprove of Truman's decision to send troops to Korea, which came out of the World War II as a divided country. North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) was governed by a Communist regime, and South Korea (the Republic of Korea) was governed by a regime closely connected to the USA. After the invasion carried out by North Korea, Truman called for emergency meeting of UN Security Council, which voted 9–0 (the Soviet Union was absent) to order North Korea to stop the invasion and withdraw. The UN Security Council did not, however, specify military action. Nevertheless Truman justified his intervention with the SC resolution, when informing the Congress about

it. Only two days after the intervention did the SC adopt a second resolution (on June 27th 1950), calling for »urgent military measures« (Schlesinger jr. 2004, 103).

This was clearly a proof of unilateral decision-making by the President, the Congress was completely ignored and Truman ordered General MacArthur (US commander in the Far East) to evacuate Americans from Korea and to use air and naval power if needed. Until the operation was well on its way, Truman not only ordered silence, but also authorized MacArthur to use air and naval power to directly help South Korea defend itself from the North Korean attack. The following day the UN Security Council urged all members to provide assistance to South Korea, and this second resolution added some legitimacy to what originally was the USA's unilateral action. Only after all of this, did Truman go to the Congress to read his statement, a press release announcing US air and naval support for South Korea and requesting the views of congressional leaders (Crabb and Holt 1989, 129). The Congress was thus just pushed into the position where it had no choice, but to approve, by adopting a joint resolution, what had already been done. On June 30, 1950 Truman gave MacArthur authority to expand war and include also military targets in North Korea and to recur to the use of ground forces, which fully committed the USA to the conflict. The operation that started as defensive rapidly evolved into offensive operation with the goal of making Korea united, independent and democratic. MacArthur was at first authorized only to help defend South Korea without crossing the thirty-eight parallel, later he was authorized not only to cross it, but also to attack military targets in North Korea, which symbolized a clear expansion of military goals.

When Carter sought to withdraw troops from Korea in 1976, he was faced with a completely different situation and congressional opposition, partly based on increased powers given to the Congress by the War Powers Resolution, adopted in 1973. In Carter's case the Congress tried to limit President's authority to bring the troops home, and succeeded.

6.1.3.2 Legal basis for the Korean War

President Truman's commitment of American military to Korea represents a precedent for the executive use of military force without congressional consent; it is thus important to study the legality of this action with a view to the United States Constitution and the UN Participation Act of 1945. Truman cited Security Council Resolutions as legal basis of his action, but the question is, whether UN machinery can act as a legal substitute for congressional action. According to Fisher this is not so, and he says: »The history of the UN makes it very clear that all parties in the legislative and executive branches understood that the decision to use

military force through the UN required prior approval from both Houses of Congress« (Fisher 1993, 22). Fisher continues by saying that nothing in the history of the UN Charter supports the notion that Congress altered the Constitution by excluding itself from »war making powers«, which it simply could not have done and which was later confirmed also by the UN Participation Act.

According to the UN Charter, in the event of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the UN Security Council may recommend measures not involving the use of armed force. If these measures prove inadequate, the Article 43 of the UN Charter reads: »All Members of the UN /.../ undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including the rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.« These special agreements would define number of troops, weapons, location and all other details. It was implied that members would ratify these agreements »in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.« »Constitutional process« is defined in section 6 of the UN Participation Act of 1945. Without ambiguity the statute requires that the agreements »shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or a joint resolution« (United States Congress, 1945). The wording is therefore very clear, and a prior authorization by the Congress mandatory. There are two additional qualifications in section 6 of the UN Participation Act, and they read:

The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the Congress to make available to the Security Council on its call in order to take action under article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the armed forces, facilities or assistance provided for therein: Provided that /.../ nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities or assistance in addition to the forces, facilities or assistance provided for in such special agreement or agreements (United States Congress, 1945).

This means that once the President has received authorization for a certain agreement or agreements, he does not need subsequent approval under article 42, since congressional approval is needed for the special agreement, not for subsequent implementation of this agreement. The second qualification defines that nothing in the UN Participation Act can be interpreted as congressional approval of other agreements entered into by the President (Fisher 1994, 30). Therefore the qualifications do not eliminate congressional approval and

the President may commit the US armed forces only after having obtained explicit consent of the Congress.

On June 27, 1950, President Truman informed the American people of the aggression on Korea and of Security Council's order to withdraw the aggressive forces north of 38th parallel and that the USA, in accordance with the Security Council Resolution would support the UN and help end this violation of peace. However, at this point Truman did not mention the commitment of US military troops, which followed already the following day. Truman informed the Americans that North Korea disobeyed the orders of the Security Council and continued with hostilities, thus: »The Security Council called upon all members of the UN to render every assistance to the UN in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the (South) Korean government troops cover and support« (Truman 1950a). He also explained that Communist occupation of Formosa (Taiwan) jeopardized the security of Pacific area and consequently of the USA when performing their functions in that area.

Truman also added: »I know that all members of the UN will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the UN. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law« (Truman 1950a).

What is clear from this statement and the context is that Truman committed the US military forces to Korea without congressional approval, acting solely on the basis of the Resolution 83 of the Security Council, thus violating the procedure prescribed in the UN Participation Act. Another problematic aspect is that Truman deployed the American military forces one day before the second Security Council resolution was adopted, so the only legal coverage by the UN that he had actually requested was the first SC Resolution which ordered the North Korea to cease hostilities and to withdraw north of 38th parallel. Another aspect worth mentioning is the adoption of the June 26 resolution, which managed to be adopted without the veto application due to the absence of the Soviet Union. Only the second resolution (of June 27) requested military support of UN members, but this came a day after Truman had already committed the US forces to Korea (June 26).

On June 29 Truman held a news conference (Truman 1950b) when a question of America's involvement in Korea was asked. To the question whether America was at war, Truman replied negatively and when »police action under the UN« was offered as a possible definition he said: »That is exactly what it amounts to.«

Even though the UN officially led the operation, they had no real authority over the conduct of the war. Upon the request of the Security Council, Truman designated General MacArthur as the head of the »unified command«, but apart from this and some symbolic support from other UN members, in terms of investment in money, troops, casualties and deaths, this was an American war.

To conclude with Fisher's words (1993, 38): »The Korean War stands as the most dangerous precedent because of its scope and acquiescence of Congress« and »Presidential acts of war, including Truman's initiative in Korea, can never be accepted as constitutional or as a legal substitute for congressional approval.«

6.2 Dwight David Eisenhower, 1953–61 (Republican), 34th President

After the World War II Eisenhower, former supreme allied commander of American forces in Europe was one of the most popular and recognizable figures in the USA. First he was nominated the Chief of staff of the Army, where he served until 1948 to then retire from active duty. However, Truman called him back to serve as the first military commander of the NATO. In 1952 he won a contested Republican nomination, embarked on a campaign against the Democratic candidate Stevenson, promised to go to Korea to end the stalemated war and triumphantly won elections by six million votes, bringing a narrowly Republican Congress into office with him (Greenstein 2000a, 44–47). Thus Truman's war in Korea resulted in the election of Dwight Eisenhower and ended twenty years of Democratic control of the White House (Fisher 1994, 760). Eisenhower came to the White House as an opponent to presidential usurpation, who believed that Truman and Roosevelt had gathered too much power and hoped to restore the constitutional balance between the presidency and the Congress (Schlesinger jr. 2004, 153). The security system established during the World War II had introduced loyalty investigations and dossiers, and the Cold War extended and perfected the system of classified information, limited access and secrecy, where Eisenhower added a final touch by extending the presidential discretion to decide which information and conversations could be denied public access (Schlesinger jr. 2004, 155–156). Eisenhower was an acute observer, who intentionally resolved to maintain positive attitude and smile as part of his public image, together with personal contact with people from all walks of life.

He was an institutional innovator, who appointed the first White House Chief of staff, established the first congressional relations office, appointed the first presidential assistant for National Security affairs who coordinated all foreign affairs decision-making, and introduced weekly meetings of the NSC. Eisenhower's main interest was national and foreign security policy (Greenstein 2000a, 45–46). However, he was first and foremost »a warrior«, »General Eisenhower«, who did not cease to think and act like the military man he was trained to be, even after the end of the World War II and his election to presidency (Medhurst 1994, 1). He built his career as a strategist and tactician, by focusing on the organization of policy making, careful administration of national security, and the establishment of long-term position for the Cold War, including the deterrence of the USSR and maintenance of prosperous US economy. He believed that security should be guaranteed to Americans without paying the price of national bankruptcy and that the strength of national economy was as essential to America's security as it was its military power. Since America could not maintain the cost of

conventional and nuclear deterrence, the NSC authorized an early deployment of nuclear weapons in any conflict with Communists. And since deterrent is only efficient, when the other side knows about it, Eisenhower's administration made it public that USA was prepared to respond to aggression with the use of its »massive retaliatory power« (Brands 1988, 149), when and where it chose to (Greenstein 2000a, 47–52). Eisenhower realized that the nature of Cold War was essentially rhetorical, it was a war in which the battlefield was in the heart and minds, in the attitudes of people in America and throughout the world and for him rhetoric was a weapon with which to wage Cold War (Medhurst 1994, 1). After sharp conflicts between President Truman and the Congress, Eisenhower decided to avoid unilateral authorizations of military operations abroad. He believed national commitment would be stronger if authorized by both branches, therefore he asked Congress for specific authority to deal with national security crises (Fisher 2004, 117). However, when Eisenhower decided not to intervene without congressional authorization and not to act unilaterally in Indochina in 1954, where French resistance, encircled in Dien Bien Phu in North Vietnam, was left to itself and lost, the American credibility suffered a great blow.

He relied upon indirect style of leadership, the so-called »hidden-hand« leadership and was to a great extent involved or supporting behind the scenes political activity. Until the surprise of the Soviet launching of Sputnik, Eisenhower's nonpolitical style of leadership was constantly receiving high level of public support, and his second term of office was won with an even bigger margin (Greenstein 2000a, 52–54). Eisenhower was not very convincing in supporting his Vice President Nixon in the race for presidency of 1960, which was eventually won by the Democrat J.F. Kennedy, who lacked the predecessor's interest and devotion for inter-branch cooperation (Fisher 2004, 125).

6.2.1 Analysis of variables

6.2.1.1 Integrative complexity index

1,68 is the lowest score of all presidents from 1948 to 2008 (Thoemmes and Conway III 2007, 203).

6.2.1.2 Political time category

Eisenhower came to power as first Republican after the New Deal reconstruction and belongs to the group of preemptive leaders, who came to power with a party opposed to the previously established regime, but once in office, they had problems asserting their independence from the dominant ideological factions in both parties (Skowronek 2008, 107). The group of

preemptive leaders offers more historical variation. It is based on the commitment to a new course, without destroying the past accomplishments. Personal leadership and independent appeals are some of the emblems of the preemptive leadership (Skowronek 2008, 107). Preemptive style of leadership has usually functioned effectively at the polls and most presidents were reelected to a second term, but the »third-way« politics has not been sustained long. Skowronek says (2008, 108) that »no third way has ever outlasted the President who articulated it.«

6.2.1.3 Political composition of Congress between 1953 and 1961

Table 6.3: Political composition of Congress (1953–1961)

83 rd Congress 1953–1955	Senate: Rep. 48; Dem. 47; other 1 House: Rep. 221; Dem. 211; other 1
84 th Congress 1955–1957	Senate: Dem. 48; Rep. 47; other 1 House: Dem. 223; Rep. 203
85 th Congress 1957–1959	Senate: Dem. 49; Rep. 47 House: Dem. 233; Rep. 203
86 th Congress 1959–1961	Senate: Dem. 64; Rep. 34 House: Dem. 283; Rep. 153

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 209).

6.2.2 Key events between 1953 and 1959

Table 6.4: Key events between 1945 and 1953

1953	Soviet Union explodes a hydrogen bomb.
1954	Communist Viet Minh besiege French forces at Dien Bien Phu in French Indochina.
1955	Eisenhower holds first televised news conference.
	Military advisers dispatched to South Vietnam to train army.
1956	Suez Crisis: Israeli invasion of Gaza Strip and the Sinai, followed by British and French attacks on Egypt. USA leads efforts for the cease fire.
	Eisenhower elected for the second term.
1957	Soviets launch first artificial satellites, Sputnik 1 and Sputnik 2.
1959	Alaska and Hawaii admitted as states.

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 211).

6.2.3 Military interventions

6.2.3.1 The first Taiwan Strait crisis (1955)

The crisis escalated to a short armed conflict, mostly happening in Formosa (Taiwan) strait and particularly on the island groups Quemoy and Matsu, situated between Formosa and the Chinese mainland. These islands were the first line of the Republic of China (ROC) defense against the Communist People's Republic of China (PRC) (Ambrose 1990).

US only recognized the ROC government and already at the outbreak of the Korean War in his statement on June 27, 1950, President Truman (1950a) said: »In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.«

In 1954 conditions in the Formosa Strait threatened to deteriorate into a military conflict between the United States and China, or better the PRC. Five years after the non-Communist Chiang Kai-Shek, the leader of the ROC had been driven from the mainland China, the Quemoy, Matsu and Tachen island groups were still controlled by his Nationalist troops. On September 1954, the Communist PRC opened fire on Quemoy Island. Eisenhower personally controlled the situation and regarded it a very serious threat and not only a minor incident. He was aware that the United States had to keep its reputation by resisting the Chinese Communist pressure, while at the same time he knew that drawing a line and splitting the offshore islands from the mainland China could prove fatal. Eisenhower rejected the advice given by the NSC, (that US should support Nationalists (ROC) in the bombing of mainland China and thus defend the islands), and stated that such strategy could lead to the brink of an unlimited war, probably even World War III. The substitute plan was to appeal to the UN Security Council asking for a cease-fire. In 1955 the situation took a dangerous turn with the seizure of the Ichiang Island by the Communist China, important for the defense of the Tachen islands, where Nationalists had their base and were now within the artillery distance of the Chinese Communist forces (Ambrose 1990).

On a news conference on January 19, 1955, President Eisenhower responded to the question about the seriousness of Communist attacks on Ichiang by saying that those small islands, or even Tachens themselves, were not an essential part of the defenses of Formosa and of the Pescadores, to which the US were committed by the treaty awaiting the approval of the Senate.

Eisenhower's rich and successful military background was very important in his decision-making process related to the use of armed forces and aggressive measures. This was his great advantage, since he could decide not only on political basis, but also on the basis of his experience as military commander, thus his decision to agree or disagree with the suggestions of NSC or US military commanders were carefully considered from both sides. In the described case he decided to reject the advice of military advisors who sustained the idea that evacuation of the Tachen Islands was more dangerous and difficult than their defense, and approved the withdrawal (Rushkoff 1981, 472).

6.2.3.2 Legal basis for the intervention in Taiwan

In response to dangerous development in the Formosa Strait Eisenhower appealed to the Congress for joint action. Contrary to the path taken by Truman, Eisenhower decided not to act solely through the UN, but still expressed his interest in seeing what the UN could do:

The UN attempt to exercise its good offices /.../ because wherever there is any kind of fighting and open violence in the world, it is always sort of powder keg. /.../ Whether the UN could do anything in this particular place, I don't know, because probably each side would insist that it was an internal affair; although from our viewpoint it might be a good thing to have them take a look at the problem (Eisenhower 1955a).

In his Statement to Congress of January 24, 1955, he said: »We believe that the situation is one for appropriate action of the UN under its charter, for the purpose of ending the present hostilities in that area. We would welcome assumption of such jurisdiction by that body« (Eisenhower 1955b) .

However, instead of waiting for the UN to act, Eisenhower urged the Congress to adopt a resolution that would authorize military action directed at providing security of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Meanwhile, the situation has become sufficiently critical to impel me, without awaiting action by the UN, to ask the Congress to participate now, by specific resolution, in measures designed to improve the prospects for peace. These measures would contemplate the use of the armed forces of the United States if necessary to assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores (Eisenhower 1955b).

Despite the fact that he was asking for congressional authorization he felt he needed to clarify he was authorized to act solely on the basis of his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief.

Authority for some of the actions which might be required would be inherent in the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. Until Congress can act I would not hesitate, so far as my

Constitutional powers extend, to take whatever emergency action might be forced upon us in order to protect the rights and security of the United States. However, a suitable congressional resolution would clearly and publicly establish the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief to employ the armed forces of this nation promptly and effectively for the purposes indicated if in his judgment it became necessary (Eisenhower 1955b).

He believed that a joint resolution of the Congress would show to the world that America stood united, that its' Government, Congress and people were serious about it and this would put a halt to the Communist ambitions of challenging America's strength and resoluteness.

The Formosa Resolution was approved jointly by the House and by the Senate on January 29, 1955 and authorized the President:

To employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores (United States Congress 1955).

The resolution would expire when and if the President determined that: »the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the UN or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress« (United States Congress 1955).

This Resolution helped end the hostile bombing of Formosa (Taiwan), mainly because it showed the determination of the USA. When the Secretary of the State Dulles openly stated the President was seriously considering the use of nuclear bomb, his words were not taken lightly. When the PRC backed down and on April 23, 1955 stated it was willing to negotiate a peaceful solution, which ended the first Taiwan Strait Crisis.

6.2.3.3 The intervention in Lebanon (1958)

In a message to Congress from July 15, 1958, President Eisenhower described the recent insurrections in Lebanon, along the border with Syria, Egypt and part of United Arab Republic. The insurrections were supported by substantial amounts of arms and backed by the official Cairo, Damascus and the Soviet media broadcasting to Lebanon. He said: »The avowed purpose of these activities was to overthrow the legally constituted government of Lebanon and to install by violence a government which would subordinate the independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic« (Eisenhower 1958a).

The President referred to the resolution unanimously passed by the Security Council of the UN, in the absence of the USSR, and authorized the UN observers to visit Lebanon; to his hope for the tranquilization of the situation; and to the outbreak of violence which occurred in Baghdad, Iraq. On the basis of assassinations that happened in Iraq, President Eisenhower expressed his worries for the safety of about 2500 Americans in Lebanon, and concluded that the UN action alone was not enough. Contingents were sent to Lebanon to protect the lives of American citizens and to safeguard the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon.

After the most detailed consideration, I have concluded that, given the developments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the UN Security Council are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. I have considered, furthermore, the question of our responsibility to protect and safeguard American citizens in Lebanon of whom there are about 2,500. Pending the taking of adequate measures by the UN, the United States will be acting pursuant to what the UN Charter recognizes is an inherent right, the right of all nations to work together and to seek help when necessary to preserve their independence. I repeat that we wish to withdraw our forces as soon as the UN has taken further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence (Eisenhower 1958a).

In the radio address the same evening Eisenhower explained how the strategy of alleged civil strife within a nation has already been employed in different wars, and mentioned also the Korean War, where North and South Koreans were supposedly the only parties involved in the conflict, while in fact the North Koreans were being used as puppets by foreign aggressors, the Soviet Communists. Eisenhower also referred to the resolution »Peace through Deeds« adopted in 1950 by the General Assembly of the UN, which called upon nations to refrain from »fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign power« and denounced such action as »the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world« (Eisenhower 1958b).

He also referred to the support obtained by the Congress the previous year, when declaring that »the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East« (Eisenhower 1958b).

On the emergency session of General Assembly of the UN on August 13, 1958, Eisenhower proposed his plan of UN considerations for the situation in Lebanon, Jordan and some other issues connected to the Middle East, including the steps to end and prevent the fomenting of civil conflicts from outside, by foreign states. On August 21 the General

Assembly unanimously passed the resolution, proposed by the Arab countries, referring to the Pact of the Arab League, urging the Secretary General to consult with the Arab states and to pave the way for a smooth withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan (Wright 1959, 114).

Upon the withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon, the administration's assessment of the mission was positive, since the intervention upon the request of the Lebanese government managed to reassure a small and friendly nation, helped unite the Arab countries, and reduce external threats. This view, however, was not shared with Communist and neutralist countries, which considered it a form of military aggression that violated the principles of the UN Charter.

6.2.3.4 Legal basis for the intervention in Lebanon

In the SOU address delivered by President Eisenhower on January 5, 1957, he presented his foreign policy vision and what became to be known as »The Eisenhower Doctrine«, in which he urged the Congress to pass its war making powers on to the President. It also stated that the USA would employ armed force in the struggle against imminent or actual aggression, and would firmly stand in opposition to Communism.

When addressing the Congress on July 15, 1958, Eisenhower referred mostly to US rights and obligations arising from the UN Charter. He said:

The United States will be acting pursuant to what the UN Charter recognizes is an inherent right, the right of all nations to work together and to seek help when necessary to preserve their independence. I repeat that we wish to withdraw our forces as soon as the UN has taken further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence (Eisenhower 1958a).

However, the Charter of the UN, Article 2 also states: »All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the UN« (Charter of the United Nations).

According to this wording, the US intervention may have been contrary to the purpose of the UN »to maintain international peace and security« (Preamble). Further more; members of the UN are obliged »to settle their disputes by peaceful means.«

The Charter, however, allows for exceptions:

- pursuant to »the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense« (Art. 51);
- under the UN or other international competent authority (Art. 2, par. 5; Art. 11, par. 2; Art. 42; Art. 48) and

- upon the invitation by the state in whose territory force is used in pursuance of its sovereignty (Art. 2, par. 1), since the UN is based »on sovereign equality of its members.«

Thus the US sending of military troops to Lebanon on July 15, 1958 can only be justified if it can be proven that the US acted in »collective self-defense«, under the authorization of the UN or upon the invitation of Lebanon. Since there was no authorization by the UN, the remaining two options need to be considered.

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security (Charter of the United Nations).

This implies that the Charter only allows the use of force if there is an attack on the territory of the member state and the self-defense must end when the Security Council takes appropriate measures. This means that the USA could only act in self-defense if its territory was attacked by Lebanon. US territory was not attacked by Lebanon, who and what was in jeopardy, were the US citizens and government agencies (the American Embassy) in Lebanon. Only if US citizens and government agencies in Lebanon were in immediate danger of an armed attack that could not have been dealt with by local authorities, (which would constitute armed attack upon the USA), could the US intervention in Lebanon be justified. On the basis of the analyzed addresses and the studied historical and political situation, this does not seem to have been the case in Lebanon. There was, however, an invitation by the pro-Western oriented Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, who asked for American assistance, and whose request could not be ignored.

So far only the international authorizations for the US intervention in Lebanon have been presented. What is of greater importance for the present dissertation is to see what kind of domestic legal coverage or authorization Eisenhower actually possessed. In the case of military engagement in Lebanon, President Eisenhower only vaguely referred to the joint resolution of March 7, 1957, known as the Middle East Resolution, in which both branches of the US Government committed »to assist the nations in the general area of the Middle East to maintain their independence«, and demonstrated the will »of the American people to preserve peace and freedom in the world«.

The Middle East Resolution also recognized that US supported without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East. In his statement to the Congress of July 15, 1958, Eisenhower informed the Congress that troops had been deployed »to protect American lives and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon in the preservation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence, which have been deemed vital to United States national interests and world peace« (Eisenhower 1958a). Also The Middle East Resolution recognized the preservation of independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East as vital to American national interests and world peace.

Eisenhower also said that sending American soldiers to Lebanon was not an act of war and that he had consulted the Congress leaders (Fisher 2004, 124). Eisenhower's behavior in the intervention in Lebanon was more unilateral than his conduct in the case of Formosa and other cases of potential intervention. Generally, he was a great advocate of bilateral and collective actions, who firmly believed that collective judgment of the President and the Congress created a stronger impression, supported national prestige and strengthened the presidency.

6.3 John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 1961–1963, (Democrat), 35th President

Kennedy came from a wealthy Roman Catholic family of 9 children. His father was a self-made man who served as Ambassador to Great Britain in 1937. John was educated in private schools and after graduating »cum laude« he joined the Navy in 1940, and became a torpedo boat commander. In 1946 he was first elected to the House of Representatives of the US Congress, and in 1952 to the Senate (Greenstein 2000a, 60–67). He was a young public official with great sense of idealism and attractive personal and political qualities; however, his prominence seems to have been greatly based on political connections of his family, his war record and society wedding with Jacqueline Bouvier (Burner 1988).

In 1960 Kennedy tried to win Democratic presidential nomination by placing emphasis on foreign policy and criticizing military gap between the USA and the USSR. He succeeded by defeating Nixon for an exceedingly small margin of only 0,5 percent (Greenstein 2000a, 60–67). Kennedy came to power at the time of belief that executive powers belonged to the President and the Congress seemed quite eager to let the President decide about foreign policy and war-making powers. The difference between the foreign and domestic policy was more accentuated than ever. Also the Democratic control of the Congress was not convincing, since a substantial number of Southern Democrats on domestic issues voted with the Republicans (Schlesinger jr. 2004, 170). Despite the ambition of his predecessor to balance the powers between the executive and the Congress, Kennedy proposed a strong presidential leadership. He focused on achievable goals, such as tax reduction, tariff liberalization, and in his final year increasingly on civil rights, due to the sad events happening in the South. He also sent a Civil Rights Bill to the Congress (Greenstein 2000a, 63). The issue of civil rights was some kind of forgotten promise-Kennedy's early campaign included support for civil rights of black Americans, which he set aside at the beginning of his presidential mandate. He was determined to avoid conflicts and not to provoke the Southern conservatives, thus his inaugural and SOU addresses only briefly touched upon this issue, focusing instead on foreign policy and fight against Communism. However, by the end of 1961 it became increasingly more difficult to ignore the issue of civil rights. Black migration into northern cities was on the rise, judicial support for civil rights demands and more determined civil-rights movement in the South were increasing and also Kennedy's initiatives became much more civil-rights oriented. He appointed a record number of blacks to high positions of public officials, developed a strategy to promote and protect black voters and their registration, to punish discrimination, and proposed a very liberal and

conscious legislation. This led to a decrease of Kennedy's popularity in the South, party schism and conservative opposition (Skowronek 2008, 55–61).

Kennedy was often criticized for publicly engaging in open anti-Communist rhetoric, for the needless risky conduct to the USSR, with confrontations reaching the peak in October 1962, when the »Cuban missile crisis« pushed the world to the brink of the nuclear war. In his SOU address delivered on January 30, 1961 he asked for a major increase in military spending and was probably already preparing Americans for the forthcoming, even though secret, operation in Cuba. The address led to an awkward and counterproductive start of relations with the USSR. The debacle of »the Bay of Pigs Invasion« did not help improve bad relations with the USSR. In June, 1961 Khrushchev threatened to turn the surrendered city of Berlin over to Communist East Germany, Kennedy reacted by publicly humiliating the Soviets, tensions grew worse and all led to the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962.

Kennedy probably failed when dismantling the system of official meetings established by Eisenhower, and relied on ad-hoc consultations instead. In Cuban missile crisis he drew on the experience from the »Bay of Pigs Invasion« and solved the crisis by secretly negotiating with the Soviets. He promised to dismantle the missile systems from Greece and Turkey, in return for the Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba (Greenstein 2000a; Schlesinger jr. 2004; Fisher 2004, 125–127). As Schlesinger (2004, 176) put it, Kennedy was probably right to act as he did in the missile crisis. Even in retrospect the crisis appears acute, peculiar, urgent and secretive, and as such probably did require a unilateral executive decision-making. However, what Schlesinger questions is the fact, that instead of representing a unique situation or an exception to presidential conduct of foreign policy and crisis management, this kind of presidential executive decision making has asserted itself as a rule.

6.3.1 Analysis of variables

6.3.1.1 Integrative complexity index

Kennedy was attributed 2,18-the highest index in integrative complexity of all the presidents since 1948 (Thoemmes and Conway III 2007, 203).

6.3.1.2 Political time category

Kennedy followed the Eisenhower Republican presidency which interrupted a long Democratic reign. Skowronek identified him as a politician of articulation, affiliated with the existing regime and trying to build on the positive establishments from the past, which were supposed to provide guidance also for the future. His leadership was thus based on

controversy of interest management, grounded in the established power on the one side, and the problematic balancing of interests, which led to party schism and the breaking apart of majority coalition (Skowronek 2008, 60–64). Kennedy, just like Polk had done much sooner, tried to uphold the regime commitments, advocate and support his party orthodoxy, but also doubted the regime survival. Because Kennedy’s liberalism ultimately came at the expense of the old majority coalitions, a new appeal to the political interests of the nation seemed absolutely necessary; this, in turn, led to sectarianism in the development of the regime (Skowronek 2008, 60–64).

6.3.1.3 Political composition of Congress between 1961 and 1965

Table 6.5: Political composition of Congress (1961–1965)

87 th Congress 1961–1963	Senate: Dem. 65; Rep. 35 House: Dem. 263; Rep. 174
88 th Congress 1963–1965	Senate: Dem. 67; Rep. 33 House: Dem. 258; Rep.177

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 212).

6.3.2 Key events between 1961 and 1963

Table 6.6: Key events between 1961 and 1963

1961	Failed CIA-backed invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles, the Bay of Pigs Invasion.
	Kennedy meets with Soviet premier Khrushchev in Vienna.
	East Germany erects the Berlin Wall.
1962	A black student (James Meredith) admitted into the University of Mississippi.
	Buildup of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the Cuban missile crisis.
1963	Nuclear Ban Treaty agreed upon by the USSR, Great Britain and USA.
	Demonstrations for equal rights for blacks in Washington.
	Hot-line communications installed between Moscow and the White House.
	Kennedy assassination in Dallas, on November 22.

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 213).

6.3.3 Military intervention

6.3.3.1 The Bay of Pigs invasion (1961)

When Kennedy became President in 1961, the Cold War dominated international arena and thus also the American Foreign Policy. Communism was spreading and very close to America, Cuba was turning into a Communist outpost, drifting increasingly to the left and closer to the Eastern Block, in reaction to America's efforts to isolate it internationally.

Many believed that a Communist state so close to America could jeopardize not only the security of USA, but of the Western Hemisphere as a whole. American intelligence, which became very developed and active during the presidency of Eisenhower, estimated that Cuban underground opposition to Castro could not successfully overthrow the regime on its own, thus the idea of training and helping the anti-Castro opposition started to evolve. The secret landing of well trained anti-Castro Cuban exiles would lead the uprising against the regime, followed by a revolt of increasingly discontent population. Kennedy learned about the plan as President Elect before his inauguration, during the briefing meetings with the leaving President Eisenhower.

The scenario was supposed to remain secret, the operation would be officially attributed to Cuban exiles, and America's intervention should remain hidden. The presumptions, however, proved to be inadequate. Despite the government's efforts to keep the invasion plan covert, the region where Cuban exiles were getting organized soon became common knowledge, particularly in Florida. Also the establishment of training camps in Guatemala failed to remain a secret even to Castro. He was expecting and getting ready for a coup d'état sponsored and organized by America, partly on the basis of a similar scenario that happened in 1954 in Guatemala.

On April 17, 1961, 1400 Cuban exiles started the invasion at the Bay of Pigs on the South of Cuba. The landing point of the invasion was moved from its original position, from the coastal city of Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs. CIA continued to assure the President that if the brigade ran into difficulties it could »go guerrilla« in the Escambray Mountains. But if these mountains were indeed in the vicinity of Trinidad, eighty miles of impassible swamp lay between the Escambrays and the new landing site. Moreover, the exiles had long since ceased guerrilla training in favor of conventional warfare (Vanderbroucke 1984, 475).

This explains why the operation could not end well. In fact, the Cuban exile invasion force came under heavy fire immediately upon landing, since the airstrike on Cuban airfields that took place two days earlier, failed to destroy Cuban military planes, which were thus used

to attack the exile invaders. When American complicity in the invasion became obvious, President Kennedy cancelled the second planned air strike.

When the exile soldiers landed, bad weather and swampy ground only worsened the situation in which the exile opposition ended. Also Castro was well prepared for the attack and sent 20000 troops to counter the attack. Also the emergency air support, ordered by Kennedy when the situation became very serious, failed and the invasion was crashed the next day, with nearly 1200 members of the exile Brigade surrendered and more than 100 killed.

6.3.3.2 Legal basis for The Bay of Pigs invasion

Kennedy had no legal basis for the invasion, and strictly speaking, the invasion was not supposed even to be associated with the US. Every intention was to disguise the operation and sell it as operation of Cuban opposition in exile. The original plan consisted of two phases; the first phase was the landing of exile force and their establishment of provisional authority. This phase heavily based on the presumption that Cuban population would join the opposition and overthrow Castro's government. In support of this also a powerful radio station broadcasting anti Communist propaganda, intended to motivate Cuban population and prepare it for a »revolution.« The plan envisaged also a chance of failure and in this case the second phase would come into action, namely the US intervention (Gleijeses 1995, 27). This second phase actually happened and this is why The Bay of Pigs Invasion needs to be considered as an example of American military intervention abroad.

Due to the secrecy of the operation, President Kennedy acted without obtaining prior authorization by the Congress or without any kind of UN support. When the debacle of invasion forced him to address the issue, he avoided going directly to people of the US, but explained the course of events in the Bay of Pigs when addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 20, 1961.

Kennedy described the situation in Cuba as: »A struggle of Cuban patriots against a Cuban dictator« (Kennedy 1961). He also said that the US openly sympathized with Castro's opposition, but were firmly decided not to deploy the US armed forces in an armed intervention, because that would be contrary to American traditions and international obligations. »While we could not be expected to hide our sympathies, we made it repeatedly clear that the armed forces of this country would not intervene in any way. Any unilateral American intervention, in the absence of an external attack upon ourselves or an ally, would have been contrary to our traditions and to our international obligations« (Kennedy 1961).

However, he also pointed out: »If the nations of this Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration, then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation« (Kennedy 1961).

As can be read in a declassified CIA report on the Bay of Pigs Invasion, written by Inspector General Kornbluh in October 1961 and made public in 1988, the Bay of Pigs Invasion was a covert paramilitary operation intended at overthrowing the Communist Castro government, in which the hand of the US government should not appear. The plan was prepared and authorized by the President Eisenhower, and officially started in March 1960 (Kornbluh 1988).

If any kind of authorization was actually given to the operation, it could only be the presidential authorization of CIA secret operation. No other form of congressional or international authorization was either asked for or obtained by the President Kennedy prior to committing US military to foreign hostilities.

6.4 Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1963–1969, (Democrat), 36th President

Greenstein (2000a) described his presidency as the one of phenomenal failures and towering achievements but most people remember it for the 1965 intervention in Vietnam, which was probably not based on a sufficient assessment of its potential cost and consequences. Skowronek believes that »The Johnson presidency remains one of the great riddles of our time« (Skowronek 2004, 325), and sees Johnson as »a master politician who self-destructed at the commanding heights.« By the time Johnson entered the White House, three of his predecessors have moved the nation towards war in Vietnam. These were Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy. Johnson's term of office therefore started at the time when presidential unilateral decision-making seemed to be at its peak and did not provoke any constitutional questions or doubts (Schlesinger jr. 2004, 177).

Johnson's childhood was marked with a conflicting relationship of his parents, his father had a drinking problem and was a poor provider, whereas his mother pressed for education and pushed him in school. In 1931 Johnson went to Washington as a secretary of newly elected Texas congressman, and in 1937 he got elected to the House of Representatives and served 5 and a half terms, to be continued in the Senate. In 1953 he became the leader of the Democratic Party and a year later the youngest majority leader in the Senate history. In the 1960 campaign, Johnson, as John F. Kennedy's running mate, was elected vice President. On November 22, 1963, when Kennedy was assassinated, Johnson was sworn in as 36th President of the USA (Goodwin 1977). First he continued with the measures that were left unfinished by the death of President Kennedy, and managed to enact a new civil rights bill and a tax cut. His next steps were the so called »War on Poverty« program, which he turned into a priority on his agenda (Greenstein 2004, 79–81). In 1964 he ran for reelection against the conservative Barry Goldwater, and was swept into office with 61 percent of the vote and the widest popular margin in American history, more than 15.000.000 votes (Greenstein 2004, 79–81). In January 1965 he put a very ambitious social program, called »The Great Society«, which represented a major improvement in the voting rights for African Americans, medical care for the poor and the elderly, education and much more (Greenstein 2004, 79–81). Johnson was a devoted believer in exclusive and spacious presidential authority to deploy force abroad in the service of American foreign policy (Schlesinger jr. 2004, 178). In August 1964, after President Johnson received reports about attacks against US vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, he ordered retaliatory actions against the North Vietnamese (Fisher 2004, 128). In February 1965, following the attack on an American base in Pleiku, Johnson ordered US air raids on

North Vietnam and in July of the same year Johnson announced open-ended military commitment to defend South Vietnam. He became politically trapped in a continually escalating spiral of involvement in a war he did not want. At the same time, his Great Society domestic programs which represented his true policy interests were left largely unimplemented and drained of resources by the conflict in Indochina (McPherson 1972). Towards the end of his second term his approval level declined substantially as the antiwar protests continued (Greenstein 2004, 83). His decision not to run for reelection in 1968 caught the nation by surprise, but according to Skowronek, »gave him precisely what he needed most at the time, the restoration of a semblance of credibility as a faithful son, who was simply doing his duty« (Skowronek 2004, 356).

6.4.1 Analysis of variables

6.4.1.1 Integrative complexity index

Johnson's integrative complexity index was 2.10, which is above the average calculated since 1948, and among the highest of this period.

6.4.1.2 Political time category

Johnson belonged to the category of articulation, and was an orthodox innovator. He managed to build great superstructure on the regime foundations, was a loyal regime booster and confident believer in what the future regime should be like. Orthodox innovators tend to push their agenda and adjust reality to it, instead of doing the opposite; their authority is not flexible and generally do not get reelected, for they cannot control events for such a long period. Johnson was a great orthodox innovator, who wanted to take the New Deal liberalism of F.D. Roosevelt to a Great Society (Skowronek 2008, 136).

6.4.1.3 Political composition of Congress between 1963 and 1969

Table 6.7: Political composition of Congress (1963–1969)

88 th Congress 1963–1965	Senate: Dem. 67; Rep. 33 House: Dem. 258; Rep. 177
89 th Congress 1965–1967	Senate: Dem. 68; Rep. 32 House: Dem. 295; Rep. 140
90 th Congress 1967–1969	Senate: Dem. 64; Rep. 36 House: Dem. 246; Rep. 187

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 214).

6.4.2 Key events between 1964 and 1968

Table 6.8: Key events between 1964 and 1968

1964	War on Poverty Bill adopted in August.
	Civil Rights Bill-July 3 rd , the most sweeping legislation of this kind in the US history.
	Gulf of Tonkin Resolution-Johnson is authorized to repel any attack in Vietnam.
1965	SOU address in which Johnson presents his Great Society Program.
	Viet Cong attack on the American base and retaliation of the USA.
1966	SOU address in which Johnson declares that the USA can afford its international commitments while building a Great Society. First African American to hold a cabinet position.
1968	Offensive of North Vietnamese.
	Martin Luther King assassinated.
	Nixon elected President (Johnson announced he would not run for another term of office).

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 215).

6.4.3 Military interventions

6.4.3.1 The Tonkin Gulf Incident (1964)

The involvement of America in Asia started at the time of President Truman, who entered into what was to become The Korean War, and continued throughout the presidencies of Eisenhower and Kennedy. However, most historians agree that the main responsibility for engaging America in Vietnam lies on the President Johnson. In August, 1964, President Johnson reported attacks against US destroyer Maddox and ordered retaliatory attacks against the North Vietnamese, and thereby further escalated American involvement in the Vietnam War. In his radio address to the people from August 4, 1964, he said:

As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply. The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two US destroyers with torpedoes. The destroyers and supporting

aircraft acted at once on the orders I gave after the initial act of aggression. We believe at least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no US losses (Johnson 1964a).

The Johnson administration claimed it had done nothing to provoke the alleged attack and President Johnson, who called it outrageous, asked the Congress on August 5, 1964, to adopt a joint resolution.

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against US naval vessels operating in international waters, and I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two US aircraft were lost in the action. After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia (Johnson 1964b).

Johnson added that based on increasing attacks and display of hostilities from North Vietnamese he decided it was the right time to remind the Congress of America's commitment to the goals expressed in international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954 and to ask the Congress » to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom« (Johnson 1964b).

He also repeated the USA was not interested in the escalation of conflicts and a wider war: »We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area.« The President explained that America had no territorial interests in Asia and its sole purpose was peace. »This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence« (Johnson 1964b).

6.4.3.2 Legal basis for the Tonkin Gulf Incident

As mentioned before, President Johnson asked the Congress for a Joint Resolution that would grant him the powers to act in South East Asia. He reminded the Congress of America's commitments under international agreements, such as Geneva Accords of 1954.

The resolution passed only two days later, unanimously in the House of Representatives and merely with two dissenting votes in the Senate. The Resolution, officially known as The South East Resolution authorized the President »as Commander in Chief, to

take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression« (United States Congress 1964).

The constitutional impact of the resolution was, however, not clear (Schlesinger jr. 2004, 179–207), and its vague language gave the President remarkable scope of action and the authority to use force as he saw fit. The reasons behind the adoption of this resolution were, not surprisingly, vital interests of America and the world peace.

The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SACDT), the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the SACDT, requesting assistance in defense of its freedom (United States Congress 1964).

The resolution provided that it would remain in force until the President determined that »the peace and security of the Southeast Asia area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by the UN or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of Congress« (United States Congress 1964).

Johnson was very fond of carrying the resolution in his pocket and showing it to anyone who wanted to question or who doubted his authority, and considered the Resolution a functional equivalent of a declaration of war (Crabb and Holt 1989, 140). One of the reasons for such a swift and unanimous voting of the Congress was the apparent moderate response of Johnson to the incidents in Asia, which proved to be only false impression. Another very problematic issue was connected with the Tonkin Gulf incident. Maddox, the first (and perhaps the only) attacked US ship was indeed not on a routine patrol, as had been claimed, but was engaged in a sensitive intelligence mission. On the basis of new evidence the Congress actually repelled the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1971 (Crabb and Holt 1989, 142).

6.4.3.3 The Dominican Intervention (1965)

Reacting to a Dominican counter-coup of April 24, 1965 that turned into a generalized revolt within days, on April 28, the US government sent the first contingent of what would eventually become 23,000 troops, to occupy the capital Santo Domingo. Dominicans agreed to a settlement by September 1965, but the fact and the style of US intervention stirred worldwide criticism.

President Johnson perceived the Dominican crisis as part of the Cold War antagonism between the USSR and the USA, and felt strongly about potential Communist takeover of the

Dominican Republic. The decision to intervene was partly based on the pleas from the Dominican military to send American troops in support. They were initially resisted, since the USA was reluctant to intervene in the domestic affairs of a sovereign country. In the Statement delivered by President Johnson on April 28, 1965 he said:

The United States Government has been informed by military authorities in the Dominican Republic that American lives are in danger. These authorities are no longer able to guarantee their safety and they have reported that the assistance of military personnel is now needed for that purpose (Johnson 1965a).

Johnson committed the troops despite the lack of solid evidence of Communist danger; and was perhaps more concerned about the domestic political fallout from the fear of »another Cuba« in the Western Hemisphere than about the real danger of a Communist takeover. Castro's victory in Cuba increased American worries about potential loss of control over the region, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 nearly escalated into a nuclear war and definitely provided more than enough evidence of all the dangers that Communist nearness could bring to America and the Western Hemisphere. In the Dominican Republic situation was not very stable since the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo in 1961, followed by electoral victory of Juan Bosch. This ended the 30 years of dictatorship, but also of political and economic stability, which America probably preferred even to democracy. Bosch disappointed the expectations of Kennedy's administration, local instability was increasing, and when his government was overthrown, America did not intervene. On the contrary, friendly relations were soon established between America and the ruling junta. However, popular sentiment was slowly moving back, and towards the democratically elected Bosch (Brands 1987, 607–624).

As mentioned, the USA acted upon the request of the Dominican ruling junta, which made the situation different from the Lebanese, where the democratically elected President Chamoun asked for American assistance in 1958. In the Dominican Republic the ruling junta did not constitute democratically elected government and thus the legitimacy of its request was not very convincing. Because of this reason the Johnson administration apparently tried to include the Organization of American States (OAS), but the interest was apparently more formal than real, since there was no real consultation prior to American intervention, and the OAS was only notified about it. President Johnson and his administration feared that lives of Americans in the Dominican Republic were seriously endangered and needed help:

American lives are in danger. I have ordered the Secretary of Defense to put the necessary American troops ashore in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in

the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this country. This same assistance will be available to the nationals of other countries, some of whom have already asked for our help (Johnson 1965a).

6.4.3.4 Legal basis for the Dominican Intervention

Due to the American policy of nonintervention, each administration tried to find some legal coverage for individual interventions. This has not always been easy. In the case of Dominican intervention, there was no congressional authorization granted to the President Johnson prior to the intervention. He acted on the basis of information on inability of the Dominican forces and government to provide for the security of American citizens, and upon the request for help by the ruling junta. The action was consistent with Johnson's interpretation of executive prerogatives vested in him by the Constitution. However, immediately after the dispatching of marines, the President informally started to brief individual members of the Congress, and apparently there were no objections raised to the intervention. When Johnson met with congressional leaders to explain the situation, he laid particular emphasis on the consensus behind the decision to intervene, and declared that intervention was the »unanimous« recommendation of all officials in the policy stream, from the ambassador in the Dominican Republic through the secretaries of state and defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Brands 1987, 617). However, the only legal authorization President Johnson could refer to at the time of intervention, was the Constitution with its definition of Presidential prerogatives.

6.4.3.5 The Vietnam war, 1964–1965

During 1964–65, Johnson launched several operations transforming Vietnam into a full-scale American conflict, and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution granted the President sweeping war-making powers. Operation 34A (with its full name Operational Plan 34A) was a highly-classified U.S. program of covert actions against North Vietnam; operation »Rolling Thunder«, was the air war against North Vietnam, launched in March 1965; and the most fatal, the introduction of US combat troops which culminated in the open-ended commitment of American forces the following July.

Not long after having been sworn as the President, Johnson was informed about military and political chaos in South Vietnam, where Viet Cong was expanding its territorial control. Johnson thus faced a serious dilemma: whether to abandon South Vietnam and let the Communists win, or to send American soldiers there to save it. A Communist take over would

not only endanger East Asia, but also undermine the reputation and credibility of the USA. It was not so much about South Vietnam as it was about America, for which Vietnam presented some kind of a test for proving its strength and reliability in the global fight against Communism. Also the American commitment to the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was strongly pressing upon Johnson not to abandon Vietnam, unless he wanted to push the world towards another world war.

On February 5, 1965 a surprise Viet Cong attack on the US army base at Pleiku in South Vietnam happened, and President Johnson responded with a plan consisting of two phases. The first was direct response to the attack, and the second phase consisted of retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. He approved the start of the »Operation Rolling Thunder« with sustained bombing of North Vietnam that would gradually intensify. In March, 1965, the first US ground troops were sent to Vietnam. Vietnamese Communist Party reacted to the increased military commitment by starting to implement a prolonged war strategy intended to wear out the Americans and eventually withdraw from Vietnam. However, Johnson felt this was a crucial test for America and only increased American involvement, despite the death toll the war was taking. He increased the number of troops and by June 1965 the number already exceeded 50,000, soon to be followed by many more. By 1966 the troop level in Vietnam reached 535,000, the US dropped more bombs on Vietnam than during the whole period of the World War II, and its monthly cost was about 2\$ billion (Greenstein 2004, 80–86). Under the new defense Secretary Clark Clifford and under the pressure of greatly eroded support of the war, in his Address to the Nation on March 31, 1968 Johnson announced he was ordering a redirection of Vietnam policy by reducing the bombing of North Vietnam and was prepared to negotiate.

Tonight, I renew the offer I made last August—to stop the bombardment of North Vietnam. We ask that talks begin promptly, that they be serious talks on the substance of peace. We assume that during those talks Hanoi will not take advantage of our restraint. We are prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations. So, tonight, in the hope that this action will lead to early talks, I am taking the first step to deescalate the conflict. We are reducing, substantially reducing, the present level of hostilities. And we are doing so unilaterally, and at once (Johnson 1968).

6.4.3.6 Legal basis for the Vietnam War

According to Schlesinger jr. (2004, 182), the SEATO Treaty had never been invoked in the Kennedy administration nor did any other previous administration interpret the pact in the way the Johnson administration chose to do it. However, the essential argument for Vietnam

rested on the constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief. In the argumentation written by Department of State, Office of Legal Adviser, published in June 1966, the reason or justification of US involvement in Vietnam was as follows:

In response to requests from the Government of South Vietnam, the United States has been assisting that country in defending itself against armed attack from the Communist North. International law has long recognized the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack. South Vietnam and the United States are engaging in such collective defense consistently with international law and with United States obligations under the UN Charter (Department of State 1966).

It is true that the Charter of the UN defends territorial integrity and independence of sovereign states, and claims the safeguard of international peace and security is the greatest obligation of member states, but Article 51 of the same Charter also states that: »Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security« (Charter of the United Nations).

Thus, Article 51 maintains the principle that Member States who find themselves in the situations covered by the Article have the inherent right to act upon a long-recognized principle of international law. The Article is designed to make clear that no other provision in the Charter shall be interpreted to impair the inherent right of self-defense referred to in Article 51.

Three principal objections have been raised against the availability of the right of individual and collective self-defense in the case of Vietnam: a) that this right applies only in the case of an armed attack on a UN Member; b) that it does not apply in the case of South Vietnam because the latter is not an independent sovereign state and c) that collective self-defense may be undertaken only by a regional organization operating under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Department of State 1966, 1087).

Firstly, the right of self-defense is an inherent right and is in no way limited by membership in any kind of organization. But even if this were so, also the UN Charter specifies that the UN are responsible for ensuring that non-Member States act in accordance with the principles of the UN insofar as it is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security (Charter of the United Nations, Article 2).

Secondly, South Vietnam was not an independent state but according to the Department of State its government applied for UN membership, which was recommended by the General Assembly and blocked only due to the USSR's veto in the Security Council.

South Vietnam was not independent because North Vietnamese Communist regime failed to act in accordance with Geneva Accords of 1954, which provided for a temporary division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel into a Communist North and Non-Communist South. Elections under international supervision were to be held in both the North and South two years after the signing of the Accords. Aggression of one zone against the other was explicitly forbidden (Geneva conventions 1954). Another important thing is that the Republic of Vietnam had been recognized as a separate international entity by approximately 60 states of the world, and had been admitted as a member of a number of specialized agencies of the UN (Department of State 1966, 1090).

Thirdly and according to the same source, namely the Department of State, there is nothing in the Charter of the UN that would limit the right to collective self-defense only to some kind of a regional organization. The main support of this argument is to be found in the Charter itself, since its Chapter VII, entitled »Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,« includes the previously cited Article 51, which emphasizes the inherent right of self-defense of a country as the highest right and priority. It is the Chapter VIII, entitled »Regional Arrangements,« which deals with relations among members of regional arrangements in particular, but as stated in Article 51: »Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN.«

As the article written by the Office of the Legal Adviser in the Department of State summarizes, South Vietnam had the right to defend against armed attack from the North Vietnam and to organize collective self-defense in participation with other countries. United States acted upon the request of South Vietnam. The American action was in compliance with international law, and consistent with its obligations deriving from the Charter of the UN. However, once the question whether the Vietnam War was a mistake appeared, there was no way in finding a united response to it (Ravanel 1974).

In the case of American military engagement in Vietnam, the action of the President was based primarily on Article II of the American Constitution, but also on international commitments arising from the SEATO treaty, which had been confirmed by the US Senate, and the Joint Resolution of August 7, 1964 (United States Congress 1964), passed by the US Congress. Prime authority of the President, however, seems to be based in his Presidential Prerogatives as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy. In late 1960s and early 1970s Vietnam became the most divisive and controversial issue. There were serious conflicts between the Congress and the President, which actually led to the adoption

and enactment of the War Powers Resolution over Nixon's veto in November 1973. Not only people also the Congress was divided over the issue, which later led to the argument over constitutional powers granted to the President and to the Congress in relation to warfare.

Johnson was largely left unrestricted when in February 1965 he ordered the bombing of North Vietnam in retaliation for Viet Cong attack on American barracks, and in July of the same year he ordered the deployment of additional 50.000 troops in Vietnam.

Why did the Congress go along? Before July's decision the administration had talked about severe measures that would include the calling up of reserves, the raise of taxes and other so to send only additional 50000 soldiers seemed acceptable.

The Congress acted in a similar measure when providing statutory basis for the Gulf of Tonkin operation, which later turned out to be one of the biggest mistakes. President Johnson ordered air strikes against North Vietnamese bases and the following day asked the Congress for a joint resolution. Two days after the request was presented, the resolution passed Congress and Johnson considered it »the functional equivalent« of a declaration of war. Despite the fact that Johnson promised not to expand US participation in Vietnam, he used the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to send thousands of Americans into the war for South Vietnam, justifying it with the »domino theory«: If Vietnam were to come under Communist rule, the other nations of Southeast Asia would fall as well (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 121). Crabb and Holt (1989, 141) explain the reasons for such a swift and clear adoption of the resolution with moderate military response of US army to North Vietnamese attacks, which made Johnson look moderate. As it turned out later, the Maddox (ship supposedly attacked by the North Vietnamese, which caused retaliation and led to the adoption of joint resolution) had not been on a routine patrol, but on intelligence mission, and even the reported attacks had not been completely reliable and convincing. In 1971 the Congress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

Opposition to Vietnam War was growing and the Congress was ever more unhappy, trying to end it by cutting resources for its funding. Under such pressure, Johnson withdrew from presidential election and paved the way for the election of Richard Nixon. In 1970 the Congress refused to fund operation in Cambodia (Nixon), and it used the same approach also in Indochina-the proposal to curb presidential powers to use armed forces abroad was under congressional consideration until 1973, when it came out in the form of The War Powers Resolution and became law in October 1973, which Nixon vetoed but both Houses voted to override it in November 1973.

6.5 Richard Milhous Nixon, 37th President, Republican (1969–1974)

Nixon was a politician with a very controversial personality, distrustful and self-destructive nature on the one side, and a desire for constructive achievements on the other. He was fearful of surprises, and mistrustful of his own responses, a person who disliked personal encounters and meetings (Neustadt 1990, 204).

He had a stressful and troubled childhood, with diametrically opposed parents. His father was a violent man, and mother pious and devoted person. Nixon reacted to this reality by excelling at school, earning tuition for Harvard, but then decided to reduce the cost of studying by staying in his home town. After having graduated from law school he practiced law for a while, then joined the army and became supply officer in the Pacific (Greenstein 2000a, 92–95). In 1946 Nixon was elected to the Congress (controlled by Republicans) for the first time. He became a House Committee on UN-American activities (HUAC) member, which investigated the famous Hiss case in 1948 and made Nixon a celebrity. Hiss, who used to serve as F.D. Roosevelt's foreign policy adviser, was accused of spying for the USSR and later convicted of perjury, and was sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment (Greenstein 2000a, 96). In 1950 Nixon got elected to the Senate and was a running mate to Eisenhower in 1952 presidential elections. In 1960 he won the Republican presidential nominations, but lost elections to Kennedy, to be followed by winning the nomination and elections in 1968. His election in 1968 had climaxed a career unusual on two counts: his early success and his comeback after being defeated for President in 1960 and for Governor of California in 1962 (White house 2009).

Reconciliation was the first goal set by President Richard M. Nixon. The Nation was painfully divided, with turbulence in the cities and war overseas. His foreign policy was marked with the belief that the USA and the USSR should maintain sufficient forces to defend themselves and should stop competing for superiority, his intention was to remove US combat forces from Vietnam and to normalize relations with China. Cold War politics in the pre-Nixon period distorted an evolving international politics marked by multiple centers of power in military, diplomatic, economic, and even cultural and scientific affairs. Within each policy area, fundamental differences among political actors, including states, governments, and international organizations, were not permitted to express themselves but were ensnared in a bipolar struggle that magnified and rigidified conflicts. Regional powers, like China, Japan, and the states of the European Community, were unable to play appropriate local roles. American expansionism, initially largely prompted by a perceived Soviet threat, resulted finally in unifying otherwise diverse and conflicting international groupings against the

United States (Kolodziej 1976, 152). It has often been said that the so called »Nixon Doctrine« represented the beginning of a new era in the American foreign policy.

The Nixon Administration sees American foreign policy during the preceding two decades as having been determined by one overriding reality: that it was the United States alone that could conduct a policy designed to stem the tide of Communist aggression and to build a reasonably stable framework of international cooperation. »Nixon saw the situation had changed, other states were coming back strong, American people were dissatisfied with the ongoing Vietnam War, Communist block fragmented and America found itself in the situation of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union« (Brzezinski 1971, 4–5).

The words taken from Nixon's first inaugural address prove his determination to bring change: »Time has come to lead the world out of the valley of turmoil and onto that high ground of peace« (Nixon 1969a). As a broad generalization, the principal foci of Nixon's doctrine could be said to include Vietnam as an immediate problem, the American-Soviet relationship, relations with American principal partners, both in Western Europe and Japan, and finally the question of American-Chinese relations. Other issues and regions were of secondary importance (Brzezinski 1971, 5–6). In the so called »Silent majority address« of November 3, 1969, Nixon announced the program of »vietnamizing« the Vietnam search for peace, lashed out against anti-war demonstrators and called on »the great silent majority« of Americans to back him up (Nixon 1969b). Nixon took his authority as Commander-in-Chief very seriously and merged it with the principle of troop protection. He followed closely the course of action adopted by Kennedy in the case of Cuban missile crisis and acted without having consulted the Congress when he authorized an incursion of American troops into Cambodia in April 1970 (Schlesinger 2004, 189).

Cambodia was believed to be a Communist safe haven for the supply of their forces in South Vietnam. Schlesinger (2004, 192) says Cambodia did not present a threat to the security of the USA and definitely not a sudden emergency; no similar case of a massive attack on a neutral country to protect the American troops in a third country has ever happened before.

In 1971 Nixon announced his plans to visit China and engage in official relations, and in 1972 the Watergate system offices were broken in. The White House accused the act, but as it turned out later, the Nixon Administration was carrying out political espionage itself. The Senate Committee discovered Nixon's taping system and demanded the tapes, which Nixon refused on the basis of »separation of powers.« Brzezinski (1971, 20) however believed Nixon faced a very difficult situation, since he was the first postwar President to conduct a

foreign policy in the setting of domestic dissent. None of his predecessors had labored under a similar handicap.

With a list of damaging disclosures, in 1974 the deliberation on the process of impeaching the President started and Nixon’s support on Capitol Hill evaporated. On August 8, 1974, Nixon resigned.

6.5.1 Analysis of variables

6.5.1.1 Integrative complexity index

Nixon’s integrative complexity score was exactly the same as Clinton’s, i. e. 2,03. This is a reasonably high and above average index.

6.5.1.2 Political time category

Nixon is a prime example of preemptive leader, whose leadership style is based on the balancing between the old and the new, trying to find the third way, a new and different course. The message of preemptive leaders is equivocal, and their opposition to the established regime is preemptive and not reconstructive. Like Wilson (before) and Clinton (after), also Nixon first reached the presidency in a three-way race, featuring a big schism within the dominant party. He rose to power with a party opposed to the previously established regime, but once his mandate has started, he suffered to assert his independence from the dominant ideological factions in both parties. It is interesting to see that most of »third way« leaders (Tyler, Johnson, Nixon and Clinton) got themselves in the impeachment trouble. Preemptive leaders drive defenders of the established system to purge them as threats to constitutional government itself (Skowronek 2008, 106–112).

6.5.1.3 Political composition of Congress between 1969 and 1971

Table 6.9: Political composition of Congress (1969–1971)

91 st Congress 1969–1971	Senate: Dem. 57; Rep. 43 House: Dem. 245; Rep. 189
92 nd Congress 1971–1973	Senate: Dem. 54; Rep. 44; others 2 House: Dem. 254; Rep. 180
93 rd Congress 1973–1975	Senate: Dem. 56; Rep. 42; others 2 House: Dem. 239; Rep. 192; other 1

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 217).

6.5.2 Key events between 1969 and 1974

Table 6.10: Key events between 1969 and 1974

1969	»The Silent Majority Speech« announcing the policy of »vietnamization« of warfare in Vietnam.
1970	Incursion into Cambodia; student anti-war protests and mass demonstrations.
	Reduction of US troops in Vietnam down to 340.000.
1971	New York Times starts to publish the classified Pentagon Papers study of the Vietnam War.
	Nixon wants to stop and prevent further leaks and thus forms the »secret plumbers group.«
1972	Nixon visits Peking and Moscow as first US President. North Vietnamese attack the demilitarized zone and US retaliate by bombing Hanoi and Hiphong.
	There is a break-in of National Party Headquarters at Watergate.
	Nixon is reelected.
1973	Cease fire in Vietnam, establishment of liaison offices in China and US, vice President Spiro Agnew resigns and Gerald Ford becomes the first appointed, non elected, vice President.
	War Powers Act enters into force, setting a 60-day limit on presidential commitment of troops without congressional authorization.
1974	Nixon's impeachment is recommended on the basis of three articles and on August 8, 1974 Nixon resigns.

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 218–219).

6.5.3 Military intervention

6.5.3.1 Cambodia (1970)

Nixon's policy of disengagement from the unwinnable war in Vietnam paradoxically led to a wider war in Laos and Cambodia. The paradox becomes less enigmatic if we know that the Cambodian operation was not new on the US military agenda. In fact, already in August 1964 the US Joint Chiefs recommended »hot pursuit« operation against Cambodian sanctuaries, »raids against the enemy« in November 1966, and »an extension of the war« in April, 1967 (Girling 1971, 531). The reason for inaction throughout the described period, were the

international circumstances unfavorable to any wider war. The situation in 1970 was very different. The Vietnam War was coming down, Americans were withdrawing, the bombing of North Vietnam stopped and the pro-American Lon Nol Government in Cambodia was asking for help. The fall of Lon Nol regime would pose serious danger to South Vietnam and this was partly the reason for Nixon's decision to strike against Cambodian sanctuaries. In his address on April 30, 1970, Nixon said: »To protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization programs, I have concluded that the time has come for action« (Nixon 1970a).

The action was thus intended to assure the success of America's, or better Nixon's, policy of Vietnamization and also to protect the lives of remaining American soldiers in Vietnam. A series of military operations was undertaken by the US and South Vietnamese troops, with the purpose of defeating North Vietnamese forces in the border regions of Eastern Cambodia, where the Communist bases had been established and protected by Cambodian neutrality in a series of sanctuaries. Nixon explained the reasons and the background of the operation:

For the past 5 years-as indicated on this map that you see here-North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam. Some of these extend up to 20 miles into Cambodia. The sanctuaries are in red and, as you note, they are on both sides of the border. They are used for hit and run attacks on American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. These Communist occupied territories contain major base camps, training sites, logistics facilities, weapons and ammunition factories, airstrips, and prisoner-of-war compounds. For 5 years, neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation. Even after the Vietnamese Communists began to expand these sanctuaries 4 weeks ago, we counseled patience to our South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our own commanders (Nixon 1970a).

Meanwhile, efforts continued to restrict the President's discretion in committing the United States in Southeast Asia or in employing American forces in the area. In December 1969, an amendment to the defense appropriations bill prohibited the President from introducing ground troops in Laos and Thailand. This restriction did not hinder the President from ordering a military incursion into Cambodia in the spring of 1970. The President's action made Cambodia a charge of the United States, enlarged civil strife, and threw American support behind the now defunct Lon Nol regime at the expense of other competing groups, including the ultimately victorious Khmer Rouge. The American military action was taken

with the cooperation of the Cambodian and South Vietnamese governments, but in the absence of preceding congressional knowledge or approval.

6.5.3.2 Legal basis for the incursion in Cambodia

Despite the curiosity that Nixon was actually a lawyer and could have shown more interest in legal side of his foreign interventions, this was not the fact. According to Schlesinger jr. (2004, 190) Nixon asked the State Department lawyers to prepare legal case covering the incursion in Cambodia only after it had already started. His argument for intervention was-as so often before him-the Constitution and there from deriving presidential prerogatives related to the conduct of foreign policy, including the deployment of armed forces outside America. Additionally, the war in Indochina had the support of a joint Tonkin Gulf Resolution, since the operation was needed to assure the safety for the withdrawing and the remaining American troops in Vietnam.

This was a very questionable legal basis, because invasion in a neutral country is something very different from having authority to wage an already begun war. If the understanding of the presidential war powers of Johnson and Nixon are compared it can be seen that Johnson's administration believed an attack on a country far from America could impinge directly on America's security, and unilateral presidential action was, in view of this threat, therefore justified and sanctioned. An argument in defense of Johnson's action is that he actually restricted unilateral action to Vietnam, namely a country with which the US was in a state of war, and rejected recommendations to carry the war into the neutral states of Laos and Cambodia.

Nixon's administration interpreted presidential war powers differently, allowing for unilateral presidential action only in case of potential attack on American forces, but in practice actually took the war into two new and neutral countries, Laos and Cambodia. Nixon apparently believed he had legal justification for war anywhere in the world, as long as he could claim the American forces were in danger.

In Vietnam the Congress was reluctant to use the power of the purse and withdraw funds for financing the war in order to stop it, but in 1969 and 1970 it did vote against the funding of American ground troops in Laos, and in 1971 added an amendment to the Defense Procurement Authorization Act in which American policy was committed to end all military operations of the US in Indochina as soon as possible (Schlesinger 2004, 194).

Nixon's doctrine was firmly based on the idea of protecting the American troops and stated the President would use military force whenever and wherever in North Vietnam or

South East Asia he had found it necessary for the purpose of protecting American soldiers. This justification, however, could not be used to cover American bombing of Cambodia in March 1973 (Beland and Waddan 2006).

6.6 Gerald R. Ford, 1974–1977 (Republican), 38th President

Gerald Ford entered the White House in the most unusual way. After the resignation of Spiro Agnew, Ford became the first appointed Vice President in 1973, and upon the resignation of Richard Nixon in 1974, Ford became the 38th President of the US and the first to enter the office upon his predecessor's resignation and thus the first individual to be President without having been elected to either the presidency or the vice presidency (Greenstein 2000a, 112–114). However, the accession of Gerald Ford to the presidency was a relief for many Americans (Mervin 1990, 50).

Gerald R. Ford Junior was born in Omaha on 14 July 1913 by the name of Leslie Lynch King. His mother left his father when he was two years old. They moved to Michigan where his mother married Gerald R. Ford, and he adopted his stepfather's name. Ford was a very successful football player, but he did not carry the sport any further, because he saw no future in the sport. In the fall of 1935 Ford accepted a position at Yale University as assistant coach, where he later decided to study law. In 1938 he was accepted as a part-time law student on a trial basis, and in 1939 he had the school's permission to study full time. In 1941 he received his law degree as top third of his class. In 1942 Gerald Ford enlisted in the army where he had a short military career, and was discharged as lieutenant in December 1945. He returned home where his political career started to take off. In 1948 Ford won the Republican Party primaries and was voted into Congress in November of the same year. He served in the House of Representatives from 3 January 1949 to 6 December 1973, where he developed a good relationship with Nixon. Nixon supposedly thought about adding Ford to the ticket in 1968, due to his proven leadership abilities of the Republican Party in the Congress and increasing popularity, which was partly built on television coverage of his opposition to the administration's Vietnam policy. However, Ford aspired to become the Speaker of the House and Nixon decided to run with Spiro Agnew, which turned out as a winning combination (University of Groningen 1999)

When it became public that Vice President Agnew was involved in some scandals, and was forced to resign, Nixon became the first President to act under the twenty-fifth Amendment, and offered Ford the job of Vice President. Ford was sworn in as Vice President of the United States on 6 December 1973, and after Nixon's resignation on 9 August 1974,

Ford became the 38th President. Ford found himself in an unusual position of succeeding a disgraced man and lacking the legitimacy of popular election, thus he felt the need to demonstrate difference from his predecessor. He turned to his unquestionable decency and very soon managed to build himself a great reputation (Neustadt 1990, 259).

When the Watergate scandals broke out, Ford at first defended his friend Nixon, but attacked his administration. Eventually, when there was no chance of bringing Nixon back, he withdrew his support to Nixon, but after a month in office changed attitude again, and surprised all by deciding to give Nixon a full pardon. He thought that this was best for the country, but this decision very possibly made him lose the 1976 elections. Neustadt's guess was that Ford had done it out of sympathy and conscience, since it is believed that Ford had been informed of Nixon's supposed suicidal attitude (Neustadt 1990, 259).

Ford had a very unenviable presidency. He inherited an administration plagued by war in the Middle East, inflation, and fears of energy shortage. He also had to restore the credibility of the President and try to rebuild the confidence in government after the Watergate scandals. Soon after the pardon of Nixon, he declared war on inflation, which also back slashed on him, as recession was already on its way. Ford's reputation dropped together with his prestige and the media and the public withdrew support (Neustadt 1990, 259).

In foreign policy, President Ford and the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger continued the policy of *détente* and Nixon-Ford years might well be called the Kissinger era. Kissinger, who was Nixon's national security advisor, articulated and justified the Republican approach to foreign policy and personally carried out much of his private and public diplomacy. *Détente* and relaxation of tensions seemed to be the only option, since Americans were becoming tired of their foreign policy burdens. Before Vietnam the Congress rarely questioned presidential prerogatives, whereas in the post-Vietnam era the attacks on the »imperial presidency« became much more articulated (e.g. War Powers Resolution) and the belief that President had to be restricted and controlled wide spread (Spanier 1992, 186–189). A critical point in the long-term effort to stabilize mutual nuclear deterrence was Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II), and after Nixon's resignation President Ford and the Soviet Union leader Brezhnev, at a 1974 meeting in Vladivostok, set new limitations upon nuclear weapons (Spanier 1992, 204). Ford tried to maintain US power and prestige after the collapse of Cambodia and South Vietnam, and preventing a new war in the Middle East remained a major objective. However, he was widely criticized for failing to use the powers at his command to respond successfully to external challenges, such as the Soviet military buildup, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Communist gains in the Caribbean and

Central America (Crabb and Holt 1989, 233). In 1976, Ford lost the reelection to Carter. It was one of the closest elections in history.

6.6.1 Analysis of variables

6.6.1.1 Integrative complexity index

Ford’s integrative complexity index is 1,87, which is among lower scores of modern presidents.

6.6.1.2 Political time category

Ford belongs to the category of articulation; he inherited the established regime and only tried to distance himself from its problematic issues, while building upon its healthy foundations. (Skowronek 2008, 86). Ford followed a President from his own party whose administration was plagued by scandals, war in the Middle East, inflation, and fears of energy shortage. Upon entering the office, Ford lacked control of Congress faced significant economic difficulties, while trying to heal a nation divided in the aftermath of a long and arduous war. He also had to restore the credibility of the President and try to rebuild the confidence in government after the Watergate scandals. Soon after the pardon of Nixon, he declared war on inflation, which also back slashed on him, as recession was already on its way. Ford’s reputation dropped together with his prestige and the media and the public withdrew support (Neustadt 1990, 259).

6.6.1.3 Political composition of Congress between 1973 and 1977

Table 6.11: Political composition of Congress (1973–1977)

<p>93rd Congress 1973–1975</p>	<p>Senate: Dem. 56; Rep. 42; others 2 House: Dem: 239; Rep. 192; other 1</p>
<p>94th Congress 1975–1977</p>	<p>Senate: Dem. 61; Rep. 37; others 2 House: Dem. 291; Rep. 144</p>

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 220).

6.6.2 Key events between 1974 and 1976

Table 6.12: Key events between 1974 and 1976

1974	Ford becomes President upon resignation of Nixon; on September 9, he pardons Nixon.
1975	US civilians evacuated from Saigon and Communists overrun the country; Mayaguez incident, in June CIA illegal operation is revealed.
1976	President Ford escapes two assassination attempts; defeated by Carter in general election.

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 221).

6.6.3 Military intervention

6.6.3.1 The Mayaguez incident (1975)

On May 12, 1975, The United States merchant ship Mayaguez was seized in an area where international shipping was customary. However, Cambodia claimed the ship had been seized within its own territorial waters. About two hours after the seizure the United States Departments of State and Defense and President Ford were informed. For approximately ten days prior to the seizure, the Cambodians have fired on or even captured more than 20 ships and fishing boats, and after the seizure of the Mayaguez they claimed that espionage ships, operating as fishing boats, had been present in their territorial waters on daily basis. In the days before the seizure, the Cambodians continued to stop and inspect the ships, even interrogate their crews, but release them afterwards, seizures continued and a warning was issued to the ships traveling through those waters (Paust 1976, 794).

When President Ford was informed he met with the NSC and issued a 24 hour ultimatum to the Cambodians to release the US ship and its crew. A similar message was delivered to Peking by the American delegation there, but no reply was received from either side. On May 13, the US launched an air attack on the Cambodian boats escorting the Mayaguez crew to the mainland because they feared it would be much more difficult to rescue the crew once they reached the mainland. The planes unsuccessfully bombed and tear gassed the ships, trying to divert the direction of the boat carrying the crew. They destroyed a couple of escorting ships, but the one with the crew proceeded to its destination. On May 14, the USA addressed the UN for the first time during the rescue mission with the request to obtain

the release of the ship and its crew. Despite this, the NSC and the President Ford decided to engage the marines. This second attack started just when the crew and its ship were being released, it was carried out through air raids on a mainland airport, on unused oil refinery and the landing of marine force (Paust 1976, 802).

6.6.3.2 Legal basis for the intervention in Mayaguez

When President Nixon ordered American troops into Cambodia in May 1970, his action provoked the Congress to draft a proposal which would somehow limit the powers of the President to deploy American armed forces abroad. The proposal was debated for a very long time and in November 1973 came out in the form of the War Powers Resolution. This was the legal basis upon which presidents from Ford on mostly based their interventions on.

When confronted with allegedly an illegal seizure of a United States merchant ship, the Ford Administration was bound to respond in accordance with the basic commands of the UN Charter. Article 2(3) of the Charter states: »All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered«.

The Ford Administration argued that armed force was necessary to protect the lives of American citizens and property, including appropriate measures of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

However, the US was not authorized by the Charter to use force to protect the property of the American citizens. The only possible argument was the protection of American lives, which should have been proportionate with the Cambodian form of violence. Since there was no evidence of actual danger of crew members' lives and moreover, a few days before the incident another crew consisting also of some Americans had been released safely and unharmed, the American response was obviously not proportionate.

If nothing else it is clear that the American response to the seizure was definitely disproportionate, and the justification based on the use of force in self defense not very plausible.

As President Ford wrote in identical letters addressed to the Honorable Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Honorable James O. Eastland, President pro tempore of the Senate, dated May 15, 1975: »This hostile act was in clear violation of international law« (Ford 1975).

Ford's determination and prompt reaction was met with great support in the Congress, but slowly, when facts and information started to come in, the President's action began to lose

its appeal. The administration did not spend much time and effort to employ diplomacy, the information channels were not functioning, and miscommunication led to unnecessary bombing of the mainland against the orders of the President, after the crew had been released.

Despite the fact that Ford had voted against the War Powers Resolution while still a member of the House and considered it unconstitutional, he did report of his action on the basis of the very same Resolution.

6.7 James Earl (»Jimmy«) Carter, 1977–1981 (Democrat), 39th President

In 1976 the Democratic hopes for a restoration of the normal state of affairs ushered by F.D. Roosevelt and the ending of Republican interregnum of Nixon and Ford, were reasonably high. But a very narrow winning margin for Jimmy Carter (who defeated Ford with only 50,1 percent of the popular vote, and with 57 electoral vote margin the smallest plurality since 1916) together with a problematic legacy from Ford, did not increase his chances for success (Skowronek 2008, 86). Carter's presidency started on optimistic notes with high and populist symbolism, to reach towards the end of his mandate the lowest level of support in the history of presidential polling, particularly due to high inflation and economic stagnation (Greenstein 2000a, 129). Carter's presidency initially implied a positive change, since this was the first time in eight years that the President and Congress were in the hands of the same party (Mervin 1990, 55). The presumption, however, proved wrong and Carter had quite a difficult leadership.

Jimmy Carter was born on October 1, 1924, in a small farming town of Plains, Georgia, and grew up in the nearby community of Archery. His father, James Earl Carter, Senior, was a farmer and businessman, and his mother, Lillian Gordy, a registered nurse.

He was educated in public schools and received a bachelor's degree from the United States Naval Academy in 1946. He served in the Navy and rose to the rank of lieutenant. When his father died in 1953, he resigned his naval commission, returned with his family to Georgia, and took over the Carter farm. He quickly became the leader of the community, serving on county boards supervising education, the hospital authority, and the library. In 1962 he won election to the Georgia Senate, and became Georgia's governor on January 12, 1971. He was the Democratic National Committee campaign chairman for the 1974 congressional and gubernatorial elections. His political experience was quite modest and none of it on the national level. However, in December 1974, he announced his candidacy for President of the United States, won his party's nomination, and was elected President on November 2, 1976.

Carter's candidacy had the support of Martin Luther King's father and wife, because he advocated racial justice and equality. Religion was central to his personal life and political leadership, and his presidency was marked with populist manners, such as his behavior and simplicity (Bourne 1997). After having taken the oath as the 39th President, he walked to the White House accompanied by his wife. During his presidency Carter delivered addresses to

the Nation from his office, wearing a sweater and seated in front of the fireplace, which was supposed to symbolize the need for energy saving.

His support measured in March 1978 was high. 78 percent of population included in the Gallup poll expressed their support for his policies (Greenstein 2000a, 134). As a »born-again Christian«, Carter became the »redeemer of the American tradition«, trying to find consensus in America's historical role as the defender of democracy and individual liberty. He hoped to mobilize support on the platform of »human rights« and the liberal tradition once united with the American foreign policy (Spanier 1992, 227). The Soviets did not embrace Carter's emphasis on human rights, which they felt was directed against them, and his policy of support for Soviet dissidents was viewed in Moscow as a fundamental attempt to undermine the Soviet system. All of this led to a postponement of the SALT (Spanier 1992, 228). Carter's organization of foreign affairs was quite chaotic and he relied heavily on the conflicting advice from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, whose influence on Carter was substantial (Greenstein 2000a, 135).

In 1978 the Senate approved the treaty transferring control of the Panama Canal to Panama, and in the same year Carter became personally involved in the negotiation of peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, the so called Camp David reconciliation (Ribuffo 1988, 20-21).

In November 1979, Iranian militants seized the US Embassy in Teheran and took more than 50 Americans as hostage. They were held captive for the next 444 days, throughout the remainder of the Carter administration. Unable to obtain the release of the hostages by diplomatic means, Carter opted for a military intervention, which ended with the malfunctioning of two helicopters out of eight, and a problem on third. Carter was therefore forced to abort the operation (Fisher 2004, 158–159).

Carter was challenged for the 1980 Democratic nomination by Senator Edward Kennedy and won the nomination. However, the economic situation was worsening, the hostage crisis continued and the public support plunged to 21 percent in July 1980. The Republicans made the situation even worse, when they nominated a candidate whose communicative skills exceeded by far those of Carter: Ronald Reagan.

6.7.1 Analysis of variables

6.7.1.1 Integrative complexity index

Jimmy Carter's index was second lowest after Eisenhower's, and that is 1,87.

6.7.1.2 Political time category

Carter represents a prime example of the politics of disjunction, affiliated with a vulnerable regime and committed to rehabilitate the troubled establishment. He recognized serious problems in the governing establishment, promised continuity with the basic commitments and dedicated to sort out governmental problems. It was a mission impossible and no President ever has succeeded in such a task (Skowronek 2008, 86–92).

6.7.1.3 Political composition of Congress between 1977 and 1981

Table 6.13: Political composition of Congress (1977–1981)

95 th Congress 1977–1979	Senate: Dem. 61; Rep. 38; other 1 House: Dem. 292; Rep. 143
96 th Congress 1979–1981	Senate: Dem. 58; Rep. 41; other 1 House: Dem. 276; Rep. 157

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 222).

6.7.2 Key events between 1974 and 1977

Table 6.14: Key events between 1977 and 1981

1977	Carter pardons approximately 10000 Vietnam draft evaders; gives his »fireside chat« from the White House library wearing a cardigan sweater; seeks enactment of his energy program.
1978	Congress votes to turn over Panama Canal to Panama (in 1999).
	Camp David Summit with Begin and Sadat ends with the signing of a framework for Mideast peace.
	Carter calls for voluntary wage and price control to bring down inflation.
1979	Nuclear reactor accident at Three Mile Island, Pa.
	Carter and Brezhnev sign SALT II treaty.
	Carter gives the speech on »crisis of confidence« and accepts resignation of four members of Cabinet.
	Soviet Union invades Afghanistan.
	63 Americans taken hostage at US Embassy in Teheran.
1980	US retaliate against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with grain embargos.
	Rescue attempt of American hostages in Iran fails.

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 223).

6.7.3 Military intervention

6.7.3.1 Iran, »Desert One« rescue effort (1980)

The USA and Iran had an allied history of cooperation, which became very unstable when America failed to support the Iranian revolution and continued to express its support to the overthrown government of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. When America allowed the Shah to enter the USA and be treated for cancer in an American clinic, this was perceived as »betrayal« and as countermeasure, 52 American diplomats were taken hostage at the Embassy in Teheran. They were kept captive for the following 444 days, throughout the Carter presidency, who was unable to obtain the release of hostages by diplomatic means and therefore ordered a military raid, involving eight American helicopters and six planes with commandos on board. Two helicopters crashed due to technical problems and Carter cancelled the operation. When leaving the site, another helicopter and plane crashed; eight Americans died, several were injured.

6.7.3.2 Legal basis for »Desert One« rescue effort

In his SOU address of 1980, President Carter explained, what later became known as »the Carter Doctrine«: »An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the USA, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force« (Carter 1980a).

When reporting to the Congress, President Carter relied on the War Powers Resolution and presidential prerogatives vested in him as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.

This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's powers under the Constitution as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces, expressly recognized in Section 8(d) (1) of the War Powers Resolution. In carrying out this operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them (Carter 1980b).

Carter could have informed the Congress of his plans prior to the intervention, but he decided to consult the legislators only after the rescue operation had started. However, Carter reported within 48 hours, which was the period the Resolution allowed for.

6.8. Ronald Reagan, 1981–1989 (Republican), 40th President

On February 6, 1911, Ronald Wilson Reagan was born in Tampico, Illinois. He attended high school in nearby Dixon and then worked his way through Eureka College. Upon graduation he became a radio sports announcer, and after successfully passing a screen test in 1937, he won a contract in Hollywood. During the next two decades he appeared in 53 films. Reagan described his early years as »one of those rare Huck Finn-Tom Sawyer idylls«, implying racism, violence, drunkenness and superstition in mid-nineteenth-century America. Reagan was raised in a family with an alcoholic father and a religiously fervent mother and soon started to create a distance between reality and fantasy (Schaller 1992, 5–6).

While his film career stagnated, Reagan became an active member of the actors union and soon the President of the Screen Actors Guild, where he became embroiled in disputes over the issue of Communism in the film industry; his political views shifted from liberal to conservative, and his views of the Communist threat often mirrored movie plots (Schaller 1992, 5–6). He toured the country as a television host, and turned into a spokesman for conservatism. In 1966 he was elected Governor of California by a margin of one million votes and he was reelected in 1970. Ronald Reagan won the Republican presidential nomination in 1980 and chose as his running mate former Texas Congressman and UN Ambassador George Bush. Voters troubled by inflation and by the year-long confinement of Americans in Iran swept the Republican ticket into office. Reagan won 489 electoral votes to 49 for President Jimmy Carter (Greenstein 2000a, 150). Ronald Reagan has made a career out of being underestimated and the same mistake was made in 1980, when his critics wrote him off as an amiable, ex-movie actor, ill-qualified for the presidency. What they forgot was that by that time Reagan had served a valuable apprenticeship in the communications industry and had completed two terms as governor of one of most populous and wealthiest states, California (Mervin 1990, 74). In fact, Reagan's victory was of landslide proportions, but when he was preparing to take office, the omens for a successful presidency did not look very good. Against the odds, Reagan and his administration managed to establish sufficient mastery over the machinery of government, to bring about some major changes in the direction of public policy (Mervin 1990, 94). Reagan obtained legislation to stimulate economic growth, curb inflation, increase employment, and strengthen national defense. He embarked upon a course of cutting taxes and Government expenditures, refusing to deviate from it when the strengthening of defense forces led to a large deficit. Reagan believed that government was not a solution to American problems, but American problem instead. And as Cannon (2000,

23) put it, people who listened to Reagan, tended to feel good about him, and better about themselves. A renewal of national self-confidence by 1984 helped Reagan and Bush win a second term with an unprecedented number of electoral votes.

Reagan was also known for his transformation in the 1950's from a liberal Democrat to a conservative Republican; he used to be a great supporter of Franklin Roosevelt but slowly, together with his rise to affluence in Hollywood and with his employment as corporate spokesman for General Electric Company, Reagan started to adopt the values and ideas of the Republican Grand Old Party (GOP). In 1962 Reagan actually registered as Republican and in 1964 his fundraising speech »Time for choosing« for the campaign or presidential candidate Barry Goldwater received enthusiastic response, and brought Reagan support for his own candidacy for governor, which he won. Columnist D. Broder described Reagan's performance as the »most successful political debut« (Broder in Schaller 1992, 12). In the speech Reagan used some of the phrases coined by Roosevelt, Lincoln and Churchill, and said, among others: »You and I have a rendezvous with destiny. We can preserve for our children this, the last best hope of man on earth, or we can sentence them to take the first step into a thousand years of darkness« (Reagan in Schaller 1992, 12).

When Governor, Reagan relied greatly on his aides who provided him the information and program details, while Reagan himself focused mostly on negotiation and public communication. His aides created some sort of small memory cards which Reagan memorized and used as reference points when speaking publicly. Reagan's effective use of television was repeatedly underestimated. Cameras loved him and consequently also people did (Schaller 1992, 27–33). He maintained the same approach also as President. Despite many doubts about his involvement, he did set the tone and direction of his policies, had strong general convictions and set administration priorities, among which defense build-up was on prime position. He was tactically flexible and adjusted easily to changed circumstances and political opposition, and he readily delegated authority. However, he was too dependent on his aides' advice and generally never questioned it, which he paid dearly, when Iran-Contra affair, involving six of his National Security advisers, came out. The affair was about covert and illegal arms sales to revolutionary regime in Iran, which had been explicitly forbidden by the Congress. The arms sales profits were used to finance rebel Contra guerillas trying to overthrow left-leaning government in Nicaragua (Greenstein 2000a, 152–155). November 1986 was probably the worst month in Reagan's presidency. Due to the reports that started to leak, Reagan was compelled to inform the public about secret arms sales to Iran. The political

backlash from what became known as the Iran-Contra affair was devastating, and Reagan’s Gallup job approval rating fell for 16 percent (Mervin 1990, 151).

Despite all this, Reagan will be remembered as one of more successful and most loved presidents, because he allowed people »to feel that anything was possible, as in a daydream« (Schaller 1990, 57).

6.8.1 Analysis of variables

6.8.1.1 Integrative complexity index

1.90 is the index of Reagan’s integrative complexity, which is close to the average calculated for presidents since 1948.

6.8.1.2 Political time category

Reagan represents the politics of reconstruction, where he followed the footsteps of presidents Jefferson, Lincoln, and F.D. Roosevelt. He was a repudiator of the governing regime in collapse His policy rose on the bankruptcy of the old establishment. Reconstruction politicians deftly turn the predecessor’s difficulties into a proof that something fundamental had to be wrong with the previous regime. Reagan proposed to cast away the past assumptions and start afresh, without the old burdens (Skowronek 2008, 92–98).

6.8.1.3 Political composition of Congress between 1981 and 1989

Table 6.15: Political composition of Congress (1981–1989)

97 th Congress 1981–1983	Senate: Rep.53; Dem.46; other 1 House: Dem.242; Rep. 189
98 th Congress 1983–1985	Senate: Rep. 54; Dem. 46 House: Dem. 286; Rep. 167
99 th Congress 1985–1987	Senate: Rep. 53; Dem. 47 House: Dem. 253; Rep. 182
100 th Congress 1987–1989	Senate: Dem. 55; Rep. 45 House: Dem. 258; Rep. 177

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 224–225).

6.8.2 Key events between 1981 and 1989

Table 6.16: Key events between 1981 and 1989

1981	Reagan survives assassination attempt; largest tax cut in nation's history passes (29 July).
	Sandra Day O'Connor-first woman justice of the Supreme Court.
1982	Reagan rules out new taxes and admits that a balanced budget is not achievable by 1984.
	Leonid Brezhnev dies.
1983	Soviet Union was referred to as »the Evil Empire«.
	Strategic defense initiative.
	Reagan orders US marines to invade Grenada
1984	Reagan calls for improved relations with the Soviet Union and meets Soviet foreign minister Andre Gromyko in the White House.
	Reagan is reelected.
1985	Gorbachev becomes Soviet General Secretary. ReaganGorbachev summit meeting is held in Geneva.
1986	Iran-Contra scandal emerges;
	The Reykjavik summit-plans to reduce nuclear weapons.
1987	The commission investigating Iran-Contra affair blames Reagan for letting the situation get out of control. Reagan-Gorbachev summit held in Washington, where the first Cold War pact on nuclear arms reduction was proposed and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (IRNF) Treaty signed in December.
1988	Gorbachev announces withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
	IRNF Treaty is ratified.

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 226–227).

6.8.3 Military interventions

6.8.3.1 Lebanon intervention (1983)

Deployment of marines to Lebanon was an effort of Reagan's administration to bring peace to Lebanon and the Middle East. In the summer of 1982 the Israelis invaded Lebanon, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) promised to withdraw. First Reagan intervened in

Lebanon as part of multinational peacekeeping force (together with France and Italy), with the goal of restoring sovereignty to the Lebanese government and making PLO withdraw. He explained that the troops were not to be engaged in combat, and American, Italian and French armed forces were only supposed to supervise the withdrawal.

A non-combatant mission turned violent when terrorist attacks on US Embassy and other facilities started. Despite the imminent hostilities, Reagan deployed the troops on the same legal basis as Ford and Carter did, namely on the basis of his constitutional prerogatives. US troops started arriving on August 25, and only one day before, Reagan reported to the Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution. US troops numbered 800 when they came to oversee the withdrawal of PLO, and their number later increased to 1200 and 1700. In the meantime the Congress was debating whether the situation in Lebanon really was of imminent hostilities and whether to follow the War Powers Resolution, extending the maximum allowed period of stay in Lebanon to 90 days, or some kind of war declaration should be adopted.

From August on, first victims on the American side were reported, operation started its escalation and US forces became involved in a civil war. Nevertheless the President did not describe the situation as involvement in hostilities. On October 23, 1983 a terrorist attack-suicidal truck crash at the Beirut airport-demanded more victims on the American side and increased efforts of the Congress to bring the marines back home, which drastically changed the situation. »The posture of neutrality« disappeared (Fisher 2004, 160), Reagan ordered military strikes and terminated US participation in the multinational force. Operation that began as up to 30-day long peacekeeping multi-national mission, turned into a war that continued for almost two years.

6.8.3.2 Legal basis for the Lebanon intervention

The Congress adopted Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act (approved on June 27, 1983) which expressed approval of action to that point, but was not really sure about the future direction (Crabb and Holt 1989, 145).

Encouraged by Reagan's consistent support to the spirit of cooperation as a sign of successful foreign policy, both Houses adopted a joint resolution on September 28, 1983, which served as the necessary specific statutory authorization and gave Reagan additional 18 months.

»Today's vote in the Senate, authorizing, as the House did yesterday, the continued presence of the US peacekeeping force in Lebanon, sends a strong signal to the world:

America stands united, we speak with one voice, and we fulfill our responsibilities as a trustee of freedom, peace, and self-determination« (Reagan 1983a).

The Resolution was retroactive and became operative on August 29, 1983, but Reagan disagreed with this date, claiming that isolated acts of violence did not constitute involvement in hostilities, despite the American victims. He also believed that setting a fixed duration for the intervention was unwise and claimed his decision to use force had been based on the Constitution, and that he felt no obligation to seek congressional authorization once the 18 month period would expire.

I believe it is, therefore, important for me to state, in signing this resolution, that I do not and cannot cede any of the authority vested in me under the Constitution as President and as Commander-in-Chief of United States Armed Forces. Nor should my signing be viewed as any acknowledgment that the President's constitutional authority can be impermissibly infringed by statute, that congressional authorization would be required if and when the period specified in section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution might be deemed to have been triggered and the period had expired, or that section 6 of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution may be interpreted to revise the President's constitutional authority to deploy United States Armed Forces (Reagan 1983b).

6.8.3.3 Grenada intervention (1983)

On October 25, 1983, only two days after the terrorist attack in Lebanon, American marines together with contingents of members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) invaded Grenada in the Caribbean (Connell-Smith 1984).

Members of Reagan's administration referred to the operation as »liberation« and not »invasion«, and the President called it a »rescue mission«, referring to the evacuation of US medical students from the island (Reagan 1983c). Reagan gave three justifications for the intervention:

We have taken this decisive action for three reasons. First, and of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives, including up to a thousand Americans, whose personal safety is, of course, my paramount concern. Second, to forestall further chaos. And third, to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada where a brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized power, killing the Prime Minister, three Cabinet members, two labor leaders, and other civilians, including children (Reagan 1983d).

Reagan presented the situation in his address of October 27, 1983:

Last weekend, I was awakened in the early morning hours and told that six members of the OECS, joined by Jamaica and Barbados, had sent an urgent request that we join them in a military operation to restore order and democracy to Grenada. They were proposing this action under the terms of a treaty, a mutual assistance pact that existed among them. These small, peaceful nations needed our help. Three of them don't have armies at all, and the others have very limited forces. The legitimacy of their request, plus my own concern for our citizens, dictated my decision. I believe our government has a responsibility to go to the aid of its citizens, if their right to life and liberty is threatened (Reagan 1983c).

At its 43rd plenary meeting on November 2, 1983, the General Assembly of the UN adopted the Resolution 38/7, which »deeply deplores the armed intervention in Grenada, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State« (General Assembly Resolution 1983). A similar resolution was debated also in the Security Council, but its draft proposal was vetoed by the United States.

6.8.3.4 Legal basis for the intervention in Grenada

President Reagan reported to the Congress on the deployment of US forces to Grenada consistent with the War Powers Resolution on the day of the invasion: »This deployment of United States Armed Forces is being undertaken pursuant to my constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces« (Reagan 1983e), and a day before he had addressed congressional leaders with an advance briefing regarding the situation in Grenada prior to the intervention.

On October 28, the Senate voted 64–20 that the sixty-day clock of the War Powers Resolution had started running in Grenada on October 25 (Crabb and Holt 1989, 150).

6.8.3.5 Intervention in Libya (1981, 1986)

Tensions between USA and Libya have been occurring all through the 80s, but the first armed clash regarded Libyan territorial claims over the Mediterranean Sea waters. In August 1981, the US ships, sailing in international waters (according to Libya, their waters) shot down two Libyan planes, which Reagan failed to report to the Congress (Crabb and Holt 1989, 150).

A bigger clash occurred in March 1986, when Libya attacked US planes with missiles and America responded with missiles too. On March 26 (with a two day delay), Reagan reported to the Congress but he neither asked for authorization, nor specified his compliance with War Powers Resolution. He stressed that America responded in self-defense, adding that:

All US aircraft returned safely to their carriers, and no casualties or damage were suffered by US forces. The extent of Libyan casualties is not known. US forces will continue with their current exercises. We will not be deterred by Libyan attacks or threats from exercising our rights on and over the high seas under international law. If Libyan attacks do not cease, we will continue to take the measures necessary in the exercise of our right of self-defense to protect our forces (Reagan 1986a).

In April an attack on a club frequented by US soldiers in West Berlin happened, which was allegedly the work of Libyan actors. America responded in a retaliatory action, with the toll of one plane with two crewmen, but caused about 130 Libyan casualties.

And for us to ignore by inaction the slaughter of American civilians and American soldiers, whether in nightclubs or airline terminals, is simply not in the American tradition. When our citizens are abused or attacked anywhere in the world on the direct orders of a hostile regime, we will respond so long as I'm in this Oval Office. Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission undertaken tonight, a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter (Reagan 1986b).

Reagan also warned about a possible increase of hostilities: »Should Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks against United States citizens not cease, we will take appropriate measures necessary to protect United States citizens in the exercise of our right of self-defense« (Reagan 1986c).

6.8.3.6 Legal basis for the intervention in Libya

On March 26, 1986 Reagan informed the Congress of the Gulf of Sidra Incident in a letter, where he explained the attack and the American response.

On March 24, our forces were attacked by Libya. In response, US forces took limited measures of self-defense necessary to protect themselves from continued attack. In accordance with my desire that the Congress be informed on this matter, I am providing this report on the actions taken by United States Armed Forces during this incident (Reagan 1986a).

The President described the American response as limited and the reason was self-defense, but he also mentioned international law, which regulated the exercise of nations on and over the high seas. Reagan explained the measures were taken on the basis of presidential prerogatives: »The deployment of these United States Armed Forces and the measures taken by them in self-defense during this incident were undertaken pursuant to my authority under the Constitution, including my authority as Commander-in-Chief of US Armed Forces« (Reagan 1986a).

On April 14, 1986, Reagan reported of another American military engagement in Libya, provoked by a bomb explosion in a discotheque in West Berlin. US responded by air strikes on targets in Libya.

Reagan informed the selected members of Congress of this action about three hours in advance, when the planes from the British bases were already in the air, but theoretically, could have still been called back. Most of the informed members supported the action. Two days later, Reagan sent a letter with the report to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, saying:

In accordance with my desire that Congress be informed on this matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution, I am providing this report on the employment of the United States Armed Forces. These self-defense measures were undertaken pursuant to my authority under the Constitution, including my authority as Commander-in-Chief of United States Armed Forces (Reagan 1986c).

He also justified the American response with their right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, adding that the Libyan terrorists had already conducted a series of attacks against US. This time America reacted by taking appropriate measures for self-defense, as it would continue to do also in the future.

These strikes were conducted in the exercise of our right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This necessary and appropriate action was a preemptive strike, directed against the Libyan terrorist infrastructure and designed to deter acts of terrorism by Libya, such as the Libyan-ordered bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin on April 5. Libya's cowardly and murderous act resulted in the death of two innocent people—an American soldier and a young Turkish woman—and the wounding of 50 United States Armed Forces personnel and 180 other innocent persons. This was the latest in a long series of terrorist attacks against United States installations, diplomats and citizens carried out or attempted with the support and direction of Muammar Qadhafi. Should Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks against United States citizens not cease, we will take appropriate measures necessary to protect United States citizens in the exercise of our right of self-defense (Reagan 1986c).

6.9 George Herbert Walker Bush, 1989–1993 (Republican), 41st President

George H. W. Bush entered the office as a faithful son of Reagan's reconstruction, with 53 percent of the vote and very high levels of public approval, but without the bonus of party control in one of the houses of legislature (Mervin 1900, 218). George H. W. Bush was the first true post Cold War President, who witnessed the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the demise of Soviet Union. He was the creator of US led military coalition which triumphed over the forces of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and gained a historical 89 percent approval of his job performance in March 1991. His governmental experience prior to becoming the 41st President was outstanding (Greenstein 2000a, 160). Many believed that his famous saying »Read my lips. No new taxes«, pronounced when accepting the Republican nomination for presidential race (written by Peggy Noonan, the favorite speechwriter of Ronald Reagan), helped him win the presidency and his failure to live up to his promise, helped him lose the reelection. George H.W. Bush came from an affluent community in Connecticut, with father an investment banker and mother from a prominent St. Louis family. After graduation Bush enlisted in the navy, became the youngest combat pilot, and earned the Distinguished Flying Cross for completing a mission in a burning torpedo bomber before bailing out. After the war Bush attended Yale, where he graduated in 1948. He rejected a secure position on Wall Street and instead moved his family to Texas to become a prosperous oilman. With financial worries settled, he started to build his public career (Greenstein 2000a, 161).

Between 1966 and 1970, Bush represented the Houston congressional district in the House of Representatives. Following his second unsuccessful attempt to enter the Senate, President Nixon appointed him ambassador to the UN in 1970, the assignment that Bush took with a lot of enthusiasm and was quite reluctant to leave it in 1972 to come and chair the Republican National Committee (Greenstein 2000a, 162).

In 1974, during the Ford presidency, Bush was appointed chief of the US Liaison Office in the PRC, and thirteen months later he was appointed the CIA director. Bush lost in 1980 elections for party nomination against Reagan, who then chose him as a running mate on his ticket. Bush saw parallels between Truman's accession to the office in 1948 and his own, implying that they both succeeded a powerful and strong reconstructive leader.

In 1988 Bush finally won the Republican presidential nomination and was elected President against Democratic opponent Michael Dukakis with 54 percent of the popular vote (Parmet 1997). In domestic affairs he tried to build on Reagan's legacy and to continue his

revolution, but soon looked outside the American borders to create something new (Skowronek 2004, 431).

In his leadership style Bush was quite different from his predecessor. He rarely addressed the nation from the Oval Office, his rhetoric was far from fluent and appealing, and above all, he lacked the vision Reagan was so good at describing. His lack of vision was well compensated for with deep involvement in the presidency; nevertheless, Bush felt hounded and heavily criticized by the media for this deficiency throughout his term of office (Langford in Medhurst 2006, 19). He was often accused of being somewhat unpredictable, and his episodes of impulsive behavior alternated with periods of depression. Apart from that, Bush was able to express his emotions quite openly (Winter et al. 1991, 236). The »vision thing«, as it became known, reflected the contemporary demand for a more personal form of leadership, expecting that each President would stand for personally distinctive priorities and purposes. However, Skowronek (2008, 104) perceives personal vision in stark contrast to a leadership project, where leaders adhere to an established and set in advance orthodoxy.

Bush was the first President to face a dramatically changed and still changing world, as the Cold War finally came to an end after 40 years of tensions. The Communist empire started to fragment and the Berlin Wall fell (White House 2009). One of more visible features that Bush and Reagan did not have in common was their attitude to the sea change happening in the Soviet Union. Bush remained distrustful of the new East and, unlike Reagan, still considered it a threat. However, the political changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union brought the professionalism out of the President, and he gradually established a close working relationship with Gorbachev, while insisting on the restraints in the US policy towards new nations (Duffy and Goodgame 1992).

Bush vented the powers of his office most dramatically in the Persian Gulf against Iraq and in defense of Kuwait (Skowronek 2004, 431). He committed to it, gathered broad international coalition, won the war and obtained great rate of public approval. This, however, did not help him at home, where he had to raise taxes to solve budgetary problems and consequently lost support and reelection to Bill Clinton.

6.9.1 Analysis of variables

6.9.1.1 Integrative complexity index

2,00 is among higher scores in integrative complexity and also above the average calculated for presidents since 1948.

6.9.1.2 Political time category

George H.W. Bush pertains to the category of articulation. He was indeed an orthodox innovator, not very flexible committed to a fixed agenda, which had to be set in advance. He identified with the established and collective political project on the one side, and advocated President's constitutional independence and personal responsibility for the use of power. He was a faithful son of reconstruction bound to Reagan and came to power affiliated with a set of governing commitments that he affirmed forthrightly as providing a clear and compelling guide to future action (Skowronek 2008, 99). He said: »There's a general thrust and President Reagan set that. We're not coming in to correct the ills of the past. We're coming in, to build on a proud record that has already been established« (Bush in Skowronek 2008, 99).

6.9.1.3 Political Composition of Congress between 1989 and 1991

Table 6.17: Political composition of Congress (1981–1989)

101 st Congress 1989–1991	Senate: Dem. 55; Rep. 45 House: Dem. 260; Rep. 175
102 nd Congress 1991–1993	Senate: Dem. 56; Rep. 44 House: Dem. 267; Rep. 167; other 1

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 228).

6.9.2 Key events between 1989 and 1993

Table 6.18: Key events between 1989 and 1993

1989	In his inaugural address Bush ordered a pause in diplomacy with Moscow.
	In June he announced a suspension of high-level contacts with China, due to a crackdown on student protests.
	Continued diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
	Intervened in Panama which helped overthrow government of Manuel Noriega.
1990	Summits with the Soviet Union continue.
	Joint condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by the Soviet Union and America which leads to an agreed cooperation in ending of Iraqi aggression.
1991	Persian Gulf War begins on January 16 and after 100 hours of fighting, Bush orders cease-fire.
	Bush and Gorbachev sign Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), announcing their co-sponsorship of a Middle East peace conference; after a failed coup attempt on Gorbachev he resigns and the USSR ceases to exist on December 25.
1992	Bush and Yeltsin issue statement officially ending the Cold War on February 1.
	Bush is defeated for reelection by Arkansas governor Bill Clinton.

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 229–230).

6.9.3 Military interventions

6.9.3.1 Panama intervention (1989)

Panama was considered strategic global transportation link and 10 years before the transfer of its control from the hands of USA and back to Panama, as had been accorded in Torrijos-Carter Treaties of September 7, 1977, the US conducted the so called Operation Just Cause, invaded Panama, deposed the dictator Manuel Noriega and dissolved the Panamanian Defense Force. 10.000 troops were sent to Panama to join up with 13.000 American troops already in the Canal Zone. In his Address to Nation on Panama Invasion delivered on 20. December

1989 Bush cited a number of reasons for intervening, but the last ones that actually triggered the operation were:

Last Friday, Noriega declared his military dictatorship to be in a state of war with the United States and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama. The very next day, forces under his command shot and killed an unarmed American serviceman; wounded another; arrested and brutally beat a third American serviceman; and then brutally interrogated his wife, threatening her with sexual abuse. That was enough (Bush 1989a).

Bush based his decision to intervene also on the American experience of working with other nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, who have together been trying to solve the crisis in Panama for several years. American goals were peaceful and only directed at protection of American lives, integrity of the Panama Canal and at combating drug trafficking.

The goals of the United States have been to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty. Many attempts have been made to resolve this crisis through diplomacy and negotiations. All were rejected by the dictator of Panama, General Manuel Noriega, an indicted drug trafficker (Bush 1989a).

Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990, and was taken to the US to be tried on a variety of criminal charges, and US combat troops started to leave Panama and in his SOU address of 1990, Bush said the American troops would leave by the end of February 1990, restricting himself and the administration to War Powers time schedule (Burgin 1992).

Today democracy is restored; Panama is free. Operation Just Cause has achieved its objective. The number of military personnel in Panama is now very close to what it was before the operation began. And tonight I am announcing that well before the end of February, the additional numbers of American troops, the brave men and women of our Armed Forces who made this mission a success, will be back home (Bush 1990a).

6.9.3.2 Legal basis for the Panama intervention

In his written report to the Congress of December 21, 1989, Bush cited the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the obligations arising from the Panama Canal Treaties and his authority as Commander-in-Chief.

The deployment of US Forces is an exercise of the right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter and was necessary to protect American lives in imminent danger and to fulfill our responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties. It was welcomed by the democratically elected government of Panama. The military operations were ordered pursuant to my constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as

Commander in Chief. In accordance with my desire that Congress be fully informed on this matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution, I am providing this report on the deployment of US Armed Forces to Panama (Bush 1989b).

On February 7, 1990, the House of Representatives passed a resolution stating that »the President, with the support of the Congress and the American people, acted decisively and appropriately in ordering United States forces to intervene in Panama after making substantial efforts to resolve the crisis in Panama by political, economic, and diplomatic means in order to avoid resorting to military action« (United States House of Representatives 1990).

However, besides the praise for prompt and efficient intervention, the resolution also tried to prevent Panama from becoming a precedent for US interventions elsewhere, with the following wording: »Action in Panama was a response to a unique set of circumstances, and does not undermine the commitment of the Government of the United States to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries« (United States House of Representatives 1990).

The resolution was concurrent, it passed the House, but the Senate did not act upon it. The »self-defense« justification can be seen as questionable, since 13.000 troops in the Canal probably sufficed for that purpose and there was no need to send additional 10.000. In fact, the OAS condemned the invasion.

Also the claim that US intervention was needed to protect the Panama Canal is not convincing, since the operation of the Canal was not problematic and free transit of ships through the Canal proceeded without problems.

To protect democracy by invading an independent country is obviously quite problematic, and lastly, to combat drug trafficking cannot be a justified reason for military invasion of another independent and sovereign country.

6.9.3.3 Intervention in Saudi Arabia (1990)

After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President Bush sent troops to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, to engage in a purely defensive operation and deter further Iraqi aggression.

In his address to the nation following the deployment of US military in Saudi Arabia, Bush stressed the historical uniqueness of international situation, with the UN Security Council united in its determination to end the aggression of Iraq and make it withdraw from Kuwait. The President also expressed the US commitment to this goal.

And this past Monday, the UN Security Council approved for the first time in 23 years mandatory sanctions under chapter VII of the UN Charter. These sanctions, now enshrined in international law, have the potential to deny Iraq the fruits of aggression while sharply limiting its ability to either import or export anything of value, especially oil. I pledge here today that the United States will do its part to see that these sanctions are effective and to induce Iraq to withdraw without delay from Kuwait (Bush 1990a).

US immediately responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and military build up in Saudi Arabia was impressive. The US planes and ships started to patrol the Saudi border with the main purpose of protecting Saudi Arabia and preventing a potential attack on the ally country. Saudi Arabia had great geopolitical importance; it represented a very important regional actor and was the leading oil supplier.

Already in November the planned defensive operation was about to turn into something else. President Bush doubled the troops with the intention to start offensive war against Iraq. When Security Council adopted the Resolution 678, which authorized member states to use all means, including force, to compel Iraq to withdraw, military action was not far.

6.9.3.4 Legal basis for the intervention in Saudi Arabia

The Bush administration did not try to obtain authority from the Congress, but instead created a multinational alliance and encouraged the UN Security Council to authorize the use of military force. This broad international coalition signaled the American recognition of international community and its importance, and it was also very useful for the US, since it financed most of the costs of military action. On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678, authorizing member states to use all necessary means to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. The Congress should have acted here, by either supporting military action or voting against it. In every case, it should have acted upon the Resolution since it obviously impacted upon the use of US military forces.

Some scholars have claimed this was in fact a UN police action and since congressional authorization was not needed for UN actions, the Bush Administration was authorized by the Security Council resolution. In his Statement upon the adoption of the resolution, Bush expressed the Administration's determination, in cooperation with other countries, to fully implement the resolution and to employ whatever means might be needed in the pursuit of ending Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

The UN Security Council vote underscores the unity and determination of the international community to end Iraq's illegal occupation of Kuwait. We are pleased to note the common

stance and determination of the world in this endeavor. The United States will continue working with all countries for the express purpose of having the UN Security Council resolution fully implemented. We continue to favor a peaceful settlement of this crisis; at the same time, and as the Security Council vote demonstrates, there is growing resolve that Saddam's occupation of Kuwait not be allowed to stand and that all necessary means be employed to ensure this is the case (Bush 1990b).

The Resolution was obviously the only authorization the Bush Administration intended for and also received. The fact that the US Congress ignored the Resolution and thus the deployment of US forces in a military mission abroad implied that the Security Council had a priority and could authorize any kind of military engagement of American troops. This is not true. Constitutional responsibility for the authorization of US troops deployment was still vested in the Congress and the President should have asked for its approval. Even more so, because the decision to use US troops abroad was not based on the fact that American lives were in danger, which could have been interpreted as exceptional situation requiring prompt response of the President as Commander in Chief.

6.9.3.5 The Persian Gulf Intervention (1991)

Persian Gulf intervention was a continuation of Saudi Arabia conflict, which spread to the neighboring countries and from a purely defense mission grew into a military operation. On January 16, 1991 the liberation of Kuwait started, and America led an unprecedented coalition of Arab and Western countries that after a couple of weeks ended with victory for the USA and its allies.

This successful operation overshadowed many other voices, questioning prior involvement of America in Iraq, which perhaps encouraged the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The noble cause of protecting Kuwait was probably of questionable nature; in particular when presumed that America's prime interest was to safeguard Saudi Arabia and its oil reserves. Bush also succeeded in his other objective; he urged the UN to impose economic sanctions on Iraq, which the UN Security Council did through several resolutions.

Due to domestic problems, partly deriving from the rising price of oil, the US Congress stopped supporting Bush and America's involvement in Iraq, claiming the President did not have the powers to commit the nation to war. Bush objected on the basis of his constitutional powers. Congress was split along the party lines and the administration requested the adoption of a resolution supporting the UN Security Council Resolution 678, which authorized the »use of all necessary means« to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive if he could have presented the Iraqi government a Resolution passed by both houses of Congress supporting the UN position and in particular Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a Resolution (Bush 1991a).

The President believed that such a resolution »w/ould send the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression« (Bush 1991a).

He made sure that withdrawal from international commitment was not on his agenda and was determined to live up to it. On January 12 the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the resolution and on January 16 the air attack on Iraq began. In a couple of weeks to follow the US forces and coalition managed to expel Iraq from Kuwait and nearly forced Hussein to step down. The success of President Bush was partly the consequence of international pressure of the UN and other allied countries on the USA. Bush definitely demonstrated great skills of coordination, cooperation and the ability, not only to guide an alliance, but also to persuade the American people and the Congress. The success in the war, expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait and consequently lower gasoline prices were reflected in President's ratings, which came close to 90 percent, to fall, however, below 40 percent in the next, election year (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 132).

6.9.3.6 Legal basis for the Persian Gulf Intervention

The operation of liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation was based on formal authorization by the Congress. President Bush received nearly unanimous support in both houses of the Congress, which passed a resolution in support of military intervention in Kuwait.

The resolution: »Declares that this Act constitutes specific statutory authorization for the use of US armed forces required under the War Powers Resolution and requires the President to report to the Congress every 60 days on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the U.N. resolutions« (United States Congress 1991).

War powers resolution was followed in terms of schedule; the air operations lasted six weeks and ground operations additional 2 days, with the successful end and a victory for the allied forces on February 28, a bit more than a month after the beginning.

6.9.3.7 Intervention in Somalia (1992–1994)

In December, 1992, President Bush delivered the address on the situation in Somalia, a war-torn African country where rival tribes and warlords impeded the work of UN peacekeeping mission, whose main task was to distribute food and medicine to the starving and dying population. Security was worsening, humanitarian help could not reach the population and President Bush ordered the US military to intervene. The operation was known as the »Operation Restore Hope« and started on December 4, 1992, when President Bush also delivered his address on the situation in Somalia.

The intervention in Somalia was initially humanitarian, but later on America was slowly and unintentionally dragged into a civil war. Hundreds of thousands were saved from starvation, but unintended involvement in Somali civil strife cost the lives of thirty American soldiers, four marines, and eight Air Force personnel and created the impression of chaos and disaster (Stewart 2001, 2). Civil strife in Somalia among rival clans under different warlords turned the distribution of food and medical relief impossible. Warlords controlled the relief supplies and sold them to increase their own power and brutally punish the population. Pictures of starving and dying children and population were a daily reality. The Bush Administration, still enthusiastic due to the success in the Persian Gulf and the Desert Storm Operation, decided it could not ignore this humanitarian disaster any longer.

On December 4, 1992, President Bush told the nation that for many months the USA had been actively engaged in international aid to alleviate the suffering of Somali population, but the situation was becoming only worse, food relief seized to reach the starving people and:

The UN has been prevented from deploying its initial commitment of troops. In many cases, food from relief flights is being looted upon landing; food convoys have been hijacked; aid workers assaulted; ships with food have been subject to artillery attacks that prevented them from docking. There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down. Anarchy prevails (Bush 1992).

On April, 24, 1992, UN adopted the Resolution 751, which authorized humanitarian relief operations and established the UN Operations in Somalia. The situation was critical; supplies destined for people were hijacked by warring armies of the clans. Problems of distribution continued to grow and US decided to use its planes and logistic to help get the supplies to the starving population, without engaging the American ground forces. However, the suffering and starvation did not improve much and on December 8, 1992, the US forces were sent to Somalia and the operation with code name »Restore Hope« began. Security

Council Resolution 794, passed on December 3, 1992, provided support and international legitimacy to the operation. The Resolution 794 authorized the US led intervention to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible. The US Army participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia from 03 December 1992 to 4 May 1993, and from a strictly humanitarian view, the operation was successful, since it ended the food shortage and starvation, but it was less impressive from other perspectives. Not until the Clinton Presidency did the American soldiers finally withdraw and by March 1994, most of the American troops were out of Somalia.

6.9.3.8 Legal basis for the intervention in Somalia

In his remarks at the West Point Academy on January 5, 1993, President Bush explained that in Somalia, but also in Iraq and Kuwait, he acted as Commander in Chief, and on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions (751 and 794). However, UN Resolutions without the congressional approval were and are not sufficient authorization for the deployment of military troops, and the US Congress should have authorized the deployment of military troops abroad, as was stipulated also in the UN Participation Act. There should not have been any automatic transfer of powers from the Congress to the UN Security Council, since they have always been vested with different powers and jurisdiction. Bush (1993) said: »As Commander in Chief, I have made the difficult choice to use military force. And more recently, as I'm sure you know, I determined that only the use of force could stem this human tragedy of Somalia«.

6.10 William Jefferson (Bill) Clinton, 1993–2001, (Democrat), 42nd President

Clinton was the first Democrat to enter the White House in sixteen years and the first President in eight years to find his own party in control of both houses of Congress. He promised and implied change, which, however, was about to come from the direction he hoped to avoid, namely a Republican takeover of the House in 1994 (Skowronek 2004, 447).

William Jefferson Clinton (born Blythe) in Arkansas in 1946, to his mother Virginia Kelley and father William Blythe, who was killed in a car accident three months before Bill's birth. His mother remarried Roger Clinton, and the marriage was not very stable and calm, in particular due to Bill's stepfather's drinking problem. Bill spent his early years with his grandparents and moved in with his family when he started school. He was a gifted student and avid participant in all extra-curricular activities, so he was constantly surrounded by friends and admirers (Renshon 2000).

Bill Clinton inherited his resiliency after his mother who managed to rebound from the deaths of three husbands. Also Bill was characterized on the one side by lack of discipline, which lead him into trouble, and on the other side extreme coolness and resiliency when performing under pressure, which extricated him from many problematic situations. Virginia Kelley, his mother, was a critically important emotional center of Bill Clinton' life, when he was a child and also in his adulthood (Renshon in Post 2005, 279). At the age of sixteen he became enchanted with politics after having shaken hands with President Kennedy while visiting Washington. After graduating from Georgetown University where he was very active in campus politics, he found employment with Arkansas senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who became Clinton's exemplar in his anti (Vietnam) war stance and as a Rhodes Scholar (Greenstein 2000a, 174–176).

While at Oxford Clinton protested against Vietnam War, traveled Europe, read a lot and engaged in actions that enabled him to avoid military service. After Oxford, Clinton entered Yale Law School and after the graduation joined the faculty of the University of Arkansas Law School again. In 1976 he was elected state attorney general and two years later won the Arkansas governorship.

In October 1991 Clinton announced his presidential candidacy and won the Democratic Party nomination. Together with his running mate Al Gore they defeated Bush and H. Ross Perot, an independent candidate, and won. The Democrats maintained control of the Congress, but lost 10 seats in the House. Clinton wanted to appoint a woman to the cabinet position of attorney general and to end the discriminatory policy of the armed forces

to bar homosexuals from its ranks. Clinton's frequent attempts to have it both ways comprise one strategy for managing political risks. But the combination of strong ambition, high self-confidence, feelings of being special and beyond the rules that govern others frequently combine to push him toward substantial risk-taking, often of a self-absorbed type. One prime example is the President's ambitious, complex health care plan, which represented a risk not only for President Clinton but for the public. Clinton was willing to take a large policy gamble in the public's name: his untried plan would work as promised, it would not result in damaging consequences, and it would function in a fair way (Renhson 2000, 50). Ideas and other alleged gaffes of the new administration were widely contested and cost Clinton a great part of public support. Again, Clinton proved his resiliency and capacity for self-correction, adjusted the White House staff by including a number of Washington-wise professionals, and started to turn his political and rhetorical skills to his advantage, triumphing at the end of the year with his hard fought budget agreement and presided over the signing of peace treaty between the Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin and the PLO chairman Yasser Arafat. By the time of 1994 congressional election, Clinton was again in disfavor and an unprecedented Republican congressional campaign with Newt Gingrich at wheels cost the Democrats a loss of control for the first time in forty years. This was a crushing loss for Clinton (Greenstein 2000a, 178–180).

Clinton's second term opened with his call for a more moderate government that does more, with less, but the year that followed was marked by scandal and impeachment, but also by flourishing economy, Clinton's determination to push his legislative proposal through, even at the cost of shutting down the government and his role in a marathon peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine, where Clinton personally brokered a breakthrough agreement. Bill Clinton waged protracted veto battles with Republican majorities for six of his eight years in office, endured a government shutdown, and faced the ultimate sanction, impeachment (Conley 2005, 1–3). The impeachment turned to Clinton's advantage and public approval of his performance raised to 73 percent. His final year in office was marked by efforts to broker a peace agreement in the Middle East, which remained unaccomplished (Greenstein 2000a, 185). Also in the historians rating of presidents' relations with Congress, Clinton received the worst score of all presidents since Truman, with the exclusion of George W. Bush, who was not included in the analysis (Smith et al. 2000).

Clinton's leadership lacked Reagan's clarity, so common to great repudiators. Clinton often attempted to assert a more positive role for the federal government in the economy and

the society, but lacked the authority to challenge its established position and thus engaged in preemptive, rather than reconstructive leadership (Skowronek 2004, 449).

6.10.1 Analysis of variables

6.10.1.1 Integrative complexity index

Clinton's score is 2,03 and therefore identical with the one of another preemptive President, Richard Nixon. Suedfeld (1994, 337) claims that the integrative complexity of President Clinton, which was supposed to be excessively high, judging from his indecisive, flexible and often non-present commitment to valued goals, turned out to be surprisingly low and not increasing after the reelection.

6.10.1.2 Political time category

Clinton is a great example of preemptive politician (Beland and Waddan 2006). He was a Democrat set out to pre-empt the Republican revolution by promising a third-way approach, with the aim of getting back in the game and dispelling the aura of Democratic Party's illegitimacy (Skowronek 2008, 105). Third way politicians are committed to a new course of action, while acknowledging the accomplishments of established regimes. By actively disassociating from past mistakes and failures (Clinton did not hesitate to peg the nation's problems to twelve years of Republican rule) and at the same time building on it, preemptive leaders are sending an equivocal message. The third way for example insisted that government was not the root of all evil, but at the same time guaranteed that the era of big government was over (Skowronek 2008, 106). Their leadership is based on a preemptive and not reconstructive opposition and features personal leadership independent appeals, hyphenated party labels and hybrid agendas (Skowronek 2008, 107).

6.10.1.3 Political Composition of Congress between 1993 and 2001

Table 6.19: Political composition of Congress (1993–2001)

103 rd Congress 1993–1995	Senate: Dem. 56; Rep. 44 House: Dem. 258; Rep 176; Other 1
104 th Congress 1995–1997	Senate: Rep. 52; Dem. 48 House: Rep. 230; Dem. 204; other 1
105 th Congress 1997–1999	Senate: Rep. 55; Dem. 45 House: Rep. 227; Dem. 207; other 1
106 th Congress 1999–2001	Senate: Rep. 55; Dem. 45 House: Rep. 223; Dem. 211; other 1

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 231).

6.10.2 Key events between 1993 and 2001

Table 6.20: Key events between 1993 and 2001

1993	Clinton cuts spending and raises taxes for the wealthy to reduce the deficit.
	Israel and Palestine sign a peace accord on the White House lawn (September 13).
	Clinton reveals his universal health care plan and signs the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
1994	White House and congressional leaders concede that Clinton health care reform proposal is dead.
	Republicans win control of the Congress for the first time in 40 years (November 8).
1995	In his first prime-time news conference in 8 months, Clinton declares he is not irrelevant in the face of the new Republican majority in Congress.
	Clinton passes a compromise 7-year budget plan.
	The federal government shuts down by suspending all nonessential services on November 14.
	On December 6, Clinton vetoes the Republican balanced-budget bill.
	In ensuing impasse, government shuts down for a second time.
1997	Congress votes to end the shut down and Clinton proposes a plan for a new balanced budget.

	In August a sweeping reform of welfare system is enacted.
	In November Clinton is reelected for the second term.
1998	Clinton and the Republican leaders agree on a plan how to balance the federal budget by the year 2002.
1999	Clinton denies his alleged affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky; a few months later he admits his inappropriate behavior and apologizes for having misled his wife and the American people.
	Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr submits a report to the Congress, stating the possible grounds for impeaching Clinton
	House votes along party lines to adopt two articles of impeachment, charging Clinton with perjury and obstruction of justice for attempting to cover up his affair with Lewinsky.
	Democrats gain seats in Congress, the first such midterm gain by a party holding the White House since 1934.
2000	Senate deliberates on articles of impeachment voted by the House, needing a two thirds majority of 67 votes; only 45 and 50 votes for impeachment were cast and consequently Clinton is acquitted of charges in February. Clinton delivers his SOU address, emphasizing the economic revival of America, and proposes to use part of budget surplus to strengthen social security and Medicare.
	NATO and USA start a bombing campaign of Serbia, to halt repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
2001	Independent Counsel Robert Ray closes the six-year Whitewater investigation, clearing the Clintons of all criminal wrongdoing.
	Clinton visits Vietnam-a three day visit is the first of this kind since 1967.
	A contested presidential race between Gore and Bush is decided by the Supreme Court, which attributes the victory to Bush, and halts a manual recount of ballots in Florida.

Source: Greenstein (2000a, 232–234).

6.10.3 Military interventions

6.10.3.1 Intervention in Iraq (1993)

On June 26, 1993 Clinton ordered air strikes against Iraqi intelligence headquarters, to retaliate the attempted assassination of former President Bush. In his Address to the Nation he explains the reasons and the method of conducting the operation by saying:

A firm and commensurate response was essential to protect our sovereignty, to send a message to those who engage in state-sponsored terrorism, to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations... I ordered our forces to launch a cruise missile attack on the Iraqi intelligence service's principal command-and-control facility in Baghdad.../I have discussed this action with the congressional leadership and with our allies and friends in the region. And I have called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to expose Iraq's crime. These actions were directed against the Iraqi Government, which was responsible for the assassination plot (Clinton 1993).

The reasons for air strikes against Iraq are not very convincing. Even if intelligence really did find proofs for the assassination plot, air strikes would probably have some collateral damage and they can hardly be called a commensurate response. Protection of American sovereignty and affirmation of civilized behavior among nations is the argument that has no credibility-if this was the policy of the USA, namely to retaliate for things that had never happened and to teach civilized behavior by setting non-civilized and greatly exaggerated responses as a model, then a myriad countries was to be imparted such lessons by the United States.

The reasons for interventions obviously were not the ones given, but probably had something to do with Clinton's image of an unconvincing Commander in Chief, unwilling to use military force, which led him to advocate interventionist foreign policy already at the time of his presidential campaign. The retaliation action targeted at Iraq in June, 1993, obviously served this purpose. Clinton wanted to start his term with a reputation of a decisive and strong leader, capable of making tough military decisions. That is why the White House chose to act in Iraq-there was no serious threat of getting backfired and the fear of retaliation was not needed. This was extremely important, if Clinton really wanted »to combat terrorism,/.../deter aggression,/.../protect our people« (Clinton 1993).

6.10.3.2 Intervention in Iraq (1998)

The launching of missiles against Baghdad in 1993 was only the beginning of successive military operations against Iraq. In September 1996 he ordered the launching of additional

cruise missiles against Iraq in response to Iraqi attack and take-over of the Kurdish controlled city of Irbil. Clinton explained his motivation for action in the Remarks of September 3, 1996: »These acts demand a strong response, and they have received one. Earlier today I ordered American forces to strike Iraq. Our missiles sent the following message to Saddam Hussein: When you abuse your own people or threaten your neighbors, you must pay a price« (Clinton 1996). According to Clinton, America's objectives were limited and clear: »to make Saddam pay a price for the latest act of brutality, reducing his ability to threaten his neighbors and America's interests« (Clinton 1996).

Clinton's argumentation and justifications were quite unusual, since he did not rely upon the need to protect American lives or interests or security. He felt the need to punish Hussein for brutality against his own people and threats to neighbors, which could mark a dangerous precedent for future behavior of America and its right to intervene abroad. Another important fact is that Clinton's 1996 decision to launch missiles against Iraq coincided with his reelection and acceptance of Democratic nomination.

Towards the end of January 1998, when Hussein refused the access to UN inspectors who wanted to check Iraqi sites for possible nuclear, biologic and chemical weapons, Clinton again threatened to bomb Iraq. When the UN Secretary General negotiated a settlement with Iraq, the Clinton Administration accepted it.

6.10.3.3 Legal basis for the bombing in Iraq (1993, 1998)

On June 26, 1993, President Clinton ordered air strikes against Iraq, based on CIA assessment there had been a plot to assassinate former President Bush, and the plot included the use of a powerful bomb made in Iraq (Fisher 2004, 176). Clinton referred to the bombing as self-defense for the alleged assassination plot, and did not consult with members of Congress before ordering the launching of cruise missiles against the Iraqi intelligence facilities in Baghdad.

Legal basis for the bombing of Iraq was not convincing and consisted of the January 1991 statute that authorized the war against Iraq and a succession of resolutions passed by the Security Council of the UN. On January 15, 1991, Congress enacted Public law 102-1, which authorized military action against Iraq. The President could use military force pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 678. The statute therefore authorized military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, which was also the purpose of Resolution 687.

However, as Fisher put it »The Congress had no right to delegate war in perpetuity, nor could it surrender to an international organization its prerogatives over war and foreign

policy« (Fisher 2004, 193). In January 1998, congressional leaders drafted a resolution condemning Iraq and urging Clinton »to take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond« (United States Congress 1998).

In a letter to Congress, Clinton said: »Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the UN Council« (Clinton 1998a).

Whether congressional authorization for the use of force in the Persian Gulf in 1991 could be interpreted as to extend in future and cover all potential actions and uses of force with the purpose of not only removing Iraq from Kuwait but also making Iraq accept UN inspectors and much more, was less than convincing. To think that the Congress would intentionally give up its war powers for indefinite time in the future and cede war making sovereignty to the Security Council of the UN simply could not be accepted as option. On this point also the legal basis that could justify the Clinton Administration and its conduct of warfare against Iraq, loses ground (Damrosch 2000).

6.10.3.4 Intervention in Yugoslavia/Serbia (1999)

The conflict in former Yugoslavia has been on President Clinton's agenda since the beginning of his mandate, always as integrative part of multinational actions under the aegis of the UN and NATO. However, the involvement of America became more direct and less UN bound, relying only on the support of NATO. It was a known fact that the USA avoided the Security Council and did not seek the UN authorization, since Russia (or China) was very likely to use veto power to block the use of force against Serbia. Fisher (2004, 198) went as far as saying that the only two clearly unconstitutional wars in the history of the USA were the Korean War, initiated by President Truman and the war against Yugoslavia in 1999, ordered by President Clinton.

Further more, Fisher (2004, 198) noted that in other NATO member states, authorization for the use of military force against Yugoslavia was needed; for example the Italian Parliament had to vote approval for the NATO strikes, but the US Congress was only informed and consulted.

6.10.3.5 Legal basis for the intervention in Yugoslavia

On March 11, 1999 the House voted on a resolution to support US armed forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation. However, concurrent resolution is not enough, since

it is not signed by the President; it is thus not a law and not legally binding. Congress can therefore not authorize anything in a concurrent resolution. The Senate voted on a resolution, which would support military air operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Senate Concurrent Resolution was not enough and the War against Yugoslavia, which began on March 24, 1999, did not have either statutory or constitutional support (Fisher 2004, 199).

The only support Clinton sought for was the approval of NATO member states and not the approval of Congress.

According to many scholars, Clinton's military initiatives were remarkable for their absence of institutional checks and authorizations.

6.11 George Walker Bush, 2001–2008, (Republican), 43rd President

The 2000 elections were partly the outcome Republicans have been working for in the past eight years, trying to stigmatize the great preemtor Clinton as deviant, and presenting their own candidate as a return to normality (Skowronek 2008, 115). However, the victory did not come as easy as most had predicted and popular vote went to Democratic candidate Gore. At the end it was the Supreme Court that pronounced Bush the winner and ended manual recount of ballots in Florida. George Bush, the oldest son of George Herbert Walker Bush, became the second chief executive in the history whose father had also held the same position (White House 2009).

George Bush was born in Connecticut, where his war hero father was a Yale undergraduate, went to public school in West Texas and became the product of oil marked State with little league baseball and easy informality. Growing up he followed his father's footsteps and attended Phillips Academy in Massachusetts and later Yale. He did not excel academically, but stood out for his social skills and popularity. The political ferment of anti-Vietnam protests did not involve him much; however, he got engaged in his father's 1964 race for the Senate, took part in his 1970's Senate campaign, and in his 1980 quest for Republican presidential nomination (Greenstein 2003, 2-5).

After Yale he served in the Texas Air National Guard, graduated from Harvard Business School with a Master of Business Administration and founded an oil exploration company with funds raised through family connections. In 1978 he entered the race to succeed a retiring Republican congressman, but lost the seat to a Democrat. After his father's defeat in the reelection, George started to build his political career and entered a race for Texas governorship, which he actually won with 53 percent of the two-party vote. His mandate was marked with interpersonal activities, and already during campaign he focused on the issues that were highly supported by the democratically controlled Texas legislature, to maintain this manner also when elected to the office and reelected (this time with 69 percent of the vote) (Fortier 2003).

With the approaching of 2000 presidential election, Bush confirmed his fund-raising potential and abilities and became the Republican presidential candidate. He ran against former Clinton's vice President Al Gore and the electoral result was very close and highly disputed. Gore won the popular vote and the electoral vote was so even that Gore requested a manual recount of ballots in Florida, which was stopped by the Supreme Court that ruled George Walker Bush the winner (Greenstein 2003, 2–17).

George Bush experienced a life-changing conversion and personal transformation to a born-again believer, which ended his drinking problems, solidified his family life, and gave him a sense of direction. Bush's personal faith helped prompt his interest in the promotion of »compassionate conservatism« and the faith-based initiative as part of his new administration (Wallis 2004, 63). His first legislative initiative as President was the »No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)«, which focused on raising the standards in schools and particularly on minority students and their under-achievements. Less than a year later, President Bush secured passage of the landmark NCLB Act of 2001. The new law reflected a remarkable consensus, first articulated in the President's NCLB framework, on how to improve the performance of America's elementary and secondary schools, while at the same time ensuring that no child was trapped in a failing school (United States Department of Education 2002).

The first and the biggest blow to the presidency of George Bush was the terrorist attack of 9/11 on World Trade Center, the Pentagon and Washington, with nearly 3000 victims on the American soil. The attack led to a reform of intelligence agencies, the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the creation of global coalition joined in the »War on Terror« that led to the war in Afghanistan and later Iraq. Not since Richard Nixon's conduct of the war in Vietnam has a US President's foreign policy so polarized the country, and the world. Yet as controversial as George W. Bush's policies were, they were not as radical a departure from his predecessors as both critics and supporters proclaim (Leffler 2004, 21). It seems that the American invasion of Iraq fits very well in the so called Bush Doctrine, a far-reaching policy aimed at establishing »something very much like an empire«, which is based on four elements: domestic regime determines foreign policy; great threats cannot be met if not by preemptive war; unilateral action is acceptable when necessary; peace and stability require the USA to assert its primacy in world politics (Jervis 2003, 365). It is hardly surprising that President Bush and his senior officials characterized the threat of terrorism in strikingly ideological, rather than material, terms (Mazarr 2003, 513). In his speech to a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001, Bush said of Osama bin Laden and his allies:

»We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions-by abandoning every value except the will to power-they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.' The battle against such foes would not just be 'America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This

is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom« (Bush 2001a).

The Bush administration's affinity for non- realist ideas surely stems in part from the fact that many of them would identify Ronald Reagan-rather than Richard Nixon-as their philosophical lodestar. Reagan was one of the century's leading idealists, believing in things like the eventual triumph of democracy and the possibility of global nuclear disarmament. He just happened to marry his idealism to an abiding hatred of Soviet totalitarianism, a commitment to the importance of military power, and an astonishing faith that the world simply knew America was the good guy and would react to its growing power with relief rather than resentment (Mazarr 2003, 513).

It has been widely believed that 2003 war in Iraq received high levels of public support because the Bush administration successfully framed the conflict as an extension of the War on Terror, which was a response to the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (Gershkoff and Kushner 2005, 525). As can be seen from the results of the 2002 midterm elections they were exceptional: not since 1934 has a President's party gained seats in both houses in a first-term midterm election and not since 1882 has a midterm election transformed a divided party government into a united one. Bush turned the midterm into a referendum on his presidency and his popularity at the time affected the voting for Republican congressmen (Hetherington and Nelson 2003, 42). Bush was reelected in 2004 after having successfully won over the Democratic Senator John Kerry. However, his dealing with the humanitarian disaster in the aftermath of 2005 Hurricane Katrina was severely criticized. Towards the end of his mandate the USA started to approach a serious recession, which resulted also in the decline of his popularity and he left the office with only 22 percent of public approval (CBS 2009).

6.11.1 Analysis of variables

6.11.1.1 Integrative complexity index

The index of integrative complexity for Bush is 1,95, which is just slightly below the average of all presidents since 1948.

6.11.1.2 Political time category

Bush modeled a political stance that renounced flexibility in the name of commitment, while remaining affiliated with the regime party. Bush tried to upgrade Reagan's legacy; he subscribed to his governing philosophy and applied it to new and different circumstances. In

the case of George W. Bush, the orthodoxy would be that of Ronald Reagan and his belief in tax cuts, aggressive foreign policy and social policy that suits religious and social conservatives. Bush made »preemption« his watchword in the War on Terror. For him preemption meant getting out ahead of events, defining them and orchestrating their development (Skowronek 2008, 117–141).

6.11.1.3 Political Composition of Congress between 2001 and 2009

Table 6.21: Political composition of Congress (1993–2001)

107 th Congress 2001–2003	Senate: Rep.221; Dem.212; others 2 House: Rep. 50; Dem. 50
108 th Congress 2003–2005	Senate: Rep. 229; Dem. 205; other 1 House: Rep. 51; Dem. 48; other 1
109 th Congress 2005–2007	Senate: Rep. 231; Dem. 202; other 1 House: Rep. 55; Dem. 44; other 1
110 th Congress 2007–2009	Senate: Dem. 236; Rep. 199 House: Dem. 49; Rep. 49; other 2

Source: House of Representatives (2009).

6.11.2 Key events between 2001 and 2009

Table 6.22: Key events between 2001 and 2009

2001	A very close election following the ruling of the US Supreme Court which stopped manual recount of ballots in Florida,
	George W. Bush was sworn in as 43rd President of the USA.
	On September 11 the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, Washington and Pentagon is carried out, causing nearly 3000 victims.
2002	Congress authorizes Bush to use force against Iraq.
2003	A US led coalition of international armed forces invades Iraq.
2004	Bush is reelected for a second term.
2006	Democrats gain control in the House of Representatives for the first time since 1994 and the balance on the Capitol Hill shifts, mainly because of protracted war in Iraq.
2007	The Dow Jones reaches its peak and closes at its all-time high 14, 164. Very soon after this a serious decline begins.
2008	America enters into a serious financial crisis and recession.
	Bush signs the largest bailout in the US history, namely a \$700 billion measure to purchase failing bank assets.
	A Democratic candidate Barrack Hussein Obama wins presidential election to become the 44 th and the first black American US President ever.

Source: White House (2009).

6.11.3 Military interventions

6.11.3.1 Intervention in Afghanistan (2001)

President Bush practically started his mandate with a very sobering episode of 9/11, when terrorists, linked to Islamic militant Osama bin Laden, hijacked four American commercial planes and flew two of them into the World Trade Center, and another into the Pentagon building in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth plane crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania near Pittsburgh, after passengers struggled with the hijackers for control of the aircraft. The attacks were immediately interpreted as acts of war and Bush very quickly asked for legislative authorization for military action against Afghanistan, where he believed the terrorist network Al-Qaeda was hiding. Because of historical and unprecedented 9/11 attack

on the American soil, the public, Congress and also international community stood united behind the President and offered broad support to a decisive military response.

In the speech President Bush delivered on September 20, 2001, to the Congress, he described Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden, and connected it with the attacks on 9/11, but also with earlier terrorist strikes, including the bombing of US embassies in Tanzania, Kenya and others. Bush said the attack on America was unprecedented, and: »All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack« (Bush 2001a).

In the same address, Bush also presented the ultimatum delivered to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which included as follows:

- Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al-Qaeda who hide in your land.
- Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned.
- Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country.
- Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. And hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities.
- Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating (Bush 2001a).

President Bush also added that the demands were not open to negotiation or discussion and warned the Taliban, to act immediately if they did not want to share the fate awaiting the terrorists. The Taliban rejected the ultimatum and America decided to act upon its promise.

On October 7, 2001, President Bush addressed the nation on military action in Afghanistan. He said America was joined by a broad international alliance of friendly nations, who pledged forces, granted air transit or landing rights, shared intelligence and generally supported America in this fight. »We are supported by the collective will of the world« (Bush 2001b).

The operation in Afghanistan was a success, the capital city Kabul was captured in November 2001 and also other regions gradually fell, but security problems outside Kabul remained notable. The new Afghan government was not capable of exercising power through the country and a quick military victory was followed by little more, and soon the fundamentalist Islamic leaders began to reassert control (Fisher 2004, 210).

6.11.3.2 Legal basis for the intervention in Afghanistan

After 9/11 the Administration submitted »Use of Force Act«, which authorized military action against the terrorists and the bill was enacted on September 18, 2001 unanimously in the Senate and with 420 votes to one in the House (Fisher 2004, 208).

The Joint Resolution authorized the President »to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.« What was of particular importance in this case was the request by the White House, which wanted Congress to authorize the President »to deter and preempt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States.« If Congress authorized this draft resolution, it would have given the President open-ended authority »to act against all terrorism and terrorists or potential aggressors against the United States anywhere, not just the authority to act against the terrorists involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks, and those nations, organizations and persons who had aided or harbored the terrorists« (Grimmet 2008, 2–3).

Fortunately, this part of the draft was strongly opposed by part of the Congress, which declined to grant that authority to the President and consequently was not included in the final version of the legislation that was passed.

However, this part of the language nevertheless appeared in the statute, more precisely in the »whereas clause« at the top of the statute, and reads as follows: »Whereas, the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States« (Grimmet 2008, 4).

Another point of interest related to the intervention in Afghanistan was the fact that Bush reported of combat activities pursuant to his constitutional prerogatives and only vaguely mentioned the joint resolution, which became Public Law 107–40 and actually provided legal basis for the American intervention. Bush referred to the congressional legal authorization as »continuing support of the Congress.«

I have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct US foreign relations as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive./.../I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution and Public Law 107–40. Officials of my Administration and I have been communicating regularly with the leadership and other members of Congress, and we will continue to do so. I

appreciate the continuing support of the Congress, including its enactment of Public Law 107–40 (Bush 2001c).

6.11.3.3 Intervention in Iraq (2003)

The Bush Administration based their decision to use military force against Iraq on the presumption that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and was preparing to build nuclear weapons. At a press conference on August 21, 2002, President Bush denied his administration had a war plan, which it intended to use very soon. Only a few days later, vice President Dick Cheney in his speech at the Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Nashville on August 27, 2002, made it clear there was no other serious option but to go to war. He said: »Many of us are convinced that Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon. Just how soon, we cannot really gauge. Intelligence is an uncertain business, even in the best of circumstances« (Cheney 2002).

In the same speech vice President also advised against the UN inspectors being sent to Iraq prior to intervention, since he believed that:

A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with U.N. resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow back in his box. Meanwhile, he would continue to plot. Nothing in the last dozen years has stopped him; not his solemn agreements; not the discoveries of inspectors; not the revelations by defectors; not criticism or ostracism by the international community; and not four days of bombing by the United States in 1998 (Cheney 2002).

Cheney went even further by presenting the single viable option as the one leading to preemptive war. He relied on the words of advice provided by former Secretary of State H. Kissinger:

As former Secretary of State Kissinger recently stated: »The eminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system, and the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action.« If the United States could have preempted 9/11 we would have, no question. Should we be able to prevent another much more devastating attack, we will. No question. This nation will not live at the mercy of terrorists or terror regimes (Cheney 2002).

The common belief was that there was not much room for any other kind of action against Iraq but the military preemptive war, intended to prevent further, perhaps even more devastating attacks on America, and to end the hostility of Saddam Hussein. However, not all in the Bush Administration shared Cheney's vision.

6.11.3.4 Legal basis for the war in Iraq

Initially the Administration announced that President Bush did not need any kind of congressional authorization to attack Iraq, since the Iraqi resolution of 1991 provided continuing military authority to the President. This was a disputable argument and has been contested several times already in this dissertation. Another attempt of reliance upon an old resolution or act was the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, approving the US military action against Iraq for violations of Security Council resolutions.

However, in September 2002, probably encouraged by the military victory in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration felt confident enough to spread its anti-terroristic fight also in Iraq and asked the Congress to pass an authorizing resolution. The Congress, pressured by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and by the approaching November elections, moved swiftly and passed the Resolution 114 of October 2002, which granted the President the authority »to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and enforce all relevant UN Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq« (United States Congress 2002).

In the statement delivered upon the signing of Resolution, President Bush said: »By passing House Joint Resolution 114, the Congress has demonstrated that the United States speaks with one voice on the threat to international peace and security posed by Iraq« (Bush 2002). However, he felt the need to explain the reasons for seeking the authorization of Congress in the first place, since it has always been the position of his administration and himself that he did not need any kind of authorization but the one vested upon him as Commander-in-Chief in the Constitution (Katzman 2003). How he felt about the resolution was revealed also in his referring to it as »that support« and specifying it was nothing more than a confirmation of the position held by the government.

While I appreciate receiving that support, my request for it did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to US interests or on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution (Bush 2002a).

His opinion did not change and when ordering troops into the combat he cited his Constitutional prerogatives and not the Resolution.

7 Analysis of presidential addresses

7.1 Codification

The coding scheme considered the length of the speech as well as the frequency of justifications, which were divided in 10 semantic groups. Multiple justifications appear in each paragraph of presidential public addresses, and each paragraph with one or more justifications in it was counted as a separate instance. Hierarchy of justifications (primary, secondary...) was impossible to define and justification frequency was thus expressed in paragraphs, rather than individual frequencies.

SOU addresses comprise more issues and foreign affairs represent only one part of the address. Only the part of the address that refers to foreign policy was thus calculated and considered in the analysis. An exception was made in the case of President Nixon's 1971 SOU address, where foreign policy issues were not mentioned at all, since he established the practice of sending special foreign policy reports to the Congress. In his case the Radio Address to the Nation on Foreign Policy Report was used instead of the SOU of 1971.

The text of each presidential address was coded for the presence of the below given semantic groups (groups of justifications), and the percentage shows how much of each analyzed address (the percentage of paragraphs) is dedicated to individual semantic group. In each address there were multiple semantic groups present in the same paragraph; however, the presence of one semantic group does not exclude the presence of other groups, therefore the sum and the total percentage for all semantic groups does not amount to 100.

Table 7.1: Semantic groups

Human rights	Save innocent lives, protect, massacre, genocide, ...
War	Escalation, terror, arms, weapons, ...
Peace	Enforce, bring, advance, provide, free, prevent war, end war, ...
America's interests	Vital, protect, save, ...
America's values	Upholding, protecting, freedom, moral, religion, ...
America's responsibility	Moral imperative, duty, responsibility, is expected, ...
Diplomacy	Diplomacy failed, last resort, use, try all diplomatic means, ...
Experience	We have learned, from experience, from the past, history teaches us,...
International alliance	Commitment, NATO, UN, allies, international, ...
Democracy	Independence, just government, sovereignty, ...


Source: Author's analysis.

7.2 Harry S. Truman 33rd President (1945 (1948)–1953)

The following three addresses were analyzed:

- June 27, 1950. Statement by the President on the situation in Korea (Formosa-Taiwan); 7 paragraphs, 30 lines (Truman 1950a);
- July 19, 1950. Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea; 69 paragraphs, 217 lines (Truman 1950c) and
- SOU address, 1951; 87 paragraphs, 301 lines / 51 paragraphs, 169 lines on foreign policy (Truman 1951).

Figure 7.1: Harry Truman-graphic representation of justifications per speech



Source: Author's analysis.

7.2.1 Data interpretation

The statement of June 26, 1950 is very brief and thematically focused; President did not lose time to talk about general issues, but directly presented the facts. It is therefore understandable the main emphasis was placed on war. War related words appear in 43 percent of all paragraphs, preceded only by International alliance related words, which occupy 71 percent of the total number of paragraphs. If this is considered in the historical context of the Korean War, it is not surprising. Truman acted on the alleged basis of UN Security Council resolution; he did not ask the Congress for authorization and thus had to rely on international commitments, such as the UN Charter and the resolution (of June 25). Other issue areas

represented in Truman's statement from June 26 are »peace«, »America's interest«, »America's values« and »Diplomacy.«

In the address to the nation from July 19, 1950, Truman spoke directly to the nation and tried to present a broader picture of America's involvement in Korea, but the two most present categories remained the same, namely »war« and »international alliance.« What is noticeable is that the percentage of the two mentioned categories is not much higher than the percentage of other categories. The new categories of this address that did not appear in the first statement are »America's responsibility«, »Experience«, and »Diplomacy.« This address was delivered a couple of weeks after the statement; it was longer and therefore required a different framework and a better explanation of America's interest to send its own soldiers to the other side of the world. Truman opened the speech by exposing peace as America's prime interest: »I want to talk to you tonight about that situation, and about what it means to the security of the United States and to our hopes for peace in the world. Korea is a small country, thousands of miles away, but what is happening there is important to every American« (Truman 1950c). He thus made it clear that America and the world had interest in Korea, and this interest was obviously peace. He mentioned the violation of the UN Charter, but mostly stressed it was »a direct challenge to the efforts of the free nations to build the kind of world in which men can live in freedom and peace« (Truman 1950c). He explained the situation in Korea, its past, the conduct of the UN and also the role of the Security Council, which in Truman's words was to: »To act in such cases as this, to stop outbreaks of aggression in a hurry before they develop into general conflicts« (Truman 1950c). He also emphasized the support of 54 out of 59 at the time existing UN member states. This support, however, seems less convincing, when he mentions that only two other states (Australia and Great Britain) have sent planes to Korea, and six other states have offered naval support (Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and New Zealand). In contrast, USA decided not only to participate in the mission, but also offered air, naval and land forces, and all these even before the second resolution of the Security Council required it. Furthermore, America also provided the commander of unified forces of the UN, General Douglas MacArthur. Truman read parts of reports of commanders of air and naval forces, all very optimistic, and a part of General MacArthur's report, stating there were fewer victims than expected and hoping for a positive future development, with the increase in strength on the American side and a gradual decrease on the Korean side. Truman criticized the Soviet Union for not participating, for its apparent ambivalence and only theoretical support to peace, but lack of deeds in practice. Truman also tried to draw some conclusions and analogies on the basis of past experience; he

said that the world had learned its lessons from the past and warned that inaction could only lead to manifestation of similar aggression elsewhere. »Furthermore, the fact that Communist forces have invaded Korea is a warning that there may be similar acts of aggression in other parts of the world. The free nations must be on their guard, more than ever before, against this kind of sneak attack« (Truman 1950c).

He warned: »It is obvious that we must increase our military strength and preparedness immediately« (Truman 1950c) and talked about the needed readiness of Americans to commit more resources to meet the increasing military needs. On the basis of this it can be presumed that not even a month after the beginning of military deployment, Truman felt the war would need a much bigger sacrifice and would last longer than expected, despite the optimism displayed by the military commanders.

Truman ended his address to the nation by exposing America's commitment to freedom and peace, regardless of the cost it would have to pay, since the danger of falling victims of the »Communist slavery« was simply too great. »T/he American people are unified in their belief in democratic freedom. We are united in detesting Communist slavery. We know that the cost of freedom is high. But we are determined to preserve our freedom, no matter what the cost« (Truman 1950c).

SOU address that followed in January 1951 consisted of 87 paragraphs, 51 of them or 58 percent related to the issues of foreign policy, and it featured all content groups. An interesting feature was a decrease in war related words and a substantial increase in »America's interest«, »America's values« and »America's responsibility«, with the last category reaching the highest exhibited percentage of this SOU, namely 27 percent, followed by »international alliance« with 24 percent. The longer the war in Korea continued the more justifications and convincing it took to maintain support of Americans. Truman's attachment to international obligations and commitments arising from the UN Charter, UN Participation Act and the resolutions was strongly emphasized. An important element of this address is the identification of the enemy in a broader sense and direct accusation of the Soviet Union, for trying to take over the control of the world: »Our men are fighting, alongside their UN allies, because they know, as we do, that the aggression in Korea is part of the attempt of the Russian Communist dictatorship to take over the world, step by step« (Truman 1951). The Communist-supposedly Soviet-aggression was presented as a threat to liberty, freedom, and values of the free world. Truman was very clear in stating that the USA were not defending themselves, but were in this fight together with their friends and allies, for: »The gun that points at them points at us, also. The threat is a total threat and the danger is a common

danger« (Truman 1951). He went on to expose the Soviet plot, their subversive methods of operation, their »poisonous« propaganda, deliberate sabotaging of economic progress and their plan to conquer the world. It was a very vivid and a very grim picture too. On the other side he portrayed the image of non-Communist nations as honest, hardworking, skilled, devoted to freedom and liberty and emphasized that their strengths lied in their common ideals, which, he said »/a/re the driving force of human progress.« He exposed the dangers of potential Soviet victory in East Europe, Asia, Africa, how this could greatly increase the raw sources of coal, steel and even uranium, and thus provide the Soviet Union with immense power, including atomic, which America, the strongest nation, could not even dream of matching, and continued with America's responsibility to lead other nations in their fight for freedom and protection of the rights of independent nations.

»We are the most powerful single member of this community, and we have a special responsibility. We must take the leadership in meeting the challenge to freedom and in helping to protect the rights of independent nations« (Truman 1951). Truman explained his plan of action, consisting of several phases.

Firstly-to extend economic assistance, eliminate social injustices and economic disorder and help European states build their defenses. Secondly-to provide military assistance to countries which want to defend themselves. The defense of Europe is the basis for the defense of the whole free world, ourselves included/.../. Strategically, economically, and morally, the defense of Europe is a part of our own defense. That is why we have joined with the countries of Europe in the NATO, pledging ourselves to work with them (Truman 1951).

Truman said that people should learn from past mistakes and that the history of the world would be a different one if free nations had opposed the 1931 invasion of Manchuria, the 1935 attack on Ethiopia, or the 1938 seizure of Austria, as they were rightly doing in the case of Korea. He said that Korea represented a joint effort of the free world in the fight against aggression and against Communism.

The principles for which we are fighting in Korea are right and just. They are the foundations of collective security and of the future of free nations. Korea is not only a country undergoing the torment of aggression; it is also a symbol. It stands for right and justice in the world against oppression and slavery. The free world must always stand for these principles-and we will stand with the free world. And thirdly-to strive for peaceful settlements in international disputes, by supporting the UN and adhering to the principles of international cooperation enshrined in the Charter of the UN (Truman 1951).

7.2.2 Legal basis

In both addresses of 1950 Truman referred to the resolutions of the Security Council as legal authorization for the deployment of military forces in Korea, and in a broader sense the obligations arising from the Charter of the UN and the UN Participation Act. The USA Congress did not authorize this mission and was not even subsequently asked to authorize it.

7.2.3 Justifications

In the first statement of the President submitted a day after the deployment of US forces in Korea, the main justification for action was »war«, which accounted for 43 percent, followed by »peace« and »America's interests« with 28 percent and »America's values« with 14 percent. The highest percentage was scored by »international alliance«, namely 71 percent, which provided support to the dubious legal basis and was intended to make people believe they were in this action together with the rest of the world.

Fifty-two of the 59 countries which are members of the UN have given their support to the action taken by the Security Council to restore peace in Korea. /.../ These actions by the UN and its members are of great importance. /.../ So far, two other nations, Australia and Great Britain, have sent planes to Korea; and six other nations, Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, have made naval forces available. /.../ Under the flag of the UN a unified command has been established for all forces of the members of the UN fighting in Korea (Truman 1950c).

If Truman's justifications in all three analyzed addresses are compared, some interesting facts can be observed. The category of »human rights« only appeared in the SOU address, so the reason for the engagement in the Korean War was obviously not presented as humanitarian. The percentage of war related words sharply decreased and fell from 43 to 19 and in the SOU address to 8 percent. The more detached Truman was from the beginning, the less belligerent his vocabulary was, supplanting war words with America's interest, values, responsibility. Semantic group »responsibility«, was not even present in his first statement, just like the categories »experience« and »democracy«, which occupied 18 and 10 percent respectively in the SOU address and 3 percent and 9 percent in the Address to the Nation from July, 1950. Experience related word were of great importance in SOU address, since Truman draw many analogies with the past, invasion of Manchuria, attack on Ethiopia, seizure of Austria and also based his conduct of foreign policy on past experience of relations with the Soviet Union. »The free nations have now made it clear that lawless aggression will be met with force. The free nations have learned the fateful lesson of the 1930's. That lesson is that


aggression must be met firmly. Appeasement leads only to further aggression and ultimately to war« (Truman 1950c).

7.3 Dwight David Eisenhower, 34th President (1953–1961)

The following addresses were included in the analysis for President Eisenhower:

- January 24, 1955. Special Message to the Congress Regarding United States Policy for the Defense of Formosa; 24 paragraphs, 115 lines (The address was delivered prior to intervention, asking for authorization) (Eisenhower 1955b);
- SOU 1956. 135 paragraphs, 629 lines/25 paragraphs, 124 lines on foreign policy (Eisenhower 1956);
- July 15, 1958. Statement by the President to the Congress, following the Landing of United States Marines at Beirut; 24 paragraphs, 93 lines (Eisenhower 1958a);
- July 15, 1958. Statement by the President to the people (taped, recorded and broadcast) following the landing of US Marines at Beirut; 34 paragraphs, 127 lines (Eisenhower 1958b) and
- SOU 1959. 132 paragraphs, 418 lines/21 paragraphs, 71 lines on foreign policy (Eisenhower 1959).

Figure 7.2: Dwight Eisenhower-graphic representation of justifications per speech



Source: Author's analysis.

7.3.1 Data interpretation

Based on the data from the first selected address it can be seen that the rhetoric of President Eisenhower in this statement differs from others. The most obvious difference is a very high percentage of references to »diplomacy.« This is understandable, since Eisenhower delivered this statement with the main purpose of obtaining congressional authorization for action,

deployment of troops and if needed use of force for the defense of Formosa, Taiwan. The 42 percent of »diplomacy« are followed by 29 percent for »international alliance«, 29 percent for »America's interests« and 25 percent for »America's responsibility.«

It can thus be concluded that Eisenhower made a diplomatic move. He wanted to persuade the Congress it was of great importance for the President to be prepared for the protection not only of the interests of America, but also of the world peace. Strong international support only added to the weight of the argument.

/T/his existing and developing situation poses a serious danger to the security of our country and of the entire Pacific area and indeed to the peace of the world. We believe that the situation is one for appropriate action of the UN under its charter, for the purpose of ending the present hostilities in that area (Eisenhower 1955b).

The two addresses delivered upon the landing of US soldiers in Lebanon are quite similar, even though their target group or audience was different. The first address was delivered to the US Congress, whereas the second, also dated July 15, 1958, wanted to reach the American people, and was indeed taped, recorded and broadcast in the evening of the same day.

When addressing the Congress, whose authorization was not requested by the President at all, Eisenhower felt he needed to inform the Legislature of the reasons for such behavior. Firstly, he referred to the urgency of the matter: »On July 14, 1958, I received an urgent request from the President of the Republic of Lebanon that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon. President Chamoun stated that without an immediate showing of United States support, the government of Lebanon would be unable to survive« (Eisenhower 1958a).

He continued by stressing the fact that the only scope of US intervention was: »/T/o protect American lives and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon in the preservation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence« the goals which »have been deemed vital to United States national interests and world peace« (Eisenhower 1958a).

In conclusion of this message Eisenhower reiterated that US have long had friendly relations with the peaceful nation of Lebanon, and stressed the American values, such as the readiness to help a friend in need and the commitment to the safety and security of USA and the world.

Our Government has acted in response to an appeal for help from a small and peaceful nation which has long had ties of closest friendship with the United States. Readiness to help a friend in need is an admirable characteristic of the American people, and I am, in this message,

informing the Congress of the reasons why I believe that the United States could not in honor stand idly by in this hour of Lebanon's grave peril. As we act at the request of a friendly government to help preserve its independence and to preserve law and order which will protect American lives, we are acting to reaffirm and strengthen principles upon which the safety and security of the United States depend (Eisenhower 1958a).

The second address to the people of the USA was not as strong in terms of political issues, but conveyed a very clear message, when the President presented a historical comparison to other similar cases. To learn from experience is not a very common feature of people in general, but historical comparison or statistical data can serve the purpose of persuading very well.

In the 1930's the members of the League of Nations became indifferent to direct and indirect aggression in Europe, Asia and Africa. The result was to strengthen and stimulate aggressive forces that made World War II inevitable. The United States is determined that that history shall not now be repeated (Eisenhower 1958b).

Eisenhower drew analogy with the attempted Communist takeovers of Greece in 1947 and Korea in 1950 and with successful takeovers of Czechoslovakia in 1948 and China in 1949. He concluded the address with the hope of: »Striving for an ideal which is close to the heart of every American and for which in the past many Americans have laid down their lives. To serve these ideals is also to serve the cause of peace, security and well-being, not only for us, but for all men everywhere« (Eisenhower 1958b).

In the last analyzed SOU address dated January 9, 1959, President Eisenhower uses a moderate tone, with no particular emphasis placed on intervention in Lebanon, but focusing on more general issues of »peace«, »security«, »American values« and »connectedness with the world in the battle against dictatorships and against Communism, which too often in the history of mankind betrayed the trust of people and governments« (Eisenhower 1959), and thus could not be trusted any longer.

»We cannot build peace through desire alone. Moreover, we have learned the bitter lesson that international agreements, historically considered by us as sacred, are regarded in Communist doctrine and in practice to be mere scraps of paper« (Eisenhower 1959).

Eisenhower emphasized that America was part of the world and its: »Security can be assured only within a world community of strong, stable, independent nations, in which the concepts of freedom, justice and human dignity can flourish« (Eisenhower 1959).

7.3.2 Legal basis

The first Formosa Strait crisis in 1950 proved that Eisenhower acted on the basis of a joint resolution of the US Congress, which he considered as additional to his presidential powers of the Commander-in-Chief of the US armed forces. Instead of waiting for the UN to act, Eisenhower addressed the Congress directly, for he believed that:

The situation has become sufficiently critical to impel me, without awaiting action by the UN, to ask the Congress to participate now, by specific resolution, in measures designed to improve the prospects for peace. These measures would contemplate the use of the armed forces of the United States if necessary to assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores (Eisenhower 1955b).

The Congress granted Eisenhower the authorization »/t/o employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores« (United States Congress 1995).

The resolution would expire when and if the President determined that: »The peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the UN or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress« (Eisenhower 1955b).

In the case of Lebanon, the situation was different. In 1958 President Eisenhower, upon the request of the Lebanese government, decided to deploy 14000 American troops on the basis of his presidential prerogatives.

7.3.3 Justifications

Analysis of justifications employed by President Eisenhower in the studied addresses, revealed some noticeable differences.

The first address, as already mentioned, served a different purpose, compared to the addresses number 3 and 4 from 1958, since the address was actually delivered prior to intervention and its main purpose was to obtain legal authorization by the Congress, for the deployment of American troops in Formosa (Taiwan) Strait crisis, in advance. This accounts for high percentage of words from the group »diplomacy« and »international alliance.«

It should also be noted that »human rights« were not a very common presence in the President's addresses, and similar to Truman, also Eisenhower did not try to link the interventions with humanitarian reasons.


International alliance, diplomacy and experience are among the most frequent justifications, and on the basis of historical context and political situation it is safe to presume that Eisenhower thought very seriously about how and when to intervene, whose support was important and what kind of consequences his decisions could have. He was concerned about the world and America's position in it, he did not want to jeopardize its reputation, and he definitely did not want to see Communism spreading around. Eisenhower believed in the power of words and diplomacy, but he also knew when to apply threat or even force.

7.4. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 35th President, (1961-1963)

The following addresses were included in the analysis:

- April 20, 1961. Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors (The Bay of Pigs Speech); 17 paragraphs, 105 lines (Kennedy 1961) and
- SOU 1962. 113 paragraphs, 496 lines / 36 paragraphs, 187 lines on foreign issues (Kennedy 1962).

Figure 7.3: John F. Kennedy-graphic representation of justifications per speech



Source: Author's analysis.

7.4.1 Data interpretation

The intervention discussed in Kennedy's address of April 20, 1960, was a secret; or better, it was supposed to remain a covert operation, where the role and participation of the US would not be revealed. However, the operation failed and the debacle demanded some kind of explanation by the President. He decided not to address the American public directly, but instead spoke in front of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, because he felt that: »The President of a great democracy such as ours, and the editors of great newspapers such as yours, owe a common obligation to the people: an obligation to present the facts, to present them with candor, and to present them in perspective« (Kennedy 1961).

When keeping in mind the circumstances and the addressed audience, the highest percentage (47 percent) related to the word group »America's responsibility« is easy to understand. Kennedy was in a very unpleasant position, the operation he authorized, and was

supposed to remain covert, failed. He had to explain how America got involved in the clandestine operation of Cuban exiles, to overthrow the Communist leaning Castro's government, and he had to explain how and why the mission failed. He focused primarily on the responsibility of American President to protect the freedom and security of his Nation, even if the price to pay was involvement in a dubious military intervention.

The second highest percentage of references related to war, which can be closely linked to previously mentioned responsibility to defend and protect the security of America and Americans. Closely related to both issues is also the third most frequently mentioned group, the »America's values«.

»It is not the first time that Communist tanks have rolled over gallant men and women fighting to redeem the independence of their homeland. Nor is it by any means the final episode in the eternal struggle of liberty against tyranny, anywhere on the face of the globe, including Cuba itself« (Kennedy 1961). He mentioned the value of gallantry, independence, liberty, commitment to homeland, and struggle against tyranny, and these were the values that prompted Kennedy into action.

Kennedy's SOU address was very moderate, about 30 percent focused on foreign policy issues and the focus was quite evenly distributed among semantic groups of justifications, with a slight advantage of »international alliance«, »America's values« and »Peace«. It is clear from this address that Kennedy wanted to avoid the mentioning of his disastrous performance at the Bay of Pigs, exposed the importance of international alliances and the support of UN, presented the situation in most exposed areas, including the Latin America, and the dangers of Communism and its potential spreading to other countries.

7.4.2 Legal basis

As already mentioned Kennedy acted without congressional authorization and based his actions solely on presidential prerogatives. The issue of presidential prerogatives in relation to secret, covert operations was soon to become a very disputed and contested one. The Bay of Pigs invasion was a covert operation inherited from the Eisenhower administration, and Kennedy did not think it over seriously enough and thus committed a grave mistake. His tendency for the application of executive prerogatives continued also in crises that followed. The Cuban Missile Crisis from 1962, which brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war, saw Kennedy ask for congressional resolution that would authorize him to apply military force, but he made it clear it was not something he would depend on or wait for. He was

willing to use force, again, solely on the basis of presidential prerogatives, but fortunately the imposed naval blockade and diplomacy sufficed and the war was avoided.

7.4.3 Justifications

As stated above, the most frequently employed justifications in his Address to the editors were »America's responsibility«, »values« and »war«, which seem to have been a reasonable choice considering the circumstances Kennedy was facing after the debacle of The Bay of Pigs Invasion.

»America's interests«, »values«, »international alliance« and »diplomacy« have obtained a similar score in both addresses, but »interests«, surprisingly, did not appear very often (6 percent). This could be partly explained with the fact that particularly the first address happened immediately after the invasion when the failure became public and the wish to keep America's hand hidden or at least to minimize its involvement, was still very strong.

»I have emphasized before that this was a struggle of Cuban patriots against a Cuban dictator« (Kennedy 1961).

The involvement of America was denied: »We made it repeatedly clear that the armed forces of this country would not intervene in any way. Any unilateral American intervention, in the absence of an external attack upon ourselves or an ally, would have been contrary to our traditions and to our international obligations« (Kennedy 1961). However, Kennedy paved the way for a possible intervention in the future:

Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of non-action, if the nations of this Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration-then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation! (Kennedy 1961).

Kennedy (1961) stressed »the importance of Cuba's »liberation« from the grip of Communism not so much for America, but for the future of other nations in the Western Hemisphere, that should all join in this struggle«.

It is clear that this Nation, in concert with all the free nations of this Hemisphere, must take an ever closer and more realistic look at the menace of external Communist intervention and domination in Cuba. The American people are not complacent about Iron Curtain tanks and planes less than 90 miles from their shore. But a nation of Cuba's size is less a threat to our survival than it is a base for subverting the survival of other free nations throughout the Hemisphere. It is not primarily our interest or our security but theirs which is now, today, in

the greater peril. It is for their sake as well as our own that we must show our will (Kennedy 1961).

In his SOU address from 1962 Kennedy expressed clearly, how important the international alliance, including the one with European countries in the framework of the NATO, was for a successful struggle against the dangers of Communism:

The emergence of the new Europe is being matched by the emergence of new ties across the Atlantic. It is a matter of undramatic daily cooperation in hundreds of workaday tasks: of currencies kept in effective relation, of development loans meshed together, of standardized weapons, and concerted diplomatic positions. The Atlantic Community grows, not like a volcanic mountain, by one mighty explosion, but like a coral reef, from the accumulating activity of all (Kennedy1962).


The world Kennedy was portraying consisted of black and white images, gallantry, freedom, justice, peace, democracy on the side of America and its allies, and totalitarianism, repression, war, violence on the side of the Communist countries. Kennedy's anti Communist rhetoric was very strong throughout his mandate, even though the relations with the USSR did improve after the successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when both sides realized the world was closest to nuclear war than ever before and managed to negotiate an acceptable solution.

7.5 Lyndon Baines Johnson, 36th President, (1963–1969)

The following addresses were included in the analysis:

- August 4, 1964. Radio and Television Report to the American People Following Renewed Aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin; 8 paragraphs, 36lines (Johnson 1964a);
- SOU 1965, 180 paragraphs, 363lines /48 paragraphs, 111 lines on foreign policy issues, 32 percent (Johnson 1965c);
- April 17, 1965. Statement by the President: »Tragedy, Disappointment, and Progress« in Vietnam; 34 paragraphs, 98 lines (Johnson 1965b);
- April 28, 1965. Statement by President Upon Ordering Troops into Dominican Republic; 5 paragraphs, 25 lines (Johnson 1965a) and
- SOU 1966. 160 paragraphs, 432 lines/ 82 paragraphs, 132 lines on foreign issues, 51 percent (Johnson 1966).

Figure 7.4: Lyndon B. Johnson-graphic representation of justifications per speech



Source: Author's analysis

7.5.1 Data interpretation

The data gathered on the basis of selected addresses delivered by President Johnson reveal that his first selected address (the radio and television report to the American people following the renewed aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin), was the most militant one. The

percentage of vocabulary related to »war« is extremely high, namely 63 percent, followed by »peace« and »America's responsibility« with 38 percent each, and »diplomacy« with 25 percent. It must be however noted, that this was a very brief and focused address, delivered shortly after the beginning of direct hostilities. It is also interesting that subsequent studies and analyses of the situation in the Tonkin Gulf revealed the misinterpretation of the situation (and very possibly a deliberate one) by the administration, which decided to use (or create) this incident as a trigger and a pretext for American disproportional military reaction.

If this was the case, a militant response, allowing no doubt in the righteousness of American intervention and its responsibility to lead the struggle for peace and security in the Southeast Asia, was definitely needed, and a firm and resolute response to the »outrage«, as Johnson had called it, was provided nearly instantaneously.

Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the USA. The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war (Johnson 1964a).

After stressing peaceful intentions of America, Johnson also emphasized the diplomatic efforts invested in the search of a diplomatic solution and support:

I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries and, indeed, to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the UN. Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in southeast Asia (Johnson 1964a).

Johnson ended the address by stressing the importance of America's responsibility and the values for which it stood.

It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the USA, but it is my considered conviction, shared throughout your Government, that firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace; that firmness will always be measured. Its mission is peace (Johnson 1964a).

Only 32 percent of his SOU addresses of 1965 was dedicated to foreign policy and related issues, with quite an even distribution of focus. In 27 percent of the paragraphs Johnson referred to »America's values«, representing the highest score, whereas 8 percent of

»war, »peace« and »democracy« related words can be found at the bottom of the scale. »Human rights« and »diplomacy« were not mentioned at all. Johnson frequently mentioned the shared responsibility of the world in the quest for peace: »Yet, it is not merely our concern but the concern of all free men. We will not, and we should not, assume that it is the task of Americans alone to settle all the conflicts of a torn and troubled world« (Johnson 1965c)

He divided this part of the address in three subgroups, state of the world, the Communist world and the non-Communist world, and discussed their respective challenges separately.

The following two addresses were both delivered in April of the same year (1965), the first one of April 17, 1965, summarizing the situation in Vietnam, and the second one upon the ordering of American military into Dominican Republic on April 28, 1965.

The address dealing with the situation in Vietnam was very balanced with all categories present, ranging from the lowest 3 percent for »experience«, to the highest 24 percent for »peace«. It can thus be said this was a moderate and balanced address, with only slight emphasis on references to peace. Johnson presented the US as the actor whose interest was only peace, who was willing to negotiate and was supported by the world opinion. However, he also made it very clear that the US were not willing to surrender or to be forced out of Vietnam:

Our policy also remains the same: to strive for peace, but not to yield to aggression; to use what power we must, but no more than we need; to stay until independence is secure, but to leave when that independence is surely guaranteed. And let this also be clear: Until that independence is guaranteed there is no human power capable of forcing us from Vietnam. We will remain as long as is necessary, with the might that is required, whatever the risk and whatever the cost. We are told by some that there can be no peace and no hope for a better life unless we first surrender and abandon South Vietnam. This we will not do (Johnson 1965b).

He also emphasized the growing anti-war sentiment of the world: »And I hope that a mounting crescendo of world opinion that is weary of war, that is opposed to aggression, will finally find a way to reach the ears of those that are now deaf to calls for peace« (Johnson 1964b), which could help shift the balance in favor of a peaceful solution.

Johnson concluded his address by presenting a vision of a peaceful world of free countries, each able to determine and freely choose its own path and future:

It is not easy to engage in a struggle whose beginning is obscure, and whose end is not in sight. Peace, like war, requires patience and the courage to go on despite discouragement. Yet we must go on, for there is a world to lose—a world of peace, of order, and of expanding promise for all who live therein. That will be a world whose institutions are as varied as

humanity itself. It will be a world in which nations follow where reason and experience lead, never sacrificing man to the abstract arrogance of ideology. It will be a world where each nation is free to take its own path to change. (Johnson 1965b).

The address delivered upon the sending of US military troops to the Dominican Republic was very short and focused on the intervention and reasons behind it. The only content groups present were »war«, »peace«, »America's interests« and »America's responsibility«. On the basis of such a limited vocabulary the address obviously wanted to stress how much was at stake and thus the President's responsibility to protect the American lives: »I reported the decisions that this Government considers necessary in this situation in order to protect American lives. I have ordered the Secretary of Defense to put the necessary American troops ashore in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this country« (Johnson 1965a).

The President was very determined and presented the intervention as the only possible option. There was no place for doubt or hesitation.

In the SOU address of 1966, Johnson touched upon all content groups, with the lowest percentage attributed to »diplomacy« (4 percent) and the highest to »America's responsibility« (22 percent). Johnson's rhetoric was very moderate also in this address, slightly emphasizing the responsibilities of America in the course of 1965. On the basis of important military involvement in the past year, one could expect Johnson to deliver a stronger or a more militant address, but on the other hand the importance of foreign issues was clearly revealed with 50 percent of the address dedicated to them and with a strong beginning that pointed in the direction of American military involvement abroad: »Our Nation tonight is engaged in a brutal and bitter conflict in Vietnam. Later on I want to discuss that struggle in some detail with you. It just must be the center of our concerns« (Johnson 1966).

By stating that »bitter conflict in Vietnam« simply needed to be the center of Americans' concerns, Johnson was very clear in presenting the priorities of America, even though he tried to link it with his »Great Society« program, which had been introduced in 1964 and was focused on civil rights, tax cuts and the so called »war on poverty« (Johnson 1966).

The President exposed Vietnam as the greatest danger, but on the other hand also specified that a narrow focus on one issue presents an obstacle to the seeing of a big picture.

Tonight the cup of peril is full in Vietnam. That conflict is not an isolated episode, but another great event in the policy that we have followed with strong consistency since World War II. The touchstone of that policy is the interest of the United States—the welfare and the freedom

of the people of the United States. But nations sink when they see that interest only through a narrow glass. In a world that has grown small and dangerous, pursuit of narrow aims could bring decay and even disaster (Johnson 1966).

It is clear that Johnson perceived the importance of a connected world, where nations help each other and strive for common goals and interests, in order to avoid a major disaster.

The President stated once more that the most important element of the SOU was the grim awareness of »american men at war«, and that wars could be very different, but yet all the same: »The war in Vietnam is not like these other wars. Yet, finally, war is always the same. It is young men dying in the fullness of their promise. It is trying to kill a man that you do not even know well enough to hate. Therefore, to know war is to know that there is still madness in this world« (Johnson 1966).

Despite the fact there had been an intervention in the Dominican Republic practically simultaneously with the escalation in Vietnam in April 1965, Johnson only focused on the situation in Vietnam. He concluded the address by taking upon himself the responsibility for the adopted decisions and with the hope of being able to bring the war to an imminent end.

Many of you share the burden of this knowledge tonight with me. But there is a difference. For finally, I must be the one to order our guns to fire, against all the most inward pulls of my desire. For we have children to teach, and we have sick to be cured, and we have men to be freed. There are poor to be lifted up, and there are cities to be built, and there is a world to be helped. Yet we do what we must. I am hopeful, and I will try as best I can, with everything I have got, to end this battle and to return our sons to their desires (Johnson 1966).

7.5.2 Legal basis

In his address following the deployment of armed force in response to the attack on American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson talked about his steps in the direction of a potential authorization for the use of force by the Congress and by the Security Council of the UN, however, his decision to use force was based on none. His decision was based on prerogative powers granted to the President as Commander-in-Chief, even though he did not explicitly refer to them.

I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries and, indeed, to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the UN. Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our

Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in southeast Asia (Johnson 1964a).

Later, on August 7, 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was adopted (United States Congress 1964), which gave President Johnson the authority to increase US participation in the war between North and South Vietnam.

The resolution expressed the support of the Congress for the President, who as Commander-in-Chief can take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent any further aggression. In response to the adopted Resolution, President Johnson, and later President Nixon heavily relied on and referred to it as the legal basis for the conduct of their military engagement in Vietnam. Within the Resolution also the commitments to the SEATO and to the UN Charter were referred to as legal bases for the American engagement in Vietnam.

The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. Section 2: The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the UN and in accordance with its obligations under the SACDT, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the SACDT requesting assistance in defense of its freedom (United States Congress 1964).

As for the intervention in the Dominican Republic it can be said that the process of obtaining an authorization might have started, but was definitely not prior to the intervention. Once more the President decided to act upon his executive prerogatives defined by the Constitution.

I have just concluded a meeting with the leaders of the Congress. I reported to them on the serious situation in the Dominican Republic. I reported the decisions that this Government considers necessary in this situation in order to protect American lives. The members of the leadership expressed their support of these decisions./.../Pursuant to my instructions 400 Marines have already landed (Johnson 1965a).

As seen from the address, the President took complete responsibility for the intervention upon himself, and justified it with the need to protect American lives.

7.5.3 Justifications

The prevailing justifications employed in all addresses were »war«, »peace«, and »America's responsibility«. There were no justifications out of the ordinary, but interestingly enough, »human rights«, »diplomacy«, »international alliance« and »democracy« failed to appear in two out of five addresses. This may seem rather unusual, but it can be explained with the historical context in which President Johnson operated and delivered the addresses. Much of the context was only implied in the addresses, since conflicts and American involvement in Asia had begun already at the time of President Truman, and every subsequent address only added some emphasis to what was the most outstanding feature of each individual incident.

Contrary to Eisenhower, who has often been judged as the main »culprit« for having engaged Americans in the Vietnam War, Johnson did not resort to »international alliance«, »diplomacy« and »experience«. Eisenhower was indeed well known for his thought-out military doctrine, and considered international alliance and America's reputation in the world of utmost importance.

Johnson was not as broad in his focus. He believed that acts of aggression required a direct and firm response, and conducted his foreign policy accordingly. However, all presidents who had engaged American military forces in Asia mostly refrained from linking the interventions with human rights and humanitarianism in general.


After all, this was still the period of the Cold War, when black and white division of the world and the dangers of Communism presented a good enough pretext for any kind of intervention.

7.6 Richard M. Nixon, 37th President, (1969–1974)

The following addresses were included in the analysis:

- May 14, 1969. Address to the Nation on Vietnam; 81 paragraphs, 245 lines (Nixon 1969c);
- SOU 1970; 125 paragraphs, 337 lines / foreign policy: 26 paragraphs, 66 lines, 21 percent (Nixon 1970b);
- June 3, 1970. Address to the Nation on Cambodian Sanctuary Operation; 40 paragraphs, 155 lines (Nixon 1970c) and
- February 25, 1971. Radio Address about second annual foreign policy report to the Congress; 88 paragraphs, 274 lines (Nixon 1971).

Figure 7.5: Richard Nixon-graphic representation of justifications per speech



Source: Author's analysis.

7.6.1 Data interpretation

»War«, »peace« and »diplomacy« are the most common groups in the first analyzed address delivered by President Nixon in May, 1969. The address needs some additional explanation, since it does not mark the opening of hostilities, but was delivered at the time of an imminent final stage and the end of Vietnam War. The Nixon administration was determined not to accept a defeat, but in view of a growing discontent in America and the cost of Vietnam War, it planned to withdraw gradually and thus silence the critics at home.

The address was delivered four months after the inauguration. Nixon entered the office with the promise of ending the war and in this address he reminded Americans of his promise:

Since I took office 4 months ago, nothing has taken so much of my time and energy as the search for a way to bring lasting peace to Vietnam. I know that some believe that I should have ended the war immediately after the inauguration by simply ordering our forces home from Vietnam. This would have been the easy thing to do. It might have been a popular thing to do. But I would have betrayed my solemn responsibility as President of the United States if I had done so (Nixon 1969c).

He went on to explain the history of the conflict in Vietnam, the American involvement, the price America was paying and the difficulties in trying to bring the war to an end. »The fact that there is no easy way to end the war does not mean that we have no choice but to let the war drag on with no end in sight« (Nixon 1969c).

There is no substantial gap between the highest and lowest content group, and as seen from the data, this was a moderate address intended to gather support of his loyal public, the so called »silent majority«, which Nixon later openly addressed in his November 1969 speech, when he also revealed that his work had started already before the inauguration, because he wanted to study the situation in every detail and not to rely on the information provided by others:

Our first step began before inauguration. This was to launch an intensive review of every aspect of the Nation's Vietnam policy. We accepted nothing on faith, we challenged every assumption and every statistic. We made a systematic, serious examination of all the alternatives open to us. We carefully considered recommendations offered both by critics and supporters of past policies (Nixon 1969c).

Nixon ended the address by reminding the American people of his commitment to end the war and told them to hold him accountable if he should fail: »In my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to end this war in a way that would increase our chances to win true and lasting peace in Vietnam, in the Pacific, and in the world. I am determined to keep that pledge. If I fail to do so, I expect the American people to hold me accountable for that failure« (Nixon 1969c).

The address reporting on the situation in Cambodia is more dynamic in terms of the gap between different content groups, with emphasis heavily placed on »war« (35 percent), »America's responsibility« (27 percent), »peace« (25 percent), and »human rights« (22 percent). On the opposite end of the scale are »America's values« and »international alliance« (both sharing 2 percent), »diplomacy« (7 percent), and »democracy« (5 percent). The address was delivered with some distance from the beginning of the operation and thus allowed for a

broader assessment of the situation, the operation and its implications and also of possible scenarios that could have happened if the US had not decided to intervene. The highest score was attributed to war-related content, which shows that despite the policy and ongoing process of withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, America remained resolved not to allow the Communist victory and was prepared to respond firmly, including the use of force, should the remaining American troops be in danger or the withdrawal made more difficult.

You will recall that on April 20, I announced the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops from Vietnam within a year-which will bring the total number withdrawn, since I have taken office, to 260,000. I also reaffirmed on that occasion our proposals for a negotiated peace. At the time of this announcement I warned that if the enemy tried to take advantage of our withdrawal program by increased attacks in Cambodia, Laos, or South Vietnam in a way that endangered the lives of our men remaining in South Vietnam, I would, in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, take strong action to deal with that threat (Nixon 1970c).

This was the scenario Nixon had warned of in his previous addresses and as promised, America responded with force and determination. The North Vietnamese plan, to merge the occupied sanctuaries in »one continuous hostile territory from which to launch assaults upon American and allied forces« (Nixon 1970c), presented an unacceptable threat to the remaining American forces, »It would have meant higher casualties. It would have jeopardized our program for troop withdrawals. It would have meant a longer war. And, carried out in the face of an explicit warning from this Government, failure to deal with the enemy action would have eroded the credibility of the United States before the entire world« (Nixon 1970c).

As can be observed, the American reputation and credibility in the eyes of the world was probably equally important to Nixon, as was the safety of the American troops. This explains a similar percentage of references to »America's responsibility«, »peace« and »human rights«. Nixon explained that the intervention in Cambodia allegedly had the sole purpose of liberating the sanctuaries from the occupying forces of North Vietnamese, destroying their supplies and thus bringing the war in Vietnam to an end. Nixon said:

After very intensive consultations with my top advisers, I directed that American troops join the South Vietnamese in destroying these major enemy bases along the Cambodian frontier. I said when I made this announcement, "Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw." That pledge is being kept. I said further on that occasion, "We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam." That purpose is being advanced (Nixon 1970c).

The rest of the address was a summary and revision of the promises Nixon had made, and their realization, which ended with the President's pledge to end the war in Vietnam and to bring peace. He was determined to carry it out, but stressed the needed support for his work and the efforts of his administration.

There is one commitment yet to be fulfilled. I have pledged to end this war. I shall keep that promise. But I am determined to end the war in a way that will promote peace rather than conflict throughout the world. I am determined to end it in a way that will bring an era of reconciliation to our people and not an era of furious recrimination. In seeking peace, let us remember that at this time only this administration can end this war and bring peace. We have a program for peace, and the greater the support the administration receives in its efforts, the greater the opportunity to win that just peace we all desire. Peace is the goal that unites us. Peace is the goal toward which we are working. And peace is the goal this Government will pursue until the day that we reach it (Nixon 1969b).

Nixon introduced a novelty in the structure of SOU addresses. He separated foreign policy issues from the SOU address and delivered annual, separate reports to the Congress, entirely dedicated to foreign policy issues. The reports were exhaustive and very detailed, which definitely revealed how important Nixon considered the issues of foreign policy. Due to their written form, length and exhaustiveness, they were, however, unsuitable for the purpose of this analysis. Instead, the SOU address of 1970, which still contained 21 percent of the total address dedicated to the issues of foreign policy, and the radio address on the submitted foreign policy report for 1971, were included in the analysis. The SOU address of 1970 actually preceded the first special foreign policy report and therefore partly referred to foreign issues in general, with strong emphasis on peace and the future direction of America's foreign policy. Nixon explained America's responsibility in defending the freedom of the world.

Because of America's overwhelming military and economic strength, because of the weakness of other major free world powers and the inability of scores of newly independent nations to defend, or even govern, themselves, America had to assume the major burden for the defense of freedom in the world (Nixon 1970b).

Despite having emphasized America's prime responsibility and obligation to provide peace and freedom, Nixon was also aware of the growing criticism for America's policy of sending its soldiers to fight and die for a foreign people.

The nations of each part of the world should assume the primary responsibility for their own well-being; and they themselves should determine the terms of that well-being. We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments, but we shall reduce our involvement and our presence in

other nations' affairs. To insist that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility; it is a sharing of responsibility (Nixon 1970b).

Nixon also stressed the importance of international alliances, stressing that European and non-European nations joined with the USA in the struggle for peace and freedom:

Relations with our European allies are once again strong and healthy, based on mutual consultation and mutual responsibility. We have initiated a new approach to Latin America in which we deal with those nations as partners rather than patrons. The new partnership concept has been welcomed in Asia. We have developed an historic new basis for Japanese-American friendship and cooperation, which is the linchpin for peace in the Pacific (Nixon 1970b).

Nixon was determined to build a new kind of relationship with the USSR, which he considered of vital importance for the world peace: »If we are to have peace in the last third of the century, a major factor will be the development of a new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union,« which was an important sign for the coming »détente« and the end of Cold War hostilities.

Nixon's radio address on foreign policy report shows amazing balance of represented issues, from 1 percent dedicated to »human rights«, to 23 percent for »peace«, 20 percent for »diplomacy«, 18 percent for »international alliances« and so forth. It is a positive address, where hopes for a peaceful future seem to prevail. At the time of Nixon's presidency in the early 1970s, America was far from flourishing, which probably represented the main drive behind Nixon's intention to change the course of political relations the world powers had set, and thus improve America's reputation at home and abroad. »Today I am able to talk to you in a more hopeful and positive vein-about how we are moving this Nation and the world toward a lasting peace. We have brought ourselves to a time of transition, from war toward peace, and this is a good time to gain some perspective on where we are and where we are headed« (Nixon 1971). Against the reality of a strong USSR, the leading producer of steel and oil, with a rich history of military victories, America was facing a series of setbacks, and a prolonged war in Vietnam, which imposed a costly toll in terms of human lives and money. Anti-war demonstrations and great public opposition to the American policy of containment in the South East Asia and a strong USSR on the other side, forced the Nixon administration to embark on a new path and devise the policy of »détente« with China, which reached its peak when Nixon traveled to China, but to a certain extent, also with the Soviet Union, with the signing of the SALT in May, 1972.

7.6.2 Legal basis

The reason for analyzing the first selected address was its reference to the Cambodian incursion. By promising to end the war in Vietnam, Nixon actually expanded it to include Cambodia and Laos, which in turn unleashed a wave of protests across the nation and prompted the Congress to enact restrictive amendments in 1971, which forbade the introduction of US ground troops or advisers into Cambodia (Fisher 2004, 135). However, legal basis for the intervention in Cambodia was the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (obtained by the President Johnson under questionable circumstances), combined with presidential prerogatives, granted to the President by the Constitution. The President was thus authorized by the Congress to withdraw American troops from Vietnam. Incursion in Cambodia could be either interpreted as part of the authorized withdrawal, or it could imply another, new military operation, carried out without congressional authorization.

In 1969 the Senate passed a resolution, which challenged the right of the President to commit the nation to war without congressional action. It said that the national commitment, understood as the use of US military force on a foreign territory, results only from affirmative action taken by the Legislative and Executive branch together. Since the resolution was passed as Senate resolution only (and not congressional joint resolution), it carried no legal effect; however, it signalled the expression of bipartisan interpretation of constitutional principles.

Only the War Powers Act that followed in 1973 in reaction to Johnson's intervention in the Dominican Republic took a tentative step towards the curbing of the President and his war-making authority. Resolution was enacted over President Nixon's veto and the Congress was thus given authority to limit presidential war-making powers and demand a 60 day limit on presidential initiative for the use of military force, should the President fail to obtain congressional authorization. After this period military troops must be withdrawn. It is questionable if the War Powers Act really intended this, because ever since its adoption, the presidents have interpreted it as legal justification for a 60 day unchecked and unauthorized military adventure.

7.6.3 Justifications

The most constant and continuous presence in all of Nixon's analyzed addresses is represented by »peace«, which is followed by »America's responsibility«. Other groups are not as evenly distributed across the addresses and seem to respond more precisely to specific historic and political context. The percentage can be generally assigned to »war« and »peace«,


which are inevitably connected and well suited for the situation of late 60s and the beginning of 70s, when the Cold War and the fear of Communism were very present, as well as the anti-war public sentiment for the war in Vietnam. Once again, »human rights« were not at the forefront, apart from the address on the Cambodian incursion, where a substantial 22 percent of the address focused on the issue of »human rights«. To think about the abuse, violence and the death toll among American soldiers and the Vietnamese population, this seems quite odd. On the other side, too much focus on human suffering and civilian casualties would have surely caused Nixon even more trouble at home.

7.7 Gerald Ford, 38th President, (1974–1977)

The following two addresses were included in the analysis:

- May 15, 1975. Remarks to the Nation Following Recovery of the SS Mayaguez; 3 paragraphs, 9 lines (Ford 1975) and
- SOU 1976; 115 paragraphs, 372 lines/22 paragraphs, 62 lines on foreign policy (Ford 1976).

Figure 7.6: Gerald Ford-graphic representation of justifications per speech



Source: Author's analysis.

7.7.1 Data interpretation

The two analyzed addresses differ in length and style. The first address and the only direct one, dealing with the Mayaguez incident was delivered the morning after the intervention. Ford was extremely short, and this was possibly due to the fact that at the time of his address the rescue mission was not over yet and the situation was less optimistic than the address made believe. The data reveal there were two main reasons for intervention, namely »human rights« and »war«, which were logically connected, since war and related hostilities are always accompanied by violations of human rights. Only four categories of justifications were featured in the first address, besides the aforementioned »war« and »human rights«, there were also »America's values« and »America's responsibility«. The last two categories provided additional support for America's action, which is nicely presented in the last paragraph of the address: »I wish to express my deep appreciation and that of the entire

Nation to the units and the men who participated in these operations for their valor and for their sacrifice« (Ford 1975).

Only 22 paragraphs out of 115, or 14 percent of the SOU address is dedicated to foreign issues, which shows that Ford did not want to emphasize and concentrate on the situation abroad very much. The two strongest justifications were also among the four present in the Mayaguez address, and they were »America's values« and »responsibility«. »The protection of the lives and property of Americans from foreign enemies is one of my primary responsibilities as President« (Ford 1976).

Ford also stated that America is »the world's greatest democracy. We remain the symbol of man's aspiration for liberty and well-being. We are the embodiment of hope for progress« (Ford 1976).

In Ford's 1976 SOU address Mayaguez was not mentioned at all. It was a brief operation, initially seen as success story. When it became clear that the loss of human lives of the rescue team could have been avoided if only the communication channels had worked properly, and that the use of force was not necessary at all, also public support disappeared.

7.7.2 Legal basis

The Mayaguez operation was conducted in secrecy and haste, so the President acted solely on the basis of his prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief. He opened his address with the words: »At my direction« (Ford 1976), which were followed by a very brief description of the reasons and that far achieved results of the operation.

7.7.3 Justifications

As mentioned above, remarks following the Mayaguez incident were extremely short, consisting of only three paragraphs and nine lines altogether, so the number of justifications is accordingly very restricted. As expected, the President referred to »human rights« and »war«, the antagonistic partners that frequently appear together, and he also referred to »America's values and »responsibilities«. When Ford delivered the message, the mission was still going on, the ship had been recovered and the crew rescued, but the rescuers were still under fire. The President thus only delivered this short report and did not expand on its elements and characteristics. He explained that the US forces »boarded the American merchant ship SS Mayaguez and landed at the Island of Koh Tang for the purpose of rescuing the crew and the ship, which had been illegally seized by Cambodian forces« (Ford 1975).


In the SOU address, the Mayaguez incident is not even mentioned and the part of the address that refers to the foreign policy issues is very general. It focuses on high level of US armed forces, on good relations with the developed and developing world, on the leading role of America in the world, and on the American values.

7.8 Jimmy Carter, 39th President, (1977–1981)

The following addresses were included in the analysis:

- April 25, 1980. Address to the Nation on Rescue Attempt for American Hostages in Iran; 15 paragraphs, 60 lines (Carter 1980c) and
- SOU address; 16.1.1981²; 701 paragraphs, 2801 lines/168 paragraphs, 675 lines on Foreign policy / 43 paragraphs, 124 lines on general, Soviet Union and Iran issues (Carter 1981).

Figure 7.7: Jimmy Carter-graphic representation of justifications per speech



Source: Author's analysis.

7.8.1 Data interpretation

Carter's decision to use military force was connected to a diplomatic conflict between Iran and the USA, which resulted in the seizure of 52 American diplomats who were taken as hostages and kept in captivity for several months prior to the attempted rescue mission, and for 444 days until their final release. After the negotiation attempt for the liberation of American hostages failed, a new plan was made to rescue the hostages from Teheran and transport them to a safe place with the help of US helicopters. On the basis of the context it is clear that the operation had to be based primarily on »human rights« and their abuse, which

² This was both, SOU and Farewell Address at the same time, representing a very long and systematic overview of all activities during the President's term of office.

was indeed presented as the leading justification together with »America's interest«, »values« and »responsibility«.

»The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It has caused no Iranian casualties« (Carter 1980c).

Thus the absence of »war«, which nearly always appears among the most cited justifications, is something that could have been anticipated, and was additionally emphasized by low percentage of references to »peace«. As Carter said when explaining the death toll of soldiers involved in the rescue mission »/t/here was no fighting; there was no combat« (Carter 1980c), Carter attempted to negotiate the release of hostages with no success and thus decided to order the rescue operation with the prime purpose of protecting American lives and national interests.

This attempt became a necessity and a duty. The readiness of our team to undertake the rescue made it completely practicable. Accordingly, I made the decision to set our long-developed plans into operation. I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard American lives, to protect America's national interests, and to reduce the tensions in the world that have been caused among many nations as this crisis has continued (Carter 1980c).

However, soldiers died and as a result of technical failure and difficulties of rescue helicopters and planes, Carter aborted the mission and hostages remained captive for another 8 months.

7.8.2 Legal basis

As President Carter said, the operation was conducted on the basis of his decision »It was my decision to attempt the rescue operation. It was my decision to cancel it when problems developed in the placement of our rescue team for a future rescue operation. The responsibility is fully my own« (Carter 1980c).

When reporting to the Congress, Carter explained his intention to keep the Congress informed »on this matter and consistent with the reporting provisions of the War Powers Resolution of 1973« (Carter 1980c). In the same letter, Carter provided explicit legal basis for the undertaken operation stating:

This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's powers under the Constitution as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces, expressly recognized in Section 8(d) (1) of the War Powers Resolution. In carrying out this operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with Article

51 of the UN Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them (Carter 1980c).

It was therefore clear that President Carter believed he was completely covered by Constitutional prerogatives, which were additionally confirmed by the War Powers Resolution, whereas international legal aspect was provided for by the Charter of the UN. As Carter himself said in his autobiography, he had reported to the Congress in consistency with the War Powers Resolution and on the basis of his Constitutional authority as Commander-in-chief, »but I would notify a larger group of the leadership of the House and Senate only after the rescue operation had reached the point of no return« (Carter 1982, 521).

7.8.3 Justifications

A look at the graphic representation of justifications employed by President Carter in his address to the nation following the unsuccessful rescue attempt of American hostages in Teheran, some justifications seem to be missing. Carter did not refer to »war«, »experience« and »democracy«, while relying heavily on »human rights«, »America's values« and »America's responsibility«, to be followed by »America's interest« and »diplomacy«. If the context of this operation is considered, the justifications used by President Carter could not have been chosen better. This was primarily a diplomatic conflict, where respect for human rights definitely ceased to exist, since the act of depriving people of their freedom and holding them in captivity most definitely speaks for itself.

In his Address to the Nation of April 25, 1980, Carter explained why he decided to wait for so long before attempting to rescue the hostages. He made it clear the Administration was hoping for the crisis to be solved through peaceful channels and the Iranian authorities would release the hostages. With the passing of time the awareness that this would not happen settled in and thus the President decided to order the rescue operation to begin.

This rescue attempt had to await my judgment that the Iranian authorities could not or would not resolve this crisis on their own initiative. With the steady unraveling of authority in Iran and the mounting dangers that were posed to the safety of the hostages themselves and the growing realization that their early release was highly unlikely, I made a decision to commence the rescue operations plans (Carter 1980c).

Furthermore, Carter also presented the goals of this operation, which were: »To safeguard American lives, to protect America's national interests, and to reduce the tensions in the world that have been caused among many nations as this crisis has continued« (Carter 1980c).

The main part of the address however evolved around the problems and failure of the mission and Carter openly admitted his accountability for the loss of American lives, but stressed the responsibility of Iranian authorities for the wellbeing of American hostages. In the aftermath of the failed liberation of hostages, President Carter made a commitment to »to persevere and to bring all of our hostages home to freedom« (Carter 1980c). He stressed the importance of international support to this pursuit and expressed the determination to find solution and liberate the hostages with the help of diplomacy and the use of peaceful means.


We have been disappointed before. We will not give up in our efforts. Throughout this extraordinarily difficult period, we have pursued and will continue to pursue every possible avenue to secure the release of the hostages. In these efforts, the support of the American people and of our friends throughout the world has been a most crucial element. That support of other nations is even more important now (Carter 1980c).

7.9 Ronald Reagan, 40th President, (1981–1989)

The following addresses were included in the analysis:

- October 27, 1983. Address to the nation on events in Lebanon and Grenada; 64 paragraphs, 296 lines (Reagan 1983c);
- SOU 1984; 78 paragraphs, 376 lines / 11 paragraphs, 56 lines on foreign issues (Reagan 1984);
- April 14, 1986. Address to the nation on US air strikes against Libya; 7 paragraphs, 67 lines (Reagan 1986b) and
- SOU 1987; 26 paragraphs, 275 lines / 10 paragraphs, 80 lines on foreign issues (Reagan 1987).

Figure 7.8: Ronald Reagan-graphic representation of justifications per speech



Source: Author's analysis.

7.9.1 Data interpretation

After the Vietnam War experience, American public was more and more reluctant to send the US troops abroad, especially for ideological reasons, such as the fear of Communism. Reagan had a double burden to deal with; on the one side the reluctance to military operations on the basis of ideology, and on the other side the institutional context of his presidency, with the Congress controlled by the Democrats. A combination of both adversary elements contributed to his cautiousness when presenting reasons and justifications for American presence abroad. It is important to remember that Reagan was considered »the Great Communicator«. His past

experience of an actor, coupled with his natural ease when communicating with people were undoubtedly noticed also in his public addresses. Reagan knew how to touch human hearts and nearly always, when he was addressing the public, he used some personal stories that emphasized the overall message or added the emotional dimension to his words. Another issue that became increasingly important during the presidency of Ronald Reagan was the fact that world was becoming less polarized, with the fear of Communism still very high at the beginning of Reagan's first term of office, to see it slowly disappear towards the end of his second mandate. The first peculiarity that can be seen from the graphic representation (Figure 7.8) is a dramatic rise in the percentage of justifications within a single address (Reagan's second analyzed address) and in the total. His addresses became more vivid and colorful around 1984, which can be explained by touching briefly upon the historical context of Reagan's time. Reagan was the last Cold War President, but it was actually at the time of his second term of office, when a big change and the détente started to appear. Soviet Union was slowly but surely changing, and Reagan, who used to be in first lines of anticommunist fight, sensed it just right and adjusted to the new era, which probably reached its peak when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. This was a period of summit meetings (the Geneva summit, the Reykjavik summit) between the USA and the USSR, which often ended with the signing of some kind of anti-nuclear armament treaty.

7.9.2 Legal basis

On the day when the intervention in Grenada started, President Reagan reported to the Congress and explained the reasons, which led the USA to consider and take part in the operation. The President stated that America only participated as part of »collective multiforce« with other to Grenada friendly nations, and upon the request of the OECS which was determined to »take immediate, necessary steps to restore order in Grenada so as to protect against further loss of life, pending the restoration of effective governmental institutions« (Reagan 1983d).

Reagan explained that heads of government of member states of the OECS met in emergency session following an outburst of violence in Grenada, and realizing the unprecedented threat the situation posed to the peace and security of whole region, they »formed a collective security force comprising elements from member States to restore order in Grenada and requested the immediate cooperation of a number of friendly countries, including the governments of Barbados, Jamaica and the United States, in these efforts« (Reagan 1983d).

Reagan thus decided to join other nations in the effort to protect lives of people, including Americans, in Grenada: »In response to this call for assistance and in view of the overriding importance of protecting the lives of the United States citizens in Grenada« (Reagan 1983d). The letter Reagan sent to the leaders of the Congress was thus of only informative nature, since the authorization for the use of the American Armed Forces provided the President himself. »I have authorized the Armed Forces of the United States to participate along with these other nations in this collective security force. In accordance with my desire that the Congress be informed on this matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution, I am providing this report on this deployment of the United States Armed Forces« (Reagan 1983c).

Also in the Address to the Nation delivered a few days later, on October 27, 1983, Reagan emphasized that America acted upon request of the OECS, saying:

These small, peaceful nations needed our help. Three of them don't have armies at all, and the others have very limited forces. The legitimacy of their request, plus my own concern for our citizens, dictated my decision. I believe our government has a responsibility to go to the aid of its citizens, if their right to life and liberty is threatened. The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated (Reagan 1983d).

As far as legal basis for air strikes against Libya in April 1986 were concerned, Reagan referred to the Charter of the UN and the obligation of America to protect its civilians and soldiers anywhere in the world. According to Reagan, this duty was met also in the mission in Libya: »It is the purpose behind the mission undertaken tonight, a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter« (Reagan 1986b).

The Congress was largely left out, even though Reagan mentioned it in his address of April 14: »This afternoon we consulted with the leaders of Congress regarding what we were about to do and why« (Reagan 1986b).

However, a formal letter reporting to the Congress was sent only two days later, on April 16, 1986, where Reagan again referred to his authorization stemming from the right to self-defense, as enshrined in the Charter of the UN:

These strikes were conducted in the exercise of our right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This necessary and appropriate action was a preemptive strike, directed against the Libyan terrorist infrastructure and designed to deter acts of terrorism by Libya, such as the Libyan-ordered bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin on April 5. Libya's cowardly and murderous act resulted in the death of two innocent people-an American soldier and a young Turkish woman-and the wounding of 50 United States Armed Forces personnel and 180 other innocent persons (Reagan 1986c).

The doctrine of preemptive action against the alleged sponsors of terrorist attacks on Americans and others was presented as the right of self defense, and manifested itself in the form of attack on a foreign state. A very similar approach will be repeated later under the presidency of George W. Bush in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

7.9.3 Justifications

The two analyzed Addresses to the nation differ greatly in length and scope, which partly accounts for a higher percentage of justifications in the second, shorter address. The address of October 1983 consists of 64 passages, covering the general situation and the background of problems in Lebanon and Grenada, whereas the second address consisted of only 7 paragraphs and concentrated strictly on the episode of air strikes against Libya in April of 1986.

The only justification that was missing in the second address was »democracy«, and »war« represented the strongest presence in both addresses.

In the first address dealing with the issue of Lebanon and Grenada, Reagan voiced the question of many Americans, particularly those who had family members or friends in the Armed Forces: »Why should our young men be dying in Lebanon? Why is Lebanon important to us?« (Reagan 1983c)

And his answer was not a simple one. He emphasized strategic importance of the Middle East, its energy resources, the Suez Canal and above all the importance of a peaceful region. He went on to claim that »peace in the Middle East is of vital concern to our nation and, indeed, to our allies in Western Europe and Japan. We've been concerned because the Middle East is a powder keg; four times in the last 30 years, the Arabs and Israelis have gone to war. And each time, the world has teetered near the edge of catastrophe« (Reagan 1983c).

He also mentioned another, less obvious reason for America's interest in the Middle East: »We have another reason to be involved. Since 1948 our Nation has recognized and accepted a moral obligation to assure the continued existence of Israel as a nation. Israel shares our democratic values and is a formidable force an invader of the Middle East would have to reckon with« (Reagan 1983c).

From the above provided reasons it can be seen how important the Middle East actually was to America. Reagan talked of vital interests of America connected to oil, transport, and strategic geo-political position; he mentioned America's responsibility and its values, which could all be found also in his second address of April 1986.

Human rights were also important to Reagan and together with war and peace usually appeared implicitly and explicitly in his colorful anecdotes. In his address of October 27, 1983, Reagan described a story which had happened to the Commandant of Marine Corps, General Paul Kelley, while visiting injured marines in an Air Force hospital, in which a display of heroism and gallantry of young soldiers serving and risking their lives to provide freedom and peace to people of different nations.

I'll let General Kelley's words describe the incident. He spoke of a "young marine with more tubes going in and out of his body than I have ever seen in one body." "He couldn't see very well. He reached up and grabbed my four stars, just to make sure I was who I said I was. He held my hand with a firm grip. He was making signals, and we realized he wanted to tell me something. We put a pad of paper in his hand—and he wrote 'Semper Fi.'" Well, if you've been a marine or if, like myself, you're an admirer of the marines, you know those words are a battle-cry, a greeting, and a legend in the Marine Corps. They're marine shorthand for the motto of the Corps—"Semper Fidelis"—"always faithful." General Kelley has a reputation for being a very sophisticated general and a very tough marine. But he cried when he saw those words, and who can blame him? That marine and all those others like him, living and dead, have been faithful to their ideals. They've given willingly of themselves so that a nearly defenseless people in a region of great strategic importance to the free world will have a chance someday to live lives free of murder and mayhem and terrorism. I think that young marine and all of his comrades have given every one of us something to live up to (Reagan 1983c).

What can be added from the second address of April 16, 1986 is strong emphasis on »human rights« and »experience«, and the fact that Reagan actually justified his »preemptive action« on the basis of negative experience America and the world already had with Qadhafi.

We have solid evidence about other attacks Qadhafi has planned against the United States installations and diplomats and even American tourists. Thanks to close cooperation with our friends, some of these have been prevented. With the help of French authorities, we recently aborted one such attack: a planned massacre, using grenades and small arms, of civilians waiting in line for visas at an American Embassy. Colonel Qadhafi is not only an enemy of the United States. His record of subversion and aggression against the neighboring States in Africa is well documented and well known. He has ordered the murder of fellow Libyans in countless countries. He has sanctioned acts of terror in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, as well as the Western Hemisphere (Reagan 1986c).

Reagan believed it was America's obligation to respond with force and said: »Today we have done what we had to do. If necessary, we shall do it again,« making it clear he had no second thoughts and regrets about the accomplished mission. He also relied upon the

American tradition which firmly stood behind the protection of American civilians and soldiers, their lives and their rights. He said:

And for us to ignore by inaction the slaughter of American civilians and American soldiers, whether in nightclubs or airline terminals, is simply not in the American tradition. When our citizens are abused or attacked anywhere in the world on the direct orders of a hostile regime, we will respond so long as I'm in this Oval Office. Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty (Reagan 1987).

Reagan presented and defended the policy of preemptive action against terrorism, which he considered essential in the quest for a safer world and stated:

We believe that this preemptive action against his terrorist installations will not only diminish Colonel Qadhafi's capacity to export terror, it will provide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior. I have no illusion that tonight's action will ring down the curtain on Qadhafi's reign of terror. But this mission, violent though it was, can bring closer a safer and more secure world for decent men and women (Reagan 1987).

As mentioned before, also the air strikes against Libya were a preemptive operation and the Congress was »consulted«, or better informed, only afterwards: »This afternoon we consulted with the leaders of Congress regarding what we were about to do and why« (Reagan 1987).

Reagan wanted to emphasize that all other means, such as diplomacy and different sanctions, have been used and the use of force against Libya was indeed the last option available. He said:

We Americans are slow to anger. We always seek peaceful avenues before resorting to the use of force—and we did. We tried quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, economic sanctions, and demonstrations of military force. None succeeded. Despite our repeated warnings, Qadhafi continued his reckless policy of intimidation, his relentless pursuit of terror. He counted on America to be passive. He counted wrong (Reagan 1987).

Reagan based his decision to order preemptive air strikes against Libya on the right of self-defense, which seemed to have been forgotten and pushed aside towards the end of his address, when elements of threat and revenge took over, establishing the so called war on terror.


I warned that there should be no place on Earth where terrorists can rest and train and practice their deadly skills. I meant it. I said that we would act with others, if possible, and alone if necessary to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere. Tonight, we have (Reagan 1987).

7.10 George H.W. Bush, 41st President (1989–1993)

The following addresses were included in the analysis:

- December 20, 1989. Address to the nation announcing military action in Panama; 14 paragraphs, 66 lines (Bush 1989a);
- SOU 1990; 65 paragraphs, 283 lines/20 paragraphs, 108 lines on foreign affairs (Bush 1990c);
- August 8, 1990. Address to the nation announcing the deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia; 23 paragraphs, 119 lines (Bush 1990b);
- January 16, 1991. Address to the nation announcing allied military action in the Persian Gulf; 25 paragraphs, 106 lines (Bush 1991c);
- SOU 1991; 71 paragraphs, 315 lines / 36 paragraphs, 157 lines on foreign affairs (Bush 1991b) and
- December 4, 1992. Address to the nation on the situation in Somalia; 23 paragraphs, 91 lines (Bush 1992).

Figure 7.9: George H. W. Bush-graphic representation of justifications per speech



Source: Author's analysis.

7.10.1 Data interpretation

Graphic representation of the analyzed addresses delivered by President George H. W. Bush reveals a quite uniform distribution of justifications in all addresses, with the highest score between 40 and 50 percent referring to »war«, »America's values«, »international alliance« and »human rights«. The focus of each address is slightly different, as was different also the

nature of intervention. For example, the last studied address dealing with the intervention in Somalia reveals more focus on »human rights«, which makes perfect sense, since the mission was clearly a humanitarian one. There is, however, another interesting semantic group, which is particularly obvious in the two post military interventions referring to Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and America's response. This is the justification »international alliance« and the operation known as »The Desert Storm« was indeed characterized by great success of President Bush in rallying the support of many nations, which not only participated in the military part of the operation, but also helped alleviate financial burdens. Another justification that stands out is »America's values«, strongly emphasized by President Bush in the SOU address of 1990, in which he draws on the success in Panama and pictures America as a shining example of values such as freedom, democracy, justice; an example to oppressed nations and particularly to new democracies, born out of the rumbles of Communist regimes and dictatorships.

7.10.2 Justifications

In December 1989, President Bush sent 11.000 troops into Panama, where they joined the 13,000 US troops already in the zone of the Panama Canal. He gave a number of reasons for intervention, the main one being the protection of American lives:

Last Friday, Noriega declared his military dictatorship to be in a state of war with the United States and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama. The very next day, forces under his command shot and killed an unarmed American serviceman; wounded another; arrested and brutally beat a third American serviceman; and then brutally interrogated his wife, threatening her with sexual abuse. That was enough. /.../ As President, I have no higher obligation than to safeguard the lives of American citizens (Bush 1989a).

Other justifications for intervention presented by Bush included: »The goals of the United States have been to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty« (Bush 1989a).

As Fisher (2004, 168) claims in his book *Presidential war power*, the above given justifications did not hold water. To send additional 11.000 troops to the area where 13.000 American troops were stationed seems greatly exaggerated, especially in view of isolated incidents and only 35.000 American citizens living there.

To claim that American intervention protected democracy was not a plausible excuse either. If Communist Soviet Union had used such a claim for invading some neighboring

country, USA would definitely not have believed it. Another problem is that the USA, while exporting democracy to Panama, continued to have good and friendly relations with some other »Illegitimate, undemocratically elected and undemocratically maintained governments/.../whose territories the US has not invaded and which the US government has continued to treat as friends« (Henkin in Fisher 2004, 168).

After Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President Bush sent American troops to deter further Iraqi aggression. »At my direction, elements of the 82d Airborne Division as well as key units of the United States Air Force are arriving today to take up defensive positions in Saudi Arabia. I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the defense of its homeland« (Bush 1990b).

The reasons for intervention as provided in the same address of August 8, 1990, were the security and stability of the Persian Gulf, and the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad. He also stated the goals of the intervention as follows:

First, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime. And third, my administration, as has been the case with every President from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad (Bush 1990b).

Bush also explained the efforts his Administration had put into making Iraq withdraw from Kuwait without the use of force, namely by resorting to all other diplomatic means, including the sanctions. »Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, I ordered an embargo of all trade with Iraq and, together with many other nations, announced sanctions that both freeze all Iraqi assets in this country and protected Kuwait's assets« (Bush 1990b).

He also drew on past experience of trusting Hussein, whose words and promises meant nothing. »As was the case in the 1930's, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors. Only 14 days ago, Saddam Hussein promised his friends he would not invade Kuwait. And 4 days ago, he promised the world he would withdraw. And twice we have seen what his promises mean: His promises mean nothing« (Bush 1990b).

Bush was an experienced diplomat with a rich history of serving abroad, and he greatly valued the importance of international coalitions and international support. In line with this attitude he was determined to gather other states in a joined action against Iraq, and was very successful in doing it. The international support and participation in the operation was impressive.

In the last few days, I've spoken with political leaders from the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Americas; and I've met with Prime Minister Thatcher, Prime Minister Mulroney, and NATO Secretary General Woerner. And all agree that Iraq cannot be allowed to benefit from its invasion of Kuwait. We agree that this is not an American problem or a European problem or a Middle East problem: It is the world's problem (Bush 1990b).

By doubling the size of American forces in November 1990, Bush moved from defensive to offensive intervention, without bothering to consult the Congress; he spoke before a joint session of the Congress in September 1990, when he presented the situation and America's plan to support the rule of law and to protect its vital interests by helping Kuwait defend against the aggressor: »America and the world must defend common vital interests- and we will. America and the world must support the rule of law - and we will. America and the world must stand up to aggression - and we will« (Bush 1990d).

After the military victory, Bush decided to pull out of Iraq, because he knew the coalition assembled to force Iraqi troops from Kuwait would have fallen apart had he insisted on expanding the Security Council mandate and moving on to Baghdad (Scowcroft in Fisher 2004, 173).

The last analyzed intervention in President Bush's term of office was the intervention in Somalia. This was a highly humanitarian operation, and as Bush said in his remarks at the West Point Academy on January 5, 1993, its purpose was to curb the growing humanitarian disaster, which could not have been done without the use of military force.

First the United States underscored the importance of alleviating the growing tragedy, and then we organized humanitarian efforts designed to bring hope, food, and peace. At times, real leadership requires a willingness to use military force. And force can be a useful backdrop to diplomacy, a complement to it, or, if need be, a temporary alternative (Bush 1993).

Bush emphasized the use of force had been the last resort after all other options had already failed and the suffering and starvation of Somali population continued, despite the increased efforts of America, UN and international community.

But in the months since then, the security situation has grown worse. The UN has been prevented from deploying its initial commitment of troops. In many cases, food from relief flights is being looted upon landing; food convoys have been hijacked; aid workers assaulted; ships with food have been subject to artillery attacks that prevented them from docking. There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down. Anarchy prevails (Bush 1992).

With the worsening of humanitarian situation, he felt there had been no other option left but to intervene military and thus try to get the food and help to the starving people of Somalia.

After consulting with my advisers, with world leaders, and the congressional leadership, I have today told Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali that America will answer the call. I have given the order to Secretary Cheney to move a substantial American force into Somalia. As I speak, a Marine amphibious ready group, which we maintain at sea, is offshore Mogadishu (Bush 1992).

The sole purpose of the mission was humanitarian and the following words clearly express this: »The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We're able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act« (Bush 1992).

President Bush also said it had been, at the time of the interventions under his orders, and still was at the time of his West Point address, his firm belief »that using military force to implement the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council was in the interest of the United States and the world community« (Bush 1993).

He believed that: »The United States should not stand by with so many lives at stake and when a limited deployment of US forces, buttressed by the forces of other countries and acting under the full authority of the UN, could make an immediate and dramatic difference, and do so without excessive levels of risk and cost« (Bush 1993).

7.10.3 Legal basis

As legal basis for the intervention in Panama, Bush referred to the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, fulfillment of responsibilities under the Panama Canal treaties, and his authority with respect to foreign relations and as Commander in Chief.

In his written statement to the President pro-tempore of the Senate of December 21, 1989, Bush stated:

The deployment of US Forces is an exercise of the right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter and was necessary to protect American lives in imminent danger and to fulfill our responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties. It was welcomed by the democratically elected government of Panama. The military operations were ordered pursuant to my constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander in Chief. In accordance with my desire that Congress be fully informed on this matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution, I am providing this report on the deployment of US Armed Forces to Panama (Bush 1989b).

On February 7, 1990, the House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution stating that »the President, with the support of the Congress and the American people, acted decisively and appropriately in ordering United States forces to intervene in Panama after making substantial efforts to resolve the crisis in Panama by political, economic, and diplomatic means in order to avoid resorting to military action« (United States House of representatives 1990). The resolution was concurrent, it passed the House, but the Senate did not act upon it.

In the American intervention against Iraq of September 1990, on which President Bush failed to consult the Congress, he made it clear it was not about a solo action of the USA, but an operation undertaken together with other countries, which agreed to share the financial burdens. His plan was to obtain the support of the UN and on November 29, 1990, the Security Council adopted the Resolution 678, authorizing »the Members States cooperating with the government of Kuwait/.../to use all necessary means/.../to restore peace and security in the area.« The Security Council also requested: »all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 above« (Security Council 1990).

However, there was no congressional authorization for the use of force, and the SC resolution is not and cannot be considered a replacement for the legal authorization by the Congress. According to the UN Participation Act from 1945 (and the amendments from 1949), a declaration of war by the Congress is not required for UN action, it is however expected of the Congress to approve the use of military commitments to the UN (in Fisher 2004, 170). President Bush and his administration strongly believed that no additional authorization, besides the Security Council's Resolution, was required. In response to such attitude and to the testifying of the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, who also claimed that President Bush did not require any additional authorization from Congress before attacking Iraq, the House adopted a resolution stating that the President must first seek authorization from Congress unless American lives were in danger (Fisher 2004, 170). There was a lot of disagreement on the issue within the Justice Department as well, which probably implicitly pressured President Bush to ask Congress for the adoption of legislation in support of his policy in the Persian Gulf.

»It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the UN Security Council on twelve separate occasions« (Bush 1991a). He emphasized the Resolution would place America firmly on the side of international community, law and decency and he was of the opinion it would send a

message of determination to the Iraq's leaders. The President also stressed the Resolution would »strengthen the prospects for peace and safeguard this country's vital interests« (Bush 1991a). The interesting thing is that Bush, after he had gotten the Resolution on January 12, 1991, authorizing him to take offensive actions against Iraq, claimed he had not even needed it and would have acted the same way even without congressional authorization. When he signed the Resolution he said:

As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital US interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution (Bush 1991b).


Legal basis for the humanitarian operation in Somalia was the same as the one deployed in Iraq and Kuwait; President Bush acted as Commander in Chief, and on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions (751 and 794). As has been often repeated throughout this dissertation, UN Security Council could not and cannot authorize the deployment of American military forces abroad, in the absence of any congressional authorization.

7.11 Bill Clinton, 42nd President, (1993-2001)

The following addresses were included in the analysis:

- June 26, 1993. Airstrikes against Iraq; 12 paragraphs, 59 lines (Clinton 1993);
- SOU 1994; 13 out of 79 paragraphs on foreign affairs (Clinton 1994);
- December 16, 1998. Address to the Nation announcing military strikes on Iraq; 36 paragraphs, 163 lines (Clinton 1998b);
- SOU 1999; 9 out of 126 paragraphs on foreign affairs (Clinton 1999d);
- March 24, 1999. Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); 27 paragraphs, 156 lines (Clinton 1999a) and
- SOU 2000; 22 out of 133 paragraphs on foreign affairs (Clinton 2000).

Figure 7.10: Bill Clinton-graphic representation of justifications per speech



Source: Author's analysis.

7.11.1 Data interpretation

Clinton was a great advocate of interventionist foreign policy already during his presidential campaign. In the post Cold War world, chaos replaced bipolarity and Clinton's administration responded to it accordingly, by treating each crisis as a separate event, without even trying to establish a pattern of causes leading to various crises and without establishing a coherent form of response to crisis situations.

Americans were not eager to support any kind of involvement of American troops abroad and Clinton made it clear that he prioritized domestic issues. However, when he took office opportunities for intervention were many and increasing. This was accompanied by increasing military capabilities of other states, by weak national prohibition of military interventions and by the lack of available and possible strategies for solving international disputes. Clinton's pre-electoral promises included a focus on domestic issues, curbing of the military and restructuring military to meet the challenges of new type of conflicts (McCormick 2000, 60), namely the ones without a predictable adversary.

From the graphic representation many differences can be noticed, which reveals how difficult is to talk about rhetorical style of individual presidents, when it is quite obvious the rhetoric changes also within the frame of studying one individual president. Also Clinton adjusted to a particular historical moment and socio-political context, when he addressed his audience.

It is interesting that Clinton did not emphasize his foreign policy actions and interventions abroad also in his SOU messages. The percentage dealing with foreign policy issues in the three analyzed SOU addresses ranged from 8 percent to 17 percent, which partly accounts for high percentage of content groups, especially in the shortest caption, the one representing only 8 percent of 1999 SOU address. This is even more interesting when considering the ease and frequency of deploying American Armed Forces abroad, which marked the presidency of Bill Clinton, and increased after the initial period of domestic priorities. This change of priorities can be explained from four points of view:

- the Congress was controlled by Republicans and it was becoming increasingly difficult for Clinton to push through very controversial home issues, such as the health reform;
- the President seemed quite successful abroad (Israeli-Palestinian agreement...) and wanted to build the momentum;
- at home, Clinton was facing numerous scandals and was eager to shift focus and make people concentrate on other issues, where he played a more positive role and
- the world was filled with situations demanding something be done, such as gross violations of human rights in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia.

7.11.2 Justifications

On June 26, 1993 Clinton ordered air strikes against Iraqi intelligence headquarters, under the pretext of retaliation for the Iraqi attempt to assassinate former President Bush. In his Address

to the Nation Clinton said: »The Iraqi attack against President Bush was an attack against our country and against all Americans. We could not and have not let such action against our Nation go unanswered« (Clinton 1993).

He also explained the message of this lesson and what it hoped to achieve: »A firm and commensurate response was essential to protect our sovereignty, to send a message to those who engage in state-sponsored terrorism, to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations« (Clinton 1993).

In the address there was a clear predominance of references to »war« (over 70 percent), followed by »experience«, »America's responsibility« and »democracy« (around 20–30 percent). The reasons for air strikes against Iraq are not very convincing and could hardly be considered appropriate and »commensurate« response. To deter violence by violence and to teach civilized behavior by military force is not very plausible either.

Clinton wanted to start his term with a reputation of a decisive and strong leader, capable of making tough military decisions. In his address Clinton already provided the backdrop of his future behavior and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces: »I want to say this to all the American people: While the Cold War has ended, the world is not free of danger. And I am determined to take the steps necessary to keep our Nation secure. We will keep our forces ready to fight. We will work to head off emerging threats, and we will take action when action is required« (Clinton 1993).

In 1998 Clinton decided again it was time to use military force against Iraq, with the purpose of protecting »the national interest of the United States and, indeed, the interest of people throughout the Middle East and around the world. Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological weapons« (Clinton 1998b).

His address relied mostly on the issue of »war«, on the contents related to »international alliance« and to past »experience« of trusting Hussein. Clinton had the support of America's allies and international community. »/O/ur allies, including Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, concurred that now is the time to strike« (Clinton 1998b).

President Clinton explained the past history of negotiations with Iraq, of UN and USA diplomatic measures that were supposed to force Iraq into complying with the UN Security Council resolutions, he also explained how international community and neighboring Arab states felt about Iraq and Hussein's conduct. »This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere. The international

community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize the chance. And so we had to act, and act now« (Clinton 1998b).

Clinton warned that by failing to address Iraq's violations of UN resolutions, America and the world would give Hussein the sign of having lost interest and of giving up, and thus Hussein would »surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction. And some day, make no mistake; he will use it again, as he has in the past« (Clinton 1998b).

On March 24, 1999, Clinton announced that American Armed Forces, together with NATO allies started airstrikes against Serbia, in response to the brutalities committed in Kosovo. The main reason for intervention as presented by President Clinton was stressed at the very beginning of his address, and it was the protection of human rights.

We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war, to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace (Clinton 1999a).

Clinton explained the history of conflicts in former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, emphasizing that great efforts had been made for a peaceful solution with the aim of rescuing starving and suffering population. There was international commitment to the proposed solution, including the allied forces and also Russia. The leaders of Kosovo acknowledged the importance of this historical moment and agreed to the proposal, whereas the Serbian side ignored the efforts and responded by gathering troops in the Kosovo area, obviously preparing for attack (Leroy 1999).

Last fall our diplomacy, backed by the threat of force from our NATO alliance, stopped the fighting for a while and rescued tens of thousands of people from freezing and starvation in the hills where they had fled to save their lives. And last month, with our allies and Russia, we proposed a peace agreement to end the fighting for good. The Kosovar leaders signed that agreement last week. Even though it does not give them all they want, even though their people were still being savaged, they saw that a just peace is better than a long and unwinnable war. The Serbian leaders, on the other hand, refused even to discuss key elements of the peace agreement. As the Kosovars were saying yes to peace, Serbia stationed 40,000 troops in and around Kosovo in preparation for a major offensive-and in clear violation of the commitments they had made (Clinton 1999a).

7.11.3 Justifications

In his address of June 26, 1993, Clinton said:

I ordered our forces to launch a cruise missile attack on the Iraqi intelligence service's principal command-and-control facility in Baghdad./.../I have discussed this action with the congressional leadership and with our allies and friends in the region. And I have called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to expose Iraq's crime (Clinton 1993).

In broad outline, the constitutional practice of the Clinton administration concerning war powers seems similar to that of previous administrations in the sense that sweeping claims of executive authority have been tempered through pragmatic political accommodation. A plausible legal basis for these actions (and various other actions throughout his presidency) could be the Iraq Resolution of January 14, 1991, which by its terms conferred open-ended authority on the President to use US armed forces to achieve implementation of a series of UN Security Council resolutions, the last of which authorized UN member states not only to assist in ejecting Iraq from Kuwait but also »to restore international peace and security in the region« (Security Council 1990). As required by the Iraq Resolution, the Administration has periodically reported to Congress on its efforts to achieve compliance with the Security Council resolutions. The legislative branch has evidently accepted (or at least has taken no steps at odds with) the executive claim of sufficient authority to deal forcibly with Iraq throughout the 1990s (Damrosch 2000, 132).

On March 24, 1999, NATO air strikes began against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in an effort to interrupt »ethnic cleansing« by Serb forces against the Kosovar Albanians. This was a more substantial use of military force than in previous deployments (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina), which were initially not intended to result in combat and were for the same reason not included in the analysis. In Kosovo, the combatant posture was undeniable, yet the Clinton Administration avoided explicit acknowledgment of »hostilities« within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution or war in the constitutional sense. In the first report filed consistent with the War Powers Resolution »on March 26, 1999 President Clinton recited that he had« taken into account the views and support expressed by the Congress in two resolutions« (Clinton 1999b). In the Letter to Congressional Leaders of April 7, 1999 he thanked the Congress for continued support and added: »I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution. I appreciate the continued support of the Congress in this action« (Clinton 1999c).


Yet, neither at the outbreak of the conflict, nor subsequently did Congress enact a specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution, thus leaving the President open hands to refer to his constitutional prerogatives only.

7.12 George W. Bush, 43rd President (2001–2008)

The following addresses were included in the analysis:

- October 7, 2001. Address to the nation announcing strikes against Al-Qaeda training camps and Taliban military installations in Afghanistan; 21 paragraphs, 81 lines (Bush 2001b);
- SOU 2002; 64 paragraphs, 276 lines total/38 paragraphs, 166 lines on foreign affairs (Bush 2002b);
- March 19, 2003. Address to the nation on Iraq; 19.3.2003 / 11 paragraphs, 42 lines on foreign affairs (Bush 2003b) and
- SOU 2004; 69 paragraphs, 366 lines / 22 paragraphs, 133 lines on foreign affairs (Bush 2004).

Figure 7.11: George W. Bush - graphic representation of justifications per speech



Source: Author's analysis.

7.12.1 Data interpretation

The graphic representation above is in a way surprising. The first address, the one delivered only a month after the attacks of 9/11 is obviously a very moderate one, which is confirmed furthermore by looking at the individual lengths of addresses. The first address consisted of 22 paragraphs, precisely the same length of the 2008 SOU address referred to foreign policy issues, and yet the difference is obvious.

There are two possible interpretations; a month after 9/11 America was still in shock and the new administration of George W. Bush was struggling to find the right response. America expected retaliation, punishment for the attacks on its soil, but on the other hand was deeply afraid. Not knowing what to expect from the attacks on Afghanistan dictated a substantial dose of caution and Bush managed to convey all of these through a balanced and moderate address. With time and the unfolding of events in Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush was becoming more direct and aggressive and his perception of reality increasingly black and white, based on »either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists« (Bush 2001a).

Contents that appeared with greatest consistency and represented the focal point of all analyzed addresses were »war«, »America's interest«, »America's values« and »America's responsibility«. This can be taken as the frame of reference for the presidency of George W. Bush.

7.12.2 Legal basis

President Bush reported to the Congress on the deployment of US Armed Forces in combat action in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda terrorists and their Taliban supporters, as part of campaign against terrorism. He stated: »I have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct US foreign relations as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive« (Bush 2001c).

In the same letter he thanked the Congress for continuing support to the actions aimed at protecting the security of the USA and its citizens at home and abroad and said he was reporting consistent with the War Powers Resolution and the Senate Joint Resolution 23 of October 18, 2001 (signed into Public Law 107-40), authorizing the use of force against those responsible for the attacks of 9/11.

I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution and Public Law 107-40. Officials of my Administration and I have been communicating regularly with the leadership and other members of Congress, and we will continue to do so. I appreciate the continuing support of the Congress, including its enactment of Public Law 107-40, in these actions to protect the security of the USA and its citizens, civilian and military, here and abroad (Bush 2001c).

Upon the signing of H. J. Res. 114, which authorized the use of US Armed Forces against Iraq, Bush applauded the Congress for having demonstrated that the US was united and committed to respond firmly to Iraq and the threat it posed to international peace and security.

Today I have signed into law H.J. Res. 114, a resolution "To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq." By passing H.J. Res. 114, the Congress has demonstrated that the United States speaks with one voice on the threat to international peace and security posed by Iraq. It has also clearly communicated to the international community, to the UN Security Council, and, above all, to Iraq's tyrannical regime a powerful and important message: the days of Iraq flouting the will of the world, brutalizing its own people, and terrorizing its neighbors must-and will-end. Iraq will either comply with all U.N. resolutions, rid itself of weapons of mass destruction, and in its support for terrorists, or it will be compelled to do so (Bush 2002c).

On March 18, 2003, President Bush ordered the use of armed force against Iraq, which had failed to comply with the UN Security Council Resolutions and thus continued to threaten international peace and security. Together with other members of the coalition Bush decided to have no option but to use force in order to restore international peace and security. He reported to the Congress on the basis of different joint resolutions that had been signed into Public Law. He also connected military operation against Iraq with the fight against terrorism that had begun after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001.

I have (also) determined that the use of armed force against Iraq is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons, who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. United States objectives also support a transition to democracy in Iraq, as contemplated by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338). Consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), I now inform you that pursuant to my authority as Commander-in-Chief and consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), I directed US Armed Forces, operating with other coalition forces, to commence combat operations on March 19, 2003, against Iraq (Bush 2003a).

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has raised questions about the legality of unilateral intervention in other states and the circumstances under which multilateral intervention can take place. The main explanations offered by the administration of President Bush were centered on humanitarian issues and elimination of the risk posed to the world by Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction. Another important document (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America) linked with the America's perception of its right to preemptive self-defense was prepared by the NSC in September 2002 in which the

plan of combating terrorism and defending America was laid down. The strategy was to destroy terrorists (also) by:

Defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense, by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America).

The ideas of providing security, contained in the Strategy, were to say the least very militant and dangerous. To exercise the right to self-defense is one thing, but to exercise a preemptive right to self-defense by waging war against alleged terrorist or potential threats to national security in somebody else's land, before the danger actually reaches the borders of America, was and is unacceptable for many reasons.

The decision to invade Iraq was apparently an exercise of that doctrine; the US also asserted that the military action was justified on humanitarian grounds and was aimed at the replacement of regime and introduction of democracy to Iraq. In the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 the following appeared: It is the sense of the Congress that once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq's transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals.

If international arena and the Organization of UN are considered it is clear that such interventions should not be carried out without the approval of the Security Council, save in the case of an armed attack, when the attacked state could respond in self-defense as defined in Article 51 of the Charter. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the UN. Any resort to military action is reserved to the UN Security Council acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter, and article 39 gives the Security Council the right to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression (Charter of the UN).

7.12.3 Justifications

The main four justifications mentioned before appeared also at the beginning of the first analyzed address of October 7, 2001. The address opens with a report on thus far taken actions and their purpose.

On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime. By destroying camps and disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans (Bush 2001b).

What could be seen as problematic was the spread of conflict or military attack on a sovereign nation which had allegedly sponsored terrorists and was thus indirectly responsible for the attacks of 9/11. Destruction of terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan were presented as the main goal of the operation. Bush believed that Al-Qaeda was a state sponsored terror organization and thus equalized its actions with the actions perpetrated by Afghanistan. This explains why intervention in Afghanistan was not perceived as expansion of conflict and a disproportionate retaliating measure, but a just and right response, or the payback time as Bush had put it: »And now the Taliban will pay a price« (Bush 2001b).

Bush also said the operation was not an attack on civilian population, on the Afghanis, but rather a precisely targeted and limited attack on those who harbored terrorism or were directly involved in the attacks. Bush claimed that the people of Afghanistan would be given relief and would get to know the »generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we'll also drop food, medicine, and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan« (Bush 2001b).

Bush also said that America was not waging a religious war, and that it condemned only those »who profane a great religion by committing murder in its name« (Bush 2001b).

The war against terrorism was strengthened with additional measures, such as: »Diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of financial assets, and the arrests of known terrorists by law enforcement agents in 38 countries« (Bush 2001b).

President Bush clearly conveyed the message of America's commitment to just values, to freedom and peace, and its sense of responsibility, not only to Americans, but also to the world.

»We did not ask for this mission, but we will fulfill it. The name of today's military operation is Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear« (Bush 2001b). He concluded by stressing America's commitment to the value of freedom and its determination to win the war and reestablish freedom and peace.

»Since September 11, an entire generation of young Americans has gained new understanding of the value of freedom and its cost in duty and in sacrifice. The battle is now joined on many fronts. We will not waver; we will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail. Peace and freedom will prevail« (Bush 2001b).

On March 19, 2003, President Bush ordered the beginning of military operation against Iraq. Interestingly enough, public support for the war was incredibly high, with about 70 percent of the population in favor of it (Gershkoff and Kushner 2005, 525–526). The main reason probably lies in the fact that Bush and his administration managed to package and sell the war in Iraq as some sort of continuation of the War on Terror. Bush did not link the two wars directly, but made an implicit linkage by saying: »The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder. We will meet that threat now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of firefighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities« (Bush 2003b).

It was clear that Bush was thinking of dramatic events following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 when streets of New York on the site of World Trade Center twin towers, hit by two of the hijacked planes, were filled with firefighters, policemen and medical staff, fighting to save people from the rumbles. Another element strongly emphasized at the beginning of war against Iraq was the alleged existence of the weapons of mass destruction. Bush also relied on the support of international alliance: »More than 35 countries are giving crucial support, from the use of naval and air bases, to help with intelligence and logistics, to the deployment of combat units. Every nation in this coalition has chosen to bear the duty and share the honor of serving in our common defense« (Bush 2003b).

8 Statistical modelling and interpretation

In order to study and analyze the justifications and references to legal authorization of American presidents from 1948 to 2008, military interventions involving the deployment of American Armed Forces on foreign soil at the time of individual presidencies were selected. Subsequently a list of presidential addresses to be included in the analysis was prepared.

After initial reading of the addresses, intended to provide a general feeling of potential justifications and authorizations, a coding scheme was drawn and 10 categories of justifications were established: »human rights«, »war, »peace, »America's interest, »America's values, »America's responsibility«, »diplomacy«, »experience«, »international alliance«, and »democracy«. Each of the selected addresses was divided into paragraphs, and justifications appearing in each paragraph were counted as separate instances. If a justification appeared in one paragraph more than once, it was still counted as single case. If more justifications appeared in one paragraph, each justification was counted as a separate occurrence. Human instead of computer coding was opted for, since the data basis was of a manageable size and the intent of the dissertation was to gather (often to computer hidden) implicit meanings or messages. Coding was repeated after a month and 20 percent of data basis was coded by another person, to account for inter-coders' reliability. There were no statistically significant differences between the three codings. Results were reported as number of paragraphs where justifications occurred, and their percentage out of the total number of paragraphs in the address was calculated. For SOU addresses a percentage of the address (in paragraphs) with reference to foreign issues was calculated, which served as the frame of reference for subsequent analysis.

Results were statistically analyzed with the program SPSS 15.0 for Windows, to see whether there existed statistically significant proof for the set hypotheses. Figures and statistics were reported one variable at a time and were also cross tabulated with T-test of independent samples, comparison of means and descriptive cross tabulation. The total of 43 public addresses, divided in 19 SOU and 24 post military intervention addresses, were analyzed.


Table 8.1 Tested variables

Address type	1 SOU Address
	2 Post military intervention address
Divided government	1 YES (1955–1958, 1969–1976, 1983–1992 and 1998–2000)
	2 NO
Legal basis	1 congressional joint resolution
	2 Other
Substantial prior international experience	1 YES (Eisenhower, Nixon, Bush Senior, Clinton)
	2 NO (Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford Carter, Reagan, Bush Junior)
Cold War	1 PRE (before 1984)
	2 POST (after 1984)
Party affiliation	1 Democratic
	2 Republican
Integrative complexity index	1 HIGH (for Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Bush senior and Clinton)
	2 LOW (for Eisenhower, Ford, Carter, Reagan and Bush junior)
Political time 1	1 Disjunction (Carter)
	2 Articulation (Bush senior, Truman, Ford, Kennedy, Johnson)
	3 Reconstruction (Reagan)
	4 Preemption (Clinton, Eisenhower, Nixon and Bush junior)
Political time 2	1 Affiliated (Carter, Bush senior, Truman, Ford, Kennedy and Johnson)
	2 Opposed (Reagan, Clinton, Eisenhower, Nixon and Bush junior)
Political time 3 (Orthodox innovators)	1 YES (Truman, Johnson and Bush junior)
	2 NO (Others)

Source: Author's analysis.

Figure 8.1 presents an overview of all the justifications the analyzed presidents have employed in their yearly SOU addresses and their distribution in time. Each President is represented with as many addresses as were included in the analysis, minimum one and maximum three.

Figure 8.1: Cross presidential analysis by SOU address




Source: Author’s analysis.

Figure 8.1 represents the percentage of employed justifications in 19 SOU addresses, delivered by the American presidents. The address of 1984, delivered by Ronald Reagan was identified as pivotal point due to a notable decrease of hostilities in the speech and the sign of a new period of détente, sometimes also called the second Cold War. 10 addresses were delivered prior to 1984, and 9 including and after 1984.

As can be noted from Figure 8.1, there has been a notable increase in the use of justifications in the address of 1984, which marked a new trend in the SOU addresses that followed. Student T-test of independent samples revealed there was statistically significant difference in the use of the following justifications before and after 1984; »war« (p=0.006), »America’s values« (p= 0.001), a potentially significant difference is pointed out for

»America's responsibility« ($p=0.067$) and »democracy« ($p=0.067$), whereas all other justifications did not reveal any kind of statistically significant difference.


Figure 8.2: Cross presidential analysis by post military intervention address



Source: Author's analysis.

Figure 8.2 displays a less diverse usage of justifications in the 24 post military intervention addresses. There are fewer differences relative to individual presidents and they are not statistically significant. This can be taken as a proof of strong contextual influence on presidential addresses. Presidents are obviously less constrained by their party affiliation, than they are by the context, in this case a military intervention. There was also no substantial difference in the distribution of justifications before and after Cold War, even though this was expected.

Figure 8.3: Use and distribution of justifications in presidential addresses (1948–2008)



Source: Author's analysis.

Graphic representation of all justifications that were employed by the selected American presidents in the total of 43 analyzed addresses reveals that the prevailing justification was »war«, followed by »America's values«, »America's responsibility«, »international alliance«, »peace« and »America's interests«. Justifications distributed on the lowest side of the scale are »democracy«, »diplomacy«, »experience« and »human rights«. The emphasis on militancy is understandable, since 24 addresses were delivered following a military intervention abroad (post military intervention addresses), and therefore recurrence to the semantic group of justifications titled »war«, seems more than logical. What is, however, quite surprising, is the lack of appeal to democracy, marginalization of peaceful instrument of diplomacy, absence of reference to experience (in particular nearly no reference to lessons learned from the history and the consequent avoidance of conflict), and low profile of human rights. Even when experience was referred to it was mainly in the negative sense, which served as a trigger for another military intervention.

8.1 Hypothesis number 1

International institutional factors determine justifications for military intervention abroad.


Table 8.2: Independent Samples T-test: Influence of Cold War on justifications

	T-test for Equality of Means				
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
Human rights	-1,628	41	0,111	-0,08011	0,04920
War	-2,412	41	0,020	-0,15072	0,06248
Peace	-1,045	41	0,302	-0,04930	0,04716
America's interests	-1,825	41	0,075	-0,06033	0,03306
America's values	-3,793	41	0,000	-0,17191	0,04532
America's responsibility	-0,315	41	0,754	-0,01200	0,03803
Diplomacy	0,271	41	0,788	0,00961	0,03549
Experience	-0,804	41	0,426	-0,03020	0,03758
International alliance	-1,118	41	0,270	-0,05428	0,04854
Democracy	-1,363	41	0,180	-0,03360	0,02464

Source: Author's analysis.

T-test run on all the analyzed addresses reveals statistically significant difference in two semantic groups, i.e. »war« ($p=0,020$) and »America's values« ($p=0,000$), and very close, although not statistically significant is also the semantic group of »America's interests« ($p=0,075$). The total number of analyzed addresses is 43, with 24 addresses delivered before 1984 and 19 addresses after 1984. The mean value for percentage of »war« related references prior to 1984 was 22,8 percent, and after 1984 it was 37,9 percent, whereas the mean value for »America's values« prior to 1984 was 17,1 percent and post 1984 was 34,3 percent. Thus it can be said that Cold War exerted influence on rhetorical behavior of American presidents, who referred to »war« more commonly after 1984, and also emphasized »America's values« together with »America's interests« with greatest recurrence after 1984. This can be explained with the general loosening of tensions, which was reflected also in presidential communication.

Figure 8.4 Group statistics-Justifications used in post military intervention addresses before and after 1984



Source: Author's analysis.

Figure 8.4 shows there have been some differences in presidential addresses before and after 1984, which marked the beginning of détente and change in traditionally cold relations between the USA and the Soviet Union. Differences were more accentuated in SOU addresses, which can be explained with some basic arguments. SOU addresses are longer, ceremonial addresses delivered by American presidents on annual basis, usually in February, focusing on all areas of state affairs, not only on foreign policy and related issues. The presidents thus have more time, cover different issues and more importantly, they are less restricted by the context and the urgency of a recent military intervention, therefore also the semantic structure of their address results richer and more diversified. What is of interest is that only three semantic groups (peace, America's responsibility and diplomacy) experienced a decrease in their mean value. The antagonism between war and peace after the Cold War is clearly seen in the figure above, with war related references on the increase and peace on the decrease. Also the decrease of America's responsibility and diplomacy can be explained with the loosening of political tensions between the two blocks and consequently a lesser need for caution in communication; it can thus be said that the Cold War obviously constrained presidents in their speeches, which became more versatile and vivid after 1984. Post military intervention addresses are subjected to the context of a recently conducted military intervention and are thus more narrowly focused and to the point, which explains why the loosening of tensions between the Soviet Union and the USA was not much reflected in presidential post military intervention addresses. None of the American interventions was pointed directly against the Soviet Union; however, they all had an identified enemy.

As can be seen from Figure 8.4, after 1984 presidents referred with greater frequency to »human rights«, »America's interests«, »America's values«, »experience«, »international alliance«, »democracy«, but also »war«; and less frequently to »peace«, »America's responsibility« and »diplomacy«. However, the difference found is not statistically significant, which is visible from the table below. In fact, when T-test was run on post military intervention addresses (Table 8.3), there was no significant difference related to the Cold War or post Cold War verbal behavior of American presidents. The total number of addresses analyzed in this group was 24, with 14 addresses delivered prior to 1984, and 10 addresses delivered post 1984.

Table 8.3 Independent Samples T-test: Influence of Cold War on justifications in post military intervention addresses

	T-test for Equality of Means				
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
Human rights	-1,439	22	0,164	-0,11500	0,07994
War	-1,113	22	0,278	-0,09857	0,08853
Peace	0,549	22	0,588	0,02357	0,04291
America's interests	-1,202	22	0,242	-0,06186	0,05148
America's values	-1,683	22	0,106	-0,07957	0,04727
America's responsibility	1,466	22	0,157	0,06957	0,04744
Diplomacy	0,638	22	0,530	0,03057	0,04792
Experience	-1,144	22	0,265	-0,06886	0,06016
International alliance	-0,728	22	0,474	-0,05243	0,07199
Democracy	-0,332	22	0,743	-0,01257	0,03787

Source: Author's analysis.

This is not very surprising, especially since the tendency has however changed, even if the results were not statistically significant. This can be partly explained with a restricted sample of 24 post military intervention addresses. On the other hand, the analysis of only 19 SOU addresses managed to reveal statistically significant differences (see table 8.4), proving that the context and the type of address constrain presidents more than other factors, including the political environment and the so called international institutional factors.

Table 8.4: Independent Samples T-test: Influence of Cold War on justifications in SOU addresses

	T-test for Equality of Means				
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
Human rights	-1,532	17	0,144	-0,05133	0,03350
War	-3,139	17	0,006	-0,23256	0,07409
Peace	-1,498	17	0,153	-0,12744	0,08510
America's interests	-1,387	17	0,183	-0,05600	0,04037
America's values	-4,061	17	0,001	-0,27022	0,06654
America's responsibility	-1,960	17	0,067	-0,10811	0,05517
Diplomacy	-0,305	17	0,764	-0,01689	0,05537
Experience	0,477	17	0,639	0,01900	0,03982
International alliance	-0,800	17	0,435	-0,05267	0,06586
Democracy	-1,959	17	0,067	-0,05544	0,02830

Source: Author's analysis.

When T-test was performed on 19 SOU addresses only, 10 of which were delivered prior to 1984 and 9 after 1984, the difference in p-value for »war« ($p=0.006$) and »America's values« ($p=0.001$) resulted statistically significant, and also the value for »America's responsibility« and for »democracy« resulted only slightly out of the 5 percent margin, with p-value of 0.067. This can be interpreted as statistical proof for the influence of Cold War on the rhetoric of American presidents.

Hypothesis number 1 - partly confirmed


On the basis of these statistical data the first hypothesis, which claims that international institutional factors (namely the Cold War) determined the justifications American presidents employed in their addresses, can be confirmed. It should be however stressed that the influence of Cold War resulted less influential than had been expected, since its influence was statistically significant only in semantic groups »war« and »America's values«, and only when T-test was run on SOU addresses or combined addresses. No significant difference was found when T-test was conducted on the sample of post military intervention addresses only.

8.2 Hypothesis number 2

Domestic institutional factors determine legal basis for military interventions abroad

Domestic institutional factors comprise party alignments in congress, partisan alliances, and positioning in political time. In the analysis of legal authorizations only post military intervention addresses were considered. Presidents referred to legal authorization for a certain intervention immediately after the intervention and only in the addresses related to that specific intervention. The data basis thus consisted of 24 post military intervention addresses. Firstly, legal authorizations were divided into the following 7 categories (see Figure 8.5): constitution, war powers resolution, international treaties, congressional joint resolution, constitution and international treaty, international treaty and other, international treaty and war powers resolution.


Figure 8.5: Graphic representation of initial categorization of legal authorization



Source: Author’s analysis.

Due to data dispersion and consequently impossible statistical analysis, the categories of legal authorization were subsequently merged into two broad categories, »congressional joint resolution« (CJR), which based on the constitutional wording and the theory of institutional power sharing represents the most acceptable authorization, and »other«, which embraced all remaining options, such as constitution, international treaty or UN resolution, war powers resolution and their different combinations.


Figure 8.6: Graphic representation of merged categories of legal authorization



Source: Author's analysis.

Figure 8.7 and table 8.4 demonstrate that divided house was slightly but not significantly connected with legal authorizations presidents employed. They referred to CJR as legal basis for military intervention more frequently when house powers were not divided, i.e. in 4 cases out of 10 addresses, and less frequently, i.e. in 3 cases out of 14 addresses, when they operated in the context of divided house powers.

Figure 8.7: Correlation of legal basis and party alignment (divided house)



However, the percentage of references to other forms of legal authorizations for intervention was much higher in all situations, whether the powers were divided or non-divided. From the table 8.5 it can be seen that the percentage of CJR authorizations in 24 post military intervention addresses was only 29,2 percent, and the percentage of other legal authorizations 70,8 percent. Also the context of united or divided house powers, implying that the president was of the same or different party as the congressional majority, did not exert significant influence. This finds support also in theory, since most researchers connect the importance of divided house with domestic legislation and the relative ease of presidents to obtain support for their proposals when their party commands congressional majority. This is in particular true when there is a Republican President facing congressional majority of Democrats (LeLoup and Shull 1999, 127–129).


Table 8.5: Correlation of legal basis and party alignment (divided house)

			Legal basis CJR		Total
			CJR	Other	CJR
Divided house	YES	Count	3	11	14
		% of Total	12,5%	45,8%	58,3%
	NO	Count	4	6	10
		% of Total	16,7%	25,0%	41,7%
Total		Count	7	17	24
		% of Total	29,2%	70,8%	100%

Source: Author’s analysis.

As can be noted in the table above, there is not much connection between the referred legal authorization and party affiliation. The total number of analyzed (post military intervention) addresses was 24, with 10 of them delivered by the Democrats and 14 by the Republicans. In 5 addresses out of 14 (36 percent), the Republicans referred to CJR as their legal authorization, whereas the share of Democratic reference to CJR was only 2 out of 8 (25 percent).

Figure 8.8: Correlation of legal basis and party affiliation



Source: Author’s analysis.

Table 8.6: Correlation of legal basis and party affiliation

			Legal basis CJR		Total
			CJR	Other	CJR
Party	Democrats	Count	2	8	10
		% of Total	8,3%	33,3%	41,7%
	Republicans	Count	5	9	14
		% of Total	20,8%	37,5%	58,3%
Total		Count	7	17	24
		% of Total	29,2%	70,8%	100%

Source: Author’s analysis.

The difference is not statistically significant and the margin is very small; however, it does find support in historical and political context. As stated in previous chapters, both presidents from the family Bush had asked, at different times and in different interventions, for joint congressional authorization of the intervention (the Gulf War, Afghanistan and Iraq), received it, and only later claimed it had actually not been needed, and the operation had been authorized already by the constitutional prerogatives of the President as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. This could be a sign of more »conservative« orientation and less improvised or flexible approach to the search for legal coverage or legal justification for the employment of military forces abroad. The idea of flexibility was well developed and presented by Skowronek’s (1997; 2008), in his analysis of presidencies in political time.

Table 8.7: Correlation of legal basis and political time 1 in post military intervention addresses

			Legal basis CJR		
			CJR	Other	
Political time	Disjunction	Count	0	1	
		% within political time	0%	100%	
	Articulation	Count	3	8	
		% within political time	27,3%	72,7%	
	Reconstruction	Count	0	2	
		% within political time	0%	100,0%	
	Preemption	Count	4	6	
		% within political time	40%	60%	
	Total		Count	7	17
			% within political time	29,2%	70,8%

Source: Author’s analysis.

As can be seen from Table 8.7, presidents from all four categories of political time mostly relied on other types of legal basis (in 70,8 percent of cases), when justifying their decision to military intervene abroad, and usually refrained from asking for congressional authorization. However, preemptive presidents did go to Congress for authorization in 40 percent of all instances, whereas presidents of articulation in only 27 percent of all instances. Presidents belonging to the political time of disjunction and reconstruction did not rely on congressional joint resolution at all. However, the sample is not big enough to be able to make any inferences at all, since there were only three post military addresses delivered by the presidents of disjunction and the presidents of reconstruction.


Table 8.8: Correlation of legal basis and political time 2 in post military intervention addresses

		Legal basis CJR	
		CJR	Other
Political time 2	Affiliated	3	9
	Opposed	4	8
Total		7	17

Source: Author’s analysis.

Political time 2 consists of only two categories of political time, defined on the basis of affiliation with the existing regime or opposition to the existing regime. Presidents affiliated with the established regime referred to congressional joint resolution less often (in 3 cases out of 12, or 25 percent) than presidents opposed to the established regime (in 4 cases out of 12, or 30 percent). The difference is not statistically significant and it is thus impossible to predict the behavior of presidents on the basis of their affiliation and/or opposition to the regime.

Figure 8.9: Correlation of legal basis and political time 3 (orthodox innovators) in post military intervention addresses



Source: Author’s analysis.

Table 8.9: Correlation of legal basis and political time 3 (orthodox innovators) in post military intervention addresses

			Legal basis CJR		Total
			CJR	Other	CJR
Orthodox innovators	YES	Count	4	3	7
		% within OI	57,1%	42,9%	100%
	NO	Count	3	14	17
		% within OI	17,6%	82,4%	100%
Total		Count	7	17	24
		% within OI	29,2%	70,8%	100%

Source: Author’s analysis.

Political time 3 represents a particular category of political time, the so called orthodox innovators. This category includes the presidents who are fixed on their set agenda, hate improvising and do not have flexible authority. This can be seen in their frequent recurrence to congressional joint resolution (57 percent), the most »orthodox« option available. The contrast with non-orthodox innovators could seem substantial, if it was not for a very restricted (24 addresses of 11 presidents) and unevenly spread sample (only three presidents were orthodox innovators, as opposed to 8 non-orthodox innovators).

Hypothesis number 2-partly confirmed

The second hypothesis, stating that domestic institutional factors determine legal basis for military intervention abroad, could thus only be partly confirmed. Descriptive statistics pointed to some trends in presidential verbal behavior related to the deployment of American troops abroad and its legal authorization, which were particularly interesting when observed in relation to the category of orthodox innovators. Party affiliation and divided house powers, together with other categories of political time, did not result as significant influence in the presidential search for legal authorization.

8.3 Hypothesis number 3

Attitudinal factors determine justifications for military interventions abroad

Hypothesis no. 3 tried to statistically prove the relationship between the justifications used by the presidents and their attitudinal factors; the focus was placed on presidential integrative complexity and substantial international experience prior to the beginning of their first term of office.

Table 8.10: Independent Samples T-test: Influence of integrative complexity on justifications in post military intervention addresses

	T-test for Equality of Means				
	t	df	Sig.	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
Human rights	1,646	22	,114	,13222	,08035
War	,753	22	,459	,06889	,09149
Peace	-,585	22	,564	-,02556	,04366
America's interests	,796	22	,435	,04244	,05335
America's values	2,812	22	,010	,12333	,04387
America's responsibility	,724	22	,477	,03622	,05003
Diplomacy	,244	22	,810	,01200	,04919
Experience	,912	22	,372	,05644	,06191
International alliance	-,165	22	,871	-,01222	,07415
Democracy	-,721	22	,478	-,02756	,03821

Source: Author's analysis.

When the relationship of integrative complexity and justifications in post military intervention addresses was probed for, the only significant influence of integrative complexity was established for the semantic group »American values«, with $p=0.010$ (see Table 8.10).


Table 8.11: Independent Samples T-test-Influence of integrative complexity on justifications in all addresses

	T-test for Equality of Means				
	t	df	Sig.	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
Human rights	1,891	41	,066	,09351	,04946
War	,986	41	,330	,06606	,06702
Peace	-,154	41	,878	-,00749	,04852
America's interests	1,207	41	,235	,04140	,03432
America's values	1,647	41	,107	,08536	,05182
America's responsibility	1,739	41	,090	,06489	,03732
Diplomacy	,939	41	,353	,03353	,03570
Experience	,698	41	,489	,02670	,03824
International alliance	,480	41	,634	,02394	,04991
Democracy	-,768	41	,447	-,01952	,02541

Source: Author's analysis.

However, when all the addresses were used in the analysis, integrative complexity was nearly statistically significant for the justifications »human rights«, with p-value of 0,066 only slightly out of the margin, and »America's responsibility«, also under 10 percent, with p=0,090 (see Table 8.11). This means that presidents with more complex and integrative way of thinking, who were open to different scenarios and preferred complex way of reasoning, referred to »American values« significantly less than presidents with low integrative complexity index. The mean value for the latter was 26 percent, and for the former 14 percent, meaning that presidents with high integrative complexity index referred to »American values« in just 14 percent of their post military intervention addresses.

Figure 8.10: Group statistics-Influence of integrative complexity on justifications in all addresses



Source: Author's analysis.

Figure 8.10 reveals group statistics for the same relationship, but the sample consisted of all 43 addresses. Despite the fact that there was no statistically significant difference, the two groups with p-value under 0,10 reveal the same tendency as mentioned before - presidents with low integrative complexity index referred to »human rights« and »America’s responsibility« noticeably more often than presidents with high integrative complexity index. The mean values for »human rights« were 18 percent (low) and 8 percent (high), and for »America’s responsibility« 28 percent (low) and 21 percent (high). Furthermore it can be observed, that presidents with high integrative complexity index referred more often only to two semantic groups, i.e. to »democracy« and »peace«. The difference, however, is very slight; in »peace« from 20,08 to 20,81 percent, and in »democracy« from 8,47 to 10,42 percent.

Table 8.12: Independent Samples T-test: Influence of international experience on justifications in all addresses

	T-test for Equality of Means				
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
Human rights	-,879	41	,384	-,04394	,04997
War	-,595	41	,555	-,03931	,06604
Peace	,636	41	,529	,03002	,04724
America’s interests	,093	41	,927	,00316	,03415
America’s values	-,755	41	,455	-,03922	,05197
America’s responsibility	-2,105	41	,041	-,07563	,03593
Diplomacy	,587	41	,560	,02063	,03515
Experience	,864	41	,393	,03221	,03729
International alliance	,391	41	,698	,01909	,04886
Democracy	1,502	41	,141	,03660	,02437

Source: Author’s analysis.

The next attitudinal factor that could have influenced the use of justifications was presidents’ substantial international experience prior to the beginning of their mandate. »America’s responsibility« is the only justification with statistically significant difference in relation to international experience (Table 8.12). A look at group statistics in Figure 8.11, which shows the mean values of justifications in all addresses, proves that presidents with no

or with less »international experience« referred more frequently to the following semantic groups of justifications: »human rights«, »war«, »America’s values« and »America’s responsibility«, and less to »peace«, »America’s interests«, »diplomacy«, »experience«, »international alliance« and »democracy«. The biggest increase of the mean value of justifications employed by the presidents with no or with less international experience, was found in »America’s responsibility«, followed by »war«, »human rights« and »America’s values«.


Table 8.13: Independent Samples T-test: Influence of international experience on justifications in post military intervention addresses

	T-test for Equality of Means				
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
Human rights	-,601	22	,554	-,04917	,08178
War	-,889	22	,384	-,07833	,08815
Peace	-,492	22	,628	-,02083	,04237
America's interests	-,016	22	,987	-,00083	,05240
America's values	-1,660	22	,111	-,07750	,04668
America's responsibility	-1,480	22	,153	-,06917	,04674
Diplomacy	,743	22	,465	,03500	,04710
Experience	1,093	22	,286	,06500	,05947
International alliance	,431	22	,671	,03083	,07154
Democracy	2,039	22	,054	,07000	,03433

Source: Author’s analysis.

Table 8.13 shows that international experience exerted more influence on the choice of presidential justifications, when the sample included only post military intervention addresses. Just outside the 5 percent margin, with p-value 0.054 is the justification »democracy«, and the mean values also confirm verbal behavior of presidents, who referred to »democracy« more often when they possessed substantial international experience. The justification »America’s values«, with p=0,11 (the closest to 5 percent margin or all other groups) confirms the above mentioned tendency, and the mean values support the thesis that presidents with international experience referred much less to »American values« than did the presidents with no international experience.

Figure 8.11 Influence of international experience on justifications in all addresses



Source: Author's analysis.

Hypothesis number 3-rejected

It was proven that attitudinal factors exert some influence on the use and selection of presidential justifications for military interventions. However, their influence is very limited and there are more similarities than differences among presidents with different attitudinal characteristics. Hypothesis no. 3 was therefore rejected and not confirmed.

9 Conclusion

9.1 Hypothesis verification

The starting point of the present dissertation was to probe for a pattern of verbal behavior of presidents, related to their attitudinal characteristics and to normative restraints of institutional (domestic and international) framework.

Hypotheses derive from and are based on the following research goals:

- to compare the addresses before and after 1984, in order to see if the Cold War exerted notable pressures on the way presidents spoke and behaved; hypothesis 1: **International institutional factors determine justifications for military interventions abroad;**
- to establish the importance of institutional framework, party alignments, partisan alliances and their relationship with legal authorization presidents referred to; hypothesis 2: **Domestic institutional factors determine legal basis for military interventions abroad;**
- to find out whether there exist patterns of rhetorical behavior in presidential justifications for military interventions abroad, which are based on presidents' attitudinal characteristics; hypothesis 3: **Attitudinal factors determine justifications for military interventions abroad.**

The first hypothesis presumed that international factors, in the present research the Cold War, exerted influence on the use of justifications. Results that were obtained with statistical analysis prove that the Cold War had some influence on the use of justifications, but much less than expected and the influence was restricted only to SOU addresses or the total of all addresses, whereas no significance was found in post military intervention addresses. However, the first hypothesis was partly confirmed as some influence, albeit only restricted, was found to be statistically significant.

The importance of domestic institutional relations and alliances was probed for in connection to the legal authorization presidents asked for or referred to. The first goal, related to the second hypothesis, was to search for all types of legal authorizations, including their possible combinations. This only dispersed the data leading to insignificant results that could not be interpreted. Consequently, legal authorizations were grouped into two categories, namely »congressional joint resolution« and »other«, but the results did not change significantly. The sample was restricted to 24 addresses, excluding the SOU addresses from the analysis and focusing exclusively on post military intervention addresses. The next step

was to probe for the relationship between party affiliation and legal basis, but there were no statistically significant results. Hypothesis no. 2, stating that legal basis for military intervention abroad largely depends on institutional factors, was thus only partly confirmed. Descriptive statistics revealed some trends, implying that presidential verbal behavior might be related to the deployments of American troops abroad and their respective legal authorization. A factor of great interest was the so called political time. Its concept and categorization guidelines were developed by Stephen Skowronek, and the category of orthodox innovators was found to be importantly correlated with legal authorizations or presidential public reference to them. Presidents who belonged to the group of orthodox innovators referred most frequently to congressional joint resolution (57 percent). However, it should be noted that a restricted sample rendered significant inference impossible, and hypothesis no. 2 was thus only partly confirmed.

Hypothesis no. 3 claimed that attitudinal factors determined the presidents' justifications of American military interventions abroad. With the use of statistical methods a pattern of significant relations between integrative complexity and substantial international experience on the one side, and the use of justifications on the other, was probed for. »America's responsibility« was the only justification revealing statistically significant difference in relation to international experience and a look at group statistics and mean values reveals that presidents without (or with less) international experience referred significantly more to »America's responsibility« and »democracy« and much less to »American values«, when justifying respective military interventions abroad than did the presidents without international experience. It can be also said that presidents with a higher integrative complexity index, who demonstrated their ability for complex thinking and were not restricted to generalizations and over simplified interpretations or reality, referred to »American values« and »America's responsibility« less than the presidents with low integrative complexity index. Therefore hypothesis no. 3, stating that attitudinal factors influence on justifications, could not be confirmed and was thus rejected.

It can nevertheless be said that presidential rhetoric plays an important role in each presidency. It functions as a link between the public and the President, and between the Congress and the President. Their relationship, however, cannot be predicted only on the basis of rhetorical behavior of individual presidents.

9.2 Conclusions and recommendations for future research

The underlying idea of the present dissertation was to combine linguistics, communication science and political science and through various approaches to the studying of aforementioned disciplines arrive at a comprehensive explanation of presidential discourse in public addresses. Presidential rhetoric is an extremely vast topic and the interest of the present dissertation was much more focused. Its main goal was to study presidential verbal behavior during or immediately after a crisis, which lead to military intervention. Crises represent defining moments of each presidency and it has become increasingly more important to gain public and congressional approval for action at such a time. A variety of crisis situations of internal, political, economic, foreign, and military nature were witnessed in each of the analyzed presidencies, therefore a definition of crisis that would serve the purpose of this research was needed.

Since the world has become one big global village, foreign policy of one nation, particularly a nation of the size, population and power of the USA, became of considerable importance also for other states and nations of the world. It is true that presidents are considered crucial actors in the framing of foreign policy; however, they are not alone. Their liberty is restricted by many factors and actors, and their main instruments for mustering public and congressional support are their public addresses. This principle guided the selection of the cases of military interventions and the respective presidential public addresses.

The time frame of the research begins with the conclusion of World War II, and the first elected term of President Truman in 1948, and it ends in 2008, with the end of President G.W. Bush's second term of office. The decision to place the beginning of research after the end of the World War II derived from the awareness that the War had importantly changed the distribution of power in the world and also the behavior of the USA. Prior to World War II America mostly pursued its policy of isolationism, focusing nearly exclusively on internal issues, and the involvement of Congress in diplomatic issues was very limited. America was neither interested in, nor willing to dedicate its resources to goals outside its borders. However, when America emerged as a superpower after World War II, interests for participation in the adoption and the conduct of foreign policy started to appear, and the isolationist era came to its final end. The symbolic death of it was represented by President Truman's address to Congress on March 12, 1947, where he presented the policy of containment against expansive ideas and policies of Soviet Communism, by proposing aid to Greece and Turkey that would help them resist the Soviet pressure.

Other restrictions imposed on the research were the type of crisis and the type of intervention. The selection of interventions was not easy, because many interventions had been disguised as different types of operations, many planned military interventions reached their end before realization, and many were not followed by any kind of public address. The process of research and filtration was therefore quite difficult and time consuming. Another filter regarded the type of public address. After extensive reading of different types of public addresses delivered by American presidents, the first public address following the intervention, and the first subsequent SOU address were selected and included in the sample. A list of all potential factors that might have influenced verbal behavior of selected presidents was drawn, and factors were subsequently divided in two groups, external or institutional and internal or attitudinal factors. The former are seen as outside influences on the President that cannot be arbitrarily changed, and they were further subdivided into domestic institutional factors (party alignments in Congress, partisan alliances and regimes, political time) and international institutional factors (here the focus was exclusively on the Cold War, with 1984 taken as the pivotal point, when détente started and the relationship between the USA and the Soviet Union changed). The other, internal or attitudinal factors included integrative complexity and substantial international experience of presidents prior to their first presidential mandate.

The emphasis of the research was placed on presidential justifications, divided into ten semantic groups («human rights», «war», «peace», «America's interests», «America's values», «America's responsibility», «diplomacy», «experience», «international alliance» and «democracy»), and legal authorization (congressional joint resolution or other types of legal authorizations, such as constitutional prerogatives of the President, war powers resolution, UN resolutions and different combinations of these groups) for each of the selected military interventions.

Different methods were employed in the analysis, and the main empirical method was the content analysis, which started with the coding of speeches and translation of frequencies into percentage values. With the qualitative method of descriptive analysis the addresses of every individual president were studied and interpreted for the general impression and separately for justifications and legal basis.

The next step was cross presidential analysis with the help of statistical program SPSS 15.0 for Windows. T-test of independent samples, comparison of means and descriptive cross tabulation were used in the analysis of the variables. After statistical manipulation of the data and interpretation of results, the following conclusions were drawn:

Generally speaking, the Cold War did, to a certain extent, constrain the verbal behavior of presidents, especially in their SOU addresses, where some significant changes occurred after 1984, with a bigger emphasis placed on »war« and »America's values«; a trend in the same direction was pointed out also for »America's responsibility« and »democracy«. Post military intervention addresses failed to produce any kind of statistically significant difference before and after 1984, which was explained with the focus on military intervention regardless of the time of its occurrence. Increased focus on »war« that was found in the SOU addresses after 1984 was a sign of a less predictable and no longer bi-polar distribution of powers and a consequent increase in conflicts, perception of situations as dangerous and increase of interventions that nearly always involved the use of military force.

However, if justifications presidents have been employing since 1948 are prioritized, it can be seen that »war« was the prevailing justification in all 43 analyzed addresses, followed by »America's interests«, »America's values«, »peace« and »international alliance«. Due to the sample, which consisted of presidential addresses dedicated exclusively to military interventions and only that part of annual SOU addresses that was related to foreign policy, the highest frequency of »war« is not surprising. Wars are usually waged for two reasons—they are either offensive or defensive, which explains the co-occurrence of seemingly antagonistic semantic groups of »war« and »peace«, which can be further supported by the fact that most wars have been allegedly fought in the name of peace. »America's interests« and »America's values« also fit in the context of war. It has always been in America's vital interest to preserve and cherish values such as democracy, freedom, and peace.

Results that were obtained through the analysis of presidential rhetoric indicate that presidents are more constrained by the institutional framework, social, historical and political context, than they are by party affiliation, their personal attitudes, or international factors. Presidents of both parties, of high and low integrative complexity, pertaining to different categories of political time, with or without previous international experience have displayed quite similar verbal behavior. There have been substantial differences within the rhetoric of individual presidents during their mandate, when they responded differently to a changed socio-political context, and thus shifted their rhetorical focus from war to peace, from human rights to war, from America's interests to international alliances. All of these findings prove how important the context is and how context and institution bound presidents are. This does not imply that the factors outlined as potentially significant for verbal behavior of presidents did not play any role at all. As seen in the analysis, most of the analyzed variables actually proved to be significant in certain combinations. The lesson to learn from this finding is that

generalization and oversimplification do not belong to science, which should be objective and exact. Only a glance at our figures could sometimes lead to summary inferences, which often prove wrong when confronted with statistical analysis. A Republican or a Democratic President cannot be expected to behave in a certain way only on the basis of his party affiliation. Factors that influence verbal behavior of presidents are diverse and often correlated. A factor that might seem of significant influence in isolation, may lose all or some of its impetus when correlated with another factor or factors. This should not only be taken into consideration, but should also be appreciated. It proves that presidents do respond to socio-political and historical context, they do adapt their behavior to situations and are not blindly dependant on their preset characteristics and constraints.

The present dissertation undoubtedly reveals some of the beauty and complexity of research in this area and opens the door to new research that should build onto the present. Despite the timeframe of a substantial span, the sample of addresses proved to be quite restricted, in particular when confronted with the fragmentation of factors that were included in the analysis. Advice for potential future research is thus to define a larger sample of addresses, which would, however, probably imply less restrictive conditions for the selection of cases and/or addresses and also impose the need for computer coding. Furthermore, to make results more statistically significant and reliable, the selection of addresses could be given additional thought, in particular the comparability of length, media, and audience. A smaller sample makes it difficult to provide statistically significant results, but on the other hand offers a much more complex overview, including some implicit meanings and connections that are easier to find through human coding and analysis. However, computerized analysis (Hart 1984) presents another challenge and imperative for the future research, which would be based on a larger sample.

Another serious challenge was presented by the fragmentation of justifications, and merging of semantic groups into broader categories would probably make the statistical analysis more manageable; however, it would also take away some of more interesting findings and conclusions, and not necessarily produce more statistically significant results. The example of fragmentation of legal authorizations, which was corrected already in the course of the present research by merging different types of authorizations into two main categories, namely the congressional joint resolution and other, provided no statistically significant difference when correlated with international experience, party affiliation and divided House. This proves that also statistically insignificant results can be nevertheless

informative and can provide important insight into the background of presidential communication.

There are also some caveats that should be noted, and perhaps considered, in a potential future research on this topic. Poole and Rosenthal have traced voting patterns of American Congress throughout its history and they discovered that more than 81 percent of the voting decisions can be attributed to ideological positions of voting members (Poole and Rosenthal 2008), which not necessarily correspond to their party affiliations. From this perspective it would be very interesting to see whether divided house really was divided at a particular time, or there were other coalitions between conservative and liberal members of both major American parties, that influenced on voting and decision making process.

Another important element that was not considered in the present dissertation was presidential speechwriting and its relationship to policy making (Medhurst and Ritter 2003, 16). Presidential speechwriters, also nicknamed the »ghosts of the White House« (Schlesinger 2008), have exerted a more or less pronounced influence on practically all presidents since the beginning of American democratic state. How much influence the speechwriters really possessed and how involved the presidents were in the process of speech crafting, varied greatly throughout the American presidential history. Medhurst (in Medhurst and Ritter 2003) claims that speechwriters in the past actually covered also the role of advisors and were much more involved in the decision making process, while this side of their job has been greatly reduced and minimized today. This is partly due to the increased number of specialized advisors, focused on strategic goals and issues of a particular presidency, whereas speechwriters concentrate on the strategic dimensions of language use and not policy making.

However, it is important to acknowledge that all methods have their own limitations, or to borrow the words of Poole and Rosenthal (2008, 6) »in almost any social sciences endeavor, allowances must be made for errors,« and this holds true for manual analysis and computerized analysis alike, but the errors will probably be different. This is why a combination of descriptive, qualitative methods and statistical quantification should be maintained also in future research, for it is impossible to define every word, idea or thought with statistically significant numbers only, without losing too much of the soft and linking tissue, communication is mostly about.

The present doctoral dissertation provides an important theoretical, methodological and empirical contribution to the field of political science, and particularly to the understanding of political communication. The dissertation is based on interdisciplinary design. It combines some of well established concepts from the area of political science,

political psychology, communication science and linguistics, thus presenting a complex, scientifically rooted, and innovative approach to the research of this topical issue. The dissertation presents a contribution to the field of empirical research and introduces a fresh approach to the analysis and interpretation of presidential addresses, by combining multiple methodological tools to study presidential communication; historical and contextual analysis, simple quantitative and regression analyses, as well as a traditional linguistic method of research - content analysis. This provides additional insight to the understanding of presidential justifications and authorizations in their public addresses. It can be said that because of the interdisciplinary approach, the use of multiple methodological tools, the presentation of a relevant theoretical overview, the analysis of primary sources and the author's own empirical analysis, the dissertation presents an original scientific contribution to the field of political science.

10 Povzetek v slovenščini

10.1 Uvod

Disertacija izhaja iz predpostavke, da so besede pomembne. To še toliko bolj velja v primeru, da gre za besede predsednika ene najmočnejših držav sveta, Združenih držav Amerike (ZDA), ki se je odločil uporabiti oborožene sile svoje države za vojaški spopad na tujem ozemlju. Avtorica se je analize vojaških intervencij lotila z namenom osvetlitve vzorcev utemeljevanja ameriških predsednikov, ko opravičujejo določeno vojaško intervencijo in jo poskušajo umestiti v pravni okvir svojih posrednih ali neposrednih pooblastil. Ameriški predsednik ne opravlja le funkcije predsednika, ampak je hkrati tudi predsednik vlade in vrhovni poveljnik oboroženih sil. Potrebno se je zavedati, da predsednik svojih zunanjepolitičnih odločitev, vključno z odločitvami za vojaško intervencijo v tujini, ne sprejema sam, ampak je v process odločanja vključena vrsta notranjih in zunanjih akterjev. Disertacija se osredotoča le na enega izmed najpomembnejših akterjev, torej na predsednika ZDA, ki je omejen tako z institucionalnim okvirom delitve oblasti na tri veje-izvršno, zakonodajno in sodno, kakor tudi z ustavo, ki predstavlja temeljni pravni akt.

Disertacija izhaja iz naslednjih predpostavk:

- jezikovno sporočilo ne more biti nevtralnno, saj izraža in hkrati oblikuje našo ideologijo in svetovni nazor;
- uporaba vojaške sile zahteva jasno pravno podlago in moralno opravičilo;
- predsedniki se pogosto odločijo za javno argumentiranje svoje odločitve za vojaško intervencijo, z namenom pridobitve naklonjenosti javnega mnenja in posledično tudi zakonodajalcev;

Prepletenost vsebinskih področij je narekovala interdisciplinaren pristop. Raziskovanje institucije predsednika in njegovih pooblastil sodi na področje politologije; eno izmed močnejših orožij predsednika je javno utemeljevanje in prepričevanje, kar sodi na interesno področje komunikologije; med dejavniki, ki vplivajo na način utemeljevanja vojaških intervencije so tudi osebnostne značilnosti predsednikov, ki sodijo v politično psihologijo; kot zadnje pa velja omeniti, da je bila za analizo govorov uporabljena metoda vsebinske analize, ki tradicionalno izvira iz jezikoslovja.

Raziskovalno delo je potekalo v več fazah, začelo pa se je z uvodnim branjem predsedniških govorov, dostopnih na internetnem portalu The American Presidency Project. V naslednji fazi je bilo potrebno določiti med seboj primerljive govore, zato smo vključili letni nagovor predsednika (SOU address) in govore, ki so sledili vojaški intervenciji v tujini.

Gre za dve različna tipa govorov, s katerima smo želeli zajeti tako bolj, kot tudi manj formalen register. Naslednji korak je bilo oblikovanje kodirne sheme z enajstimi vsebinskimi skupinami in kodiranje izbranih govorov. Rezultate, izražene v frekvenci, smo prevedli v odstotne vrednosti in tako pridobljene podatke statistično analizirali ter interpretirali, na koncu pa smo preverili tudi veljavnost izhodiščnih hipotez.

Prvi cilj disertacije je bil primerjati predsedniške govore pred in po letu 1984, ki smo ga postavili kot pomembno prelomnico v obdobju hladne vojne. Iz tega izhaja hipoteza št. 1: **Mednarodni institucionalni dejavniki vplivajo na utemeljitve za vojaške intervencije v tujini.**

Drugi cilj je bil ugotoviti pomen institucionalnega okvira, predvsem strankarske pripadnosti in medstrankarske delitve oblasti, pri sklicevanju na določena pravna pooblastila in posledično upravičenost vojaške intervencije. To izraža hipoteza št. 2:

Notranji institucionalni dejavniki vplivajo na izbiro pravne podlage za vojaško intervencijo v tujini.

Tretji cilj je bil preveriti ali obstaja vzorec utemeljevanja vojaških intervencij v tujini, ki se pojavlja pri različnih predsednikih in je odvisen od predsednikovih osebnostnih lastnosti. Hipoteza št. 3 predpostavlja, da:

Osebnostno vedenjski dejavniki vplivajo na predsedniške utemeljitve za vojaško intervencijo v tujini.

10.2 Pregled virov in oblikovanje teze

Namen drugega poglavja je pregled temeljnih virov s področja raziskovanja predsedniške institucije in predsedniške retorike. Proučevanje institucije predsednika se je dodobra uveljavilo kot raziskovalno pod-področje politologije, ali širše gledano, družboslovja, vendar vse do druge polovice 80-tih ni temeljilo na uporabi sodobnih politoloških empiričnih metod (Howell v Rhodes 2008, 303). Howell je raziskal delež kvantitativnega raziskovanja na področju institucije predsednika in ugotovil, da je kvalitativno raziskovanje sicer v veliki prednosti, vendar se je trend obrnil v smer kvantitativnega raziskovanja (Howell v Rhodes 2008, 317).

Fisher dokazuje obstoj vzorca obnašanja predsednikov v krizni situaciji, ki temelji na koncentraciji moči in zlorabi ustavnega okvira v smislu izključitve ameriškega kongresa iz procesa odločanja, kakor tudi nadomeščanja njegove vloge z različnimi resolucijami mednarodnih ali celo regijskih organizacij, kot sta Organizacija združenih narodov (OZN) in

Organizacija severnoatlantskega zavezništva-*North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (NATO) (Fisher 2004, xi-xiv).

Drugačen pristop k analizi predsednikov je ubral Stephen Skowronek, ki vidi predsednika kot nosilca politične spremembe. Njegov pristop ni zgodovinsko oz. kronološko urejen, ampak temelji na dveh različnih konceptih časa, na »političnem času« in »kronološkem času«. Skowronek trdi, da so predsedniki iz istega zgodovinskega obdobja lahko soočeni s povsem različnimi izzivi in kontekstom delovanja (Skowronek 1997, 1–18). Želel je ugotoviti, kaj povezuje predsednike iz različnih zgodovinskih obdobj, iz česar je razvil tezo, da predsednike lahko delimo glede na: a) to, ali so povezani z obstoječim režimom ali mu nasprotujejo in b) ali je ta povezava močna ali šibka. Iz tega izhajajo štiri kategorije: a) predsednikova politična identiteta je lahko bodisi nasprotujoča šibkemu obstoječemu režimu (politika obnove, rekonstrukcije) ali b) močnemu obstoječemu režimu (politika preprečevanja); c) lahko je povezana s šibkim obstoječim režimom (politika odtujitve, osamljenosti) d) oziroma z močnim obstoječim režimom (politika izrekanja, artikulacije) (Skowronek 1997, 36). Spet drugačno in zgodovinsko usmerjeno je bilo pojmovanje predsedniške institucije kot »cesarske vladavine«; *imperial presidency* je bil koncept, ki ga je razvil in predstavil zgodovinar A. M. Schlesinger ml., ko je analiziral položaj in vlogo predsednika v obdobju več kot dveh stoletij, s posebnim poudarkom na njegovi moči in izpodbijanju ustavnih omejitev (Schlesinger 2004). Izraz »imperial« izvira iz »empire«, torej »cesarstvo« in nakazuje močno vlogo predsednika ter njegovo nadvlado nad ostalima vejama oblasti. Schlesinger je verjel, da je prišla »cesarska doba« z začetkom mandata Billa Clintona (1993) k svojemu koncu, vendar je bilo slovo od obdobja predsedniške vladavine vendarle prezgodnje.

Eden izmed najbolj priznanih raziskovalcev predsedniške institucije, Richard E. Neustadt (1990, 188) je predstavil za tiste čase revolucionaren pristop k razumevanju institucije predsednika s trditvijo, da je vir predsednikove moči njegova prepričljivost, s katero želi pridobiti podporo preostalih vej oblasti za svojo politiko. V tem primeru gre torej za moč predsednika, ki je le posredno povezana s formalnim okvirom ustavnih pooblastil. Howell je to idejo označil kot začetek »behavioristične revolucije« (Howell 2008, 9), ki je izpostavila komunikacijo, stil, osebnost in ugled kot temeljne elemente uspešnega prepričevanja in posledično predpogoj za uspešnega predsednika. Tudi Anderson (1988, 210) trdi, da so predsedniki postali tvorci lastne legitimnosti, saj so svoja pooblastila in moč branili in zahtevali s pomočjo jezikovne in retorične manipulacije oz. nadzora. Jezik torej ni le sredstvo za izražanje političnih idej, ampak je tvorno soudeležen pri oblikovanju in preko

svoje prepričevalne funkcije, tudi udejanjanju političnih idej. Potrebno se je zavedati, da političnih govorov ne smemo ocenjevati zgolj z vidika vsečnosti, ampak morajo služiti predvsem državnikiškim ciljem. Mnogo študij se je ukvarjalo s povezavo med predsednikovo karizmo in njegovo uspešnostjo prepričevanja. Cynthia G. Emrich (Emrich in drugi 2001, 527–557) je ugotovila, da so predsedniki, katerih nastopni govori (*inaugural addresses*) uporabljajo bolj slikovito retoriko, tudi višje uvrščeni tako na lestvici karizmatičnosti, kot tudi na lestvici najboljše ocenjenih predsednikov. Retorika torej očitno predstavlja pomemben element politike. Formalni začetek »retorične vladavine« je bil najprej opisan v članku iz leta 1981 (Ceaser in drugi 1987), kjer so avtorji analizirali začetke od leta 1800 dalje in ugotovili, da so se predsedniki vedno pogosteje pojavljali v javnosti in jo nagovarjali z namenom iskanja podpore za dosego zastavljenih ciljev. Tulis (1987) je v svoji knjigi *The Rhetorical Presidency* predstavil retoriko predsednikov iz 19. stoletja in jo postavil v širši politični okvir ter uporabil retorično analizo kot orodje za interpretacijo ameriške politike. Javno nastopanje je postalo vedno pogostejša strategija vladanja modernih predsednikov, saj so ugotovili, da je lažje pridobiti soglasje zakonodajne veje oblasti, če imajo na svoji strani javno mnenje. To velja toliko bolj za situacije, ko je izvršna veja oblasti razdeljena med največji stranki in ni enotna. Kako pogosto se predsedniki odločijo za javen nastop in iskanje podpore je v veliki meri odvisno od vsebine politike, institucionalnega okvira, razporeditve moči med in znotraj vej oblasti in drugega. Disertacija je vsebinsko omejena na govore, ki so sledili vojaški intervenciji v tujini in s svojo empirično raziskavo predstavlja pomemben doprinos k poznavanju in razumevanju dejavnikov, ki vplivajo na predsednikove utemeljitve vojaških intervencij.

10.3 Teoretični okvir in metode

Kot je bilo že večkrat omenjeno, na predsednika in njegov način vladanja vplivajo različni dejavniki, med katerimi smo omenili predvsem institucionalni okvir, delitev moči znotraj izvršne veje oblasti, mednarodni dejavniki in zgodovinsko-časovni kontekst, kakor tudi osebnostne lastnosti posameznih predsednikov. Tretje poglavje se začne s teoretičnim pregledom na področju politične psihologije, kjer sta Suedfeld in Tetlock (Suedfeld in drugi 1992) izpostavila pomen integrativne kompleksnosti kot sestavnega dela intelektualnega stila, ki se kaže v kompleksnosti obdelave informacij, reševanja problemov in sprejemanja odločitev. Kompleksnost je definirana in merjena kot stopnja diferenciacije in integracije, ki se osredotoča na strukturo posameznikovih misli in se ne ukvarja z njihovo vsebino. Diferenciacija pomeni stopnjo vključevanja različnih perspektiv ali dimenzij v komunikacijo,

integracija pa pomeni stopnjo medsebojne povezave različnih dimenzij in perspektiv. Nas zanima odnos med kompleksnostjo razmišljanja in vodenjem države, torej opravljanjem predsedniške funkcije, saj je vodstveni položaj predsednika nedvomno izredno kompleksne narave. Vrsta študij potrjuje naše sklepanje (Suedfeld in drugi 1977), da je kompleksnost predsednikovega razmišljanja pomemben dejavnik v razumevanju predsedniških političnih odločitev. Thoemmes in Conway III. (2007) sta sistematično analizirala integrativno kompleksnost vseh ameriških predsednikov in rezultate svoje raziskave tudi numerično predstavila ter oblikovala lestvico povprečja predsedniške integrativne kompleksnosti. Za potrebe naše disertacije smo uporabili njune podatke za predsednike od leta 1948 do vključno 2008. Najvišjo integrativno kompleksnost sta izmerila pri predsedniku Kennedyju, najnižjo pa pri predsedniku Eisenhowerju. Zanimiv je tudi podatek, da se pred izbruhom vojne integrativna kompleksnost pogosto zmanjša, saj se način razmišljanja poenostavi (Suedfeld in Leighton 2002, 585). Suedfeld (1992) pravi, da visoka integrativna kompleksnost v komunikaciji pomeni, da so akterji upoštevali več vidikov določenega problema in jih medsebojno povezali ali vključili v rešitev.

V drugem delu poglavja se dotaknemo institucionalne teorije, ki se ukvarja s proučevanjem političnih institucij in se deli dva temeljna pristopa k proučevanju. Prvi izhaja iz pozitivistične teorije in vidi institucije kot zunanje dejavnike, ki izvajajo pritisk na politične akterje, vendar nimajo vpliva na njihove notranje motivacije (Howell 2008), medtem ko drugi črpa iz normativne in zgodovinske teorije, ki institucije konceptualizira kot zunanje in notranje dejavnike vpliva na politično obnašanje, motivacijo in cilje političnih akterjev. Eden izmed vidnejših predstavnikov drugega pristopa je Stephen Skowronek (1997; 2008), ki trdi, da moramo obnašanje predsednika proučevati v kontekstu skozi zgodovino spreminjajočih se institucij, ki sestavljajo politične režime; to Skowronek imenuje »politični čas«. Tradicionalni pristop k študiju institucij, tako imenovani »stari institucionalizem« predstavljajo analizo zgodovinskega razvoja formalno-pravnih institucij in idej, ki jih le-te predstavljajo. Rhodes (2008, 95) je mnenja, da moderne politične vede temeljijo na pozitivističnem pristopu, ki je empiričen, primerljiv, zgodovinski in induktiven. March in Olsen (v Rhodes in drugi 2008, 4) sta mnenja, da so institucije zbirke pravil in praks, ki se le stežka spreminjajo in ki posameznikom omogočajo delovanje v skladu s predpisanimi pravili primerne vedenja, a jih pri tem hkrati tudi omejujejo. March in Olsen poudarjata, da je zgodovina institucij vtisnjena v njihove postopke in pravila, zato se njihova notranja struktura ne more arbitrarno spreminjati (v Rhodes in drugi 2008, 7). Institucije pa so vendarle izpostavljene nenehnemu spreminjanju, ki le delno sovпада z zgodovinsko izkušnjo, zato ne moremo v celoti sprejeti

teze, da sprememba vedno pomeni nekaj pozitivnega in nujno odraža njihovo boljše prilagoditev okolju (March in Olsen 1989). V določenem okolju delujejo različne institucije in organizacije, ki so zasnovane na različnih sistemih načel in pravil, zato različne oblike političnega reda niso nikoli povsem integrirane, ampak so prav nasprotno izpostavljene vrsti institucionalnih neuravnoteženosti, nasprotij in sporov (Skowronek 2004). Razumevanje zgodovinskega konteksta in razvoja institucij je nedvomno pomembno za razumevanje in interpretacijo dejanj političnih akterjev (Sanders v Rhodes in drugi 2008, 39), vendar kot poudarja Skowronek (1997), to ni dovolj. Skowronek trdi, da zgodovinski kontekst ni glavni dejavnik, ki določa obnašanje političnih akterjev in razkrije določene brezčasne kvalitete in značilnosti izvršilnega obnašanja in štiri ponavljajoče se vzorce, prisotne v vladnih politikah (Skowronek 1997). Gre za štiri faze, ki se začnejo v letih med 1789–1832 kot patricijska politika, nato se nadaljujejo v strankarski politiki med letoma 1832–1900, pluralistični politiki med 1900–1972 in se končajo v plebiscitarni politiki od leta 1972 do danes (Skowronek 1997, 53). Skowronek prav tako pravi, da so predsedniki vključeni v več institucionalnih ureditev istočasno, ki se do določene mere prekrivajo in sovpadajo, zato institucij ne gre proučevati v kontekstu izoliranih zgodovinskih izsekov, ampak je potrebno upoštevati različna obdobja, ter sile spremembe in ureditve, ki so jih sooblikovale. Institucije so torej razumljene kot medsebojno delovanje in vplivanje akterjev, struktur in sil (Skowronek 1997, 9). Disertacije se osredotoča na proučevanje predsednika, ki ima znotraj sistema delitve oblasti prav poseben položaj. Howell (2008, 13) vidi mnogo priložnosti, ki jih ima predsednik na voljo za samostojno delovanje, z ali brez eksplicitnega soglasja zakonodajne veje oblasti. Število enostranskih odločitev, ki so jih sprejeli predsedniki, se občutno zvišuje, kar je še posebno vidno v času nacionalnih kriz, ki so ekstremni prikaz, kako neomejen je lahko predsednik pri svojem odločanju. Howell sicer pravi, da ameriška ustava ne predvideva možnosti samostojnega delovanja predsednika (Howell 2008, 12–14), vendar se predsedniki lahko odločijo in prevzamejo pobudo, ne da bi čakali na odločitev kongresa. Unilateralno delovanje predsednika torej predstavlja antitezo teorije prepričevanja, ki jo je zagovarjal npr. Neustadt (1990). Prvi je »unilateralna pooblastila« omenil Locke, ko je opisoval »pooblastilo za delovanje v skladu z diskrecijsko pravico in v javno dobro, tudi brez pravne podlage oziroma včasih celo proti njej« (v Howell 2008, 16). Locke je menil, da predsednik nujno potrebuje taka pooblastila, saj zakonodajalci in tvorci ameriške ustave nikakor niso mogli predvideti vseh morebitnih nepredvidenih dogodkov v prihodnosti.

Zadnji del teoretičnega okvirja je jezikovne narave in predstavlja vsebinsko analizo, ki jo Neuendorf (2002) definira kot sistematično, objektivno, kvantitativno analizo značilnosti

sporočila. Eden od mejnikov v analizi politične komunikacije je bil postavljen leta 1949 (Lasswell in drugi 1949), ko je nastala knjiga *The Language of Politics*, kjer so proučevali moč propagande in kvantitativne metode analize, ki bi bile primerne za proučevanje vsebine političnih sporočil. Besedilna analiza na področju družboslovja se je zgodovinsko gledano opirala na vsebinsko analizo, ki omogoča analizo večje baze tekstov, z vidika uporabljenih besed in konceptov. Van Dijk (v Shäffner in Wenden 1999, 17) verjame, da so ideologije tipično izražene in ponovno ustvarjene v diskurzu in komunikaciji. Družbeno poznavanje oz. znanje je pridobljeno, uporabljeno in se spreminja v stiku z različnimi družbenimi situacijami, diskurz pa je eden od pomembnejših virov njegovega razvoja in sprememb. Na zgolj jezikovni ravni obstaja močna povezava med kompleksnostjo stavkov in izobrazbo oziroma socialnim položajem (Van Dijk v Shäffner in Wenden 1999, 20). Elitni govorniki in institucije namreč lahko omejijo dostopnost svojega diskurza tako, da omejijo njegovo razumljivost in posledično preko jezika omejijo dostop do javnega diskurza, kot sta na primer medijski ali politični diskurz (Van Dijk v Shäffner in Wenden 1999, 25). Kalin Golob (2004) poudarja pomen stilistično oblikovnih značilnosti, ki vplivajo na izbiro jezikovnih sredstev in končnega sloga besedila, kot so na primer intelektualna stopnja, izobrazba, družbeno okolje, odprtost duha, in drugo. Tudi leksika predstavlja pomemben element tako pri vsebinski, kot tudi diskurzivni analizi in tesno povezan z ideološkim (pre)vrednotenjem posameznih besed (npr. »borci za svobodo namesto« »teroristi«). Ponavljajoč vzorec političnega diskurza sta prav ideološka kontrola in pozitivna predstavitev »nas« , ter negativna predstavitev »vas«. Politični diskurz ni primarno določen z vsebino ali stilom, ampak bolj z akterji-torej, kdo govori, komu, kaj in s kakšnim namenom (Van Dijk v Chilton in Shaffner 2002, 225).

Raziskovalni cilji disertacije so bili: ugotoviti, ali obstajajo vzorci predsedniškega utemeljevanja vojaških intervencij, ki bi bili odvisni od vedenjskih značilnosti posameznika; oblikovati tipologijo najpogostejših utemeljitev za vojaške intervencije; ter ugotoviti, kakšna je vloga mednarodnih dejavnikov pri sklicevanju predsednikov na pravna pooblastila za intervencijo.

Raziskava je vključevala 11 predsednikov od leta 1948 do leta 2008, vzorec pa je obsegal 43 javnih predsedniških govorov, 19 govorov o stanju v državi in 24 govorov, ki so sledili vojaški intervenciji v tujini. Po uvodnem branju govorov so bili na podlagi v naprej pripravljene kodirne sheme kasneje tudi analizirani po vsebinskih skupinah. Pridobljene podatke smo kvalitativno in kvantitativno obdelali in nato preverili hipoteze. Kot raziskovalne metode smo uporabili vsebinsko analizo, deskriptivno analizo in primerjavo.

10.4 Institucionalni kontekst

Prvi pomemben element institucionalnega konteksta je delitev oblasti v ameriškem predsedniškem sistemu. Sodna veja oblasti nadzira in omejuje predsednika, kar lahko razložimo s tremi različnimi znanstvenimi pristopi; pravni pragmatizem, ki se ukvarja s situacijami, ko se sodnik umakne iz spora in tako ohrani legitimnost in integriteto svoje institucije (Bickel v Howell 2008, 137); novi institucionalizem, ki izpostavlja endogene (notranje) in eksogene (zunanje) institucionalne omejitve (Clayton in Gillman v Howell 2008, 137); ter ocenjevanje institucionalne kapacitete sodišč za reševanje različnih vrst civilnih in političnih sporov, kjer sodne omejitve delujejo kot gibalo družbene spremembe (Rosenberg v Howell 2008, 137). Ameriški sistem delitve oblasti je nastal z namenom preprečevanja koncentracije moči in zagotavljanja uravnoteženega in skupnega sprejemanja odločitev med njimi. Kongres ima po ustavi pristojnost, da objavi oziroma razglasi vojno napoved, medtem ko predsednik, kot vrhovni poveljnik oboroženih sil, vojno dejansko vodi; to kaže, da sta v primeru vojne zakonodajna in izvršna oblast soodvisni in bi morali delovati skupaj. Izpodbijanje te zakonsko formalistične definicije je v Ameriki prisotno od nekdaj, vendar Anderson izpostavi predvsem dve smernici interpretacije predsedniških pooblastil (Anderson 1988, 209–10): na eni strani doktrino ustavnih privilegijev oz. posebnih pravic, na drugi strani pa predsednikovo moč prepričevanja, ki je tesno povezana s komunikacijo in retoriko. Kot pravi Fisher (2004, 283), se je debata glede vojnih pooblastil nagibala stran od zakonodajne oblasti, saj je veljalo prepričanje, da kongres zaradi svoje številčnosti in redkih zasedanj ne more biti pristojen za vodenje vojne, zato so kongresu dodelili zgolj pristojnost za vojno napoved. Ustava torej določa uravnoteženost vojnih pristojnosti med izvršno in zakonodajno oblastjo. Zgodovinski pogled nam pokaže precej drugačno sliko. *UN Participation Act*-UNPA (zakon, ki ureja sodelovanje z OZN) iz leta 1945 (Fisher 2004, 283), služi kot pravna podlaga za ameriško sodelovanje pod pokroviteljstvom Združenih narodov in v 6. členu pooblašča predsednika ZDA za sklepanje posebnih sporazumov z Varnostnim svetom OZN. Za te sporazume mora predsednik pridobiti soglasje kongresa v obliki posebnega akta ali skupne resolucije obeh domov kongresa, ki določa tudi naravo pomoči, številčnost oboroženih sil, stopnjo pripravljenosti in drugo. *War Powers Resolution* iz leta 1973 je skupna resolucija obeh domov ameriškega kongresa, ki ureja vojne pristojnosti ameriškega predsednika in je verjetno največkrat izpodbijan pravni dokument (Fisher 2004, 290). Glavni namen resolucije je bil izpolniti namen tvorcev ameriške ustave in zagotoviti skupno sprejemanje vojnih odločitev predsednika in kongresa, ki obvezuje predsednika, da se pred uporabo vojaške sile posvetuje s kongresom oz. le-tega obvesti najkasneje 48 ur po uporabi vojaške sile; če

predsednik ne pridobi soglasja za uporabo ameriške vojske ali kongres ne razglasi vojne, je potrebno vojaško akcijo zaključiti najkasneje v šestdesetih dneh, kar se lahko podaljša še največ za trideset dni v primeru zagotavljanja varnosti ob umiku. Grenke izkušnje iz korejske in vietnamske vojne so Američanom pokazale, da predsedniki lahko odločajo o vojni in miru skorajda povsem samostojno in brez nadzora. Resolucija je bila neposreden odgovor na Nixonovo napotitev ameriških sil v Kambodžo leta 1970 in je bila leta 1973 sprejeta z dvotretinjsko večino v kongresu, ki je ovrгла predsednikov veto. Od sprejema resolucije dalje so predsedniki v večini primerov ukrepali sami, nato pa v skladu z resolucijo o tem obvestili kongres (Fisher 2004, 154). Zakonitost resolucije so izpodbijali skoraj vsi predsedniki, saj naj bi omejevala posebne pravice poveljnika oboroženih sil, kot jih določa ustava (Crabb 1989, 143). Vendar tudi resolucija ni uspela okrepiti vloge kongresa, katerega največja moč še vedno ostaja vezana na dodelitev oziroma odvzem finančnih sredstev za vojne namene (*appropriations authorization*). Prav tako je velika ovira na poti do enakopravne vključenosti kongresa v sprejemanje odločitev glede vojne njegova nemoč pri sankcioniranju predsednika. Edino sredstvo, ki ga predvideva ustava, je tako imenovana javna obtožba predsednika, ki mora odstopiti s položaja, če ga kongres spozna za krivega (*impeachment process*). Ta vzvod je bil v zgodovini ZDA uporabljen le štirikrat, vendar postopek ni bil nikdar izpeljan do konca (Skowronek 1997, 44). Glede na trend obnašanja predsednikov v času vojne oz. ob sprejemanju odločitve glede vojaških intervencij lahko predvidevamo, da se ta praksa tudi v prihodnje ne bo bistveno spremenila. Sodna veja oblasti se je distancirala glede ustavnosti ali neustavnosti odločitev za vojaško intervencijo, predsedniki so se in se večinoma sklicujejo na svoje ustavne pristojnosti in po potrebi na skupne resolucije kongresa, ki jih interpretirajo kot zakonske ekvivalente, in na resolucijo o vojnih pristojnostih (War Powers Resolution). Kot lahko razberemo iz utemeljitve ministrstva za zunanje zadeve v primeru vojne v Vietnamu in odločitve predsednika Johnsona:

Ni dvoma/.../da ima predsednik pooblastila za uporabo ameriških oboroženih sil za obrambo Južnega Vietnama/.../po ustavi je predsednik ne le vrhovni poveljnik obrambnih sil in mornarice, ampak je tudi odgovoren za vodenje zunanje politike ZDA. Te naloge so vezane na široke pristojnosti predsednika, vključno s pravico do uporabe ameriških oboroženih sil za vojaške intervencije v tujini, če se mu to zdi nujno za ohranitev varnosti in obrambe ZDA (Meeker v O'Brien 2008, 260).

Poleg opisanih težav, ki izhajajo iz delitve oblasti na tri veje, je ameriška politika zaznamovana tudi z močno polarizacijo, ki je bila najbolj izražena sredi sedemdesetih let, ko so demokrati trdno podpirali liberalne ideje, medtem ko so bili republikanci strogo konzervativni (Poole in Rosenthal 1984). Schattsneider (v Poole in Rosenthal 1984, 87) trdi,

da je ameriška politika nastala na sporu med največjima strankama, ki je bil ogledalo družbenih in ekonomskih konfliktov v državi. Poole in Rosenthal (1984, 67–69) ugotavljata, da se veliki nihaji iz ene strani na drugo niso zgodili prav pogosto, saj sta bili največji stranki v svoji polarizaciji precej stabilni, sta pa zaznala večje premike v tridesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja, torej v času velike depresije (*The Great Depression*) in v času druge svetovne vojne. Po drugi svetovni vojni so se demokrati razcepili na severno in južno krilo in polarizacija je postala manj očitna. Poole in Rosenthal vidita politike v času od 1954 do 1980 kot precej liberalne, še posebno v času Johnsonovega mandata in projekta velike družbe (*The Great Society*) in v času predsednika Nixona. Politike so postale manj liberalne, ko je bila demokratska večina v kongresu soočena s šibkim demokratskim predsednikom (npr. Johnson v zadnjih dveh letih svojega mandata oz. Carter) ali močnim republikanskim (Nixon oz. Reagan v prvih dveh letih svojega mandata). Opazila pa sta tudi, da se domova kongresa ne odzivata pretirano na zunanje dejavnike in strankarsko identiteto predsednika ter da se ideološko prepričanje kongresnikov ali senatorjev praktično ne spremeni ves čas trajanja njihovega mandata (Poole in Rosenthal 1984, 74). Prekrivanje strank nam pokaže delež predstavnikov stranke, ki so ideološko in vsebinsko bližje nasprotni stranki, kot pa svoji. Prekrivanja praktično ni bilo v času popolne strankarske polarizacije, začelo pa se je pojavljati v senatu okoli leta 1920, ko je skupina srednje-zahodnih republikancev večinoma glasovala skupaj z demokrati (Kernell in drugi 2009, 584–585). Precejšnje prekrivanje je bilo opaženo tudi v šestdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja v povezavi z vprašanjem pravic afriških Američanov, ko so se zmerni republikanci nagibali k demokratom, južni demokrati pa k republikancem. Po letu 1979 se je to prekrivanje ponovno zmanjšalo, saj so liberalni republikanci postali precej redki, demokratska stranka pa se je poenotila. Velike spremembe v obnašanju strank so večinoma sovpadale s pomembnimi zgodovinskimi mejniki in temami (Kernell in drugi 2009, 585). Ko se pojavijo vprašanja, ki koalicio razdelijo, postane strankarska identiteta šibkejša, glasovanje po strankarski pripadnosti upade in poveča se deljenje volilnih glasov med predstavnike kongresa ene stranke in predsednika druge stranke (*ticket splitting*). Strankarsko pogojeno glasovanje je upadlo med 1950 in 1970, kar se je potrdilo tako v senatu kot v predstavnikiškem domu-kongresu, medtem ko se je deljenje volilnih glasov izredno povečalo (Kernell in drugi 2009, 193). Kot smo dejali, politika temelji na konfliktih, ki so najbolj očitni v interakciji med kongresom in predsednikom (Shull 2000, 65). Sundquist (v Shull 2000, 65) ugotavlja, da je deljena izvršna oblast pogosto pripeljala do zastojev v procesu političnega odločanja. Hickley sicer verjame, da so zastoji odvisni

predvsem od teme odločanja (Hickley v Shull 2000, 66), medtem ko sta LeLoup in Shull (1999) ugotovila, da so zastoji mogoči na vseh področjih politike.

Volilno obnašanje sta Bond in Fleisher (v Shull 2000, 66) razdelila na strankarsko, dvo-strankarsko in nasprotno strankarsko obnašanje, veliko pozornosti pa je bilo namenjene tudi geografski delitvi znotraj strank in internim ali pa preko-strankarskim koalicijskim sporazumom (Shull 2000, 150). Koalicija južnih demokratov in republikancev je uspešno nastopala proti manjšini severnih demokratov in dosegla svoj vrhunec z 98,2% zmag v letu 1995 (Congressional Quarterly Report v Shull 2000, 67).

10.5 Zgodovinski pregled ameriške zunanje politike

Glede na to, da so vojaške intervencije v tujini sestavni del zunanje politike, je bil cilj tega poglavja predstaviti razvoj ameriške zunanje politike od druge svetovne vojne do danes, njen okvir, razvojne in strateške spremembe ter hkrati predstaviti kratek pregled glavnih vojaških intervencij v tujini v tem obdobju. Amerika je bila pred drugo svetovno vojno odločena vse sile posvetiti notranjemu razvoju in je vodila politiko izolacionizma. Po koncu druge svetovne vojne se je svetovna razporeditev moči precej spremenila in ZDA so bile prisiljene zavzeti bolj aktivno mednarodno držo in se soočiti z vedno močnejšo Sovjetsko Zvezo (Spanier 1992, 16). Nezdržljivost ameriške demokracije in sovjetskega totalitarizma, ki ju je v času druge svetovne vojne povezoval boj proti skupnemu sovražniku, Japonski in Nemčiji, je po končani vojni postajala vedno bolj očitna, prav tako kot potreba po odločnem vodenju zunanje politike. Wildawsky (v LeLoup in Shull 1999, 117) opaza, da sta bili v ZDA prisotni dve vladi, oz. dva predsednika, notranje in zunanje politični, kar kaže na to, kako neomejen je bil predsednik v vodenju zunanje politike, medtem ko je bilo pri notranji politiki sodelovanje zakonodajne veje oblasti precej bolj aktivno in učinkovito. Hladna vojna je svet razdelila na dva pola in ta delitev se je obdržala skoraj petdeset let. ZDA so odigrale pomembno vlogo v povojni obnovi Evrope, kjer je potrebno omeniti Marshallov načrt (*The Marshall Plan*) obnove, ki ga je potrdila vlada predsednika Trumana. V tem obdobju je Amerika stopila v svoje prvo zavezništvo z zahodno-evropskimi državami, NATO, ki je bil odgovor na vzhodni varšavski pakt. Ameriška zunanja politika je temeljila na politiki vzdržnosti (*The policy of containment*), medtem ko je njihova obrambna strategija temeljila na politiki zastraševanja (*The policy of deterrence*). Predsednik Truman je odigral pomembno vlogo v definiranju Ameriške zunanje politike po drugi svetovni vojni. 1. marca 1947 je nagovoril predstavnike zgornjega in spodnjega doma kongresa in jim predstavil svoje videnje zunanje politike in ameriške vloge v svetu, kar je postalo znano pod imenom Trumanova doktrina (*The Truman*

Doctrine). Temeljila je na delitvi sveta na svobodni del in zatirani, komunistični del in v njej je Truman napovedal aktiven boj proti komunizmu. Predsednikovo pretiravanje (Spanier 1992, 43) glede strahu pred napadom Sovjetske zveze mu je prineslo izjemno podporo javnosti in zakonodajalcev pri zunanjepolitičnih odločitvah.

Vojna v Vietnamu je nedvomno precej spremenila odnos Američanov do zunanje politike in predvsem do skoraj neomejenih pooblastil, ki jih ima pri njenem vodenju predsednik. Zaradi izjemnega nasprotovanja javnosti, da ameriški vojaki še naprej odhajajo v Vietnam, se je iz volilne bitke za drugi mandat moral umakniti tudi predsednik Johnson (LeLoup in Shull 1999, 119). V času predsednika Nixona so Američani postali vidno nasičeni z vojno in protivojni protesti so preplavili državo, kar je delno vplivalo tudi na Nixona in njegovo prepričanje, da morajo ZDA ponuditi prijateljskim državam v stiski vojaško in drugo pomoč, ne le neposredno posredovati z uporabo vojaške sile. Prav tako se je aktivno vključil v politiko popuščanja napetosti med Sovjetsko zvezo in Kitajsko (*The policy of détente*), vendar sta šele predsednik Reagan na ameriški strani in Gorbačov na sovjetski, pripeljala hladno vojno do njenega konca (LeLoup in Shull 1999, 123).

Mednarodne organizacije, kot so Združeni narodi, so začele pridobivati na pomenu in postajati vedno pomembnejši akterji globaliziranega sveta, kjer sta ekonomija in zunanja politika vedno bolj povezani. Zunanja politika je bila od nekdaj le delno odraz posameznega predsednika in mnogo bolj odgovor na razporeditev moči v svetu. Prvi predsednik, ki je nastopil svoj mandat po koncu hladne vojne-George H. W. Bush, je odpeljal ZDA v zalivsko vojno (*The Gulf War*) skupaj z močno mednarodno koalicijo, ki je nosila večji del finančnega bremena (LeLoup in Shull 1999, 124). S prihodom Billa Clintona na oblast, so bila pričakovanja bolj usmerjena v povečanje aktivnosti v notranji politiki in pri reševanju notranjih ameriških problemov, kot je bila zdravstvena reforma (LeLoup in Shull 1999, 124). Nasprotovanje kongresa je bilo žal preveliko, tako je tudi Clintonov mandat bolj zaznamovan z aktivno zunanjo politiko in vojaškimi intervencijami v tujini, kot z domačimi uspehi (LeLoup in Shull 1999, 124). Deljena oblast je zagotovo edenn izmed dejavnikov vpliva na zunanjo politiko. Kot sta ugotovila LeLoup in Shull (1999, 127–129), je dvojno obnašanje kongresa bolj opazno, če je predsednik republikanec, večino v kongresu pa imajo demokrati. V taki situaciji bo nasprotovanje politikam predsednika hujše pri notranjepolitičnih vprašanjih, medtem ko bo podpora zunanji politiki večja. Če je razmerje obrnjeno, ta dvojnost v obnašanju kongresnikov ni opazna, saj republikanski kongres predstavlja demokratskemu predsedniku na vseh političnih področjih močno opozicijo. V izrednih situacijah, kot je bil na

primer teroristični napad na ZDA 11. septembra 2001, se o posebnih privilegijah in pravicah predsednika večinoma ne dvomi in njegova moč v zunanji politiki postane skoraj neomejena.

Intervencije v tujini, v katerih so bile uporabljene ameriške vojaške sile, se razlikujejo tako v vzrokih, kot tudi oblikah in posledicah, ter ne nazadnje v utemeljitvah, ki so jih kasneje uporabili odgovorni predsedniki. Sklicevali so se na različne pravne podlage, iz katerih naj bi izhajale njihove pristojnosti za uporabo vojaške sile brez soglasja kongresa. Med navajanimi pravnimi podlagami so pokroviteljstvo Združenih narodov in različne resolucije Varnostnega sveta, resolucija o vojnih pristojnostih predsednika (*War Powers Resolution*), skupna resolucija obeh domov kongresa (*congressional joint resolution*) in ustavni privilegiji ter posebne pravice predsednika, kot vrhovnega poveljnika oboroženih sil.

Kot je bil predsednik Truman izjemno pomemben pri oblikovanju smernic ameriške zunanje politike v obdobju po drugi svetovni vojni, tako je tudi njegov mandat predstavljal obdobje redefiniranja meja izvršne oblasti, saj jih je Truman izdatno razširil in s tem predsednikom za njim odprl pot do skoraj neomejenega upravljanja z vojaškimi silami ZDA. Napotitev vojaških sil v Korejo Truman ni predstavil kot vojaško intervencijo oziroma posredovanje, temveč naj bi šlo zgolj za policijsko akcijo (*Police action*) urejanja problematične situacije. Na ta način je predsednik obšel kongres. Druga taktična poteza predsednika Trumana pa je bila, da je ob odsotnosti Sovjetske zveze zaprosil za pooblastilo kar pri Varnostnem svetu OZN, ki je agresijo Severne Koreje soglasno obsodil in pozval države članice naj posredujejo tudi z uporabo vojaške sile.

Seznam v disertacijo vključenih vojaških intervencij je bil oblikovan na podlagi varnostnega poročila za ameriški kongres (Grimmet 2008) in zajema le tista posredovanja, ki so jih predsedniki v javnem govoru tudi utemeljili. Seznam vseh analiziranih intervencij je razviden iz Tabele 10.1.

Tabela 10.1: Analizirane vojaške intervencije

1950–1953	Korejska vojna
1950–1955	Formosa (Tajvan)
1945–1955	Kitajska
1958	Libanon
1962	Kuba
1964–1973	Vietnamska vojna
1970	Kambodža
1975	Incident ameriške ladje Mayaguez
1980	Iran
1981	Libija
1983	Grenada, Libanon
1086	Libija
1988	Panama
1991	Irak
1992	Somalija
1993	Irak
1998	Irak
1999	Jugoslavija
2001	Afganistan
2003	Irak

Vir: Avtoričin lasten prikaz.

10.6 Pregled in analiza predsedniških mandatov ter vojaških intervencij v posameznem mandatu

Gre za najobsežnejše poglavje doktorske disertacije, saj združuje krajšo biografijo vsakega v analizo vključenega predsednika, njegovo umestitev v politični čas (Skowronek 1997), njegovo integrativno kompleksnost (Thoemmes in Conway III 2003), strankarsko delitev zakonodajne in izvršne oblasti v času njegovega mandata in najpomembnejše politične dogodke tistega časa. Drugi del analize posameznega predsednika pa predstavlja natančna

analiza izbranih vojaških intervencij, pregled in analiza utemeljitev za intervencijo ter pravna podlaga.

10.7 Analiza predsedniških govorov

V poglavju sedem se nahaja začetek empiričnega dela disertacije, ki uvodoma predstavi kodirno shemo in vsebinske skupine, po katerih smo analizirali vse v raziskavo vključene govore (43). V analizo smo vključili dva tipa govorov, redni letni predsednikov govor o stanju v državi (le iz tistih let, ki so sledila vojaškim intervencijam) in tematske govore po vojaški intervenciji. Pri tem smo morali paziti na oblikovno, stilistično in hkrati vsebinsko primerljivost govorov ter na njihovo ciljno publiko. Novinarske konference so na primer mnogo bolj neformalne kot je nagovor o stanju v državi. Ker so govori o stanju v državi redni letni dogodek in so zelo dolgi (v njih predsednik namreč predstavi stanje v državi v minulem letu, zato se dotakne prav vseh problemov in vsebin, od gospodarstva, izobraževanja, socialnih zadev in drugega), smo upoštevali le del, ki se je nanašal na zunanjo politiko in izračunali njegov delež v odstotkih. Izjema je bil predsednik Nixon, ki v nagovoru o stanju države iz leta 1971 ni niti omenil zunanje politike, saj je uvedel novo prakso (ki se kasneje ni obdržala) posebnih in izjemno dolgih ter natančnih zunanjepolitičnih poročil kongresu, ki jih je oddal v pisni obliki. Zato smo v njegovem primeru izjemoma upoštevali radijski govor o zunanjepolitičnem poročilu kongresu. V vsakem govoru smo poiskali, v kolikšnem številu odstavkov se besede oz. besedne zveze iz posamičnih vsebinskih skupin pojavljajo in to izrazili v odstotnem deležu (odstavkov) glede na celoten govor. Kodiranje smo izvedli dvakrat, približno v razmaku meseca dni, prav tako je 20 odstotkov baze kodirala neodvisna oseba. Med rezultati vseh treh kodiranj ni bilo statistično pomembnih razlik. Vsebinske skupine se ob pojavljanju deloma prekrivajo, zato skupen seštevek vseh odstotnih vrednosti ni 100. V vsakem odstavku se hkrati pojavljajo besede iz različnih vsebinskih skupin. Vsak pojav v odstavku smo šteli le enkrat, saj smo želeli v končni analizi prikazati v kolikšnem delu govora (delež odstavkov) se pojavljajo posamezne skupine utemeljitev in ne absolutne številke za pojav posamezne skupine. Kodirna shema je vključevala naslednje skupine a) človekove pravice, b) vojna, c) mir, d) ameriški interesi, e) ameriške vrednote, f) ameriška odgovornost, g) diplomacija, h) izkušnje, i) mednarodna zaveznitva, j) demokracija. Tako kodirane govore z vrednostmi, izraženimi v odstotnih deležih, smo grafično predstavili, nato pa smo podatke obdelali in interpretirali; v govorih smo poiskali utemeljitve in zakonska pooblastila, na katera se je skliceval predsednik pri posamezni intervenciji.

10.8 Statistično modeliranje in interpretacija

Z namenom verifikacije hipotez, smo spremenljivke statistično analizirali s programom SPSS 15.00 za Windows in tako preverili ali obstaja statistično pomembna podpora za njihovo potrditev. Spremenljivke, ki smo jih upoštevali v analizi so opisane v tabeli 10.2.

Tabela 10.2: Analizirane spremenljivke

Vrsta govora	1 Govor o stanju v državi
	2 Govor po vojaški intervenciji
Deljena oblast	1 DA (1955–1958, 1969–1976, 1983–1992 and 1998–2000)
	2 NE
Pravna podlaga	1 Skupna resolucija obeh domov Kongresa
	2 Drugo
Pomembne predhodne mednarodne izkušnje	1 DA (Eisenhower, Nixon, Bush starejši, Clinton)
	2 NE (Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush mlajši)
Hladna vojna	1 PRED (pred1984)
	2 PO (po 1984)
Strankarska pripadnost	1 Demokrat
	2 Republikanec
Indeks integrativne kompleksnosti	1 VISOK (za Trumana, Kennedyja, Johnsona, Nixona, Busha starejšega in Clintona)
	2 NIZEK (za Eisenhowerja, Forda, Cartera, Reagana in Busha mlajšega)
Politični čas 1	1 Politika odtujitve (Carter)
	2 Politika artikulacije (Bush strejši, Truman, Ford, Kennedy, Johnson)
	3 Politika rekonstrukcije (Reagan)
	4 Politika preprečevanja (Clinton, Eisenhower, Nixon in Bush mlajši)
Politični čas 2	1 Povezani z režimom (Carter, Bush starejši, Truman, Ford, Kennedy and Johnson)
	2 Nasprotujejo režimu (Reagan, Clinton, Eisenhower, Nixon and Bush mlajši)
Politični čas 3 (Ortodoksni inovatorji)	1 DA (Truman, Johnson in Bush mlajši)
	2 NE (ostali)

Vir: Avtoričina lastna analiza.

Nato smo statistične rezultate obdelali, jih grafično predstavili ter interpretirali. Analiza utemeljitev je pokazala, da so po letu 1984 predsedniki v svojih letnih nagovorih o stanju države začeli govoriti bolj sproščeno, kar je privedlo do višjih vrednosti in statistično pomembne razlike pri uporabi »ameriških vrednot«, zelo blizu pa sta tudi »ameriška odgovornost« in »demokracija«. Analiza govorov po vojaški intervenciji ni pokazala bistvenih razlik pred in po letu 1984, kar je glede na naravo govora tudi razumljivo. Predsednike očitno manj določa njihova strankarska pripadnost, saj med republikanskimi in demokratskimi predsedniki ni zaznati bistvenih razlik v uporabi utemeljitev, kot jih določa družbeno in zgodovinski kontekst. Pogled na uporabljene utemeljitve nam pokaže, da je bila prevladujoča utemeljitev za vojaške intervencije »vojna«, ki so ji sledile »ameriški interesi«, »ameriške vrednote«, »mir« in »mednarodna zaveznitva«. Poudarek na »vojni« je seveda razumljiv, saj gre za retorično analizo, vezano na vojaške intervencije v tujini, hkrati pa je v določenih obdobjih in pri posameznih predsednikih to precej presenetljivo, saj bi pričakovali več sklicevanja na »človekove pravice« ali pa morda »demokracijo«, ki so skupaj z »diplomacijo« in »izkušnjami« na spodnjem delu lestvice uporabljenih utemeljitev. Marginalizacija »diplomacije«, ki očitno ni konkurenčna uporabi sile, predstavlja veliko razočaranje, kakor tudi sklicevanje na »izkušnje« v negativnem smislu, ki so posledično predstavljale vzvod za vojaško intervencijo. Glede sklicevanja na zakonska pooblastila za vojaško posredovanje velja omejiti začetne težave pri analizi, ki jih je povzročila vsebinska razdrobljenost te skupine. Najprej smo namreč zakonska pooblastila razdelili v sedem različnih kategorij (a) ustava, b) resolucija o vojnih pooblastilih-*War Powers Resolution*, c) mednarodni sporazumi, d) skupna resolucija obeh domov kongresa, e) ustava in mednarodni sporazum, f) mednarodni sporazum in ostalo, g) mednarodni sporazum in resolucija o vojnih pooblastilih). Glede na to, da smo pri analiziranju v povezavi z zakonskimi pooblastili upoštevali le govore po intervenciji, se je njihovo število zožilo na 24 in rezultati so bili povsem razdrobljeni. Zato smo se odločili kategorije združiti v dve (a) skupna resolucija obeh domov kongresa in b) ostalo), saj je bil naš namen ugotoviti predvsem sodelovanje kongresa v sprejemanju odločitve za vojaško intervencijo, kar pomeni, da bi v skladu s politiko delitve oblasti predsednik moral pred vojaško intervencijo pridobiti soglasje kongresa, izraženo kot skupna resolucija obeh domov kongresa.

10.9 Zaključek

Z verifikacijo hipotez smo lahko delno potrdili medsebojni vpliv analiziranih dejavnikov.

Prva hipoteza je predvidevala vpliv mednarodnih institucionalnih dejavnikov na utemeljevanje vojaških intervencij v tujini. Hipotezo smo delno potrdili. Hladna vojna je vplivala na predsedniške utemeljitve, kar je bilo dobro razvidno iz govorov o stanju države.

Druga hipoteza je predvidevala obstoj povezave med vrsto uporabljene pravne podlage in notranjimi institucionalnimi dejavniki. Tudi drugo hipotezo smo le delno potrdili. Analiza je pokazala, da obstajajo določeni vzorci sklicevanja na pravno podlago za vojaško intervencijo, vendar statistično pomembne povezave nismo našli. Pomemben trend je bil opažen pri predsednikih, ki sodijo v kategorijo ortodoksnih inovatorjev (Skowronek 1997) in so se v 57 odstotkov primerov sklicevali na skupno resolucijo obeh domov kongresa.

Tretja hipoteza je iskala povezavo med osebnostnimi in vedenjskimi dejavniki predsednikov ter njihovim utemeljevanjem vojaških intervencij. Statistično smo preverili, ali obstaja povezava med indeksom integrativne kompleksnosti predsednikov ter njihovimi mednarodnimi izkušnjami na eni strani in utemeljitvami na drugi ter ugotovili, da se statistično pomembna razlika pojavi le pri skupini »ameriška odgovornost«, kjer je razvidno, da so se nanjo bolj sklicevali predsedniki brez predhodnih mednarodnih izkušenj. Tudi razlika med visokim ali nizkim indeksom integrativne kompleksnosti ni prinesla statistično pomembnih rezultatov, nakazala pa je tendenco predsednikov z nizkim indeksom ki se kaže v pogostejši uporabi utemeljitev »vojna«, »ameriške vrednote«, »ameriška odgovornost«. Tretjo hipotezo smo ob pomanjkanju statistično pomembnih razlik ovrgli.

Ob zaključku lahko ugotovimo, da so razlike med vsebinskimi in pravnimi utemeljitvami predsednikov za vojaške intervencije v tujini manj odvisne od strankarske pripadnosti ali vedenjskih dejavnikov, kot od formalnega institucionalnega okvira ter družbenega, političnega in zgodovinskega konteksta. Predsedniki obeh strank, z visokim ali nizkim indeksom kompleksnega mišljenja, iz različnih kategorij političnega časa, z ali brez mednarodnih izkušenj, so si bili v svojih utemeljevitvah vojaških intervencij presenetljivo podobni. Največje spremembe v predsedniški retoriki so vezane na spreminjanje konteksta v času posameznih mandatov, kar nakazuje, da zgolj zamenjava predsednika v Beli hiši ni zagotovilo za večje spremembe v njegovem odnosu do vojaških intervencij v tujini in hkrati poudarja stabilnost institucije predsednika in njeno vpetost v institucionalni okvir. Ugotovili smo tudi, da so se v večini analiz določene povezave med razlagalnimi spremenljivkami pokazale kot statistično pomembne, kar potrjuje pravilnost uporabe empiričnega pristopa za

analizo predsedniških govorov. Pogosto bi nas zgolj deskriptivna analiza zlahka privedla do posplošitev in poenostavljanj, ki v znanost ne sodijo. Kljub temu pa je potrebno poudariti, da tudi statistično nepomembni rezultati včasih pripomorejo k razumevanju ozadja določenih politik ali dejanj, zato je smiselno uporabljati in kombinirati različne metode analize, tudi deskriptivno. Omeniti velja tudi nekaj opozoril oziroma smernic za nadaljnje raziskovanje. Poole in Rosenthal (2008) že vrsto let spremljata in analizirata trend polarizacije ameriške politike in nedvomno bi bilo zanimivo videti, koliko je delitev oblasti med strankami resnično pomembna v primerjavi s konzervativno-liberalno delitvijo znotraj strank. Pomemben element, ki ga v disertacijo nismo vključili, so pisci govorov. Medhurst (2003) ugotavlja, da so v preteklosti tekstopisci dejansko vplivali tudi na proces odločanja, saj so bili neke vrste predsedniški svetovalci. Danes se je ta vloga izgubila, saj se je v predsednikovem štabu povečalo število specializiranih svetovalcev in pisci govorov se osredotočajo le še na strateško uporabo jezikovnih in retoričnih sredstev in ne več na proces odločanja. Naslednje izhodišče za razmislek je uporaba računalniških programov za analizo govorov, ki bi omogočila obdelavo bistveno večje baze podatkov in bi dodatno objektivizirala raziskavo, ima pa seveda tudi negativne posledice. »V skoraj vsakem družboslovnem raziskovanju je potrebno upoštevati tudi možnost napake« (Poole in Rosenthal 2008, 6), kar velja tako za ročno analizo, kot tudi računalniško, le da so napake verjetno drugačne. Prav zato bi ob koncu želeli poudariti pomen souporabe kvantitativnih in kvalitativnih metod analize, ki naredijo raziskavo bolj zanesljivo in objektivno, ne da bi s tem izgubili tista sporočila, ki jih je včasih težko matematično natančno označiti, predstavljajo pa pomemben del medčloveške komunikacije.

Pričujoča doktorska disertacija predstavlja pomemben teoretični, metodološki in empirični prispevek na znanstvenem področju politologije in še posebej prispeva k razvoju vedenja na področju politične komunikacije. Disertacija temelji na interdisciplinarni zasnovi, saj povezuje že uveljavljene koncepte s področja politologije, politične psihologije, komunikologije in jezikoslovja, ter tako predstavlja kompleksen, znanstveno utemeljen in inovativen pristop k proučevanju izredno aktualne vsebine. Disertacija predstavlja pomemben doprinos tudi na empiričnem področju raziskovanja, saj uvaja inovativen model analize in interpretacije predsedniških govorov. Povezovanje različnih metod kvalitativne in kvantitativne analize ter statistična obdelava podatkov in interpretacija rezultatov, ki je umeščena v ustrezen družbeno politični kontekst in je utemeljena z relevantnimi teorijami, dodatno osvetli problematiko predsedniškega utemeljevanja in opravičevanja vojaških intervencij v tujini. Prav zaradi interdisciplinarnega pristopa, pregleda in uporabe relevantnih

teorij iz več znanstvenih področij, ki so nadgrajena z lastno in eksaktno empirično analizo, utemeljeno na uporabi različnih metod raziskovanja, predstavlja disertacija izvorni prispevek k razvoju znanstvenega področja politologije.

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