

**UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI**  
**FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE**

Polona Bunič

**Problematizacija zunanje politike EU kot procesa oblikovanja  
identitete EU v svetovni politiki**

**Problematization of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity  
formation in world politics**

Doktorska disertacija

Ljubljana, 2016

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*Staršema,  
ki sta mi  
vedno stala ob strani*

## **Problematizacija zunanje politike EU kot procesa oblikovanja identitete EU v svetovni politiki**

Disertacija se v luči sprememb v svetovni politiki po koncu hladne vojne ter še posebej v začetku 21. stoletja osredotoča na delovanje zunanje politike Evropske unije (EU). Zunanja politika EU se je oblikovala v obdobju 1970-ih let, ko je Evropa predstavljala območje miru in blagostanja med dvema velesilama, Združenimi državami Amerike (ZDA) ter Zvezo sovjetskih socialističnih republik (ZSSR); velik dosežek tega procesa je bil že samo dejstvo sodelovanja med državami članicami Evropske gospodarske skupnosti (EGS) na področju zunanje politike. S tega vidika se je zunanjo politiko EU videlo predvsem v smislu prispevka k skupni identiteti držav članic. V sedanjem obdobju, ko je moč zaznati vse več sprememb v svetovni politiki, se zato postavlja vprašanje, ali in v kolikšni meri je zunanja politika EU naravnana navzven, v angažma z zunanjim okoljem EU oziroma s svetovno politiko. Doktorsko delo je namenjeno proučitvi tega vprašanja.

Doktorsko delo s tem namenom opazuje zunanjo politiko EU kot problematizacijo oblikovanja identitete EU v svetovni politiki tj. kot proces, v katerem je bila identiteta EU postavljena kot problem, s katerim se je treba ukvarjati. V prvem delu disertacije je predstavljena znanstvena relevantnost raziskovanja glede na obstoječe pomanjkljivosti v literaturi s področij evropskih študij in mednarodnih odnosov. Opredeljeni sta raziskovalni vprašanja in postavljene so teze, ki obravnavajo povezave med zunanjo politiko EU, idejo identitete EU v svetovni politiki in svetovno politiko. Predstavljeni so predvideni prispevek k znanosti, predpostavke in omejitve disertacije, ter operativni pristop, ki je tristranski, saj hkrati opazuje raven diskurza (Evropskega sveta), raven izvedbe oziroma prakse zunanje politike EU (v okviru Sveta EU), kot tudi zadevni kontekst svetovne politike.

Disertacija konceptualizira in kontekstualizira obravnavano temo in razvije teoretski in metodološki pristop. Definiran je koncept svetovne politike, ki predstavlja tudi kontekst zunanje politike EU. Svetovna politika je bila v več obdobjih pomembno povezana z zunanjo politiko EU. V začetku 21. stoletja je za svetovno politiko značilno, da v njej ni jasno prevladujočih (vele)sil, hkrati pa se pojavlja velika soodvisnost med akterji v njej, zato je ključna lastnost svetovne politike v tem obdobju predvsem negotovost, tudi glede tega, kako se bo pristopilo k reševanju posameznih vprašanj. V konceptualizaciji je razvit pojem identitete EU, ki je uporabljen v disertaciji; podani so primeri konstrukcije ideje identitete EU v dokumentih EU. Zunanja politika EU je opredeljena v smislu vseh politik EGS oziroma EU, ki se obračajo navzven; izpostavljen je problem zapore identitete EU v diskurzu zunanje politike EU. Disertacija razvije teoretski pristop k obravnavani problematiki, ki se sestoji iz: a) opazovanja razvoja zgodb v diskurzih zunanje politike EU; b) zgodovinskega pristopa; c) celostnega pristopa, ki upošteva raven diskurza, izvedbe in konteksta; d) pozornosti glede odprtosti/ zaprtosti diskurzov; e) etike v povezavi z obravnavanimi diskurzi. Metodološki pristop opredeljuje štiri glavna metodološka orodja disertacije: študijo primera; analizo diskurza; pristop dekonstrukcije za analizo idejnih svetov; in pristop genealogije za analizo materialnih praks.

Prvi korak analize je kartiranje zunanjih in z njimi povezanih zadev, o katerih je razpravljala Evropski svet od začetka svojega obstoja do decembra 2009, ko je stopila v veljavo Lizbonska pogodba. Ugotovljeno je, da je Evropski svet zunanje ter z njimi povezane zadeve obravnaval na skoraj vsakem od svojih zasedanj, pri čemer je bil Bližnji vzhod najpogosteje obravnavan (na skoraj polovici zasedanj), sledi širitev (obravnavana na približno tretjini zasedanj). Na podlagi tega prva študija primera v

analizi obravnava razvoj zunanje politike EU do Bližnjega vzhoda, druga pa v okviru širitve. Tretja študija v analizi je zgodovinska študija razvoja zunanje politike EU kot take do decembra 2009; zadnja, četrta, pa opazuje razvoj zunanje politike EU v obdobju prvih petih let po vstopu Lizbonske pogodbe v veljavo tj. do decembra 2014, kar omogoča primerjavo dogajanja v zunanji politiki EU v zadnjih letih s predhodnim obdobjem.

Študija primera zunanje politike EU do Bližnjega vzhoda pokaže, da je bilo ukvarjanje z Bližnjim vzhodom bistvenega pomena za zunanjo politiko EU že v njenem začetku ter v vsem opazovanem obdobju, tudi v odsotnosti zunanjih razlogov za to. Kot je razvidno iz analize, se je EU z Bližnjim vzhodom ukvarjala v veliki meri zaradi notranjih razlogov, kot tudi, da bi se s tem vzpostavila kot samostojen akter v svetovni politiki. Bližnjevhodna politika EU je bila implicitno prežeta z idejo identitete EU v svetovni politiki. Po drugi strani je svetovna politika že od 1970-ih zamejevala možnosti delovanja EU na Bližnjem vzhodu. Praksa EU je bila skladna z diskurzom zunanje politike EU do te mere, da je EU postala pomemben akter v smislu svoje ekonomske in podporne vloge v zvezi z bližnjevhodnim konfliktom. Kljub velikemu obsegu ukvarjanja z Bližnjim vzhodom pa EU do konca opazovanega obdobja ni uspelo, da bi se neposredno vključila v politično reševanje tega konflikta.

Tudi širitev je bila pomembno povezana z začetkom zunanje politike EU; zaradi dogovora o prvi širitvi EGS je leta 1969 prišlo do sodelovanja na (zunanje) političnem področju med državami članicami EGS. Kot je ugotovljeno v drugi študiji primera, je širitev v zgodovini EGS in EU delovala kot politika, prek katere so države članice EGS/EU naslavljale izzive svetovne politike, s katerimi se je soočala evropska celina, od okrevanja bodočih sredozemskih držav članic po padcu nedemokratskih režimov v 1970-ih do razpada ZSSR v 1980-ih in vojn na Balkanu v 1990-ih. Širitev je tako predstavljala ključno orodje zunanje politike EU in vez med svetovno politiko, zunanjo politiko EU in identiteto EU. Kot je namreč razvidno iz analize, so diskurzi o širitvi skozi zgodovino širitve gradili zgodbo o enotni Evropi. Zunanja politika EU je tudi imela največji vpliv v svetovni politiki takrat, ko je bila identiteta EU videna kot odprta tj. ko je bila ostalim državam v Evropi ponujena možnost pristopa k EGS/ EU, kar je bilo najbolj opazno na primeru držav srednje in vzhodne Evrope.

Kot kaže tretja študija, je diskurz zunanje politike EU od leta 1973 vseboval številne sklice na idejo identitete EU, ki so bili tako eksplicitni kot implicitni. Diskurz zunanje politike EU je poleg tega od svojega začetnega obdobja do konca opazovanega obdobja redno omenjal tri označevalce v zvezi z identiteto EU: skupen glas, vlogo in odgovornosti EGS oziroma EU v svetovni politiki. Ti označevalci so bili del zgodbe o tem, da EU še ni dosegla svoje polne vloge v svetovni politiki, kar je bilo v zgodovini zunanje politike EU ključno gibalno njenega nadaljnjega razvoja. Tako lahko govorimo o prepletu zunanje politike in ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki. V tem prepletu se je identiteta EU videlo kot še ne dosežen ideal, katerega doseganje je predstavljeno na nedoločen čas v prihodnosti. S tega vidika lahko tudi govorimo o zaprtosti ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki. V praksi zunanje politike EU se je idejo identitete EU v svetovni politiki uresničevalo prek posameznih politik v okviru zunanje politike EU, prek odzivov na dogajanje v svetovni politiki, oblikovanja (strateških) partnerstev z ostalimi akterji v svetovni politiki, kot tudi, z začetkom 1990-ih, prek oblikovanja orodij in misij v okviru skupne zunanje in varnostne politike ter evropske varnostne in obrambne politike. Kot je ugotovljeno v tej študiji, se je preplet zunanje politike in identitete EU do neke mere odzival na razmere v svetovni politiki, vendar ne vedno. Poleg tega študija ugotavlja, da je za preplet zunanje politike in identitete EU značilno,

da je podoba, ki jo ima in gradi EU o sebi v svetovni politiki bistveno drugačna od tiste, ki jo imajo o njej njeni ključni zunanji partnerji.

Na začetku četrte študije je izvedeno kartiranje zunanjepolitičnih tem, s katerimi se je ukvarjal Evropski svet od 2009 do 2014. Rezultati kažejo, da se je Evropski svet največkrat ukvarjal s podnebnimi spremembami, ki jim je sledila širitve. Tretja in četrta tema sta bili Sirija in Ukrajina; če ti temi združimo, je Evropski svet v obdobju 2009-2014 največkrat obravnaval sosese EU. Četrta študija zato analizira zunanjo politiko EU na področjih podnebnih sprememb, širitve in sosese ter zunanjo politiko EU kot tako. EU se je v obdobju 2009-2014 v svetovni politiki profilirala prek teme podnebnih sprememb; hkrati se je na tem področju soočala s spremenjeno resničnostjo svetovne politike, predvsem z rastočim pomenom novih akterjev. Širitvena politika je v obdobju 2009-2014 ohranila pomen za (re)produkcijo ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki ter za zasledovanje njenih zunanjepolitičnih ciljev, in se je delno prilagajala razmeram v svetovni politiki, vendar ne do te mere, da bi se na novo konceptualiziralo pojem širitve. Sosedska politika je od leta 2011, predvsem na diskurzivni ravni, predstavljala osnovo odziva EU na t.i. arabsko pomlad in na dogajanje v Ukrajini; vendar se je do konca opazovanega obdobja v praksi pokazalo, da ta politika ni dorasla razmeram na terenu in v svetovni politiki. Poleg tega so bili prek sosedske politike reproducirani vzorci zunanje politike EU, ki so bili oblikovani v okviru širitvene in bližnjevzhodne politike. Tudi na ostalih področjih zunanje politike EU so se v obdobju 2009-2014 ohranjali obstoječi vzorci. Poleg tega se osnovna ideja identitete EU v svetovni politiki ni spremenila. Tega se v zunanji politiki EU v tem obdobju ni ozavestilo ali reflektiralo, prav tako se ni opredelilo potrebe po splošni odzivnosti EU na spreminjajoče se razmere v svetovni politiki.

Disertacija v zaključnem delu ugotavlja, da je bila glede na prve tri študije v analizi prek zunanje politike EU (re)producirana specifična samopodoba EU v svetovni politiki, ki je vplivala na večino politik v okviru zunanje politike EU. Poleg tega je bilo moč ugotoviti, da je zunanja politika EU v primerih, ko je bila ideja identitete EU v svetovni politiki razumljena fleksibilno oziroma odprto, imela vpliv v svetovni politiki. Tesna povezava med idejo identitete EU v svetovni politiki in zunanjo politiko EU se je nadaljevala v 2009-2014. Zunanja politika EU je tako tudi v praksi delovala kot problematizacija identitete EU v svetovni politiki; to je pomembno, saj je za problematizacije značilno, da je v njihovem okviru možno oblikovati nove rešitve, kolikor se te skladajo z že obstoječo problematizacijo. Hkrati so vse štiri študije v analizi pokazale, da je ena od ključnih značilnosti zunanje politike EU delovanje na podlagi obstoječih vzorcev, in da je treba pri analizah zunanje politike EU kot pomembna omejujoča dejavnika upoštevati razmere svetovne politike ter možnost doseganja konsenza med državami članicami EU. Te ugotovitve med drugim pomenijo, da je bila v proučevanem obdobju, do decembra 2014, zunanja politika EU v veliki meri obrnjena navznoter, ki identitetnim ciljem evropske integracije, in da je reproducirala pretekle vzorce, kar je zaskrbljujoče z vidika spreminjajočih se razmer v svetovni politiki. Hkrati je disertacija osvetlila značaj svetovne politike kot pojava, ki je še vedno v nastajanju, in na katerega lahko akterji kot je EU vplivajo, če usmeritve svoje zunanje politike uskladijo z razmerami tega konteksta, v katerem delujejo.

Po zaključku je dodan pripis (*post scriptum*), ki pokriva obdobje 2015-2016, ki ni zajeto v analizi. Kot je mogoče opaziti, so se tudi v tem obdobju nadaljevali vzorci zunanje politike EU iz preteklega obdobja, na področjih sosese, širitve, podnebnih sprememb, kot tudi zunanje politike kot take.

**Ključne besede:** Evropska unija, zunanja politika, identiteta, svetovna politika

## **Problematization of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics**

In the light of changes in world politics with the end of the Cold War and particularly in the beginning of the 21st century, the thesis focuses on how European Union (EU) foreign policy has been functioning. EU foreign policy had been established in the 1970s when Europe represented an area of peace and prosperity between two superpowers, United States of America (USA) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); in this process the mere fact of cooperation between European Economic Community (EEC) members in the area of foreign policy represented a success. Thus EU foreign policy was seen mostly in the sense of contributing to common identity of the member states. However in recent years as more and more changes could be observed in world politics, the question arises whether and to what extent EU foreign policy is oriented outwards, towards engaging with the EU's external environment or world politics. The aim of the thesis is to examine this question.

With this aim, the thesis observes EU foreign policy as a problematization of the process of EU identity formation in world politics i.e. as a process in which EU identity has been seen as a problem to be dealt with. The first part of the thesis discusses scientific relevance of research with regard to existing gaps in the literature in the areas of European Studies and International Relations. Research questions and theses are formulated which handle the connections between EU foreign policy, the idea of EU identity in world politics and world politics as such. Contribution to science, assumptions and limits are presented, as well as operational approach which is three-pronged as it observes the level of discourse (of the European Council), of implementation or practice of EU foreign policy (by the Council of the EU), as well as the relevant context of world politics.

The thesis conceptualises and contextualises the topic and develops a theoretical and methodological approach. The concept of world politics is defined which also represents the context of EU foreign policy. During different periods, world politics has been significantly connected to EU foreign policy. In the beginning of the 21st century however, a key characteristic of world politics is that there are no clearly predominating (great) powers, and at the same time, there is high interdependence between its actors which is why a defining quality of world politics in this period is above all uncertainty as to how individual issues would be addressed. The conceptualisation defines the concept of EU identity that is applied in the thesis; examples of construction of the idea of EU identity in EU documents are given. EU foreign policy is defined in the sense of all the policies of the EEC and the EU that are external; and the problem of closure of EU identity in EU foreign policy discourses is highlighted. The thesis develops its theoretical approach which consists of: a) observing development of narratives in EU foreign policy discourses; b) historical approach; c) holistic approach which takes into account the level of discourse, implementation and context; d) observing closure or openness of discourses; e) ethics in relation to the discourses observed. Four main methodological tools are identified: case study approach; discourse analysis; deconstructive approach for the analysis of ideational worlds; and genealogical approach for the analysis of material practices.

The first step of the analysis is mapping of foreign and related issues which were discussed by the European Council since its establishment until December 2009 when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. It has been found that the European Council discussed foreign or related issues at almost every session, and that the Middle East has been discussed most often (at almost half of the meetings), followed by enlargement

(discussed at about a third of the sessions). On this basis, the first case study in the analysis studies the development of EU foreign policy towards the Middle East, and the second in the framework of enlargement. The third study observes historical development of EU foreign policy as such by December 2009; while the last (fourth) observes EU foreign policy in the first five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon i.e. by December 2014 which allows for a comparison of EU foreign policy in the recent years with its previous development.

The case study of EU foreign policy towards the Middle East shows that dealing with the Middle East has been of crucial importance for EU foreign policy already in its beginnings and during all the period observed even in the absence of external reasons for this. As can be seen from the analysis, the EU has been dealing with the Middle East in a large measure due to internal reasons, as well as to establish itself as an independent actor in world politics. EU Middle Eastern policy has been implicitly imbued with the idea of EU identity in world politics. On the other hand, since the 1970s, world politics has been delimiting the possibilities of EU action in the Middle East. EU practice has been consistent with its discourse to the extent that the EU became an important actor in the sense of its economic and support role in relation to the Middle Eastern conflict. But despite the considerable amount of EU efforts with regard to the Middle East, the EU has by the end of the period observed not succeeded in becoming directly involved in political resolution of the conflict.

Enlargement too was connected in an important manner to the beginning of EU foreign policy; political cooperation between EEC members was made possible due to an agreement on the first EEC enlargement in 1969. As the second case study finds, in the history of the EEC and the EU, enlargement has functioned as a policy through which EEC/ EU members addressed world political challenges that the European continent was facing, from recovery of future Mediterranean member states following the demise of undemocratic regimes in the 1970s, to the dissolution of the USSR in the 1980s and wars in the Balkans in the 1990s. Thus, enlargement has represented a key tool of EU foreign policy, and a link between world politics, EU foreign policy, as well as EU identity. Namely, as can be seen from the analysis, throughout the history of enlargement the discourses on enlargement have been constructing a narrative about a united Europe. Also, EU foreign policy has had an impact in world politics when EU identity was seen as open i.e. when other European states were offered the opportunity to join the EEC/ EU which was most noticeable in the case of Central and Eastern European countries.

The third study shows that, since 1973, EU foreign policy discourse has contained numerous explicit and implicit references to the idea of EU identity. Also, since its beginnings and by the end of the period observed, EU foreign policy discourse has regularly referred to three signifiers related to EU identity: common voice, role and responsibilities of the EEC/ EU in world politics. These signifiers formed part of a narrative which told that the EU has not yet attained its full role in world politics, which has, through the history of EU foreign policy, represented a key motive for its further development. Therefore we might speak about a nexus of EU foreign policy and the idea of EU identity in world politics. Within this nexus, EU identity has been seen as an ideal which has not yet been reached and whose fulfilment has been deferred to an undefined future time. From this perspective, there has been a closure of the idea of EU identity in world politics. In the practice of EU foreign policy, the idea of EU identity in world politics was realised through different policies within EU foreign policy, through responses to developments in world politics, by forming (strategic) partnerships with other actors in world politics, as well as, with the beginning of the 1990s, through tools



and missions within the framework of common foreign and security policy and European security and defence policy. As has been found in the study, EU foreign policy/ identity nexus has been responding to the circumstances of world politics to some degree but not always. Furthermore the study finds that it has been characteristic for EU foreign policy/ identity nexus that the image the EU has been constructing about itself in world politics has been crucially different from the one that its key external partners have had about it.

The fourth study first performs a mapping of foreign policy topics that the European Council has discussed from 2009 to 2014. The results show that the European Council has discussed climate change most often, followed by enlargement. The fourth and third topics were Syria and Ukraine; if these are joined, the topic that has been discussed most often in 2009-2014 has been EU neighbourhood. Thus the study analyses EU foreign policy in the areas of climate change, enlargement and the neighbourhood as well as EU foreign policy as such. The EU has been profiling itself on the world stage through the topic of climate change in 2009-2014; at the same time, it has been facing the changed realities of world politics in this area, particularly the growing importance of the emerging actors. Enlargement policy has retained its importance for the (re)production of the idea of EU identity and attainment of its foreign policy objectives in 2009-2014, and has adapted to the circumstances of world politics, but not to the extent where the notion of enlargement would be reconceptualised. Since 2011, particularly on a discursive level, neighbourhood policy has represented the basis of EU response to “Arab Spring” and crisis in Ukraine; however by the end of the period observed it was visible that in practice, this policy was not up to the circumstances on the ground and in world politics. Also, through this policy, EU foreign policy patterns were reproduced which stemmed from its enlargement as well as Middle Eastern policies. Also in the other areas of EU foreign policy in 2009-2014 existing patterns were retained. Moreover the underlying idea of EU identity in world politics has not changed. This was not reflected in EU foreign policy and also no need was identified for a general responsiveness to the changing conditions of world politics.

In conclusion, the thesis finds that a specific self-image of the EU in world politics has been (re)produced through EU foreign policy which has been influencing the policies within EU foreign policy. Also, where the idea of EU identity was seen as flexible or open, EU foreign policy had an impact in world politics. The connection between the idea of EU identity in world politics and EU foreign policy continued in 2009-2014. Thus EU foreign policy has functioned in practice as a problematization of EU identity in world politics; it is characteristic for problematizations that new solutions can be added to them if they conform to the existing problematization. All four studies have also shown that a key characteristic of EU foreign policy is acting on the basis of existing patterns and that analyses of EU foreign policy need to take account of the conditions of world politics and the possibility of reaching consensus between the member states. This also means that, during the period observed, by December 2014, EU foreign policy has been turned inwards, towards identity goals. In addition, the character of world politics has been highlighted as an emerging reality which may be influenced by actors such as the EU if they adapt their foreign policy to the changing context of world politics.

A postscript has been added for the period 2015-2016 which is not covered by the analysis. Also in this period, previous patterns of EU foreign policy were continued, in the neighbourhood, on enlargement, climate change and EU foreign policy as such.

**Keywords:** European Union, foreign policy, identity, world politics

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## INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been a rapid succession of changes in world politics, also in the European Union's surroundings which has had consequences for the European Union (EU), among others in the form of geostrategic developments to the South and East and increased migration flows. Regarding this the question arises how the EU is coping with or reacting to these changes. Since this question concerns the external environment of the EU, it falls within the realm of EU foreign policy.<sup>1</sup> However, in its development so far, EU foreign policy rather seems to have been focused on establishing a vision for, or an identity of the EU in world politics. Has consideration of the developments in world politics been involved in this process, and to what extent? What can observation of interaction between EU foreign policy, the idea of EU identity and world politics tell us about how the EU has been performing in world politics, also with regard to the recent developments?

A study of problematization of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics begins, from the perspective of this thesis, with a recognition that significant changes have been and are occurring in world politics, making the world today much different from what it had been during the formative years of EU foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s; and that this is important from the perspective of EU foreign policy, since these changes have had, are having and probably also will continue to have an impact on the position of the EU in the world.

Patterns usually seem discernible when we look backwards in time. In a few decades from now, with the knowledge of what has transpired, the changes in the midst of which we are living (within the EU which is part of the wider world) might seem logical; however, it is difficult to make sense of what these changes *mean*, or imply, for us, for the EU, and the world, at the present moment. But that is exactly what the EU needs to try to do, and this idea represents the motive of this thesis: the changes that are occurring need to be not only noticed and discussed; they need to be reflected thoroughly, from the perspective of the EU, in the world, and the world as a whole which the EU forms a part of.

There are multiple trends that have contributed or are contributing to the present situation in world politics. One has been the end of the Cold War and the ensuing decomposition of the bipolar structure of world order after 1989-1990. Another has been a

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<sup>1</sup> EU foreign policy has existed within EU framework since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union in 1992; it had an important predecessor in European political cooperation (EPC) that took place between European Community (EC) member states in the period 1970-1992 and cannot be treated separately from external instruments of other EU policies known as 'first pillar' or common policies. For a more thorough discussion and definition, see subchapter 2.2.

change in China's policies in the direction of opening up to the world and seeing itself as more equal to other powers than previously following, in particular, Asian economic crisis and China Communist Party congress of 1997. There has also been a growing realisation of emerging economies or powers (such as Brazil, China, India, South Africa, but also Mexico, Nigeria and Turkey) since the beginning of the 21st century that they share similar interests and of potential benefits of mutual cooperation. More recent but just as important has been economic crisis that spread since the late 2008 particularly through the EU, but also the United States of America (USA) and some of the emerging economies which affected the positions of individual powers in world politics. An evident result of these changes has been that, since 2009, some of the key decisions regarding salient issues in world economy began to be made at the level of the G-20<sup>2</sup> and not the G-8<sup>3</sup> anymore. Also, the spread of radical religious movements and its consequences have begun to have an impact on world politics in the recent years.

The changes that these and other developments have been bringing to world politics imply that the landscape of world politics is markedly different today from what it was in 1970 or 1990, or even in 2000, and at the same time, world politics is in flux, as the changes are still going on, making it very difficult if not impossible to foresee how the picture of world politics, once the conditions have settled down, might look. For example, the economic crisis in the EU and the USA has, at least for a period of time, turned the former 'third world' countries, such as China, or Brazil, into creditors of the 'developed' Western world. Also, the clout of the EU, but also the USA (to a lesser degree) in important international negotiations has been waning, e.g. in climate change negotiations, where the EU has had to struggle to have its voice heard, although it has tended to see itself, in its internal rhetoric, as a champion of the fight for the mitigation of climate change. Some of the trends that have brought up these changes are continuing, and other, new trends are surfacing, making it plausible to infer that still more changes might be in the making.

Also, as the case of the climate change negotiations has shown, world politics today is so different from what the EU had been used to that there is a strong possibility that solutions to key international issues might be adopted without including the EU or without taking its position into account, even if it has a strong position on the issue concerned (as happened during the climate change negotiations in December 2009 in Copenhagen). It follows that, if it

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<sup>2</sup> Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, the USA, EU Presidency, European Central Bank and Bretton Woods institutions.

<sup>3</sup> Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, the USA.

wants to cooperate in elaborating solutions to key global problems, the EU needs to be more adaptable and open to different modes of cooperation if it does not want to be presented simply with *faits accomplis*.

Considering this, it is worth noting that the defining feature of world politics today is none of the individual trends touched upon above – i.e. the end of the Cold War, or the consequences of the economic crisis, and not even the rise of potential new powers. The distinguishing feature of world politics today, or in the first decades of the 21st century, is rather what all of those and other changes are amounting to: a marked and perceptible uncertainty as regards the structure of world politics – whenever an issue occurs, it is not clear how the rules of the game would be determined – who would be ‘calling the shots’ or who would be the actors to address the issue; this has, instead, been determined on a case-by-case basis, as in the case of Georgia in 2008, of Syria from 2013, or Ukraine from 2014, leading, in some cases, to protracted conflicts without a clear perspective of resolution.

A changing world, therefore, is a world of eroding certainties. This means that, behind the evident power struggles in world politics, another struggle is going on, which is a struggle for a winning interpretation or definition of the conditions of world politics. The winning subject (or subjects) in this struggle will be the one(s) who is (are) able to produce the concepts and frameworks of thought for grappling with the uncertainties of world politics and who will succeed in these being taken up by other significant subjects of world politics. In addition, taking the material aspect into account, any winning interpretation of the circumstances of world politics will probably need to be backed by some form of power. By implication, under these circumstances, foreign policy is of crucial importance, as it represents *the* field for launching new frameworks of thought and practice aimed towards other subjects of world politics.

In the context of such circumstances which are characterized by the possibility of sudden new developments and unexpected situations in world politics, it would be prudent from the perspective of foreign policy of any subject of world politics, firstly, to be attuned to the changes that are going on, and, secondly and most importantly, to remain as open and flexible as possible in its foreign policy so as to enable itself to react promptly and appropriately to any new developments that might occur. This would be all the more necessary from the perspective of an important economic integration such as the EU which could represent one of the hubs of the changing world but is, at the same time, at risk of losing its position because of various factors including its economy and inability to reach consensus between its member states on key issues of foreign policy.

However, if we look at EU foreign policy itself and its development since its beginning in the form of European Political Cooperation (EPC) as well as in the recent period (from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1st December 2009), it has been more characteristic for it to be seen as an achievement in itself, to be preserved as such and only incrementally built upon.

The predecessor of today's Common Foreign and Security Policy, EPC, was formed under specific circumstances of the Cold War in 1970. The then European Community (EC) member states were interested in cooperation; West Germany was opening itself to the world (Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*), fuelling concerns from France. At the same time, the two poles of the bipolar world, the USA and the USSR, were mostly preoccupied with each other and with preserving their own positions. Also, since European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed in 1951 and European Community in 1957, the position of EC countries as a zone of peace and economic prosperity between the two poles was well established by the time when EPC was being formed. Importantly, there were no big shifts in world politics that would represent a challenge to the cooperation of the Six (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) in the field of foreign policy at that time. The circumstances were thus conducive to cooperation, but, simultaneously, did not require much of an outward-looking orientation from the Six, as the questions of high politics were already being addressed in the relationship between the two poles, the USA and the USSR.<sup>4</sup> Under these circumstances, coordination in the field of foreign policy came to be seen as an achievement of the European integration process in itself – in other words, it was considered a success that there was a coordination of foreign policies, and the orientation of EPC towards potential shifts in world politics or issues of the day was not the primary goal of cooperation.<sup>5</sup> The process of formation of a common foreign policy thus came to be seen in terms of contributing to *common identity* of the member states. This was also visible in key documents of EPC, in which EU foreign policy and identity were not only introduced side-by-side but as two concepts whose interconnection was treated as essential and self-evident (this will be discussed in more detail later).

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<sup>4</sup> In other words, the relations of foreign policy cooperation between the Six, which were developing, were in contrast with their common outlook in practice, or with their relations with the world beyond their borders including with the rest of Europe, particularly regarding important (world-)political issues.

<sup>5</sup> A possible exception deserves to be mentioned, namely the process of negotiations within Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe – CSCE – which was driven by EC member states with regard to issues which proved their importance towards the end of the Cold War, such as human rights. However, that process, from the perspective of EC member states, did not begin with an intention to affect world politics, although that was its final result, particularly from 1989 onwards.

After the establishment of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through the Treaty on European Union in 1992, which replaced EPC as the framework of cooperation in the field of foreign policy between EU member states, the practice of seeing EU foreign policy in terms of constructing and maintaining a common identity of EU member states continued (particularly in key foreign policy documents and orientations produced at the highest level, including by the European Council), although important new instruments were established, such as common positions and joint actions within the framework of CFSP. At the same time, it can be observed that gradualism and evolution were characteristic for formulation and implementation of EU foreign policy, as new policy orientations and strategies were cautiously built on the basis of existing achievements of cooperation, even when they were explicitly devoted to reflection of current shifts in world politics (e.g. Cologne European Council declaration of June 1999, European Security Strategy of 2003).

The process of EU foreign policy formation has therefore been, since its beginning in the form of EPC, interwoven with the process of EU identity formation, to the point where we might speak of a nexus or interweaving of discourses and practices regarding EU identity and foreign policy. At the same time, this process served and still serves to (re)produce that part of EU identity that is the face which the EU is turning to the rest of the world – EU identity in world politics.<sup>6</sup> Even though there has recently been some indication of awareness of a need for new venues of thought with respect to the changes in world politics this slow, painstaking development of EU foreign policy on the basis of previous compromises and agreements, although rational from the perspective of EU member states themselves, i.e. from an internal perspective, has not been showing signs of flexibility in practice and with regard to the main patterns and policy areas of EU foreign policy.<sup>7</sup>

Considering the shifts in world politics described above it would thus be beneficial for EU foreign policy to be put in a new perspective. Hitherto, from an internal EC member states' or EU perspective, it had been considered a success, to be valued as such. It has, so far, not been looked at or evaluated systematically while simultaneously taking into consideration the aspect of world politics. One may assume that if we look at EU foreign policy not only from its internal perspective, but also from the outside, from the tectonics of (today's) world politics, it would look markedly different. In other words, since the conditions of world politics have changed, the EU is facing the question: should the content of EU foreign policy, including an idea of EU identity in world politics that EU foreign policy might be

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<sup>6</sup> For a definition of EU identity in world politics, see subchapter 2.2.

<sup>7</sup> The issue of openness, in relation to EU foreign policy, is discussed in subchapters 1.1 and 2.3.



(re)producing, be reflected in terms of the changes that are occurring in world politics, and how?

The problem is, then, as the discourse and practice of EU foreign policy so far indicate, it is likely that, through the years since 1970, EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics experienced reification and was essentialized, and is now being treated as if it was a given and not a construct which can and should be changed with respect to the changing circumstances of world politics. It looks as if the notions of EU foreign policy and EU identity in world politics have been established, defined, and filled with meaning from 1970 onwards; and as if their meaning has since been closed, as if there was no need to change it, as if it should be treated as something static and unchangeable. Such a reified and essentialized conception of its own identity in world politics could be detrimental to the EU because it could limit the options available to EU policy-makers and thus the decisions that can be made by them concerning the courses of action that the EU can take when responding to the challenges of the changing world politics.

As will be shown later, there have been some attempts to explore new ways of thinking with respect to this problem. However, most of the debate within the relevant literature (outlined in subchapters 1.2 and 2.2) has resulted in contributing to the closure of the meaning of EU foreign policy and EU identity in world politics. Namely, within the literature, it is most often either assumed that there *is* an EU identity in world politics being formed through EU foreign policy or that EU identity in world politics *cannot* be formed at all, for various reasons – and thus EU identity in world politics is being built through various discourses on EU foreign policy, on the one hand through assuming and on the other hand through denying it, but also in trying to fill it with meaning, without allowing for EU foreign policy to remain open. This process needs to be reflected as well. Particularly with regard to the current changes in world politics, assumptions about EU identity in world politics that are implicit in conceptions of EU foreign policy should be made conscious, brought to the surface, and reflected upon, together with more explicit assumptions about EU identity in world politics, because, in the end, they affect actual EU discourses and practices.

It may thus well be that if we try to illuminate whether the EU has been constructing a narrative about itself in world politics and what the content of such a narrative might be, we might find that, since the beginning of the cooperation between EEC member states in the field of foreign policy, a narrative has been constructed about EEC member states and later the EU in world politics, but that, although that narrative continues to influence the perceptions of key actors involved as well as concrete action in the field of EU foreign policy,

it does not correspond to the context of world politics anymore, as world politics, which had fostered the establishment of the EEC itself and also of EPC, has changed crucially, and what has previously been of assistance to the EU might, in the light of the new circumstances, limit the EU in the courses of action it could conceive and take.

This needs to be analysed, these discourses and practices, because the circumstances which led to their creation and which made them logical at the time when they were being formed are no longer there. World politics has changed. The EU is no longer a zone of peace and prosperity in a bipolar world. It is not even simply a partner to the sole remaining superpower, as it used to be during the 1990s. Since the beginning of the 21st century, world politics has been changing and the EU is one of many potential centres of power in a world in the midst of change.

In 2012, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize for its contribution to world peace. The European integration process was devised as a response to a key question of world politics immediately after the Second World War which was how to appease former enemies on the European continent from which the World War had spread to the rest of the world, particularly France and Germany. If we pursue this thread of thought further into history, the Second World War broke out, among others, as a consequence of solutions that concluded the First World War, particularly reparations and land sequestrations from the defeated Germany. And, if we continue to pursue the thread of causes and consequences, the First World War broke out because a key instrument for maintaining peace on the European continent since the second half of the 19th century, the balance of power between the European powers, broke down. We have made this excursion into history to point out that European powers had, before the time of cooperation and before the two World Wars, been practicing power balancing amongst themselves. (More about this will be said in subchapter 2.1.) Yet, in the end, the balance of power broke down, resulting in two deadly and global wars.

This is important because today, in world politics, there are, as well, multiple (potential) powers or centres of power. The European history of the last couple of centuries teaches us that the existence of multiple centres of power within a single context might lead to competition which could culminate in power balancing – previously, the context of such balancing was the European continent, but today, *this context in which multiple centres of power coexist is global, for the first time in history*. And, if anyone, the EU, as the bearer of the memory of two devastating World Wars, and as a direct result and solution to the issues brought up by those wars, should be attuned to such changes. From this perspective, too, flexibility in conceiving and practicing foreign policy could be of crucial importance for the

EU, as well as for the rest of the world. Should it come, on the global level, to such courses of events as had been occurring on the European continent in the run-up to the First World War (e.g. solidification of alliances or struggles for dominance in strategic areas such as the Balkan Wars before the First World War), the EU as one of the centres of power in the emerging world could be the one to be able to see telltale patterns forming on the level of world politics and call on others to seek solutions to preserve peace, due to its historical experience.

This is why this thesis will follow and analyse the ways in which the EU has been thinking about itself and (re)producing itself in world politics via its foreign policy since the times of EPC until the present; with the objective of researching how the notion of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics was conceived, filled with meaning, whether and how its meaning has been closed and how this might be affecting the ability of the EU to adapt to the current conditions of world politics. Simultaneously, the thesis will represent a test whether, in conducting such research, it is possible to remain open as regards the subject of research (EU foreign policy), as this is crucial due to the fluidity of the world-political context. It should, namely, be borne in mind that already the subject of research implies a bias in favour of the existence of the EU and its foreign policy.

The analysis of the problematization of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics refers to the intention of prying open the existing structure of thinking about, and discourse and practice of EU foreign policy, and to the process of reflecting it, to expose those conventions and compromises that have given it its present form, to be able to shed light on it from the perspective of the current changes in world politics; while being constantly aware that this structure, because it represents a result of the processes of social construction that underlie it, is actually already always open and in a constant state of modification – it is only a consequence of social convention to see it as an achievement, closed in on itself, to be preserved as such.<sup>8</sup> The social conventions and unreflected assumptions that (re)produce EU foreign policy *qua* EU identity in world politics as an intransigent notion with closed meaning should be illuminated and evaluated, together with their possible consequences for EU foreign policy and for the position of the EU in world politics.

More generally, therefore, the purpose of this thesis is an evaluation of EU foreign policy with respect to the recent shifts in world politics. As we shall see in the following

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<sup>8</sup> For more on problematization, see subchapter 1.1.

chapter, there has been recognition among some theoreticians and professionals that changes are occurring in world politics to which the EU should be paying more attention. But the products of efforts to search for solutions have mainly been of a prescriptive nature, that is, the usual response is to devise a direction in which EU foreign policy should be moving. However, what has been missing is a moment of realisation that there are multiple different directions available to the EU at any given moment, and that, due to the volatile circumstances of world politics, the door should not be shut on any of them. In other words: the question of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics is not a question of its direction, but of how to allow for openness or flexibility in choosing and adapting its direction to the challenges of the present moment.

## 1. PROLEGOMENA

The aim of this chapter is to lay out the considerations and issues, and to elaborate the questions, theses as well as the approach that will guide the work in the rest of the thesis.

### 1.1 Problem definition/ problematization

Within philosophical literature, problematization has been expounded by Michel Foucault (1985; Rabinow 1984). In particular, Foucault studied the practice of *parrhesia* in ancient Greece, and found that this practice (which could be summarized as the practice of free speech that was meant to lead to the uncovering of truth) became subject to internal tensions, split within itself, as ancient Greek society and its democracy developed, and a debate arose in Greek philosophy as to who (of the free male citizens) should have access to such free speech, and to the quest for truth (Foucault 1985). Thus tensions regarding *parrhesia* gave rise to its *problematization* by the Greek philosophers (*ibid.*). This focus on *parrhesia* as a problem that the ancient Greek society focused on and sought solutions for was studied by Foucault (1985; Rabinow 1984). This can be seen as the Foucauldian interpretation of the practice of problematization within the ancient Greek society.

Yet, through Foucault's analysis of the problematization of *parrhesia* that had developed in the ancient Athenian society (Rabinow 1984; Foucault 1985), another kind of problematization had been performed: the problematization made by Foucault (1985) himself, as he observed and analysed the texts of the Greek philosophers in their quest to accommodate *parrhesia* in the developing democratic Athenian society. In other words, we can speak about two instances or levels of problematization in the case of *parrhesia*: a) the problematization made with regard to social practice or phenomenon itself (the problematization of *parrhesia* by the philosophers of ancient Greece) i.e. when a society focuses on a certain practice it has identified as problematic; and b) the problematization of this performed by an outside observer, with some historical distance, as was the case of Foucault's own analysis of the Greek society's problematization of *parrhesia* (1985; Rabinow 1984).

This observation has a number of consequences in terms of production of meaning through problematizations. In relation to the first, Foucauldian signification of problematization, problematizations which are used by a society can give rise to new social practices, of institutions as well as individuals. These problematizations transform the difficulties and obstacles identified by a society into a problem to which various solutions are proposed and may thus form the bases of new social practices (Rabinow 1984; Koopman

2011). Foucault referred to problematizations in this respect in his genealogies of madness and delinquency, for example (Rabinow 1984; Koopman 2011; Bacchi 2012). Moreover, problematizations in the second sense, of describing the practice of an observer who analyses the problematizations made by a society, may also lead to production of meanings which are positioned in relation to the first-instance problematizations produced by a society: this holds true for the present thesis – it is entangled in a process of producing new meanings by virtue of being part of the social world itself, and we (I as the writer and you as the reader) need to be aware of this underlying process to be able to retain a critical stance with regard to the subject we are studying and the present writing itself. Finally, the practices of problematization applied by a society also imply that, while attention regarding a certain social practice or phenomenon is focused on an area seen as problematic, this means that attention is, at the same time, withdrawn from other areas which are accepted as unproblematic, self-evident, and go without saying (Ashley 1989a).

These observations apply also to the field of EU foreign policy; this thesis endeavours to study the problematization that has been produced through the years of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics. Its aim is to study whether, how and why (*cf.* Foucault 1985), within the field of the developing EU foreign policy, the idea of EU identity in world politics became the focus of attention, a problem that solutions were sought to throughout the existence of EU foreign policy.

Namely, in the development of EU foreign policy, as well as in the development of its focus on the idea of EU identity in world politics, at least preliminarily, a central, constitutive tension or split can be observed: between the tendencies, on the one hand, to build or construct EU identity in world politics, and, on the other hand, the assumption and frequent invocation of an abstract idea of EU identity in world politics that is seen as an (already existing) ideal and thus closed in on itself. This basic tension gives rise to the ensuing problem that EU foreign policy (in its discourse and practice) has been focusing primarily on internal goals, such as constructing a real-life ideal of EU identity in world politics despite the changes that have been occurring in world politics. There are indications (which will be studied in more detail in the analysis) that the idea of EU identity in world politics has become the centrepiece of EU foreign policy while inadequate attention has been paid to the context of world politics and the crucial, momentous changes in world politics particularly with the beginning of the 21st century have not been adequately taken into account.

Considering the first tendency, it consists of envisioning, either explicitly or implicitly, what EU identity in world politics is or should be, and in prescribing corresponding or

‘appropriate’ courses of action for EU foreign policy. This has been done in the report *Project Europe 2030* (European Council 2010a), for example, but also in other documents and by a number of authors who have written about EU foreign policy, as shown in subchapter 1.2. Such (re)production of EU identity in world politics is problematic as it establishes EU identity as a pre-given and unchanging concept; it consists of unreflected use of the equation “EU in world politics = X”.

No idea of identity can be taken lightly or for granted. Numerous authors have written about the controversial and pernicious nature of the idea of identity: Checkel and Katzenstein (2009a) highlight that identity politics can easily become a matter of life and death and use the example of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians to underline this; Delanty (1995) points out the atrocities that have been committed as an expression of the idea of Europe in the past (under colonialism, fascism and anti-semitism); and Amartya Sen (2009) warns that identity can kill when its function of bringing cohesion to one group of people becomes the mirror function of sowing contempt or hatred towards those outside that group. Even more: identities in their ugly outside mirror not only generate hatred towards other groups but dehumanize persons who belong to those groups so that crimes committed against people belonging to dehumanized groups are not seen as crimes at all.

How can this problem be addressed? A step in that direction could be to be aware at all times when considering identity of the dangerous and constructed nature of the very idea of identity and to acknowledge and reflect this nature. It is important to realise that the meaning of EU identity (as well as any other identity, and any other notion) is inherently open, because the notion as such is constructed, since it is a social and human notion, and to realise that attention should be paid to discourses about EU identity, also in relation to foreign policy.

Regarding the second tendency, of (re)producing EU identity in world politics as an abstract ideal through EU foreign policy, it needs to be taken into account that political discourses rely on narrative patterns and that narratives have an important role in shaping and expressing political identity (Shenhav 2006, 245–246). Also, Delanty and Rumford (2008, 67) emphasise that identities have a narrative dimension and that they can be seen as stories told by the people about themselves. This can be applied to the discourse of EU foreign policy: this discourse looks as if it might be part of a foreign policy narrative that the EU has been telling (itself and its audiences) about itself in world politics. This observation will be outlined further in the remaining parts of this chapter and in subchapter 1.2 and tested in the analysis. If EU foreign policy has been (re)producing an ideal of EU identity in world politics that has not been compared to or adapted against previous and current changes in world

politics, a question of closure arises: how tightly have discourse and practice of EU foreign policy been closed, have they allowed for changes of the image of the EU in world politics and are they capable of doing so if needed?

As mentioned above, the tension between, on the one hand, striving to build EU identity in world politics, and on the other hand presupposing this identity raises the issue of the EU's inflexibility and focus on itself, on achievements of integration in its foreign policy despite the changes occurring in world politics.

The EU has, in fact, noted the changes that have been occurring in world politics in some of its strategic documents. For example, Strategy Europe 2020 (European Commission 2010a) highlights the growing power of the emerging economies (as evidenced through the increased role of the G-20), and, in the view of the changes, portrays two choices and two possible futures for the EU: appropriate response or decline on the world scene. A solution proposed in the field of foreign policy is to build flexible and politically driven strategic partnerships with the emerging economies (*ibid.*, 21). However, this is all that is proposed in the field of foreign policy – there is nothing more comprehensive or reflective. Similarly, the report Project Europe 2030 (European Council 2010a) predicts that in the next twenty years, there would be several centres of power in the world and the world's centre of gravity would shift to Asia and the global South; according to the report, the EU has to become a more assertive global actor or it risks sliding into marginalisation. The proposed solution from foreign policy perspective is for the EU to “become a driving force in shaping the new rules of global governance” and “champion an international environment” that will enable it “to promote its agenda” (*ibid.*, 42). Another example can be found in the report on main aspects and basic choices of CFSP for 2008 which states that the “EU has a responsibility to lead the debate” on how to restore legitimacy in the system of global governance, in partnership with others, including the emerging economies (Council of Ministers 2008a, 65).

If we look at the foreign policy recommendations made in these strategic documents from the perspective of the changes occurring in world politics, it can be established that at least one crucial consideration has been overlooked. As Gamble and Lane (2009, 12) note in their analysis of the EU and world politics, the world in the 21st century is not “a Eurocentric world”; in their opinion, Europe will have to adjust to being a much less important part of the world than it has been for the last three centuries. The recommendations for EU foreign policy made in the above-mentioned documents are predicated on the assumption that the EU would be able to significantly influence the course of world politics. This is also in contrast with the findings of Keukeleire and Bruyninckx (2011, 384) who see the rise of the emerging



economies as situated within the changing balance of power in the 21st century and find that the EU has no policy to deal with this. Evidence of this can also be found in the recurring reports on CFSP (since 1998) where there has been no mention or reflection of how the EU might respond to the changes in world politics, apart from strengthening its partnerships with the emerging economies (first mentioned in the report for 2004 – Council of Ministers 2005).

Although the West (first in the form of Europe and then in the form of the USA) has provided the template for global values and global governance for more than two centuries, the rise of the emerging powers such as India and particularly China implies that world polity will no longer be dominated by Western values – instead, we are moving into a world of multiple competing templates of values and governance (Jacques 2009, 79–94). In other words, if the EU was deriving its power from its position in the structure of world system, as Orbie writes (2009, 6), until 2008, the structure of world system has since changed in favour of the emerging economies and other centres of power; such a structure of world system will most likely not be as supportive of EU power as it used to be in the past.

To sum up, until recently, it had been the Western world – the EU together with the United States – that dominated world politics and held hegemony over the agreed vision of world order. With the changes that are occurring in world politics, this vision of the world is not the only one that is on the table. The EU should thus set itself the important question of “how does Europe react to being left behind” (Wæver 2010b), or, perhaps, does it react or recognize a need to react at all. From this perspective, although the foreign policy strategy outlined in the report Project Europe 2030 (to entangle other important, potentially powerful actors in a network of agreed rules) looks appropriate, it misses the key question of whether other (and possibly more powerful) powers will be inclined to agree to the rules proposed by the EU. Climate change negotiations and other cases, such as the crisis in Syria which began following the Arab Spring in 2011-2012, have shown that this is not necessarily so.

Reflecting on this from the perspective of EU foreign policy, and EU identity in world politics, it may be said that while political communities need narratives to guide them (Neumann 2008, 3), narratives need to be reflected if they are to adapt successfully to new circumstances. Such a reflection would entail awareness that: a) there is a political narrative, b) which is constructed and c) that it can be changed when needed. The site of such reflection is politics or political discourse which means foreign policy discourse when reflection concerns outside relations. It is questionable whether such a reflection has been part of EU foreign policy – its discourse appears to be closed which merits a more detailed study, and, in

case a closure of the discourse can be confirmed, an analysis of possible reasons for such a closure.

At the same time, as a number of authors have emphasised, closures are vital to the existence of a society and its systems of signification: from a sociological perspective, a society needs to delimit itself from its environment to allow for its own development (Luhmann 2004). From a semiotic perspective, production of meaning implies that, through every instance of signification, some meanings are focused upon while others are ignored, producing semiotic micro-universes (Greimas 1977). And, from a political perspective, closures are necessary to narrow the field of possibilities and allow for capacity to act politically; for strategic existential reasons (e.g. to confirm subaltern classes in their struggle); and to furnish ontological security to recipients of policies (Wæver 1995a; Spivak 2012; Rumelili 2015). The consideration of the underlying openness of all social processes, including EU foreign policy referred to in this thesis therefore does not imply doing away with closures; nor should it be taken to signify uncritical acceptance of new ideas. But it is a call for awareness of the necessity for flexibility and new directions in devising EU foreign policy: every society needs to be able to adapt to the changes in its environment, and systems of signification need to be able to allow for new developments. If informed political decisions are to be made, prior reflection is needed on *all* possible or imaginable options. Before a final (political) closure is made, there needs to be awareness and evaluation of all the available possibilities, and there also needs to be awareness that a closure *is* about to be made. Thus, it might be argued, full openness is impossible, but full closure also.

## **1.2 Scientific relevance: current literature and its gaps**

EU foreign policy as well as and in relation to EU identity in world politics have, through the years since the beginning of EPC in 1970, been discussed by a number of authors and in a number of publications, making significant conceptual and analytical contributions to the field of EU foreign policy analysis.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, if we consider EU foreign policy and EU identity in world politics through the lens of the underlying problematization described in the

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<sup>9</sup> E.g. Duchêne 1972; Bull 1979; Nuttall 1992; Hill 1993; Wæver 1994, 1995, 1996; Delanty 1995; Moravcsik 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Checkel 1999; Christiansen et al. 1999, 2001; Ginsberg 1999, 2001; White 1999, 2001; Nuttall 2000; Cederman 2001; Neumann 2001; Manners 2002, 2006, 2008; Manners and Whitman 2003; Smith 2003; Wagner 2003; Carlsnaes et al. 2004; Diez 2004, 2005; Smith 2004, 2008; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Levy et al. 2005; Risse 2005; Tsoukalis 2005; Greathouse 2006; Hyde-Price 2006; Lucarelli 2006, 2008; Kajnc 2006; Sjursen 2006; Telò 2006, 2009; Cerutti 2008; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Laïdi 2008; Orbie 2008; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Gamble and Lane 2009; Krotz 2009; Rogers 2009; Vasconcelos 2009; Bendiek and Kramer 2010; Howorth 2010; Hill and Smith 2011; Tiilikainen 2011; Toje 2011.

previous subchapter, there have been gaps in the discussions on EU foreign policy (including those in key EU documents in addition to the discussions within the academia) that need to be addressed, particularly from the perspective of the ongoing changes in world politics.

For this, it is useful to begin in the field of social anthropology as these authors have provided valuable insights in the constructed nature of European integration which goes beyond the perspective of theories of international relations such as constructivism. In particular, authors in this field have underlined the invented nature of the very idea of Europe and have highlighted European integration as a process which is not self-evident (e.g. Delanty 1995; Shore in *Anthropology Today* 2004; Delanty and Rumford 2008). In this vein, in social anthropology literature dealing with the phenomenon of European integration, it has been found that the European project has been intertwined with the (re)production of European identities even though this has usually not been stated explicitly (Delanty 1995; Abélès 2000; Béllier and Wilson 2000), and that this important aspect of the process of European integration has had a bearing on the developing role of the EU on the world stage, on its external identity (Béllier and Wilson 2000). More recently, this has become the subject of international relations literature, for example in Tiilikainen's recognition that the EU's self-understanding is a constitutive element of its international identity and shapes its role in world politics (Tiilikainen 2011, 188).

If we look more closely at some of the key contributions from the field of EU foreign policy analysis that connect EU foreign policy to EU identity in world politics, it can be observed that, quite early, suggestions have been made as to how E(E)C member states/ the EU might or should act in world politics, using foreign policy, or, rather, what kind of actor the E(E)C/ EU is, might or should be.

In 1972, François Duchêne wrote that Western Europe could be one of the civilian centres of power in the world, in response to de Gaulle's notion of *Europe puissance* (Orbie 2008, 5–7). A traditionalist<sup>10</sup> response to this in the field of international relations was to ask whether a “civilian power” Europe was a contradiction in terms (Bull 1979). Within the context of the 1990s and the failure of the EU to preclude disaster in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the debate continued with the notion of “capability-expectations gap” (Hill 1993), on the basis of which Hill (*ibid.*, 310–314) ascribed a number of existing and possible future roles to the EU

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<sup>10</sup> It has been considered that international relations theories have developed through a succession of four debates: between realists and idealists around the time of the Second World War; between scientific and traditional approaches until the 1970s; though inter-paradigm debate in the 1970s and 1980s; and the latest debate between rationalist and reflectivist approaches (Dunne, Kurki and Smith 2010; Kurki and Smith 2010; Wæver 2010). More on international relations theories can be found in e.g. Brglez (2006) or Smith (2010).

in the world. The next notable step in the debate was Ian Manners' notion of "normative power Europe" (Manners 2002; 2006; 2008) which saw the EU as representing a normative power in world politics, where such power could be lost by focusing on military capacity (Manners 2006). Already at the time, the notion was problematized within the academia (Sjursen 2006) because it carried the risk of relating to values of European cultural context and thus promulgating "Eurocentric cultural imperialism" (*ibid.*, 247). Also during this period, a debate involving EU identity as well as foreign policy developed in relation to the split between ("old" and "new", as it was coined by the US Secretary of State Powell) EU countries on whether to support the US in Iraq (e.g. Habermas and Derrida 2003). More recently, Vasconcelos (2009) argued that the EU should go in the direction of building a system of universally accepted rules if it wanted a major role in world politics; and Howorth (2010) wrote about the EU as a "global actor" implying that the EU should, with regard to the rapidly changing world, nudge other actors in world politics towards a global grand bargain. On the other hand, Toje (2011) described the EU as a small power which should "embrace its small power identity" (*ibid.*, 57) to advance in the world. Also, Rogers (2009) analysed the move from "civilian power" to "global power" approach since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003, and critiqued both notions as "empty signifiers".

Already from this description of the discussions it can be seen that there have been a number of key authors in the field of EU foreign policy analysis who have constructed a link between EU foreign policy and EU identity on the world scene, either implicitly or explicitly. Yet the fact that such a link is being constructed or that it is significant (*cf.* Béllier and Wilson 2000) is not mentioned, and usually the link made is also not reflected. For example, explicit links between EU foreign policy and the idea of EU identity in world politics have been made by Manners (2002; 2006; 2008), Manners and Whitman (2003), Telò (2006), Vasconcelos (2009), Howorth (2010) and Toje (2011); while an implicit connection between those two notions can be found, for instance, in Duchêne (1972), Bull (1979) or Hill (1993).

There have been, in addition, authors mostly from the rationalist or neorealist school, who have denied the possibility of a specific EU identity in world politics (e.g. Kagan 2003; Hyde-Price 2006; Krotz 2009). Although through denial, such a stance also serves to (re)produce a kind of idea about EU identity in world politics – in this case, through denying it or through describing what would need to be put in place before we could speak about such an identity.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> International relations theories and the placement of this thesis in relation to them are discussed in subchapter 2.3 (Theoretical approach).

To write about the idea of EU identity in world politics, there needs to be a certain minimum consensus about such an idea within the community of authors who write about it and the fact that the above-mentioned authors wrote about this idea indicates that they were conforming to such a minimum consensus. This minimum consensus can be summarized most simply as the admissibility of the idea of EU identity in world politics which is being built through EU foreign policy.

In addition, the debate on EU identity in world politics has been related, on a deeper, genealogical level, to debates on the idea of Europe and European identity. Witnessing European unification, and in particular enlargement process, there have been authors, mostly philosophers, who have discussed what European identity was (Kundera 1984; Morin 1987/1989; Enzensberger 1988; Derrida 1992; Habermas and Derrida 2003). On an even more basic level of signification, historical discussions about the idea of Europe itself need to be taken into account (Gollwitzer 1964; den Boer, Bugge and Wæver 1995; Delanty 1995; Hay 1995; Mikkeli 1998; Stråth 2010) as they show how it became a value to unite Europe, and how some ideas have been established in this process while others have been marginalized (Wæver 2015).

Thus, either through description, prescription or denial, a patchwork image of the EU in world politics has been built or implied in the course of the discussions on EU foreign policy, as well as EU identity and Europe as such. Within the academia, this has been noted by some contributions (Diez 2004; Rogers 2009) that found that the ‘search’ for identity was not so much a search as a construction of Europe or the EU.

The difficulty that can be identified, therefore, is that a majority of the contributions to the debate concerning EU foreign policy and identity amount to co-constructing or co-(re)producing EU identity in world politics (e.g. as “civilian power”, “normative power”, “global power”, “small power”, or even “no power”) while this fact is usually not reflected in the contribution or the debate itself. However, such reflection is crucial because, as Abélès has noted (2000, 51), Europe cannot be “reified under the categories of community and of identity” – it needs to be studied as a social *process*. Also, Diez (2004, 321) emphasized that identities are not given but discursively constructed; talking about European (or EU) identity inscribes that very notion into the debate. Thus, the main gap in the current literature comprising the debate about EU foreign policy/ identity is that a majority of key contributions to the debate (with some notable exceptions, e.g. Derrida 1992; Wæver 1994, 1995b, 1996; Delanty 1995; Diez 2004, 2005) have used the main categories of the debate (EU foreign policy and EU identity) either explicitly for making their cases, or have implied them, which

has resulted in reification or essentialization of those categories through their continued unreflected use in the debate. There has been little scholarly effort so far to simultaneously and consciously allow for openness of the idea of EU identity in world politics while realising that perceptions of this identity (whether they actually correspond to reality or not) affect the social world, particularly EU foreign policy.

The next, related difficulty or gap is that, in the debate, an implicit assumption is often involved that there is an already existing notion of EU identity in world politics that can be grasped or outlined through conceptualization. In this case, the debate relies on and reproduces a closed-meaning notion of EU identity in world politics, because an identity is implied or explicitly stated instead of being seen as being constantly reproduced through social discourses and practices, including the discourse of the author her- or himself.<sup>12</sup> This implies a second assumption that if the EU continues to work in line with the presumed closed-meaning notion of its identity in world politics, it is proceeding in the right direction; in other words, a closed-meaning notion of EU identity in world politics is used to justify particular orientations for EU foreign policy.

Thirdly and finally, although some of the contributions represent responses to the changing circumstances of world politics (such as Hill 1993; Vasconcelos 2009), they do not perceive a need for EU foreign policy to remain flexible or open to different possibilities to be able to respond to the changes but, instead, usually a single course of action for the EU is proposed which is considered to be the most appropriate, on the basis of the connection between EU foreign policy and EU identity in world politics which has been made or implied in that contribution. At the same time, however, as shown in the description of the debate above, it should be noted that EU identity in world politics has been portrayed in markedly contrasting terms by different contributions to the debate and thus different, sometimes quite divergent, courses of action have been prescribed.

In the continuation of this thesis, the discourses that construct a link between EU foreign policy and EU identity in world politics without specifically acknowledging and reflecting this will be referred to as *identity-casting discourses*, and the discursive action of *casting* EU identity in world politics in a particular way will be referred to as *EU identity-casting*. The analytical concept of *identity-casting* will thus be used to show that a specific discourse only represents one of a number of alternative and perhaps complementary strains of thinking about the EU in world politics. To some extent, this has been done by

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<sup>12</sup> However, some authors have reflected on their work as part of political processes, such as Delanty (1995); Wæver (1996); Diez (2004; 2005); Sjørnsen (2006); Diez and Manners (2007).

Vasconcelos (2009), for example, who combined the discourse about the EU as a power with a multilateral approach to world politics, yet the realisation that multiple foreign policy directions are always open to the EU is not fully brought to the fore. Considering this, it can be admitted that various identity-casting discourses contribute to the reflection of how the EU could respond to the changes in world politics; however, a recognition has been missing that with respect to world politics which is in flux, there is a need to be open to multiple courses of thought and action in the realm of foreign policy particularly regarding the perspective of the EU which is not in a clear position of power.

In addition to the debate described above, links between EU foreign policy and EU identity in world politics have been made in EU documents as well. An explicit connection between these two notions can be found in the *Document on the European Identity (Déclaration sur l'identité européenne)* which was adopted by foreign ministers of the EEC member states in December 1973. The second title of the document addresses “The European Identity in Relation to the World”, and then deals with specific aspects of it, such as relations with the United States, and intention of the Nine to progressively define “their identity in relation to other countries”. The Document on the European Identity therefore established the idea of European identity in world politics. (The content of the Document is studied in more detail in the third study in the analysis.) This implies that, from very early on in the existence of EU foreign policy, EU foreign policy has been infused with the idea of European identity; although this connection became taken for granted from then on (which will be looked into in the analysis), such a close link and even exchangeability of policy with identity has not been as self-evident for other kinds of policies, for example (*cf.* Wæver 2015). This idea of identity was upgraded in the Treaty on European Union (1992) that stated that implementation of CFSP would reinforce “the European identity” (Preamble) and that one of the EU’s objectives was to assert its identity on the international scene (Article B).

In December 2007, another important document was adopted which endeavoured to fill EU foreign policy with meaning – the Treaty of Lisbon. Under the chapter “General provisions on the Union’s external action”, the Treaty defines the principles and objectives of the EU’s action on the international scene, where the principles consist of positive values on the basis of which the EU was founded such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, while the first of the objectives is to safeguard these values in international relations. Furthermore, it states that, on the basis of these principles and objectives, the European Council would define strategic interests of the EU (by mid-2016, this has, however, not been done). It can therefore be said that this part of the Treaty of

Lisbon testifies of an awareness of EU policy-makers about the significance of positioning the EU in world politics. Furthermore, as mentioned before, the report Project Europe 2030 (European Council 2010a) states that the EU should be a “much more assertive player in the international scene”, and that the EU should defend “responsible interdependence” in world politics where key actors would agree to work together “within a system of multilateral governance”.

If the contents of these documents are compared with the gaps identified before within the debate in the academia on EU foreign policy/ identity, it can be inferred that, also within EU documents, the link between EU foreign policy and EU identity in world politics is made but not really reflected; that the idea of EU identity in world politics is explicitly constructed, but the process of construction is closed in on itself, as EU identity in world politics is seen as an unchanging ideal; and that there has not been much consideration of a need to allow for the possibility of multiple courses of thought and action for the EU in its foreign policy with respect to the changing conditions of world politics and to leave this process consciously and deliberately open.

To conclude this part, on the basis of the analysis above, various narratives about the EU in world politics have been and are being constructed through different discourses on EU foreign policy. Importantly, from the analysis of EU documents above it can be seen that the process of constructing a narrative about the EU in world politics has been going on also on the level of the EU.<sup>13</sup>

From these discourses and documents, therefore, a certain image of the EU in world politics arises. Yet, these discourses and in particular the discourse that the EU has been constructing about itself<sup>14</sup> in world politics through its foreign policy have not yet been subject to a thorough reflection (the importance of such a reflection has been underlined, for example, by Diez 2004 and 2005), although there has been a recognition by some authors

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<sup>13</sup> A narrative can for now be defined as a socially meaningful account of a series of events or actions intended for a specific audience (Czarniawska 2004; Elliot 2005; Shenhav 2006; Suganami 2008; Eder 2009); e.g. for the recipients of EU foreign policy. More about narratives is said in subchapter 2.3.

<sup>14</sup> In any discourse about social entities such as the EU a degree of *anthropomorphising* is present; this means that characteristics are attributed to a social entity that only individuals can possess (Brglez 2006, 115-116). While Wendt (2004) and Manning (Suganami 2001) have referred to social entities such as states as personified entities, or persons, this is not the usage intended here. The issue of anthropomorphising is mentioned because it is a problem that cannot be avoided: we refer to the EU as an entity in and of itself, but it is a product of ongoing inter-subjective processes. As we refer to the EU as a social entity, we are contributing to its anthropomorphising; we should be aware of this. The issue of anthropomorphising thus highlights the constructedness and performativity of the social phenomenon that is the EU: the EU appears as a person but behind it there have been and are scaffoldings and backstages as the EU is constantly (re)constructed and (re)enacted through the discourses and actions of individuals who act for and in the name of it, which also means that, in every moment, there are opportunities for change (cf. e.g. Campbell 1998; Pettman 2000).



(Telò 2006; Laïdi 2008) that the EU has been facing a radically different set of circumstances in the last few years which necessitate its adaptation.

The remainder of the present thesis will be devoted to performing such a reflection on selected cases of EU foreign policy.

### **1.3 Research questions and theses**

Considering the previous subchapters and the introduction, it appears that an idea of EU identity in world politics has been developed through the discourse and practice of EU foreign policy since its very beginnings, which has, in the later development of EU foreign policy, been assumed, or taken for granted, and built upon, and that this might have had a significant impact on the processes underlying EU foreign policy-making, as well as, crucially, on the conduct of EEC member states/ the EU on world-political stage i.e. on the relationship between EU foreign policy and world politics. As explained in subchapter 1.1, the close interconnection that has been (re)produced between EU foreign policy and the idea of EU identity in world politics can be seen as a central problematization that arose through the development of EU foreign policy. This needs to be analysed; and, at the same time, the question arises whether and how this problematization has actually been involved with what has been going on in world politics. Therefore, the following two research questions are proposed:

- a) Have EU foreign policy and the idea of EU identity in world politics been so closely interconnected that we might speak about an EU foreign policy/ identity nexus?**
- b) What has been the character of the relationship between EU foreign policy/ identity nexus and world politics?**

The first research question will be used to test and lay out the interconnection between EU foreign policy and the idea of EU identity in world politics, which will be performed, on a general level, in the next chapter, particularly under Conceptualization (subchapter 2.2), but will also be showcased and analysed on specific examples of EU foreign policy discourse and practice in the studies which form the bulk of the analysis. To be tested, the second research question requires concretization with regard to the social and political realities on the level of EU foreign policy and vis-à-vis world politics; that is, a relationship that might (or might not) exist between EU foreign policy/ identity nexus and world politics needs to be formulated in more practical terms with respect to the internal and external aspects of EU foreign policy to be operationalized.

Considering its internal aspect, EU foreign policy has been marked by differences – between the member states and EU institutions, as well as between different EU institutions and between the member states. For example, when a new foreign policy issue arises (such as Georgia in 2008 or Syria in 2012), it is not certain that the member states are going to approach it via the existing EU institutional setup for coordinating foreign policy; individual actions or ad-hoc cooperation are possible, notwithstanding the existing Treaty provisions. On the level of EU institutions, there is a distinction between the intergovernmental aspect of foreign policy represented by the Council of the EU and the supranational aspect embodied in the Commission (Telò 2009, 47).<sup>15</sup> If we look at the member states themselves, the most often cited rift has been that between “Atlanticists” and “Europeanists” or “new” and “old” Europe as it was labelled in 2003 over the argument whether or not to support the USA’s Iraq campaign (*cf.* Smith 2004, 203–204); however, there are other important differences such as between two EU permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (France and the United Kingdom) and the other member states (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 306), or between large and small member states (Edwards 2011, 66–69). In addition, there have been divisions over general orientation of EU foreign policy (*cf.* Edwards 2011, 66–69) as well as with respect to specific foreign policy issues.

With regard to the interconnection between EU foreign policy and identity, or the processes of (re)production of a narrative about the EU in world politics, nevertheless, a hazy notion of EU identity in world politics seems to persist despite the differences outlined above (as shown in the preceding subchapter) which has been used to substantiate various discourses and actions in the field of EU foreign policy. At the same time, concerning the internal divisions identified above, it might be expected that any attempt to significantly alter the existing idea of EU identity in world politics in any one particular direction could feed into these divisions and potentially exacerbate the tensions between them.

The second dimension of interest is the external aspect of the interconnection between EU foreign policy and identity, namely its relation to world politics, particularly considering the current fluid conditions of world politics. In this respect, the EU might be tempted, in formulating its identity in world politics, to construct itself by constructing various “others”. Diez (2004) remarked that, since the 1990s, there has been an increase in the construction of external “others” with respect to geography and culture in EU foreign policy, while Neumann (2001) warned about the EU’s “supranational temptation” (*ibid.*, 106) to construct Russia as

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<sup>15</sup> This division might be overcome through the existence and work of European External Action Service – EEAS which has been established after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009).

an inferior “other”. On the other hand, Wæver (2005a) reflected on temporal othering present in European discourses, where the threat has not been ‘someone else, different than me’, but ‘me, in the past’ meaning Europe as it had been in the process of its descent into two world wars. A third kind of othering in European discourses has been identified by Južnič (1993, 346) who wrote about integration of Europe understood in the sense of integrating of the more developed economies, while, on the level of the world, there persists a division between the developed and the underdeveloped; he found that confrontation along this axis created a specific and distinct identity and that it was comparison with the South that created a central starting point for identity formation in the North.

If we take into account the different cases of othering described above it may be inferred that the temporal othering identified by Wæver (2005a) predominantly reminds the EU of what it should not be and where it should not go, while the geopolitical othering reflected by Neumann (2001) and Diez (2004) could represent a risk when it comes to EU foreign policy as it would mean that the EU might be constructing itself through presenting various geopolitical others as inferior; and the kind of North-South othering identified by Južnič (1993) might prove to be an obstacle to formulating new orientations of EU foreign policy in the conditions of world politics in which the former “South” has much more power than in the past. In the fluid conditions of world politics in the 21st century, the foreign policy that arises from the (re)production of a closed-meaning idea of EU identity in world politics might have various consequences for the EU. In order to reflect what these consequences might be, the following set of theses is proposed:

- 1. There has been a closure of the meaning of EU identity in world politics produced mainly for internal reasons of EU integration.**
- 2. A specific<sup>16</sup> relationship has developed between EU foreign policy/ identity nexus and world politics.**
- 3. When EU identity in world politics has been (re)produced as open, EU foreign policy was able to have an impact in world politics.**

The first thesis will be tested partially already in the conceptual section (subchapter 2.2) since dealing with foreign policy might have been functional from the perspective of European integration process itself.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> This thesis posits that there is not only a general relationship, but a relationship with a specific character between EU foreign policy/ identity and world politics, and the character of this relationship is specified in the third thesis. Moreover, as will be shown in the analysis, the relationship between EU foreign policy and world politics can be looked at not only from the perspective of EU foreign policy (as stated in the third thesis – when EU identity in world politics has been seen as open, EU foreign policy had an impact in world politics), but also from the perspective of world politics, i.e. how world politics functioned to enable or delimit EU foreign policy.

The remaining two theses will be tested using the studies in the third chapter – analysis (comprising the study of those cases of EU foreign policy which have been discussed most often at the highest level throughout the history of EU foreign policy; of the construction of EU identity in world politics as such; and of foreign policy issues that were discussed most often at the highest level in the recent years). Using this kind of a historical approach together with the analysis of more recent trends and a comparison of the results of the different studies, it is expected that the analysis will show whether there were cases in which the EU was able to impact world politics through its foreign policy/ identity nexus and what were the contours of EU foreign policy/ identity nexus as well as world politics in those cases (was the idea of EU identity in world politics seen as open or closed and how did this work out under the prevailing conditions of world politics at the time). These findings will, in turn, be used in the end of the analysis to evaluate in what way an open or closed notion of EU identity in world politics might function under the current conditions of world politics.

Namely, taking into account the discussion of openness (and closure) in the end of subchapter 1.1, and the external aspect of the idea of EU identity (subchapter 2.2.1), EU foreign policy seems to have been (re)producing a certain image of the EU in world politics, or EU identity in world politics, and it should be key to observe, in the contexts where EU foreign policy was or is facing challenges in world politics (either through changes or stasis of world politics), whether the meaning of EU identity in world politics has, in the discourse and practice of EU foreign policy: a) been preserved the way it had been established through the discourse and practice of EU foreign policy by that time; or b) has it been changed or adjusted in response to the challenges posed by world politics, and in what manner.

#### **1.4 Contribution to science, assumptions and limits**

As mentioned in subchapter 1.2, some authors have noted and warned that speaking about EU identity in world politics actually (re)produces such identity (e.g. Diez 2004; 2005; Sjursen 2006; Rogers 2009). However, a connection between EU foreign policy/ identity nexus and changes in world politics has not been made so far, in the sense of a reflection that the way EU foreign policy/ identity nexus currently operates might be out of step with the changes occurring in world politics.

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<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of the issue of openness vs. closure, and the (im)possibility of complete openness, or complete closure, see the end of subchapter 1.1, as well as the discussion on openness as one of the five theoretical tenets of this thesis in subchapter 2.3.4.

Namely, within the current literature on EU foreign policy,<sup>18</sup> it has not been studied systematically how, firstly, EU identity in world politics is (re)produced through EU foreign policy; secondly, how this occurs with reference to the conditions of world politics; and thirdly, how this occurs particularly regarding the shifts that world politics has been experiencing since the end of the 20th century. Nevertheless, it should be analysed how the mechanism of (re)production of EU identity in world politics through EU foreign policy works, considering historical experience, in the current changing conditions of world politics. The present thesis represents a combination of historical analysis and perspective with the analysis of recent conditions on the axes EU foreign policy – EU identity in world politics – conditions of world politics. This will provide for a study of what has been invested in EU identity in world politics through the workings of EU foreign policy, what this has implied in different circumstances of world politics throughout the history of EU foreign policy, and in turn, what this might mean for the EU with regard to the changing tectonics of world politics in the 21st century.

A main contribution to science thus consists of identifying the patterns of thinking and doing EU identity in world politics, in the past and the present. These patterns will be identified through analysis of EU foreign policy discourse and implementation, with respect to the conditions of world politics which prevailed at the time when a particular EU foreign policy discourse or practice was being formed; subsequently, patterns identified in this manner will be set against the background of more current conditions of world politics to see what effects they have been producing in recent times, what this might mean for the EU and whether it might be detrimental for the EU in any way.

A theoretical framework to study the interconnection between EU foreign policy and EU identity in world politics and their relationship (or a lack of it) with the circumstances prevailing in world politics will be constructed in the first part of the thesis which will take into account existing theoretical perspectives yet will aim to provide a broad and holistic approach specifically devised for the study of the problem at hand. A holistic approach tailored to the problem studied is necessary if we want to elucidate as much of the complex

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<sup>18</sup> E.g. Duchêne 1972; Bull 1979; Nuttall 1992; Hill 1993; Moravcsik 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Checkel 1999; Ginsberg 1999, 2001; White 1999; Nuttall 2000; Cederman 2001; Christiansen et al. 2001; Neumann 2001; White 2001; Manners 2002, 2006, 2008; Manners and Whitman 2003; Smith 2003; Wagner 2003; Carlsnaes et al. 2004; Smith 2004, 2008; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Levy et al. 2005; Risse 2005; Tsoukalis 2005; Greathouse 2006; Hyde-Price 2006; Lucarelli 2006, 2008; Kajně 2006; Sjursen 2006; Telò 2006, 2009; Cerutti 2008; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Laïdi 2008; Orbie 2008; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Gamble and Lane 2009; Krotz 2009; Rogers 2009; Vasconcelos 2009; Bendiek and Kramer 2010; Howorth 2010; Hill and Smith 2011; Toje 2011.

social phenomenon that EU foreign policy/ identity is as possible (*cf.* Patomäki 2002; Wight 2006; Kurki 2008; Bauer and Brighi 2009a).

In connection to this, an innovative conceptualization of EU identity in world politics will be developed with the aim of encompassing the relationship between EU foreign policy and EU identity and to guide the research in the analysis.

In empirical terms, the main contribution to the field is a study of how EU identity in world politics has been (re)produced through dealing with (i.e. speaking about and implementing) the main external issues within EPC/ EU foreign policy, using case studies and historical analysis. The approach for the empirical study (described in more detail in subchapter 2.4 and in the beginning of the analytical part) is innovative and eclectic, and, above all, has been conceived to provide a global overview of each of the issues analysed in the studies. Specifically, the approach used will not only gauge foreign policy discourse (through discourse analysis) but will also include an analysis of foreign policy practice in the sense of symbolic and material actions (as the phase of implementation of foreign policy has often been neglected in studies of foreign policy identities – Tulmets 2011), and of the relevant context of world politics. This means that the empirical approach will be three-pronged, taking into account foreign policy discourse, practice and context, which represents a new point of view, as analysis of ideational and material social worlds together, including applicable context, has not been used systematically to study EU foreign policy, taking into account the existing literature.

A critical evaluation of the results of the empirical study and of discussing EU identity in world politics will follow the analysis. As mentioned before, identities are not only positive but can also have destructive consequences; moreover, a reflection of the idea of EU identity in world politics is part of the scientific process in the case of the present thesis because, as the thesis will evaluate the reflections of others with regard to the issue of EU identity in world politics, also a reflection of own thinking on this issue is needed, as any reflection of EU identity may serve to (re)produce this identity. This final reflection will, therefore, contribute to the ethics of research/ writing.

Last but not least, in this manner, a reflection will be performed as to whether the EU has constructed a narrative about itself in world politics through its foreign policy, what might be the possible content of this narrative, how this narrative might be affecting EU foreign policy, and whether (re)producing this narrative still makes sense and benefits the EU from the perspective of the changing conditions of world politics.

Any contribution to science is based on certain assumptions, contains bias, and needs to take into account its limits. A main assumption implicit in this thesis is that stable world politics is in the interest of the EU. This assumption will be researched in the analysis, particularly the third study focusing on the (re)production of EU identity in world politics through EU foreign policy documents. Meanwhile, Morgenthau (1948, 64) noted that reliance on international law and support for international organizations that contribute to the maintenance of a particular *status quo* (such as the United Nations) imply a foreign policy in support of that *status quo*. Therefore, a preliminary inference that the EU is interested in the stability of world politics can be made on the basis of its support for international law and the United Nations mentioned in the main EU foreign policy documents cited above, including the Treaty of Lisbon. Also, it is assumed that the EU and its members are interested in continuing and strengthening EU foreign policy. Another assumption, which is also a bias, refers to allowing for the possibility of EU identity in world politics. Furthermore, the necessity of anthropomorphising the EU, also mentioned before, represents a bias. We will return to these considerations in the concluding part of this thesis, to reflect how they affected the writing as well as how they could be taken into account.

There are a number of considerations that might contribute fruitfully to the discussion in this thesis but cannot be considered at length and are thus mentioned only to support the central argument which relates to the interconnection between EU foreign policy and identity and its relation to world politics, such as: domestic aspect of EU foreign policy (concerning relations among the member states, and with their internal constituencies); relationship between EU foreign policy and other policies, in particular economic policy and international economic relations and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); and the question of the merits of different international relations theories when studying EU foreign policy (nevertheless, these theories are briefly considered in subchapter 2.3 which also devises a single approach to the issue of interconnection between EU foreign policy/ identity and their relation to world politics that is then applied in the analysis).

## **1.5 Operationalization**

If we compare some of the key actors in world politics today, such as the USA, the EU, or China, including international organizations such as the United Nations, it can be said that the European Union is a very complex actor in comparison to other actors, as it functions as a unitary actor in some respects (such as external dimension of its common or Union policies),

yet is at the same time composed of currently 28 member states who are involved in a complex institutional machinery to ensure effective coordination. The EU's mode of existence and functioning is so different from the other known actors in world politics that some authors have called it a *sui generis* (one of a kind) type of actor in world politics (e.g. Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Ginsberg 2001).

To take into account the EU's complex *modus vivendi et operandi*, therefore, with respect to the field of foreign policy, operationalization of the research questions and theses needs to be able to encompass as many aspects of its existence and functioning as possible. In this sense, authors in the field of international relations have written about the need for methodological eclecticism (Kratochwil 2009; Katzenstein and Sil 2010; Wight 2006; Kurki 2008) which allows applying all methodological tools that can serve to shed light on the subject of research; and Brglez (2006, 57) has argued that social sciences should not eschew their own complexity, as the subject of research should be comprehended as closely as possible and taking into account the relevant contexts before venturing into abstraction or focusing on the most relevant aspects.


The operational approach used in this thesis applies a range of methods, with the purpose of understanding the subject of research (problematization of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics) in all its relevant aspects, as a complex whole composed of a number of relevant facets. With this in mind, the empirical approach combines qualitative and quantitative methods, beginning with discourse analysis, as discourse analysis represents an appropriate starting point in the case of foreign policy where meaning is often hidden (Wæver 2005a, 35). Moreover, discourse analysis can be used to study the (re)production of social and political narratives (Shenhav 2006, 251). However, not only discourse needs to be studied to comprehend the problem fully, as Tulmets (2011) found that the phase of implementation is often neglected but nevertheless crucial in studying foreign policy identities. Consequently, a comprehensive analysis of the problem of EU identity formation in world politics should not only look at discourse but also at implementation of foreign policy. Thirdly, Brglez (2006, 41) underlined the importance of social, historical and other contexts when researching problems in the field of international relations. Taking this observation into account, the third key element for a full analysis of the research problem is the analysis of the context of EU foreign policy which is world politics from the perspective of this thesis.

The discourse analysis will focus on the discourse of the European Council as the highest and longest-existing body dealing with foreign policy in the EU. The discourse of the



European Council on foreign policy issues will be quantified (in the beginning of the analysis) to determine which of the foreign policy issues on its agenda were discussed most often and, on this basis, choice will be made concerning (two) foreign policy issues on which case studies will be performed so as to analyse the (re)production of foreign policy in these cases from the 1960s to 2009. The case studies will be followed by a historical study of foreign policy discourse of the European Council in connection to EU identity in world politics as such during the same period with which the results of the case studies will be compared. While these studies will follow EU foreign policy throughout its history and by 2009, the final study in the analysis will focus on EU foreign policy development in more recent period and will analyse which foreign policy issues were discussed most often and how they were handled in the first five years since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009-2014).

This is important for the present study because following the economic crisis that began in the autumn of 2008, the markedly different situation of the EU in the world became apparent; at the same time, the analysis of the period after entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon allows for the observation of the changes in EU foreign policy that were introduced with this Treaty, such as strengthened role of the High Representative and institution of European External Action Service (EEAS). Moreover, an approach is needed that allows us to trace the patterns of EU foreign policy-making from their early beginnings to the recent period, but that allows, at the same time, for the comparison of these established patterns of EU foreign policy with how EU foreign policy has fared in the recent period, in which the position of the EU in the world has been changing. This will allow for a comparison and analysis whether the EU has been changing the idea of its identity in world politics in the recent years, taking into account the changes occurring in world politics.<sup>19</sup> This setup which will guide the analysis is schematically shown below:



<sup>19</sup> More on discourse analysis and case studies as methods of research is said in subchapter 2.4.

To put into practice the three-pronged theoretical and empirical approach outlined above, the analysis of the discourse of the European Council on the issue/s concerned<sup>20</sup> as recorded in the Presidency Conclusions of the sessions of the European Council and in other relevant documents, also concerning EU identity in world politics (for example, the Document on the European Identity of 1973), will represent the first layer of research. In this manner, the declaratory level of EU foreign policy will be explored, including possible narrative that the EU might have been constructing about itself in world politics.

The second layer of research is represented by implementation of EU foreign policy; this mainly took place on the level of foreign ministers of E(E)C/ EU member states, in the form of EPC High Conference of Foreign Ministers during the time of EPC, that is from 1970 until the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, then in the form of General Affairs Council (GAC) until the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice, thereafter, since 2002 and until 2009, General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) which deliberated also separately as General Affairs or External Relations Council, and finally in the form of Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009 (*cf.* Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006; Vanhoonacker 2011). The work of these ministerial bodies can be regarded as the level of implementation of EU foreign policy, as not only joint actions, as they became known since the Treaty of Maastricht, represent implementation of foreign policy; speech itself can also produce reality and represent action in the field of foreign policy, for example in the form of diplomatic *démarches* and common statements intended for recipients in third countries or for international bodies and conferences – such forms of speech are known as *speech acts* (*cf.* Wæver 1998; Milliken 1999; Débrix 2002). In addition, focus on ministerial bodies on the level of implementation can be supplemented by looking at the work and statements or speeches of the High Representative for CFSP since October 1999 (when the first High Representative Javier Solana was appointed) as well as acts that were adopted by the E(E)C/ EU in relation to the issue(s) observed.

The third level of analysis needs to probe the context of world politics with respect to the issue(s) studied;<sup>21</sup> in the case of some foreign policy issues, this can be done by analysing the work of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and/ or General Assembly (if the issue was discussed also within those UN bodies). For other studies, for example the study on EU

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<sup>20</sup> This is because, in the final study which focuses on EU foreign policy in the more recent period, more issues may be identified that figured prominently in the discourse of the European Council.

<sup>21</sup> World politics is touched upon here in an operational sense; it is discussed in more detail in the beginning of the next chapter, and its current structure and trends are considered in subchapter 2.1.3.

identity, however, also the speech and action of other prominent actors in world politics, including most significant states, about the EU in world politics, might prove to be of interest. Moreover, there have been or are bodies and organisations in world politics, including *ad hoc* bodies (such as the CSCE/ OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the Middle East Quartet), whose work might be significant when it comes to determining the context of world politics relevant to the issues which will be analysed in the studies. Where relevant, this research can be complemented using reports on the work of the E(E)C and on CFSP as well as secondary sources.

The analysis will endeavour to handle all the three components of the operational setup described above – that is, EU foreign policy discourse, foreign policy practice, and the context of world politics – in their own right, without reducing any of the components to another. For example, discourse in its own right also produces reality, and makes a certain reality appear normal and taken for granted (Milliken 1999). An example of such productivity is *speech acts* – discursive utterances which are deeds in themselves, such as when speaking about security (Wæver 1998; Débrix 2002). Thus EU foreign policy discourse cannot be judged, for instance, from the perspective of EU foreign policy practice alone in the sense of whether concrete actions were taken on an issue that appeared in discourse (*cf.* Wæver 2015). Also, EU foreign policy practice or actions need to be judged in their own right and not only from the perspective how they were spoken about; and world politics needs to be considered as such, without e.g. evaluating it only from the perspective of EU foreign policy.

To avoid the risk of essentializing EU identity in world politics and to keep the focus on openness of the idea of EU identity in world politics in the analysis, two methodological approaches (described in more detail in subchapter 2.4) are applied in the studies which have been designed with the intention of showcasing the constructed nature of the social world, that is deconstruction (Derrida 1967/1998; 1992; 2000; Grilc 2001) for the analysis of discourse, and genealogy (Foucault 1975/1995; 1977) for the analysis of concrete social history. Both approaches start with the premise that a) no meaning is ever closed in a discourse (it may however appear to be closed, and its apparent closure may be functional for the social world); and b) discourse and practice are contingent and infused with power relations.

Deconstruction is applied to the discourse of the European Council as well as the Council of the EU and is used to look for a narrative that the EU might have been constructing about itself in world politics; while genealogy is applied to EU practice in terms of foreign policy actions as well as to the genesis of world politics on the particular issue of

concern. Both of these approaches are not used strictly in the manner in which they were conceived by Derrida and Foucault; their tenets are employed as a starting point for the analysis of foreign policy discourse, practice and context since it is expected that the analysis and evaluation following the analysis will show where and in what manner these approaches might need modifying when it comes to analysing the interconnection between EU foreign policy/ identity (*cf.* Žižek's remarks on Derrida's writings on identity 1991/2008).

## **1.6 Structure of the thesis**

Although the research problem has been explained above, its core concepts require more elaboration so as to clarify the relations between them, particularly those which are problematic. This is performed in the following chapter beginning with a contextualization of the research problem through its placement in world politics. This is followed by a conceptualization of the main subjects observed in the thesis, EU identity (in world politics) and EU foreign policy. Thereafter, a theoretical approach devised specifically for the study of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics is outlined. Finally, in the fourth subchapter, the main methodological approaches are described.

The third chapter contains the analysis and begins with a mapping of those foreign or related issues that were discussed most often by the European Council. On this basis, choice is made concerning those issues of EU foreign policy that are used in the (two) case studies to analyse the relationship between EU foreign policy and EU identity in world politics. The case studies are followed by a study of the (re)production of the idea of EU identity in world politics as such since the beginning of EU foreign policy in the form of EPC and up to the current period. The final (fourth) study focuses on the (re)production of EU identity in world politics through EU foreign policy in the recent years. As described in subchapter 1.5, the studies in the analysis encompass the discourse of EU foreign policy, the practice or actions of EU foreign policy and the relevant context of world politics.

The analytical chapter is followed by a discussion and evaluation of the results of the empirical study. Since, as mentioned before, researching any identity, including EU identity, is closely related to the question of research ethics, this is discussed following the evaluation of the results of the empirical study; and the final part of the evaluation offers an assessment as to what might be expected in the future regarding the EU in world politics. A postscript after the conclusion covers the period 2015-2016 which has not been part of the analysis.

## 2. LOCATING THE PROBLEM

### 2.1 Contextualization: world politics as the context of EU foreign policy

#### 2.1.1 The concept of world politics in relation to the EU

The aim of this part is to clarify why the term “world politics” has been chosen to denote the external context of EU foreign policy (instead of, for example, international relations, international politics or global politics), to provisionally define this concept with a view to analysis and to explain why it is appropriate for the study of EU foreign policy.

To begin with, the adjective “international” directs attention to relations among nations; as explained before, the EU is, in contrast, a complex actor that functions towards its exterior in a number of ways different to those found among nations or states (e.g. Kajně 2006) which is why it has been called a *sui generis* kind of actor (Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Ginsberg 2001). Therefore, if we use “world” instead of “international”, the cognitive framework for considering politics on the world stage is much wider and allows for the inclusion of actors other than states such as the EU (*cf.* Baylis and Smith 2006, 3). In addition, “world” seems more neutral (*cf.* Brglez 2006, 8) than “global” since “global” might refer to other processes (such as globalisation). Furthermore, the noun “politics” is deemed more appropriate than other possible nouns (e.g. “relations” or “community”) because using it signifies an acknowledgement that, through every contact and relation to its exterior, the EU is entering the sphere of the political which is important when discussing foreign policy<sup>22</sup>.

Using the term “world politics” thus means that we speak about politics which takes place on the level of the world. To comprehend the expressions that the political can take on the level of the world, Gamble’s (2006) understanding of politics as manifesting in three dimensions – governance, power and identity – can be applied to world politics:

a) in terms of *governance*, all structures, structured relations and different ways of addressing various issues on the level of the world fall in the sphere of world politics, such as the state system, international governmental organisations (for example, the UN) and non-governmental organisations on the level of the world (such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International), as well as less formalized ways of solving common problems (e.g. the G-8, G-20, or international climate change negotiations on a regime to succeed the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). Significantly, Khagram *et al.* (2002) see world politics from this perspective as consisting of non-governmental sector (comprising transnational collective actors, including social movements), government sector

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<sup>22</sup> A concise definition of foreign policy of states can be found in Benko (1996, 225).

and multi-national business, and Rosenau (2006, 14) and Strange (1996) emphasise that non-state actors can be as important as state actors in today's world. Considering this, importantly, it can be said that social movements that have arisen across the world following the economic crisis in 2008 (such as *Occupy*) or transnational pressure groups (e.g. *Anonymous*) and radical religious movements also belong to the sphere of world politics.

b) *power* has been a subject of international relations theories particularly in the traditional(ist) and (neo)realist approaches (e.g. von Clausewitz 1832/2003; Morgenthau 1948; Mearsheimer 1990) where it was mostly seen in terms of relations of force such as confrontation, competition and dominance between states and in the international system. But power can also be seen as the ability to shape global structures (*cf.* Strange 1994); and it could be argued that in the current conditions of world interdependence this aspect of power is gaining importance. In terms of power in the first, relational sense, competition for power took the form of the bipolar structure of world politics during the Cold War, while it is yet unclear what kind of structure (if any) might emerge eventually from the current (fluid) distribution of power. (More about this aspect of world politics, including in relation to the EU, will be said below.) But this aspect of world politics, with regard to a) above, also comprises competition for power between states and transnational corporations, states and transnational movements, and between transnational corporations and movements.

c) finally, considering Gamble's (2006, 105) emphasis that politics as an activity is not just part of our experience but is constitutive of that very experience, world politics also includes processes of identity-building which are important on the level of the world (for example, to preserve key values and principles such as non-interference in internal affairs, or human rights). This aspect is significant from the perspective of this thesis in relation to the question of how much and in what manner the EU may be involved in these processes, whether and how it might be using them for the (re)production of its own identity and how does it fare when faced with the (re)production of identities of other actors in world politics.

Europe, and consequently the EU, is intimately connected to world politics and to the logics that guide its operation, not only by virtue of being part of it but because a large part of what world politics *is* today originated in Europe over the course of the past few centuries. The idea of sovereign state developed in Europe in the 15th-17th centuries (Wight 1977; Benko 1997) and then spread through the rest of the world; the society of states is a European creation and, until the end of the First World War, it was mostly European states who decided who may join it (Nel 2010, 965; Taylor 1954, 568). Since European states were also colonial powers, such recognition was not necessarily accompanied with equality (Nel *ibid.*).

Furthermore, after the end of Napoleonic wars in Europe in 1815 and by the beginning of the First World War, European logic of balance of power developed into a world-wide system (Morgenthau 1948, 138). However, solidification of alliances within the system of the balance of power in Europe following the formation of a unified German empire in 1864-1871 led to the outbreak of the First World War (Hobsbawm 1989, 312).

This short history is important because, as Morgenthau noted in 1948 (149), if the scales of the balance of power were still located in Europe at the end of the First World War and even until the beginning of the Second World War, those scales have since moved elsewhere in the world and the situation in Europe is today a function of a world-wide balance (with Europe contributing to the construction of this balance, together with other global actors, it might be added). At the same time, Benko (1997, 354) finds that a multipolar system is developing following the end of the Cold War which is however different from the system of the 19th century in that it consists of a few conglomerates of power within which regional centres are coming to the forefront (more about the current situation in world politics will be said in the final part of this subchapter). Thus, a note of caution from Mearsheimer (1990) is pertinent, also from the perspective of EU foreign policy, namely that the world is more unstable after the end of the Cold War than it was during the Cold War due to an increase in the number of possible relations between the powers across which misunderstandings and conflicts may occur and the related tendency of the rules of the game to change.

### 2.1.2 Historical interplay between world politics and EPC/ EU foreign policy

EU foreign policy intersected on a number of occasions with major developments in world politics, or reflected them, particularly during the years of EPC formation and its transformation into CFSP (*cf.* Nuttall 2000; White 2001); evidence of this can be found if we follow the conclusions of the meetings of the European Council and of Heads of State or Government of EEC member states during these key periods.

The first prominent example is the establishment of EPC itself. In December 1969, the Heads of State or Government of EEC member states gave their foreign ministers the task to prepare proposals to achieve progress in the field of political cooperation, mentioning the role that the EEC had to play in the “relaxation of international tensions and the *rapprochement*” (Final communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or Government). The crucial external or related factors contributing to this were the *détente* in East-West relations, concerns over the USA’s commitment to Europe following the Vietnam War, desire of EEC governments to have a more substantial role in the Middle East, as well as German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s

*Ostpolitik* of warming relations with Eastern European countries (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 44; White 2001, 72). An important internal factor was ousting of General de Gaulle from power in France earlier that year. The request of the Heads of State or Government was followed up by so-called Davignon Report (Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the problems of political unification) in October 1970 that, among others, emphasized that the EEC must be prepared to take on “imperative world duties”.

Furthermore, the developing international situation, characterized by the relations between the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, was reflected in the development of EPC. For example, the Presidency Conclusions of the first session of the European Council in March 1975 in Dublin (European Council 1975a) mentioned the will of the Nine to contribute to the *détente* in Europe and deliberated on cooperation of the Nine in the context of the CSCE. But international tensions increased with the beginning of the 1980s, and although the EEC countries were not able to directly affect the relations between the two superpowers, they did react by evolving EPC cooperation: the 1981 Report on European political cooperation underlined the need for a coherent external approach in the period of increased world tensions; this urge to react in some way was also apparent in the 1983 Solemn Declaration on European Union which mentioned “responsibilities” of the EEC regarding the “dangers of the world situation”; and 1985 witnessed agreement on a Draft Treaty on European cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy (European Council 1985c) which became the foreign policy chapter of the Single European Act in 1986 (more on these developments will be said in the third study in the analysis).

A crucial external impetus was given to EPC in the period of great changes in world politics from 1988 to 1991, eventually leading to the establishment of CFSP, as can be seen from the interplay between the changing circumstances of world politics at that time and the deliberations of the European Council. Looking at the most prominent developments in Europe, in 1988, labour protests with the involvement of Solidarity movement culminated in Poland and official negotiations with the government began in December that year; while in Hungary in November 1988, independent political parties were allowed (Judt 2005, 606–609). In December that year in Rhodes, the European Council adopted Declaration on the International Role of the EC which invoked the need to demonstrate the EC’s solidarity for the “spreading movement for democracy”, and, in this context, welcomed the intention of European members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) to develop economic relations with the EC (European Council 1988b). By the end of 1989, communist



regimes ended in six Central and Eastern European countries,<sup>23</sup> the “Singing Revolution” was under way in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and Germany was on the way to reunification (Hobsbawm 2005, 486). In June that year, the Madrid European Council (1989a) adopted Presidency Conclusions which specifically noted the importance of the changes unfolding in the USSR and Central and Eastern Europe and reaffirmed its determination “to play an active role in supporting and encouraging positive changes and reform”. Significantly, this was also the last time that the European Council used the term “East-West relations”; from its informal meeting in November 1989 onwards (European Council 1989b), it spoke, instead, first of “Eastern Europe” and then, from December 1989, of “Central and Eastern Europe”. By December 1989, the EEC concluded trade agreements with the majority of those states and “new forms of association” were being examined (European Council 1989c). In 1990, free elections were held in Slovenia and Croatia, at that time republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), German reunification became a reality, and Lithuania declared independence. It was during this year that, on the level of the European Council, the idea was formed and put into action that the EEC should hold one other conference parallel to that on economic and monetary union, namely on political union.<sup>24</sup> Already in April (European Council 1990a), the European Council tasked foreign ministers of EEC members with the preparation of proposals for treaty changes that would enable the EEC to respond “effectively to the demands of the new situation”; the proposals were prepared by June when it was decided that an intergovernmental conference would be called on political union (European Council 1990b). In October 1990, the European Council (1990c) progressed to a “consensus on the objective of a common foreign and security policy”. 1991 brought more changes – Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia declared independence, dissolution of the SFRY began, and the USSR formally ceased to exist in December. Also in December, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union was approved.

However these preliminary observations should not imply that there has been substantial development and innovation in EU foreign policy only in those cases where the E(E)C/ EU reacted to the challenges of world politics (*cf.* Nuttall 2000, 270; White 2001, 72; Judt 2005, 713). Also those instances were crucial for the development of EU foreign policy where there have been outside challenges, even very close to the E(E)C, but there has not

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<sup>23</sup> Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and German Democratic Republic.

<sup>24</sup> Strengthened foreign policy encompassed only one of the components of the political union – already in April 1990, the European Council (1990a) spoke about democratic legitimacy as an important element of the political union, and the December 1990 European Council (1990d) envisaged political union as consisting of measures for greater democratic legitimacy, CFSP, European citizenship, strengthened Community action and increased efficiency of EEC institutions.

been a substantial reaction from EU foreign policy (e.g. former Yugoslavia, discussed in the third case study; *cf.* Wæver 2015).

Moreover, a general question regarding EU foreign policy arises if we compare its development in the period 1970-1992 and after that date. It can be observed that major conceptual and institutional moves forward in the development of EU foreign policy occurred by the first half of the 1990s. Later developments and functioning of EU foreign policy mostly drew from and built on the breakthroughs made in this period (e.g. further development of CFSP and common defence policy, continuation of enlargement policy and its upgrade through European Neighbourhood Policy). Therefore, the question is whether this (absence of groundbreaking innovation in EU foreign policy following the institution of CFSP and defence policy, or the expanded enlargement policy) was so because EU foreign policy, as it had been put in place in the first half of the 1990s, has been functioning so well and was able to meet the external and internal challenges, particularly the tectonic changes in world politics, through the way it functioned – or was there perhaps a lack of vision and opportunity for further innovation though this might have been needed with regard to the changing circumstances of world politics (*cf.* Wæver 2015). This question will also be looked into in the final two studies in the analysis.

### 2.1.3 Current tendencies in world politics and their significance for the EU

To illustrate the problematic nature of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics from the perspective of the current changing conditions of world politics, the present section traces the main contours of the changing world politics; but underlines, at the same time, that world politics is a social process whose nature needs to be seen, among others, as emergent and open which is also significant for further development of EU foreign policy.

Following the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, a major transition or a shift has been going on in world politics; this has been attributed to appearance of new actors on the world scene such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa, but also to deepening globalisation and inequality and the ensuing mobilisation of the disillusioned (Kegley 2009; Nolte 2010; Wæver 2010b; UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in his Five Year Action Agenda – United Nations 2012). This has been reflected in the literature: while Buzan and Wæver (2003) saw security at global level as consisting of one superpower plus four great powers,<sup>25</sup> Buzan

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<sup>25</sup> Buzan (2014, 4) defines superpowers as polities whose influence in a range of areas extends across the international system; while the influence of great powers extends across more than one region.

(2014) found that, due to declining influence of the US, a world order might be forming that is consisting only of great powers. Kegley (2009) considered that a global shift was in the making, but noted that changes exist together with continuity and slower evolutionary processes. Authors have also been drawing attention to interdependence between the powers in world politics (e.g. Baylis and Smith 2006; Buzan 2014); this aspect has been exemplified in multilateral approaches to solving the economic crisis and in international climate change negotiations. Moreover, in some aspects in more recent years, world politics has been functioning as a chaotic system: a system whose components are so closely interconnected that very small changes in initial conditions can lead to dramatic transformations in later development of the system – here, attention has been drawn to the Arab Spring 2011-2014 which swept through North Africa and the Middle East following self-immolation of Tunisian salesman Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 (Banerjee, Erçetin, Tekin 2014; Ferreira 2014). Similarly, radical religious movements started to feature prominently in world politics though this has not been foreseen when initial conditions for this development were being formed (US Iraq campaign in 2003 and the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011).

The aspect of interdependence has been epitomized by the rise of the so-called BRICS and global approach to solving the economic crisis. The concept of the BRIC(S)<sup>26</sup> has been used by investment bankers around 2003 to denote vibrant emerging economies (Nolte 2010, 881), although this was a disparate group of powers – some growing and others declining (Hurrell 2006, 18). The concept gained power as effects of the economic crisis became apparent and some of the emerging economies came to be creditors of the established economies. This transformation can be illustrated through the changing roles of the G-8 and the G-20 in the first decade of the 21st century. In 2007 at the G-8 meeting in German Heiligendamm, the “Heiligendamm process” began as a high-level dialogue between the G-8 and the emerging economies (G-8 2007). But already at the G-8 summit in Hokkaido in Japan in 2008, the emerging economies (Brazil, India, China, Mexico and South Africa) prepared a separate declaration as G-5. At the same time, the G-20 at their summit in that year welcomed the fact that their leaders would be convening for the first time in November (G-20 2008). At the G-8 summit in L’Aquila in Italy in 2009, a common declaration was prepared together with the G-5 (G-8 2009). In fact, since 2009 inclusive, themes related to key issues in world economy burgeoned at G-20 meetings, leading the process of giving the emerging economies

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<sup>26</sup> Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa. The BRIC(S) have been meeting on their own since 2009, and since 2011 with participation of South Africa.

more voice in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). This means that the G-20 became the key global forum for addressing the economic crisis.

Similarly, authors in this field (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Kegley 2010; Nolte 2010; Buzan 2014) have found that there are a number of powers (great powers – Buzan and Wæver 2003; Buzan 2014) in world politics which are approximately equal to the point where future relations among them are difficult to predict. For the purposes of the present study, China, Russia and the United States are regarded as the most relevant from the perspective of the EU although a number of other potentially important (regional) powers can be identified, such as Brazil, India, Japan, Nigeria, South Africa or Turkey. Considering the relevant powers, the criterion of being recognised by other powers as a power is useful (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 33) and will be used here later. If we look, however, at material criteria, the USA, China, the United Kingdom and France as well as Russia have been five top military spenders (e.g. SIPRI 2011, 8). Euro area and the USA have been dominating over the largest percentage of world gross domestic product – GDP (both 19,5 % in 2010), followed by China (13,6 %) and Russia which is fifth, after Japan and India; while China has had the highest percentage of world population (19,7 %), followed by India (17,5 %) with the Euro area (4,8 %), the USA (4,6 %) and Russia (2,1 %) lagging behind (IMF 2011, 167).

If we look at EU reports on CFSP (e.g. for 2011 – Council of the EU 2012), the USA emerges as the most important partner. In memoranda, China is mentioned as “increasingly important political power” (e.g. RAPID 2012a), in contrast to India which has not been seen as a power in those terms (*cf.* RAPID 2012b). National Security Strategy of the United States (2010, 8) sees the EU, Russia, China and India as actors who have influence in the world; the United Kingdom, France and Germany – key EU member states – are counted among closest friends and allies (*ibid.*, 11). The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013) mentions the USA in relation to international security while other actors are noted only in the context of various regional priorities. China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2003) emphasizes that China will not form alliances with any great power or powers.

From the national foreign policy and security documents of all these actors, a profound sense of change in world politics exudes: for example, US National Security Strategy (2010, 9) speaks about “fluidity within the international system”; and Russian foreign policy concept (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013) about the emergence of a “polycentric system of international relations”. At the same time, all four powers underline

the need to adhere to international law as embodied in the UN; however, China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2003) identifies a need for UN reform. This might be significant considering Morgenthau's finding (1949, 64) that support for international organizations which were established to safeguard a particular *status quo* amounts to supporting the continuation of that *status quo*. From this perspective, the EU, the US and Russia seem more supportive of current *status quo* than China.

Another crucial feature of world politics in the recent years has been an inclination to use ad hoc approaches to solving emerging international or globally important regional issues, such as the conflict in Georgia in 2008, in Ukraine from 2013, and, importantly, consequences of the Arab Spring particularly in Libya and Syria since 2012. A characteristic of international or global approaches to resolving these issues has been an inability to address them effectively via the existing international institutional setup (the UN); instead, these issues have been addressed variously through shuttle diplomacy (Georgia in 2008), increase of bilateral tensions and sanctions (Ukraine in 2013-2014) and multilateral meetings and conferences (Libya and Syria following the Arab Spring since 2014). This could point to another emerging contour of the way world politics is functioning, namely shifting nature of alliances between (great) powers in world politics, as alliances have been changing with regard to the approaches to addressing individual issues (such as the climate change, Georgia, Ukraine or Syria). The future shape of world politics is thus an open question, depending especially on how many issues might be at stake in world politics at any one time, how important and divisive those issues might be as well as what the prevailing circumstances would be at the time when those issues develop.

To recapitulate, the following four tendencies have been prominent in world politics in the recent years and especially since 2008-2009:

- a) existence of a number of (great) powers, some rising, some declining, none of whom acts from a clear position of dominance;
- b) awareness of interdependence and thus an inclination to (at least some form of) cooperation (as exemplified by the approach to resolving the global economic crisis and by the climate change negotiations);
- c) uncertainty regarding the character of world politics itself, as well as the rules of the game, accompanied by *ad hoc* approaches to solving emerging global or globally important regional issues;
- d) due to all this, necessity of alliances between (great) powers when addressing global or globally important issues, with the nature of alliances shifting and unstable.

Considering that, due to the tendencies described above, world politics is still changing which means that its nature is difficult to pin down or define, it is felt here that strict definition of world politics in terms of “world politics = x” should be avoided; as such “world politics-casting” might occlude perceptiveness to new patterns or situations that might be emerging in world politics. It cannot be definitely said which of the currently observable tendencies might prevail at any future time. From the perspective of EU foreign policy, therefore, one would need to be on the lookout for all developments or patterns that might be of relevance.

## **2.2 Conceptualization**

### 2.2.1 EU identity in relation to EU foreign policy

#### 2.2.1.1 Working definition of EU identity (in world politics)

It is necessary to define the subject(s) of study because concepts are needed to set the framework for analysis. Yet definitions narrow the field of possibilities for reflection and may work as a conceptual blind, as any definition is also a kind of closure. The definition attempted here should be seen only as an analytical concept with a provisionally and partially closed meaning with the purpose of analysing the unreflected assumptions of the problematization of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics so that some crucial questions can be asked. A key premise of the line of thought leading to the working definition of EU identity in world politics is that EU identity as a lived social reality cannot be fully closed. A conceptualization of EU identity in world politics is thus proposed in order to delineate the subject of research; it should not be seen as implying a content or form of EU identity in world politics.

In general, EU identity could<sup>27</sup> be studied as a social identity (Južnič 1993, 344; Delanty and Rumford 2008, 67). Social identities have been the subject of research in the field of social psychology, where social world has, among others, been seen as intersubjective reality which is (re)constructed through our actions, speech and ideas (Ule 2009, 23). With reference to the formation of social identities, relations involving social groups<sup>28</sup> have been of interest (e.g. Tajfel and Turner 1979; 1986; Ule 2009, 400–411). Tajfel (1978 in Ule 2009, 403)

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<sup>27</sup> Conditional is used on purpose, to indicate that EU identity is not assumed but remains a possibility.

<sup>28</sup> Social groups have been used as basic units of research in social psychology; they have been defined broadly – as collections of individuals who perceive themselves as belonging to the same social category, and share some emotional involvement and a degree of consensus about the group (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 40; Ule 2009, 400-401).


defined social identity as those positive or negative aspects of self-image that arise from a person's belonging to different social groups. This occurs through a process of social categorisation i.e. a person placing him/ herself within a social group by, on the one hand, identifying her/ himself with other members of that group (the "in-group"), and, at the same time, differentiating him/ herself from other groups (the "out-group"); the results of these processes represent an important source of self-meaning and self-respect (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Ule 2009, 400–411). From this approach, the finding arose that a positive social identity, to a large degree, depends on the in-group being seen as positively differentiated "from the relevant out-groups" along a shared value dimension (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 40–41). In this manner, the group social identity theory provides the insight that group cohesion not only results from relations within social groups, but perhaps even more from comparison with other social groups; which is also a possible source of bias and prejudice in inter-group relations (Ule 2009, 405–411).

Regarding their intersubjective nature, and the importance of internal/ external aspects of social identities, potential political implications of the processes of construction of social identities via inter-group relations are considerable. Anderson (1987, 5) highlighted nations as imagined communities; images that live in the minds of the people who imagine them. Diez (2004) and Delanty and Rumford (2008) analysed social identities as political projects of narrative nature, stories that people who share a particular collective identity are telling about themselves which implies that collective identities are discursive constructs. Žižek (1991/2008, 37) and Derrida (1992) have seen these stories as compensating for a constitutive lack that lies at their centre, often leading to a search for or invention of origins; and Derrida (1992), Delanty (1995), Campbell (1998), Rumelili (2004) and Delanty and Rumford (2008) reflected on the relational nature of these stories which put the social self in a relationship with others and may thus be based on and sustained by building a negative difference towards others.

In studying the (re)production of EU identity in the sense of the present thesis, our referent object is therefore the external aspect of a potential imagined social identity referring to social and political processes comprising EU integration and cooperation. In connection to this, Checkel and Katzenstein (2009b, 213) stressed that EU identities exist in the plural as there is no single identity but a multiplicity of processes taking place at the same time and across a variety of levels and networks; or, from a narrative perspective, European narrative, if it exists, is an ever-changing patchwork of different stories (Eder 2009, 442).

But what happens on the level of individuals? Cerutti (2008, 5) emphasized that anything that might be conceived of as EU identity is that which is relevant to the self-description of people as Europeans and to the image that “they want to project onto external actors”. Žižek (1990/1992, 196) however mused that collective national self-description is a matter of belief, in the collective, on the level of the individual; or, in Wæver’s conceptualization and use (1998, 77; 2005a, 38), common identity functions as a “second-order reflection”, an idea of the collective embedded in the self-conception of individuals.

In other words, it can be seen from the work of different authors on the idea of EU identity that tension emerges between different levels or dimensions of observing this idea of identity, in particular between observing the level of individuals versus a collective EU level. To clarify, both of these might be seen as one dimension across which EU identity can be observed, i.e. from individuals’ beliefs and actions to an interactive, collective level (*cf.* European Commission 2012b). Studies of EU identity on the level of individuals have been made mostly via public opinion surveys such as Eurobarometer (e.g. Eurobarometer 2010). But these studies have lacked an insight into collective EU identity formation which might be observed on the aggregate level of the EU as a whole, for example, in relation to its outside. In connection to this, another dimension can be added to the observation of EU identity formation, namely stretching from local, national and internal EU (intra-group) perspectives to external (inter-group) perspectives. Finally, a third dimension of observing EU identity, as Checkel and Katzenstein (2009a; 2009b) have noted, encompasses observing the formation of this identity on the axis of EU identity as a process (in the sense of social processes that might not necessarily be amenable to political control) versus EU identity formation as political project. To sum up, these different processes and possibilities of observing EU identity formation might be illustrated using a three-dimensional diagram:



From the perspective of this thesis, placing it in the above diagram, we are thus observing the upper-right corner of the diagram or the upper-right quarter of the three-dimensional cube.



From this perspective, also, Eurobarometer polls are of interest: while what will be observed here is a second-order reflection of the idea of a potential collective EU identity (*cf.* Žižek 1990/1992; Wæver 1998; 2005a), a reminder is needed in each of the main analytical chapters that EU identity also encompasses processes taking place at individual level, internally within the EU, and within the society as such. That is, while a mainly top-down process of identity construction is observed, taking into account bottom-up perspectives and processes is important as also these processes feed into, shape and interact with the overall process of EU identity formation (as has been seen, for example, in the case of the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe which has been negotiated on a collective EU level but then rejected on popular referenda in France and the Netherlands).

In addition, social identities also have a material dimension which is however often neglected in studies of social identities in relation to foreign policy (*cf.* Wight 2006, 294; Tulmets 2009, 24). This is why Tulmets (2009) decided to focus on solidarity in the form of political support and concrete assistance as a material expression of identities that have been proclaimed through foreign policy discourses. The implementation side of EU foreign policy (e.g. through adopted declarations, documents, joint actions) will be included in the analysis in the continuation of this thesis; this will allow for a comparison with EU foreign policy discourse.

Social identities may also be expressed implicitly. Here, comparison can be made with implicit construction of security as an issue as studied by Wæver (1996), Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) and Buzan and Wæver (2003). According to their findings, for something to be recognized as a security issue, it is not necessary to use the word itself; instead, it is enough that a specific rhetorical structure, a specific discourse with a specific logic is used and an issue becomes a security issue even though the word “security” has not been uttered (Wæver 1996, 107; Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1998, 24–25). The logic used to achieve this “constitutes the core meaning of the concept security” (Wæver *ibid.*). Therefore, a crucial issue, such as security, but also EU identity, may be involved in a discourse (or action) implicitly even though it has not been stated explicitly; this has been found to be the case with respect to EU discourses regarding international governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina through which this country has been cast as not yet being mature enough to join the society of states or the EU (Bunič 2005). In this regard, a relevant question for the analysis is also: does EU identity in world politics operate as a specific logic/ under a specific rhetorical structure even when not mentioned as such?

Finally, it is important to take into account that identity comprises not only how a social entity sees itself but also how it is seen by other relevant social entities (*cf.* Fioramonti and Lucarelli 2008); or, perhaps even more, how it *perceives* itself to be seen by other social entities.

With this in mind, the following working definition of EU identity in world politics will be used in the thesis: *EU identity in world politics means how the EU sees itself in world politics, how it sees world politics, what it does or does not<sup>29</sup> do in world politics, as well as how it perceives itself to be seen by other social entities in world politics that are relevant to it. Or, in short form, EU identity in world politics is the self-conception of the EU and the position from which it functions in world politics.*<sup>30</sup>

Before moving to the next subchapter, the authors who have been writing about the idea of European/ EU identity (thus expressing but also co-constructing this idea) deserve to be mentioned briefly. In the 1980s, also in relation to the tumult that was beginning and then unravelling in Central and Eastern Europe, Kundera (1984), Morin (1987/1989) and Enzensberger (1988) were writing about European identity as a complex, evolving idea of identity. This was followed by Derrida's *The Other Heading* in 1992, arguing for a radical opening towards the other. Another discussion of this idea arose in 2003 (Habermas and Derrida 2003) in relation to the divisions between the European countries concerning cooperation with the USA in its Iraq campaign. In addition, den Boer, Bugge and Wæver (1995) and Mikkeli (1998) provided overviews of the development of the idea of European/ EU identity through history.

#### 2.2.1.2 (Re)production of the idea of EU identity in world politics

If the documents adopted at the highest political level within the context of EPC as well as E(E)C and EU Treaties are analysed it can be seen that E(E)C/ EU member states have been constructing an idea of EU identity, and an image of EU identity in world politics has been part of this process.

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<sup>29</sup> The aspect of *inaction* has been added with regard to the fact that the EU was unable to do something when it had mass atrocities at its borders in the first half of the 1990s which had a profound effect on how it perceived itself in world politics (Hill 1993; Flego 1996), and how other actors perceived it.

<sup>30</sup> As will be explained in the next subchapter, difficulty emerges when speaking about EU foreign policy during the time of EPC which was the form of political cooperation of EEC member states before the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. The term »EU identity«, as defined here, can be used to denote the idea of external identity emerging through EPC because EPC was closely related from its beginning to the emerging political project of European Union (*cf.* Nuttall 1992; Document on the European Identity 1973). Moreover, also the term "European identity" was used by EEC member states in the documents in the context of EPC (outlined below and in the third study in the analysis).

In the Document on the European Identity, the foreign ministers of EEC member states systematically defined, already in 1973, elements that were seen by them as constituting European identity. In this document, firstly, internal aspects of identity were considered, most importantly values shared by the European states (such as representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights), achievements of the European integration process, and diversity of cultures “within the framework of a common European civilization”. Secondly, European identity “in relation to the world” was considered; it was mentioned here that the member states intended to play an active role in the world in accordance with the UN Charter. Finally, the dynamic nature of European integration in its internal and external aspects with the intention of achieving a European Union was emphasized.<sup>31</sup>

Two observations are pertinent with regard to the content of this document: firstly, this was an explicit early attempt at constructing EU identity from the highest political level; at the same time, the body producing the definition of EU identity was doing this by making reference to something seen as already existing, particularly by invoking European values. It is true, as the Document on the European Identity stated (1973), that these were the values shared by EEC member states at the time. Yet it was the Document on the European Identity itself that posited these ideals as the “fundamental elements of the European Identity”. Such an approach has been repeated in another endeavour to (re)produce EU identity at the highest level, the work of the Adonino Committee that began to function in 1985 and prepared proposals, among others, on the rights of EU citizens and on EU symbols (e.g. Laffan 1996, 96). In particular, EU symbols proposed which are used widely today (EU flag and anthem) represent values that are seen as embodying the European integration process (e.g. unity, diversity, equality between the member states) – although it was the European integration process that produced these symbols.

To put it differently, it can be inferred that, in EU documents and practices mentioned, EU identity is constructed in the very document or practice we are looking at; yet that document or practice tries to create an impression that the identity being constructed is pre-existing. Thus, an erasure occurs of the fact that the idea of EU identity is (re)produced and (re)enacted through that very document or practice. This could be compared to the act of *fabulous* (i.e. referring to fable) *retroactivity* which Derrida (2002, 49–50) uncovered in the US Declaration of Independence, revealing that the signers of the Declaration had invented themselves as signers retroactively through the very act of signing this document.

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<sup>31</sup> As the Document on the European Identity of 1973 shows, EEC member states perceived this identity as consisting of an internal and external dimension.

This is the case also when it comes to the external dimension of EU identity. The Single European Act of 1986 stated that cooperation in the field of security would contribute to developing “European identity in external policy matters” (Article 30). The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) furthermore spoke of European identity in relation to common defence (Preamble) and about asserting the EU’s “identity on the international scene”, particularly by implementing CFSP (Article B). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) listed the principles on which the EU was founded. The Treaty of Nice (2001) again contained an explicit reference to the external aspect of EU identity (by speaking about “Union identity on the international scene” – Article 27a); and the Treaty of Lisbon (signed in 2007) defined the values on which “the Union is founded” and which should guide the EU in “its relations with the wider world” (Article 1a).

Although the policies of which these acts spoke (such as CFSP in the case of the Single European Act and common defence policy in the case of the Treaty of Maastricht) did not yet exist at the time when these acts were being drawn up, it was emphasized in the acts that such policies would contribute to EU identity. The putative EU identity was thus reinforced through the discourses of these acts even though the actual policies that were supposed to reinforce it did not yet exist; with reference to Derrida (2002, 46–54) it can be said that EU identity was *performed* through the actions of preparing and adopting these documents.

The *performativity* of EU identity, including its external dimension, has also been illustrated by the process of establishing the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe. The title of the draft Treaty, signed in October 2004, was telling – it proclaimed a *constitution* for *Europe* i.e. it contained an explicit claim to constitutive bases (which are usually attributed to states) as well as to *the whole of Europe*. The fact that it had been rejected on popular referenda in France and the Netherlands in May 2005 however indicated a disconnect between the processes of top-down and bottom-up EU identity construction in its case. Moreover, the process surrounding this Treaty can be seen as a case of would-be *fabulous retroactivity* (cf. Derrida 2002) as the Treaty purported to establish a *new kind of Europe*, a constitutional one which would only have come into being once the Treaty was ratified, yet the Treaty also implied that that Europe was pre-existent, arising from the European “venture” and the process of European unification (Treaty on a Constitution for Europe 2004).

To complicate matters further, when the implementation side of EU foreign policy is considered, it is in contrast with the discourse found in the documents cited above. In 2011, for example, the Council of the EU adopted General Arrangements on EU statements in multilateral organisations (Council of the EU 2011) where it is stated that the EU can only

make a statement in multilateral organisations where a) it is competent according to the Treaties and b) there is a position that has been “agreed in accordance with the relevant Treaty provisions”. It therefore seems that, in reality, expressions of EU identity towards its exterior are considerably limited which does not correspond to the discourse on EU identity in world politics that can be found in key documents and Treaties that gives the impression of an already existing EU identity in world politics. The reality of the above-mentioned General Arrangements shows that negotiations have to be led and common positions adopted in practically every case where the EU would like to speak with one voice, at least when it comes to multilateral organisations.

The (re)production of the idea of EU identity in world politics thus merits more detailed research. In particular, it needs to be analysed how this idea is (re)produced through documents at the highest level, including the Treaties; whether the idea of identity (re)produced in this manner corresponds to the enactment of identity in practice; and how the idea of EU identity in world politics functions not only from an internal EU perspective but from the perspective of world politics.

### 2.2.1.3 Relationship between identity and foreign policy in the case of the EU

In International Relations and European Studies literature, there has been a debate concerning the question whether, in the relationship between EU foreign policy and EU identity, EU identity should be seen as the dependent or independent variable. For example, Cederman (2001, 4) viewed EU identity as the dependent variable and foreign policy or external interaction as the independent one due to its connection to the notion of boundaries. A similar view was expressed by Lucarelli (2006; 2008) due to foreign policy’s function of constituting a role for an actor in the outside world and of producing images of the self that feed back into the self-identification process. Also, Lucarelli and Manners (2006, 212) saw EU foreign policy as producing an external identity of the EU. However, such views have been subject to critique. Sedelmeier (2004, 126) urged for a sociological understanding of identity where any international identity that the EU might have could be seen also as an independent variable; and Wæver (2005a, 34) argued for an identity-based theory with which to approach foreign policy.

Considering the reflections of social identities in subchapter 2.1.1.1, it might be found that, in analysing the idea of EU identity in the context of (foreign) policy or politics, one would need to differentiate at least between a) actual social processes of collective identity

formation, and b) purposeful political acknowledgements and applications of these processes; and that analysis along these lines would also need to include ceaseless re-examination of possible interconnections between and mutual enrichment of the processes under a) and b). In addition, it would probably need to take into account the close connection between the internal and external aspects of group (or collective) social identities (*cf.* Tajfel and Turner 1979; Ule 2009), e.g. that external expressions of identity may serve internal purposes, such as strengthening internal cohesion; and that external expressions of identity might be biased regarding other groups as well as towards positive self-images.

Such processes, including in the sense of fabulous retroactivity suggested by Derrida (2002, 46–54), may be observed in the documents of EU foreign policy that contributed to the (re)production of the idea of EU identity in world politics.

For example, it may be said that, after the Second World War, a common inter-subjective process involving similar self-understandings in the form of a political project that produced a narrative how to avoid war took place among the European states which brought about the beginning of the European integration process in the form of the Schuman Declaration in 1950 and the subsequent Treaties on European Communities. These could be elements of (an idea of) social identity; nevertheless, it would be difficult to characterize these elements as a pre-given or pre-existing “European identity”. Yet, as shown in the previous part, EU documents from 1973 onwards spoke about “European identity” and made references to values in relation to this idea of identity. EU identity based on European values has been treated as if it was pre-given, although it has been an idea(l) that has been (re)created and (re)enacted anew every time that it has been repeated in a discourse or practice.

Therefore, although this topic would require an in-depth discussion in itself, the whole phenomenon of EEC member states deciding to cooperate in the field of foreign policy in the years up to and including 1969, finally doing this in the form of the Final communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or Government on 1 and 2 December 1969 at The Hague, merits the question of *what* was it that drove the representatives of EEC member states to initiate and bring such cooperation to fruition: was it only political interests? Or was there at least some idea of a collective European identity that they shared? Maybe it was their belonging to the *group* of EEC member states that they wanted to strengthen through cooperation in the field of foreign policy? Or did they want, as a group of Western European countries, to *differentiate* themselves from other, external powers? The analysis in the third (historical) study might shed some light on at least some of these questions.

However if only the external policy aspect of EU identity is taken into account, it might be said that it had been developed following the emergence of EPC in 1970: the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 spoke about “European identity” in relation to common foreign and security policy that could lead to common defence (Preamble and Article B); and also the only other subsequent Treaty that explicitly mentioned European or EU identity, the Treaty of Nice that was signed in 2001, referred to the idea of EU identity in relation to foreign policy by speaking about the EU’s “identity as a coherent force on the international scene” (Article 27a). Since its establishment, therefore, EU foreign policy has been influencing the external aspect of the idea of EU identity.

But even from this perspective, the relationship between EU foreign policy and the idea of EU identity in world politics cannot be seen as one-directional: although foreign policy might have had an effect on the external aspect of the idea of identity, that idea of identity and the way it has been (re)produced had a feedback effect on foreign policy (*cf.*, for example, Manners and Whitman 2003; Hansen 2006, 1–2). Moreover, regarding implementation, through a successful foreign policy, the feeling of a collective identity could be strengthened.

## 2.2.2 EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics

### 2.2.2.1 Conceptual issues related to studying EU foreign policy

The first conceptual issue in studying EU foreign policy is how to conceptualize the subject of this policy so as to take into account its continuity since the beginning of the political cooperation between E(E)C member states to the present. The subject we are looking at which is the bearer of the political aspect of European integration has namely been evolving through the years. From 1970 to the entry into force of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, the subject of political cooperation was EEC member states. From 1987 and until 1993, political cooperation, of which the emerging foreign policy represented a large part, took place in parallel with EEC framework. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, foreign policy was integrated into the framework of the EU as the “second pillar” in the form of CFSP. Yet the European Communities remained the legal subject of European integration until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009 which granted legal subjectivity to the EU. In other words, only since December 2009 has there been real congruity between EU foreign policy and the subject that it refers to.

Another issue is how to conceptualize the EU as a subject of world politics or international relations, particularly from the perspective of foreign policy analysis.

Considering this, firstly, it has been found by a number of authors that it is impossible to conceptualize the EU satisfactorily within the dichotomy intergovernmental – supranational which is why the EU is often studied as *sui generis*, as mentioned before (e.g. Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Ginsberg 2001; Hill 2003; Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White 2004; Kajnič 2006). Secondly, there needs to be a reflection whether the tools for foreign policy analysis that were developed to study foreign policy of states can be successfully adapted to studying EU foreign policy. It has been found that such adaptation is possible – EU foreign policy analysts began using approaches that move beyond the state-centric view (such as White 1999 and 2001; Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White 2004; Kajnič 2006) where the concept of state is replaced with the concept of actor (the EU) and the concept of government with that of governance.

Before moving on to EU foreign policy, in relation to the process of EU foreign policy-making, a pertinent question is also what is seen as the EU. It had been said that the EU could be compared to an elephant being touched by blind men who thus perceive the elephant in markedly different terms (Puchala 1972). With regard to this, it might be noted, the process of EU integration, and by implication the EU, is probably not the elusive elephant, and also not partial observations of it, but a collective “imagination” of the elephant that emerges from the different observers (or co-creators) of the EU. In relation to this, a day after the British (Brexit) referendum on leaving the EU in June 2016, a meeting of key representatives of France, Germany and Italy took place to which smaller EU members were not invited. Gegout (2002) explored the workings of “the Quint” – the group of the “big four” of the EU (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) with the US which was instrumental in adopting key decisions during Balkans crises in the 1990s, and launched foreign policy initiatives that smaller member states had to accept. The meeting of the “big three” after the Brexit vote might be likened to this. However, despite this, if the EU is a common, agreed image or imagination of the elephant (*cf.* Puchala 1972) that emerges from various levels and actors, then the EU has been represented by the collective decisions that were made on EU level (e.g. by the European Council) following the Brexit vote, regardless of the procedures that were used to arrive at those decisions.

A final point to bear in mind is that the EU as an idea and social reality is permanently under construction, and that this has been crucial for it: social anthropologists have cautioned that the final political aim of the European project has never been defined, as the project itself challenges an old conception of identity rooted in territory, and that although the European project has not referred explicitly to defining identities and cultures or to creation of



meanings,<sup>32</sup> that is what it has been doing, since it would not have been able to succeed without a feedback loop between the political and economic project on the one side and legitimization via cultural infrastructure on the other; which implies that the European project would lose its momentum if these processes of construction were exposed (Abélès 2000; Bellier and Wilson 2000). As found in the previous subchapter, EU foreign policy is intertwined with these processes. It is therefore crucial to see both the EU and its foreign policy as processes that go on all the time and that are entangled with many other social processes that take place at the same time, on different levels, and across different areas and networks (such as globalisation, re-definition of state sovereignty, regionalisation, changing structure of world politics, changes in national, EU or regional and world economies, changing nature of democracy etc.).

We can trace the beginning of foreign policy cooperation between EEC member states to 1970 when the first report by EEC foreign ministers considering this was prepared (Davignon report). This was followed by two further reports (in 1973 and 1981). Codification of EPC began in 1987 with the entry into force of the SEA. During the course of 1990, CFSP was conceived as a response to the challenges of world politics and became the central focus of EU foreign policy in the Treaty of Maastricht with its entry into force in 1993. This timeline is important as it shows that it is necessary to conceive of EU foreign policy broadly, taking into account all its forms of appearance since the beginning of this kind of cooperation between EEC member states. Therefore, in this thesis, the term “EU foreign policy” denotes *all policies in the field of external relations connected to E(E)C/ EU framework since the beginning of EPC in 1970*. As mentioned before, this is deemed appropriate also because the process of cooperation in the field of foreign policy was, since its beginning, closely related to the political project of setting up a European Union (e.g. Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the problems of political unification 1970; Document on the European Identity 1973; Nuttall 1992 and 2000). Moreover, such a conception of EU foreign policy allows taking into account also common E(E)C/ EU policies such as those through which the EEC responded to the changing political landscape in Central and Eastern Europe from 1988 since it was the EEC that was in possession of policies that could provide adequate tools for response, such as trade agreements, and not EPC although EPC was the official form of cooperation in the field of foreign policy at the time (*cf.* Nuttall 2000, 84).

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<sup>32</sup> Culture is used here in a social anthropological sense, as encompassing ways of life, material and ideational phenomena that characterize human societies.

The need for a broad conception of EU foreign policy has been underlined by a number of authors in the field of EU foreign policy analysis, particularly with regard to different types of activities that may be connected to EU foreign policy. For example, Tonra and Christiansen (2004, 2) speak about “totality of the EU’s external relations”, which is similar to the conception used by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008, 28), Lucarelli and Manners (2006, 202) and Hill (2004, 144). In relation to this, some authors conceive of foreign policy of the EU as consisting of more components – not only CFSP and the external aspect of common policies (such as, most prominently, trade), but also national foreign policies of EU member states and those third country foreign policies that are taken in coordination with the EU, and use the term “European foreign policy” to denote this complex (White 2001 and 1999; Kajnc̆ 2006; Smith 2008). From the perspective of this thesis, however, it is more appropriate to use the term “EU foreign policy” as it focuses attention on how the EU is being shaped through its foreign policy as a *sui generis* subject of world politics. EU foreign policy can thus be defined also as the external policy of the EU as a *sui generis* subject of world politics.

A final conceptual issue in studying EU foreign policy is the question of its tools in connection to its effectiveness. This is important because it will be evaluated in the analytical part. Smith (2008, 179) considers the degree of meaningful political change that EU foreign policy might produce over time to be the most relevant criterion. Ginsberg (2001, 10) makes another distinction: EU foreign policy decisions (declarations, positions or actions) are considered to be outputs; they become outcomes only when they have an impact.

#### 2.2.2.2 Narrative about EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics

As found in the previous section, EU foreign policy might be playing an important part in the processes of (re)production of the idea of EU identity in world politics. As mentioned before, a number of authors see EU foreign policy as significant for the formation of EU identity (Bretherton and Vogler 1999; White 1999; Manners 2002 and 2006; Manners and Whitman 2003; Lucarelli 2006 and 2008; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). Lucarelli (2006, 13; 2008, 30) argues that foreign policy has a function of producing external images of the EU which feed back into the self-identification process; foreign policy also provides the context in which values are interpreted and reinforced, as well as an external mirror in the form of others who can provide recognition (*ibid.* 2008, 36). On this basis, Lucarelli and Manners (2006, 212) conclude that principled foreign policy is involved in the construction of “international identity” of the EU. On the other hand, other authors (Shore in

Anthropology Today 2004; Stetter 2004) have warned that foreign policy is constitutive of EU identity due to its function of producing a difference between the self and others which means that care should be taken when considering EU foreign policy as a possible resource for the construction of EU identity.

If we study the key political and legal documents which have formed the basis of EU foreign policy since the conception of EPC in 1969, it is possible to outline a narrative about EU foreign policy as contributing to the building of EU identity in world politics.

Already the Final communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or Government adopted in December 1969 at The Hague spoke about a need for a Europe “capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission”. It mentioned the role that Europe had to play in promoting relaxation of international tension and rapprochement. This discourse continued in the Davignon Report of 1970 that emphasized that Europe should “prepare itself to discharge imperative world duties entailed by its greater cohesion and increasing role” (this was mentioned as one of the rationales for the establishment of EPC). Similarly, the Second report on European political cooperation in foreign policy matters of 1973 called on Europe to “establish its position in the world as a distinct entity” so as to be able to make “an original contribution to the international equilibrium”. The Document on the European Identity of 1973 explained that unification implied “new international obligations” for Europe.

This short analysis shows that the discourse in the documents upon which EPC was built contains an outline of a narrative about the subject of European political cooperation as *having a vocation in world politics* even though this is the discourse of EPC at its first and earliest stage. Even more, the subject of European political cooperation that is emphasised by the discourse is not EEC member states (that cooperated to establish EPC) but a much broader notion of “Europe”. Using the term “Europe”, the discourse implies that not only does cooperation in the field of foreign policy relate to fulfilling a vocation in world politics, but that it means a vocation also in terms of geographical space, specifically that space which belongs to Europe.

This can be confirmed looking at the legal documents or Treaties that have given the cooperation in the field of foreign policy its current form. The Preamble of the Single European Act which was signed in 1986 invoked “responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly with one voice” so that it could make a “contribution to the preservation of international peace and security”. The Treaty on European Union (in the preamble) mentioned the need to reinforce European identity “in order to promote peace,

security and progress in Europe and in the world”. Moreover, further development of EU foreign policy was driven forward using the rationale of the need for the EU to play a significant role in world politics. The Cologne European Council Declaration of June 1999 (European Council 1999b) proclaimed resolve that the EU should “play its full role on the international stage” (this rationale was used to justify the need to provide the EU with increased capabilities in the field of security and defence). These “Petersberg tasks” were included in the Treaty of Nice. It is perhaps significant that the discourse of the latest Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon signed in 2007, is more pragmatic when it comes to the EU in world politics. It proclaims that the EU’s “aim is to promote peace” (Article 2) and, with regard to its relations with the wider world, upholding its values and interests is mentioned as the first goal of the EU.

In sum, considering the above it can, firstly, be observed that the discourse in the political and legal documents that form the basis of EU foreign policy speaks about a mission for the subject of such cooperation in world politics which is, in the first instance, to play a significant role in achieving peace, security and stability in the world (more about this will be said in the third study in the analysis). Although the subject of political cooperation which has most recently been the EU does not yet play such a role, its foreign policy is seen as leading towards the realisation of this objective. EU foreign policy is thus seen as a process of fulfilling the EU’s vocation and achieving its envisaged role in world politics (a process of EU identity formation in world politics). This discourse can be found in those documents or parts of documents that are the most political and declaratory in character, such as preambles of legal documents or individual declarations. The location of the discourse about EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics therefore signals that this might be political discourse as opposed to concrete social reality; the studies in the analysis will be devoted to testing this observation, among others. For example, Bendiek and Kramer (2010) have pointed out that although the EU claims to be leading strategic foreign policy this has not been backed by actual practice.

A second pertinent observation arising from this review that will also be tested in the analysis (particularly the final two studies) is that, as it approaches the present, the discourse looks as if it might be becoming more pragmatic; for example, the SEA was the last document that spoke about “Europe” as having a mission in world politics – subsequent documents spoke rather about the EU. Furthermore, the latest Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon, does not use elevated language anymore (about having duties in world politics) but states that the EU will uphold and promote the values that have led to its creation on the level of world politics as

well (Article 10 A). This might be an indication that the narrative about the EU in world politics which is told through EU foreign policy might be starting to change; and it poses the question of what the shift from “duties” to “values” might imply in terms of EU identity.

### 2.2.2.3 Closing the meaning of EU identity in world politics

Since it has been found that a narrative about EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics can be traced through the documents that represent the milestones of EU foreign policy, a positive answer can be given to the first research question: there has been a close interconnection between EU foreign policy and the idea of EU identity in world politics, and this interconnection has had a narrative form.

How does this relate to the first research thesis (that there has been a closure of the meaning of EU identity in world politics produced mainly for internal reasons of EU integration)? As mentioned before, narratives represent political tools as political discourses rely “extensively on narrative patterns” (Shenhav 2006, 246). Furthermore, it has been noted that EU or “European” identity has narrative character i.e. it is a constantly evolving collection of stories (Eder 2009). Closing the meaning of EU identity (including EU identity in world politics) is functional because through the closure, internal objectives of European integration process are being fulfilled. Smith (2008, 180) has argued that EU foreign policy serves primarily internal functions, such as confidence-building between the member states, pursuit of unity, establishing common viewpoints, socializing new member states etc. In addition, he pointed out (2004, 247) that, in its beginning, EPC was designed to help EEC member states understand each other’s foreign policy and to reinforce economic integration, and not as a way of undertaking initiatives in world politics. Similar views have been expressed by Risse and Grabowsky (2008, 11), namely that EU foreign policy serves to reify EU identity internally; and by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008, 13) who see EU foreign policy as being often directed by internal objectives (management of mutual relations, strengthening EU integration, asserting EU identity).

A demonstration that closing the meaning of EU identity (in world politics) serves internal objectives of EU integration can be found in the discourse of the key documents of EU foreign policy: as two main objectives of EPC which was seen as primarily consisting of foreign policy concertation, the Davignon Report of 1970 elaborated: a) ensuring “greater mutual understanding” (regarding issues of international politics), and b) increasing solidarity between EEC member states by harmonizing their views. At the same time, as noted above, the report tried to define (and thus close, at least partially) the content of European identity in

world politics by referring to Europe's "imperative world duties". Three years later, the Document on the European Identity (1973) proposed to progressively define the identity of the Nine in relation to other countries, saying that "in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion". Another evidence that the objectives of reinforcing integration, coherence and strengthening identity were targeted by trying to define the meaning of EU identity in world politics is in the discourse of the European Council during the years in which CFSP was being conceived: the European Council meeting in October 1990 achieved consensus on the goal to establish CFSP to "strengthen the identity of the Community" and to achieve greater coherence of its action in international relations (European Council 1990c). It should be noted that the identity objective of establishing CFSP has been put first, before the external objective that related to international environment.

Therefore, regarding the above, the first thesis can be supported, in the sense that through the history of EU foreign policy there have been attempts to define and thus, at least partially, close the meaning of EU identity in world politics, and these attempts have been functional from the perspective of achieving the political objective of EU integration, including the aspect of deepening (achieving greater internal cohesion) and widening (achieving geographical spreading of EU values and views). More detailed analysis is needed to see what were the concrete expressions that these attempts to define EU identity in world politics have taken in the field of individual policies as well as what have been their concrete outputs and their relation to the context of world politics, in addition to their discursive forms; which will be performed in the next chapter.

This brings us back to the problematization of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics: if the closure of the meaning of EU identity in world politics serves political objectives which, as has been shown, relate primarily to the internal aspect of EU integration, this implies that external objectives of EU foreign policy have been sidelined in this process. This is problematic from the perspective of the current changes in world politics because such an introspective view of EU foreign policy might be working as a blind overshadowing the necessity of relating EU foreign policy to what is going on in world politics. Significantly, in the years immediately after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, no overall document that would contain a strategic overview or directions of EU foreign policy has been adopted by the European Council, and the work in this field continued to consist of a collection of discussions on individual issues.

### 2.3 Theoretical approach

As explained in the Prolegomena, the aim of this thesis is not to problematize theories or different schools of thought within International Relations or European Studies; the aim is also not to compare the explanatory power of different theoretical approaches as this would require a broad study in itself. Instead, the purpose of this subchapter is to delineate a theoretical approach appropriate and relevant to the study of the problem discussed in the thesis which is the (re)production of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics. After all, as Robert O. Keohane has written, “worthwhile studies of world politics are problem-oriented” and the value of theories lies in providing adequate tools to study real-life problems (Keohane 2009, viii). In addition, Smith (2010, 11) emphasized that the choice of theory needs to be guided by the issue studied.

Similarly, although the thesis is related to studies of European integration as it focuses on one of the achievements of European integration which is EU foreign policy its purpose is not to explain the mechanisms of European integration. Rather, it is informed, to a certain extent, by EU foreign policy analysis (e.g. Wæver 1994; Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Gamble and Lane 2009; Hill and Smith 2011). Key issues in relation to EU foreign policy analysis have already been noted in subchapter 2.2.2.<sup>33</sup>

Paying due attention to the choice of theoretical approach is important, nevertheless, because, in every study in the field of world politics, theory is present even when this is not explicitly stated (Smith 2010, 8; Wæver 2010a, 315). Theories therefore form an essential part of the study of International Relations or European Studies (*cf.* Brglez 2006). On this note, it is believed here that it is necessary to illuminate the theoretical suppositions of the work to be performed, since, in the opposite case, they would remain implicit and would influence the flow of thoughts from the background, with the reader having no knowledge why such a line of thought has been produced. At the same time, while realising that theory is important and needs to be reflected if adequate study is to be made of the problem at hand, a note of caution should be borne in mind from James Rosenau (2006, 11) that any school of thought is at the same time a “conceptual jail” because it has been constructed in such a way as to repel any lines of reasoning that could negate it.

Bearing all this in mind, the theoretical approach developed in this section does not follow any specific theory or school of thought, but is, instead, primarily guided by the problem outlined in the beginning of the thesis. A framework aimed at studying specifically

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<sup>33</sup> More on theories of European integration can be found, for example, in Haas 1970; Carlsnaes, Sjusen and White 2004; Kajnc 2006; Pagden 2006; Wiener and Diez 2009.

the problem stated in the beginning of the thesis is developed below, consisting of five main theoretical tenets: narrative approach, historical perspective, integrative approach, keeping openness in mind, and ethics.<sup>34</sup>

### 2.3.1 Narrative approach

It follows from what has been shown that it is important to pay attention to (re)creation of meanings for the analysis of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics. Also, as Benedict Anderson (1983, 53) remarked – market zones in themselves “do not create attachments”; if they want to shape identities, they need to create *meaning*. The field in which meaning is created and maintained is language. Language thus needs to be taken seriously (Fierke 2002, 350) because it provides rules through which objects and acts are invested with meaning. Furthermore, language plays, due to this function, a crucial role in politics as it can make some meanings appear normal or natural even if they are not grounded in material reality and can privilege one set of meanings and representations over another (Shapiro 1989, 12; Débrix 2002, 205). In this sense, Roland Barthes (1957/1991) wrote about myth as a mode of signification which works through being taken as a factual system although it is a semiological system; this is possible because myth functions in such a way that it naturalizes meaning.

To highlight the focus on the (re)production of meanings through language, the term *discourse* is used (e.g. Milliken 1999; Débrix 2002; Fierke 2002; Hansen 2006). *Discourse* can be understood most simply as a manner of speaking or writing about something, of treating it within language. Gee (2011, ix; cf. Wæver 1995a) refers to discourse as “language-in-use” which means seeing language as a way of not only saying but *doing* things. Similarly, Milliken (1999, 229) notes that discourses are systems of signification (of constructing meaning) which produce things but also categorize or disqualify things and that discourses are unstable because constant re-inscription of meanings and identities created by them is needed to maintain those meanings and identities.

*Narrative* is a particular form of discourse. It has been defined variously in the literature, but its key elements can be identified as: account of events and actions, social meaningfulness, temporal dimension, attribution of cause and effect, and its audience (Suganami 1997, 405; Czarniawska 2004, 17; Elliot 2005, 11; Shenhav 2005, 251). In addition, Suganami (1997, 405) emphasizes that narratives make a point which is considered

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<sup>34</sup> General overviews of different schools of thought in the field of International Relations can be found in Sterling-Folker 2006a; Brglez 2006; Dunne, Kurki and Smith 2010; Baylis, Smith and Owens 2011.



appropriate in the given context. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, a narrative is defined as a *socially meaningful account of a series of events or actions intended for an audience which makes a point about something*.

Narratives are significantly connected to identities and foreign policy. Epstein (2011, 336) points out that the making of the self (of individuals and social entities) is a narrative act because saying “I” inscribes an individual or a social entity into the symbolic order. Similarly, Wæver (2005b) writes that social identity refers to narration of time. In this vein, Eder (2009) identifies a number of stories about Europe that produce a “narrative network” (*ibid.*, 427), e.g. story of common market, of unique culture, of hybrid Europe.

Considering foreign policy, Steele (2008, 3) analysed the “self” of states as being (re)produced through narratives, which results in various foreign policy actions. As mentioned in subchapter 2.2.2, EU foreign policy can be analysed similarly to foreign policies of states if the concept of state is replaced with the concept of actor and the concept of government with that of governance. Working along these lines, it should be possible to extract a narrative of how the EU sees itself in world politics through the analysis of EU foreign policy.

### 2.3.2 Historical perspective

If we want to analyse the (re)production of the social world, we need to acknowledge that patterns are usually discerned *backwards* in time from the present moment. In other words, when explaining what has happened or is happening, violence is committed on past events because they are interpreted according to the logic of the present moment in which interpretation occurs. Yet, at any given moment, countless (social) events happen. We cannot know from which of those events a trend might grow, but they will be interpreted at some moment in the future from the perspective of that trend which might not be obvious to us at the present moment. In addition, when making analyses, we may not be aware of all the relevant facts that exist presently.

To put it differently, historical perspective is important because patterns can be discerned and well-grounded analyses as well as informed guesses about the future made on the basis of the knowledge of how relevant social phenomena have been developing so far through time, up to the present moment. This has been emphasized by a number of prominent authors who have studied trends in the social world (e.g. Parker et al. 2003, 108; Wallerstein 2005, 82 and 2011, 223–226; Keane 2009, 876).

Moreover, history is crucial from the perspective of analysing narratives as narratives have an important relationship with history. As Ashley (1989b, 263–264) explains, a narrative is a representation that fixes meaning and imposes a standard of interpretation that is taken independently of the time that it represents. Moreover, historical science has had a particular relationship with narrative discourse, as historical narrative has been seen as neutral although it too produces meanings, and has thus often been representing reality rather than revealing it (White 1987).


Delanty (1995, 3) spoke of “Europe as an ‘invention’”, to emphasize that “Europe” is not a subject of history but its product, “a fabricated reality of /.../ changing forms and dynamics”; he thus saw “Europe” as a unifying myth of integration. If we take into account Barthes’ (1957/1991, 128) observation that it is the very principle of myth that “it transforms history into nature”, history is crucial for the analysis of social narratives because only historical analysis can show that what a narrative might be trying to picture as ever-existing and unchanging reality has actually been produced and reified through history.

This is crucial for EU foreign policy analysis – to show how a narrative of EU identity in world politics has been constructed, maintained and closed through EU foreign policy, a historical perspective is required. Also, as the discourse about EU identity might be representing history in particular terms (*cf.* White 1987; Wæver 2005b; 2015), the analysis in this thesis will pay attention to how time has been structured in narrating EU identity in world politics.

2.3.3 Integrative approach

As described in subchapter 1.5, the problematization of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics will be analysed using a three-pronged approach which can also be called integrative, or holistic, taking into account not only the discourse of EU foreign policy but also its implementation and its context, since this is necessary in order to establish what might be the content of the idea of EU identity in world politics, besides that which is claimed by the discourse of EU foreign policy, and in relation to the context of world politics. The integrative approach used in this thesis can be illustrated as follows:

*Figure 2.1: Integrative approach*



Meanings represent a starting point for the analysis of EU foreign policy and foreign policy analysis in general because they play a crucial role in foreign policy – actors behave as they do because of the meanings they ascribe to their external world (*cf.* Hay 2002, 213; Kurki 2008, 11). Meanings in the realm of foreign policy, including identity, can be accessed using foreign policy discourse (e.g. Torfing 2005, 14; Wæver 2005a, 35). Therefore, discourse analysis represents an appropriate beginning of foreign policy analysis because discourse is an aspect of foreign policy which can be accessed easily, particularly in the age of public diplomacy (*cf.* Wæver 2005a).

However, the level of discourse (notwithstanding speech acts – *cf.* Wæver 1995) in foreign policy does not necessarily correspond to the level of implementation (*cf.* Bunič and Šabič 2011; Tulmets 2011). Policy outcomes are not simple reflections of ideas or meanings but the result of a dialectical relationship between ideational and material factors (Hay 2002, 208). In this vein, Tulmets (2011) highlighted solidarity as a way of operationalizing foreign policy identity expressed through discourses, and used consistency between foreign policy discourses and foreign policy action (*ibid.*, 17) to assess foreign policy: to be consistent, the solidarity expressed through foreign policy discourses needed to be followed by “symbolic and/ or material actions”. In this thesis, we will therefore look at relevant symbolic and material actions (including speech acts) of EU foreign policy to see if they are consistent with EU identity in world politics as expressed through the discourse of EU foreign policy.

The final aspect of the integrative approach used in this thesis is the relevant context. With regard to the analysis of EU foreign policy, context is crucial because identities of social entities, particularly in their external aspect, are constructed in specific contexts (Diez and Manners 2007, 186); moreover, issues in the field of foreign policy are conditioned by the contexts in which they arise (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 24–25); and foreign policy discourses need to be put in their corresponding contexts to be analysed properly (Gee 2011, 37). Considering this, there are different contexts that could be relevant for the analysis of EU foreign policy from different perspectives (e.g. the internal context of its construction, the context of globalisation). However, if we are interested in analysing EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics, world politics represents the most relevant context and will therefore be included in the analysis.

#### 2.3.4 Keeping openness in mind

In the realm of natural sciences, a closed system is usually understood as an experimental environment in which all the factors that could affect outcome(s) are known and can be

controlled. It is evident that foreign policy cannot be studied as such a system because foreign policy, in particular, is an area where many factors are unknown (hence the need for embassies and intelligence agencies). Also, importantly, society as a whole can be seen as an open system (Patomäki 2002, 8).

However, there is another meaning to openness, particularly within the social sciences. Derrida (1967/1997, 162) spoke about the necessity of departure from the “closure of a self-evidence”. This aspect is about *openness in the process of production of meanings, of signification, or open-endedness* of the social world which is relevant for foreign policy analysis: due to innumerable unknown factors that condition outcomes in the social world, it needs (including foreign policy) to be studied as a contingent, unpredictable system where there is constant possibility of emergence of unknown or new practices and factors, and of creative action to which the scientist her/ himself contributes (Hay 2002, 250; Bauer and Brighi 2009, 164). Social world, including (EU) foreign policy therefore needs to be studied as emergent, constantly changing reality.

Keeping in mind the openness of the social world (and of EU foreign policy) would mean for a researcher to actively try to avoid essentializing his/ her subject(s),<sup>35</sup> because meaning in the social world can never be fully closed. This could represent a problem: if we want to make viable scientific conclusions about the social world, meaning needs to be closed, otherwise concepts cannot be defined etc. In addition, for survival of societies as such, closures are necessary, as has been discussed in the end of subchapter 1.1 (*cf.* Greimas 1977; Wæver 1995a; Luhmann 2004; Rumelili 2015). A possible solution which will be applied here is for the researcher to be constantly *aware* of the closure(s) s/he is making, as well as of the closures made by the society.

Last but not least, it needs to be kept in mind also from the perspective of analysing EU identity that meaning cannot be closed (but is constantly (re)produced). This is vital because of the pernicious nature of the idea of identity (see subchapter 2.2.1): not only might a closure of the idea of EU identity leave open only a “bright march to a free market haven” (Neumann 2001, 160); but, above all, the possibility should be avoided of contributing to totalising visions of Europe which exclude difference and otherness and which have led, in Europe’s past, to atrocities committed in their name (*cf.* Delanty 1995; Wæver 2005b).

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<sup>35</sup> Essentializing in this sense would mean working on the basis of the assumption that ideas have an essence which is given and unchanging, instead of being seen as being constantly (re)created through discourses and practices, including our own.

### 2.3.5 Ethics

As described in the Prolegomena and the previous subchapters, the subject of this thesis falls within the field of the political: not only world politics, but also EU foreign policy and EU identity, although this may not be obvious at the first sight, are political subjects *par excellence*. From the perspective of the writer, this recognition requires introspection: what discourses, intersubjective realities and power relations am I reproducing through this writing? Ethics of writing, then, means that the writer needs to be aware of his/ her own self within her/ his writing and that s/he reflects that writing. This has been emphasized by Hans J. Morgenthau, a noted author from the realist school of International Relations: knowledge cannot be pursued for its own sake but demands “moral evaluation” without which science could become an ideological justification “which any social agent may invoke in his own behalf” (Morgenthau 1947, 143–144; 1948, 7).

This raises the question of what taking ethics into account while producing knowledge through writing can mean for the author him/ herself. For Coicaud and Warner (2001, 1), the aim of ethics is to take into account others, to integrate them “into our thoughts and actions”. In this respect, in writing, ethics means positioning ourselves as part of the humanity that we are, instead of maintaining an illusion of being “separate and coolly detached” (Doty 2004, 382). In writing, we can therefore recognize our own humanity through recognizing the humanity of others whom we write about, including those others who participate in the (re)production of emergent social and political realities such as the EU and those who are recipients of EU policies, including its foreign policy.

Moreover, from the perspective of ethics of writing, *voice* is important, since writing is also an expression of identity. Being aware of this, of her/ his voice, can enable the researcher to be reflective of the research s/he is doing and of his/ her role in the research and in the (re)production of knowledge (*cf.* Elliot 2005, 153). This can help the researcher avoid the risk of “going native” and becoming part of the political game her/ himself by reproducing biased concepts (*cf.* Stavrakakis 2005, 81; Jørgensen 2004b, 36). It can also help the researcher become aware of possible (political) consequences of research (Bacchi 2012, 6).

In the final consequence, therefore, an awareness of own identity and voice in writing fosters a critical stance, not only towards the (re)production of discourses and practices being studied, but also towards own writing. With regard to the subject of study, dominant forms of knowledge are subjected to critical questioning which can open new venues of thought and pave way for alternatives (Shapiro 1989, 13; Milliken 1999, 236; Campbell 2010, 223); in

turn, own thinking needs to be subjected to that same questioning (*cf.* Fierke 2002, 343; Campbell *ibid.*).

To conclude this section, the theoretical tenets presented above resonate with some of the key schools of thought in the field of International Relations. For example, it has been mentioned that, to study how EU foreign policy has been constructed as a process of EU identity formation in world politics, we need to pay attention to history and how the meanings related to EU foreign policy/ identity nexus have been (re)produced and closed since the beginning of EU foreign policy. It has also been mentioned that, in studying EU foreign policy, not only discourse is important but also implementation (practice) and the context of world politics. In addition, it has been emphasized that it would be beneficial to see EU foreign policy as open while at the same time keeping in mind the importance of enduring ideas for the social world. These elements resonate with two prominent schools of thought in International Relations: mostly pragmatism (e.g. Bauer and Brighi 2009a; 2009b; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009), but also the English School (*cf.* Bull 1977/2002; Dunne 2010).

Furthermore, insights made within constructivism are significant, particularly that social realities, identities and meanings are socially constructed and connected to underlying social processes (e.g. Wendt 1992; Guzzini 2000; Sterling-Folker 2006b; Delanty and Rumford 2008; Fierke 2010). On the other hand, findings made within the poststructuralist school are also crucial as poststructuralism focuses on the very act of (re)production of meaning – here, the notion of *performativity* has been used as discourses are seen as performative in the sense that they constantly produce, reproduce or change social reality through the act of their utterance; moreover, social and discursive realities, including identities, can be seen as products of power (Foucault 1975/1995; 1997; Derrida 1967/1998; 1992; Campbell 1998; 2010; Brglez 2006, 118–119). The aim of poststructuralist analyses is constructive critique (Campbell 2010) in order to show how discursive/ social reality could be produced differently, to allow for openness in thinking and thus for alternatives, also through uncovering the underlying assumptions of established discursive or social realities.

Identities have tended to be seen as social facts, unitary, stable and entrenched by constructivists, in comparison to authors relating to post-structuralism, who have been observing identities as being constantly (re)produced (and thus complex and unstable) through processes of discursive articulation and contextualization or of constructing difference in relation to others (Wendt 1992; Campbell 1998; Zehfuss 2001; 2004). If we look at how EU foreign policy has been constructed as a process of EU identity formation in world

politics, both a constructivist and poststructuralist outlook are needed: the constructivist outlook uncovers how EU foreign policy has been socially constructed and how this construct now represents a social fact (from an internal EU perspective but also from the perspective of the external impetus that was given to EU foreign policy during its formative years, as described previously); while the poststructuralist outlook can help reflect EU foreign policy (also from an outside perspective) through the knowledge that it is a construct although it has become a reified social fact, and can highlight the very process of its (re)production and therefore possibilities for change.

Finally, the school of postcolonialism (e.g. Grovogui 2010; Spivak 2012) might be relevant for a reflection of how EU foreign policy might be positioning itself with regard to the ongoing changes in world politics since it draws attention to “imperial desire” present in some conceptions and orientations of foreign policy, and criticizes “aspiration to unilaterally set the terms and rules of politics” (*ibid.*, 254). Instead (*ibid.*), it advocates universalism based on participation of diverse political entities which is relevant regarding the current conditions of world politics (subchapter 2.1.3).

## **2.4 Methodological approach**

While operationalization was the subject of subchapter 1.5, and the selection of those foreign or related issues that were discussed most often by the European Council is the subject of the following subchapter and the beginning of the analysis, the purpose of this subchapter is to elucidate those methods of approaching discourse and practice which follow from the theoretical approach described in the previous subchapter and which will be used to analyse EU foreign policy as a (possible) process of EU identity formation in the context of world politics.

### 2.4.1 Case studies

Case studies represent a widely applied tool in social sciences, and have been used to test the explanatory power of theories and hypotheses (e.g. Parker et al. 2003), for problem-solving regarding current issues as well as to contribute to the development of larger-scale theories and schools of thought, such as in the field of security studies (Buzan and Hansen 2009). It can thus be said that case studies as a method have been used to connect theory to social/political reality and vice versa, in inductive and deductive terms. Within the context of this thesis, case studies are used to access the meanings (re)produced by the social and political actors involved in EU foreign policy, and, in a more general sense, to locate these within a

wider theoretical framework and thus contribute to (middle-range) theory (*cf.* Stark and Torrance 2005, 34).

Case studies are useful for approaching those research problems that are wide, since they allow us to narrow down the field of observation to those cases which are most salient from the perspective of the problem. In studying EU foreign policy in a historical perspective, the most salient cases can be seen as those areas of EU foreign policy which were most frequently discussed by the European Council. Namely, the frequency of handling these areas of EU foreign policy by the heads of state or government within the European Council demonstrates that those were EU foreign policy issues which seemed to be the most crucial for these leaders throughout the existence of EU foreign policy, and were thus continuously being put on the agenda. Moreover, as will be shown in the analysis, with regard to the issues which have been the most often discussed by the European Council, it has also been declared in the discussions and documents of other key EU bodies dealing with foreign policy (the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament) that these issues were of key importance for the EU externally (e.g. the Middle East, but also enlargement).

Thus, when analysing EU foreign policy, case studies allow for the observation of the (re)production of EU identity through EU foreign policy in the most frequently discussed areas of EU foreign policy; they allow us to follow the issues selected through time; and they enable the observation of this process also in those areas of EU foreign policy where EU identity has not been mentioned explicitly – e.g. the Middle East. Since the subjects of the case studies (those foreign or related issues that were discussed most often by the European Council) will be selected on the basis of primary documents (Presidency Conclusions), this will also allow for an unbiased selection of the cases to be analysed, which are at the same time those cases that were the most topical from the perspective of the problem observed.

In addition, case studies are appropriate for the observation of the construction and (re)production of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics because EU foreign policy is complex in the sense that it mostly consists of an overview of a variety of different foreign or related issues; it does not seem to have a ‘core’. Yet it is possible to approach its innermost workings if we observe those areas of it that have been most discussed and are thus likely to be the most crucial for it. The analysis of the (re)production of EU identity in world politics in those cases can then be compared with the explicit discourse and practice regarding EU identity in world politics; and made relevant for the present by identifying and analysing those issues that were dealt with most often in more



recent years (which will be performed in the final study in the analysis) and comparing this with the results of the case studies and of the study of EU foreign policy as such.

The case studies in the analysis are structured according to the timeline of the development of EU foreign policy (discourse and practice) on the issue concerned since that issue began to be dealt with within EU foreign policy; this means that the development of the issue itself will be relevant but not central to the case studies. Simultaneously, as mentioned in subchapter 1.5, the case studies will observe the interaction between this process (of EU foreign policy) and the development of world politics on the issue concerned.

#### 2.4.2 Discourse analysis

If discourse is “language in use”, then analysis of discourse is the study of how language is used in social and political world to construct and (re)produce things, to fill them with meaning, in relation to other things (*cf.* Gee 2011, ix). Discourse analysis therefore looks at available discourses in their various forms (such as speech or written language) to see how things are made meaningful – since discourses are performative, discourse analysis looks at the act of their performance (*cf.* Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 2; Diez 2001, 87).<sup>36</sup> It uncovers how discourses function to produce, maintain or change meanings that are taken as given and that make things appear natural and normal, and how meanings, including identities, are fixed to produce particular “regimes of truth” that a society accepts without questioning, as being true (*cf.* Foucault 1980, 143; Milliken 1999, 230; Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 3; Débrix 2002, 205). This also means that discourse analysis may uncover political purpose behind what appears to be given and natural. This has been highlighted by authors such as Foucault (1978; 1980) who believed that power and knowledge were closely intertwined and that this relationship found its expression and was transmitted through discourse, among others; and Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) who used the notion of empty signifier to point out that ideals of societies are often underpinned by empty (or floating) signifiers – notions that are vague and, at the same time, cannot be fully realised or achieved but persist because societies are organised around them. This is similar to the concept of floating signifier as used by Lévi-Strauss (1987, 63–64) who described the floating signifier as a simple form that can carry any symbolic meaning ascribed to it but which is, as such, not finite, not defined.

Discourse analysis is particularly useful for the study of identities and narratives. If identities are seen not as given but as constructed, in the sense that particular discourses (but

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<sup>36</sup> For examples of discourse analysis, see Wæver 2005, Diez 2005 or Bunič 2005.

also practices) inscribe identities into the social and political world (cf. Diez 2004, 321), discourse analysis can be used to observe the inscription and (re)production of identities (of social entities, for example, including states or the EU) through discourses without presupposing a self (cf. Epstein 2011) – i.e. identities can be analysed without becoming essentialized through discourse analysis. Moreover, discourses are locales where narratives can be looked for, because it is crucial for a narrative to be told, usually using spoken or written language.

While recognizing the workings of identities within discourses would mean showing what identities do and how they function when stated explicitly, and also pointing out those discourses or discursive formations that (re)produce identities implicitly, recovering a narrative which is told by a discourse would mean recognizing it as a narrative and understanding “what it amounts to”, to be able to state its “essence” (cf. Suganami 1997, 409).

Various tools can be used for discourse analysis; however the following seem to be the most relevant from the perspective of analysing identities and narratives:

- “*stepping back*” – looking at a discourse as if it was completely new and strange (to avoid the fallacy of overlooking key assumptions of the discourse – Gee 2011, 8);
- identification of crucial *features of speech* – such as repetitions of words and phrases, causal links, contradictions, binary oppositions, examples, (in)coherences, silences and omissions which are significant because they may define a discourse through what is not being said (cf. Foucault 1969/2003; Schiffrin, Tannen and Hamilton 2001);
- *figures of speech* can be observed, such as metaphors, metonymies, analogies, similes, enumerations and euphemisms (*ibid.*);
- looking not only at what a discourse is saying, but at what it is *trying to do* (Gee 2011, 45);
- observing *how words and grammar are used* – how and why grammar is used in one way and not other, how words and grammar are used to increase or decrease the significance of things, to connect or disconnect them (*ibid.* 55, 92, 126);
- in relation to *identities*, observing what is the identity that a discourse is trying to build and how the discourse is positioning others – with regard to this, taking into account instances of “alter-casting” might prove useful i.e. how a subject is trying to build an identity for itself by treating others as if it already had that identity (*ibid.*, 110; Wendt 1992, 421);
- what are the typical stories or narratives (figured worlds) that a discourse assumes and invites its audience to assume (Gee 2011, 171);
- how a discourse *structures* the world it constructs, in the sense of Greimas’ (1977) semiotic square, with an emphasis on axes of equivalence or correlation and of contradiction or

difference (axes of valorization), which allows for the uncovering of the structure or general map of a discourse that is “scaffolded over” to (re)produce a system of meaning or a theory (Laclau and Mouffe 1985/2001; Wæver 2015);

- finally, exaggerations, over-wording and unusual expressions need to be observed because such embellishments of meaning might point to myth which is characterized by being too rich (Barthes 1957/1991, 161; Howarth 2005, 345).

### 2.4.3 Deconstruction

Deconstruction is a specific approach to discourse analysis whose main aim is to show how the outside, the exterior of a system which that system declares, denigrates and excludes is actually at work within the system, to the point where self-identity of the system and the coherence of its discourse depend on the excluded, outside otherness; to do this, deconstruction identifies and discusses the moments of undefinedness and inarticulateness that a discourse tries to hide or avoid (Grilc 1999, 163; 2001, 7–8). For its work, deconstruction uses the concepts and rules of the discourse it observes, but uses those concepts to isolate the assumptions, gaps and dilemmas within the discourse and to problematize the relations between its concepts, to disturb its conceptual order (Caputo 1997, 77; Grilc 2001, 8). In this way, deconstruction opens up the discourse it observes as it demonstrates that the notions which are crucial to the discourse are in an intimate relationship with the discourse’s outside, and therefore demand its openness (*cf.* Grilc 2011, 233).

This is why deconstruction is useful for the study of discursive construction of identities: since it shows how the meaning of a notion is dependent on at least one other notion (Gregory 1989, xvi), it exposes that there can be no “full-identity-with-itself” for a subject (Žižek 1991/2008, 37) because the subject depends on otherness and others for its identity (Grilc 1999, 164; 2001, 301). Although this was the point where Derrida’s deconstruction stopped, it can be taken further: in Žižek’s (1991/2008) view, the impossible, or the otherness, the radical difference that deconstruction can expose as being at work within a discourse, “constitutes the very definition of identity” (*ibid.*, 37). In other words, identity can be seen not only as the impossibility of achieving a full closure of a subject within itself, but also as being constituted through reference to something the subject is not.

Deconstruction is not only a de-constructive exercise (*cf.* Débrix 2002, 208). It performs two moves at the same time: a disturbing and displacement of the accustomed conceptual order and the belonging binary oppositions *together* with an inversion of the usual hierarchy of concepts so that the previously subordinated or excluded terms are liberated and

illuminated which leads to reflection about possible alternatives (*cf.* Derrida 1972/1982, 329; Grilc 2001, 65; Campbell 2010, 223).

A host of analytical concepts is related to Derrida's deconstruction.<sup>37</sup> Of these, one might be of use when dealing with identities: the *blind spot*. Derrida (1967/1997, 163–164) used this term to denote an element of a discourse which is constitutive for that discourse but which, at the same time, evades it – it is the “not-seen that opens and limits visibility” and which the discourse is organised around. The concept of the blind spot highlights that meaning within a discourse is not given but constructed, and that that construction is blind to itself (*cf.* Johnson 1981, xv). With respect to the research problem of this thesis, this opens the question whether, for example, ideas related to EU identity in world politics could be seen as blind spots of EU foreign policy discourse.

#### 2.4.4 Genealogy

Genealogy can be seen as complementing the discursive approach and deconstruction in that it analyses concrete social practice, together with relevant discourses. It is a “form of history” which looks at how practices, domains of objects and the belonging knowledges and discourses were formed contingently through history, yet, despite having been formed through the interplay of contingencies in the past, function today as authoritative, timeless forms of knowledge and practice which go without saying, as given, having a solid essence or point of origin (Michel Foucault in Fontana and Pasquino 1984, 59; Koopman 2011, 5–6). With respect to this, genealogy also represents a critical approach because it shows how, in social/ political history, there is no landmark or point of reference that could be seen as origin; rather, history is analysed as interplay of power relations and creation of knowledge through which social reality is produced (Foucault 1975/1995; 1997).

Genealogy analyses historical documents, in which it is “gray, meticulous and patiently documentary” (Foucault 1997, 139). In those documents, it seeks to identify the accidents, contingencies, errors, reversals of meaning or faults which have produced the things that exist today and continue to have value for us (*ibid.*, 146). This is why it is crucial for genealogy that, when researching emergence or continuation of a social practice, it does not look for transcendental reality or something unchanging that would lie outside of what is being observed and represent a foundation of that practice (*cf.* Foucault in Fontana and Pasquino 1984, 59). Instead, in its search for descent of social practices, genealogy disturbs what has

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<sup>37</sup> The most well-known would perhaps be *différance*, the discursive activity which at the same time produces difference and defers full realisation of meaning – Derrida (1972/1982, 13-14).

previously been seen as immobile and shows how social practices have been established in the course of history as patchwork syntheses of other, often incidental forms and events (Foucault 1997).

Genealogy thus has implications for the analysis of how identities have been and are being (re)produced: it may show how a seemingly unitary social self actually does not have an essence that would justify it but has rather been produced through countless forgotten events and accidents in history (*cf.* Foucault 1997).

Regarding the problematization of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics, genealogy represents a way of analysing the formation of the practice of EU foreign policy and of inscription of EU foreign policy in the changing conditions of world politics because it can be used to show whether and how a sense of EU identity in world politics has been formed through the practice of EU foreign policy since the first session of the European Council in 1975, and can trace how the meaning of EU identity in world politics that has been generated in this manner has been interacting with the corresponding context of world politics.

In this way, genealogy also opens the space for reflection of alternative courses of thinking and doing EU foreign policy because its manner of work makes it attuned to those knowledges and practices that have been disqualified in history for the benefit of a unitary knowledge of the social practice that is EU foreign policy (*cf.* Foucault 1980, 83).

### 3. ANALYSIS

To analyse how EU foreign policy has been (re)produced as a process of EU identity formation in world politics, first, the discourse of the EU with respect to foreign policy needs to be gauged. For this, documents that recorded discussions are useful (in addition to formal documents or agreements); also, case studies should follow an issue of interest through time – regular recurring documents are important but they should also include those cases where EU identity has not been stated explicitly but may have been involved implicitly (Wæver 2010b).

The first part of the analysis thus consists of the analysis of the discourse of the European Council on issues of foreign policy and related issues, since, in the history of EU foreign policy, the European Council has been the longest existing institution which has been dealing with issues of foreign policy, and it is also the highest-level institution that has been handling foreign policy within EPC/ the EU.

The discourse of the European Council will be used in two ways in the analysis. Firstly, it will be used to identify all foreign or related issues that the European Council has been discussing so as to see which of those issues appeared most often and are therefore suitable for further analysis. After identifying those foreign or related issues that have been appearing in the discourse of the European Council most often, choice will be made concerning the subjects of the (two) case studies.

Secondly, the analysis of the discourse of the European Council on a particular issue of concern will represent one of the elements of the three-pronged approach to the (case) studies. Namely, for each of the studies performed in this chapter, the discourse analysis will be complemented using two further analytical tools. One is the analysis of EU foreign policy practice (including speech acts) on the issue of concern; this will be performed using the genealogical approach described in subchapter 2.4 with regard to the issue on the level of EPC High Conference of Foreign Ministers/ Council of the EU. The third and final analytical tool applied will be the analysis of the context – how the EU has been handling the issue of concern from the perspective of the relevant context of world politics, and what EU involvement in the issue has actually meant or contributed from the perspective of world politics, i.e. in terms of resolving or addressing that issue. This will be performed by making reference to and following the course of world politics on the issue concerned, for example by observing the work of United Nations bodies (the Security Council and the General Assembly) where applicable, as well as the work of other key actors or bodies identified with respect to the issue.

The time frame for the mapping of those foreign or related issues that were discussed most often by the European Council is the period from the first meeting of the European Council in 1975, that is since the existence of the European Council, and up to and including the last meeting of the European Council before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (on 1 December 2009). This period and particularly the end of it have been chosen because the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has brought significant changes to the functioning of EU foreign policy system but also because, by the end of 2009, the impact of the changes in world politics on the EU, including its foreign policy, could be visible. This also means that by observing EU foreign policy from December 2009 onwards, and comparing it to EU foreign policy before that date, changes in EU foreign policy that have been brought about by the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon as well as concurrent changes in world politics should be noticeable. Furthermore, this is deemed more appropriate than a single longitudinal study as such a study could miss the changes that have been occurring in EU foreign policy recently: the frequency of the issues discussed by the European Council during the whole period from 1975 to 2014 would be much higher than of the issues that perhaps began to be discussed anew and more often from 2009, meaning that a single longitudinal analysis would not reveal the issues that came to be discussed more often by the European Council in more recent years.

Before proceeding, it should, firstly, be explained why those foreign and related issues that were discussed by the European Council most often are being analysed. To begin with, if a certain foreign policy issue has been dealt with often by the European Council, it follows that this issue has been of importance to EC/ EU member states. Arguably, an issue could have also appeared often because it continued for a prolonged period of time on the world scene; yet the fact that it was included on European Council agenda means that dealing with it was seen by EC/ EU member states as constitutive for their coordinated activity in the field of foreign policy. Therefore, observing those issues that were discussed most often by the European Council during the history of EU foreign policy also allows for the observation of those cases of EU foreign policy which were the most salient, in the case studies. Moreover, advocacy within the European Council that is demonstrated by putting an issue on its agenda increases the likelihood of the member states taking an action on that issue. Thus, looking at the issues that have been discussed often by the European Council increases the likelihood of being able to capture, by following the discussions on those issues, the full extent of the activity of the European Council in that particular area of foreign policy since its establishment and until December 2009. This, in turn, enables the observation of how, in

dealing with the issues concerned, a narrative that the EU has been telling about itself in world politics might have been (re)produced, changed, and possibly closed.

Secondly, the analysis looks at foreign as well as related issues because demarcation between the issues that fall within the field of foreign policy and other issues has not always been clear in the Presidency Conclusions of European Council sessions. For example, climate change world summits have been discussed together with ‘first pillar’ or Community policies although they also fall within the realm of foreign policy. Furthermore, enlargement has sometimes been discussed together with other foreign policy issues but sometimes separately, under separate titles or subtitles in the Presidency Conclusions, and also under ‘first pillar’ policies. Also, some ‘first pillar’ policies that were discussed by the European Council have an external dimension particularly when considering international conferences or dealing with third countries (such as energy policy or trade policy). Finally, there were procedural issues related to foreign policy as well although they did not directly concern its substance.

As an informal body, the European Council was conceived in 1974, in the final communiqué of the meeting of Heads of Government of EEC member states in December in Paris. The Heads of Government decided to meet three times a year, accompanied by foreign ministers, to ensure an overall approach to internal and external problems that “Europe” was faced with. The European Council first met in March 1975 in Dublin. The European Council was mentioned in the Single European Act of 1986 and in the Treaty on European Union of 1992 in which it was tasked with defining “principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy” (Article J.8). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997, Article J.3) extended this to “matters with defence implications” and gave the European Council the competence to decide on common strategies. Most recently, in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the European Council became an institution of the EU, and, with respect to foreign policy, it is competent for identifying “the strategic interests and objectives of the Union” that relate to CFSP and other areas of external action. Judging from the discourse used in these documents concerning the competences of the European Council in the field of foreign policy, it can be argued that, on the agenda of the European Council, all those foreign policy issues appeared that have been so important for E(E)C/ EU member states that they needed to be elevated to the highest political level, thus warranting a focus on the European Council in the discourse analysis.

As mentioned previously, the conclusions of the European Council are Presidency Conclusions; and Presidency Conclusions have been changing in form under different Presidencies which means that also the manner in which the issues discussed by the European



Council have been included in the Conclusions has been changing – the issues discussed can thus be identified as either subtitles, statements, declarations or even paragraphs in the different Presidency Conclusions. For the purpose of the analysis, a foreign or related issue is considered to have been discussed by the European Council if it appeared in the publicly available documents summarizing the discussions. On this note, the Presidency Conclusions cannot represent the only source for identifying the issues discussed by the European Council, since, in the period from 1975 to 1992, foreign policy issues were sometimes not included in the Presidency Conclusions; however, these issues have been published in Bulletin of the European Communities which therefore, in some cases, represents a better source than the Presidency Conclusions for the period 1975-1992 (*cf.* European Council 1975a-1991c).

A final methodological note before commencing the analysis concerns two possible caveats regarding the authenticity of the discourse of the European Council as it can be discerned from the above-mentioned documents. Particularly in the recent period, it has become a matter of habit to have a draft of Presidency Conclusions prepared in advance. The extent to which the published Presidency Conclusions reflect actual debates within the European Council is thus impossible to determine without participant observation. However, this caveat represents an advantage from the perspective of the present analysis because it means that the published Presidency Conclusions reflect the consensus of EC/ EU member states on a particular issue; therefore, Presidency Conclusions can be regarded as a record of EU foreign policy. Another caveat is that, as is evident from Presidency Conclusions themselves, the final published documents have sometimes been revised before or after publishing which opens the possibility that the actual discourse that was agreed on the spot at a particular European Council session was altered after the session.

The first of the two steps of the mapping is performed in Table A.1 (“Foreign and related issues discussed by the European Council, January 1975 – November 2009”) which is in Appendix A. In the table, those European Council sessions at which foreign or related issues were discussed have been included (i.e. a European Council session has been included in the table if at least one foreign or related issue, according to the above-mentioned criteria, was discussed at that session). There were 106 such European Council sessions out of altogether 122 in the period from March 1975 to November 2009 inclusive which means that foreign or related issues were discussed at almost every European Council session. For each of these 106 European Council sessions, foreign and related issues that were discussed have been identified in two separate columns in the Table A.1. The name of each issue has been

shortened in the Table to key words that appeared in the documents summarizing the discussions of the European Council (such as “Middle East”).

If we look at the Table A.1, some observations can be made. Firstly, with respect to some issues, the terms denoting these issues have been changing through the history of European Council sessions, in line with contemporary historical processes (for example, USSR before 1991 vs. Community of Independent States, former Soviet Union, and Russia after that date). On the other hand, signifiers for some issues have remained unchanged throughout the European Council’s history (such as the Middle East, enlargement, or the Mediterranean). It has also been characteristic that during key historical periods (e.g. 1989-1991), the terms for the most crucial issues have been changing from one European Council session to another, before finally settling on a new term that was used for many subsequent years (e.g. Eastern Europe, later Central and Eastern Europe; or former Yugoslavia, then Western Balkans in Presidency Conclusions after 1997).

Secondly, appearance of new terms denoting new issues or illuminating old issues in new light can be observed particularly during the last two decades, such as issues linked to the environment. The term “climate change” started to appear in the records of European Council sessions from 1995 onwards (before, “environment” was used). In more recent years, since June 2003, the European Council started discussing “green diplomacy” as a new form of diplomacy, for example.

From the Table A.1, reactions of the EU at the highest political level can be observed to new circumstances of world politics as new issues have been brought up and discussed by the European Council. Since December 2004, the European Council has, occasionally, been discussing relations with “partners” (this term has been used to denote most important third countries, such as the USA and China, but also blocks of countries such as Latin America or African Union). Significantly, in June 2007, the European Council discussed the so-called “Heiligendamm process” or the appearance on the world scene of new economies and their assertiveness within global economic fora (the G-20 in particular).

Finally, the number of issues discussed at individual European Council sessions has been growing, with leaps during significant periods of recent history – an increase in the number of issues discussed can be observed in the period around 1990 and also from 2001, that is, since the signature of the Treaty of Nice. Moreover, from 2004 on, it can be observed that similar issues were grouped under ‘umbrella’ terms and policies, and there were consequently less discussions on individual countries – examples of such a policy and such a term would be European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the term “strategic partners”. A

question can thus be asked whether this trend might continue in the discussions of the European Council towards, perhaps, a global perspective on evolving issues, including the EU's surroundings and events taking place on the world scene, which the EU might develop in time.

Using the Table A.1, the number of appearance of foreign or related issues in the discussions of the European Council has been determined in the following manner. First, foreign and related issues from the Table A.1 were sorted by alphabetical order to identify those issues that appeared often. Thereafter, the Table A.1 was analysed from the perspective of individual issues to identify possible synonyms in order to obtain the number of appearance of the issue in all its different synonyms. All of the foreign or related issues appearing in the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in the period from March 1975 to November 2009 that have been found, in this manner, to have appeared at least 10 times in the Presidency Conclusions, have been included in Table 3.1 below, in descending order of the number of times they appeared. In this way, it can be established which of the issues have been dealt with most often by the European Council, and also whether the terms signifying a particular issue have been changing through the course of the history of the European Council. (Note: if an issue has been discussed at the same European Council under different titles or topics, it is considered to have appeared once in the discussions of that European Council session.)

Table 3.1: Number of appearance of foreign and related issues discussed by the European Council, March 1975 – November 2009

<b>External or related issue discussed by the European Council /different signifiers</b>	<b>Number of appearance /of different signifiers</b>	<b>Number of appearance - TOTAL</b>
Middle East/ Annapolis conference	65/ 1	66
Enlargement	38	38
Mediterranean (countries, policy)/ Barcelona process	25/ 4	29
Russia/ Russian federation/ Schmidt-Brezhnev meeting	20/ 1/ 1	22
Africa/ African issues	21	21
Iran	21	21
Climate change/ policy/ protection	18/ 1/ 1	20
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)	18	18

Iraq	18	18
Cyprus	17	17
Latin America	17	17
United States/ US/ USA	8/ 7/ 2	17
Afghanistan	16	16
Lebanon	16	16
Western Balkans	16	16
Former Yugoslavia/ Yugoslavia	12/ 2	14
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)/ WTO (World Trade Organisation)	4/10	14
Terrorism/ terrorist	12/ 1	13
Ukraine	13	13
Neighbours/ Neighbourhood	1/ 11	12
Central and East(ern) Europe/ Central and East(ern) European countries	9/ 2	11
Turkey	11	11
CSCE/ OSCE	9/ 1	10

From the Table 3.1 above, it can be seen that the issue of the Middle East has been by far most often discussed as it was discussed at 66 (i.e. roughly a half) of European Council sessions. The first European Council session where it appeared was already in June 1977, and it was discussed most recently in June 2009 (in the period observed). Furthermore, the term signifying the issue (“Middle East”) has remained unchanged throughout the discussions. The second foreign or related issue discussed most often by the European Council has been enlargement (the term signifying it has also remained unchanged) which was discussed first in March 1977 and most recently in December 2006 during the period observed. It was discussed at about a third of the sessions of the European Council.<sup>38</sup> The next issue which appeared most often was the Mediterranean, however, the terms signifying this issue have been changing (e.g. “Mediterranean”, “Mediterranean countries”, “Mediterranean policy”, “Barcelona process”), and, also, this issue was discussed at less than a quarter of European Council sessions. Therefore, with regard to the results of the mapping summarized in the Table 3.1 above, the Middle East and enlargement appear to be most suitable for further analysis (and have been highlighted in the Table A.1 in Appendix A).

<sup>38</sup> In addition, concerning enlargement, also the discussions on some of the other issues (such as the Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe, Western Balkans and Turkey) were in some cases related to the enlargement process; this is discussed in more detail in the second case study in subchapter 3.3.

If we look at some of the other results in the Table 3.1, it can be noted that, from the other potential powers, only Russia and the US have been discussed more than 10 times in the period from March 1975 to November 2009 (Russia at 22 sessions, and the US at 17). It appears that, from regional relations, Africa has been most important for the EU, as it was discussed at 21 European Council sessions, followed by Latin America which was discussed at 17 sessions. The European Council has, in addition, been discussing issues which were of concern on the world scene, such as Iran (at 21 sessions), Iraq (18 sessions), Cyprus (17), Afghanistan (16) and Lebanon (16). It is interesting, with respect to this, that the issues most frequently discussed were not necessarily those issues or conflicts that were unfolding in the E(E)C/ EU's proximity but those that were topical on the level of world politics (e.g. the Middle East or Iran, Iraq). For example, former Yugoslavia was discussed at only 14 European Council sessions. The term appearing later which is different in meaning was "Western Balkans" which was discussed at 16 sessions. Concerning particular policies, "climate" (change/ policy/ protection) appeared at 20 sessions, firstly in December 1994 and most recently in October 2009 during the period observed. From the other policies related to foreign policy, only European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) appeared more than 10 times, at 18 European Council sessions.

Since the issues of the Middle East and enlargement have been found to be most appropriate for further analysis, these will be the issues which the two case studies in the first part of the analysis will consider. A third (historical) study will be performed with respect to the discourse of the European Council on European or EU identity in world politics including implicit discourse on EU identity and using also other key documents in the period 1975-2009; the results of the two case studies will be compared with the results of this study.

As mentioned before, these studies include three movements: discourse analysis of European Council discussions on the issue using discourse analysis and deconstruction; analysis of concrete EU foreign policy practice on the issue using genealogy (including speech acts and analysis of relevant common positions and joint actions by the Council of Ministers); and context analysis of EPC/ EU discourse and performance on the issue from the perspective of world politics.

As a final step, in the fourth study in the analysis, the mapping of foreign or related issues discussed by the European Council will be repeated for the period beginning with December 2009. This will show which foreign or related issues have been most important for the EU and how the EU has been constructing itself on the world scene in more recent period. The results of this mapping will be compared with the results of the mapping performed for

the period 1975-2009. This should make it possible to discern what EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation has meant in the changing context of world politics in the beginning of the 21st century.

Before commencing the analysis, a few notes on the two issues that will be analysed in the case studies. Although the European Council has sometimes treated “Middle East” as comprising a wider array of issues (including Iran and Iraq, particularly during the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf War), the issue of the Middle East will be narrowed down in the analysis to the conflict between Israelis and the Palestinians which is also what has habitually been discussed under the term “Middle East” by the European Council.

Furthermore, it seems that the issues of the Middle East and enlargement are somewhat atypical foreign issues to have been discussed so often. For example, concerning the Middle East, the question arises why would the EU choose to profile itself on the world scene through dealing with this issue since there are a number of areas which have been closer to the E(E)C/ EU, in terms of geography (e.g. the Western Balkans) as well as content (e.g. the environment). This is an additional question to which an answer will be sought in the analysis.

Also, enlargement seems to have been of prime concern to EPC/ the EU within the realm of foreign policy which is corroborated when we look at the discourse of the European Council, historical circumstances of various enlargements, as well as the findings of key authors in this area. For example, Ginsberg (1999), Smith (2002), Jørgensen (2004a) and Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) emphasize that enlargement not only needs to be seen as a form of foreign policy, but that it has indeed been one of the most successful EU foreign policy areas. Although these authors make reference mostly to the last ‘big bang’ enlargement (in 2004), the discourse of the European Council reveals that the European Council has seen previous enlargements as instruments of foreign policy too. In December 1978, with respect to the enlargement with Greece, Portugal and Spain, the European Council reaffirmed “great political significance of enlarging the European Communities for the consolidation of democracy in Europe and the strengthening of the European Communities’ position in the world” (European Council 1978c). Moreover, as will be shown in the analysis, enlargement was seen by the E(E)C/ EU as being of crucial foreign policy importance also already before 1975 (Turkey) and after 2004 (particularly with respect to the Western Balkans).

### **3.1 Case study I: the Middle East**

A case study is a story to be told. To be able to showcase the narrative that the EU has been telling, through its foreign policy, about itself in world politics, that narrative has to be *narrated*. All the items deemed to be of relevance and all the levels observed need to be bound together in appropriate sequential order. In other words, for each of the years and periods covered in this and the following studies, all the relevant collections of documents from different institutions have been analysed in parallel. This has been crucial also regarding activities at the levels of the European Council and of the ministers of foreign affairs that have been closely interconnected through the years, and because both bodies have been referring to what the other body has been saying or doing; at the same time, both of them have been working with reference to what was going on in world politics during the contemporary period of time.

A careful reading of Presidency Conclusions of European Council sessions together with press releases of the sessions of the ministers of foreign affairs (within EPC and CFSP) shows that important discursive elements can be found on the levels of both bodies; also, there have been cases (in the analysis below) where discourse on the level of the ministers has supplemented or explained, and sometimes even acted as a substitute for the discourse of the European Council. On the other hand, decisions of the European Council have also been crucial for policy implementation as this body issued guidelines for the implementation of its decisions, and, particularly in the case of CFSP, has been giving its approval prior to launching important EU contributions on the ground (such as, in the case of the Middle East, two ESDP missions – EU Police Mission or EUPM and EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point – EUBAM Rafah).

Apart from discourse, legal E(E)C and EU acts and documents can be looked into to reveal the material side of implementation of the EU's Middle Eastern policy. And, from a world-political aspect, the conflict between Israelis and the Palestinians became a matter of the set-up of world politics following the Second World War particularly with the onset of the Cold War, as one of the main protagonists of the Cold War, the US, sided with one of the sides in this conflict. As will be shown in the analysis, EU foreign policy invested heavily in being recognised as a relevant external actor involved in resolving the conflict; from this perspective, UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions are relevant for the analysis, as well as documents of a key international body that has been dealing with this conflict since the 2000s, the Middle East Quartet. Regarding the world-political perspective,

in addition, it is therefore important to include in the analysis also the relevant events from the period before 1975.

Before continuing, a note on the genealogy of the term “Middle East”. Its current usage can be traced to an American officer in the beginning of the 20th century who used it to describe the strategic significance of the area between Ottoman and Russian empires and India to Britain (Selvik and Stenslie 2011, 2). Today, Selvik and Stenslie, for instance (*ibid.*, 3), use this term to denote a wide geographical area stretching from the Maghreb to and encompassing the Arab peninsula. However, an analysis of the conclusions of the European Council (European Council 1975a-2009e), as well as of the foreign ministers within EPC/CFSP (below) shows that these bodies have used the term “Middle East” as an elastic expression which has most often denoted the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians; but occasionally also the wider Arab-Israeli (or Israeli-Arab) conflict including the relations between Israel on the one hand and its neighbours Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the other; and sometimes even the wider region, in relation to the conflicts that have been occurring in or between Iran and Iraq, for example.<sup>39</sup> In sum, this shows that the term “Middle East” does not have a pre-existing essence, but has been, instead, constructed in a variable manner according to different needs and considerations.

### 3.1.1 Prologue

The current conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has had a long history which cannot be done justice here.<sup>40</sup> However, some of the events related to the history of this conflict represent a wider setting which is crucial for the understanding of how E(E)C/ EU<sup>41</sup> member states have been functioning and still do with respect to this conflict which is also important from the perspective of the genealogical method.

In 1916, during the First World War, France and Britain concluded a secret agreement (Sykes-Picot Agreement) in which they divided the Middle Eastern area of the crumbling Ottoman Empire under their anticipated future administrations.<sup>42</sup> A year later, British foreign minister Lord Balfour sent a letter to Lord Rothschild, at that time leader of British Jews,

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<sup>39</sup> This is similar to the current usage of the term as noted by Halliday (2005, 111).

<sup>40</sup> More about the conflict itself can be found e.g. in Halliday (2005), Roberson (2005) or Shlaim (2011).

<sup>41</sup> The EEC (European Economic Community) was established by the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community of 1957; it existed from 1958 until the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht on 1 January 1993 when it was replaced by the European Community (EC); as a legal successor of the EC, the EU was established on 1 December 2009 with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. At the same time, the EU existed as a political subject since the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht on 1 January 1993.

<sup>42</sup> In particular, Palestine and Transjordan were to go to Britain and Lebanon and Syria to France (Cook and Stevenson 2005, 82; Steiner 2005, 102-3).



which spoke about Palestine as a “national home for the Jewish people” (Balfour 1917). In 1922, the League of Nations gave mandate over Palestine to Britain (Council of the League of Nations 1922). Britain was also given the mandate over Transjordan, while France received the mandates over Lebanon and Syria (Cook and Stevenson 2005, 82). At a minimum, these events and the documents they produced testify to the historical importance of the area of the historical Palestine, as well as the Middle East, to two key E(E)C/ EU countries: France and Britain.

The Holocaust perpetrated against Jews in Europe during the Second World War contributed significantly to the emigration of the Jewish people from Europe to the then area of Palestine after the War ended. This led to a volatile situation on the ground. At the same time, the Holocaust left a dark stain on the collective memory of at least one European country, Germany, which has since been influencing its foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Also, during and after the Second World War, the United States (US) replaced Britain as the main supporter of the movement for a Jewish state, Zionism (Duiker 2005, 256–257; Calvocoressi 2009, 317). In terms of the context of world politics, this meant that one of the two powers of the emerging bipolar world was in favour of one of the two key actors in the conflict between the Jews and the Palestinians.

Lebanon and Syria were admitted to the United Nations in 1946. Regarding the contested area of Palestine, UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution in 1947, 181(II), which provided for retreat of Britain as mandatory power and for establishment of Arab and Jewish States in this area by October 1948. However, only Israel was established in May 1948. This led to the first Arab-Israeli war which ended in 1949 with armistice between Israel on the one side and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the other (Cook and Stevenson 2005, 91).

Two more wars between Israel and its neighbours took place before EPC came into existence. In 1956, in the Suez crisis, Israel attacked Egypt with the backing of Britain and France; however, the forces of these two powers withdrew following a request from the US (Halliday 2005, 70; Calvocoressi 2009, 332–334). In 1967, during the Six-Day war, Israel secured substantial territories from its Arab neighbours Egypt (Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula), Jordan (Jerusalem, the West Bank) and Syria (the Golan Heights). UN Security Council (UNSC) responded by adopting Resolution 242 (1967). It stressed the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war, called for a “just and lasting peace” and for “territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area”. Not only were these

expressions used by EEC member states during the first phase of their deliberations within the fledgling EPC regarding the conflict in the Middle East (Bulletin of the European Communities 1971, 31), but these and other, future, UNSC formulas were since used regularly in EPC and CFSP discourses, together with frequent references to Resolution 242 and subsequent UNSC resolutions on the Middle East. Thus, as showcased below, through their common discourse on the Middle East referring to the UN, EEC countries *cast* (or shaped) their common external identity with regard to the Middle East (EU identity in world politics) as one of upholding the values and principles as embodied in and (re)produced by the UN. Nevertheless, the first document in relation to Israel or the Palestinians that was adopted by EEC member states before the establishment of EPC was a trade agreement between the EEC and the State of Israel of 1964 (Council of the European Communities 1964).

The Middle East was one of the two main topics to have been discussed at the first meeting of the foreign ministers within EPC in November 1970, together with the CSCE (Nuttall 1992, 55); after the meeting, the chairman stated that the Middle East was the subject of “the most detailed exchanges of views” (Bulletin of the European Communities 1970, 16) which is significant considering that the topic of the CSCE touched an area at the very borders of the EEC while the Middle East was much farther geographically. This indicates that the subject of the Middle East had been constitutive for EU foreign policy at the very first EPC meeting. It was included on the agenda of that meeting at the request of France, with the support of Germany and Belgium; France’s interest was to test its position regarding the Middle East which now leaned towards support for the Arab side with the other EEC member states, and to “assert European independence of American policy” (Nuttall 1992, 56), while Germany was interested in stability in the Middle East and in improving its relations with the Arab states (Nuttall 1992, 55–56; Möckli 2009, 71–72).

Also in 1970, the EEC concluded another commercial agreement with Israel in relation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, Council of the European Communities 1970) which contained tariff concessions and did not relate to proceedings within EPC. This shows that, in the beginning of EU foreign policy, the policy of the EEC and developments within EPC concerning the Middle East took place on separate tracks.

The second conference of foreign ministers within EPC produced the first recorded EU foreign policy discourse on the Middle East (Bulletin of the European Communities 1971, 31). Firstly, the reasons for the interest for the Middle East were stated: “long established and close links” between “Europe” and the countries of the Middle East and “interests they have in common”. As it has been shown in the beginning of this case study, long established and

close links existed between two (but not all) EEC member states and the Middle East. Turning to the tools of discourse analysis, this discourse used the rhetorical figure of *metonymy*<sup>43</sup> to generalize the interest of two member states to all EEC member states. Moreover, even though they were general and not specified in more detail, these two phrases were used to substantiate the essence of EEC member states' Middle Eastern policy. The use of "links" and "interests" in EU foreign policy discourse on the Middle East thus exhibited the characteristics of empty or floating signifiers – words which do not hold definite meaning but are used to substantiate key (political) orientations of a society. Also, both of these phrases were connected to identity – through their first recorded discourse on the Middle East, the Middle East was *cast* by EEC countries as an area of their common external "interests" and of "ties" with them. To apply the terminology on EU identity developed in the introductory part, therefore, this was a case of *identity-casting* by EEC countries aimed towards the Middle East; at the same time, they *cast* themselves as a holder of those "ties" and "interests".

The second main feature of the foreign ministers' statement was a repetition of the discourse of the UNSC, namely a reference to "just peace" and to UNSC Resolution 242 (Bulletin of the European Communities 1971, 31). Thirdly, the Six declared their willingness to contribute to "social and economic stabilization of the Middle East" (*ibid.*). In the beginning of EPC, EEC member states thus saw their role in relation to the conflict in terms of a social and economic contribution, and of fostering stability in the area. Concrete implementation was in line with this orientation, as the EEC and UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees) signed a Convention on assistance in the form of food aid to the UNRWA in 1972 (Council of the European Communities 1976).<sup>44</sup> By 1972, in this manner, EEC member states achieved two things in relation to the Middle Eastern conflict: they managed to formulate common positions and the first outlines of a common external identity in relation to this issue and area; and, through this, they staked a claim to the world-political issue that the Middle Eastern conflict came to represent.

In October 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel which led to the fourth Arab-Israeli (Yom Kippur) war that ended with a ceasefire in the same month. Partly in response to this, also during October, the oil crisis of 1973 began as Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increased its oil prices, in some cases by 70 per cent; at the same time, Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) cut back its oil deliveries,

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<sup>43</sup> In all the four studies in the analysis, key analytical findings are highlighted by using *italics*.

<sup>44</sup> Such Conventions between the EEC and the UNRWA were concluded also in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999 and 2002 and covered all these years up to and including 2005 after which they were discontinued.

including to EEC countries, particularly to the Netherlands which was a supporter of Israel (Calvocoressi 2009, 349–350; Möckli 2009, 189–190). The consequences for EEC countries were grave because they depended primarily on the Middle East for oil supplies (Calvocoressi 2009, 54). It became clear that the US and EEC countries had diverging interests when it came to the Middle East, with the US not as heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil as EEC countries, and with the US interested in assisting Israel, while EEC countries were keen to show their readiness to cooperate with the Arab world (*cf.* Calvocoressi 2009, 350; Möckli 2009, 101–102).

The intended audiences of the Declaration on the Situation in the Middle East that was adopted by the foreign ministers of the Nine on 6 November 1973 (Bulletin of the European Communities 1973, 105–106) were therefore not in the EEC, but rather outside, particularly in the US and Arab world. The Declaration had several discursive features. Firstly, reference was made to two UNSC Resolutions – Resolution 242 (1967) which urged withdrawal of Israel from the territories occupied in the 1967 war, and Resolution 338 (1973) which called for a ceasefire and for negotiations to begin on a just peace in the Middle East. Accordingly, the Declaration called for a “just and lasting peace” to be achieved in the Middle East through the implementation of these two Resolutions. In a key phrase, EEC countries declared they were “*ready to do all in their power to contribute to that peace*” (emphasis added). The Declaration then described four elements on which future peace should be based: inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force; end of territorial occupation by Israel; respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area; and, significantly, legitimate rights of the Palestinians. But, in contrast to the press release of 1971, the 1973 Declaration also contained elements of own approach to the Middle East by EEC member states: it stated that peace negotiations should take place “within the framework of the United Nations”; called for “international guarantees” in relation to a possible settlement, referring to Resolution 242; and for “peacekeeping forces” to support such guarantees. The Nine reserved themselves “*the right to make proposals in this connexion*” (emphasis added).

In terms of generating meaning, the Declaration of 1973 thus made at least three symbolic discursive gestures (which could also be called speech acts): it stated the intention of having an own distinct policy towards the Middle East by EEC member states; it made clear that EEC countries thought that appropriate steps for resolution of the conflict should be made within the framework of the UN; and it signalled an understanding to the Arab world by championing the rights of the Palestinians. Regarding this last discursive gesture, the Declaration had immediate effect, as the OAPEC ceased its oil cutback to EEC countries in

November 1973 (Nutall 1992, 95). The first two symbolic gestures of the Declaration, on the other hand, revealed the importance of the identity aspect of dealing with the Middle East for EEC countries; this was made even more clear in the Document on the European Identity that was adopted on 14 December of the same year, which, under the title “European Identity in relation to the world”, proclaimed the intention of the Nine to “*preserve their historical links with the countries of the Middle East*” and to cooperate in achieving peace there. It should be noted that the Document emphasized the *historicity* of the links between EEC countries and the Middle East. This shows that the historical background of engagement of some of EEC countries in the Middle East is important for understanding the way in which EEC countries as a whole were giving meaning to their engagement there (using the tool of *metonymy*). Furthermore, the fact that the issue of the Middle East had been included in the Document on the European Identity (1973) explicitly connected this issue and area to the idea of external EU identity; from this perspective, both the Declaration on the Situation in the Middle East (1973) as well as the placement of the Middle East in the Document on the European Identity functioned as *speech acts* that established EU identity in world politics as one composed of, among others, being involved in the Middle East. Also, the phrase “historical links” was used by the discourse of the Declaration as a floating signifier, because its content was not explained; it was, rather, used in a self-explanatory manner.

Implementation was in line with the discourse of EPC on the Middle East: towards the end of November 1973, collective demarches of the Nine were sent to Arab capitals and the Nine coordinated their positions in UN General Assembly concerning resolutions regarding this conflict (Möckli 2009, 207). But the activism of the Nine had a downside: on the level of world politics, it was not accepted favourably by the key power in relation to the conflict, the US. In March 1974, US President Henry Kissinger made a statement at NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) that EEC countries should issue no further declarations regarding the conflict and that they should prove their identity in other ways than competing with the US in the Middle East (Möckli 2009, 290). In the following years, no EPC statements were made by EEC member states regarding the Middle East; only further agreements on food aid were concluded between the EEC and the UNRWA.<sup>45</sup> It was only in 1977 that another statement on the Middle East was issued by the European Council and the next EPC declaration on the Middle East was made after seven years, in 1980.

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<sup>45</sup> Official Journal (OJ) L 243 of 5. 9. 1974 and OJ L 328 of 7. 12. 1974.

Thus, the period before the first meeting of the European Council in 1975 had seen the crucial first stage of the activity of EEC member states with respect to the Middle East; key elements of a Middle Eastern policy were established. In terms of discourse analysis, the floating signifiers of “links” and “interests” were used to substantiate the policy, the rhetorical figure of metonymy was applied to generalize the interest regarding the Middle Eastern conflict to all EEC member states, and an explicit connection had been made between the issue and area of the Middle East and the idea of EU identity in world politics. The policy itself originated partially in the vital needs of (some of) EEC countries to cooperate with the Arab world; but it was, as the instances of EU identity-casting in the analysis above show, also a process of construction of an own identity in relation to addressing the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. This implies that the Middle Eastern policy of EPC had been infused with identity considerations in its earliest stage. To a small degree, regarding the scarcity of foreign policy instruments that were available to EPC at this early stage, concrete implementation followed orientations of the discourse. However, circumstances on the level of world politics were disadvantageous, as a key world political player pronounced itself against EEC activism.

### 3.1.2 1975 – 1990

On the level of world politics, the period from 1975 to EPC 1980 Venice Declaration on the Middle East was characterized by renewed efforts to achieve peace, such as the Geneva Conference under co-chairmanship of the US and the USSR in 1975-1976, and, afterwards, efforts of the US to achieve peace between Egypt and Israel which bore fruit in the form of the Camp David peace conference in 1978 and the 1979 Peace Agreement between the two countries (*cf.* Calvocoressi 2009, 356).

EPC was not involved in these efforts. Yet EPC discourse in this period painted a picture of engagement with the peace efforts. In 1975, foreign ministers of the Nine stated that the Middle East was of “*utmost importance*” to Europe and the world, expressed warm appreciation for the efforts of Egypt, Israel and the US, and a “conviction” that “negotiations should be kept going” (Bulletin of the European Communities – hereafter Bulletin EC 1975a, 96; emphasis added). The European Council adopted its first statement on the Middle East in 1977. In the statement, the European Council welcomed the efforts towards peace and expressed an interest in “early and successful” negotiations (European Council 1977b). It repeated the four EPC principles for a settlement, but added a new element – a “need for a homeland” for the Palestinians (*ibid.*). The readiness of the Nine to contribute to a settlement

was repeated and explained: EEC countries would contribute to a settlement “to the extent that the parties wish”, and to implementing such a settlement, “putting it into effect”. Overtly, these statements served to express the interest of EEC countries towards the Middle East; but implicitly, they also worked to reproduce the common external identity of EEC countries (EU identity in world politics) that has been established by them as that of being involved at least with (if not in) the Middle East. Nevertheless, although a forward one, this was also a cautious formulation as it did not relate the efforts of EPC directly to the ongoing activities of finding a solution to the conflict on the level of world politics, but, rather, to other conditions and activities, such as initiative of the parties and implementation of a peace settlement. Moreover, since finding a solution was the domain of other powers, particularly the US, the circumspect nature of this formulation reveals a discourse which is striving to avoid any chance of transgressing into that domain while, at the same time, expressing an interest. In effect, therefore, this formulation defined the boundaries of EPC engagement regarding the conflict in the Middle East but also proved the importance of engaging with the Middle East for EEC member states to the relevant audiences. In 1978 and 1979, EPC discourse commended the achievement of US President Carter regarding the peace between Egypt and Israel, while repeating the positions of 1973, particularly the principles of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 (Declaration of the Nine 1978; Bulletin EC 1979a, 86).

Considering the close attention that EPC discourse had been devoting to the peace negotiations although EEC countries were not involved in them, the discourse is characterized by a paradox: while striving to show that the Nine were engaged, and depicting the Nine as if they were on the verge of stepping in (“ready to /.../ contribute”, as in the Declaration of 1973), this readiness has, through the years, not been put into practice, but has, instead, been deferred, proclaimed anew from year to year (e.g. European Council 1977b; Declaration of the Nine 1978). In this discursive manoeuvre, the discursive action of Derridean *différance* can be recognised: the discourse of EPC acknowledged the difference between the present state of the Middle Eastern conflict (with EEC countries not involved in seeking a resolution) and an envisaged future state (when they would be involved), but deferred the realisation of this to an undefined future time. In the absence of actual involvement in the resolution of the conflict, EPC discourse thus tried to bring EEC countries as close to the peace efforts on the level of world politics as possible. From the perspective of the idea of EU identity, these discursive manoeuvres by the Nine reproduced, on the one hand, an ideal of EU identity in world politics as that of being involved in the Middle East that had however not been

achieved yet, while, on the other hand, the common work of the Nine in the field of EU foreign policy was seen as leading towards realisation of this ideal.

From 1978 onwards, EPC discourse contained new elements which articulated a distinguishable EPC position towards the conflict, and reproduced the common external identity of EEC countries as that of being involved in and connected to the Middle East. In UN General Assembly, EPC President Genscher stated that a peace settlement in the Middle East was of “vital interest” to EEC countries too, considering the close ties between them and this region (Genscher 1978). In the Declaration of the Nine Member States of the European Community on the Camp David Agreement of September 1978, the foreign ministers, while expressing “strong support to all efforts to achieve” peace, also expressed an EPC point of view, and through it, a subtle disagreement with the partial peace achieved at Camp David: they expressed “hope” that this agreement was a “step on the path” to a “comprehensive” peace which “all parties concerned” could join. This position was more fully developed in the ministerial statement of March 1979 (Bulletin EC 1979a, 86) which spoke of a road that remained “to be trodden”, and about a need and the ministers’ hope for a “comprehensive settlement” in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. For the first time in the history of EPC, the statement also contained a direct critique of Israel, namely of Israeli policy of establishing settlements in the territories occupied during the 1967 war as an obstacle to the search for peace; this critique was even more extensive in the ministerial statement of June that year (Bulletin EC 1979b, 93). As discourse analysis shows, the discourse of 1978-1979 thus again served to bring the Nine closer to the efforts for resolution as it established them not only as interested observers of efforts on the level of world politics but as an entity with its own views on how those efforts should proceed, inviting the audiences of the discourse to a *figured world* of a *comprehensive* peace settlement (*ibid.*).

Implementation in this period, apart from the regular agreements between the EEC and the UNRWA on food aid, was, in part, going in a different direction than EPC discourse: the EEC and Israel concluded a cooperation agreement in commercial matters in 1975 and a financial protocol in 1978<sup>46</sup> without reference to positions expressed by EPC which showed that EPC and the policy of the EEC continued to work on separate tracks.

The year 1980 brought renewed aspirations for EPC involvement in efforts for peace in the Middle East. The European Council in April that year stated that “Europe” might have “a

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<sup>46</sup> Agreement between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel (OJ L 136/1 of 28. 5. 2976); Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel, and Protocol relating to financial cooperation (OJ L 270/1 of 27. 9. 1978).



role to play” and gave the foreign ministers the task to prepare a report on this for its next session (European Council 1980a); this led, during the course of 1980, to the beginning of realisation in practice of the envisaged idea of external identity of EEC member states that they had been proclaiming with regard to the Middle East. However, at first, these intentions were met by a counter-reaction from the US; in an interview in the end of May that year, President Carter encouraged “European allies not to intervene” and made it clear that the US would use its power of veto in the UNSC to keep the Camp David process going (Nuttall 1992, 164). The discouragement by the US had the effect of diluting the text of the Venice Declaration on the Middle East that was adopted by the European Council in June 1980 (European Council 1980b; cf. Nuttall 1992, 165) which, for the most part, limited itself to repeating the already known positions of EPC: the signifiers of “traditional ties” and “common interests” connecting the EEC to the Middle East, the expression of readiness to participate in a comprehensive settlement, and the call for an end to Israeli occupation of the territories seized in 1967. But, at the same time, the Declaration contained a reference to a “special *role*” that required “Europe /.../ to work in a *more concrete way* towards peace” (emphases added). This conviction about a role to play for the EEC and the call for a concretisation of its efforts were put into practice, as already the end of the Venice Declaration contained a decision to make “contacts with all the parties concerned” in order to establish their positions and what form “an initiative” by the Nine could take. These contacts were made by the Luxembourg Presidency that travelled to the Middle East and met with the US (European Political Cooperation 1982, 225). The European Council, meeting in December (European Council 1980c), concluded that the mission had been a success and that a new round of contacts would be made, in the framework of an “action programme” to bring the parties closer together. These contacts, altogether, represented the first concrete action by EEC member states within EPC regarding the political aspect of the conflict.

However, these activities did not push through to the level of world politics. There were also no further developments and no follow-up of this action in the European Council in the coming years; in 1981, the European Council only “took note” of the report by the Presidency on its Middle Eastern mission (European Council 1981a) and decided to maintain appropriate contacts, including with the US (European Council 1981b). Nevertheless, in his speech in UN General Assembly in September that year, EPC President expressed his conviction that the EEC had a “distinctive *role* to play” in resolving the conflict (Carrington 1981; emphasis added).

In the following years, the discourse of the European Council started to lean more on the US than in its previous statements and declarations, e.g. in 1983 when the European Council stated that US efforts would “continue to be indispensable” for peace negotiations (but also mentioned the need for PLO – Palestine Liberation Organisation representing the Palestinians – to be associated with the negotiations; European Council 1982c; 1983a). But the European Council (European Council 1983a) also expressed the intention of EEC countries “to use their influence to encourage” the parties to find solutions, thus conceiving a new foreign policy initiative with regard to the manner in which EEC countries could indirectly engage in the peace efforts.

In 1985-1986, the Middle East was not discussed by the European Council. Taking this into account, together with the fact that, with respect to finding solutions to the conflict, discourse on the level of the UNSC and UN General Assembly (UNGA) did not mention EEC countries (but mentioned other actors, notably the US – UNGA Resolution 41/162 of 1986), shows that, despite the clear intentions expressed by the European Council in 1980, these intentions did not materialize on the level of world politics.

On the ministerial level, implementation was consistent with the discourse of the European Council critiquing the actions of Israel in that the ministers took action against Israel following its attack on Lebanon in 1982; in June that year, the ministers decided not to sign the second financial protocol between the EEC and Israel (Bulletin EC 1982, 79). This protocol was signed only in June 1983, after a ceasefire agreement was reached between Israel and Lebanon (Speech to the European Parliament by German Foreign Minister, 1983). However, this was not a case of EPC having an impact in terms of world politics; the peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon was achieved through the involvement of the US.

Still, contacts were being maintained with Middle Eastern leaders through visits of representatives of EEC Presidencies (EPC Bulletin 1985, 106; 1986, No. 1, 186; 1986, No. 2, 107). EEC member states also continued to coordinate their positions in discussions within the UNGA on topics related to the Palestinian question (EPC Bulletin 1985; 1986, No. 1; 1986, No. 2; 1987, No. 2; 1988, No. 2; 1989, No. 2). At the same time concrete measures were adopted for increased EEC support to the Palestinians: increase in technical and financial assistance, preferential access to EEC market for industrial and some agricultural exports from the occupied Palestinian territories, and renewed support for the UNRWA, not only for food aid but also for educational programmes (EPC Bulletin 1986, No. 2, 209–210 and 243). The Twelve saw this as a practical expression of their desire to contribute to peace (*ibid.*, 209).

Although the efforts of EEC countries did not have an impact and were not recognized on the level of world politics in terms of contributing to the search for a solution to the conflict, discourse analysis reveals that EPC discourse found a way to magnify these efforts, through a set of embellishments which were mostly adjectives (in the continuation of this thesis, such discursive embellishments will be called *magnifiers*), such as those used in the report of the European Council on the European Union of 1986 (EPC Bulletin 1986, No. 2, 243): even though there were no activities regarding the Middle East within the European Council that year, the report stated that *closest* attention was given to the Middle East, *important series of* contacts with the region were undertaken, *active* contacts with the parties to the conflict were maintained, and *important* measures were adopted for improved aid to the occupied territories. This discursive activity of embellishing and therefore discursively increasing the meaning of EPC engagement in the Middle East indicates that it was important for EEC countries, from an internal perspective, to picture their engagement as significant.

In 1987, after this possibility was articulated by the UNGA in its Resolution 41/162 of 1986, the European Council began expressing support for an international peace conference on the Middle East to be called under the auspices of the UN (European Council 1987; 1988a; 1989a; 1990b). It was emphasized by the European Council that it considered the UN to be “*the* appropriate forum” for direct negotiations between the parties, that the PLO should participate in the negotiations, and that it supported the efforts of permanent UNSC members in that they facilitated the convening of such a peace conference (emphasis added, European Council 1988a; 1989a; 1990b). From the perspective of discourse analysis, this discourse implicitly expressed a less favourable attitude to the calling of a peace conference that would *not* proceed under the auspices of the UN. In connection to the possibility of a peace conference, the European Council stated that the EEC and its member states “*have demonstrated* their readiness to participate *actively* in the search for a *negotiated* solution” (emphases added, European Council 1989a); a phrase that served to establish a relationship between a potential peace conference and efforts of EPC, implying that EEC members too had a stake in participating should such a conference be called. Also, this and similar phrases of EU foreign policy discourse during this period served to underline the external identity of EEC countries as that of being involved with the Middle East.

On the level of the ministers, the possibility of calling such a conference was tested in practice by the succeeding Presidencies through their continued contacts with the parties and powers involved in the Middle East (EPC Bulletin 1987, No. 2, 67; 1988, No. 1, 114); in 1989, the first meeting of such kind was held within the context of EPC efforts regarding the

Middle East with the US Secretary of State; and the Middle East was also included in the political dialogue with the USSR (EPC Bulletin 1989, No. 2, 31).

The discourse of the European Council (1987; 1989a; 1990b) and the ministers (EPC Bulletin 1987, No. 2, 67) also began highlighting a deteriorating human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territories; on the level of the ministers, this discourse was followed by symbolic diplomatic action, as representatives of EEC countries (ambassadors) and the Commission directly presented these concerns (via joint démarches) on a number of occasions to Israeli authorities (EPC Bulletin 1987, No. 2, 316; 1988, No. 1, 42 and No. 2, 247; 1989, No. 1, 196). Apart from devising a novel approach to their involvement in the Middle East (through coordinated action of their ambassadors in Israel), this also implicitly established the common external identity of EEC countries with regard to the Middle East as that of an entity which was a defender of human rights. In the years that followed, the focus on human rights regarding the situation in the occupied territories became a frequently repeated feature of EU foreign policy discourse on the Middle East; also, in connection to the issue of human rights, the will of EEC member states was repeated to contribute to economic and social development of the occupied territories (EPC Bulletin 1987, No. 2, 67; European Council 1987 and 1989a), but, at the same time, it was emphasized that this cannot represent a substitute for a political solution (EPC Bulletin 1987, No. 2, 67).

Before the Madrid peace conference of 1991 and the significant changes in world politics in this period, EPC discourse somewhat explained the signifiers of “links” and “interests” as a rationale for the attention that EPC had been giving to the Middle East: in 1987, the ministers stated that the EEC had “traditional” as well as “political, historical, geographical, economic, religious, cultural and human links” and “shared interests” with the Middle East (EPC Bulletin 1987, No. 1, 114 and 119) which obliged it to “play a *special* role” (emphasis added; this adjective discursively magnified EEC countries’ efforts). This discourse appeared in two statements of the ministers that otherwise did not bring new positions with respect to the Middle East. This represents a puzzle for interpretation: why the extensive discursive handling of the Middle East? It would appear that, since the European Council (1987) in that year again supported an international peace conference that would be called by the UN, the over-worded signifiers have been used to substantiate the continued occupation of EPC with the Middle East, to stake a claim by EEC countries in resolving this conflict, and reproduce their common external identity (EU identity in world politics) as that of being involved.

In the period 1975-1990, therefore, EU foreign policy efforts on the Middle East were characterized by discursive mechanisms, which were, particularly from 1980 onwards, complemented to some degree by concrete undertakings that brought EEC countries closer to the efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East on the level of world politics. The discourse included what could be called traditional tools of diplomacy, such as declarations, responses to what was going on, as well as joint demarches; and new tools for engagement were invented, for example, through joint actions of resident ambassadors of EEC countries in Israel. From 1980, EEC countries also managed to establish contacts with the parties involved in the conflict which were maintained and renewed through the visits of successive Presidencies in the following years, and have established themselves as a counterpart in relation to the two main outside actors with respect to the conflict, the US and the USSR. Simultaneously, these EU foreign policy efforts served to reproduce the idea of EU identity in world politics as one of being involved, of dealing with the Middle East; and not only towards the EEC's outside, but (as importantly) between EEC member states themselves.

EPC had little impact on the workings of world politics with regard to the conflict and, rather, supported the efforts by other actors, mostly the US. Nevertheless, EPC succeeded in formulating a distinctive perspective on how to approach resolving the conflict which included a figured world of a comprehensive peace settlement; and EEC countries started to work around the boundaries that were imposed on their actions on the level of world politics. EPC discourse and action also constructed EEC countries as an actor which was interested in human rights in relation to the conflict.

From the perspective of (re)production of the idea of common external identity of EEC member states (EU identity in world politics), it should not be overlooked that EPC continued its labours on the subject of the Middle East even when they were not welcome on the level of world politics (e.g. after the Vienna Declaration of 1980); and that, during the periods when there were no actions that could be taken by EEC members, EPC produced discourse that connected the EEC to the Middle East and highlighted the importance of engagement. From a diplomatic perspective, this discourse functioned to establish EEC members as an actor in relation to resolving the conflict, and justified this using the signifiers of traditional ties and shared interests between EEC members and the Middle East.

### 3.1.3 1991-2000

The Peace Conference on the Middle East was convened in Madrid, Spain, on 30 October 1991, at the initiative of the US. At the conference, negotiations on the so-called bilateral

track began between Israel and its neighbours; these bilateral talks were to be complemented through multilateral negotiations on regional cooperation in the Middle East with respect to several issues (such as economic cooperation and security; EPC Bulletin 1991, 544). Following the Madrid conference, bilateral talks continued in 1991-1992 in Washington under US and Russian co-sponsorship; multilateral talks began in 1992 in Moscow and were divided into several working groups. While bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians were not successful within the context of the Madrid process, secret talks between them continued in the period 1991-1993 (*cf.* Halliday 2005, 134–135).

In 1991, the European Council (1991b; 1991c) expressed “firm support” to the initiative of the US and highlighted the EEC and its member states as a “participant” intending to make their “full contribution” to the Conference. Following the Conference, in December 1991, the European Council (1991c) repeated EPC principles on which a solution should be based and expressed a “determination” to support the process “*alongside*” the US and the Soviet Union; furthermore, it was stated that, in Madrid, the EEC and its countries “pledged their constructive *partnership*” in the negotiations (emphases added). The actual extent of EPC involvement in the peace process can be determined by looking at statements and actions on the level of foreign ministers. In 1993, the Danish Presidency explained that the EEC was “invited” to attend the Madrid conference “as a participant alongside” the US and the Soviet Union (EPC Bulletin 1993, 211). The EEC was also not an important player in the bilateral talks that continued in Washington – in December 1991, the European Council (1991c) only “noted” these talks; and the Portuguese Presidency, in June 1992, explained that it had “a representative of the troika” present at the talks in Washington who met with the parties to the bilaterals as well as with the US and the USSR, “which many did not think was possible” (EPC Bulletin 1992, 372; 1993, 211). This EPC discourse demonstrated that EEC countries endeavoured to *cast themselves* i.e. they *cast* EU identity in world politics as that of a party entitled to that same level of participation in resolving the Middle Eastern conflict as the US and USSR (a case of EU *identity-casting*).

EEC countries subsequently saw themselves as playing a role in the multilateral track of the peace process that began in Madrid (EPC Bulletin 1992, 124). Yet they were not included from the start in those working groups established within the multilateral track that were of a political nature (e.g. on security) but were included in them only after considerable efforts by EPC Presidency (EPC Bulletin 1992, 124 and 372). But although EEC countries had to exert themselves to be included in the Madrid process, their success i.e. eventual participation in this process, in bilateral as well as multilateral tracks, demonstrated a significant change,

particularly regarding the attitude of the US, concerning the involvement of EEC countries in the Middle East peace process in comparison with the 1980s.

This new set of circumstances and the concomitant tension between the fact that EEC countries were recognized as a counterpart in the Middle East peace process but that their role was very limited at the same time, was evident also from the activities of the ministers. In May 1991, in the run-up to the Madrid Peace Conference, EEC Presidency succeeded in securing participation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at the Conference for which it received appreciation of the US; considering this, and the dialogue that the Presidency had with all the parties to the conflict (EPC President Jacques Poos saw the EEC as being “unique in that”), the EEC expected to have a “mediating role” at the Conference (EPC Bulletin 1991, 242–243). However, as later developments have shown, the EEC did not play a significant role at the Conference nor in the ensuing talks. Similarly, EEC countries envisioned themselves as making “active practical contribution” in the area of regional cooperation in the Middle East within the Madrid and later talks (EPC Bulletin 1991, 545); however, this idea was not developed further in the peace process.<sup>47</sup>

Throughout these events, EEC countries used EU foreign policy discourse to stake their claim in participating in resolving the conflict, and did this by fleshing out the signifiers of “ties” and “interests” that connected them to the Middle East: at the Madrid Conference itself, EPC President explained that due to the close proximity and “intensive relations” as well as “many interests” they shared with the Middle East, EEC countries had a “close interest” in the future of this region and were resolved to participate in building peace; and in February 1992 the ministers made a statement on the Middle East in which they again referred to the “ties” with the region and stated that its stability and security were “essential to Europe’s own” which is why achieving peace was of “vital importance for Europe” (EPC Bulletin 1991, 545; 1992, 124). Also, it was important for the Portuguese Presidency to emphasize that through its activities “Europe’s essential interest in the peace and stability of the Middle East” was “clearly demonstrated” (EPC Bulletin 1992, 372). Altogether, therefore, these statements reveal something about the nature of EEC countries’ interest in participating in resolving the conflict in the Middle East: among others, they show that this interest was endogenous, stemming from the needs and concerns of EEC countries; and that they considered their involvement “essential” – since it has been shown that it was not essential from the perspective of world politics, it follows that it was essential for EEC countries themselves. In

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<sup>47</sup> Instead, the idea of regional cooperation with and between Middle Eastern countries was developed in the following years by the EU itself, in the context of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

turn, this implied that the importance of reproducing the idea of EU identity as that of an actor involved in the Middle East was crucial internally, serving among others as a common cause (and thus a point and resource of common identification) for EEC member states. Accordingly, EEC countries, within EPC, continued to have contacts on their own with the parties to the conflict and offered them good offices “if requested” (*ibid.*, 124).

In August 1993, after secret talks between Israel and the PLO, and following the PLO’s recognition of Israel’s right to exist and Israel’s recognition of the PLO as representative of the Palestinians, an agreement (Oslo I) was reached between the parties which was formalized as Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements in Washington on 13 September 1993; it contained a schedule in three phases stretching from 1993 to 1999 for withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Palestinian territories beginning with the Gaza Strip, and for transfer of power in these territories to the Palestinians (*cf.* Calvocoressi 2009, 369). A further agreement, Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), was signed in Washington on 28 September 1995. These agreements represented a landmark in Israeli-Palestinian relations; however, implementation stalled already by 1996 and, by 2000, relations between Israel and the Palestinians deteriorated again considerably. The EU was excluded by the US and Israel from the negotiations that led up to and followed the Oslo agreements (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 286).

In a discourse that was characteristic for EU foreign policy during this period, the European Council expressed support to the peace process and recognition and welcome for the Declaration of Principles and the ensuing documents that were concluded between Israel and the Palestinians (European Council 1993c; 1994a; 1995a). The typical phrases of the discourse of the European Council as well as of the Council in the period during which the Middle East peace process focused on the Oslo agreements were thus of declaratory nature, such as “*fully agrees* with the co-sponsors /the US and Russia/”, “pays tribute”, “looks forward”, expresses “fervent hope”, while, at the same time, “political support and *readiness* to cooperate” were offered by the EU (emphases added – EPC Bulletin 1993, 159 and 406; European Council 1994a; 1995a).

Considering this, and also looking at the discourse of the ministers, e.g. in 1996 (the ministers were discussing US efforts to bring Israel and the Palestinians to negotiating table following outbursts of violence in the region), a *recurrent discursive structure* can be discerned in EU foreign policy discourse which can be laid out as follows: support to efforts of key outside actors, most often the US, is expressed by EU foreign policy discourse; but this is almost immediately followed by phrases which declare willingness or readiness of the EU



to take on a part of the responsibility for resolving the conflict, to participate in proposals, or to play an active role (Council of Ministers 1996a; 1996b). A similar recurrent discursive structure had been used already in the first statement of the European Council on the Middle East (1977b) and had been repeated since, on the levels of the European Council as well as the ministers when commending the efforts to resolve the Middle Eastern conflict, especially by the US (e.g. European Council 1989a; EPC Bulletin 1993, 159). Using the tools of discourse analysis, it can be observed that this discursive structure exhibits a *contradiction* as, on the one hand, unconditional support to those actors who work on the level of world politics to resolve the conflict is expressed by the discourse; but, on the other hand and at the same time, the discourse expresses a desire for the EU to be elevated to that same level of involvement. It can be observed that EU foreign policy discourse is *trying to achieve* something through this discursive structure, namely greater involvement in resolving the conflict by the EU. In this manner, furthermore, the discourse implicitly *valorizes* greater EU involvement in resolving the conflict. Altogether, in effect, through this discourse, EU countries are implicitly (re)producing the idea of EU identity in world politics as that of an *actor* with regard to the Middle Eastern conflict, an actor which is giving support but is also ready to step in, to become directly involved.

Despite this discourse which revealed a certain disregard for the EU on the level of world politics with respect to the political aspect of the conflict in the Middle East, the years from 1993 were marked by rapid development of CFSP instruments that enabled the EU to engage in the Middle East in concrete terms, but regarding practical aspects of implementation in support of the peace efforts on the level of world politics.

Already in December 1993, as soon as CFSP was established, the European Council (1993c) identified a number of areas for EU initiatives: participation in international arrangements in support of the peace process, strengthening democracy including through electoral assistance and monitoring, building regional cooperation, and, importantly, support to the Palestinian Interim Authority still to be established (here, the European Council emphasized that the EU was the largest donor to the occupied Palestinian territories). These initiatives were concretised on the level of the ministers through the adoption of the first Joint Action on the Middle East in April 1994 (Council of Ministers 1994a). In accordance with it, arrangements were made for the observation of elections to Palestinian Legislative Council in 1995.<sup>48</sup> In November 1996, furthermore, the Council adopted a Joint Action which appointed

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<sup>48</sup> Council Decision of 25 September 1995 supplementing Decision 94/276/CFSP on a joint action by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, in support of the Middle East peace process,

the first EU Special Envoy for the Middle East peace process (Council of Ministers 1996c); significantly, while the first task of the Special Envoy was to establish and maintain contact with the parties to the conflict as well as with the US, he was also given the task of reporting to the Council on possibilities for EU “intervention in the peace process”. Also, contacts were maintained on the level of the ministers with the parties to the conflict, in the region, and with the US (Council of Ministers 1995b; 1996b).

Another important long-term aspect of EU foreign policy on the Middle East from the perspective of concrete implementation which was developed further in this period was assistance to the occupied Palestinian territories. The ministers saw the increase of this assistance as supporting steps forward in the negotiations between Israel and the PLO (Council of Ministers 1994b); in this context, the intention was announced to provide increased aid for the occupied territories. Two Council Regulations were adopted on financial and technical cooperation with the occupied territories.<sup>49</sup> In 1995, provisions were made for disbursement of loans to the Palestinian Authority (PA) as well as appropriations for projects in the occupied territories (European Council 1995b; Council of Ministers 1995b).

Moreover the EU began taking on part of the responsibilities on the level of world politics concerning the economic aspect of the conflict through its involvement in international donor efforts to ensure aid to the Palestinian people and the occupied territories. To begin with, the EU agreed to prepare an international ministerial conference on economic assistance to the Palestinians in 1995 (Council of Ministers 1995b). The EU also worked actively to be included and taken into account in Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), the international coordinating body for development assistance to the Palestinian people (Council of Ministers 1998a); and organised, in February 1999, a meeting of AHLC to review donor efforts (Council of Ministers 1998e).

In the mid-1990s, the aid the EU was providing to the occupied territories and to the region of the Middle East was put in the context of EU support to the Mediterranean region and the EU’s Mediterranean policy (Council of Ministers 1994b). The Mediterranean aspect of cooperation with Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories was implemented through the negotiation and conclusion of an Association Agreement with Israel (in November 1995 – *ibid.* 1995c), and negotiation and conclusion of an Interim Agreement on trade and

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concerning the observation of elections to the Palestinian Council and the coordination of the international operation for observing the elections (94/403/CFSP), OJ L 238/4 of 6. 10. 1995.

<sup>49</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 1734/94 of 11 July 1994 on financial and technical cooperation with the Occupied Territories (OJ L 182/4 of 16. 7. 1994); Council Regulation (EC) No 1735/1994 on financial and technical cooperation with the Occupied Territories and amending Regulation (EEC) No 1763 concerning financial cooperation in respect of all Mediterranean non-member countries (OJ L 182/6, 16. 7. 1994).

cooperation with the PLO for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority (the Agreement was signed in June 1997 – *ibid.* 1996d; 1997c). At the same time, the EU began to use the content of these negotiations and agreements as a channel through which it could put pressure on Israel and the Palestinians in relation to the peace process – for instance, in December 1996, in the light of a deterioration in the relations between Israel and the Palestinians, the European Council (1996b) emphasized that the Association Agreement with Israel and the Interim Agreement to be concluded with the PA committed both of these countries to promote compliance with the basic norms of democracy and human rights. In December 1997, the European Council (1997b) stated, in addition, that it would use the joint dialogue with Israel to remove obstacles to Palestinian economic development.

The political significance of the Mediterranean aspect of dealing with the Middle East for the EU is evident also from European Council statement on the Middle East in relation to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (European Council 1997a): it stated that “the peoples” of “Europe” and the Middle East were “linked by a common destiny”; and invited the “peoples of the Middle East” to join the “peoples of Europe” in “building a future of harmony”. Apart from the rhetorical figure of *metonymy* that was used by the discourse which equated the political agents of the anticipated cooperation with “the peoples” as a whole, in Europe as well as in the Middle East, this discourse contained another unexplained (empty) signifier – the “common destiny” of the peoples of Europe and the Middle East; in addition, it also contained a figured world of a common future of harmony. From these three rhetorical figures, the empty signifier of a “common destiny” is most strongly linked to identity considerations although all of them were related to identity (*cf.* e.g. Sen 2009). Thus, in another iteration of the activity of EU *identity-casting* by EU foreign policy discourse, the idea of EU identity in world politics was reproduced as that of being connected to the Middle East.

From 1997 on, the EU stepped up its endeavours to be included in the peace process on the level of world politics. In January 1997, the Protocol on implementation of Israeli redeployment in Hebron was agreed between the Chairman of the PA Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu; although this process was led by the US, EU Special Envoy for the Middle East Miguel Angel Moratinos was able to play a role in it, through his contacts with Yasser Arafat (Council of Ministers 1997a; UNISPAL 1997). Importantly, in a practice that accompanied the conclusion of this Protocol and subsequently also other significant steps in the peace process during this stage, EU foreign ministers provided a letter of assurance to Yasser Arafat which contained a pledge that the EU would

use its “political and moral might” to ensure implementation of the agreements reached by the parties within the peace process (Council of Ministers 1997a; 1999b; 2000b). This was also an expression in practice of the envisaged idea of EU identity with regard to the Middle East.

In April 1997, the EU proposed a Code of Conduct to Israel and the Palestinians with the aim of fostering peace; this document and other EU proposals for the peace process (such as opening of the Gaza airport and free passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) were the subject of contacts of EU Special Envoy and EU Presidency with the parties to the conflict, the US and Russia (Council of Ministers 1997f; 1997g); and were incorporated in the guidelines of the European Council of December 1997 aimed at facilitating progress in the peace process (European Council 1997b). The guidelines contained a set of measures and approaches proposed in the short and medium term on the Palestinian track, Syrian and Lebanese tracks, and with regard to cooperation with the US and “other parties” (support for US efforts was expressed, as well as willingness to “work closely” with the US and to maintain close contact with Russia); and thus represented, together with the Code of Conduct, the first elaborate proposal of what the EU considered to be the necessary steps for eventual attainment of peace in the Middle East. Moreover, the Council held meetings with Yasser Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, as well as with other representatives of both parties to the conflict; and meetings between high-ranking representatives of both parties, including between the Chairman of the PA and Israeli Prime Minister were held in Brussels (Council of Ministers 1997d; 1997f; 2000a).

In 1997, EU foreign policy devised a new tool which helped it implement its interests regarding human rights in the occupied territories, Israeli settlement policy and Jerusalem – the “watch instrument” whereby embassies of EU member countries in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem observed what was happening in Israel on the ground and then reported to the Council of Ministers; in 1998, a summary of these reports was made public (European Council 1997b; Council of Ministers 1997b; 1998b). Also, EU foreign policy began focusing on the fight against terrorism (European Council 1997b); measures were adopted to support the PA in its fight against terrorist activities emanating from the occupied territories.<sup>50</sup> In addition to constituting itself as a subject who advocated human rights, the EU thus started constituting its identity in world politics also with regard to the fight against terrorism.

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<sup>50</sup> Joint Action of 29 April 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the establishment of a European Union assistance programme to support the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to counter terrorist activities emanating from the territories under its control (97/289/CFSP; OJ L 120/2 of 12. 5. 1997); and Council Decision of 6 July 1999 concerning the extension of this Joint Action (1999/440/CFSP; OJ L 171/1 of 7. 7. 1999).

In 1999 and 2000, the Council instructed the relevant bodies (EU Presidency, the High Representative for CFSP, the Commission and Special Envoy for the Middle East) to examine how the EU could support and contribute to the bilateral tracks of the peace process, and instructed them also to consult the US on this (Council of Ministers 1999a; 2000a). This heightened activity to identify how the EU could engage in the Middle East took place at the same time as that phase of the Middle East peace process which concerned the signature and implementation of the Sharm-el-Sheikh Memorandum between Israel and the PLO of 5 September 2000.<sup>51</sup> In a new development, EU representatives were included in this phase of the peace process. In particular, EU Presidency and Special Envoy were present in Sharm-el-Sheikh at the signature, and the EU was invited to the opening ceremony of final status talks in Erez (Council of Ministers 1999b). Moreover, EU High Representative for CFSP represented the EU within the Fact-Finding Committee which was set up by the Sharm-el-Sheikh summit in October 2000 to examine the causes of the second Arab uprising (Intifada) that began in September 2000 (European Council 2000d).

Even though this shows that the EU managed to be in touch with the course of world politics on the Middle East peace process, and to be represented at the main events, particularly from 1999 onwards, it can also be observed, if we analyse EU foreign policy discourse as well as discourses on the level of world politics (by the UNGA and the US, for example), that EU initiatives did not affect the dynamics of the Middle East peace process itself, as breakthroughs occurred and negotiations moved forward through the actions of other actors, particularly the US. In September 1997, Israel and the Palestinians agreed to resume negotiations following personal engagement by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (which was welcomed by the EU – Council of Ministers 1997f). On 23 October 1998, Wye River Memorandum on resumption of implementation of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was signed by both parties in Washington; the negotiations were led at the Wye River by US President Bill Clinton (this achievement was noted by the UNGA in its Resolution 53/42 of 20 January 1999). As mentioned before, on 4 September 1999, after further efforts of the US, as well as Egypt and Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians signed the Sharm-el-Sheikh Memorandum.

With regard to these breakthroughs on the level of world politics, the discourse and activities of the European Council and the Council were limited to declaratory phrases calling for peace and aimed at Israel and the Palestinians (Council of Ministers 1999b; European

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<sup>51</sup> The aim of the Memorandum was to provide for the implementation of outstanding commitments between the parties concerning the previous agreements.

Council 1997a; 1997b; 1998a; 1998b; 1999a; 1999b; 2000c) and to supporting the efforts of the parties and the US (Council of Ministers 1998a; 1998b; 2000c; European Council 1998a; 1999d). Furthermore, the discourse of these two EU bodies after 1997 did not mention EU proposal for a Code of Conduct between Israel and the Palestinians. Rather, in EU foreign policy discussions on peace efforts on the level of world politics, the familiar discursive structure could be observed where support offered by EU foreign policy discourse to the efforts for peace on the level of world politics was closely followed by a statement of the EU's readiness or offer to participate or to make a contribution in the peace process (e.g. Council of Ministers 1997f; 1998a; 1998d; 2000c; European Council 1998a; 1998b; 1999a). These statements again stressed the importance for the EU of reproducing EU identity as one of involvement with the Middle East. But the EU even depended on the US and Russia as the co-sponsors for the resumption of the multilateral track of the peace process in which it saw itself as making a more substantial contribution (Council of Ministers 2000a).

In substantive terms, the EU did have a role in the peace process from an economic perspective, since it supported continued functioning of the Palestinian Authority. The European Council (1997b; 1998b) started to emphasize that the EU was the largest donor of financial assistance to the PA and saw this as an argument for the EU to have a larger role in the peace process. In relation to this, it was stressed that economic development represented a prerequisite for political stability (Council of Ministers 1998c; European Council 1997b). In 1997, the EU provided emergency payment to the PA for its pressing needs (Council of Ministers 1997e). Also, in 1998 the EU was involved in negotiations on interim economic issues in the peace process (European Council 1998a).

This discrepancy between the political and economic involvement of the EU in the Middle East peace process was noted by the European Parliament in 1999 and 2000, when it adopted Resolutions in relation to the Middle East peace process in which it regretted that the EU did not play a "meaningful political role" although it was one of the main financial contributors and stated that the EU's financial role should be matched "in the political field" in that the EU should "be involved in all the negotiations" (European Parliament 1999a; 1999b; 2000). These observations also pointed to a discrepancy between how the EU saw its external identity with regard to the Middle East as compared to how the process of its external identity construction fared on the level of world politics, in relation to the other actors involved in the peace process.

The E(E)C continued to conclude agreements with Israel that did not refer to the peace process: protocols on financial cooperation were concluded in 1991 and 1992;<sup>52</sup> two agreements were concluded regarding public procurement in 1997;<sup>53</sup> and in 1999, an agreement was concluded on scientific and technical cooperation.<sup>54</sup> This indicates that the discrepancy between E(E)C policies and EU foreign policy continued also after the establishment of CFSP.

#### 3.1.4 The 2000s

In 2001 and 2002, conclusions on the Middle East were adopted at three European Council meetings in each of these years, and in 2003 and 2004 at four meetings. This indicates that there was increased activity within EU foreign policy regarding the Middle East in this period. From the perspective of the three-pronged analytical approach, taking into account EU foreign policy discourse, concrete actions as well as the context of world politics, these were the years in which EU foreign policy scored two successes on the level of world politics – EU participation in the Middle East Quartet, and adoption of the Roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by the Quartet.

With regard to the first, there were indications already in 2001 that the EU was being treated differently than before on the level of world politics when a joint statement was produced by EU Special Envoy, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process, Russian Special Envoy and US Consul-General following their meeting with Yasser Arafat in October 2001 (UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process 2001). In December 2001, the European Council (2001e) as well as the Council (2001f) mentioned a need for “concerted action” together with the UN, the US and Russian Federation (RF); and the High Representative for CFSP (HR) Javier Solana was mandated to pursue contacts towards this objective (European Council 2001e). In its Resolution 1403/2002 of 4 April 2002, the UNSC (2002a) welcomed the mission of these four entities; although the EU was mentioned last by the UNSC, this was the first reference to EU foreign policy (including EPC) by any UNSC Resolution on the Middle East by that time. In addition, this was also the first explicit recognition of the process of EU external identity formation with regard to the

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<sup>52</sup> Protocol relating to financial cooperation between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel, OJ C 135/13 of 25. 5. 1991; and OJ L 94/46 of 9. 4. 1992.

<sup>53</sup> Agreement between the European Community and the State of Israel on procurement by telecommunications operators and Agreement between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel on government procurement (OJ L 202/74 and 202/85 of 30. 7. 1997).

<sup>54</sup> Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation between the European Community and the State of Israel, OJ L 83/51 of 27. 3. 1999.

Middle Eastern conflict on the level of world politics and by the relevant actors. The Quartet as such was mentioned in the same year in UNSC Resolution 1435/2002 (UN Security Council 2002b) that expressed “full support” to its efforts, thus endorsing this informal body. The four entities first gave joint statement as the Quartet at their meeting in Madrid on 10 April 2002. But the EU’s participation in the Quartet is not the only reason why this body can be seen as a success of the EU’s Middle Eastern policy; perhaps even more importantly, in the words of HR Solana (2003), the EU participated in “devising and setting up” this body. This is why the Quartet can be seen as the first output with regard to EU involvement in the Middle East on the level of world politics.

Moreover the Roadmap which represented the Quartet’s agreed vision of how to approach resolving the conflict was an initiative of the EU (Solana 2003). In 2002, the EU presented other Quartet members “with a joint roadmap” which foresaw that a Palestinian state would be established by 2005 (Council of Ministers 2003c; Quartet 2002b). On 20 December 2002, the Quartet adopted its Roadmap which built on this draft (*ibid.*). On 30 April 2003, the Quartet Roadmap was presented to Israel and the PA; it was notified to the UNSC in May 2003 (Quartet 2003). It contained a vision of how a permanent solution to the conflict would be achieved through three stages – by May 2003, terrorism would be ended and the life of the Palestinians normalised; by December 2003, a Palestinian state with provisional borders would be created; and in the period 2004-2005, a permanent status agreement would be reached between Israel and the Palestinians (*ibid.*). The UNSC (2003) endorsed the Roadmap in its Resolution 1515/2003 of 15 November 2003 in which it called on Israel and the Palestinians to “fulfil their obligations” from the Roadmap. Nevertheless, in subsequent years, implementation of the Roadmap stalled.

In the years that followed, EU foreign policy focused on the Roadmap as the solution to the conflict. Discourse emphasizing that there was “no alternative” to the Roadmap, and that the Roadmap represented the “only route” to a peaceful solution, was frequent (Council of Ministers 2003d; European Council 2003d; 2004a; 2004b; 2005b); in 2004, when Israel announced its intention to withdraw from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, it was underlined by the EU that this should take place in the context of the Roadmap and not replace it (Council of Ministers 2004c; European Council 2004a). It may thus be observed that, following the endorsement of the Roadmap, EU vision of a possible solution to the conflict narrowed down to what was written in the Roadmap: from the perspective of discourse analysis and for EU foreign policy, the Roadmap represented an elaborate *figured world* of eventual resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. This figured world



contained, in contrast to efforts on the level of world politics which were focusing on the bilateral relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, a vision of *comprehensive* peace which would include Syria and Lebanon (*cf.* European Council 2003d; 2004b; 2004d).

If we look at the effectiveness of EU foreign policy in practice, implementation of the Roadmap did not proceed as planned. It was clear by the end of 2004 that the Roadmap would not be followed, as the situation between Israel and the Palestinians worsened: Israeli settlement activities continued, there was a resurgence of violence from the occupied Palestinian territories to which Israel responded by force (missile strikes on targets in the occupied territories), by tightening security measures, and by continuing its construction of a security wall in the West Bank which began in 2002; the humanitarian situation in the occupied territories deteriorated. In these circumstances, the contents of the Roadmap were a dead letter – the Roadmap was not a true roadmap anymore, but instead, in subsequent negotiations, became an overview of the requirements that would need to be fulfilled by the parties at an undefined time in the future (e.g. Quartet 2008a; 2009a). Thus, due to the reality on the ground, the Roadmap was not implemented; even though it represented an important success of EU foreign policy, it was an output and not an outcome from the perspective of world politics.

The Quartet also did not turn out to be functioning the way the EU had hoped. Initially, the EU anticipated that the Quartet would directly assist Israel and the Palestinians in resuming negotiations for a peace settlement: the European Council stated that “/t/he Quartet has a key role to play in starting a peace process” and the Council produced similar discourse (Council of Ministers 2001f; European Council 2002b; 2002d). In addition, the EU saw the Quartet as engaging the US (and its peace efforts) in joint action: Solana (2003) stated that the Quartet made possible direct US involvement “in the context of a joint action”. However, from its very beginning, the Quartet, rather, generated support for US efforts to achieve peace, and was itself not directly involved in those efforts. Already in its beginning, in July 2002, the Quartet welcomed President George Bush’s commitment to US “leadership” in finding a peace settlement (UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process 2001; Quartet 2002a). At the same time, EU foreign policy discourse showed that the EU, too, looked to the US as the main actor to be making concrete steps towards overall peace – support was expressed in 2001 to the Sharm-el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (European Council 2001b) led by former US Senator George Mitchell; to Special Envoy of US President to the Middle East Anthony Zinni in March 2002 (European Council 2002a); and to US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s mission to the Middle East in April 2002 (Council of Ministers 2002a). In

October 2001 (Council of Ministers 2001e), the ministers urged the US to “exert all its influence” to achieve a settlement. In turn, this implied that the EU saw its own identity with regard to the Middle Eastern conflict as connected to the US as the main actor.

This was in line with the report of HR Solana to the Göteborg European Council (Solana 2001a) which said that the US would “*always* continue to be *essential*” for the peace process, and emphasized the importance of consultation and coordination of the EU’s efforts which would need to be complementary to those of the US (emphases added).<sup>55</sup> At the same time, the interest of the EU for the Middle East was explained – in Solana’s (2001a) view, peace and stability there were of »*fundamental* interest« to the EU because of the proximity of this region to the EU and because of possible negative consequences of instability there for the EU (emphasis added).

The discourse used in Solana’s report (2001a) is of interest from the perspective of discourse analysis and deconstruction as it used words which essentialized the meaning conveyed through them, in particular the adjectives “always”, “essential” and “fundamental”. These signifiers implied that not only was the Middle East of deep, “fundamental” significance for the EU, but also that the relationship of the EU with the US regarding the Middle East was of such significance, and, moreover, that this relationship was of a timeless character, as the word “always” was used to describe it. Therefore, although the adjectives in Solana’s report were used to describe the EU’s position regarding the Middle East, they simultaneously contributed to a closure of meaning regarding the EU’s involvement in the Middle East, and, through this, also to closing the meaning of EU identity in world politics.

By 2004, EU foreign policy discourse (Council of Ministers 2004a) started to point out that the Quartet should have an “*active* role” in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East (emphasis added). This phrase was the same as the one the EU used to underline its own desire for greater involvement in the resolution of the conflict (below). By the end of 2004, the European Council (2004c) endorsed an initiative for a “short-term programme of action”, proposed by the HR, to support the PA in various fields (such as security and reforms); and the European Council emphasized (2004c; 2004d) that success of the proposed actions would be enhanced if they were put “in a broader political perspective” and instructed the HR to pursue consultations to this effect with the other members of the Quartet in particular.

An analysis of EU foreign policy discourse and practice therefore shows that, even though the EU managed to participate in the Middle East Quartet and to influence the

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<sup>55</sup> EU foreign policy discourse also expressed support for efforts of other actors, such as those of Egypt in Taba in 2001 (Council of the ministers 2001a).

contents of the Roadmap, the tension in EU foreign policy between support to the US as the main actor on the level of world politics as well as to other actors directly involved in resolving the conflict, and the EU's own desire to be directly involved, continued also in the period after the creation of the Quartet and the endorsement of the Roadmap. To illustrate, EU foreign policy discourse contained elements that signalled resistance against the prevailing state of affairs on the level of world politics: continued use of the discursive structure which conveyed support for the efforts of other actors while simultaneously emphasising that the EU should play an “*active role*” (emphasis added; Council of Ministers 2001a; 2001e; European Council 2001b; 2002a; 2002b; 2003d; 2003e); and drawing of attention to the need for an international monitoring mechanism of implementation of the Roadmap (which was foreseen by the Quartet) while expressing the EU's readiness to participate in it (European Council 2001b; 2002a; 2003d; 2003e). This also shows that, implicitly, EU foreign policy discourse continued to valorize EU involvement in the conflict, and that, in these circumstances, the idea of EU identity as that of an actor with regard to the Middle Eastern conflict was constructed indirectly, by calling for an active role by the Quartet, in which the EU was represented.

In addition, the EU conceived its own strategic framework for “peace, prosperity and progress” in the region – a partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, in the context of which also the EU's engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was put (European Council 2003d; 2004a; 2004b). The EU thus began to see its engagement in the Middle East through the lens of its own broader strategic approach.

With regard to the context of world politics, the EU was also not a key player in this period. Even though it was engaged with the parties to the conflict directly, through frequent visits to the region by the HR and the Presidency and through visits of the leading figures of the parties to the conflict to Brussels (Council of Ministers 2001c; 2003a; 2003b; 2004b; 2005c; European Council 2002a), the EU was mostly occupied with the drawing of attention to the need to support as well as with supporting directly the functioning of the Palestinian Authority (including through budgetary support), the Palestinian economy (Council of Ministers 2001b; 2001c; 2001f; 2003b; European Council 2002a; 2002d), and with providing assistance to the PA in the process of administrative, political and security reforms (Council of Ministers 2004c; European Council 2002b; 2004d). Significantly, the EU was focused on preventing institutional and economic collapse in the occupied territories and organised international efforts (in the framework of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee) to prevent this (Council of Ministers 2001b; European Council 2001a); and, towards the end of 2004, the EU

began supporting democratic transition in the Palestinian territories (European Council 2004d) and institutional consolidation of the PA (*ibid.* 2005b).

In terms of practical implementation of foreign policy, the EU had a prominent role in supporting the functioning of the PA during the period from January 2006 to February 2007 when a Hamas-led<sup>56</sup> government was in power in the Palestinian territories following democratic elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006 (the elections were monitored by the EU through its Electoral Observation Mission). Following the elections, the Quartet (2006a) called on the new government to commit to non-violence, recognize Israel, and to accept previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements and obligations. Due to the position of the Hamas government which did not commit to this, and since Hamas had been included on the list of groups involved in terrorist activities by the EU in 2001, the EU decided to discontinue its support to the PA; a solution was to provide assistance to the Palestinian people directly, because this was a “moral imperative” and because there would otherwise be a risk of humanitarian crisis and instability in the region (Solana 2006).

To deliver this assistance, the EU developed a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) together with international financial institutions and key donors (Council of Ministers 2006a; European Council 2006b); this mechanism was endorsed by the Quartet (2006b). TIM was launched in June 2006 with the main objective of providing for the basic needs of the Palestinian people and functioned on the basis of three-month periods; each extension was approved by the Quartet (e.g. 2006c; European Council 2006c). In February 2007, an agreement was reached by the Palestinians in Mecca on forming a government of national unity, mediated by Arab leaders; although TIM continued until the end of March 2008, the EU resumed direct (financial and technical) support to the PA by July 2007 (Council of Ministers 2007d). Thus, although a government came to power in the Palestinian territories in January 2006 that the Quartet (and the EU, as Quartet member) could not agree with, the EU worked to organise support on the level of the international community to provide for the Palestinian people. In a sense, this can be seen as a culmination of the EU’s practical efforts to provide for the Palestinians by that time, and also as a demonstration of the EU’s commitment to stability in the Palestinian territories.

Concerning diplomatic efforts, the EU was involved in ‘micro-diplomacy’ – for example, it helped resolve a crisis around the Nativity Church in Bethlehem in 2002 by

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<sup>56</sup> Hamas is a political party that operates in the Palestinian territories which has been suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. The “terrorist wing of Hamas” was put on EU list of groups involved in terrorist activities contained in Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP; OJ L 344/93 of 28. 12. 2001).

providing a temporary stay to Palestinian militants who sought refuge in the church (Council of Ministers 2003c). But the biggest material contribution of the EU to the peace efforts in the period observed came in the form of two ESDP missions to the Palestinian territories – EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah.

As the first ESDP mission to the Middle East, EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) was established by the Council in November 2005 with a mandate to contribute to the establishment of Palestinian policing arrangements (Council of Ministers 2005d). It built on the experience of EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) which began operating in the Palestinian territories in January 2005 to contribute to the reform of Palestinian security sector (*ibid.* 2006d). This means that, from January 2005, the EU had a permanent presence on the ground in the Palestinian territories which was strengthened in November that year (*cf. ibid.*). EUPOL activities were expanded in 2008 to include support to Palestinian Civilian Police and in the area of criminal justice system (Council of Ministers 2008b; 2008c).

In November 2005, the Agreement on Movement and Access was concluded between Israel and the PA with the engagement of HR Solana and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice; its objective was to facilitate movement between the Palestinian territories and provide for the opening of the Rafah crossing point between Gaza and Egypt – with respect to this, the Agreement provided for third party monitoring role (PLO 2005; Council of Ministers 2006d). In a letter of 2 November 2005, Quartet Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement James Wolfensohn requested the EU to assume this role; the Council of Ministers agreed and decided to launch ESDP EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah; Council of Ministers 2005e; 2005f). Apart from providing for the opening of this crossing point, the mandate of the mission was to monitor the related activities of the PA, to contribute to capacity-building in this area and to liaison with the concerned Israeli, Egyptian and Palestinian authorities (*ibid.* 2005g). The European Council (2005c) stated that the mission was an expression of the EU's commitment to supporting the parties' efforts towards a peace settlement. This discourse conveyed that for the EU, this ESDP mission represented a realisation of the idea of EU identity in world politics as that of an actor connected to resolving the Middle Eastern conflict.

To summarize the historical aspect of the analysis of EU Middle Eastern policy so far, it can be observed that there had been a steady progression of EU foreign policy activities in terms of EU presence in the conflict area and in peace negotiations since the beginning of EU foreign policy deliberations on the Middle East. The EU's Middle Eastern policy had first

been developed in earnest by the 1980s which were a period during which visits to the Middle East by EPC representatives became usual practice. During the 1990s, there were regular contacts between EU foreign policy representatives and representatives of the parties as well as the main outside actors, also through visits of the parties to Brussels; moreover, it became a matter of practice that the EU was invited to peace negotiations. And, in the 2000s, EU presence in the conflict area was “assured”, through the two ESDP missions that were established in the Middle East (as stated in CFSP report for 2005; Council of Ministers 2005d).

But, from the perspective of world politics, although this was a success of EU foreign policy, it needs to be taken into account that Israel accepted the EU’s role with regard to the Rafah crossing point, for example, only at the insistence of the US (Musu 2007, 117). Also, in the period observed, EUBAM monitors last participated in the opening of the Rafah crossing point in June 2007 despite repeated expressions by the EU of its readiness to resume the monitoring (Council of Ministers 2008b; 2009a; EUBAM Rafah 2014). This leads to a conclusion that even when the EU was able to contribute to the resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, it had to rely on other powers and circumstances beyond its control to be able to make that contribution.

Also, concerning overall efforts to resolve the conflict, actors other than the EU continued to have the decisive role. The Sharm-el-Sheikh Summit of February 2005, where Israel and the PA denounced violence towards each other, thus allowing for further peace talks, was made possible through the activities of the US, Egypt and Jordan. The US continued to facilitate the peace talks between the parties in 2007, with the engagement of US Secretary of State Rice. And, although the EU called for an international peace conference to be launched by the Quartet (European Council 2006c; Council of Ministers 2007a; 2007d), the Annapolis Conference of November 2007 which succeeded in the resumption of bilateral negotiations between Israel and the PA was organised by the US. In addition, calm in Gaza in June 2008 was achieved by Egypt, and indirect talks between Israel and Syria began in the end of 2008 with the assistance of Turkey.

In the light of these peace initiatives by other actors, EU foreign policy discourse was, again, reduced to expressing the EU’s welcome and support to these efforts (Council of Ministers 2007b; 2007e; 2007f; 2008c; 2008d; 2009a; European Council 2005b; 2007a; 2008e). In 2008 and 2009, the European Council, contrary to previous heightened EU activity, considered the Middle East only once per year; at the same time, in the Presidency Conclusions of these discussions, the magnifying adjective of “top” was used in European

Council discourse in relation to the Middle East – the European Council stated that the Middle East was of “top priority” for the EU (European Council 2008e; 2009c). This served to discursively magnify the significance of dealing with the Middle East during a period in which no new initiatives on this topic were otherwise launched by the EU; and to keep up the representation of the idea of EU identity in world politics as one of involvement with the Middle East.

The Quartet also did not play an active role in these efforts to achieve peace although it discussed them regularly (Quartet 2005; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007e; 2008a; 2008b; 2009). EU foreign policy discourse, however, called for and supported “*active contribution*” of the Quartet to the peace process (emphasis added; Council of Ministers 2006c; European Council 2006c; 2007a). Furthermore, EU foreign policy discourse expressed a desire for the Quartet to lead on efforts by the international community to resolve the conflict (Council of Ministers 2006b; 2007c; European Council 2006c). This indicates that there were attempts by the EU to steer the peace process so that the body in which the EU was participating could have more influence. But, even though former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair was appointed as Quartet representative in June 2007 (Quartet 2007d), the Quartet itself did not come to be engaged directly in negotiations between the parties to the conflict.

Considering the above, it can be observed, in a figurative sense, that there was an “outside” to EU foreign policy discourse on the Middle East. This “outside” were the circumstances of world politics and realities on the ground which conditioned the EU’s contribution to peace in the Middle East. It has been shown above that this “outside” was beyond the control of the EU. Here and there, EU foreign policy discourse appeared strange and difficult to understand because it tried to avoid this fact i.e. it could not mention explicitly that the EU depended on the conditions of world politics and other actors for its contribution to peace in the Middle East, and for its external identity construction with regard to the Middle East. Therefore, since the outside, the conditions of world politics, is what explains, opens and closes EU foreign policy discourse on the Middle East in the period by 2009, it might be called a *blind spot* of EU foreign policy discourse on the Middle East – in the sense of a Derridean (*cf.* Derrida 1967/1997) blind spot which signifies that a discourse is structured around something that cannot be mentioned by the discourse, but, at the same time, defines and delimits that discourse. On another level of abstraction, the concept of blind spot also shows how the collective level of EU foreign policy (and, by implication, the idea of EU identity in world politics) functioned as it tried to avoid the reality of being delimited through the circumstances of world politics (*cf.* Wæver 2015).

Thus, if, following Žižek (1991/2008) and using the approach of deconstruction, identity is constructed through reference to something other than the subject itself, then a large part of EU identity as it had been constructed through EU foreign policy discourse and practice on the Middle East consisted of the dependence of the EU on the conditions of world politics and other actors for making a contribution to the peace process as well as, and in relation to this, for the (re)production of its identity in world politics as one of being connected to the Middle East and of contributing to the resolution of the conflict(s) there. This dependence on the circumstances of world politics can be corroborated by observing the alternations of the periods of increased activity on the level of the European Council with respect to the Middle East with the periods of little or no activity that have occurred when initiatives for resolution which have been proposed or backed by the EU have shattered due to the circumstances that were beyond its control.

In the end of the period observed, EU foreign policy discourse retained some of its pervasive characteristics with respect to the Middle East, in particular its reliance on declaratory verbs such as “calls on” or “is determined” (e.g. Council of Ministers 2006a; 2008b; European Council 2005b). Likewise, the EU’s determination to make an “active” contribution was repeated (Council of Ministers 2006c; 2007d; European Council 2007a). This repetition occurred in the context of the already described discursive structure where support was first expressed to other actors, followed by expression of the EU’s readiness to make an active contribution (Council of Ministers 2007b; European Council 2007a). In 2007, the Council of Ministers stated on a number of occasions that the EU was determined to play an active role “in the framework of increased Quartet engagement” (Council of Ministers 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d). In addition, the EU’s desire for a “stronger monitoring role for the Quartet on the ground” was stressed, together with the EU’s readiness to assist in implementation of a peace agreement (Council of Ministers 2008d). Regarding the US, the Council stated in June 2009 (2009b) that the EU was “encouraged by enhanced US engagement”. Thus, using discursive devices, the idea of EU identity in world politics as being active(ly involved) with regard to the Middle Eastern conflict was reproduced.

In effect, and to conclude the analysis of EU foreign policy discourse and practice on the Middle East, in the context of world politics, these features of EU foreign policy in the end of the period observed suggest that although EU foreign policy retained much of its characteristics that have been established in the years when EPC began to consider the Middle East, particularly in the period 1975-1990, EU foreign policy, through discourse and action,



also tried to work around the constraints stemming from the context of world politics with regard to EU engagement in the Middle East.

### 3.1.5 EU identity: bottom-up perspective

As the idea of EU identity in world politics in relation to the conflict in the Middle East was being constructed on a collective level, through EU foreign policy, perhaps a reflection of this idea on the level of individuals (*cf.* Žižek 1990/1992; Wæver 1998; 2005a) can be observed by looking at the work of the European Parliament in relation to the Middle East and Eurobarometer polls that touched this issue. Also, in this way it can be observed whether there were any aggregate individual, bottom-up processes of EU identity formation related to the Middle East.

The European Parliament (EP) has been receiving reports on EPC since the first full year of EPC's existence i.e. 1971; since as early as 1975 (Bulletin EC 1975b, 94) these reports have included the Middle East which shows that this subject was seen as being of importance. The content of parliamentary questions in connection to the Middle East that were posed to the Presidencies in the context of EPC (e.g. EPC Bulletin 1985, 106; 1986, No. 2, 107; 1988, No. 2, 95 and 114; 1991, 242; 1993, 158 and 211) shows that, already during the time of EPC, the Members of the EP were not only interested in the course of events in the Middle East, but were also inquiring what has been done by EPC to help resolve and alleviate the situation there. Similarly, later EP Resolutions on the Middle East (1999a; 1999b; 2000) reveal a conviction that the EU should have been involved in the efforts for overall political resolution of the conflict, and not only through its economic, financial and technical assistance.

However, in the period observed, there were no Eurobarometer polls specifically with regard to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians; already this is telling in that it points towards a possible conclusion that this conflict has been judged to be so remote from the population of the EU that popular opinion was not considered to be of relevance. The poll in which Israel and the Palestinian territories have been included has been that on the EU's neighbours (Eurobarometer 2006a; 2007) which showed that only a small percentage of the persons interviewed considered Israel and the Palestinian territories as neighbours of the EU (16 % and 14 % for 2006 and 2007 respectively in the case of Israel, and 10 % in the case of the Palestinian territories for both years – *ibid.*).

Although Israel and the Palestinian territories appear not to have been considered important from the perspective of the EU's population, EU foreign policy has been dealing

with them extensively and continuously, as we have seen in the previous subchapters. Moreover, while, since its beginnings, EU foreign policy has been leaning towards support for the Palestinian side, Eurobarometer figures show that EU population has been identifying itself more closely with Israel. On the one hand, this might be indicating that dealing with the Middle East has not been part of reflections on a collective EU identity on the level of individuals. But, on the other hand, it might also imply that, through its Middle Eastern aspect, EU foreign policy has tried to play a role in world politics that has been considered relevant for collective EU identity formation even though the particular content of this policy has not been seen as relevant on individual level, in the sense of bottom-up processes of EU identity formation.

### 3.1.6 Reflection

As can be seen from the analysis above, studying the problematization of EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics in the case of the Middle East involved taking into account several collections of documents referring to a long period of time (1969-2009). A key dilemma that has emerged in studying these collections of documents (e.g. European Council conclusions, Council documents, UN documents, EPC documents, E(E)C and EU Treaties, EU legal acts etc.) has been which of these documents and which parts of them to illuminate in the analysis. The most practical approach has proven to be to complete, before writing, an analysis of all the relevant documents, and then, in writing the analysis, the developments showing through the documents were narrated, as this allowed tracing the appearance and repetition of key phrases and discourse structures, and of concurrent implementation and developments in world politics. In other words, this has allowed the writer of these lines to follow the developing *logic* of the *text* of EU foreign policy on the Middle East, or the appearance and development of patterns in EU foreign policy regarding the Middle East.

The analysis itself has shown that dealing with the Middle East has been of prime importance to EU foreign policy since its very beginning. This has been confirmed in European Security Strategy of 2003 which stated (European Council 2003g, 8) that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict was “a strategic priority for Europe”. This priority was substantiated by positing the resolution of this conflict as a precondition for dealing with other conflicts in the region (*ibid.*). Vasconcelos (2012, 105) identified another reason for aspiring powers to be dealing with the Middle East: that they cannot aspire to “great power status without a role”

there; and connected the necessity for aspiring powers to play a role in the Middle East to their dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

On this basis, it might be asked whether this concern has been motivating EU foreign policy in the Middle East – if the Arab-Israeli conflict has become *the* conflict to be addressed on the level of world politics (and has thus been constitutive for world politics itself), a power needs to play a role in the Middle East if it wants to be a great power (*cf.* Wæver 2015). However, on the surface, EU foreign policy documents have exhibited a different logic: that EU foreign policy needed to be involved in the conflict due to the interests and ties the E(E)C/ EU members had in the Middle East, in the last decades also in relation to stability. Nevertheless, at the same time, it should not be forgotten that EU foreign policy started dealing with the Middle East with the explicit reason of leading a policy independent of the main outside actor, the US. Therefore, it would rather appear that the E(E)C/ EU has been trying to construct itself, and to make the other (great) powers in world politics accept it as an actor with an own policy and identity in resolving the Middle Eastern conflict implicitly, through the work of EU foreign policy. This observation corresponds to the finding in the end of the analysis to the effect that the delimitation of EU foreign policy through the circumstances of world politics has functioned as a (Derridean) blind spot of EU Middle Eastern policy. In turn, and from the perspective of discourse analysis, this points to a key *axis of valorization* in EU foreign policy: dealing with and being involved in addressing the conflict(s) in the Middle East has been constructed as having a crucially positive value over (the perspective of) *not* dealing with it or not being involved.

To continue with the main findings of the discourse analysis, besides the *figured world* of a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in which the EU would actively participate that has been constructed by EU foreign policy discourse on the Middle East, this discourse has, through the years since the establishment of EPC, exhibited a number of other structures and characteristics, including *contradiction* between support expressed to other actors who were involved in the peace process on the level of world politics while, at the same time, vying for own inclusion into that process (thus valorizing EU involvement); *magnifiers* that were used to produce the appearance of having dealt with the Middle East in a significant manner even when, in practice, this was not the case; constitution of the speaking subject as a proponent of human rights and fight against terrorism; and delimitation of the discourse through the circumstances of world politics and on the ground which the speaking subject – the E(E)C/ EU – could not influence, and which were also not really reflected in the discourse, which

resulted in a *blind spot*, mentioned above, and contributed to an unreflected construction of the subject's identity.

In practice, implementation was consistent with EU foreign policy discourse to the degree that the E(E)C/ EU had been supporting the Palestinian territories since the beginning of EPC discussions on the Middle East. The E(E)C/ EU has also evolved into one of the most important donors to the Palestinian Authority and has, through its contribution and involvement, and by engaging other donors, been fostering stability in the Palestinian territories. But EPC and the EU have not really managed to become involved politically, in the sense of significantly participating in key initiatives or negotiations to achieve an overall peace settlement in the Middle East. In the end of the period observed, the EU was, rather, involved on the margins, in support of the peace efforts initiated and led by other actors, primarily the US. However, EU foreign policy has been contributing significantly to the peace process in an indirect manner, as the Palestinian Authority has been able to function and participate in the peace process also due to the support the Palestinian territories and the PA have been receiving from the E(E)C/ EU and due to E(E)C/ EU efforts (*cf.* Hollis 2010).

On the other hand, E(E)C policies have been inconsistent with EU foreign policy discourse on the Middle East with regard to the agreements that were concluded with Israel since these agreements did not usually make reference to positions that were expressed by EU foreign policy. The only example of coherence between EU foreign policy and E(E)C policies regarding relations with Israel was the deferral of signature of the second Financial Protocol between the EEC and Israel in 1982 when Israel attacked Lebanon. This inconsistency between EU foreign policy and EEC policies has been functional, however, as it enabled the member states to have a relationship with Israel while at the same time developing foreign policy on the Middle East (Nuttall 1992, 107). Through the development of the EU's Mediterranean policy since 1995 this inconsistency was gradually addressed, as the EU used Euro-Mediterranean cooperation agreements with Israel and the PA to channel its positions regarding the conflict, and also later agreements with Israel referred to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation with the EU.<sup>57</sup>

Concerning the relationship between EU foreign policy and world politics regarding the Middle East, it has been shown that the distinction between foreign policy outputs and outcomes (Ginsberg 2001, 10) is crucial. The EU has, through its engagement, been able to achieve its participation in the Middle East Quartet and to initiate and influence significantly

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<sup>57</sup> E.g. Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation between the European Community and the State of Israel (OJ L 220/5 of 25. 8. 2007).

the contents of the Roadmap which represented the Quartet's vision for a resolution. However, the EU's participation in the conflict has not resulted in it having a decisive say in the main initiatives to achieve peace, and also the Roadmap did not come to be implemented; which means that these two most important outputs of the EU's Middle Eastern policy were not translated into outcomes. In relation to this, as mentioned in the analysis, although the EU has succeeded in being in touch with the events on the level of world politics regarding the Middle East, it did not really influence the course of world politics with respect to resolving this conflict. This reveals a disconnect between the sizeable amount of outputs regarding the Middle East by EU foreign policy, and the EU's actual role in the Middle East from the perspective of world politics. But, on the other hand, it should be noted that the EU, through its engagement in the Middle East and in particular its participation in the constitution of the Quartet (Solana 2003) managed to harness the changed circumstances of world politics after the end of the Cold War – the Quartet represented a *multilateral* institutional device assisting in resolving the Middle Eastern conflict(s). In cooperation, the Quartet brought together actors that were opponents during the Cold War which represented a testimony to the changed circumstances of world politics also with regard to a possible route to resolving the conflict(s) in the Middle East.

To wrap up the historical analysis also from a genealogical perspective, there were, as mentioned above, various reasons for EPC to begin dealing with the Middle East (oil interests and a desire to have own policy in this area independent of the US); but the significant fact is that, since then, *EU foreign policy has been dealing with the Middle East on a regular basis* (almost at every other European Council session) *regardless or even in the absence of concrete reasons for dealing with it* – the Middle East has been dealt with even when there were no major developments in the region. In other words, since its origins that can be traced back to the need for oil supplies and aspiration for a foreign policy independent of the US, dealing with the Middle East has become a fixture of EU foreign policy. This suggests that there are implicit reasons for EU foreign policy to be dealing with the Middle East beyond the necessity for oil and stability in the region, among others related to EU identity needs, and, in connection to this, the position of the EU in world politics.

In conclusion, it can be found that EU foreign policy began dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because of identity objectives, among others, and that an important part of EU identity in world politics has been constructed through dealing with this conflict and with the Middle East since 1970. Discourse and implementation reveal that the content of EU identity in world politics as constructed in relation to this conflict has not changed

significantly through the years; however, the changed circumstances of world politics have enabled the EU to *express* its identity better and to become involved to a certain degree (e.g. in the Quartet, in the adoption of the Roadmap, and through its two ESDP missions), although not as an actor that would participate directly in resolving the conflict politically. The vision that EPC had for EU foreign policy with respect to the Middle East thus did not change much through the years, but was rather *realised* at a pace which the prevailing circumstances of world politics permitted.

Finally, it needs to be recognized that, through the years since 1970, EU foreign policy has exhibited a considerable tenacity *to* become involved in efforts to resolve the conflict; and, particularly during its first twenty years of existence, has retained this tenacity despite adverse reactions of the other (great) powers. Therefore, an important and perhaps a key element of EU identity in world politics in relation to this conflict has been the *assertiveness* to become involved. By December 2009, EU foreign policy successfully used periods of uncertainty and openness in the circumstances of world politics, particularly after the end of the Cold War, to become more involved in the conflict and to realise the envisioned EU identity with respect to this conflict. Nonetheless, due to the circumstances of world politics and the character of the conflict itself, these efforts of EU foreign policy did not have an immediate impact on the resolution of the conflict; instead, EU foreign policy and some E(E)C policies had an indirect, long-term influence due to their contribution to the stabilisation of (one of the sides) of the conflict and to the implementation of agreements achieved on the level of world politics.

### 3.2 Case study II: Enlargement

Over the years since the idea of EEC enlargement was first seriously considered in 1960 (in relation to the United Kingdom – UK),<sup>58</sup> enlargement policy has touched almost every country on the European continent and a number of countries on what have been or are thought to be borders of the EU; which implies that, in discourse and practice, enlargement has reached into the very heart of the idea of European/ EU identity.

From a methodological point of view, the following observations need to be taken into account when researching enlargement. Firstly, implementation of enlargement during the era of EPC took place not within EPC framework, but within the EEC which means that, with regard to the practice of enlargement until 1993 (when the Treaty on European Union entered into force), the work of the EEC has to be observed, in parallel with what has been going on within EPC and the European Council.

Furthermore, if we look at discourse and practice of enlargement, we can find that, with regard to countries or groups of countries which later became the subject of enlargement policy, E(E)C/ EU discourses in the beginning usually did not speak about enlargement or accession when discussing these countries although these discourses brought initiatives and orientations which, through the years, developed into a new wave of enlargement policy. This can be observed in a number of cases, for example in the Mediterranean enlargement rounds (which took place with Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986) as well as the so-called big-bang enlargement with ten new member states in 2004<sup>59</sup> – regarding these countries, E(E)C/ EU discourses first expressed political support which gradually developed into policies of aid and economic assistance, and, only after that, the possibility of accession was mentioned. This means that, with respect to the countries which eventually became the subject of enlargement policy, but also those countries that are currently not the subject of enlargement policy but might be in the future, not only explicit instances of enlargement discourse and practice need to be observed, but also those discourses and practices which were not or are not yet enlargement policy but might develop into this policy in due time.

Also, if we observe the cases of different countries or groups of countries that were the subject of enlargement policy through the years, the E(E)C devised different degrees or types of closeness that preceded actual enlargement – e.g. through Association Agreements (before the Mediterranean enlargement rounds), Trade and Cooperation Agreements and Europe

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<sup>58</sup> When French President de Gaulle publicly supported British membership; negotiations for UK accession began a year later (Calvocoressi 2009, 189-190).

<sup>59</sup> Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.

Agreements (before the big-bang enlargement), or Peace and Cooperation Agreements (with respect to Western Balkans countries). This implies that we cannot observe enlargement as a unitary process (*cf.* Nugent 2004a, 1)<sup>60</sup> but as a process which progressed non-uniformly, in waves with different groups of countries (and these waves were sometimes overlapping), and the characteristics of the process itself differed from one wave of enlargement to the next. This is why this case study will be looking at the periods which were characterized by specific waves of enlargement (the Mediterranean round, the conception of possibility of enlarging with Central and Eastern European countries – CEE countries or CEECs – in the years 1988-1993, the realisation of this in the period up to and including 2004, and new developments in the years until 2009).

At the same time, the case study needs to observe ‘special cases’ – those countries that were not included in the different waves of enlargement, or decided against accession during the process, such as Morocco, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. These special cases are important because they might shed light on enlargement from a different perspective – from the perspective of ‘what went wrong’ and what has been excluded, marginalised or avoided by the process of enlargement.

Thus, regarding primary documents, the analysis will consider, in addition to European Council and Council documents, also agreements and treaties related to the enlargement process as well as relevant European Commission documents. Also, as enlargement has been closely related to EPC in its initial stages, early EPC documents will be of importance in the first part of the analysis. The relevant context of world politics for this case study in addition to the general circumstances of world politics in the period 1975-2009 comprised in particular the CSCE process which began in Helsinki in 1973 at the insistence of the USSR but produced, through the engagement of EEC countries which endeavoured for the inclusion of the human rights dimension, results which were evident in the period 1988-1993 in relation to the dissolution of the USSR, emergence of new states in Europe, and the end of the Cold War (*cf.* Hobsbawm 2005; Möckli 2009). The case study will thus also consider CSCE documents where applicable.

Finally, before continuing, it needs to be observed that, from the perspective of the three-pronged methodological approach, the three levels of discourse, concrete implementation/ practice and world politics were much more closely connected in the case of

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<sup>60</sup> Nugent (2004a, 1-21) emphasized that enlargement should not be observed as a series of events but as a process as there were, in almost every year of the E(E)C’s existence, countries or groups of countries which were negotiating the possibility of accession with the E(E)C (*cf.* Wæver 1998).



enlargement as in the case of the Middle East. This has been so partially because, as we will see in the analysis, and particularly considering concrete practice/ implementation, the E(E)C/ EU has been the maker of key policies in the case of enlargement, which is different to the case of the Middle East. Also, in the case of enlargement (and in contrast to the case of the Middle East), world politics has been unfolding, in an important part, on the European continent itself. This means that, in this case study, we can observe all the three levels more or less at the same time, without making sharp distinctions between them as in the previous case study.

### 3.2.1 Prologue

There was a notable absence among the founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, namely the UK, who would have preferred the establishment of a less ambitious free trade area in Western Europe and, unsuccessfully, tried to convince the founding countries of the EEC to do so (Nugent 2004b, 23). Despite this, the Treaty establishing the EEC (Treaty of Rome) was signed in 1957. Its preamble spoke about the resolve of the founding states to safeguard peace and liberty and invited other peoples of Europe sharing this ideal to associate themselves with this effort; it also included Article 237 which stated that “/t/out *État européen peut demander à devenir membre de la Communauté*” (any European state may apply to become a member of the Community; *Traité instituant la Communauté Économique Européenne* 1957).<sup>61</sup> From the perspective of discourse analysis, this shows that the founding members of the EEC did not (yet) identify the entity they were establishing with Europe; and that the identity of this entity was seen as open, but only to other European states. As an alternative to the EEC, the UK established European Free Trade Association (EFTA) together with other non-members of the EEC<sup>62</sup> in 1960.

After receiving positive signals from French President de Gaulle in 1960, the UK submitted its application to join the EEC in 1961 followed by applications from Ireland, Denmark and Norway (Bulletin from the European Community 1961). Ireland and Denmark followed UK example due to their links with the UK, which was paralleled by Norway (Nugent 2004b, 24–25). However, in 1962, de Gaulle objected to British membership over concerns regarding UK dependence on the US particularly in the area of defence; he also opposed British membership in 1967 when the second UK application was submitted – the

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<sup>61</sup> What a »European« state was became subject to debate in the subsequent enlargement process, bringing enlargement in a close relationship with the idea of European/ EU identity also from this perspective.

<sup>62</sup> Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.

first enlargement of the EEC was thus put on hold until Georges Pompidou became President of France in 1969 (*cf.* Nugent 2004b; Calvocoressi 2009, 190).

During this period, the EEC signed agreements which were of importance for its subsequent enlargement policy with Greece and Turkey. In 1961, an Association Agreement with Greece was signed which entered into force in 1962 (Accord créant une association entre la Communauté économique européenne et la Grèce). In 1963, the EEC signed a similar, Ankara Association Agreement with Turkey which entered into force in 1964 (Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey). Both agreements dealt with the establishment of a customs union and mentioned the possibility of accession of Greece/ Turkey to the EEC in their preamble, subject to their acceptance of the obligations arising from the Treaty of Rome. In 1970, Turkey signed an Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement which, among others, concerned free movement of goods, persons and services (*ibid.*).<sup>63</sup>

After President Pompidou was elected in France in the summer of 1969, the Heads of State or Government of the EEC at their meeting at The Hague in December that year agreed to go ahead with the first enlargement of the EEC. At that same meeting, EPC was conceived; from the perspective of enlargement as well as EU foreign policy, it is very significant that the establishment of EPC and the agreement to enlarge were tied together in one sentence of the final communiqué in which foreign ministers were instructed to study how to achieve “progress in the matter of political unification, *within the context of enlargement*” (Final communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or Government on 1 and 2 December 1969 at The Hague; emphasis added). This connection was not coincidental, since a previous attempt at political cooperation between EEC member states in 1967 failed because the UK managed to persuade some of the members of the EEC that European political cooperation was not possible without UK membership of the EEC (Möckli 2009, 24). The issue of UK membership was resolved through the agreement to enlarge at The Hague which also brought success in launching EPC (*ibid.*, 35; Nuttall 1992, 5). This is important from the perspective of analysis: political cooperation only became possible following the decision to enlarge; which raises the question of whether the development of political cooperation between EU member states in general might be in some way related to the ongoing enlargement process, and how the idea of EU identity might be connected also to the UK, as enlargement as a

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<sup>63</sup> The (non-)implementation of the Additional Protocol with respect to Cyprus by Turkey became a contentious issue in its relations with the EC after Cyprus applied to become a member of the EC.

process and political cooperation between EEC member states both began with the aim of UK membership as a precondition.

In addition, the Final communiqué of the meeting of the Heads of State or Government at The Hague in December 1969 made a connection between the decision to enlarge, EU identity and world politics. With regard to identity, the communiqué spoke about the entry of “other countries *of this continent*” (emphasis added) in the EEC, in accordance with the Treaties – which represented a partial interpretation of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome; the heads of state or government thus interpreted “any European state” as a state *of the European continent* (*ibid.*). Moreover, EU identity in relation to enlargement was thus established and interpreted: not only were the Six now a Community; they saw themselves as *the* community of countries which a) other European countries would want to join and b) which would decide whether other countries *could* join them (implying that they would also decide, in the process, which other countries were *European*). Concerning world politics, the same sentence of the communiqué stated further that enlargement would enable the EEC to grow to dimensions which were “more in conformity with the present state of the world” which means that the heads of state or government made their decision to enlarge with reference to the circumstances of world politics at that time (*ibid.*).

The awareness of the relevance of enlargement with reference to world politics and for EU foreign policy was also evident from the Commission opinion accompanying the Treaty of Accession of the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway of 1972, which stated that this enlargement would enable the EEC to play “a fuller part in the development of international relations” (Documents concerning the accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). Through this, the establishing of the external aspect of the idea of EU identity began in relation to the process of enlargement. The Treaty also included Norway whose people, however, decided in a referendum in September 1972 against accession (due to fears regarding sovereignty, agriculture and fisheries – Nugent 2004b, 25). Importantly, the documents accompanying this, first, Treaty of Accession did not contain references to political or other conditionality, as documents annexed to subsequent treaties of accession did; which implies that, from an identity perspective, the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway were seen by the six original members of the EEC as being so similar to them that no special conditions for their accession were needed.

The first EEC enlargement was completed on 1 January 1973 when Denmark, Ireland and the UK became members of the EEC. Regarding the world-political context, also in 1973,

the Helsinki process opened with the launching of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in July; this process would prove increasingly important from the perspective of enlargement as well as EU foreign policy, particularly after the adoption of the Final Act in 1975 which covered three dimensions or ‘baskets’ of security – political and military, economic and environmental, and human.

Moreover in 1973 in Copenhagen, the Document on the European Identity was adopted by the foreign ministers which, too, linked enlargement to the idea of EU identity – in defining the elements of European identity, after considering common heritage and acting together towards the rest of the world, it stated that European identity would evolve with respect to “*dynamic construction of a united Europe*” (emphases added). Significantly, this was a case of *identity-casting* in relation to enlargement, which established the idea of EU identity as one of a *united Europe* in an internal and external sense (i.e. for European and outside audiences), and through which EU identity was (re)produced both as an *ideal* (a united Europe) that was, at the same time, yet *to be* constructed, via the process of enlargement. Also, enlargement was thus construed as the third component of the European identity; the process of enlargement was seen as contributing to uniting Europe and consequently to the evolution of European identity. From the perspective of genealogy, this shows that a linkage between enlargement and EU identity had been made already in the beginning of the process of enlargement by EEC member states themselves; further, it shows that, in the beginnings of EPC and enlargement, the idea of European or EU identity was connected to the political project of uniting Europe, and was seen as open (to other European countries) but also closed (as it was limited to Europe).

To sum up, the first enlargement of the EEC was a continuation of and derived from the issues which arose already when the EEC was being formed and in connection to the establishment of the political cooperation between EEC member states. During this period, EEC member states linked enlargement to the idea of European (EU) identity. The connection to the prevalent circumstances of world politics was less clear, but nevertheless present. The first enlargement, therefore, revealed incidental origins of the process of enlargement; but it also revealed the conception of a political project of constructing a united Europe, and, through this, the idea of EU identity.

### 3.2.2 The Mediterranean round

It is telling from the perspective of EU identity that a second enlargement of the EEC could have taken place earlier were it not for undemocratic regimes in Greece, Portugal and Spain

(cf. Nugent 2004b, 28). Already in 1962, Portugal and Spain approached the EEC requesting association, Spain doing so with a view to eventual membership; they did not receive a response but were offered preferential trade agreements (Commission of the European Communities 1978a; Nugent 2004b, 28). The EEC limited implementation of the Association Agreement with Greece following a military coup in Greece in 1967 and renewed the implementation after the fall of the military regime in 1974 (Commission of the European Communities 1974).

During the period of the demise of undemocratic regimes in Greece, Portugal and Spain in the years 1974-75, EU foreign policy formulated declarations aimed at influencing circumstances in the three countries in a direction which would lead them closer to the EEC. With regard to Greece, EEC foreign ministers welcomed the efforts of the new government to restore personal and political freedom (Bulletin EC 1974, 87). The ministers assessed the change of government in Portugal in April 1974 as being of “great importance for Europe” and expressed hope that political changes in Portugal would enable it to develop relations with the EEC (European Political Cooperation 1978, 88). The European Council declared in July 1975 that the EEC was ready to discuss “closer economic and financial cooperation” with Portugal but added that only “a *democracy* of a pluralist nature” (emphasis added) could be supported by the EEC, in accordance with its “historical and political traditions” (European Council 1975b). This was similar to the discourse on Spain – in October 1975, EEC foreign ministers stated that the “peoples” of Spain and of the EEC were “linked” by many ties, and expressed a desire for a “*democratic* Spain” (emphasis added) to “take its place in the assembly of European nations” (European Political Cooperation 1978, 119). Moving to analysis, in discourse regarding Spain, a metonymy (“peoples”) was used to accentuate the link constructed between Spain and the EEC; this indicates that this was a political discourse making a connection between “Europe” as embodied in the EEC and Spain. The expression “assembly of European nations” was used; this discourse assumed that the assembly of European nations was represented by EEC countries and thus pointed to an appropriation of the idea of Europe by EEC countries. Also, the discourses on Portugal and Spain recalled democratic traditions (a term related to identity) of the EEC and conveyed the message that only democracies could have closer relations with the EEC. Thus, these discourses (re)produced the idea of EU identity for audiences both within and outside the EEC (in Portugal and Spain, in this case) as that of an assembly of nations with certain key values, such as democracy. From the perspective of discourse analysis, these declarations were speech acts whose aim was to transform these countries through giving them the prospect of

having relations with the EEC (these speech acts thus functioned as tools of EU foreign policy); at the same time, and from an EU identity perspective, this also meant a political conditionality began to be established that implied that, for a country to be able to join the EEC, it had to be a pluralist democracy.

Also during this period, the bases of the policy of EEC member states towards Cyprus were set following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974. In September 1974, EEC foreign ministers called for negotiation and supported “independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus” (Bulletin EC 1974, 87). In February 1975, the Nine called again for a negotiated solution and offered their readiness to hold discussions with the parties which however did not develop into a concrete initiative; instead, in September 1975, the Nine expressed support for talks between the parties sponsored by UN Secretary-General (Bulletin EC 1975a, 96; European Political Cooperation 1978, 102). Importantly, the Nine decided on a “friendly approach” towards all the parties to the conflict, in the context of relations of association with Cyprus, Greece and Turkey (Bulletin EC *ibid.*)

Concrete implementation closely followed discourse, beginning with Greece which applied for EEC membership in June 1975; EEC ministers asked the Commission to submit its opinion on the application (Council of Ministers 1975). In January 1976, the Commission recommended that negotiations be opened but proposed, due to an underdeveloped Greek economy, an undefined “period of time” before Greece would undertake membership obligations (Commission of the European Communities 1976). Greece responded to this by emphasising the importance of EEC membership for the consolidation of its democracy and for its links with Europe and the West (Nugent 2004b, 27). In February 1976, sidelining the Commission opinion, the Council of Ministers decided in favour of the Greek application; and negotiations were opened in July that year (Council of Ministers 1976; Nugent 2004b, 27–28).

EEC Council of Ministers received applications from Portugal and Spain to join the EEC in April and September 1977 (Council of Ministers 1977a; 1977b). The handling of these applications was connected to an important declaration of the European Council (1978a): the Declaration on democracy adopted in April 1978 in Copenhagen which stated that respecting and maintaining “representative democracy and human rights in each Member State” were “essential elements of membership” of the Communities. But this Declaration, through this discourse, also stated the *essence* (or foundations) of EU identity as it was seen and constructed by EEC countries and bodies in relation to the three outsiders who wanted to join, i.e. the values that its members saw as essential to the Communities. This declaration

revealed a difference between how EEC countries approached the prospect of enlargement with the three Mediterranean countries and the approach of the first enlargement: in effect, before proceeding with further steps regarding the Mediterranean enlargement, the European Council laid down what were considered essential elements of identity of the Communities, and, in doing so, explicitly formulated the first political conditionality to appear in the enlargement process (and produced another case of fabulous retroactivity – as the values of representative democracy and human rights were not seen as a precondition for the EEC being established in 1957, and were not written in the Treaty of Rome). From the perspective of genealogy, this shows that what are usually thought of as essential elements of the enlargement process (political conditionality), and even of EU identity, were produced by EEC countries; and, regarding deconstruction, that the enlargement process incorporated the tools that EEC countries invented for dealing with the otherness they encountered in their neighbourhood. It also points to enlargement process as a “two-level game” where bilateral level of negotiations influences what is otherwise usually seen as a multilateral, European process (*cf.* Šabič 2002).

In December 1978, the European Council authorized the ministers to accelerate negotiations with the three countries, linking this enlargement to foreign policy and world politics in a statement which emphasised “great political significance” of this enlargement for consolidating “democracy in Europe” and for strengthening the “Communities’ position in the world” (European Council 1978c). The Mediterranean enlargement was thus produced as a foreign policy tool which would transform the outside of what were, at that time, the Communities, in a manner corresponding to the idea of identity of the Communities.

Greece’s accession treaty was signed in May 1979 in Athens. In addition to saying that this enlargement would enable the EEC to take a fuller part in the development of international relations (included already in the Commission opinion accompanying the first accession treaty), the Commission opinion attached to this treaty linked enlargement to foreign policy as well as EU identity. It stated that this enlargement would help “strengthen peace and liberty in Europe”, and that “principles of pluralist democracy and human rights” were part of the common heritage of the peoples of the Communities and were “essential elements of membership” (Documents concerning the accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European Communities 1979, 3). Through this, the first political conditionality of the enlargement process, the principle of pluralist democracy and human rights, became part of the legislation of the European Communities. Also, through this discourse, the identity of EEC member states as democratic countries who respect human rights was (re)produced. In

connection to this, it could be seen from a statement of the European Council of November 1979 that Greece's accession was a political matter, as the signature of Greece's accession treaty was mentioned as the first, most important, step towards achieving European Union (European Council 1979b). The discourse regarding Greece's accession thus exhibited a nexus of EU foreign policy and EU identity. On 1 January 1981, Greece became the tenth member of the EEC.

The discourse regarding the third EEC enlargement with Portugal and Spain also exhibited a close interconnection between foreign policy and identity. The European Council expressed its "political commitment" to this enlargement in the end of 1981 as well as in 1982 when there were attempts to overturn democracy in Spain (European Council 1981c; 1982c), emphasising that negotiations were opened in the knowledge that the EEC's objectives "were shared by the democratic governments and peoples" of these two countries and that political commitment was the basis of that decision (*ibid.* 1981c). In terms of implementation, this intensified phase of negotiations with Portugal and Spain included measures to prepare their economies for accession (European Council 1982c) and pre-accession aid for Portugal with that purpose (Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters 1980). The treaty of accession of the two countries was signed in June 1985 in Madrid; the Commission opinion annexed to it contained similar discourse to that found in Greece's accession treaty (Documents concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Communities 1985). In the view of the European Council, the signature of the accession treaty by the two countries demonstrated the desire of these countries to participate in "the building of Europe" (EPC Bulletin 1986, No. 1, 37).<sup>64</sup>

In sum, the two Mediterranean enlargements contributed to the construction of EU identity as well as foreign policy and represented their interconnection as key elements of the idea of identity of the Communities in relation to the countries which were the subject of enlargement were defined, and, at the same time, these enlargements were seen as a tool to spread those identity elements beyond the borders of the existing EEC member states. Through the enlargement process and particularly its first political conditionality (principle of democracy and human rights), the countries interested in applying to become members of the EEC, as potential candidates, were compelled to democratize, to become *like* EEC member states *before* their application was even received formally by the EEC. The Mediterranean enlargements were also seen by EEC member states as contributing towards achieving a

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<sup>64</sup> The accession of Portugal and Spain took effect on 1 January 1986.



“united Europe” – therefore, a narrative about and the ideal of a united Europe can be identified that has been continued from the first enlargement. Implementation was consistent with the discourse of the EEC and its member states as candidate countries received assistance before accession and the enlargement was successfully completed although it needs to be noted that discourse was much broader than the Mediterranean enlargements themselves as the discourse pictured the enlargements as part of the narrative about a united Europe. The two Mediterranean enlargements were related to European politics as they represented a response to political changes in Europe following the dissolution of undemocratic regimes in Greece, Portugal and Spain; but not so much to world politics.

During the two Mediterranean enlargement rounds, EEC member states continued their policy on Cyprus which remained on the level of expressing support to the territorial integrity of Cyprus and to solutions and plans conceived by the UN, also after Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared and recognized by Turkey in 1983; EEC countries responded with a decision not to recognize the Republic and reiterated their support for the territorial integrity of Cyprus (Bulletin EC 1977, 108–110; 1983, 68; 1984, 78). The implementation of the Association Agreement between the EEC and Cyprus continued (*ibid.* 1977, 108–110).

During the period following the enlargement with Greece in 1981 and before the enlargement with Portugal and Spain in 1986, the EEC developed a “Mediterranean policy for the enlarged Community” (Council of Ministers 1985b). In 1982 and 1984, the Commission presented to the Council two communications on this policy, following consultations with the acceding Mediterranean countries and third countries in the Mediterranean; the aim of the new policy was to develop relations and trade (through Cooperation and Association Agreements) with those third countries in view of the Mediterranean enlargement (*ibid.* 1984; 1985a; 1985b). It was emphasized by the Council that these relations were of “particular importance” for the EEC following enlargement (*ibid.* 1985b). As a consequence of the Mediterranean enlargement, therefore, the EEC developed a comprehensive or “global” Mediterranean policy (*cf. ibid.* 1985a) to manage relations with the third countries at its new borders; this policy thus represented another part of the developing EU foreign policy, as well as, from the perspective of genealogy, a predecessor of European neighbourhood policy.

The Mediterranean phase of achieving a united Europe and defining a policy for its new borders also had an exclusionary aspect. In 1987, Morocco and Turkey applied for membership. However, the Council turned down Morocco’s application in the same year with an explanation that Morocco “was not a European state” (European Parliament 2014). EEC bodies did not reply negatively to Turkey’s application although Turkey was not considered a

democratic state (Bulletin EC 1986, No. 2, 237). This might be seen as an indirect confirmation of Turkey as a European state, as EEC membership was open to European states. On the other hand, although the reaction of the Council to Morocco's application was in line with EPC interpretation of a European state as being a state of the European continent (Final communiqué of the meeting of the Heads of State or Government at The Hague 1969), it showed, from the perspective of deconstruction, that the EEC and its member states began defining EU identity by *othering* those countries who were not deemed European enough to join them, by labelling them as non-European (this was a case of North-South othering by EEC countries, *cf.* Južnič 1993).

Already during the Mediterranean enlargement, the EEC and its member states started turning towards Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) which became the focus of enlargement policy in the years 1988-93. Within the European Council and EPC, statements were made on Poland in the years 1981-82 in relation to activities of Solidarity movement: EEC countries warned against outside interference and based their calls on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act; through EEC framework, food aid and humanitarian assistance were supplied to Poland (European Council 1981a; Bulletin EC 1981, 12). In 1984, the foreign ministers issued a Declaration on East-West relations in which they saw the process of European integration as key for "peace and stability in Europe" and declared their intention of having a constructive dialogue with the USSR and "its allies in Central and Eastern Europe" (Bulletin EC 1984, 78). Through this Declaration, the common external identity of EEC countries was implicitly constructed as belonging to the "West", as opposed to the "East" and the USSR.

By 1986, the EEC responded to the interest expressed by some CEECs for relations with it and was preparing to negotiate trade agreements with Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary (Bulletin EC 1986, 234). In the same year, in the Declaration by the High Contracting Parties on Title III of the Single European Act, EEC countries announced their "*openness to other European nations*" (emphases added) who shared the same ideals, and their intention of strengthening their relations "with other democratic European countries" (Single European Act 1986). EEC countries thus began to open themselves towards the CEECs (and saw their – EU – identity as open in this sense); this process of opening up accelerated with the pace of change that led to the end of the Cold War in Europe.

### 3.2.3 A key period: 1988-1993

The momentum of change in Central and Eastern Europe that resulted from economic and political disintegration of the USSR but also the fact that, since the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which included human rights in its third basket, movements for human rights developed and spread in a number of the CEECs (Hobsbawm 2005, 480–495; Judt 2005, 500–503) was harnessed by EEC countries through EPC as well as EEC instruments. This demonstrated the importance of the world-political changes that were taking place in Europe for the enlargement process as part of EU foreign policy. In January and April 1988, at the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, the Presidency of the EEC recalled that EEC countries had impacted the CSCE process from the start and introduced human dimension to it; referring to this, the Presidency argued that a programme for realisation of human rights should be adopted within the CSCE (EPC Bulletin 1988, No. 1, 61–62 and 121). At the same time, in response to the idea of the Soviet leader Gorbachev about a “common European home” (*cf.* Gorbachev 1989), key elements of European or EU identity were defined by EEC Presidency: “being European” was a matter of “intellectual topography”, not just geography, common history or culture; and “European identity” was represented by an “ethos” of “tolerance over the infallibility” claimed by authorities, and incorporated in “the rule of law of pluralist democracy” (EPC Bulletin 1988, No. 1, 64). This speech underlined and defined EU identity as an idea, constructed it retroactively, and made a number of claims regarding EU (European) identity. Besides defining this identity, it implicitly conveyed the message that EEC countries were the bearer of Europeanness<sup>65</sup> on the European continent (i.e. *their* identity was seen as European, in contrast with Gorbachev’s view); and it proclaimed European (EU) identity to be a *non-essentialist* identity that was not based on religious or secular authority (*cf. ibid.*). Thus, from the perspective of discourse analysis and deconstruction, it built the idea of European (EU) identity via opposition to the Soviet ideas about how Europe should develop.

Apart from discourse, in practice, the EEC and its countries seized the momentum of accelerating changes in the CEECs by establishing official relations between the EEC and the CMEA through a joint declaration in June 1988, by establishing official relations with most of the CMEA countries and by concluding a trade and cooperation agreement with Hungary in September that year (EPC Bulletin 1988, No. 2, 128); also, talks on possibility of trade agreements were held with other CEECs (Council of Ministers 1988).

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<sup>65</sup> Europeanness is understood here as the defining quality of being European, what being European is.

To continue with the analysis of the developing EU foreign policy discourse on the changes that were taking place in the CEECs, in December 1988, the European Council meeting in Rhodes expressed determination to “overcome the division” of the European continent and to promote “Western values”, first and foremost through respect for the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act (European Council 1988b). The European Council invited “all countries to embark” with the EEC “as *world partner* on an *historic* effort” for a more secure, just and free continent (*ibid.*, emphases added). While continuing the narrative on a united Europe, this discourse added to that narrative a historical dimension that connected the narrative to the changes on world-political scale that were taking place on the European continent, and constructed the EEC as a force on the level of world politics with respect to those changes.

This indicated a key development: while EEC countries, through their work within the CSCE, indirectly contributed to the changes that were gradually occurring in Central and Eastern Europe up to 1988, in 1988, they actively seized the landslide of change by stepping up their support for human rights as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and through concrete support (by negotiating trade and cooperation agreements) offered to the CEECs. This was done with reference to (Western) values and European (EU) identity that EEC countries were promoting which meant that the EEC and its countries worked via EU foreign policy (EPC and the EEC) to spread what were considered to be essential elements of EU identity to the rest of the European continent as the power of the USSR was ebbing away from it.

These efforts of EEC countries became more apparent with concrete implementation in 1989, as more and more CEECs democratised and expressed their interest to establish relations with the EEC. In that year, the EEC concluded a trade agreement with Poland and was negotiating a similar agreement with Bulgaria (EPC Bulletin 1989, No. 1, 73–74; European Council 1989c); and a programme of aid for economic restructuring of Hungary and Poland was adopted (Council of Ministers 1989a). In December 1989, the European Council authorised the establishment of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to help the CEECs make the transition to market economy and restructure their economies (European Council 1989c).

In November 1989, an extraordinary meeting of the European Council was held in Brussels where EEC countries affirmed their will to “encourage democratic change” in Central and Eastern Europe and to respond to the interest to enter EEC market expressed by the CEECs (European Council 1989b). After the meeting, French President Mitterrand, in the role of the Presidency, stated to the European Parliament that the Community should

strengthen its structures on the one hand and, on the other, open itself to the CEECs (EPC Bulletin 1989, No. 1, 171). For those CEECs which had demonstrated their will to acquire democratic institutions (Hungary and Poland), advantages were agreed such as access to certain institutions (“while not contemplating enlargement without due process”) while for others which were not at that stage yet (but were dreaming that “one day Europe will be Europe”), this was an example to follow (*ibid.* 172, 174). Looking at discursive figures, this speech contained at least two elements of interest: firstly, there was a *slippage* that referred to enlargement and revealed that enlargement actually *was* contemplated at the extraordinary meeting of the European Council; secondly, a tautology which contained a *différance* in the Derridean sense was used in the end of the speech (“one day *Europe will be Europe*”, emphasis added) that implied that Europe did not have a full-identity-with-itself at the present moment but that this identity would be realised at an undefined time in the future (by intensifying relations with the CEECs). This was also a reproduction of the *casting* of EU identity as that of a *united Europe* – this ideal was again highlighted, as well as the decision to work towards building it (which meant that *united Europe* was at the same time an already existing ideal *and* under construction).

In December 1989 in Strasbourg, the European Council defined an overall approach to the democratising CEECs. To apply discourse analysis, the European Council (1989c) found that the EEC was “*the European entity*” (emphasis added) to which the CEECs were turning; and decided that the EEC would examine “appropriate forms of cooperation” with them. In its Declaration on Central and Eastern Europe (*ibid.*), it underlined “responsibility” of the EEC and its member states “in this *decisive phase* of the *history of Europe*” and saw the EEC as “*the cornerstone of a new European architecture* and, in its *will to openness*” (emphases added), as “a mooring for a future European equilibrium”; this was also seen as a reason to transform the EEC into European Union. This discourse of the European Council showed that the European Council cast the EEC and its member states as central bearers of responsibility and Europeanness and key actors on the European continent with respect to the changes taking place in the CEECs, and elaborated and concretized the narrative about uniting Europe by focusing it on a “new European architecture” – in effect, this amounted to appropriating the idea of Europe via new discourse on the developing idea of future enlargement policy (*cf.* Wæver 1990). Thus, this discourse of the European Council implicitly brought with it the discursive action of *equating EU identity with the identity of Europe*. In addition, in this manner, the discourse of the European Council connected the process of European integration to the (historical world-political) changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe.

Moreover, in December 1989, the European Council (1989c) expressed its support to the process of reunification of Germany through free self-determination, but emphasised that this process had to take place in the context of European integration. This approach to German reunification was implemented during the course of 1990 when the European Council (1990a; 1990b) provided that integration of German Democratic Republic (GDR) into EEC institutions would take effect as soon as reunification took place, and that no treaty changes for the integration of GDR into the EEC were needed. This meant that German reunification was not treated as a new enlargement but was rather put into EEC context. German reunification was crucial for further development of the enlargement policy as well as EU foreign policy: on the one hand, it led to deepening of European integration to contain the reunified Germany (answering the concerns of France), and, on the other hand, it led to further widening, due to reunified Germany's interest to bring the democratising CEECs closer to the EEC (Wæver 1990; 2015; White 2001, 9).

Thus, from the perspective of the integrative approach (taking into account EU foreign policy, EU identity as well as the context of world politics), and the historical approach adopted in the introductory part, the year 1989 can be seen as key for EU foreign policy and identity as well as the enlargement process because new meanings were generated by the EEC and its countries regarding EU identity and foreign policy while contemplating the changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe; a conscious and deliberate opening of EU identity towards the democratising CEECs as well as reunified Germany represented a key breakthrough (which was however limited to Europe; *cf.* European Council 1989c above). Simultaneously, through this process, EU identity was being built, through references to the values of EEC countries, explicit definition, and, last but not least, presenting the EEC and its countries as being at the centre of a “new European” construction which was seen as the main force of attraction on the changing European continent.

In practice, in the first half of 1990, trade and cooperation agreements were negotiated and concluded with Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria (EPC Bulletin 1990, 232); the EEC therefore had trade and cooperation agreements with six CEECs while negotiations on a seventh continued with Romania. At the same time, discussions within the European Council and between the Council and the Commission brought up a need for new kind of agreements: in February 1990 the Council mandated the Commission to prepare a communication on association agreements which would “succeed the present cooperation agreements” (Council of Ministers 1990a). At a special meeting in April 1990, the European Council (1990a) authorized the Council to begin discussions on these new

agreements (that would include far-reaching political dialogue) “on the understanding that the basic conditions” regarding democracy and market economy were fulfilled by the CEECs concerned (this was the first reference to what developed into the main conditionality of the enlargement with the CEECs and was elaborated further by the European Council in the coming years). The European Council also decided to deepen integration as envisaged in the Single European Act, as it saw the EEC as crucial for “peace and stability in Europe” (*ibid.*). If we analyse the discourse of the European Council, these decisions were preceded by an introduction that stated that the EEC shared with the “peoples” of the CEECs “a common heritage *and* future” and spoke about an “ever closer Europe” which has “overcome the *unnatural* divisions imposed on it by ideology” and “*stands united* in its commitment” to values such as democracy and human rights (*ibid.*, emphases added). Therefore, although the decision for a new kind of agreements with the CEECs was a landmark one in itself, it was accompanied by a discourse that not only developed the narrative and reproduced the ideal of a united Europe while stressing the need towards constructing it in practice, but also contained a metonymy (“peoples”) connected to a claim to a common past as well as future, and an embellished metaphor (“unnatural” divisions, Europe “stands united”) that were characteristic of myth. The April 1990 meeting of the European Council thus gave EEC countries’ commitment to openness a tangible form (the new generation of agreements) but also created new, mythical discourse about a united Europe. In addition, it confirmed that EEC countries would deepen integration before widening.

Following the directions of the European Council and taking care of implementation, the Council of Ministers debated the Commission communication on future Association Agreements in September 1990 and instructed the Commission to engage in initial talks with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (Council of Ministers 1990b). At the same time, aid programmes were extended to the other CEECs in addition to Poland and Hungary, and the CEECs were included in EEC programmes of student exchanges and trainings (EPC Bulletin 1990, 232). In December 1990 (European Council 1990d), the European Council gave the new Association Agreements the name “Europe Agreements” which discursively marked these agreements apart from previous EEC agreements with third countries, and, through their name, anchored the new generation of agreements in the developing narrative about a united Europe underpinned by a new European architecture and confirmed the view of EU identity as the identity of Europe. In the end of December, on the level of the Council, arrangements were made to open the negotiations with the three CEECs (Council of Ministers 1990c).

In terms of a wider, world-political context of these events, within the CSCE process the Charter of Paris for a New Europe was agreed by CSCE members in 1990 which contained commitment to human rights and devised new CSCE institutions (Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990). The name of the Charter (“for a new Europe”) indicated that there was a shared understanding among CSCE members that Europe was the focus of key new developments in world politics.

While the developments in the years from 1988 within EPC and the EEC indicated that EEC countries were dealing with an increasing number of foreign policy issues on the European continent in addition to the changes in the CEECs (e.g. Cyprus, Turkey, and negotiations with EFTA countries on European Economic Area – EEA – *cf.* EPC Bulletins 1988, No. 1 and 2; 1989, No. 1 and 2; 1990), in the years 1990-93, the number of these issues increased to such an extent that practically all the countries on the European continent were covered by some form of policy that was related to enlargement at least to some degree. This was even more so due to the fact that an increasing number of countries were applying for membership – the Council received applications from Austria in 1989 (Council of Ministers 1989b), Cyprus and Malta in 1990 (*ibid.* 1990b) and Sweden in 1991 (*ibid.* 1991c). Thus, the EEC and its members were developing a number of policies towards different groups of countries in or near Europe, with varying degrees of possibility of membership (*cf.* Wæver 1998 on Europe as consisting of concentric circles of countries seen as incorporating varying degrees of Europeanness).

During 1991, negotiations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland proceeded on Europe Agreements; in a careful formulation, the Council stated in April that the Agreements confirmed “membership of a democratic Europe” for these three countries (Council of Ministers 1991b). The Agreements with the three CEECs were signed in December 1991 and recognized, in their preamble, the objective of membership of the Community for the countries concerned, but also referred to “importance” of the Agreements for establishing “a system of stability” in Europe, “with the Community as one of the cornerstones” (Council of Ministers 1991f; Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part). In this manner, EEC countries’ discourse and their connection to world politics focusing on a new European architecture with the EEC as (one of) the cornerstone(s) was put into practice. (At the same time, in these cases, with regard to implementation in practice, European identity was *not* seen as simultaneous with EU identity, as the third European



countries concerned could not yet join but only signed the Association Agreements with the EEC.)

Concerning the practice regarding the remaining CEECs, in addition to trade and cooperation agreements, the EEC extended to them the Programme of Community aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (PHARE) while extension of the association policy to them was being considered (EPC Bulletin 1991, 81). The Council decided to start talks on a Europe Agreement with Bulgaria in October 1991; in the case of Romania, EEC countries made these talks conditional upon political reform – the decision to open the talks was taken in December 1991, after ratification of a new constitution in Romania (Council of Ministers 1991e; 1991f).

Implementation was extended to the Baltic in the period when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were regaining sovereignty, as EEC countries took considerable interest and included these three countries in the framework of cooperation with the CEECs. In January 1991, the foreign ministers made statements with respect to use of force in the Baltic states and sent their protest to the Soviet authorities, referring to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and emphasising that “architecture of the new Europe” should be based on the rule of law (EPC Bulletin 1991, 55 and 62). Following referenda on independence in the three countries, the foreign ministers welcomed their results and decided that diplomatic relations and economic cooperation within EEC framework would be established with the Baltic countries (*ibid.*, 101, 137, 388). In October 1991, the Council decided to begin talks on trade and cooperation agreements with the Baltic countries with a view to future Europe agreements with them, and to include them in the PHARE programme (Council of Ministers 1991d).

During this period, the foreign ministers also began to deal with Yugoslavia, although predominantly from the perspective of conflict resolution (EPC Bulletin 1991, 170). In relation to newly independent states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the foreign ministers adopted Guidelines on recognition which provided conditions under which the newly independent states could be recognized by EEC member states (*ibid.*, 769–770). Although these decisions did not immediately concern the process of enlargement, they established the common external identity of EEC countries as a coherent actor towards the newly independent states, and marked the beginning of policies with respect to the countries in the area of the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union which would, during the coming two decades, bring a number of these countries close to the prospect of accession to or at least in association with the EC (*cf.* Wæver 1998).

In December 1991, EEC heads of state or government agreed on the content of the Treaty on European Union which deepened European integration and opened the way to a new enlargement; the European Council (1991c) decided that negotiations on a new enlargement would begin as soon as EEC discussions on own resources were concluded. This decision was made with EFTA candidates for membership in mind – in addition to Austria and Sweden, Finland, Norway and Switzerland decided to apply and their applications were received by the Council during 1992 (Council of Ministers 1992a; 1992b; 1992c). Also, in the end of 1991, EEA negotiations with EFTA countries were completed setting up another “cornerstone of Europe’s new structure” (Council of Ministers 1991e); the EEA entered into force in 1993.

Regarding Cyprus, EEC countries continued to support solutions proposed by the UN but did not propose solutions of their own (e.g. European Council 1989c; EPC Bulletin 1990, 196). While Turkey applied for EEC membership in 1987, and the Commission submitted an opinion on its application in 1989, the June 1990 European Council stated that the Cyprus problem was affecting the relations with Turkey and underlined the need for talks between the two communities on Cyprus (European Council 1990b). The ministers agreed in February 1990 that conditions to open accession negotiations with Turkey were not yet fulfilled and decided to follow the Commission’s opinion and, rather, strengthen cooperation with Turkey within the Association Agreement; in April 1991, the ministers decided to work on the relations with Turkey while searching for solutions regarding Cyprus (Council of Ministers 1990a; 1991a).

This burgeoning of relations with practically all the countries on or near the European continent necessitated reflection by EEC countries and bodies – in 1992, the foreign ministers prepared a report on likely areas of development of CFSP and the Commission published the report “Europe and the challenge of enlargement” which comprehensively considered the prospect of enlargement in the near and mid-term future (Commission of the European Communities 1992; European Council 1992a). Due to the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, the report on the likely areas of development of CFSP identified this area as the first one of interest and recommended, with respect to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, to “reinforce their links” with the EU while progress had already been made in integrating some of these countries into European institutions (European Council 1992a). This recommendation thus explicitly located the growing process of enlargement at the centre of the developing EU foreign policy.

The report of the Commission (Commission of the European Communities 1992) opened by underlining the “new external context”, referring to the changes in world politics with the end of the Cold War; in relation to this, it said that integration of new democracies into “the European family” represented a “historic challenge” for the EEC to assume “its continental responsibilities” and emphasised that this enlargement would contribute to “unification of the whole of Europe”, while, in the past, it took place “in a divided continent”. To analyse this discourse, the Commission used the metaphor of “the European family” to illustrate how the newly democratised countries belonged with the EEC; and used the binary opposition between a divided Europe (in the past) and a unified Europe (in the future) to make the process of European integration in this direction appear self-evident – i.e. it used the language of myth which also referred to history and used monumental adjectives such as “continental responsibilities” to underline the urgency of seizing the momentum of change to widen European integration. This was followed by a discussion of “*the* European identity” (*ibid.*, emphasis added): the Commission found that the term “European” to which the Treaties of Rome and Maastricht referred was not officially defined but referred to geography, history and cultural elements, and that it was not “opportune” to define “the frontiers” of the EU at the moment. At the same time, the Commission (*ibid.*) cited democracy and human rights as the conditions which the applicants should fulfil. Thus, while avoiding an explicit definition of “European identity”, the Commission posited it as a pre-existing *ideal* (“*the* European identity”) and operationalized it in an implicit manner, so that the work could continue towards realising this ideal (European identity was thus seen, also from this perspective, both as *closed* – an ideal of a united Europe, and *open* – as it yet had to be achieved). (Significantly, this definition went in a different direction than the definition used by EEC Presidency within the OSCE in 1988 which was more concrete and referred to intellectual topography; this shows that both definitions might have been arbitrary, at least to some extent.) In doing this, the Commission exhibited a sense of propriety over the idea of “European (identity)” – its discourse was another case of equating European identity with that of the EU. From a deconstructive view, “European identity” was used by the Commission as a notion *sous rature*, under erasure (Derrida 1967/1998) – a notion impossible to define but central to its discourse; and a *différance* was used with regard to this notion that implied that “European identity” was not yet fulfilled but might be at some future time. Moreover, the Commission used the idea of European identity to stipulate the conditions under which applicants for membership could be considered. In conclusion (*ibid.*), the Commission differentiated between two groups of countries – those well-prepared for membership and

“other countries” that needed a “period of preparation”. With respect to the first (EFTA countries), the Commission concluded that negotiations could begin after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, and that their membership would strengthen the EC “in a number of ways” (*ibid.*). For the second group (CEECs), a “new partnership” was recommended to help their development that was seen as crucial “for the stability of Europe” (*ibid.*). This shows that the association process with the prospect of membership with regard to the CEECs was used to achieve foreign policy objectives in Europe. Concerning Turkey, the Commission urged a more active application of its Association Agreement and emphasised that Turkey should be anchored in “the future architecture of Europe” because it was critical for stability “in its region” (*ibid.*); the Commission thus saw Turkey as being in “its” (own) region.

Implementing the Commission recommendation on EFTA countries, the European Council in December 1992 decided to open negotiations on membership with Austria, Finland and Sweden in the beginning of 1993 (European Council 1992c); in April 1993, Norway was included in this round of negotiations (Council of Ministers 1993a). Consequently, the fourth enlargement began in 1993 with EFTA countries; while the enlargement with the CEECs that was yet to come would be of a predominantly political nature, this enlargement originated in the long-standing economic relations the EEC had with EFTA countries.

Regarding the CEECs, in June 1993 in Copenhagen, the European Council declared in a key speech act that the CEECs “shall become members” but also formalized the political and economic criteria that these countries would have to fulfil for membership – democracy, the rule of law, human rights and market economy which became known as the Copenhagen criteria and were written in the body of the Europe Agreements that were being concluded with the CEECs (European Council 1993a). This definition was an implicit definition of EU identity and a culmination of the process of the opening up of this identity that began in 1988. It was also a tool of foreign policy and exhibited an interconnection between EU foreign policy and EU identity as it endeavoured to transform what were, at that time, still third countries, through the prospect of EU membership. Despite the fact that it represented an opening of EU identity, the elaboration of the Copenhagen criteria revealed that, while EC countries felt a closeness to EFTA countries that did not require any preconditions before membership negotiations began, the CEECs were perceived to be so different, other, that the fulfilment of a range of clearly defined conditions by them was required before their membership would be considered.

In terms of implementation, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as the republics of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia) were included in the PHARE

programme, along with Albania; negotiations on trade and cooperation agreements began with the three Baltic states and Slovenia, and such an agreement was signed with Albania in 1992, with the possibility of a future Europe Agreement (EPC Bulletin 1992, 296 and 450–451). In the beginning of 1993, the EEC signed Europe Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania, and trade and cooperation agreements, with the possibility of conclusion of Europe Agreements, were signed in 1993 with the three Baltic states and Slovenia; with the two successor states of Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic and Slovakia, Europe Agreements were also signed (EPC Bulletin 1993, 445). In October 1993, considering Cyprus' application for membership, the Council decided (Council of Ministers 1993b), on the basis of a Commission proposal, to develop relations with Cyprus in the context of the Association Agreement without awaiting a resolution of the conflict on Cyprus; at the same time, it expressed support to the efforts of UN Secretary-General to achieve a settlement.

Yet, although the EC was proving to be the main force of attraction for a number of countries on or connected to the European continent, there were exceptions to this – in relation to the negotiations within the fourth (EFTA) enlargement, both Switzerland and Norway decided, following popular referenda, to stay out of the EC. In December 1992, a referendum was held in Switzerland on EEA membership, and, by a narrow margin, the result was negative which was followed by a decision of the Swiss government to suspend also its consideration of EC membership (Nugent 2004, 33). In November 1993, EC Council of Ministers decided, while keeping the options of EEA and EC membership open to Switzerland, to negotiate sectoral agreements with it (EPC Bulletin 1993, 531). In Norway, a second referendum for EC membership was held in November 1993 and its result was again negative, with opponents arguing that Norway had no need for membership (Nugent 2004, 33).

In 1988-93, as shown above, the idea of EU identity had been developed by EEC countries and the EEC in response to the changes that were taking place in world politics with the end of the Cold War in Europe. This idea of what EEC countries and their values and principles were was used in the discourse and practice of EEC countries and bodies towards the democratising CEECs with the aim of having an impact on the circumstances in these countries and, through this, on stability in Europe, which directly connected the idea of EU identity to EU foreign policy and world politics as it was developing in Europe. This became explicit as the possibility of enlargement with the CEECs was conceived, by opening up of the idea of EU identity (which was, however, closed at the same time, as it was limited to Europe and to the ideal of a united Europe). Europe was seen as the hub of events in relation

to the changes in world politics also by other (CSCE) countries, and E(E)C countries saw themselves and the E(E)C as the bearer of responsibility and Europeanness to respond to those changes, and equated the idea of EU identity with the identity of Europe. A mythical discourse was developed about a united Europe focusing on the new European architecture that E(E)C countries were constructing. Through their response, E(E)C countries first offered political and then economic support to the democratising countries, followed by the prospect of enlargement through a new generation of agreements which, in their name, contained a claim to Europe (Europe Agreements); in this process, also political and economic conditions were articulated which these countries had to fulfil to be accepted as potential members. Concrete implementation was thus consistent with the discourse of EU foreign policy and responded to the applicable circumstances of world politics.

#### 3.2.4 Steps to the ‘big bang’ enlargement

A period followed in which the enlargement process mainly focused on implementation: during 1993, the negotiations with EFTA countries Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway proceeded and their accession treaty was signed in June 1994; the Commission opinion attached to the treaty, in addition to the phrase that enlargement would enable the EC<sup>66</sup> to participate in “the development of international relations”, stated that accession of these countries would strengthen “safeguards for peace and freedom in Europe” (Documents concerning the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Norway to the European Union 1994) which shows that also the fourth enlargement with EFTA countries was seen by the Commission as being related to foreign policy as a tool for achieving peace in Europe. Due to the negative outcome of the Norwegian referendum, the fourth enlargement took effect on 1 January 1995 with Austria, Finland and Sweden, bringing the number of EC members to fifteen.

From 1994, concrete practice developed regarding the newly democratised European countries: Europe Agreements were negotiated with the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania); and signed with them in June 1995 and with Slovenia in June 1996 (European Council 1995a; Rapid 1996). Also, as the CEECs that the EC had or was negotiating Europe Agreements with were applying for membership in the period 1994-1995, it was decided by EC countries to include the growing number of applicants in the next (fifth) enlargement

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<sup>66</sup> The term EC is used instead of the term EEC referring to the period after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1 November 1993 which instituted the EC as the legal successor to the EEC.

round, and a strategy was developed to prepare the applicant countries for eventual accession (cf. European Council 1994b; 1995b).

To elaborate, in April 1994, the Council received membership applications from Hungary and Poland (Council of Ministers 1994b), and in June 1994 the European Council decided that Cyprus and Malta would be part of the next enlargement round (European Council 1994a). Applications from Romania and Slovakia were received in July 1995 and from Latvia and Estonia in October and December 1995 (European Council 1995a). Applications from Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Lithuania were received in January 1996 and from Slovenia in July 1996 (Council of Ministers 1996e; 1996f); there were thus a total of 12 candidates for the next enlargement. The European Council (1995b) stated that this enlargement was a “political necessity and a *historic* opportunity for *Europe*” (emphases added) and that it would ensure “stability and security of the continent”. Therefore, the discourse of the European Council linked the prospect of enlargement with these countries to stability and security in Europe and thus to achieving foreign policy objectives with respect to Europe as well as to the narrative about uniting Europe.

In December 1994, a comprehensive strategy was adopted by the European Council to assist the associated CEECs in preparing for accession which included a “structured relationship” of regular meetings between the Council and the applicants, preparation of the CEECs for EC internal market, and measures promoting integration in other fields related to all three ‘pillars’ of the EC (Community policies, CFSP, and home and justice affairs); PHARE programme was redirected towards providing support for this strategy (European Council 1994b; 1995a). Through this, the EC and its countries actively and in concrete terms came toward the applicant countries to prepare them for accession – this was the most extensive strategy of assistance to applicants that had been adopted within the framework of any enlargement so far. At the same time, from a political perspective, the applicant CEECs were included in a preventive diplomacy initiative, the Stability Pact proposed by France in 1993 which was aimed at establishing good neighbourly relations in Europe on the basis of principal UN and CSCE documents, and was established through two joint actions of the Council (Council of Ministers 1993c; 1994c; 1994d). On the basis of the ensuing discussions and agreements with and between the countries concerned, the Stability Pact was signed in March 1995 and then transferred to the OSCE (Council of Ministers 1995d; 1995e; European Council 1995a).<sup>67</sup> Thus, practice or implementation with regard to the process of fifth

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<sup>67</sup> The CSCE was transformed into the OSCE in 1994.

enlargement was in line with EU discourses (which underlined the importance of connecting other European countries closely to the EU, with the aim of stabilisation), which was also demonstrated by including Malta and Cyprus in this process.

Regarding Malta and Cyprus, the European Council (1995d) decided that accession negotiations with them would begin six months after the conclusion of intergovernmental conference on the subsequent Treaty of Amsterdam, and urged the Commission to prepare the necessary documents on time so that the opening of accession negotiations with the CEECs could coincide with this (*ibid.* 1996a). An EU observer was appointed for the Cyprus conflict to report regularly to the Council (Council of Ministers 1994e). Concerning the development of association with Turkey, the Council continued to see the conflict in Cyprus and human rights as the two main stumbling blocks (*ibid.* 1995a).

In October 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed which incorporated in an amendment of Article F of the Rome Treaty the political part of the Copenhagen criteria (liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law); Article O of the Rome Treaty was amended with a requirement for the applicant countries to respect these principles (this represented another case of fabulous retroactivity, since what were seen as key values underpinning the EU were retroactively included in its founding treaty). In December that year, the European Council (1997b) decided to start the accession process with the applicant CEECs and Cyprus; the applicant countries were divided into two groups on the basis of how well prepared they were estimated to be – in spring 1998, bilateral negotiations began with Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia but not with the rest of the applicant CEECs. At the same meeting of the European Council, European Conference was established as a forum for political consultation and deepening cooperation bringing together EU member states on the one hand and applicant CEECs, Cyprus and Turkey on the other; the principal requirement for participation in the Conference was to share the commitment to a range of values, including “pace, security and good neighbourliness” (*ibid.*). Since the Conference included applicants for EU membership and was aiming to promote shared values and socialization (through dialogue and cooperation), it represented a tangible connection between EU foreign policy and enlargement, but also the idea of EU identity, because the list of values that the Conference’s participants were expected to share was connected to what EU countries saw as their own values. The European Council also confirmed Turkey’s prospect of membership on the basis of the same criteria as were in place for the other candidates and decided to set up a strategy to assist it, but also mentioned a range of conditions for



strengthening its relationship with the EC including respect for human rights and political settlement in Cyprus (*ibid.*).

In terms of discourse, and moving again to discourse analysis, the European Parliament, too, connected the accession process to foreign policy – in its Resolutions on the applications of Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, it expressed its belief that integration of these countries would “contribute to security in Europe” (European Parliament 1998a; 1998b; 1998c).

Through the developing discourse on accession, also the narrative about uniting Europe was developed: the President of the Council saw the meeting in the end of March 1998 at which the accession process with the first group of the applicants was launched as representing a “milestone in the process of European construction”, “the end of the post-war division” and as bringing closer the “vision of the founding fathers” of the EEC “of an ‘ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe’” (Council of Ministers 1998f). Although this discourse used the preamble of the Treaty of Rome (referring to an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe – *Traité instituant la Communauté Économique Européenne*), it was mythical because it connected the fifth enlargement which was a relatively recent development to the idea which was incorporated by the six original countries that established the EEC with the Treaty of Rome almost half a century earlier and used this connection to substantiate the new enlargement. This resembled fabulous retroactivity (Derrida 2002) as the narrative as well as the ideal of a united Europe (and thus EU identity, as constructed through the reproduction of this ideal) were being developed with hindsight, as the fifth enlargement was proceeding.

In its Report on the progress towards accession for 1999, the European Commission (1999, 4) referred to the narrative about uniting Europe and underlined it by using a binary opposition, saying that, in the beginning of the 21st century, it would “be possible to re-unite Europe” and contrasting this to “division and strife” of the 20th century. This discourse was used in the preamble of the report and worked to underline the Commission’s findings that the Kosovo crisis in the beginning of 1999 had shown that “enlargement is the best way” for achieving “peace, security, democracy and the rule of law” in Europe and that Turkey should “be considered as a candidate country” (*ibid.*, 4 and 40). At the same time, through this, the Commission’s discourse again connected the enlargement process to achieving foreign policy goals in Europe. This discourse substantiated the transition to a new phase of implementation: following the Commission’s recommendations, the European Council (1999d) decided in December 1998 to begin accession negotiations early in 2000 also with the five remaining applicant CEECs as well as Malta, to contribute “to security and stability on the European

continent”, and that Turkey was a “candidate State” but would have to fulfil the political criteria for accession, particularly respect for human rights. This decision was realised in practice in February 2000 when intergovernmental conferences were held with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia (Council of Ministers 2000b). Thus, regarding implementation, the conflict in Kosovo (i.e. the circumstances of world politics) contributed to the realisation in practice of the EU’s discourse on the fifth enlargement.

Apart from continuing the narrative about a united Europe and embellishing it, including by connecting it to the past, to the vision of the ‘founding fathers’ of the EEC, and thus bringing it closer to myth, the whole process that would culminate in the fifth enlargement, from its beginnings in the period 1988-93 was therefore clearly connected to achieving foreign policy objectives on the European continent, peace and security the first among them, which also meant that, of all the enlargements so far, the fifth enlargement was most explicitly connected to EU foreign policy.

Also, in 1997-1999 when the decisions to include candidates in the process of accession negotiations were made, in addition to including the CEECs and Malta, an important decision was made regarding Cyprus – the Council and the European Council made it clear that a settlement of the conflict would not be a precondition for Cyprus’ accession to the EC (Council of Ministers 1997e; European Council 1999d).

As accession negotiations were being started with the CEECs, Cyprus and Malta, EC countries were beginning another process that was dealing with stabilisation of the countries of South-Eastern Europe (SEE) and their perspective of EU integration. For this purpose, linking stabilisation with the prospect of integration, the Council developed a more complex notion of conditionality (Council of Ministers 1997h): to “consolidate peace and stability” in SEE and foster economic development, the Council decided that relations between these countries and the EC, including contractual relations, trade preferences, economic cooperation and aid, would be subject to fulfilment of a number of conditions by SEE countries, including democracy, the rule of law, human rights and economic cooperation between SEE countries themselves; Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (comprising Montenegro and Serbia) were included in this approach. In addition to linking foreign policy objectives of EC countries regarding SEE to a (more or less distant) prospect of EU integration, this initiative developed further the conditions of candidacy for EU membership that were already in place for the applicant CEECs, Cyprus and Malta, and, with regard to SEE countries, made them more strict by moulding them into a complex conditionality that the countries concerned had to fulfil to develop relations with the EC.

Thus, looking at the enlargement process from its start in the beginning of 1970s, four ‘circles’ of countries may be distinguished on the basis of what conditions were set for their (potential) membership and how rigorously they were followed by the E(E)C:

1. applicants that were considered to be so similar to E(E)C countries that no special preconditions were needed for their membership (countries of the first enlargement and the fourth with EFTA member states);
2. Mediterranean applicants which were recovering from undemocratic regimes – for them, democracy and human rights were the political criteria for accession, but no formal framework was set to monitor their fulfilment;
3. CEECs, Cyprus and Malta – for them, the Copenhagen political criteria were set and their fulfilment was evaluated along with the fulfilment of the other accession criteria by the Commission in its regular reports on their progress towards accession;
4. SEE countries – in their case, political and economic as well as cooperation criteria for development of relations with the EC, aid and EU integration were combined in a comprehensive framework of conditionality devised by the Council.

Therefore, E(E)C countries saw Denmark, Ireland and the UK, and Austria, Finland and Sweden as the most identical to themselves, while SEE countries were considered to be the most different – so different that a comprehensive framework of conditionality needed to be established to ensure that these countries would become *like* EC member states (by fulfilling all of the criteria of the conditionality) before they became candidates for membership. This finding resonates with Wæver’s (1998) observation of Europe as consisting of a number of concentric circles that are distinguished by how close to the European idea(l) and thus EU membership the countries in each circle are considered to be. The construction and reproduction of these circles of similarity or otherness (via the process of association and accession negotiations with each candidate country) contributed to the building of EU identity in an internal as well as external sense, i.e. by defining EU values and principles on the one hand, and by setting and assessing them as criteria for the candidate countries on the other. In this process, the otherness of the candidates for accession as recognised by EU countries thus also served as a resource for the (re)production of the idea of EU identity.

Considering the practice regarding the outermost circle in the period concerned, in 1999, the Council devised the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (Council of Ministers 1999c; 1999d; 1999e;1999f) which offered SEE countries a contractual relationship in the form of a third generation of agreements called Stabilisation and Association Agreements that provided a closer relationship with the EC and “a perspective of EU membership” or “full

integration” once the countries concerned would have met all the conditions. The offer of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) thus represented a materialisation of the conditionality for SEE countries conceived by the Council in 1997, as well as of the idea of EU identity, as it had been developed through the process of enlargement. Following up on this, in June 2000 the European Council (2000b) confirmed that all SEE countries concerned were “*potential* candidates for EU membership” (emphasis added), and in November 2000, the Council adopted the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme for these countries under which previous programmes of assistance were bundled and which would function as support for achieving the objectives of the stabilisation and association process (Council of Ministers 2000c).

While this represented an opening of EC countries towards SEE, the principle of conditionality as materialised in the stabilisation and association process and the Stability Pact confirmed that EC countries considered SEE countries as more distant and more different from them than the CEECs, Cyprus and Malta (which was, as mentioned above, also a resource for the construction of EU identity): if we analyse the relevant discourse, the CEECs were offered “Europe Agreements” while SEE countries were offered agreements that did not refer to Europe, but to stabilisation (“Stabilisation and Association Agreements”). Moreover, in establishing the Stability Pact and the stabilisation and association process, the discourse of EC countries mentioned only the prospect of EU *integration* or saw SEE countries as *potential* candidates for membership but avoided pledges to their actual membership while this was not the case for the CEECs (*cf.* European Council 1993a which stated that the democratising CEECs “*shall* become members”; *cf.* Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part 2004).

If we look at the discourse accompanying the run-up to the fifth enlargement, the Treaty of Nice which was signed in February 2001 and whose aim was to prepare the EU for this enlargement mentioned in its preamble “the *historic* importance of *ending the division*” of Europe (emphases added). The narrative about Europe uniting through the fifth enlargement was continued in the Laeken Declaration adopted by the European Council in December 2001 (European Council 2001e): the Declaration used binary oppositions between “two bloody wars”, weakening of “Europe’s position in the world” and “demons of the past” on the one side, and “peace”, “concerted action” and “unified Europe” on the other to showcase the urgency of deepening and widening integration. These binary oppositions between non-integration and integration were used as self-evident although they were new: during the

previous enlargements, up to and including the fourth enlargement with EFTA states in 1995, such binary oppositions were not used. The Declaration (*ibid.*) also used a number of metaphors, saying that this was a “defining moment” in the EU’s existence which would close “one of the darkest chapters” in Europe’s history as “Europe” would become “one big family”; and it applied a metonymy which equated the European Communities with Europe. The Laeken Declaration thus staked a claim to Europe, a unified Europe, and expressed a determination to work towards the realisation in practice of the ideal of a united Europe.<sup>68</sup>

In addition, both the Treaty of Nice (2001) and the Laeken Declaration (2001e) made a connection between the process of enlargement and the future of the EU, which found expression in draft Treaty on a Constitution for Europe (2004) that never entered into force after rejection on referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, and the later Treaty of Lisbon (2007) which was agreed and entered into force as a substitute for the constitutional treaty. Namely, the Treaty of Nice (2001) contained a Declaration on the future of the Union in its Final Act which spoke about the need to launch a deeper and wider debate on the future of the EU following enlargement; and the Laeken Declaration on the future of the Union (European Council 2001e) posed the rhetoric question whether this debate on the future reorganisation of the EU might not lead to a “constitutional text”. A discourse analysis thus shows that the fifth enlargement was put in a wider (mythical – *cf.* Barthes 1957/1991) perspective of forging a future (constitutional) Europe.

A strong connection was made between the coming fifth enlargement and EU foreign policy. In its Report on the progress towards accession for 2001, the Commission found that the enlargement would make “Europe a safer place” and contribute to conflict prevention “in the wider world” (European Commission 2001a). In his speech on enlargement and CFSP, High Representative Solana noted two connections between the enlargement and EU foreign policy: he stated that enlargement was “essential for stability” and security in Europe because of its “force of attraction”, that it has, in this manner, stabilised Central and Eastern Europe and was a “vector of stability” in the Western Balkans;<sup>69</sup> and that enlargement increased the weight of the EU “on the international scene” (Solana 2001b). Considering this, enlargement

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<sup>68</sup> In doing this, a conflation of meaning was made (*ibid.*): the Declaration stated that “one of the darkest chapters” in Europe’s history was World War Two “and the ensuing artificial division of Europe”. From a historical perspective, the Cold War started with the USSR exerting its power over East Germany, the CEECs and SEE countries soon after the Second World War ended; however this did not have a direct connection to Nazism and Fascism which were responsible for the defining atrocities during the Second World War. Therefore, in speaking about “one of the darkest chapters”, the discourse of the Declaration presented three totalitarian regimes (Nazism, Fascism and Soviet) together, and used this to make a contrast to a “unified Europe”.

<sup>69</sup> For a discussion of a definition of the Western Balkans, see Bojinović (2004).

represented a key foreign policy tool through which the EU was adapting to and using the changing circumstances of world politics in Europe.

Implementation regarding the fifth enlargement was completed in 2002-2004: in 2002, the European Commission found that ten of the candidates (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, economic and *acquis* criteria and could become members in 2004, while Bulgaria and Romania fulfilled the political but not the other criteria (European Commission 2002). Accordingly, the European Council (2002c) decided to conclude the accession negotiations with the ten countries in December that year and to sign the accession treaty in April 2003. The Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 concluded the accession negotiations with the ten acceding states and decided they would become members on 1 May 2004 (European Council 2002d). In doing so, the European Council (*ibid.*) declared this to be a “*historic* moment” showing “common determination of the *peoples* of Europe to come together” to form the EU which was a driver of “peace, stability, democracy and prosperity” on the continent (emphases added). If we analyse this discourse, it marked the fifth enlargement as having a special (historical) place in achieving the ideal of a united Europe (and thus in the narrative about this); it used the metonymy of “the peoples” to present the entity which would be formed through the fifth enlargement as a product of the will of all the people in the countries concerned; and it was connected to foreign policy and identity because it spoke about the objectives that were being realised on the European continent through the enlargement process. With respect to Bulgaria and Romania, the European Council decided that they would become members as of 2007 (*ibid.*).

In April 2003, the Council (2003e) adopted a decision on the admission of the ten countries to the EC/ EU and stated they were “part of Europe’s shared history, heritage and culture”, and that this was a “beginning of a new era” that would allow for realisation of the EU’s “objective to build one Europe” based on a number of values (democracy, the rule of law etc.; this was also a reproduction of the *identity-casting* discourse which equated EU identity with the identity of Europe). If we look at the Council’s discourse, it again connected the fifth enlargement, a recent development whose final realisation was yet to come, to “Europe’s” past, to its history and heritage. It structured time and presented the time when the fifth enlargement would be fulfilled as something new, a new time (“a new era”). It also explicitly stated that the EU saw itself as the builder of (one) Europe and identified this Europe with a number of key values. These elements of the discourse can be seen as belonging to myth (*cf.* Barthes 1957/1991).

The Commission opinion that was annexed to the Treaty of Accession of the ten countries signed in April 2003 in Athens stated that the enlargement would “strengthen safeguards for peace and freedom in Europe”, thus connecting it to values and foreign policy (Documents concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union 2003). This Treaty of Accession was different in one important aspect from the previous accession treaties – it contained Joint Declaration on one Europe which stated the wish of the current and acceding member states to “make Europe a continent of democracy, freedom, peace and progress”, their determination to “avoid new dividing lines in Europe” and their commitment to “stability and prosperity” inside and outside the enlarged EC/ EU (*ibid.*). The Declaration ended with the statement: “/o/ur aim is *One Europe*” (*ibid.*, emphasis added). While the narrative about a united Europe can be discerned in the discourse of this Declaration as well as links to foreign policy objectives such as peace and stability, and to identity (the Declaration mentioned key values that were seen as European), the Declaration also contained an excess of meaning, in the form of its final sentence; in fact, the Declaration as a whole can be seen as an excess of meaning because it was clear from the accession treaty itself that it created a united entity of the fifteen existing and the ten acceding states; there was no need to additionally emphasise “One Europe” (in capital letters) – except to make it clear that this was a defining moment of a (foundational) myth (*cf.* Barthes 1957/1991). (In addition, in terms of discourse analysis, “One Europe” was a discursive figure of *oxymoron*, which functioned to reproduce the idea of EU identity as the identity of Europe.)

Also, in implementing the fifth enlargement, the European Council (2003d; 2003f) used metonymies in its discourse which were not as frequent in its discourse during the previous enlargements: in June 2003, it stated, following the signature of the accession treaty, that this was a contract “between our peoples” not just states; and, in December 2003, it declared that the enlargement would fulfil “the aspirations of the European citizens”. Together with the discourses described above, this looked as if effort was being made by the existing EU countries to tie the ten new members to the EU and its values as closely as possible.

Cyprus was a special case during the fifth enlargement. The Copenhagen European Council of December 2002 (European Council 2002d) decided that Cyprus would be admitted as soon as the accession negotiations were complete and expressed a willingness to accommodate a potential settlement of the conflict in the accession treaty; and that, in the

absence of a settlement, application of the *acquis* with respect to Northern Cyprus would be suspended. In April 2004, a referendum was held in Cyprus on a plan of UN Secretary-General to reunite the island; its result was negative and, following it, in accordance with Protocol 10 to the accession treaty, application of the *acquis* to Northern Cyprus was suspended and the Council adopted a Regulation containing a regime regulating the area between the two parts of the island with respect to application of the *acquis* (the “Green Line” Regulation – Council of Ministers 2004d). The absence of a settlement on Cyprus was affecting the negotiations with Turkey – in December 2003, the European Council (2003f) stated that a settlement on Cyprus would “greatly facilitate” Turkey’s “membership aspirations”.

As the culmination of the fifth enlargement was approaching, EC/ EU member states and institutions began considering the soon-to-be-enlarged Union’s new borders, in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Already in 1995, a policy towards Baltic Sea region was developed (Council of Ministers 1995e). In December 2002, the European Council (2002) expressed its wish to enhance the relations with the countries which would become new neighbours after the fifth enlargement, with the aim of “promoting democratic and economic reforms”. In March 2003, the Commission published a Communication “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” (European Commission 2003) which established a new EU policy whose aim was developing “a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood” (*ibid.*, 4). The Council held a debate on the Communication and decided that the new policy would not prejudice “future EU membership” (Council of Ministers 2003e). These discourses confirmed the nature of enlargement as a rolling phenomenon (*cf.* Wæver 1998) and a key tool of EU foreign policy; at the same time, the new neighbourhood policy also demonstrated the need of the enlarged EC/ EU to manage space beyond its new borders, as it was aiming to spread EU values into the new neighbourhood, which closely connected it to EU foreign policy.

In parallel with the implementation of the fifth enlargement, the stabilisation and association process continued with the countries of the Western Balkans. In 2003, Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Croatia and Macedonia were signed. At the same time, those of the countries included in this process that were considered to be the most prepared were starting to apply for accession – the Council received Croatia’s application for EU membership in April 2003 and Macedonia’s in May 2004 (Council of Ministers 2003e; 2004e). Therefore, simultaneously with the conclusion of the fifth EC/ EU enlargement with the ‘second circle of otherness’ – the CEECs, the idea started to materialise about the possibility of enlarging with the ‘third circle of otherness’, the countries of SEE.



### 3.2.5 Post ‘big bang’ and new perspectives

After accomplishing the fifth enlargement with the ten new member states on 1 May 2004, enlargement as a process continued; firstly by completing the process with Bulgaria and Romania; secondly by continuing negotiations with Western Balkans countries and Turkey, including EU perspective of the stabilisation and association process; and finally through an expanded policy for the new neighbourhood, called European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which increasingly targeted former Soviet countries aspiring to have a closer relationship with the EU such as Ukraine and Georgia.

Regarding implementation on Bulgaria and Romania, in December 2004, the European Council (2004d) declared its “determination to continue” the enlargement process with the candidate countries, to contribute to “Europe’s prosperity, *stability, security and unity*” (emphases added). In this context, it welcomed the completion of the accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania and decided they would become members with January 2007 (*ibid.*). The decision to accept Bulgaria’s and Romania’s applications was adopted by the Council in April 2005 and their accession treaty was signed in April 2005 in Luxembourg; the Commission opinion attached to it, in addition to the phrase that this (sixth) enlargement would enable the EU to take a fuller part in the development of international relations, also saw it as strengthening “peace and freedom in Europe” (Council of Ministers 2005h; Documents concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union 2005). The sixth enlargement was completed in January 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania became members; the number of EU member states now totalled 27.

With the increasing size of the EU, not only the question of how to deal with the new neighbours arose, but also about the limits of EU expansion in terms of what countries the EU could still imagine as its potential members (i.e. the question about conceivable limits and thus definition of EU identity in relation to enlargement); Turkey was a case in point.

In its opinion on Turkey’s potential accession the European Commission (2004a) found that it would be “challenging” and “different from previous enlargements” due to “Turkey’s population, size, geographical location” as well as its “security and military potential”; nevertheless, the Commission recommended that negotiations with it open provided that Turkey adopted outstanding legislation related to the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria. It also recommended (*ibid.*) that “regardless of the outcome” of accession negotiations it should be ensured “that Turkey remains fully *anchored in European structures*” (emphasis added). This recommendation needs to be highlighted because Turkey

has been, in the history of the enlargement process, the only country with respect to which such recommendation has been made; it made clear Turkey's strategic importance to the EU. It thus revealed an important link between enlargement and EU foreign policy, as it showed that, although enlargement was used as the overall policy framework in the case of Turkey, what was at stake for the EU was not enlargement but essentially the goals of EU foreign policy. The European Council (2004d) followed the Commission's recommendation, repeating the Commission's opinion that Turkey had to be "fully anchored in European structures" even if it did not become a member and adding a provision for a procedure to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey in "case of a serious and persistent breach" of the Copenhagen criteria by Turkey. Following a decision of the Council, negotiations with Turkey began in October 2005 (Council of Ministers 2005i). Therefore, if the countries of SEE represented a 'third circle of otherness', Turkey was in a separate category of otherness in terms of enlargement by itself, and dealing with it reproduced the idea of EU identity (through the recognition of differences between the EU and Turkey, setting of the conditions to address those differences, and the monitoring of their fulfilment by Turkey.)

The negotiations soon came to a standstill as those issues which held the EU back from deciding to open the negotiations in the first place resurfaced: in December 2006, the Council (2006e) decided that, within Turkey's accession negotiations, the chapters directly concerned would not be opened and no chapters would be provisionally closed until Turkey lifted its restrictions on free movement of goods with respect to Cyprus (i.e. until Turkey applied the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement of 1970 concerning the customs union to Cyprus); the Council also noted that further efforts on the part of Turkey were needed to improve respect for human rights. The Commission repeated the issue of Cyprus in its opinion on Turkey of 2007, but accompanied this with a discourse that underlined the strategic importance of Turkey for the EU (European Commission 2007a), saying that Turkey's "commitment to reform" was of "major strategic importance to the EU's own security and stability" and recalling in this context the provision of the 1963 Association Agreement which foresaw Turkey's accession. The European Commission stated that this reflected "Turkey's major strategic role from the early foundations" of the EU (*ibid.*). European Commission thus connected the idea of enlargement from its very beginnings before the first enlargement to EEC countries' strategic objectives and therefore foreign policy. In other words, this discourse confirmed that enlargement policy in the case of Turkey represented a tool for achieving EU foreign policy goals already since 1963. In December 2008, the Council noted that Turkey was not fulfilling its obligations regarding Cyprus either

with respect to resolving the conflict or to the free movement of goods (Council of Ministers 2008e). It thus appeared that the EU was treating Turkey both as, on the one hand, a strategic partner, and, on the other, a candidate for accession; i.e. that Turkey's accession process was used by the EU to pursue its strategic goals.

After May 2004 and January 2007, the European Commission also generated general discourse on enlargement that connected it to EU foreign policy as well as EU identity. To analyse this discourse, in its Enlargement strategy paper for 2005, the Commission stated that enlargement was among “the EU's most powerful policy tools”, transforming the CEECs into democracies and providing the EU with neighbours that were democracies and market economies; it also stated that it was “vitaly important for the EU” to make sure that enlargement extended values such as peace, stability, democracy, human rights, the rule of law “across Europe” and that enlargement “has *always* been an *essential* part of the European project” (European Commission 2005, 2; emphases added). While the first part of the Commission's discourse connected enlargement to foreign policy goals of transforming third countries and the EU's neighbourhood, it was also connected to identity because it spoke about key “European” (*ibid.*) values that were being spread via enlargement across Europe and because it saw enlargement as such as a key part of the “European project”. Even more, in connection to this, signifiers such as “always” and “essential” were used which implied an idea of foundations of the “European project” and the idea of EU identity in the form of enlargement. The Commission continued this discourse in its strategy paper for 2006-07 (European Commission 2006a, 2) where it used the word “essence” twice in relation to enlargement: it said that it was the “very *essence* of European integration” to overcome division and achieve unification, and that enlargement reflected “the EU's *essence* as a soft power” (emphases added). To paraphrase, the Commission saw enlargement as representing (some of) the foundation(s) of European integration, this time particularly in relation to EU identity as an identity of unification and soft power. Finally, in its strategy paper for 2008-09, the European Commission (2008a) saw enlargement as serving “the EU's strategic interests” of “stability, security and conflict prevention”; this discourse related to the enlargement agenda that encompassed the Western Balkans and Turkey.

Apart from Turkey, therefore, implementation also related to the Western Balkans. In June 2004, the European Council (2004b) decided that Croatia was a candidate country and accession negotiations with it began following a decision by the Council in October 2005 (Council of Ministers 2005i). A number of Stabilisation and Association Agreements were signed – with Albania in June 2006, with Montenegro in October 2007 and with Serbia and

Bosnia and Herzegovina in April and June 2008 (Council of Ministers 2006f; 2007e; 2008b; 2008f). Concerning concrete support, Instrument for pre-accession assistance for the candidate and potential candidate countries including Turkey and Kosovo for the period 2007-2013 was established; and the Stability Pact for SEE which had achieved its political objectives was transformed into Regional Cooperation Council (*ibid.* 2006g; European Commission 2007a, 12).

In the end of the period observed (December 2009), there were further developments in relation to changes in the EU's Eastern neighbourhood (former Soviet Union countries) which indicated that the idea of enlargement began to be connected to the EU's neighbourhood policy (which confirmed the idea of Europe as consisting of concentric circles of countries distinguished by their closeness to the EU – Wæver 1998). In February 2005, following a change of government in Ukraine and the new government's declared aspirations for EU integration, foreign ministers of EU countries welcomed "Ukraine's European choice" and adopted decisions to support a "reform-oriented Ukraine", including consultations on a new agreement between the EU and Ukraine and the intention to deepen the relations with Ukraine when Ukraine reformed (Council of Ministers 2005j). The negotiations on the new agreement that would "not prejudice" future relations between the EU and Ukraine began in March 2007 (*ibid.* 2007b). Moreover, in November 2008, following a "rose" revolution and Russian intervention in Georgia, the European Commission wrote in its enlargement strategy paper (European Commission 2008a) that enlargement was gaining importance in the light of these developments.

In the end of the period observed, the continued appeal of enlargement was being demonstrated through a number of membership applications – from the Western Balkans countries Albania and Macedonia (European Council 2005c; Council of Ministers 2009d) and from Iceland (Council of Ministers 2009c) which was submitted following a deepening economic crisis in Iceland.

Altogether, the success of the enlargement policy in the period up to December 2009 demonstrated the fulfilment of a key EU foreign policy objective, as EU influence has been extended, to varying degrees, to the whole European continent. This can be regarded as a crucial achievement also from the perspective of world politics, as it transformed the EU into a unified regional actor. Simultaneously, enlargement functioned as a resource for the construction and (re)production of the idea of EU identity (internally within the EU and externally, with regard to the area of Europe and other European countries as well as from the

perspective of world politics, in terms of staking the EU's claim to Europe), which was transformed in the framework of this process into identity of Europe/ European identity.

### 3.2.6 EU identity: bottom-up perspective

As shown in the previous subchapters, through the six successive enlargements, but particularly from 1988 on, E(E)C countries constructed themselves and the entity they were forming as the bearer of Europeanness; and constructed the integration process they were leading as key in building a united Europe, and themselves as the main representative of the new Europe. This was the gist of the narrative about uniting Europe which emerged already during the time of the first enlargement but was developed further during the following enlargements, particularly the fifth with the ten new countries. However, in connection to this, it should be noted that enlargement as such has been an *emergent* reality: until each successive enlargement and in particular the fifth one was complete, the image of a united Europe had been but a discursive one. And even though the EU, in December 2009, comprised 27 countries, the notion of a united Europe had not been defined – enlargement still was an emergent reality, defined by how the political discourse about uniting Europe could be put into practice (e.g. in relation to Turkey, Ukraine or Georgia).

In terms of its contribution to the idea of a collective EU identity, in the initial phase of the big-bang enlargement, for example, the European Parliament gave positive opinions regarding the possibility of beginning the accession process with the applicants and saw the accession process as related to foreign policy – it stated that Cyprus' membership would contribute to “peace and security in Europe”, saw Malta as being of “geopolitical and strategic importance” for the EC and the potential membership of Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia as contributing to “security in Europe” (European Parliament 1995a; 1995b; 1998a; 1998b; 1998c). Also, before each of the new applicants could become a member of the E(E)C, the European Parliament gave its assent to its membership. Therefore, through its opinions during the process of accession, on what the acceding countries had to do before becoming members (e.g. European Parliament 1999c; 1999d; 1999e), the European Parliament has also been defining what it saw as (being) European.

Eurobarometer surveys, on the other hand, have shown a more nuanced picture from the perspective of bottom-up processes of identity formation, as they revealed that the people of the E(E)C have not been as much involved in the process of (the fifth) enlargement as has been stated by the discourse of the European Council (2003f) which declared in December 2003 that the enlargement would “fulfil the aspirations of the European citizens”. In fact, in

2002, although most of the respondents were in favour of that enlargement, a “vast majority” of them did not know who were the candidates for accession, and only four of the acceding countries were recognized as such by 30 or more per cent of the interviewees (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Turkey); also, most of the people interviewed (57 %) felt they did not participate at all in the political debate about that enlargement (Eurobarometer 2002, 5–6).

Taking into account these perspectives as well indicates that enlargement as such is an emergent reality, not a given one, and is located at the intersection of different dimensions of EU identity – i.e. of individual vs. collective level of identity formation, intra-group vs. inter-group processes, as well as of EU identity as a political project vs. social process; and is constantly (re)generated and (re)defined. Its limits have never been defined – in its landmark paper “Europe and the challenge of enlargement” of 1992, the Commission itself posed the question of the limits of Europe but, at the same time, decided not to provide an explicit answer to this question (Commission of the European Communities 1992). This is also because, as this chapter has shown, the whole idea of enlargement is closely connected to the idea of Europe, European or EU identity – illustrating this, Wallace (2002, 82) named Europe “an imaginary space” shaped by politicians and intellectuals, and Nugent (2004c, 271–272) reflected that there “cannot be any definitive answer to the ‘what is Europe’ question”. If there can be no definition of “what is Europe”, it can be reflected that there can also be no clear answer about the imaginable boundaries or limits of (its) enlargement. Also, if enlargement is constitutive of the idea of EU identity (as has been seen in the previous subchapters in the discourses of E(E)C/ EU institutions), and consists of a number of concentric circles composed of countries that are differentiated according to the degree of their (imagined) proximity to the EU, then the nature of this pattern, as it has been constructed since 1969, has not been changing, but only the status of individual countries in the overall pattern (*cf.* Wæver 1998; 2015). Regarding the changing circumstances of world politics, however, this might be cause for concern: if a policy (enlargement) which has, in many aspects, been used as the central tool of EU foreign policy has not been changing, is this foreign policy still adequate for the EU in the circumstances of world politics as they have been changing in the beginning of the 21st century; and if it can still be of use to the EU – in what manner?

### 3.2.7 Reflection

The analysis above suggests that enlargement is a process that thrives on and defines the very boundaries (imagined and real) on which the *outside* of the E(E)C/ EU is being transformed into its *inside*, through the enlargement process itself. And, as such a process, whose limits have, so far, never been defined, enlargement is connected both to EU foreign policy and EU identity. In relation to this, the report Project Europe 2030 (European Council 2010a) stated that the EU should stay open to new members and that “*true limits of Europe*” (emphases added) would be defined by assessing the compliance of the candidates with the membership criteria (but, at the same time, in the report, conceivable candidates have been defined as “potential new members *from Europe*”, emphasis added).

Concerning the connection between enlargement and EU foreign policy, the conception of EPC had been made possible after the issue of UK membership was addressed, which was followed by the first enlargement (Nuttall 1992, 5; Möckli 2009, 24). Through the following two Mediterranean enlargements, but particularly during the fifth and the sixth enlargements, the policy of enlargement gradually developed into a policy that was explicitly aimed towards *transforming third countries into countries similar and well-disposed towards the E(E)C*, even if, in the final end, they might not have become members (e.g. Turkey) – enlargement, therefore, has been and is a policy whose recipients have been foreign countries, and has been a key aspect of EU foreign policy (*cf.* Karen E. Smith 2004, 4). (This might be called the *paradox* of enlargement: as soon as each enlargement has been completed, the foreign countries who have been the recipients of the enlargement policy are not foreign anymore.) In particular, there have been four instances where the main objective of the enlargement policy has been to transform third countries and make them similar to E(E)C countries: the case of the Mediterranean countries emerging from non-democratic regimes (Greece, Portugal and Spain); the big-bang enlargement in 2004 and its follow-up in 2007; the policy aimed towards Western Balkans countries; and towards Turkey (since 1999). In connection to this, it might be highlighted that the establishment of the EEC itself, and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) before it, pursued one main goal which was, *par excellence*, a goal of foreign policy – to achieve peace in Europe.

In this regard, concerning the interconnection between EU foreign policy and the idea of EU identity, it might be asked whether the idea of EU identity is an unchanging ideal or has it been changing through the decades (*cf.* Wæver 2005b; 2015). In connection to Wæver’s (2005b) finding that the idea of European identity has changed following the Second World

War and has been defined negatively, to distance a peaceful and cooperating post-war Europe from past power balancing that culminated in the Second World War, the enlargement process has incorporated this idea of identity, but by referring to a positive ideal, namely to a united Europe that was being produced and strengthened through the enlargement process.

To continue, the enlargement process has been functional from the perspective of EU foreign policy at least in three distinct ways: it has targeted third countries and has compelled them to become *like* EU member states; after each completion, it implied that the (non-EU) outside of the new member states has become the new outside of the EU, giving the EU new horizons in terms of foreign policy in relation to its new neighbours; and, through the whole process, the EU gained new members and thus more weight in the international community (which also worked to strengthen EU identity).

As regards implementation, enlargement has represented a tool through which E(E)C countries have been able to successfully address the issues that have been occurring in their surroundings in the period concerned, including democratisation in Spain, Portugal and Greece, dissolution of the USSR and democratisation of the CEECs, and, more recently, turbulences in the Western Balkans. From this perspective, enlargement might be seen as key for EU foreign policy as, through enlargement, otherness in the vicinity of the E(E)C has been brought closer, transformed, and finally assimilated by the E(E)C. Enlargement has thus allowed the E(E)C/ EU to bring most of the European continent under its influence, through various forms of cooperation. Enlargement, moreover, has also enabled E(E)C countries to *have* a common foreign policy, as EPC had been developed following the agreement on enlargement with the UK, and CFSP following the incorporation of GDR into the EEC.

Moving to the findings of discourse analysis, a crucial moment can be identified in the discourse of the E(E)C towards third countries which have been the recipients of its enlargement policy: the moment in which the discourse of the E(E)C on a particular third country *changed* and allowed for accession (instead of only association). This can be seen as a *key speech act* (cf. Wæver 1998; Débrix 2002) in enlargement discourse because, from this moment on, everything changed in the relationship between the E(E)C and the third country concerned as the accession process was activated.

The discourse on enlargement has also been producing meanings on European or EU identity. As shown in the analysis, since the 1973 Document on the European Identity, the discourse accompanying the enlargement process has been speaking about a united Europe; and has pictured the process of enlargement as the main tool in achieving a united Europe. This has been particularly evident during the fifth enlargement with the ten new member



states. Concerning this, ‘united Europe’ can be characterized as a floating signifier, because this notion has been vague and not actually defined; it has also been clear in the enlargement discourse that it has not (yet) been fully realised; but, at the same time, a crucial part of the E(E)C’s policy towards its outside has been organised around it. Furthermore, this floating signifier has been used in the narrative about a united Europe which says that there is the ideal of ‘one’ or ‘united’ Europe as envisioned by the founding fathers (of European integration), but that this united Europe is still under construction. Particularly in the period 1988-93 and after, this narrative has been embellished through discourse containing exaggerations and excesses of meaning, and a particular vision of time, as the process of uniting Europe has been seen as spanning from the time of the founding fathers to an undefined time in the future when Europe would fully realise its unity.

On the basis of discourse analysis, key valorizations (*cf.* Greimas 1977) of the enlargement discourse can be extracted. One main valorization has been made in relation to potential candidate countries for enlargement: to become like E(E)C countries and join the E(E)C/ EU has been valued positively in the discourse, while failure to do so has been valued negatively. But a key valorization has also been made in relation to the E(E)C/ EU: continuation of the enlargement process has been seen in absolutely positive terms, and there has been no consideration of a potential discontinuation of the enlargement process in the period up to December 2009.

If we look at the construction of EU identity, ‘united Europe’ was mentioned already in the Schuman Declaration made by the French foreign minister Robert Schuman in 1950, together with the necessity of maintaining peace in Europe (Schuman 1950). A peaceful Europe and a united Europe have thus been key elements of European or EU identity since the beginnings of European integration, enshrined in the preamble and Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome (Traité instituant la Communauté Économique Européenne 1957), and have since remained part of the founding E(E)C/ EU legislation, the Treaties. Enlargement has been contributing to the building of this identity, as the countries aspiring to join the E(E)C which were deemed not to be similar enough to E(E)C member states had to become like the member states before the beginning of their accession negotiations (e.g. the Copenhagen political criteria in relation to the fifth and the sixth enlargements). Enlargement has also provided openings of EU identity, through decisions to allow for a new enlargement in the first place; the Mediterranean countries in the period 1974-1986 and the CEECs in the period 1988-93 are a case in point. But, *at the same time*, these and other enlargements were also seen as realisations of a *pre-existing* idea of European identity as envisioned by the founding

fathers and defined by the Treaties, particularly Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome which spoke about “any *European* state” having the opportunity to become a member (*ibid.*; emphasis added) and as repeated in the report Project Europe 2030, for example (European Council 2010a). So, from this perspective, although the process of enlargement had occasioned multiple *openings* of EU identity, this identity has never been seen as completely open, but has rather referred to an idea of pre-existing *Europeanness* which has been used to justify the openings of identity.

From the perspective of deconstruction, limits of European or EU identity as pertaining to enlargement have been evident from the way in which the E(E)C has been treating different groups of countries trying to become members. One peculiarity of the enlargement process has been that some of the countries that have been, on average, at least as well or better off than E(E)C member states (e.g. Norway and Switzerland) have repeatedly chosen not to become members, although, judging from the conclusions of the Council and the European Council, there has been no shortage of readiness to enlarge with them. To look at the cases of the first (Denmark, Ireland and the UK) and the fourth enlargements (EFTA member states), it can be seen that this group of countries has been treated by the E(E)C in a markedly different manner in comparison to the Mediterranean, CEE and SEE applicants – the E(E)C countries have treated them as equals, while the Mediterranean, CEE and SEE countries have been the recipients of multiple conditions before they were able to become members which put them in a subordinate position and constructed a binary opposition between them and the members of the E(E)C. With respect to this, at least two patterns of identity formation can be discerned in the enlargement process: firstly, with the countries of the first enlargement and EFTA member states, EU identity has been constructed by presenting these countries as *similar* to E(E)C member states; secondly, the less developed applicants (Mediterranean, CEE and SEE applicants) have been portrayed as *different* from E(E)C member states, therefore, they had to adapt by fulfilling the conditions set by the E(E)C to bridge this difference if they wanted to become part of the E(E)C. In addition, some countries have been explicitly excluded from the enlargement process for not being European (the case of Morocco in 1987) – referred to by Rumelili (2008, 268–269) as exclusionary othering produced by EEC countries; and Turkey has been, for a long period of time, put in a “liminal” position (*ibid.*, 269) as it has not been clear whether E(E)C countries had a real intention of enlarging with it, but, on the other hand, its application was not turned down which implicitly entailed a recognition of Turkey as (also) a European state.

By dealing with these different groups of countries, the identity of the E(E)C and its countries has been built and strengthened: by aiming to assimilate that which has been deemed similar or desirable; by succeeding to change that which has been deemed different before incorporating it; and by explicitly excluding that which has been deemed completely other. To apply a deconstructive perspective, this demonstrates that, through the process of enlargement, its discourse and action, the identity of the E(E)C and its countries has been built, in a large part, by referring to outside, and to difference; the outside has thus been at work on the inside of EU identity, as this identity has mainly been built through references to what it *was not*, to *non-Europeanness* of the applicants for accession. This also represents a case of *inability of achieving 'full-identity-with-itself'* because the full realisation of the main objective of enlargement, a united Europe, has continuously been postponed to an undefined future.

A deconstruction of the enlargement discourse should also allow for a reversal of the binary oppositions underpinning the discourse: what would happen if the applicants which were put in a subordinate position were treated or behaved as equals to E(E)C countries? And what would happen if enlargement considered also countries beyond the borders of Europe? For example, in the beginning of the 1990s, the democratising CEECs might have decided to form their own integration. A reversal of the binary oppositions used in the enlargement discourse might thus conceive of the candidates setting conditions for E(E)C countries in return for association. However, enlarging with a number of countries considered to be at the very borders of Europe or beyond might change the character of enlargement and European or EU identity that this process has been (re)producing – making it less of a European or EU, and more of a regional identity. It might also put EU countries on a course of confrontation with other powers having interests in their wider region.

A genealogy of the process of enlargement shows that its origins have been incidental and related to the issues present already during the time when the EEC was established, and to the establishment of EPC. Nevertheless, already when the first enlargement was being completed, in the 1973 Document on the European Identity, the idea of enlargement was accompanied by a narrative about a united Europe. By 1988-93 when the possibility of enlarging with the democratising CEECs was conceived, enlargement became a systematic policy, regarded as a self-evident process of building a united Europe and served as a key tool of EU foreign policy.

In the end, it should be highlighted that enlargement has represented an effective tool through which E(E)C countries were able to respond to the changing circumstances of world

politics in Europe and its surroundings in the period 1969-2009. In 1988-93, enlargement was part of a comprehensive package of policies through which the E(E)C and its countries were responding to the changes in world politics and which included also recognitions, action with respect to the EEA, Baltic countries and the Western Balkans. In this period in particular, enlargement represented an important part of a wider process through which the E(E)C and its countries reflected and transformed EU foreign policy as well as EU identity, and constituted themselves as the main force of attraction on the European continent. This proactive stance of the EEC and its countries was realised in the years leading to the fifth and the sixth enlargements in 2004 and 2007, and was, to a lesser degree, present also in the response of the EU and its countries to the crises in the Western Balkans in the final decade of the 20th century.

Concerning the changing circumstances of world politics, the enlargement process has been a particular response developed in relation to the circumstances of world politics towards the end of the 20th century. Since that time, circumstances of world politics have changed, new challenges have emerged, and the EU has covered almost all European continent through policies related to enlargement. Thus, it needs to be asked whether enlargement still represents an adequate response to the changing conditions of world politics or should a different kind of (foreign) policy be developed.

### **3.3 Historical study of (re)production of EU identity in world politics**

There are a number of methodological concerns that need to be kept in mind when analysing EU identity in world politics as such. Firstly, attention needs to be paid to explicit expressions of identity in discourses. An idea of a European identity has been part of the idea of European Union since the beginning of the discussions on such a Union: in 1972, when EEC heads of state or government decided to start working on European Union they declared that “Europe” should be able to participate in world affairs as a “distinct entity” (Bulletin EC 1972, 16); and, in 1976, when Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans presented a report on European Union the aim of which was to define what was meant by “European Union”, he identified presenting “a united front to the outside world” as *the first* component of European Union (Bulletin EC 1976, 13). There have been numerous explicit expressions and definitions of European identity in its external aspect already in the earliest period of the development of EU foreign policy, e.g. in the Document on the European Identity (1973) and Declaration on the International Role of the European Community (European Council 1988b).

Discourses which comprised EU foreign policy in the period up to December 2009 also included many implicit expressions of the external aspect of the idea of European identity, most frequently in the form of speech acts and rhetorical figures in relation to foreign policy but also through introspection i.e. instances where E(E)C/ EU member states were trying to figure out what they could, together, represent or achieve in world politics. By looking at the development of the discourse of EU foreign policy, these expressions can be uncovered and analysed together with the explicit expressions of the external aspect of the idea of European identity to see whether a narrative building that identity can be outlined. At the same time, it needs to be observed whether implementation in practice was coherent with the idea of identity that was conveyed through the discourses, how this was connected to what was going on in world politics, and whether European/ EU identity was seen as open.

To gauge these discourses, the selection of documents which are the subject of this study includes, in addition to the documents of the European Council, EPC foreign ministers and the Council of Ministers, also documents of EPC conferences of heads of state or government (such conferences were held in the period before 1975 when the European Council first met), as well as, importantly, primary documents adopted by E(E)C/ EU countries that dealt with the development of EU foreign policy in the period before December 2009. For the period starting with 1999, in addition, the selection of documents includes documents related to CFSP.

Also practice (including speech acts) represents an expression of identity of an actor, even if the practice itself has not been stipulated in identity terms. For example, on the working level (of the ministers of foreign affairs), there have been few cases where EU identity was mentioned directly; but positions were adopted regarding key events and contours of world politics, and attitudes of E(E)C/ EU member states were defined towards current powers in world politics, such as the USA or the USSR, among others. Also, as EU foreign policy developed, particularly through the institution of CFSP, concrete actions were taken by EU countries in addition to the already existing external aspect of Community policies, such as ESDP missions, but also by formulating comprehensive new policies (e.g. European Neighbourhood Policy – ENP) and by building relations with other powers; all of these served to locate EU foreign policy in the field of world politics.

A final methodological issue concerns the relevant world-political context with regard to the construction of EU identity in world politics. With respect to this, world politics as such needs to be observed, or, perhaps even more, what *has been constructed* (by the relevant actors, as well as through EU foreign policy) *as* (key features and events of) *world politics* in the period observed. More specifically, the context of world politics which accompanied and occasionally inspired the specific expressions of EU identity in world politics is of importance. Last but not least, the relevant world-political context includes the views of key actors in world politics regarding the E(E)C/ EU in world politics. These will be looked into together with the development of EU foreign policy where relevant, and also in a separate subchapter.

All of this has worked to position the E(E)C/ EU in the context of world politics in the period until December 2009. The following four subchapters endeavour to follow this process: from the initial period that began around 1969 in which the idea of EU identity in world politics was conceived and shaped; through the period when EEC member states were learning to establish common positions within the developing EU foreign policy; through transformations in world politics that started to have an impact on EU foreign policy particularly in the second half of the 1980s and led to the establishment of CFSP and later ESDP; and to the building of a global perspective and expansion of capabilities of EU foreign policy in the first decade of the 21st century.

### 3.3.1 The idea of identity

In the documents related to EU foreign policy, the idea of having an identity in world politics emerged during the time when political cooperation between EEC member states was being

established which was related to the discussions on the first enlargement of the EEC, as mentioned in the second case study.

But the earliest contours of this idea can be traced further back into the history of European integration. The European integration process itself was a result of developments on the level of world politics; the EEC that was established in 1957 by the six European countries represented an alternative to a US idea for European integration based on the Marshall Plan that enabled the economic reconstruction of Europe following the Second World War; and was held together by fears of the USSR, of a too strong Germany (particularly from France) as well as of the US as an ally which took care primarily of its own interests (Hobsbawm 1995, 239–241). Thus, it is not surprising to find a degree of communality, also externally, already in the Treaty establishing the EEC (1957): while the aim of the Treaty was to “preserve and strengthen peace and liberty” (preamble), the activities of the newly established EEC included a “common commercial policy towards third countries” (Article 3) and conclusion of agreements with third countries and international organizations in the fields covered by the Treaty (Article 228). Although limited to the Community these provisions revealed a desire of the Six to be constituted as a community also with regard to their outside.

In the period before the December 1969 meeting of the heads of state or government at The Hague where the main obstacle for political cooperation was removed through the agreement to enlarge, discussions between the Six on possible political cooperation took place, and external Community policies were implemented. The discussions on the possibility of political cooperation (also towards the outside) proceeded in the period from 1960 to 1963 at the initiative of France but ceased after the French no to the possibility of British membership of the EEC in 1963 (Nuttall 1992, 36–46). In the framework of the Communities, the EEC took part in the Kennedy round of international trade negotiations in 1967 which was the first occasion where it participated as a single entity in international negotiations (First General Report on the Activities of the Communities 1967).

In addition, general reports on activities of the EEC that were issued between 1958 and 1967 reported in a separate chapter about the EEC and the outside world or the EEC’s external activities since the third report in 1960 (Third General Report on the Activities of the Community 1960). As a continuation of this practice, after the merger of the EEC, ECSC and European Atomic Energy Community, already the First General Report on the Activities of the Communities (1967) included a chapter on the external relations of the Communities which testified to a wide range of the EEC’s external relations, albeit in the fields covered by

the Communities, including with third countries and relevant international organizations such as the UN, GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or ILO – International Labour Organization.

However the external vision of EEC countries had been most explicitly established in the discourse of the Final communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or Government on 1 and 2 December 1969 at The Hague: to analyse its discourse, the Community as accomplished through the creation of a common market, or a “united Europe”, was seen as having a vocation in world politics – namely “*responsibilities* in the world of tomorrow”, capable “of making a contribution” in line with “its traditions and its *mission*”, and having a “*role*” to play “in promoting the relaxation of international tension” which was seen as indispensable for “*world equilibrium* and peace” (emphases added). Although the discourse of responsibilities and role for the EEC in world politics endeavoured to highlight the position of the EEC in world politics, it did not provide details about the content of this role and responsibilities – the terms “responsibilities” and “role” used by the discourse can thus be regarded as floating signifiers (*cf.* Lévi-Strauss 1987). Both of these signifiers referred implicitly to the idea of EEC countries having a common identity in world politics (EU identity in world politics), which was thus *cast* (to use a technical term), in the beginning of EPC, *as* having a role to play and responsibilities in the world. Also, the discourse of the communiqué used the reference to “traditions” and “mission” of “Europe” to substantiate the vocation it envisaged for the EEC and its countries in world politics which was seen in terms of contributing to equilibrium in world politics.

The discourse about a united Europe having *responsibilities* in world affairs, this time by virtue of its economic development and particularly towards developing countries, was used also in the first report on political cooperation which, in addition, found that “Europe” had “imperative world duties” (Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the problems of political unification 1970). In the Report, the discourse of responsibilities was put into practice, as the Report recommended that *the first* objective of political cooperation between EEC member states should be “foreign policy concertation” so that “Europe” would be able to “*speak with one voice*” (*ibid.*; emphasis added). To analyse the figures of speech, the discourse of the Report used the *simile* of speaking with one voice to illustrate the need for EEC member states to harmonize their positions in the field of foreign policy. In that, the discourse of the beginnings of EU foreign policy was also a discourse of identity: to show that the entity they were creating had a political vocation, EEC member states had to be able to *speak with one voice* to their exterior i.e. in addition to the signifiers of role and



responsibilities, the early idea of EU identity in world politics was *cast* also as speaking with one voice to the outside world. Nevertheless, in practice, the objectives of this cooperation that were listed in the Report were predominantly internal: to achieve “mutual understanding” regarding key issues of international politics, and to increase solidarity between EEC member states, arriving at “joint action” only when “feasible and desirable” (*ibid.*).

The discourse about a voice, role and responsibilities for “Europe” in world politics was repeated in the Communiqué of the meeting of the heads of state and government in Paris in 1972 which furthermore stated that, through its construction, “Europe” would be able to “assert its *personality* /.../ to make its mark in world affairs *as a distinct entity*” in order to promote “a better *international balance*” (emphases added); a decision was also made to achieve European Union by the end of the decade (Bulletin EC 1972, 10–26; this decision was not realised and the EU was established following the upheavals in world politics that began in the second part of the 1980s). In this way, the discourse about EU identity in relation to foreign policy began to be more explicitly formulated as it spoke about a “personality” for “Europe” in world politics, relating this personality in particular to the outside world and to achieving a better balance in world politics.

In practice and taking into account the world-political context, however, EU foreign policy in the earliest period of its development, and with it the emerging idea of EU identity in world politics, were formulated to a large degree in relation to two significant others, the USA and USSR, and as a reaction to their foreign policy initiatives.

Concerning the USSR, the CSCE process which began in 1973 followed an initiative of the USSR for a European security conference the aim of which was to weaken the West; but, in the relations between EEC member states this process represented one of the first tangible opportunities to truly cooperate in the field of foreign policy (*cf.* Möckli 2009, 123). This meant that, instead of bringing EEC countries closer to the USSR, a key result of the CSCE process from the perspective of EEC countries was their successful mutual cooperation in the framework of EPC – in January 1973, EEC member states, via EPC, acted in unison towards their outside for the first time when they submitted joint proposals for the conference in Helsinki; such cooperation continued throughout the conference until the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, and also subsequently, in relation to the implementation of the commitments the participating countries made in the Helsinki Final Act (*cf.* Möckli 2009).

With regard to the US, the then National Security Adviser to the US President, Henry Kissinger, delivered an address in April 1973 which called 1973 the “year of Europe” due to the nature of “alliance” between Europe and the USA; among others, the speech stated that

the USA's European allies had "regional interests" while the USA had "global interests and responsibilities", and called for a "unifying framework" through which diversities between the USA and its European allies could be reconciled (Kissinger 1973). The speech was not received warmly by EEC member states that were just beginning to learn to cooperate among themselves in the field of foreign policy (*cf.* Nuttall 1992, 87; Möckli 2009, 145). Consequently, as a reaction to this speech and the US initiative, at their meeting in Copenhagen in July 1973, EEC foreign ministers decided to work on a definition of European identity which would serve as a basis for their future relations with the US (Nuttall 1992, 88).

The need to establish "Europe" as a "distinct entity" in the world was explicitly stated also in the Second report on European political cooperation (1973) that was adopted by the foreign ministers in July 1973. The report saw this as necessary so that "Europe" could have a "decisive influence on the international equilibrium", primarily through international negotiations likely to affect this equilibrium, and thus on the future of the EEC. This was seen by the foreign ministers as the main reason for EEC member states to develop common positions in the field of foreign policy (*ibid.*). In this vein, the ministers advised the governments of EEC member states to seek "common positions on major international problems" and undertook not to take up final positions before consulting the other member states on such issues (*ibid.*). The Second report on EPC therefore showed that a key rationale to coordinate in the field of foreign policy was the desire of EEC countries to be able to influence their own future and their position in world politics by influencing world politics, and that the establishment of "Europe" as a "distinct entity" (i.e. a discourse closely connected to the idea of EU identity in world politics) was seen as a crucial element of this.

Although the practice of coordination between the member states on major foreign policy issues via EPC was being established in the report itself (the report contained detailed provisions on how foreign policy meetings on different levels were to proceed), the preamble of the report spoke about a "reflex" of coordination as already existing (Second report on European political cooperation 1973). This shows, from a deconstructive perspective, that the rhetorical figure (simile) of the "reflex" to coordinate was emergent social reality, still under construction within EPC although it was (re)produced by the discourse of the report as established social fact, and was used retroactively in the Report (*cf.* Derrida 2002).

In the end, the report emphasized a "spirit" of cooperation in which its proposals were to be put into effect (*ibid.*). This was another discursive figure: a *metaphor* for the mode of cooperation between EEC member states in the field of foreign policy; together with the simile of "reflex" to coordinate, it served to produce a *figured world* of foreign policy

cooperation and thus a sense of togetherness (identity) between the member states in relation to the outside world which the report was creating.

Kissinger's April 1973 "Year of Europe" initiative thus provided a key stimulus that led to the drafting of the Document on the European Identity which was adopted by the foreign ministers in December 1973 (*cf.* Nuttall 1992, 89). This was also stated explicitly by EPC President-in-Office who told the European Parliament in October 1973 that the fact that the Nine were able to develop a joint attitude towards the USA gave an impulse to the examination of European identity (Bulletin EC 1973, 105).

The Document on the European Identity (1973) firstly defined European identity as it stated in its introduction that, through the Document, a definition was provided of the relations of EEC countries with the other countries and of the "responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs". European identity was seen as composed of three aspects – the aspect comprising common heritage, interests and unity of the Nine; the degree to which the Nine were acting together towards the rest of the world; and the "dynamic nature of European unification" (*ibid.*). In other words, not only was European identity defined implicitly as well as explicitly; it was also seen as consisting of three aspects – an internal one i.e. the relations between EEC member states themselves, an external one encompassing the relations with the rest of the world, and a dynamic one taking into account the process of European integration. Perhaps even more importantly, the key rationale given in the very beginning of the Document for the formulation of European identity was to *define the relations with other countries and responsibilities and the place* of EEC countries in the world (*ibid.*) – which meant that the reason for the explicit formulation of EU identity were what were perceived to be EEC countries' *others* at that time, and concerns with their own position or identity in the world (which was again *cast* as having responsibilities). Significantly, this conception of EU identity equated European identity with the identity that EEC countries were conceiving for themselves (and thus conveyed a claim to Europe and Europeanness).

If we analyse its discourse, the Document on the European Identity (1973) also referred to "ties" with other parts of the world that EEC members have developed historically and saw these as contributing to "progress and international equilibrium". The Document also referred to history when it mentioned the role the Nine were individually able to play in the past and found that, due to the concentration of power "in the hands of a very small number of great powers", the Nine needed to unite and speak with one voice for "Europe" to be able to "play its proper *role* in the world" (*ibid.*; emphasis added). Furthermore, the Document expressed a conviction that European unification would "constitute an element of international

equilibrium” (*ibid.*). These elements of the discourse, as well as references to international equilibrium or balance in the previous EPC documents revealed the concern of EEC countries regarding international equilibrium or the number of powers constituting that equilibrium, and their intention to participate in the construction of that equilibrium through their unification.

The Document on the European Identity (1973) also exhibited concern with regard to the US. Although it mentioned the need for EEC countries to speak with one voice, it emphasized, at the same time, from the perspective of those EEC member states who were also members of NATO, the importance of keeping European commitments towards the US as the guarantor of security in Europe (*ibid.*). This discourse not only represented a contradiction (between Europe playing its proper role in the world and it relying on the US for security) but also showed an internal division between EEC member states because it expressed only the views of those who were also members of NATO. Moreover, the US was the first country to be mentioned explicitly in the chapter of the Declaration that considered European identity in relation to the world: in the view of EEC members, the close ties between them and the US were not in conflict with their intention of establishing themselves as a distinct entity in the world; the key phrases used to describe the envisaged relationship with the US were “equality” and “spirit of friendship” (*ibid.*). This discussion of the relations with the US in the Document, which specifically mentioned EEC countries as representing a distinct entity *vis-à-vis* the US, indicated that dealing with the US represented a point of and resource for common identification of EEC member states.

The Document on the European Identity (1973) also considered the relations with three other (groups of) entities in addition to the US. The relationship with other industrialized countries (of whom Japan and Canada were mentioned by name) was envisaged as one of close cooperation; the relationship with the USSR was described in terms of a “policy of détente”; finally, the intention was mentioned of intensifying relations with China due to its “major role” in international affairs (*ibid.*).

A procedure to consult with the US was finally agreed at the first informal meeting of the foreign ministers in Gymnich in June 1974 – the “gentleman’s agreement” which was presented orally by German foreign minister Genscher following the meeting was that if any member state raised the question of informing or consulting an allied or friendly country, EEC member states would discuss this and, after reaching an agreement, the Presidency would hold the consultations (European Political Co-operation 1978, 85–86).

In sum, all the reflections that were taking place with the aim of defining anew the relations between EEC member states and the US meant that a large part of EU foreign policy

during its starting phase was shaped in relation, and even in opposition, to the US. The chain of events in the fledgling EU foreign policy that was triggered by Kissinger's initiative showed that EEC countries felt a need to define their common external identity in the first place with respect to the one force in world politics that they have been the closest to, the US. Through all this, the US was *cast* as a key 'other' of EU foreign policy – a force to be seen as a friend and ally but also a force that EEC countries as a whole wanted to be different from.

Considering this, the Document on the European Identity (1973) was unique in the field of EU foreign policy in the sense that the whole document was a *speech act*: its main purpose was to *state* European identity, and by stating it produce the social reality of European identity, including the speaking with one voice, as the Document did, in the name of EEC countries as a whole. This also meant that the Document, and with it EU foreign policy, had a dual purpose: to shape an “identity in relation to other countries” which would, however, also strengthen the relations (cohesion) between EEC countries themselves, as stated in the final paragraph of the Document (*ibid.*); i.e. formulating European identity went hand in hand with a transformation of the relations between EEC countries, with the purpose of forging a united approach towards their outside. The emerging EU foreign policy thus not only had an external facet, but also an (and perhaps even more important) internal one. Moreover, to apply the terminology related to othering from the introductory part, and as shown in the analysis, geopolitical othering (of the US as well as the USSR) was a key driver in explicitly defining EU identity (in world politics) in the earliest stage of European Political Cooperation.

### 3.3.2 Speaking with one voice

EEC countries began realising their declared intention of having a collective voice in practice in the following years, through declarations regarding issues in the realm of foreign policy adopted by the European Council which first met in March 1975 (European Council 1975a-1988b, Table A.1 in Appendix 1); in parallel, and in relation to this, decisions on foreign policy topics were being adopted on the level of foreign ministers within EPC (Bulletin EC 1975a-1986). One of the most prominent foreign policy topics during the first years of European Council meetings was the CSCE. Importantly, Italian Prime Minister Moro who was EPC President-in-Office signed the Helsinki Final Act in July 1975 in his capacities as representative of Italy as well as President-in-Office of the Council and the Communities (European Political Co-operation 1978, 112) i.e. on behalf of the Communities as a whole and in the name of the political cooperation between their member states.

The CSCE process thus represented one of the first areas of foreign policy in which the intention of speaking with one voice was put into practice. Another was coordination of EEC member states with regard to the UN – in 1975, the foreign ministers declared that the EEC needed to start functioning “as a political unit” within the UN which resulted in a practice of coordination of EEC countries regarding in particular annual sessions of the UN General Assembly that developed following that decision (Bulletin EC 1975a, 96; 1979c, 134). This shows that one of the first loci where EEC member states were able to achieve a single voice in practice was international multilateral cooperation.

The process of finding a voice with which EEC countries could speak to their collective outside was closely connected to the emerging idea of European Union. In December 1975, Leo Tindemans sent a report on European Union to the European Council (Bulletin EC 1976, Supplement 1/76) which showcased the relationship between EU foreign policy, the idea of EU identity, and world politics during this period. Tindemans’ letter accompanying the report said that a common approach to “international policy” and security would contribute to “safeguarding our identity”; i.e. European identity was not only seen as something to be projected outside but also as something to be *safeguarded through* a common approach to foreign policy and security (which shows that EEC countries’ representatives, when speaking about European identity, did not only have in mind a political project but referred to an idea of collective European identity which they (re)produced through their work; *ibid.*). Presenting “a united front to the outside world” was identified as the first component of European Union (followed by common economic policy, solidarity etc.), not only in order to defend EEC countries’ interests but also to “support law and justice” in the world (*ibid.*, 13). This was important from a social psychological perspective of defining collective identity – it meant, together with the Document on the European Identity of 1973, that EU identity, or “European identity” as it was *cast* by EEC countries, had been explicitly defined in the first place *in relation to* the *out-groups* i.e. EEC countries’ common outside. World economic order, relations with the US, security and regional crises were defined as areas of foreign policy in which European Union would engage (*ibid.*, 16). At this stage, EU foreign policy was thus seen by actors within the EEC as mainly economic, regional, and still significantly connected to the US; but also exhibited an interest in regional stability in Europe. Engagement in world politics was seen mostly in terms of EEC countries’ interests, but also of upholding law and justice globally.

An analysis of EU foreign policy during this period also shows that, from the perspective of implementation, it is important to consider external EEC policies, as by the end

of the 1970s the number and importance of Communities' external activities grew to include key new areas: Eleventh General Report on the Activities of the Communities for 1977 (1978) reported on enlargement, relations with CMEA countries, and EEC action within the UN, CSCE, North-South dialogue, GATT multilateral negotiations, OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) in addition to development cooperation and external commercial relations. Moreover, relations with a growing power, China, were initiated and developed by the Commission within the Community framework – in 1974, the Commission contacted China (and a number of other third countries) to negotiate a trade agreement, as bilateral trade agreements that China had with individual EEC countries were about to expire; an EEC-China trade agreement was negotiated and entered into force in 1978 (Commission of the European Communities 1978b). In 1981, the Commission organised an EEC-China business week which was a first in the relations between the Communities and third countries (Commission of the European Communities 1981). However it was only in 1983 that the foreign ministers held their first EPC consultations with China (such consultations were to become regular); they saw this as recognition of the political weight of the EEC and its countries (Statements of the foreign ministers and other documents 1983; Commission of the European Communities 1985, 6–7).

Within EPC context, EEC countries were striving to achieve a differentiation of EPC from cooperation within the Community framework: EPC President-in-Office made a statement to the European Parliament in 1979 (Bulletin EC 1979c, 129) in which he described EPC as a non-institutional intergovernmental arrangement that operated by consensus in the area of collective relations of the Nine with the external world but in which not all foreign policy areas were considered; its instruments were those of diplomacy and, through the years, it had the effect of bringing the Nine closer together (*ibid.*). In this sense, in addition, EPC President also mentioned expectations of publics inside Europe and in the world for “Europe” to speak with a “collective voice” and said that EPC represented a response to these expectations (*ibid.*, 138). If we analyse this discourse, his statement revealed identity considerations as identity comprises, among others, how a subject or an entity perceives itself to be seen by others (*cf.* Lucarelli 2008); and it also revealed the building of the external aspect of European (EU) identity as a political project of EEC member states.

EEC countries reacted via EPC to a deterioration of the relations between the US and USSR in the first half of the 1980s. In particular, they noted “*responsibilities* devolving upon Europe” and underlined a necessity for a more united approach in view of the international situation (European Council 1980c; Report on European Political Cooperation 1981;

emphasis added). Moreover, in practice, they declared that they would “keep open the channels of East/ West communication”, and Germany’s President held talks with President Brezhnev (European Council 1981c). However, an analysis of the discourse of the third report on EPC (Report on European Political Cooperation 1981) also reveals that EEC member states were aware of a need for EEC countries to be able to take more concrete action. Firstly, the report contained a renewed commitment to consult and coordinate positions in the field of foreign policy and to promulgate them, also in international conferences (*ibid.*); but it also found that, although it was becoming possible for EEC countries “to speak with *one voice*”, this was not enough – not only a common attitude was needed, but “joint action” (emphasis added). There was thus a realisation that the Ten were not “playing a *role* in the world” corresponding to their “combined influence” and a binary opposition was used saying that the Ten should seek “to shape events” instead of only reacting to them (*ibid.*; emphasis added). With this purpose, procedures for consultations with third countries were adopted (*ibid.*). In this manner, the Report showed an awareness of the Ten that ability for action (i.e. also from the perspective of practice/ implementation) in view of the context of world politics was crucial for further development of EU foreign policy. But the Report was not more concrete, as it only stated an intention of playing a role in world politics that would be appropriate to “combined influence” of the Ten (*cf. ibid.*). Also, these discourses repeated the *casting* of EU identity in world politics as one of having a common role, voice and responsibilities in world politics; moreover, all of these signifiers were used as *ideals* by the discourse, which were yet to be achieved.

In this context, also the Solemn Declaration on European Union that was adopted by the European Council in 1983 (European Council 1983b) could be understood which stated that a “united Europe” which would assume “its *responsibilities*” was needed “to meet the dangers of the world situation”; and that, by “speaking with a single *voice*” and working on political and economic aspects of security, “Europe” could contribute to peace (*ibid.*; emphases added). The Declaration therefore merged both meanings of European/ EU identity that have appeared in the development of EU foreign policy so far: in the sense of external projection of identity, as well as of safeguarding “Europe” from outside danger (i.e. it saw EU identity as a political project of external identity projection, but also as a collective identity to be defended from outside danger). In connection to this, the need for a united Europe speaking with one voice to its outside was explicitly connected to a desire to be able to address the deteriorating Cold War situation in world politics (*ibid.*; *cf.* Report on EPC 1981). Referring to this, the Solemn Declaration provided for a reinforcement of EPC. It contained a number of



operational procedures that concretised coordination between EEC member states in the field of foreign policy and called for increased contacts with third countries which would give the Ten “greater weight as an interlocutor” (*ibid.*). Nevertheless, if we look at the signifiers used in these discourses, they show, importantly, that overall and at least during this stage of the development of EU foreign policy, EEC member states were not able to conceive of EU identity in world politics as *anything else than* having a common role, voice and responsibilities in world politics.

If we now turn to the aspect of policy implementation in the context of world politics, taking into account the three-pronged (integrative) methodological approach, a desire for the ability to take more concrete action with regard to world politics mentioned in the third Report on EPC (1981) and the Solemn Declaration (European Council 1983b) was symptomatic of EU foreign policy during this period. From 1980-1984, EEC countries mostly produced declarations (speech acts) in which they emphasized their intention of intensifying cooperation in the field of foreign policy to be able to contribute to international equilibrium, repeated assurances that they were keeping open the channels of communication, and called for dialogue between the US and USSR (European Council 1980c; 1981c; 1984b; Bulletin EC 1984, 78; Debates of the European Parliament 1984). In the period of the change of leadership in the Soviet Union and improvement of its relations with the US in 1985 and 1986, EEC member states mostly expressed hope or satisfaction about the results of US-USSR disarmament negotiations and welcomed them (EPC Bulletin 1985, No. 1, 60; No. 2, 24 and 242; 1986, No. 2, 33). However, they were able to focus more concretely on the situation in Eastern bloc countries (Poland) which they tried to alleviate through aid, also calling for respect of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act (e.g. European Council 1980c). As soon as the relations between the US and USSR were improving starting with 1985, EEC countries started to actively pursue relations with the countries of Eastern bloc: political and economic dialogue was established with these Central and Eastern European countries; and these were the first moves in the direction which later developed into a policy that influenced the stabilisation of the European continent during the period of transformations in world politics from 1988 to 1992 (*cf.* Bulletin EC 1984; European Council 1984b; EPC Bulletin 1985, No. 1, 60; No. 2, 25 and 242).

If we perform a discourse analysis of how EEC countries positioned themselves in relation to world politics in this period, theirs was a discourse of two binary oppositions: on East-West relations, and North-South relations (European Council 1977a-1988a). The discourse of EU foreign policy located EEC countries in the West: they supported

development of transatlantic relations and had regular contacts with the US, also at the highest level (e.g. Debates of the European Parliament 1982; European Council 1982a), while actions of the Soviet Union were closely followed and regarded with suspicion even following Gorbachev's announcement of reforms (EPC Bulletin 1985, No. 1, 60; 1987, No. 2, 51 and 66). EEC countries also joined other industrialised countries in a statement on East-West relations which emphasised a need for alertness regarding the actions of the USSR after the policy changes were announced towards *glasnost* and *perestroika* (EPC Bulletin 1987, No. 1, 179–180). In the North-South binary opposition, EEC countries saw themselves in the “North” which comprised industrialized countries that were donors of development assistance (e.g. European Council 1977a; 1980a). The discourse of these two binary oppositions thus represented an intersection between (the social constructs of) EU foreign policy, EU identity and world politics.

In 1985, the gist of what EEC countries had achieved in terms of foreign policy cooperation so far was written in the Draft Treaty on European Political Cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy which later became the foreign policy chapter of the Single European Act – SEA (European Council 1985c; Single European Act 1986): EU foreign policy and EU identity were mentioned, and discourse on them now included a new, security dimension. Both of these documents contained a paragraph that stated that “cooperation on /.../ *European security* would contribute in an *essential way*” to developing a “*European external policy identity*” (Draft Treaty on European Cooperation – European Council 1985c) or “*European identity in external policy matters*” (Single European Act 1986; emphases added). These statements not only connected EU foreign policy and EU identity, and saw European identity as having an external dimension which needed to be developed, but also brought the element of *security* into the nexus of EU foreign policy and identity, and posited security as a foundation, or essence, of its further development. This formulation also represented an argument on which EEC member states based their decision to coordinate their positions also with regard to (the political and economic aspects of) security (Single European Act 1986, Article 30).

In addition, the preamble of the SEA (1986) contained discourse referring to “responsibility” of “Europe” to speak “increasingly with one *voice and to act*” as well (emphasis added); the objectives of speaking with one voice and acting accordingly were justified on the one hand with the need “to protect” common European “interests and independence” and, on the other, with the aim of contributing to “international peace and security”. The preamble of the SEA thus combined most of the arguments that have been

made within EPC by that time in favour of an external European identity and exhibited a desire for foreign policy action and for involvement in world politics (and thus an awareness of a need to strengthen the aspect of implementation in practice of EU foreign policy). Furthermore, in its Title III, the SEA (*ibid.*) legalised the practical arrangements for coordination and cooperation in the field of foreign policy and provided that EPC and Community policies should be consistent with each other. At the same time, the *casting* of the idea of EU identity as having a common voice and responsibility in world politics was repeated in the discourse of the SEA, and, from this perspective, the imagined EU identity in world politics continued to be seen as an ideal.

The discourse on European “external identity” or European identity in relation to foreign or external policy was also used by the foreign ministers (EPC Bulletin 1985, No. 1, 61; 1988, No. 1, 53). EPC Presidents (EPC Bulletin 1985, No.1, 61) explicitly stated that the objective of strengthening cooperation within EPC was to “*search*” for European “external identity” (this discourse connected the idea of European identity to EU foreign policy); and spoke about developing European identity “in the field of external and security policy” (EPC Bulletin 1988, No. 1, 53; emphasis added). This statement revealed that the concrete content of this identity had not been determined yet and that it was therefore (a political project) under construction. These statements also showed that, during this period, discourse in connection to EU foreign policy reproduced the idea of European/ EU identity in a manner which constructed a specific, external (and security) aspect of this identity. In addition, together with the discourse of the SEA (1986) in the previous paragraph, they showed that the idea of EU identity in world politics was (re)produced *both* as an ideal *and* as yet being under construction.

As the linkage between EU foreign policy and (the external aspect of) EU identity was being constructed within EU foreign policy discourse, in practice, EU foreign policy (encompassing also the external aspect of Community policies) worked towards negotiating and concluding the first trade and cooperation agreements with Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). Negotiations on these agreements with the first of these countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania) took place during 1987 while exploratory talks were held with some of the other CEECs (EPC Bulletin 1987, No. 2, 302; Twenty-first General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 1988, 279).

Looking at discourse, these actions were connected to the external aspect of EU identity and the changing situation in world politics, with the aim of influencing it: EPC President as well as foreign ministers emphasized that, considering the dialogue and warming in the

relations between the US and USSR, it needed to be ensured that “Europe’s *voice*” was heard, and that the Community needed to have a “more effective contribution to this process”; the signature of declaration on relations between the EEC and the CMEA in 1988 was seen as a step towards this (EPC Bulletin 1988, No. 1, 53; No. 2, 62; emphasis added). Furthermore, Declaration on the International Role of the European Community (1988b) stated, in connection to an “*active role*” of the Community in “the preservation of international peace and security”, that “Europe” would “*actively demonstrate* its solidarity for the /.../ spreading movement of democracy” (emphases added). Also, in the Declaration (*ibid.*), while considering the improved state of East-West relations, the European Council confirmed its willingness to “further economic relations and cooperation” with the CEECs. Representing the first concrete steps in this direction, the trade and cooperation agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary were signed in 1988.

Despite the declared willingness to further the relations with the CEECs, the Declaration on the International Role of the European Community (European Council 1988b), in relation to the objective of strengthening the role of the EEC and its countries on the international stage, first mentioned the intention to continue the cooperation with the US, Japan and other industrialized countries as well as with EFTA countries and other European countries who shared the same ideals. The objective of deepening the relations with the CEECs was mentioned later, after East-West relations were discussed (*ibid.*), which means that even though EEC countries were declaring and affirming a new policy towards the CEECs they still saw world politics in terms of the East-West binary opposition.

To sum up, in the period before the great transformations in world politics that brought about the end of the Cold War and accelerated in 1988, EU foreign policy was marked by a repetition of the discourse about the need to have a voice and role in world politics, and realised that there was a need for capacity for more concrete action; this discourse was intended for audiences inside as well as outside the EEC and contained elements of an EU foreign policy narrative about EU identity in world politics. But this also meant that the imagined idea of EU identity in world politics had been *cast* as (and thus *closed* on) the ideal of *having* a role, voice and responsibilities in world politics (and, by implication, not something other than that). The first legal bases for the realisation of a common voice and action were set through the adoption of the SEA in 1986. There was also awareness of the changing context of world politics and a growing desire to be able to influence it; however, EEC countries still depended on the relations between the two superpowers for their foreign policy initiatives (regarding their relations with Eastern bloc CEECs).

Thus, through the changes in world politics following the change of leadership in the USSR, EEC countries seized the opportunity to develop their relations with the CEECs, and embarked “on an historic effort” for a more secure and free continent (Declaration on the International Role of the European Community – European Council 1988b). In this manner, through their reflections of the processes which began the end of the Cold War in Europe, and regarding the aspect of foreign policy implementation in practice, the desire of EEC countries to be able to influence world politics found its way into realisation, albeit on a small scale and on the European continent, through the establishment of the relations with the CEECs and the initiation of a policy within the Community framework which later developed into an all-encompassing policy of enlargement that had a significant impact on Europe through regional stabilisation as it entangled the CEECs, and later also other countries, in a steadily closer relationship with the EEC/ EU.

### 3.3.3 Acting together

The period of transformations in world politics that began to be discussed within EU foreign policy from 1988 set in motion also transformations of the European integration process, including EU foreign policy. In the beginning and the first half of the 1990s, these new developments were incorporated in the institutional design of European Union; all of this, in turn, implied that E(E)C/ EU member states were compelled to act together in ways that marked this period of the development of EU foreign policy apart from the previous ones.

EU foreign policy discourse reflected the transformations in world politics: the European Council last discussed “East-West relations” in Madrid in June 1989 while in November that year it spoke about “Eastern Europe”, and, from December 1989, about Central and Eastern Europe (European Council 1989a; 1989b; 1989c). In June 1989, the European Council (1989a), in view of the changes in the CEECs and the USSR, recognized the profoundness of those changes and expressed a determination “to play an *active role* in supporting and encouraging” the changes as well as reforms in the CEECs (emphases added). The objective of realising the envisaged role of the EEC and its countries with respect to the changes taking place in the CEECs was backed by the other industrialised countries: at their meeting in Paris in July 1989, with the aim of fostering reforms in the CEECs, they asked the European Commission to “take the necessary initiatives” (EPC Bulletin 1989, No. 2, 26). From the perspective of the performance of the idea of EU identity in the context of world politics, this was crucial as it represented an explicit *recognition* by the other industrialised powers that the EEC was a force which had initiative on the level of world politics in Europe.

In practice, the informal meeting of the European Council in Paris in November 1989 following the events in East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia (European Council 1989b) marked the beginning of a hands-on approach to harness the momentum of the changes taking place in the CEECs and the USSR; this was a development hitherto unseen in EU foreign policy, as, up to that time, EEC member states did not have an opportunity to become directly involved in events of a world-political scale as a main actor. At that meeting, the leaders decided that, regarding the changes taking place in Europe, they would actively “*back up and encourage democratic change*” (emphases added) and that they would reciprocate the CEECs’ desire to develop (market) relations with the EEC (European Council 1989b). After the meeting, the French Presidency (EPC Bulletin 1989, No. 2, 171) stated that, considering that the EEC had been “a point of reference and a stimulus” for the changes in the CEECs, its construction should be completed, to affirm its “*identity as a Community*” (emphasis added). Furthermore the Presidency stated that EEC countries should help carry on the reform movement, and that, through its action, the EEC should “serve as an example” for the changing CEECs (*ibid.*, 172 and 174). These statements mentioned identity directly but also involved it implicitly because serving as an example to others represents an element of the self-image of political entities (*cf.* Lucarelli 2008). Secondly, the statements showed that EEC countries decided to actively involve themselves in the transformations in Europe that, at that time, represented one of the crucial elements of the transformations that were taking place in world politics; and that the strengthening of the Communities and opening up to the reforming CEECS were the twin foci of this involvement, went “hand in hand”, as the French Presidency stated (*ibid.*, 171).

At the meeting of the European Council in December 1989 (1989c), the discourse of EU foreign policy about the EEC and its countries as having responsibilities in world politics was explicitly concretised for the first time, as it was connected to the developments in world politics taking place in Europe, and to the need to construct European Union. To analyse the discourse, the European Council declared its awareness of “*responsibilities weighing on*” the EEC during these changes, mentioned “the attraction” of the EEC to other countries, stated that the EEC should “live up to this expectation”, and used a binary opposition of *openness* to other European countries versus withdrawal to underline the necessity of cooperation with other European states (*ibid.*; emphasis added). In this vein, the European Council decided to continue examining “appropriate forms of association” with the reforming CEECs (*ibid.*). The changes in the CEECs were seen as “historic events” unparalleled since the Second World War, and, in connection to this crucial “phase in the history of Europe”, “common

responsibility” of the EEC and its member states was again invoked (*ibid.*). Moreover, identity considerations were present in the decision of the European Council that, considering the transformations in Europe, the EEC should be “a point of reference and influence” and a “cornerstone of a new European architecture” (*cf. ibid.*). The European Council’s statement concluded with a decision to continue building the European Union (*cf. ibid.*).

These deliberations of the European Council represented a key intersection between EU foreign policy and world politics and a watershed moment for EU foreign policy. Firstly, they intertwined the changes in the CEECs and on the European continent with a sense of (European or EU) identity and progress in the construction of European Union (in doing this, they also equated EU identity with European identity). Secondly, although before 1989 (as shown in the previous subchapters), identity considerations in the sense of having a role, a voice and responsibilities in world politics were present in the discourse of EU foreign policy, they existed in an undefined, abstract manner, through the discourse of EU foreign policy; while the events in Europe which accelerated in 1989 led, through EEC countries’ actions (including speech acts), to a gradual *realisation* of this discourse in practice, first and foremost by forming relations and negotiating trade and cooperation agreements with the reforming CEECs. In this manner, the idea of EU identity as having a role, voice and responsibilities in world politics was put into practice, in relation to the events in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, if the first defining moment in the development of EU foreign policy/ identity nexus was the establishment of a difference in relation to the USA (in 1973), the second was the concretization in practice of the discourse about having a role, voice and responsibilities in world politics in relation to the landslide of events in the CEECs with the end of the Cold War; because the actions of the EEC and its countries produced effects on the level of and of significance for world politics, limited geographically to Europe, by stabilising the situation in Europe through attracting and anchoring the changing and reforming CEECs to E(E)C/ EU framework (as shown partially in the second case study). In connection to this, importantly, *openness* of the European integration process (which implied openness of the idea of EU identity) towards other European countries who were reforming was explicitly pursued as a policy goal.

Despite this sea change of EU foreign policy in relation to the changes in Europe and the reforming CEECs, the most immediate impact of the changes was not towards the EEC’s outside but in how EEC countries saw their integration process; reflecting the changes, they turned inwards, also to absorb the impact of the reunification of Germany. In April 1990, French President Mitterrand and German Chancellor Kohl sent a letter to the Irish Presidency;

in the letter, considering the “far-reaching changes in Europe”, they requested that, in addition to the intergovernmental conference on economic and monetary union, a second conference on political union be called which should define, among others, a common foreign and security policy (Kohl and Mitterrand 1990). France and Germany both had an interest to further political cooperation: France in order to contain a reunified Germany in a more integrated Europe; and Germany to show its readiness to cooperate (Michael Smith 2004, 178). The European Council (1990a) considered the letter in the end of April and decided to take steps in that direction. In addition, the European Council supported action within the G-24<sup>70</sup> on assistance to the CEECs and decided that work should start on a new generation of association agreements with the CEECs (which later became Europe agreements; *ibid.*).

From the perspective of discourse analysis, it is important that the European Council (1990a) also expressed a determination for the EEC to have a “*major role as a responsible participant at a wider international level*” (emphases added). In this context, relations with the US, Mediterranean countries, as well as ACP (Asia, Caribbean and Pacific) and OECD countries were discussed (*ibid.*). This discourse revealed a wider and *global* ambition of the developing EU foreign policy, apart from forging closer relations with the CEECs, and together with a wider understanding of its external responsibilities and outlook.

In step with the developing wider perspective of EU foreign policy, as reflected in European Council discourse, and taking into account the context of world politics, the relations of the EEC and its countries with China, the US and the USSR in particular were redefined during this period. This was significant from the perspective of the analytical concept of EU identity in world politics as developed in the prolegomena, which encompasses also how the EU sees and what relations it has with other (key) actors in world politics. Concerning China, in June 1989, the European Council (1989a), discussing events in Tiananmen Square, produced the first official critique of China and took actions against it, including an embargo on arms trade which led to a discord in E(E)C/ EU relations with China in the coming years. The relations with the USSR were warming – EEC countries (European Council 1989c) recognized that the changes in the CEECs would not have been possible without the reforms in the USSR and declared the EEC would assist the USSR in rebuilding its economy and in integrating in international financial institutions, and pondered a comprehensive new agreement with it that would also cover political relations (European Council 1990d; 1991b). It was evident that the relations with the USSR were being put on a

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<sup>70</sup> Group of 24 developing countries whose aim is to coordinate positions on monetary and development issues (G-24 2015).



new footing when, in June 1990, EEC ministers, in view of the incidents in the three Baltic states following their declarations of independence, requested the USSR to provide information on the incidents in accordance with the Helsinki Accords – the Soviet authorities replied and provided a memorandum with an explanation (EPC Bulletin 1991, 63 and 106). Nevertheless, discussions of the foreign ministers within EPC following an unsuccessful coup in the USSR in August 1991 showed that EEC countries could only follow the events in the USSR, but that, following the coup’s failure and restoration of democratic freedoms, they saw the transforming Soviet entity as a more friendly counterpart than before (EPC Bulletin 1991, 385–387).

The relations with the USA were progressing rapidly, and experienced a revival unseen since the 1973 distancing from the USA (which led to the issuing of the Document on the European Identity). The revival began with an initiative on a new transatlantic partnership outlined by the US during 1989; in January 1990, the Irish Presidency of the Council met with US Secretary Baker and it was agreed that the President of the European Council and US President would meet at least once during each EU Presidency and that there would be annual meetings between US Secretary of State and the foreign ministers of EEC countries (EPC Bulletin 1990, 48 and 148; European Council 1990a). In November 1990, a joint Declaration on EC-US relations (Transatlantic Declaration) was proclaimed (EPC Bulletin 1990, 463–466). It recalled common values of both, and emphasized that “transatlantic solidarity” had been “essential” for achieving peace and with respect to the changes in Europe (*ibid.*, 464). Importantly, it recognized that the EEC was “acquiring its own *identity*” (emphasis added), among others in the fields of foreign policy and security (*ibid.*). Under the principles of the partnership it was establishing, it contained a joint commitment to consult each other on important issues, to bring positions “as close as possible”, recognizing each party’s “respective independence” (*ibid.*). A similar Declaration was adopted with Canada but described the relationship with Canada in other terms, not as “essential”, and did not include a commitment to inform, consult and approximate positions (Declaration on Transatlantic Relations 1990). In effect, therefore, the Transatlantic Declaration with the US incorporated what the US had tried unsuccessfully to achieve regarding EEC countries already in 1973; but also contained a recognition of the EEC’s efforts for own identity and independence. This was an indication that the US was not as unilateral in its position in 1990 as it had been in 1973; and that EEC countries felt secure enough in their efforts to achieve a common external identity to allow themselves to be seen as a partner of the USA. From the perspective of the building of EU identity in world politics, this episode showed that a *recognition* by the US of

EU identity in world politics was important, and that a good relationship with the US now explicitly came to be seen as fundamental, “essential” for the EU with regard to Europe.

The objective of transforming EU foreign policy was being put into practice during the same period. Regarding the intergovernmental conference on a political union, the October 1990 European Council (1990c) achieved consensus on the establishment of CFSP, “to *strengthen the identity*” (emphasis added) of the EEC “on the international scene” and to bring it in line with its “responsibilities”; the December 1990 European Council (1990d) discussed the envisaged CFSP more extensively together with a *role* for the EU in the field of security, stating that the aim of CFSP should be international peace and security and that CFSP would have to include procedures to enable the EEC to “speak with one *voice*” (emphases added). The June 1991 European Council (1991b) again connected the efforts towards CFSP to the intention of reinforcing “the *identity and role*” of the EEC on the international stage and discussed the possibility of a “defence *identity*” for the political union (emphases added).

To analyse its discourse, European Council discussions directly connected the Common Foreign and Security Policy it was conceiving to a vision of external identity of the political union. In addition, they indicated that EEC leaders saw the identity of the European Union as a project of establishing different aspects of identity, such as those related to foreign policy, security and defence. The discussions of the European Council again used EU foreign policy discourse of one voice, role and responsibilities for the EEC and its countries in world politics. These signifiers were not connected to anything in particular; they remained abstract and undefined yet were seen as being of crucial importance as they were used to substantiate the need for a new form of EU foreign policy, CFSP, and thus functioned as floating signifiers (*cf.* Lévi-Strauss 1987). This showed that the *closure* of the idea of EU identity that was limited to having a role, voice and responsibilities in world politics remained in EU foreign policy also during this period. In June 1991, the European Council (1991b) also emphasized the importance of the EEC having an “active and *open*” external role and of seeking bilateral and multilateral cooperation (emphasis added) which was an indication of discursive openness and of a direction it envisioned for the developing CFSP.

But if, in terms of concrete implementation of EU foreign policy in this period of transformations (from the perspective of the three-pronged analytical approach), including its own, the openness towards the CEECs in relation to the enlargement process developed into a success (in December 1990, the European Council decided that a new generation of agreements, “Europe” Agreements, would be concluded with them – these were signed with

Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland during the course of 1990; European Council 1990d and XXVth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 1992; *cf.* second case study), this was not the case with former Yugoslavia which began to dissolve in 1991.

It was evident that, in its initial phase, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was seen by EEC countries as a matter of EU foreign policy since this issue was handled via EPC ministerial meetings (e.g. in July 1991 – EPC Bulletin 1991, 333 and 353–354). It was also thought initially by EEC countries that they would be able to address this issue on their own: during July 1991, EEC countries, following a request by the local authorities and in accordance with the conclusions of CSCE Emergency Mechanism, decided to institute (an unarmed civilian) monitoring mission to the former Yugoslavia to oversee a cease-fire; EEC member states believed, at this stage, that they were the ones “primarily” expected “to help resolve” the crisis, and saw this as a “distinct challenge” (in addition, an arms trade embargo against Yugoslavia was established; EPC Bulletin 1991, 333 and 353–354). In this manner, in the period in which EU foreign policy was evolving towards CFSP, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia presented an opportunity for EU foreign policy to become actively and directly engaged in conflict resolution as a leading outside actor. This was the first concrete opportunity of such kind; previously, EU foreign policy only produced statements on readiness for such engagement (e.g. in relation to the Middle East).

During the summer and autumn of 1991 the violence in the former Yugoslavia (at this stage predominantly in Croatia) escalated and showed no sign of abating. In August, EEC countries expressed their “dismay” at the increasing violence and, in an effort to stop it, decided to convene a peace conference on Yugoslavia and start an arbitration procedure within the conference (EPC Bulletin 1991, 389). In the end of August, the Yugoslav parties signed another cease-fire agreement and in the beginning of September, the EEC and its countries convened the Conference on Yugoslavia and started the arbitration procedure (*ibid.*, 390–391). During September and October, despite the Conference on Yugoslavia which started to work under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, the fighting in the former Yugoslavia continued, to a point where EEC monitoring mission (now working in Croatia) was unable to perform its tasks (*ibid.*, 425, 476). Despite this, EEC countries endeavoured to secure respect for a new cease-fire agreement signed by the Presidents of Croatia and Serbia in the beginning of October with the assistance of EEC countries; both the US and USSR expressed support for EEC countries’ efforts, but, at the same time, also supported UN Secretary-General’s efforts in this direction (*ibid.*, 476, 486–487, 512). Nevertheless, the fighting in Croatia continued and, as the situation grew worse in November 1991 (towards the

end of November, the Croatian town of Vukovar fell to Serb forces), the foreign ministers of EEC countries found that the Conference on Yugoslavia was at an impasse, and, in view of the Yugoslav parties' agreement, EPC supported the possibility of sending a UN peace-keeping force to the former Yugoslavia (*ibid.*, 633–634).

As regards the implementation of EU foreign policy, 1991 thus proved to be a year in which the first real opportunity for concrete action in terms of conflict resolution opened but also closed for EU foreign policy as, during the second half of the year, events in the former Yugoslavia escalated beyond the reach of attempts at peaceful resolution by EEC member states within EPC in the form of the monitoring mission and the Conference on Yugoslavia. While, in the beginning of the year, EEC countries still saw the situation in the former Yugoslavia as a challenge that could be tackled within EPC, by the end of the year, they were reduced to admitting the need for outside (UN) engagement. Although the attempt at resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia represented a step towards implementing EU foreign policy discourse about a role for and responsibilities of the EU in world politics, its envisaged realisation failed, as EEC countries' response proved to be inadequate for the complexities of the situation on the ground – in December 1991, EEC countries *requested* that the UNSC and UN Secretary-General continue with *their* efforts for peaceful resolution of the conflict (EPC Bulletin 1991, 770). This was significant from the perspective of EU identity-building in world politics: taking into account the analytical definition of EU identity developed in the prolegomena, it showed that this identity, due to the inability of EEC countries to act decisively in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, now included *inaction* in practice with respect to this case, which was visible also to (other) key actors in world politics.

Simultaneously with the efforts by EEC member states for concrete action in the former Yugoslavia, the negotiations on a new Treaty continued which would provide legal bases for implementation in the field of foreign policy; the Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. To analyse its discourse, its preamble connected the external aspect of “European identity” to EU foreign policy: it expressed resolve to implement CFSP to reinforce “*the European identity and its independence*” with the aim of achieving peace and security (Treaty on European Union 1992; emphases added). In addition, Article B stated that the second objective of the EU was “to *assert its identity on the international scene*”, and, in Article J.1, *safeguarding* common values, “interests and *independence* of the Union” was mentioned as the first objective of the newly instituted CFSP (*ibid.*; emphases added).

The use of the idea of identity in the discourse of the TEU revealed that European (EU) identity was seen in two ways: on the one hand, there was the reference to an idea of a collective European identity, a totality which could extend to different areas (in the case of the TEU to the areas of foreign policy and security). On the other hand, building different aspects of this identity was seen as political project: the security aspect prevailed in devising CFSP which was seen in the function of safeguarding the independence of the EU. Apart from this, the TEU provided legal bases for coordination between the member states and for new instruments in the field of foreign policy: on a political level, the European Council would adopt principles and guidelines while CFSP would be implemented through the use of two new instruments, common positions and joint actions, by the foreign ministers (Treaty on European Union 1992). But the focus on this Treaty in EU foreign policy also demonstrated that, in practice, with the considerable challenges on the level of world politics that were occurring in the Western Balkans, EEC countries were still entangled in their mutual relations instead of turning outward.

In 1992 and 1993, when it took decisions on the EU and CFSP, the European Council linked CFSP again to the signifiers of role and responsibilities of the EEC on the international scene, but also to stability in a regional sense, and to expectations of third countries (European Council 1992; 1993a). Discourse analysis thus reveals a new *contextualisation* of the discourse about role and responsibilities of the EEC in world politics through the development of EU foreign policy (however the key signifiers describing the conception of EU identity in world politics remained the same). Namely, in June 1992, the European Council adopted a report by the foreign ministers on the likely areas of CFSP development (European Council 1992b). This represented a turn towards implementation in practice of the envisaged EU identity in world politics. The report used a binary opposition of being reactive to outside events versus being more active in realising the EU's interests and creating a favourable international environment to underline the direction of work for CFSP (*ibid.*). On this basis, the report defined specific objectives of CFSP including promotion of regional stability and conflict prevention and resolution; EU interest in the stability of regions or countries was mentioned as one of the rationales for the selection of areas for initial CFSP action (which included the CEECs, the Western Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East; *ibid.*). After the TEU entered into force in 1993, taking into account "instability in areas bordering" the EU, and deciding that CFSP would also comprise security, inter alia with the aim of contributing to "stability of neighbouring regions", the European Council (1993b) took the decision on five specific areas where joint CFSP actions were to be undertaken first –

stabilisation of the CEECs, the Middle East, South Africa, search for a solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as well as assistance with implementation of a peace plan, and Russia; in taking this decision, the European Council emphasised that the aim of CFSP was speaking with one *voice* and acting effectively in consideration of the EU's and wider interests (*ibid.*). These decisions on EU foreign policy again conveyed a connection to the idea of EU identity, an intention to act and, in terms of world politics, the objective of the newly instituted CFSP to contribute mostly to regional stability.

In practice, however, EU foreign policy progressed slowly and gradually, in a manner which was, at times, in stark contrast with its discourse. In February 1992, the foreign ministers welcomed the recommendation of UN Secretary-General to deploy a peace-keeping force in the former Yugoslavia (EPC Bulletin 1992, 124–125).<sup>71</sup> When violence started to spread in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as well, EEC countries were only able to “condemn” the violence and “call upon” the parties to the conflict to respect a cease-fire that has been agreed, and to recognize that this made progress in the peace talks within the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia uncertain (EPC Bulletin 1992, 211, 222–223). In response to questions on this that were posed by the European Parliament, EPC President stated that, with regard to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the EEC did not “have the necessary instruments” and not even “the basic political elements”, and that these two facts should guide EEC action after the entry into force of the TEU; he also highlighted the EEC's contribution in terms of diplomatic initiatives, observers, aid and the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and clarified that EEC member states were not “prepared to” intervene militarily (*ibid.*, 226–227). His speech demonstrated that the former Yugoslavia represented a test case for the developing EU foreign policy in terms of potential new venues of action (instruments such as military means) and from an internal perspective, as EEC members were compelled to explore the limits of their common external engagement in practice. To UNGA plenary in September 1992, EEC engagement with regard to the former Yugoslavia was presented as a division of labour where the UN led on peace-keeping and “the EC on peace-making”, via the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in which now also the UN cooperated (*ibid.*, 445). Notwithstanding the incongruence between the debate with the European Parliament and the statement in the UN, this discourse *magnified* the contribution of EEC countries with respect to the former Yugoslavia – EU foreign policy was presented as successful despite the escalating violence in BiH; in addition, the situation with the former Yugoslavia showed that

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<sup>71</sup> United Nations Protection Force – UNPROFOR was established by UNSC Resolution 743 in February 1992.

the main difficulty in terms of EEC countries' contribution in practice was how to achieve an internal *finalité politique* for necessary innovation in EU foreign policy.

The inconsistency between discourse and concrete practice regarding the former Yugoslavia (with the conflict now mostly in BiH) continued in the following years. An EPC statement in the European Parliament in January 1993 told that the EC and its countries “assumed /.../ responsibility” in the former Yugoslavia because it was “*natural* for the EC /.../ to play a *major* role in *resolving* the crisis” (EPC Bulletin 1993, 66; emphases added); a discursive magnification of EC countries' achievements on the ground. In terms of concrete contribution, EC representative together with UN representative elaborated a peace plan in the end of January 1993; at the same time, EC foreign ministers expressed hope for US support to the peace plan and welcomed a more active engagement of the US in searching for a solution (*ibid.*, 102–103, 111). Through this, also, EU identity in world politics, with regard to the conflict in BiH, was constructed as one of supporting the US as a main actor, and as being active on the margins of addressing this and related conflicts. The actual extent of EC countries' engagement on the ground was encapsulated in the first Joint Action on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia which was also the first Joint Action to be adopted within CFSP: it concerned support for the conveying of humanitarian aid to BiH (Council of Ministers 1993d).

In the years that followed, EU countries left first the military and then also the political aspect of resolving the crisis in BiH to NATO and the US. In 1994, they backed plans to use NATO airpower to support UN involvement in BiH (Council of Ministers 1994b; 1994e). In May 1995, as the situation in BiH worsened still further, EU foreign ministers were only able to “condemn” this, and to demand the release of UN peacekeepers taken hostage by Bosnian Serbs (*ibid.* 1995e). Steps towards eventual resolution of the conflict were taken by the US which, following NATO airstrikes on Bosnian Serb positions, achieved a peace agreement in Dayton in November 1995; EU foreign ministers pledged to support its implementation (*ibid.* 1995f). In line with this, during the course of 1996, EU countries focused on coordinating donor efforts and started contemplating agreements for individual countries of the former Yugoslavia with the aim of stabilising the region (*ibid.* 1996g; 1996h).

The situation with the former Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s revealed that despite its discourse and intentions in the beginning, EU foreign policy, adhering to its traditional methods and means of action (dependence on member states' consensus, aid, diplomacy, support to implementation) was not able to achieve the solutions it anticipated initially but, in the final end, participated instead in implementing the solutions pushed

through by the US. In addition, it was paradoxical, also from an ethical perspective, that EEC countries were engaged in a debate that would substantially revamp their foreign policy, on the future TEU (in 1991-1992), at the same time as civilians in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were dying in alarming numbers, but nevertheless, apparently unable to reach political agreement, failed to adopt action that would effectively help to resolve the crisis (*cf.* Lucarelli 2000). Although they were preparing a transformation of EU foreign policy, this policy remained unchanged with respect to the former Yugoslavia, at least until the countries of the former Yugoslavia fell within the purview of the association and enlargement policy (*cf.* second case study). This also had an impact on EU identity in world politics, as this identity was marked by inaction, which impacted how the EU was seen by the (other) powers in world politics.

On the other hand, from the perspective of the three-pronged analytical approach, practical implementation with regard to other subjects of interest to EU foreign policy progressed in this period. The relations with the CEECs were put unequivocally within the context of enlargement policy; the European Council decided in June 1992 to develop relations with them through Europe Agreements which were seen as the principal instrument of fostering stability in these countries (European Council 1992a; 1992c). In 1993, the second Joint Action to be adopted within CFSP related to observation of parliamentary elections in Russian Federation (RF), and the third and the fourth concerned transition process in South Africa and Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (93/604/CFSP, OJ L 286, 20. 11. 1993; 93/678/CFSP, OJ L 316, 17. 12. 1993; 93/728/CFSP, OJ L 339, 31. 12. 1993). In 1994, joint actions were adopted on issues including the Middle East and Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (94/276/CFSP, OJ L 119, 7. 5. 1994; 94/509/CFSP, OJ L 205, 8. 8. 1994). These Joint Actions were in line with European Council and Council conclusions on the areas of development of CFSP and grew in number and the variety of topics they covered in the following years.

Joint actions were perhaps the most obvious example of new practice in EU foreign policy following the establishment of CFSP. However, and at least as importantly, new practice with regard to the context of world politics in the period following the entry into force of the TEU in 1993 was also being established by the EC/ EU through the development of the relations with (other)<sup>72</sup> main powers in world politics as well as with regional

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<sup>72</sup> The idea that the EC/ EU might belong with the other powers in world politics has been put under erasure pending the conclusion; this is signified by putting the word “other” (key actors in world politics) in brackets – *cf.* Derrida (1967/1988).



groupings. This was related to another implicit aspect of building EU identity in world politics, i.e. how this identity was defined through the relations between the EU and (other) key powers.

To analyse the discourses accompanying this, in the end of 1992, negotiations started with Russia on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; the European Council (1992c) described this using a *metonymy* of building “new friendships” with the peoples of Russia and the Community of Independent States (CIS). In the following years, within the process of negotiation and ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1997 (Eur-lex 2015), the European Council’s discussions focused on the importance of creating a “substantial *partnership*” with Russia in relation to the Agreement, to Russia’s growing role in the international community, and to security and stability in Europe, with the aim of promoting reforms in Russia, avoiding division of Europe and fostering integration of Russia in the international community (European Council 1993a; 1995b; 1996a; emphasis added). The European Council saw a good relationship between the EC and Russia as “essential” for stability in Europe and saw European security as “indivisible” with regard to Russia, arguing for Russia’s place in it and calling for a strengthened dialogue between Russia and NATO (*ibid.* 1993a; 1995a; 1995b). To speed up implementation, an Interim Agreement was concluded with Russia in 1995 and entered into force in 1996 and the European Council adopted an Action Plan to promote reforms and democracy in Russia (*ibid.* 1995b; 1996a).

This shows that the EC/ EU’s relationship with Russia was evolving. Russia was recognised as an important world power (*cf.* European Commission’s Communication on Russia – Commission of the European Communities 1995a), and the EC/ EU worked on its relationship with it with the aim of building a partnership i.e. of being a partner *to* Russia and also of making a partner *from* Russia. In other words, from the perspective of discourse analysis and the development of EU identity in world politics, it was crucial that (to apply analytical terminology) EC/ EU’s efforts with regard to Russia were based on the activity of *alter-casting* (*cf.* Wendt 1992, 421): on the *casting* of Russia (a potential enemy) as a partner and a friend. At the same time, through the discourse and concrete actions of the European Council and the Commission on Russia, another activity was being performed: the construction of the partnership with Russia which implied that the EC/ EU also *cast itself* as a partner of Russia (in some respects as a more dominant partner, one who was giving assistance, promoting its values, and helping to integrate Russia in the international

community) – in analytical terms, this could be called the activity of *self-casting* of the EEC as an (equal) partner of Russia.

Also the transatlantic relations in this period were called partnership both by the EU and the USA (New Transatlantic Agenda of December 1995 – European Council 1995b) although they were unique in comparison to the EU's relations with the (other) global actors and crucially different from its relations with Russia (this was also important with regard to EU identity-building in world politics). In its Communication on the relationship with the USA, the European Commission (1993, 2) named this relationship “*the most important interdependent relationship in the world*” (emphases added). From its side, in the National Security Strategies of 1993 and 1994, the US set itself the objectives of participating in the development of a “European security identity” and of an integrated and democratic Europe cooperating with the US (White House 1993, 7; 1994, 21). As mentioned, in December 1995, both sides proclaimed the New Transatlantic Agenda (European Council 1995b) that stated that “the transatlantic partnership” had been in existence for fifty years leading to peace and prosperity and used the repetition of the adverb “together” and the adjective of “*epic achievements*” to (re)produce a transatlantic narrative (emphasis added). This discourse left out the considerable divergence between the EU and the US in the period from 1973 and, with some exceptions, until the end of the Cold War. The Agenda also saw transatlantic security as indivisible with NATO at its centre; in this context, it mentioned a European Security and Defence Identity which would contribute to NATO's European pillar (*ibid.*).

To compare the discourses on the relations with the US and Russia, from the perspective of the building of EU identity in world politics, the partnership that was being built with Russia was characterized by “dialogue” and “assistance” (e.g. European Council 1995a; 1996b), while the words used to describe the partnership with the US were “together” and “joint” (above); this showed that although both relationships the EC/ EU was constructing were named partnerships, their content differed considerably. In the partnership with Russia it appeared that one partner was assisting the other in reforming and integrating in the international community, with European security in mind, which showed that the EU saw itself as a full member of the international community, while Russia was seen as needing to be integrated into it. In the partnership with the US, both partners were working together to achieve global objectives (*cf.* European Council 1995b; 1996a). Importantly, in the New Transatlantic Agenda (European Council 1995b), European (EU) identity was again explicitly recognised, but through its security and defence aspects. Both partnerships also revealed the nature of European security as seen by the EU: if the EU saw European security in relation to

Russia as indivisible, and if the New Transatlantic Agenda saw transatlantic security as indivisible at the same time (*ibid.*), it meant that European and transatlantic security, from the perspective of the EU, were one and the same.

Regarding China, readiness was expressed within EPC in January 1993 to normalize the EC's relations with it subject to reforms in China, in particular in relation to human rights (EPC Bulletin 1993, 75). In addition, despite the political position that was taken towards China following the events in the Tiananmen Square in 1989, the economic cooperation with China was going on as high level visits and joint committee meetings continued (Commission of the European Communities 1994). In 1995, the Commission prepared and the foreign ministers discussed a Communication outlining a need for a new approach to China in the view of its growing economic and military power; a key orientation was for the EU to facilitate China's integration in the international community (which was similar to the EC/EU's approach to Russia, i.e. China was seen as in the need of integration in the international community)<sup>73</sup> and a new framework was agreed with China for regular political dialogue meetings (Commission of the European Communities 1995b; Council of Ministers 1995b). In terms of the processes of constructing EU identity in world politics, EU foreign policy discourses on relations with China thus exhibited North-South othering.

To compare this with the development of the relations with India, in the end of 1993, the EU and India signed an Agreement on partnership and development (EPC Bulletin 1993, 609) – also with India, the approach of *partnership* was used by the EU, as in its relations with Russia and the USA during this period. The partnership with India was developed further in the following years in consideration of India's "potential influence on the world stage" with the aim of achieving peace, stability and economic cooperation; however the discourse used to characterise this partnership was not as cordial as in the case of the USA nor as urgent as in the case of China (Commission of the European Communities 1996; Council of Ministers 1996d).

The relationships with the other powers that the EC/ EU was developing following the establishment of CFSP thus showed that EU foreign policy in this period deliberately targeted those actors which were considered as already being or in the process of becoming the most influential on the world stage (the USA, Russia, China, and also India to some degree). It was significant with regard to the idea of EU identity in world politics that with those actors who

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<sup>73</sup> In material terms, EU foreign policy discourse about integrating China and Russia in the international community was mostly connected to accelerating these countries' accession to international trade and financial institutions; however, in terms of overall EU discourse on China and Russia, this had the effect of signifying that they were not yet part of the international community as such, and thus of othering these countries.

were perceived as supportive of the existing world order (the USA, and India to a lesser extent – *cf.* Council of Ministers 1996d), the approach taken by EU foreign policy was that of strengthened cooperation, while the other key actors (Russia and China) were seen as needing to be integrated into the existing world order. In most cases, EU foreign policy adopted the approach of *alter-casting*, and, through it, *self-casting* in the development of these relationships: the (other) key actors in world politics were *cast* as partners (already in the beginning of the relationships although the relations of partnership were in fact only being established), and in turn, the EC/ EU *cast itself* as their (equal) partner; which also meant that, by constructing the partnerships, EU foreign policy conveyed to and impressed on the EU's partners its image of world politics (and thus of its idea of EU identity in world politics) as composed of (equal) partners one of which was also the EU.

This implied that EU foreign policy was developing a global perspective – also in its General Report on the Activities of the European Union for 1994, the Commission (1995c) changed the title of the chapter about external relations: the new title referred to the *role* of the EU “in the world”. In addition to its relations with the (other) global powers and in practice, the EC/ EU was developing its relations with other regional groupings, in particular Mediterranean countries through Euro-Mediterranean cooperation initiated at the Barcelona Conference in 1995, ACP countries through the signature of a revised Lomé Convention, and with Mercosur,<sup>74</sup> in addition to its cooperation with the CEECs, Western Balkans and other European countries (European Council 1995a; 1995b). Also the CFSP Joint Actions were acquiring a global range: in 1996, Joint Actions were adopted to support the transition process in Zaire and stability in African Great Lakes region, for example (96/656/CFSP, OJ L 300, 25. 11. 1996; 96/669/CFSP, OJ L 312, 2. 12. 1996).

Overall, therefore, there was progress regarding implementation of EU foreign policy in the period of and following the institution of CFSP in specific cases such as the CEECs, former Yugoslavia (in an indirect manner and to a limited extent) and Joint Actions with respect to particular issues; however the main cases where it acted indicate that EU foreign policy had a predominantly regional range of action, as it was most actively involved in the European and Western Balkans region, with ventures into Africa. At the same time, EU foreign policy was developing a global perspective by working on the EU's relationships with the (other) key global actors which were cast as partners which implied that the EU cast itself as their partner, and also with regional groupings. EU foreign policy exhibited openness

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<sup>74</sup> *Mercado Común del Sur*, common market between some of the South American countries.

regarding the CEECs and the process of enlargement; but in the case of the former Yugoslavia, EU foreign policy applied its accustomed mode of action which led it to abandon the resolution of the conflict to the UN and the US. This also had an impact on the idea of EU identity or the image of the EU in world politics.

The discourse of EU foreign policy continued to use the floating signifiers of responsibilities, role and voice in world politics, this time to signal further need for institutional change: in June 1995, the European Council (1995a) underlined that if the EU wanted to achieve its foreign policy ambitions a new intergovernmental conference was needed; the December 1995 European Council (1995b), mentioning a “strengthened capacity for external action”, stated that with regard to the international situation the EU had increased “responsibilities” and needed to “strengthen its *identity* on the international scene” (emphases added). It also gave the intergovernmental conference the mandate to consider how a common defence policy could help the EU “express itself” and have a “more perceptible face and *voice*”, and to study how “the European *identity*” could be better asserted in relation to security and defence (*ibid.*; emphases added). To analyse, this discourse explicitly mentioned European (EU) identity in connection to EU foreign policy, in the sense of an all-encompassing collective identity with different facets, such as in relation to security and defence. In addition, the continued usage of the signifiers of role, voice and identity produced the effect of *différance* (*cf.* Derrida 1972/1982) with regard to the development of EU foreign policy because it implied that the EU had not yet fulfilled its role and identity in world politics nor had a full voice in it – to achieve this, an amendment of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) was needed; i.e. the discourse of the European Council at the same time produced a *difference* between the current condition of EU foreign policy and its anticipated future state, and *deferred* the realisation of its fulfilment into the future. Thus, a *closure* of the idea of EU identity in world politics around the three key signifiers (role, voice and responsibilities) could be observed, that were seen as an *ideal* of this identity, which was however, as practice and slippages in the discourse have shown, still under construction.

Considering the repetition of EU foreign policy discourse about role, responsibilities and voice for the EU in world politics, these socially meaningful signifiers have been used to make a point about the EU in world politics and have been intended for audiences inside the EU (EU public) as well as outside the EU (in third countries and international or regional organizations); thus, they belong to a narrative which began in 1969 with the launching of EPC and which has been developed and conveyed through the discourse of EU foreign policy and was also realised, to some extent, but mostly in relation to specific cases (*cf.* Suganami

1997). At the same time, this narrative has often not referred only to the existing reality but to an undefined future situation where the envisioned identity of the EU in world politics would be fully realised i.e. when the EU would fully assume its role and responsibilities, and have a full voice in world politics; in this regard, it has been functioning as a myth (*cf.* Barthes 1957/1991).

#### 3.3.4 Capabilities and a global perspective

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) which was signed on 7 October 1997 mentioned European identity in its preamble with reference to the development of a common defence policy saying that this would strengthen “European *identity* and its independence” in relation to achieving peace and security in Europe and the world; and in Article B which stated that asserting its “*identity* on the international scene” was the second of the EU’s objectives, connecting this to the implementation of CFSP and, again, a common defence policy (emphases added). In addition, Article F of the amended TEU now stated the principles upon which the EU was founded (*ibid.*).

To analyse, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) again exhibited a dual understanding of European or EU identity, and developed it: on the one hand, this identity, and in particular its internal aspect was stipulated in the EU’s foundational principles, thus (re)producing a belief in a collective European identity; on the other hand, the external aspect of European identity was seen as a political project that had evolved and now referred to *asserting* the identity of the EU on the international scene, in particular via a common defence policy. This development was operationalized in the Treaty of Amsterdam itself through an amendment of Article J.7 of the TEU that provided for integration of Western European Union (WEU)<sup>75</sup> into the EU and specified the tasks<sup>76</sup> of the common defence policy (so-called Petersberg tasks; *ibid.*). Moreover, in the context of CFSP, the amended TEU now spoke only about “the Union” and not about “the Union and the Member States” as previously which implicitly affirmed EU identity (*ibid.*). The operational aspect of CFSP was strengthened through a new instrument of common strategies to be adopted by the European Council and through the institution of the post of High Representative for CFSP (*ibid.*). Thus, from the Treaty of Amsterdam on, EU foreign policy encompassed the common defence policy in addition to its other aspects such as CFSP.

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<sup>75</sup> The WEU was a collective defence organisation created in 1948 by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, France and the UK; it was integrated into the EU and ceased to exist in June 2011 (WEU 2015).

<sup>76</sup> Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, Article J.7).

In the summer of 1998, the conflict in Kosovo escalated; EU foreign ministers reacted with a declaration in which they supported action by “international security organisations” (Council of Ministers 1998g). The escalating crisis in Kosovo together with a desire to be able to address international crises, particularly those in the EU’s vicinity and in relation to its foreign policy goals, motivated rapid development of the common defence policy in the following years (*cf.* Institute for Security Studies 2001a; 2001b). In December 1998, a British-French declaration on European defence was adopted in Saint-Malo; it stated that the EU had to “play its *full role* on the international stage” through development of a common defence policy with capacity for autonomous action involving military forces which would make the EU’s “*voice heard* in international affairs” (Institute for Security Studies 2002c; emphases added). The declaration also reflected on structures and instruments needed to enable the EU to take such action in situations where NATO was not involved (*ibid.*). In the discourse of the declaration, the floating signifiers of role and voice for the EU in world politics that have been present in EU foreign policy discourse since its earliest period acquired new meaning in relation to the developing context of world politics (in Europe): that playing a role and having a voice (i.e. having identity) in world politics meant playing a “full role” and having its voice “heard” which implied the use of defence capabilities. Thus, the main signifiers describing the idea of EU identity in world politics were newly qualified, but remained the same despite this. Also, the crisis in Kosovo which was taking place on the level of world politics (as key actors such as the US were involved) again led to further development of EU foreign policy, but primarily *in the relations between EU member states themselves*.

In 1999-2001, this discourse on EU foreign policy and on idea of EU identity in world politics was realised in practice. The European Council that deliberated in June and December 1999 on the development of a Common or European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP/ESDP) reproduced the discourse of the British-French declaration of St-Malo. The June 1999 Cologne European Council expressed resolve that, to enable it to “play its *full role* on the international stage”, the EU needed to be equipped with appropriate capabilities of the common defence policy; in addition, “responsibilities” of the EU in the framework of this policy were mentioned (European Council 1999b; emphases added). The European Council stated that the EU “*must* have the capacity for autonomous action” to be able to fulfil its Petersberg tasks (*ibid.*; emphasis added). Implementing this in practice, the need to develop the capacity for autonomous action in situations of international crises where NATO was not involved was further elaborated by the December 1999 Helsinki European Council (1999d), which also agreed on specific objectives regarding the ability to conduct EU-led operations to

be achieved by EU Member States by 2003, on establishment of political and military structures within the Council to conduct such operations, as well as of a non-military crisis management mechanism, and on development of modalities for cooperation with NATO.

The development of CFSP operational (conflict prevention and crisis management) capabilities in practice continued in 2000 when the European Council considered Presidency progress reports on this (European Council 2000b; 2000e); importantly, the December 2000 Nice European Council (2000e) specifically stated that the development of these capabilities represented an integral part of CFSP, and saw these capabilities as EU contribution to the ability of the international community to respond to international crises, foreseeing that they would enable the EU to respond to requests by the UN and the OSCE. These statements of the European Council reaffirmed the view of EU foreign policy as encompassing defence policy as its integral part, and that the common defence policy was seen as significantly contributing to the visibility or a sense of being of the EU in world politics. Moreover, in this manner, the idea of EU identity in world politics was implicitly (re)produced as encompassing operational/ defence capabilities as its crucial aspect.

At the same time, from the perspective of the development of EU foreign policy, the work that was being accomplished by the European Council and the successive Presidencies in a matter of few years from 1999 to 2001 with the aim of launching the common defence policy in practice represented how the operational or implementation side of EU foreign policy was seen and (re)produced during this period. ESDP was not all the EU could be or do in world politics – as demonstrated by previous development of EU foreign policy, EU foreign policy could undertake a wide array of actions, among others by developing relations with other countries and regions, through neighbourhood and enlargement policy, aid and assistance policies, commercial relations and the external aspect of Community policies, as well as ad hoc missions and speech acts (i.e. all the actions that have or could have been used by EU foreign policy in relation to the external environment so far). However, the common defence policy was the most visible aspect of further development of EU foreign policy on which the work of key bodies, in particular the European Council and the ministers concentrated during this period, establishing not the capacity of the EU to act in world politics as such, but developing its ability to act in a particular manner.

In 2001, the work continued on the level of the ministers to set up operational elements of the developing common defence policy: in February 2001, a regulation was adopted creating rapid reaction mechanism (RRM) enabling the EU to respond quickly to urgent



situations and crises; in July 2001, a Satellite Centre and Institute for Security Studies were established (Council of Ministers 2001b; 2001g).

Moreover, on 26 February 2001, the Treaty of Nice (2001) was signed; its main aim was preparation for the coming enlargement but it also included amendments of the CFSP chapter of the TEU, in particular in the direction of developing operational aspects of the common defence policy. It provided that CFSP encompassed all questions of the security of the EU, “including the progressive framing of a common defence policy”, foresaw cooperation between the member states in the field of armaments, and specified the tasks (i.e. Petersberg tasks) of the common defence policy (Article 1, Treaty of Nice 2001). A Political and Security Committee (PSC) was instituted to monitor international situation in areas covered by CFSP, and provisions were included to allow for enhanced cooperation between the member states with the aim of contributing to the implementation of CFSP, provided that enhanced cooperation served asserting the EU’s “*identity as a coherent force on the international scene*” (*ibid.*; emphases added). As shown above, the gist of the provisions regarding the common defence policy that were written in the Treaty of Nice was agreed already in the previous years; this showed the urgency that was felt by the member states to institutionalise the common defence policy. At the same time, it showed that EU member states were able to develop their cooperation with the aim of acting in the realm of EU foreign policy without formal (Treaty) bases; political agreements were crucial for the development of the common defence policy and with it EU foreign policy. Importantly, the amendments contained in the Treaty of Nice confirmed the view of EU identity in world politics as including security and defence aspects.

Regarding further development of the EU and its foreign policy, it was important that the Treaty of Nice (2001) contained a Declaration on the future of the Union in its Final Act, which initiated a process of discussions on future widening and deepening of the EU that continued in 2001 with the Laeken Declaration of the European Council and the signature of draft Treaty on a Constitution for Europe in 2004.

From the perspective of the wider world-political context, EU approach to (other) key powers was developed in the period between the signatures of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, particularly towards Russia and China, and three common strategies were adopted by the European Council: on Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean region.

To apply discourse analysis, the European Council saw the development of the relations with Russia as being of “fundamental importance”, and the conclusion of the Founding Act on security and cooperation between NATO and Russia as a “fundamental contribution” to

European security; in December 1998, the European Council called Russia a “strategic partner” of the EU (European Council 1997a; 1998b). The first common strategy to be adopted by the European Council focused on the EU’s partnership with Russia and gave a vision (a *figured world*) in its introductory part, of a stable Russia “anchored in a united Europe” and cooperating with the EU which would allow for “lasting peace” in Europe (European Council 1999b). In addition, the strategy (*ibid.*) welcomed the return of Russia “to its *rightful place* in the *European family*”; this was a *metaphor* that showed how Russia was imagined by the EU. From the perspective of the construction of EU identity in world politics, via the relations with (other) key powers, this also represented an instance of *alter-casting*, as Russia was constructed as belonging to Europe (emphases added). The strategy defined two main goals: developing a stable democracy and market economy in Russia, and cooperation with Russia with the aim of stability in Europe (*ibid.*). Moreover it stated that a strengthened relationship with Russia would help Russia “assert *its* European identity” (*ibid.*; emphasis added).

This indicated that the first common strategy to be adopted by the European Council saw European identity as a trait that could refer not only to the EU but also to other entities, such as Russia. Therefore, three different uses can be identified that have been made of the idea of European identity in connection to EU foreign policy so far: as reference to an idea of an overarching collective identity that could find expression in different areas including security and defence; as a political project of establishing (an external) identity; and as a trait that could be borne also by other entities. This final usage represented a considerable stretching of the idea of collective European identity which was thus seen as capable of being possessed by actors outside the EU and on other continents (such as Russia). It was also significant that the first common strategy to be adopted following the Treaty of Amsterdam concerned Russia. It thus seemed as if Russia was the first and most important *otherness* that the EU felt compelled to deal with following the reinforcement of EU foreign policy through the Treaty of Amsterdam.

In practice, however, events developed in a direction that was opposite to that envisaged in the first EU common strategy: following Russia’s airstrikes in Chechnya in the second half of 1999, the common strategy was reviewed and its implementation redirected by the European Council in December 1999 and measures against Russia were taken by the ministers in January 2000 (suspension of the signature of a scientific and technological agreement, re-direction of the EU’s programme of assistance to Russia towards support to civil society and humanitarian assistance, and trade measures – Council of Ministers 1999g;

2000a; European Council 1999d). This indicated that this EU common strategy did not have much impact on Russia; also, the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation that was adopted in 2000 did not mention the EU but only Europe, and only with reference to attempts to weaken Russia's position in Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2014). In turn, with regard to the performance of the idea of EU identity (as it was being constructed through the work of EU foreign policy) on the level of world politics, this implicitly conveyed a degree of non-recognition by Russia of EU identity in world politics.

If we look at the discourse regarding China, EU foreign ministers debated its human rights situation and declared willingness for dialogue with China on it; in February 1998, they stated that the Council attached priority to the development of the EU's relations with China (Council of Ministers 1997i; 1998a). In March 1998, the European Commission published a communication on a "comprehensive *partnership* with China" (Commission of the European Communities 1998; emphasis added). In the Communication, the Commission referred to the acceleration of relations between China and other world powers that reflected China's desire to be "recognized as a world power" on the one hand and its partners' recognition of the importance of upgrading their relations with China on the other (*ibid.*, 3). Regarding this, the Commission found that integrating China into the international community was among the most important challenges "facing *Europe* and other *partners*" and defined key objectives for the EU in developing its partnership with China, including engaging China in the international community and world economy, fostering respect for human rights in China and raising the EU's profile in China (*ibid.*, 4; emphases added). From the perspective of implicit construction of EU identity in world politics, an analysis of this discourse shows that, through it, the EU was cast, firstly, as a partner of China, and secondly, as one of the partners on the global level who were seen as being responsible for integrating China in the international community. Moreover, in this discourse, the international community was represented as something external with respect to China that the EU fully belonged to but China not yet (which was a case of North-South othering by EU foreign policy discourse).

In December 1999 and June 2000, the European Council adopted common strategies on Ukraine and the Mediterranean (European Council 1999d; 2000b). The common strategy on Ukraine spoke about "*strategic partnership*" with Ukraine as being vital for peace and stability in Europe (European Council 1999d; emphasis added). Ukraine has hitherto not been seen as strategic partner by the EU; the introductory part of the common strategy provided reasons why Ukraine was now regarded as such, referring to Ukraine's geography, its population and its location "along the *North-South* and *East-West* axes" (*ibid.*; emphases

added). The main objectives with regard to Ukraine were achieving a stable democracy and cooperation with a view to stability and security; the strategy also acknowledged “Ukraine’s European aspirations” (*ibid.*). If we analyse the discourse of this common strategy, it can be clarified that EU foreign policy discourse used the term “strategic partnership” to denote those partners that were seen as strategic *by the EU*, in this case Ukraine. Furthermore, the discourse used the binary oppositions of “North-South” and “East-West” to characterise Ukraine’s position in world politics and why it was important to the EU; this revealed that the EU continued to see world politics in terms of those two binary oppositions. From the perspective of the world-political context, in addition, this Strategy testified to a growing geopolitical importance of Ukraine to the EU.

The common strategy on the Mediterranean region spoke only about a “partnership” with this region although it designated the Mediterranean, too, as being of “strategic importance” to the EU, and mentioned an “open perspective” of this region “towards Europe” (European Council 2000b). Making a reference to the Barcelona Declaration, the aim of this common strategy was to establish, in the Mediterranean region, a common area of peace, stability and prosperity and to promote the key values held by the EU and its member states (*ibid.*). The adoption of this strategy thus also testified to the strategic (and geopolitical) importance of the Mediterranean to the EU in the context of world politics.

Regarding the relations with the US, 2001 brought an important turn in EU foreign policy and highlighted its attachment to the US following the attacks on World Trade Center in New York on September 11. In October 2001, EU foreign ministers declared “full support” for the US and characterised the attacks of September 11 as attacks on “*our* open /.../ societies”, expressing a commitment by the EU to “play its part” in multilateral action following the attacks (Council of Ministers 2001e). Along these lines, the report on CFSP for 2001 stated that following September 11, the fight against terrorism became one of the centrepieces and a major objective of the EU’s external relations (Council of Ministers 2001h).

The new light in which world politics was seen following September 11 was reflected also in the strategic orientations of EU foreign policy as posited in the Declaration of the Laeken European Council on the future of the EU (European Council 2001e): if we look at its discourse, one title of the Declaration was dedicated to the EU’s *role* in the globalised world and made a contrast between a seemingly stable world in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the “rude awakening” of September 11 and a globalised, fast-changing and multipolar world. The *rhetorical question* was pondered whether “Europe” did not have a

“leading *role*” to play in the changing world order, of stabilising and pointing the way ahead for other countries and peoples; regarding this, the Laeken declaration found that Europe needed to “shoulder its *responsibilities* in the *governance* of globalisation”, and play the role of a power fighting against violence, fanaticism and injustice, “seeking to put globalisation within a *moral* framework” (*ibid.*; emphases added).

The discourse of the Laeken declaration (European Council 2001e) thus used the floating signifiers of role and responsibilities of Europe (the EU) in world politics with a newly *contextualised* meaning so that they referred to the role and responsibilities of the EU within the changing, multipolar world order and to (a moral) governance of globalisation; at the same time, it showed that a *closure* regarding how EU identity was imagined (i.e. *as having* a role and responsibilities in world politics) remained in EU foreign policy discourse. It also constructed a *figured world* of a new world order in which the EU would play a stabilising role and point the way ahead for others. With the Laeken Declaration of 2001 (*ibid.*), the signifiers of role and responsibilities of the EU in world politics thus started to refer to the EU as a power with a *global perspective*. In other words, through the attachment of new meaning to these signifiers, the idea of EU identity in world politics has been implicitly *self-cast* in the discourse of the Laeken Declaration as that of a global power with a stabilising and moral mission and as a model for others in world politics.

The discursive devices applied in the Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union (European Council 2001e) culminated in a decision to launch a Convention on the future of Europe. From the perspective of discourse analysis as well as deconstruction, a discursive build-up could be observed in the subtitles of the Laeken Declaration: the first subtitle found that Europe (with its role on the global stage) was “at a crossroads”, the second identified the challenges and reforms to be made “in a renewed Union” and ended by concluding there was a need to move towards “a Constitution for European citizens”; in the view of this, the third subtitle launched a Convention on the future of Europe (*ibid.*). The processes started with the Laeken Declaration also had a bearing from the perspective of the development of EU foreign policy which was debated, together with other reforms seen as necessary for the future of the EU, at the Convention and subsequent intergovernmental conference between 2002 and 2004; this process ended with the signature of draft Treaty on a Constitution for Europe in October 2004 which was however rejected on popular referenda in France and the Netherlands in May 2004.

The new strategic orientations of EU foreign policy from the Treaty of Nice and the Laeken Declaration were not immediately put into practice; implementation took some time

and was connected to the development of the new security and defence policy. In 2002, the foreign ministers established an EU Police Mission (EUPM) to take over the tasks of the UN police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from January 2003; this was the first case in which the EU took charge of a crisis management operation (Council of Ministers 2002b; European Council 2002b). During the course of 2003, an agreement was reached in the form of an exchange of letters between the EU and NATO on EU access to NATO planning, on the availability of NATO assets to the EU and on the use of European command options, called the “Berlin-plus arrangement” (Council of Ministers 2003c, 20; 2003e; 2003f; 2003g). This enabled the EU to launch its first military crisis management operation in March, operation “Concordia” in Macedonia which took over from NATO the overseeing of the implementation of a peace agreement, following a request to this effect by the Macedonian President (*ibid.* 2003e; 2003g). In June 2003, after a request by the UN Secretary-General, operation Artemis was launched by the EU in the Democratic Republic of Congo to stabilise the humanitarian situation in the city of Bunia which was the first EU-led military operation outside Europe (*ibid.* 2003c, 10, 19). Following the cooperation regarding Congo between the EU and the UN in the first half of 2003, a joint declaration was agreed on cooperation in crisis management in September, and a consultative mechanism for coordination was established (*ibid.*, 10). Another civilian ESDP operation, police mission Proxima in Macedonia, was launched in the end of 2003 (*ibid.* 2003c, 10; 2003h). In line with these developments, the Council of Ministers and the European Council concluded that, despite some limitations, the EU had set up its operational capabilities with regard to the military aspects of crisis management i.e. the Petersberg tasks (Council of Ministers 2003a; European Council 2003d). Therefore, from the perspective of the three-pronged methodological approach it can be found that the launching of these missions represented a realisation of the envisaged idea of EU identity (involving military capabilities) in practice, but to an extent that was limited to those missions, and also within the missions, to acting in the margins of the stabilising efforts which were mainly initiated and carried out by other actor (the US, NATO and the UN).

However, the positive developments regarding ESDP did not prevent discord within the EU regarding relations with the US in the case of Iraq in 2003. In February 2003, a debate arose in the EU whether to support the US in its allegations about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. A declaration was produced by some EU members on support to the US; and a similar one (Vilnius declaration) by a number of acceding and associated countries. At the same time, protests were held in a number of European cities against a potential US campaign in Iraq, and two prominent European thinkers, Habermas and Derrida (2003)

published an article in a number of European newspapers in which they pronounced themselves against it. The US campaign nevertheless took place from March to May 2003, but the divergences in Europe, and the fact that the European Council did not tackle them in its discussions (but only referred to a need for international unity on Iraq; European Council 2003a; 2003b; 2003c), revealed the contested and fragile nature of the external aspect of EU identity, and an ambivalent and constitutive relationship between EU foreign policy/ identity nexus and the US.

In December, European Security Strategy was adopted by the European Council prepared by HR Javier Solana (European Council 2003f; 2003g), which indirectly described an overall vision of EU identity in world politics at that time. It used discourse that explicitly expressed the EU's desire to have a more concrete impact in world politics. In its introduction, the Strategy used the signifier of responsibility to explain the main rationale for its making, saying that "Europe" needed to share the "*responsibility for global security*" and for "*building a better world*" (*ibid.* 2003g, 1; emphases added); the Strategy thus attached a *global* perspective and mission for the EU to the signifier of responsibility which was evident also in the concluding sentence of the Strategy that emphasised that an active and capable "Europe" would make a *global impact* (*ibid.*, 14). Importantly, the Strategy constructed a comprehensive and structured picture of EU foreign policy in terms of security as it dwelled not only on the issues of security in the neighbourhood and on regional conflicts, but also on relations with the key global "partners", as well as on global threats and world order from the perspective of the objectives of EU foreign policy (*ibid.* 2003g). It stated that, due to the global nature of threats, security depended on an "effective multilateral system" therefore the objectives of the EU were a strong international society and a "rule-based international order" (*ibid.*, 9). In addition, the Strategy stressed the need for the EU to be *active*, to react rapidly to emerging threats (*ibid.*, 11). In the end, the Strategy defined the key partners in terms of responding to the threats identified: the partnership with the US was described as "*irreplaceable*" and the EU saw itself together with the US as a "*force for good*"; while Russia, although mentioned immediately after the US, was seen as a "major factor" with regard to security, and was identified, together with Canada, China, India and Japan as one of the countries with which the EU should develop *strategic* partnerships (*ibid.*, 13–14; emphases added). The December 2003 European Council (2003f) decided that areas for initial action for implementation of the Strategy were Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Middle East, the fight against terrorism and effective multilateralism focusing on the UN.

A developing comprehensive and differentiated approach to EU foreign policy and to the EU's exterior, in terms of discourse as well as practice, and in relation to the context of world politics, was also visible in the conclusions of the European Council in 2004. In June 2004, after discussing progress within ESDP, it concentrated on European Neighbourhood Policy and strategic partnerships with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and discussed the EU's relationships with the "key strategic partners" (under this, the US, Canada, Japan, Russia, China and India were mentioned) and with "regional partners" (Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean; European Council 2004b). In December 2004, the European Council discussed the relations with the neighbourhood (countries in the Western Balkans, ENP and the partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East); an "international order based on effective multilateralism", concluding that, in this respect, the EU should have a major role in the UN and support the work of the UN SG; the relations with the partners (transatlantic partners, Russia, Korea, India, Asian partners, Indonesia, China, African Union and other African regional organisations, Latin America and the Caribbean); and development of ESDP (*ibid.* 2004d).

These European Council sessions are of interest because it was at them and in the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003g) that EU foreign policy displayed for the first time such a comprehensive and goal-oriented view of the EU's exterior, and, with it, world politics as well as the identity and envisaged place of the EU in it. They can be seen as containing the picture of the world and world politics as constructed through EU foreign policy by that time, which structured the world in relation to the EU (taking into account, it appeared, in particular the criteria of distance of a particular region or country from the EU and the EU's approach to it), into: the *neighbourhood* or the near abroad (encompassing countries subject to ENP and the partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, but also Western Balkans countries), the *partners* (with two sub-groups – the strategic partners and other partners which could either be regions or individual countries), and *international order* as a whole. However, this was a relative picture of world politics, as it constructed the perspective of the EU on world politics, but this process of construction was implicit and unreflected, and also did not take into account the views of others, in particular the (other) global actors.

Namely, in the development of the EU's relations with the key global actors in this period, it could be discerned that their views of world politics and the EU were not similar to the EU's own, and actions of the EU in these relations were aimed towards bringing its partners' views closer to its own, which was significant from the perspective of the building



of EU identity in world politics and its recognition and acceptance by the (other) global actors. For example, regarding the relations with the US, the European Commission complained in its 2001 Communication on EU-US relations that although EU-US relationship was “the most important strategic relationship in the world”, a partnership of equals had not been achieved as the EU was seen by the US as a regional actor and in narrow security terms without recognising its wider contribution to European stability; the Commission thus recommended that the partnership should focus more on strategic themes (European Commission 2001b, 2, 7). Nevertheless, the European Council (2003f) still saw transatlantic relations as “*essential*” for creating “a better world”.

The development of the relations with China was even more complex. In its 2001 Communication on China, the European Commission (2001c, 7) stated that China was not “an easy partner” due to divergences with it such as on human rights; however, it emphasised that it was in the EU’s interest to integrate China into the international community and to work together with it on key issues due to China’s size and growing power. The foreign ministers stated in 2003 that the EU and China had an interest to work together on peace and security because of “*their* prominent international role”, and decided in 2004 that the EU was ready to give “a positive signal” to China regarding the arms embargo (Council of Ministers 2003i; 2004f). HR Solana argued for China to be recognised as one of the EU’s strategic partners; he saw this as a strategic partnership because both partners had global strengths and responsibilities, and because they were discussing global strategic issues (Solana 2004; 2005). In this vein, in 2006, the foreign ministers repeated that both the EU and China, as strategic partners, had “important international commitments and responsibilities”, while at the same time expressing a concern regarding lack of progress on the issue of human rights (Council of Ministers 2006h). To analyse these discourses, with regard to the (re)production of EU identity in world politics, China was *cast* through them as a strategic partner (an instance of *alter-casting* – cf. Wendt 1992, 421); at the same time, and through this alter-casting, the EU was *self-cast* as a strategic partner *of* China, with *both* China and the EU presented as having prominent international responsibilities. However, the othering of China (seeing it as not yet a full member of the international community) continued. In its 2006 report on the relations with China, the Commission observed that China was seeking a “place in the world” in keeping with its growing power, and recommended the EU to join strengths with China to work together on solutions to global problems (European Commission 2006b, 2).

Russia and the EU agreed in 2003, on Russia’s initiative, to cooperate within the framework of so-called four common spaces (economic space; freedom, security and justice;

external security; research and education – Council of Ministers 2003c, 35; Lynch 2004). The partnership with India was developing: in October 2004, the Council adopted conclusions on the partnership based on a Commission’s Communication; in it, India was recognised as a regional and international player of growing significance, and it was concluded that political and strategic cooperation with India as a strategic partner should continue, particularly in order to promote an effective multilateral system (Council of Ministers 2004g; European Commission 2004b, 3). The EU was also focusing on its partnership with Africa – in June 2005, the European Council named this partnership a strategic one, and in November 2005, the foreign ministers prepared an EU strategy for Africa which called for increased support to peace and security in Africa and underlined the need for good governance (Council of Ministers 2005f; European Council 2005b). Africa was becoming more of a focus for EU foreign policy also due to an overlapping of interests with China which was increasingly active with regard to Africa – in 2006 the ministers stressed the need to begin a dialogue with China on Africa (Council of Ministers 2006h).

This review of the partnerships the EU had been developing with third countries, organisations and regions particularly since the 2003 European Security Strategy shows that there have been inconsistencies regarding discursive designation and implementation in practice of the EU’s “(strategic) partner(ship)/s”. For example, in the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003g), Canada, China, India, Japan, Russia and the US were seen as partners, while in December 2004 the European Council (2004d), under the title of “/w/orking with partners”, mentioned a variety of different actors including transatlantic partners, Russia, ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), Korea, Asian partners, India, Indonesia, African partners as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. In June 2005, the European Council (2005b) spoke about a “strategic partnership” with Africa; on the other hand, HR Solana, in his speech on the partnership with China, defined a “strategic partnership” as a partnership where global issues were discussed and where both partners had global strengths and responsibilities (Solana 2005, 1). It therefore seems that more than through their content, the terms related to the (strategic) partner(ship)/s were defined from the perspective of the EU and its identity construction in world politics and thus through their use as *speech acts* (cf. Débrix 2002; Wæver 1998): when a country or a region was defined as a (strategic) partner by EU foreign policy, specific EU foreign policy consequences followed from this, including practical ones such as summits, working meetings, cooperation policies etc. (e.g. European Council 2004b; 2004d; 2005b). The application of the term partner(ship) thus performed a particular and important function from the perspective of the long-term objectives of EU

foreign policy (including effective multilateralism) and was also crucial from the perspective of EU identity-building in world politics in practice: to use a technical term, the EU and the selected countries, organisations and regions were *cast as partners*. However, all the partners were not equally important for the EU; EU foreign policy focused on *strategic* partners, and also here, individual partners were treated differently (e.g. China or Russia vs. the USA). In addition, regarding in particular the strategic partner(ship)s, also the aspect of *self-casting* was important: if the EU had (relations with) *strategic* partners, it followed that the EU, too, was a *strategic* partner and thus one of the significant actors in world politics (*cf.* Buzan and Wæver 2003, 33) .

Considering the implementation of EU foreign policy in practice, taking into account the three-pronged methodological approach, the widening of the perspective of EU foreign policy was concurrent with further development of ESDP. In 2004, a military operation (ALTHEA) was launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina which took over from NATO the task of keeping stability and security; a civilian police mission was launched in Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and a rule of law mission in Georgia (Council of Ministers 2005a). From an organisational perspective, European Defence Agency was established and a mechanism to finance the common costs of military and defence operations, called Athena, was created (*ibid.*, 23, 25). In 2005 and 2006, further military missions were undertaken in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan (respectively involving security sector reform and civilian-military support to the African Union mission to Sudan), and civilian missions to Iraq (rule of law), the province of Aceh in Indonesia (monitoring mission) and the Palestinian territories (civilian police mission); by the end of 2006, the EU developed the operational capability to launch two rapid response operations almost simultaneously (*ibid.* 2006d; 2007g). However, if, taking into account the construction of EU identity in world politics, the EU was trying to define itself as a global power through its relations with its (strategic) partners, its ESDP missions mostly guaranteed the EU's participation in addressing the selected crisis situations, but not as a main actor; thus, they did not represent outcomes as envisaged in the European Security Strategy, of the EU having a global impact in terms of global security (*cf.* European Council 2003g, 14; Ginsberg 2001, 10). In other words, the material aspect of EU foreign policy (including speech acts) was not in line with the discourse of EU foreign policy that *cast* the idea(l) of EU identity in world politics as that of a global power.

In parallel with these processes, efforts were taking place to adopt a new Treaty which would reform the EU following its biggest enlargement, which also encompassed further

development of EU foreign policy. After the rejection of the draft Treaty on a Constitution for Europe on referenda in France and the Netherlands, the June 2005 European Council (2005b) decided to have a “period of reflection”; and in June 2007 it convened a new intergovernmental conference to prepare a draft reform treaty (*ibid.* 2007b). Following this, the Treaty of Lisbon was agreed and signed in December 2009. From the perspective of EU foreign policy/ identity nexus, it is significant that, apart from the fact that the draft constitutional treaty intended to establish the post of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs which was not taken up in the Treaty of Lisbon, there were no other major differences between the two Treaties in the area of EU foreign policy (Treaty on a Constitution for Europe 2004; Treaty of Lisbon 2007). This might indicate that, in the case of these negotiations, the (collective) idea of EU identity and actual EU policy were well-aligned with respect to EU foreign policy, in comparison to other policy areas which saw extensive developments in the constitutional treaty that were not included in the Treaty of Lisbon.

To look at it more closely, the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) expanded the existing provisions on CFSP and ESDP. Looking at its discourse, a new recital stated the “inheritance of Europe” as inspiration for the EU; which implied the EU was seen as a true representation of Europe and again equated the idea of EU identity with the identity of Europe (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). The aims defined in Article 2 included peace as the first aim and the aims the EU would pursue in “its relations with the *wider world*”; Article 7a provided that the EU would have a “special relationship” with its “*neighbouring* countries” to establish an area of “good neighbourliness” on the basis of the EU’s values (*ibid.*; emphases added). The provisions on external action spoke about the EU’s “action on the *international scene*” and its approach to the “*wider world*”; and defined, among others, the objective of building “*partnerships*” with third countries as well as with regional and international organizations, and of fostering an “*international system*” based on multilateral cooperation and solutions, particularly the UN (*ibid.*; emphases added). Regarding the organisation of CFSP, the Treaty of Lisbon provided that, externally, the EU would be represented by the President of the European Council, and European External Action Service (EEAS) was conceived to assist the HR for CFSP; in operational terms, ESDP was strengthened through new tasks including the fight against terrorism (*ibid.*).

Thus the Treaty of Lisbon incorporated the comprehensive view of the world and world politics that has been developing in relation to EU foreign policy particularly since the 2003 European Security Strategy (European Council 2003g) and which encompassed the idea of the EU as the bearer of Europeanness on the European continent (developed particularly

through enlargement and related policies, as shown in the second case study), its neighbourhood (which was regarded as an EU's area of influence), and "the wider world" – with regard to the wider world, the Treaty of Lisbon articulated the objective of influencing it in the direction of the EU's idea of world order, first and foremost by building partnerships with the (other) key global actors and through the pursuit of multilateralism with the UN at the centre. The Treaty of Lisbon thus exhibited an awareness of the world by the EU, of the changed circumstances of world politics, but also of the EU's own self within the world and, consequently, an intention to impact world politics, including through increased operational capacity, via the enhanced CFSP and ESDP instruments.

This picture of world politics further evolved in the period from 2007 to 2009. In June 2007, the European Council (2007b) debated the so-called Heiligendamm process which referred to the dialogue that was started in 2007 between the G-8 and the emerging economies. With reference to the latter, the European Council mentioned Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa; but saw the development of a dialogue with them from a predominantly economic perspective (*ibid.*). This changed by December 2007 when the European Council emphasised that, due to global challenges, the relations between the EU and its partners needed to be strengthened, and referred in particular to summits with Africa, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Brazil, China, India, Russia and Ukraine; the European Council also adopted a Declaration on globalisation in which it emphasised the EU's aim, as "a major global player" with respect to peace and prosperity, to shape globalisation, through strategic cooperation with its partners and by strengthening multilateral organisations (European Council 2007c). Significantly, from the perspective of the *casting* of EU identity in world politics, this Declaration explicitly established a new signifier on par with the previous ones of having a role, voice and responsibilities in world politics. Namely, in addition to *alter-casting* of the third countries, regions and international organisations that were mentioned by the European Council as the EU's partners, and an *indirect self-casting* of the EU as their partner, this discourse thus involved *direct self-casting* of the EU (above) which was characterized by the European Council as a "major global player" (*ibid.*).

In line with the developing orientation of EU foreign policy towards engaging the emerging economies as partners, the General Report on the Activities of the EU for 2007 (European Commission 2007b, 172) included a new title about "relations with emerging countries" under which it reported that the EU had established strategic partnerships with all of the BRICS countries. Also, in December 2007, the HR for CFSP, in his speech about Europe in the world (Solana 2007), stated that globalisation had "a less western face" and that

in the future, the EU should work closely together not only with the US, but also with China, India, African Union and the ASEAN, concluding that the EU, “o/f all the *main global players*”, should work on building and maintaining “a rules-based international system” (*ibid.*; emphases added). To analyse, from the perspective of the idea of EU identity in world politics, his speech, similarly to the European Council’s (2007c) Declaration on globalisation, contained *direct self-casting* of the EU as one of the main global actors. With regard to this speech as well as the Declaration on globalisation of 2007, it was significant that the identity of the EU as a *global actor* had been *self-cast* as such *in relation* to the newly emerging actors (which could thus be seen as key new *others* of EU foreign policy discourse). However with reference to the envisaged role of the EU as the promoter of a rules-based international system, this speech contained a deficiency similar to that of the report Project Europe 2030 (European Council 2010a): it did not reflect that, in the given circumstances of world politics, fostering the development of a rules-based international system required the support of the (other) existing and emerging global actors.

Also, in the period from the signature to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, from the perspective of implementing the idea of EU identity in world politics in practice, discursive strategies of direct and indirect self-casting appeared in discourses related to ESDP missions. In 2007, EU Operations Centre was fully set up and ESDP police missions to Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo were launched (Council of Ministers 2007h). In connection to conflict in Darfur and with reference to UNSC Resolution 1778 (2007), the Council of Ministers stated that the EU “decided to *take action*”, launching a military operation to Chad and Central African Republic to contribute to the improvement of the security situation (Council of Ministers, 2007f; emphases added). With regard to the situation in Iraq, the Council adopted a statement expressing the EU’s support, “/a/s a *major global player*”, to Iraq’s security and stability (*ibid.* 2007e; emphases added). In December 2008, the European Council (2008e), in its Declaration on ESDP, stated that the EU had “established itself as a *global political player*” over the last ten years, by assuming “increasing *responsibilities*” through its growing ESDP operations (emphases added). During 2008, EU rule of law mission in Kosovo was established (EULEX Kosovo), a civilian observer mission was sent to Georgia following the conflict between Georgia and Russia, a military maritime operation ATALANTA was launched to contribute to security off the coast of Somalia and a police mission was launched in Guinea-Bissau (Council of Ministers 2008g; 2008h; 2008j). In December 2008, the Council stated that ten years after the conception of ESDP, the EU was a “recognised and sought-after *player in the international arena*” (*ibid.*

2008i; emphases added). In 2009, furthermore, a rule of law mission in Iraq was launched (EUJUST LEX; *ibid.* 2009e). Therefore, in terms of implementation of the idea of EU identity in world politics the discourse and practice of ESDP, especially in relation to ESDP operations, conveyed *explicit* as well as *implicit self-casting* of the EU as an important global player, with *explicit self-casting* present in those cases where the EU's global role or responsibilities were mentioned directly, and *implicit* in those cases where they were implied, through discourse or action, for example action in internationally recognized conflict areas such as Iraq or in areas of geopolitical importance to the EU such as the Western Balkans or Georgia.

The building of EU identity in world politics in practice continued also through the development of the relations with the main partners: in the end of the period observed, the 2009 Report on CFSP (Council of Ministers 2010a) identified the US, Russia, China, India, Mexico, Brazil, Japan, Canada and South Africa as strategic partners. While the relationship with the US continued to be seen as a “cornerstone” of CFSP (*ibid.*, 30), the EU's relationship with Russia was stagnating. On the one hand, the EU was drawing closer to Russia. In June 2007, the European Council (2007b) adopted EU strategy on a partnership with Central Asian countries due to the increasing closeness of this region following the enlargement and ENP, and due to a growing EU interest in Central Asian security, stability and energy. In the summer of 2008, a conflict escalated between Russia and Georgia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia; a ceasefire was reached in August following mediation by the President of the European Council, French President Sarkozy (European Council 2008c). Reflecting these events, the European Council concluded that cooperation with the EU's Eastern neighbours needed to be enhanced further, through ENP instruments such as Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership (strengthened cooperation with third countries around the Black Sea and in the EU's Eastern neighbourhood); but also that, on the other hand, due to their interdependence, the relationship between the EU and Russia needed to be strengthened, based on the principles of the UN Charter and the OSCE (*ibid.*). The European Commission made similar findings in its November 2008 Communication on the relations with Russia in which it highlighted that the EU depended on Russia for its large market and energy supplies and that, therefore, it was in the interest of the EU to engage Russia to openly resolve disagreements while remaining firm on the EU's principles (European Commission 2008b). Thus, the CFSP report for 2009 (Council of Ministers 2010a, 50) highlighted a need for a “principled engagement” with Russia.

The overlapping interests in relation to China were becoming an issue – in 2008, the Commission published a Communication that explored the possibility of a trilateral dialogue between the EU, Africa and China due to China’s growing investments and overall engagement in Africa (European Commission 2008c, 52–53). In the CFSP report for 2009, China was seen as a power with growing influence in world politics and political dialogue was highlighted as the main element of the strategic partnership with it (Council of Ministers 2010a). With reference to India, the report found that the EU should accommodate India’s ambition to be recognised as a global player; but while, in reflecting the relations with the US, Russia and China, the importance of their engagement on the global level was highlighted, this was not the case with India or the other EU’s partners (*ibid.*). Thus, regarding the usage of the term “strategic partner(ship)” by EU foreign policy, although the discourse of EU foreign policy denoted a variety of partners as strategic, in practice, the US, Russia and China were treated as those strategic partners that were of global importance, and of the highest importance to the EU. Also, by developing its relations with these powers, the EU *cast* its own identity in world politics as that of a power equivalent to them.

In addition, in relation to the EU’s strategic partners, and taking into account the US’ pivotal role in the Middle East (as analysed in the first case study), in the end of the period observed, a crucial interconnection was becoming visible between the EU’s policies regarding its neighbourhood (in the East and South, including North Africa) and its relationships with its main strategic partners.

In the period from the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, therefore, a global perspective has been developed through and in connection to the discourse, but also the actions of EU foreign policy, and the idea of EU identity in world politics has been upgraded to that of a global player. The discourse included a specific view of world politics while the actions concentrated on ESDP missions, on relations with partners and on work in support of a world order based on multilateralism. Regarding ESDP missions, even though they could be seen primarily as outputs from the perspective of world politics, they were important for the EU as the EU cast itself, through them, as one of the main global players. It also cast itself as such by developing its relations with its partners, in particular the strategic partners, and with key international multilateral as well as regional organizations. Although the term “strategic partner” was used inconsistently by EU institutions, it could be discerned from the way they were handled by EU foreign policy that the US, Russia and China were seen as the most important strategic partners. In its relations with these partners, the EU proceeded from the perspective of *casting* its own



identity in world politics as that of a power equivalent to them and from its own positions without pondering the views of its partners (other than the US’); the aim of the EU to integrate Russia and China in the international community showed that, in the view of the EU, Russia and China were not yet full members of the international community. Considering this, and the situation in world politics during this period in which there was a number of actors who saw themselves as having a stake in world politics, as well as the increasing importance of its neighbourhood to the EU, a reflection by EU foreign policy was missing that, to achieve its objectives on the level of world politics, the EU would need to engage closely and on equal terms with all its partners, not only with those who shared its vision of world politics.

### 3.3.5 How the EEC/ EU has been seen by others

The attitudes of its three most important strategic partners towards the EU have been evolving over time; as has the EEC/ EU’s attitude to them. The relationship of the EEC/ EU with these partners was important as a resource for the construction and reproduction of the idea of EU identity in world politics from an internal EU perspective; but also, inversely, because the actual appearance of EU identity *in* world politics (i.e. from the outside) had been shaped in an important manner by the views of these partners.

This has been noticeable particularly in the case of the US. The US had been vital for European countries as an ally during World War Two and in post-war reconstruction, particularly through the Marshall Plan. As the Cold War continued, the US began focusing more on other areas such as South-East Asia (Vietnam) which was one of the external factors contributing to the formation of EPC (*cf.* Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 44). In 1973, US Secretary of State Kissinger in his speech in April anticipated a reduction of US forces in Europe while envisaging a tighter framework of Atlantic cooperation (“Atlantic charter”) and describing the EEC as an ally with regional interests (Kissinger 1973). EEC countries responded by adopting the Document on the European Identity (1973) which explicitly defined this identity as a distinct identity to be further developed on the basis of European integration and which stated that the close ties with the US were not in conflict with EEC countries’ “determination to establish themselves as a distinct /.../ entity”. In the coming years, EPC did not make substantial references to the relations with the US except concerning specific issues such as the Middle East, but this changed by the end of the Cold War: in 1990, the European Council (1990a) announced the intention of EEC countries to develop their relations with the US, and in November that year, a joint Declaration on EC-US relations (Transatlantic Declaration) was proclaimed (EPC Bulletin 1990, 463–466). Following the end

of the Cold War, in US National Security Strategies, Europe was seen in regional terms and from a security perspective, with an objective of the US to contribute to the development of a “European security identity” and an integrated democratic Europe that would cooperate with the US (National Security Strategy 1993, 7; 1994, 21). The EU was seen as an economic integration organization which the US supported, with NATO as a guarantor of European security and the focus of US engagement in Europe (*ibid.* 1997; 1999; 2000). Nevertheless, after ESDP was conceived, the US explicitly supported its development and EU countries’ efforts to engage in crisis response operations, but stressed, at the same time, that it intended to “remain fully engaged” in European security (*ibid.* 2000, 52).

Therefore, despite the improvement in EC/ EU-US relations following the end of the Cold War, the EU continued to be seen by the US as a regional economic integration organization, while Europe was perceived as an area of US influence, particularly due to security interests, with a focus on NATO. On the other hand, the relationship with the US, despite its ambivalence, has been constitutive for the development of EU foreign policy: in the beginning, EU foreign policy sought to distance itself from the US (and the US was seen as a key other to differentiate itself from), but later, with the end of the Cold War, the US was seen by EU foreign policy as an object of attraction (e.g. by foreign ministers – EPC Bulletin 1990, 48; and the European Council – European Council 1990b). European identity has been most clearly articulated in 1973 as an act of opposition to US discourse and actions (*cf.* Nuttall 1992, 89), while in 1990 and 1995, with the joint EC/ EU-US Transatlantic Declaration, the New Transatlantic Agenda, and the development of ESDP towards the end of the 1990s, cooperation and alignment with the US and NATO were crucial for further development of EU foreign policy and its capabilities. Consequently, while the US has not been an other of EU foreign policy during all of this time, from the perspective of deconstruction, the relationship with the US has functioned as a *blind spot* of EU foreign policy (*cf.* Derrida 1967/1997, 163–164), as it had, during crucial times, the effect of defining the dynamics of EU foreign policy but without this being reflected by EU foreign policy.

Concerning the USSR/ Russia, before the 1985 reforms in the Soviet Union which contributed to the end of the Cold War, the US represented the Western counterpart of the Soviet Union; the actions by the USSR were only followed by EU foreign policy, with suspicion and consternation. In June 1973, the US and USSR negotiated an Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war without involving EEC countries; this worried EEC countries and led to policy change particularly in France which acted to advance EU foreign policy, which was another factor that contributed to the adoption of the Document on the European Identity

in the end of 1973 (Möckli 2009, 101–103). In the CSCE negotiations which began in 1973 following a USSR initiative on a European security conference, EEC countries established themselves as an important USSR counterpart, particularly in relation to human rights (Möckli 2009). During the crisis in Poland in relation to the formation of Solidarity movement in 1980-1982, EEC countries warned against outside intervention and called for respect of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act (Bulletin EC 1981, 12; European Council 1981a). Following the reforms in the USSR that were announced in 1985, EEC countries initially expressed suspicion (*cf.* EPC Bulletin 1987, No. 1, 179–180) and only later recognized that the changes in the CEECs would not have been possible without the Soviet reforms (European Council 1989c). In 1989, following the Soviet reforms, the Soviet leader Gorbachev gave a speech in the Council of Europe in which he outlined the USSR's vision of Europe: he stated that the USSR and US were “a natural part” of the European structure and outlined in detail his idea of a “common European home” which would be based on common security, but without a “Western European defence” and starting with another European security conference, and which would also include a common economic space stretching “from the Atlantic to the Urals” (Gorbachev 1989). EEC countries responded by explicitly stating how they saw European identity (EPC Bulletin 1988, No. 1, 64). Following the end of the Cold War, the E(E)C and now Russia negotiated and signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which entered into force in 1997 (Eur-lex 2015). However, despite the strengthened cooperation with the EU, the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation which was adopted in 2000 did not mention the EU but focused on two conflicting visions of world order: an emerging multipolar one which included integrative associations and multilateral cooperation that Russia supported, contrasted against a world order dominated by Western countries under US leadership; Europe was only mentioned as an area where there have been attempts to weaken Russia's position, together with the Middle East, Central Asia and Asia-Pacific (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2014). In 2003, Russia, disagreeing with the initiative of the EU to include it in the “Wider Neighbourhood” framework, achieved instead the creation of four common spaces with the EU including a common economic space and a common space of security (Lynch 2004, 18; Council of Ministers 2003c, 35). Finally, concerning Europe, Russia drafted a European Security Treaty in November 2009 which would oblige the parties to the Treaty which are members of military alliances to ensure that decisions of such alliances did not affect the security of the other parties to the Treaty, and which would introduce a system of collective security between the parties (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2015).

Considering this, since the end of the Cold War, Russia has had a consistent approach to Europe and the EU based on promoting the idea of Europe as a common space of security as well as economic cooperation which would include Russia and take account of its interests. EU foreign policy responded to some of these initiatives but to a limited extent, among others in the interest of engaging Russia as a strategic partner, and also EU identity has been defined somewhat in opposition to some of Russia's initiatives. Russia has thus represented an other of EU foreign policy which has, however, been seen as more distant and other than the US and which has most often been regarded with mistrust and unease.

The approach of China to the E(E)C/ EU has been more pragmatic and originated in economic cooperation. The Commission contacted China in 1974 with regard to a trade agreement that would replace the previous bilateral trade agreements between EEC members and China; China accepted the initiative and the agreement was negotiated and entered into force in 1978 (Commission of the European Communities 1978b). China established official relations with the EEC in 1975; although the EEC was initially seen by China as capitalist this view began to change in the 1960s and 1970s when China started to see the EEC as key for European independence from the rivalry between the two superpowers (European Council 1975b; Commission of the European Communities 1975; 1978c). Economic and political relations between the EEC and China developed further during the 1980s (Commission of the European Communities 1981 and 1985; Statements of the foreign ministers and other documents 1983). A significant change came over the EU's policy towards China from 1995 on when the Commission published its Communication on China in which it noted China's growing economic as well as political and military power and clearly articulated the new main objective of EU foreign policy towards China which was to involve China in the international community (Commission of the European Communities 1995b). China, from its side, adopted its first policy paper on the EU in 2003 (Xinhua 2003); it is useful to analyse this paper together with China's foreign policy concept from the same year (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2003). In the latter, China emphasized the crucial significance of leading an independent foreign policy and stated that creating a "favourable international environment" was one of its basic foreign policy objectives (*ibid.*). In its EU policy paper, China noted an emerging trend of world multipolarity and called the EU "a major force in the world" with an increasingly important role in regional and international relations; it also stated the key objectives and conditions of its policy towards the EU (such as dialogue on human rights and removal of the ban on arms trade; Xinhua 2003). Through its EU policy paper, China thus recognized the EU as a force of growing political (and not only

economic) influence in the world. However in the following years it seemed that China did not consider the EU a powerful global force in practice as it engaged in Africa not considering the repeated calls by the EU for trilateral African-Chinese-EU cooperation (European Commission 2006b; 2008c). By the end of 2009, there were indications that the EU's importance in China's eyes had waned due to the effects of the financial and economic crisis in the EU, with China seeing the EU more in terms of economic cooperation and as a partner in addressing regional and global issues (Zimin 2012, 19 and 22).

Regarding the EU's evolving relationships with these powers, and considering the internal process of the construction of EU identity in world politics, this identity used a reference to the otherness of its strategic partners (in particular the US' but also the USSR's to a lesser extent) for its development, especially in its early days (*cf.* Žižek 1991/2008, 37). Although Russia and China have not been as important referent objects for the construction of EU foreign policy/ identity nexus as the US, in addition, EU foreign policy has used the practice of *othering* with regard to both of them, as EU foreign policy has considered, as a main orientation, that these powers needed to be integrated into the international community by the EU. Thus, the EU *cast* itself as a full member of the international community, while Russia and China have been *cast* as subjects that needed to be integrated, as not yet being full members of the international community.

Looking at the US', Russia's and China's views of the EU, and also some of their practices with regard to the EU, their views of the EU have differed substantially from each other and have also been significantly different from the EU's own. A key reason for this might be that, in shaping their policies regarding the EU, these powers have proceeded from *their* singular positions, their needs and objectives in world politics (and the EU has proceeded, on the other hand, from its needs and objectives). For example, China has emphasized as one of the key objectives of its foreign policy to engage independently in the international community; while the EU, in contrast, persisted in seeing China as being in need of being involved in the international community, by the EU. The US, Russia and China have also seen the international community differently than the EU has. In particular, through its own foreign policy discourse, the EU has been pictured as being more significant for world affairs than it has been from the perspectives of the US, Russia and China. A conclusion may be drawn from this: if EU foreign policy's idea of EU identity in world politics has arisen predominantly from the internal discussions between the different actors within the E(E)C/ EU, and if the image of the international community arises from confrontations of views between those actors that comprise the international community or world politics, this implies

that the image of the EU that has been constructed by the E(E)C/ EU internally has been markedly different to the image of the EU that is being constructed on the level of the international community through the discourses and actions by the (other) significant actors of world politics.

It has been said in the introductory part that, for identity of a political entity, it is important how it is seen by others, or how it perceives itself to be seen by other entities that are significant for it (*cf.* Fioramonti and Lucarelli 2008). Also, Buzan and Wæver (2003, 33) suggested that one of the criteria of being a power might be to be recognized as such by the other powers. However, judging from the development of EU foreign policy by December 2009, from the views of the US, Russia and China about the EU, EU foreign policy has been informed by the view of the US to a certain extent and following the end of the Cold War, for example with regard to its positions on terrorism and ESDP; but it has not reflected that (even following the development of ESDP) its significance in the (eyes of key other members of the) international community has been significantly smaller than in its own.

### 3.3.6 EU identity: bottom-up perspective

Already in 1961, the European Parliament supported the development of EPC in its resolutions (European Parliament 1961a; 1961b); in November 1969, it urged the Heads of State or Government of EEC countries to reach an agreement on EPC, among others to determine the “place and role” of the EEC (*ibid.* 1969). In 1972, the European Parliament (1972) adopted a resolution on the EEC in the world in which it supported the development of the EEC’s relations with “the other industrial powers” with the aim of realising “the European *identity*” in the sense of taking a “place in the world” that would be in line with the EEC’s “*responsibilities*” (emphases added). In 1973, it spoke about “*identity*” of the “Community Europe” which it saw in the function of fulfilling Europe’s “world *responsibilities*”, of developing cooperation with “Europe’s world partners” in particular the US, and of contributing to world stability (*ibid.* 1973; emphases added). These views of the European Parliament pointed in the same direction as the efforts in that period to set up EPC but went further, as the European Parliament also called for adoption of binding forms of cooperation in the field of the EEC’s external relations as well as security (*ibid.*). In addition, they showed that, also for the European Parliament, the EEC was (already at that time) seen in terms of encapsulating a European identity which needed to be expressed externally.

Regarding ideas about EU identity held by the population, following the conception of CFSP, and notwithstanding it, Eurobarometer Top Decision Makers Survey (Eurobarometer

1996) showed that the EU was perceived by 63 % of the respondents as not playing a “sufficiently important role on the world stage” in comparison to China, Russia and the US. These views were similar to those of the European Parliament which adopted its Resolution on the role of the EU in the world in 1998 (European Parliament 1998d) in which it regretted that “Europe’s *role*” in terms of CFSP and ESDP did not “match its economic role” and considered that CFSP should be furnished with strategic priorities that would enable the EU to defend its values and “not be silent” with regard to those conflicts that were connected to its interests (emphasis added). The European Parliament thus used the discourse of role and responsibilities of the EU in world politics, and equated the EU with Europe, seeing it as the bearer of Europeanness. In addition, its discourse showed that it saw EU identity in world politics as being active politically in defence of the EU’s interests and values.

A Eurobarometer survey in the middle of 2001 showed that the public expected the EU to be stronger “on the global stage”, and to “oppose antagonistic moves” by the other powers, notably the US (Eurobarometer 2001). Such views were picked up in the Laeken Declaration of the European Council (2001e) that referred to the citizens who wanted “Europe” to be more involved in foreign policy, security and defence, and the member states to coordinate better to solve international issues. Therefore, with regard to the external dimension of the idea of EU identity, it might be observed that top-down processes of identity formation (at the levels of the European Council, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament) in these cases were aligned with the bottom-up perspectives of EU population as gauged by Eurobarometer surveys.

In a final Eurobarometer survey that was connected to EU foreign policy in the period observed, “presenting a common united front” on the international scene was identified as the main priority for the future, especially with regard to the US (Eurobarometer 2006b, 53). The respondents believed that the EU needed to be more assertive on the world stage, and compete better with the other powers, primarily the US and Asia (*ibid.*, 9, 30). To do this, it was believed EU member states needed to cooperate better to achieve common positions instead of acting on their own, and thus allow the EU to have more initiative, influence and capacity externally (*ibid.*, 11, 32).

With regard to the views of the public and the European Parliament on EU external identity, it can thus be observed that these opinions supported further development of EU foreign policy, and were therefore in line with the orientations of EU policy-makers and the discourse of EU foreign policy that went in the same direction. On the other hand, public opinion and the European Parliament noted a major deficit in EU foreign policy with regard

to its implementation in practice as they drew attention to the fact that the EU was not yet truly able to adopt and carry out common positions, to intervene in those international issues that were related to its interests, and to compete with (other) key powers in world politics.

### 3.3.7 Reflection

This study has shown that, in the documents connected to EU foreign policy, many explicit and implicit linkages have been made between the external aspect of EU identity (EU identity in world politics) and EU foreign policy which have also, but not always, been connected to current events or the situation in world politics. There have been numerous instances when discourses of different bodies particularly the European Council and the ministers of foreign affairs directly mentioned the intention of building or strengthening identity of the E(E)C/ EU in relation to its external context as a rationale for the development of EU foreign policy. The notion of external E(EC)C/ EU identity has also been constructed implicitly by the discourse of EU foreign policy through the use of specific signifiers (about role, voice and responsibilities in world politics), by speaking about and working on the relations with the external partners, as well as through the conception and implementation of different policies that conveyed how the E(E)C/ EU saw itself as an entity with respect to its surroundings (in particular the enlargement policy, ENP and ESDP). It should thus be recognised that identity considerations have formed part of EU foreign policy which warrants the use of the term EU foreign policy/ identity nexus.

EU foreign policy/ identity nexus has been closely connected to the construction of the European Union (e.g. Tindemans report – Bulletin EC 1976, Supplement 1/76; Solemn Declaration on the European Union – European Council 1983b; and the decisions of the European Council as the Cold War was ending to strengthen the EEC while opening up to the reforming CEECs – European Council 1989a; 1989b; 1989c). This connection indicates that the pursuit of EU identity in world politics was closely related to the goals of European integration, in the sense of strengthening the cooperation between the member states; which could also be observed in the development of EU foreign policy (among others in the 1970 Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the problems of political unification; the Document on the European Identity of 1973; and the decision of the European Council to deepen integration through the institution of CFSP as a response to the changes taking place on the European continent – European Council 1990a).

As discourse analysis has shown, through all these years, the discourse of EU foreign policy has been marked by the signifiers of *role*, *voice* and *responsibilities* of the E(E)C/ EU



in world politics, which have, remarkably, remained unchanged throughout the period observed. At the same time, they have been used as floating signifiers (*cf.* Lévi-Strauss 1987, 63–64) as they have been seen as central to EU foreign policy yet their content has never been defined and remained vague but was adjusted with regard to the changing context of world politics. In addition, the signifier of a common voice has been used as a simile, to picture the reality the E(E)C/ EU and its member states desired to attain through EU foreign policy. In the first decade of the 21st century, the signifier of the EU being or becoming a *global player* has been added which has however functioned in a similar manner to the already existing signifiers. These signifiers namely functioned to produce the discursive effect of *différance* (Derrida 1972/1982), as, simultaneously, they produced a difference between the current and the envisioned state of EU foreign policy, and deferred the realisation of the foreseen vision of EU foreign policy into an undefined future. EU foreign policy has thus been, since its beginning and as the EU itself, a work under construction.

The signifiers of voice, role and responsibilities of the E(E)C/ EU in world politics have moreover formed part of a rhetorical structure which has been used to justify new developments in EU foreign policy<sup>77</sup> and has consisted of the following elements:

- a) a premise stating that the E(E)C/ EU had a role to play or responsibilities in world politics and/ or needed a common voice to be heard externally;
- b) a reference to current external conditions with respect to which the E(E)C/ EU needed to fulfil its role or responsibilities, speak with a common voice or make its voice heard; and
- c) a conclusion about the new elements of EU foreign policy that needed to be set up in order to achieve this (e.g. common coordination of foreign policies between the member states, amendments of the Treaty bases, common security and defence policy, new security and defence structures).

This rhetorical structure, together with the belonging signifiers, was part of a narrative (*cf.* Suganami 1997, 405) about the E(E)C/ EU in world politics: referring to the events related to EU foreign policy and considering the external circumstances, it conveyed the message that the E(E)C/ EU had a role to play and responsibilities to fulfil in world politics, and portrayed how, through fulfilling this role and responsibilities, it would become or was becoming one of the important powers in world politics (*cf.* Bulletin EC 1976, Supplement

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<sup>77</sup> *Cf.* Final Communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or Government on 1 and 2 December 1969 at The Hague; Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the problems of political unification 1970; Communiqué of the meeting of the Heads of State and Government in Paris in 1972; Document on the European Identity 1973; Report on European Political Cooperation 1981; European Council 1983b; Single European Act 1986; European Council 1990c; 1991a; 1991b; 1995b.

1/76; Second report on European political cooperation 1972; Document on the European Identity 1973; European Council 1988b; 2001e; 2003f; 2003g). The content of this narrative has mostly remained unchanged through the history of EU foreign policy, although it has been adjusted to the changing circumstances of world politics: for example, in the period before the end of the Cold War, it spoke about the EEC contributing to international equilibrium, while in the more recent period (e.g. European Council 2008d) it spoke about the EU as a global player.

This narrative was mythical (*cf.* Barthes 1957/1991) to some extent as it referred to an undefined future, and has been overly embellished in some cases which did not correspond to the realities on the ground (e.g. the case of the former Yugoslavia that has been presented in subchapter 3.4.3, and the case of the Middle East analysed in the first case study). In addition, in relation to the reasons for the development of EU foreign policy and in particular its security dimension, it displayed some characteristics of securitization (*cf.* Wæver 1996; Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1998; Buzan and Wæver 2003) as it presented the E(E)C/ EU as a subject that needed to be defended with regard to its outside; e.g. the Tindemans report considered that European identity needed to be safeguarded through a common external approach (Bulletin EC 1976, Supplement 1/76), Article J.1 of the Treaty on European Union (1992) stated that safeguarding the values and independence of the EU was the first of CFSP objectives, and European Security Strategy (2003) identified key threats and how they would be addressed through EU foreign policy including its developing security and defence dimension (European Council 2003g).

This construction of EU identity in world politics through the discourse of EU foreign policy has been blind to itself – the discourse of EU foreign policy did not note nor reflect the fact that it had been constructing an EU identity in world politics, nor did it consider that this construction might have been performed in a different manner. In addition, a key blind spot (*cf.* Derrida 1967/1997, 163–164) which has been constitutive for EU foreign policy but not reflected by it has been the relationship between the E(E)C/ EU and the US (e.g. Nuttall 1992, 89; Bulletin EC 1973, 105; Council of Ministers 2001h). Furthermore, through its discourse, EU foreign policy has also been defined by the framework of the binary oppositions it has been using which has represented the lens through which it has seen world politics – the East-West and the North-South binary opposition have both persisted in the discourse of EU foreign policy after the end of the Cold War (e.g. European Council 1977a; 1980a; 1999d). These elements have worked to delimit the imaginable cognitive space of EU foreign policy.

Has the discourse of EU foreign policy been closed with regard to the content of EU identity in world politics? Key elements of the discourse seem to suggest so: the repetition of the signifiers about role, voice and responsibilities of the E(E)C/ EU in world politics, the narrative about the EU in world politics; also, the discourse of EU foreign policy has not reflected the role of the US in the development of EU foreign policy, nor the binary oppositions that it has been using. At the same time, the idea of EU identity in world politics has been seen as an overarching idea of collective identity, but also as a political project of constructing an external identity as a facet of European identity (e.g. Treaty on European Union 1992); and even as something that could be borne by outside actors, such as Russia (European Council 1999b). The idea of EU identity in world politics has been adjusted by the discourse of EU foreign policy with reference to the changing circumstances of world politics and to the development of EU foreign policy itself (from the discourse about the EEC contributing to the international equilibrium before the institution of CFSP to the EU as a global player following the establishment of CFSP and ESDP). Nevertheless, the discourse of EU foreign policy has continuously been portraying the E(E)C/ EU as becoming or being one of the important actors in world politics.

To sum up the discourse analysis of EU foreign policy in the period 1969-2009, a key axis of valorization (*cf.* Greimas 1977) can be discerned: EU foreign policy discourse has consistently valued the idea of the EU having a role, voice and responsibilities (i.e. being visible or having identity) in world politics. On the other hand, not having these has been valued negatively by the discourse of EU foreign policy.

Regarding the practice of EU foreign policy/ identity nexus, it should be noted that the first explicit mention and construction of the idea of European identity and its external dimension dated back to the Document on the European Identity (1973) and owed existence particularly to US approach to EEC member states during 1973 but also to the fact that important international negotiations between the two superpowers of the bipolar world went on without including EEC member states (*cf.* Bulletin EC 1973, 105; Nuttall 1992, 87–89; Möckli 2009, 101–103). Thus, from a genealogical perspective, even though implicit references to European identity have been made in the discourse about a role and responsibilities of Europe in the world in the Final communiqué of the Conference of the Heads of State or Government on 1 and 2 December 1969 at The Hague, the explicit construction of the idea of EU identity in world politics had incidental origins.

In practice, EEC member states contributed to the CSCE process, particularly its human rights dimension, first in the framework of the CSCE conference 1973-1975, and after that to

the follow-up of the commitments adopted at the conference. Before the end of the Cold War, however, they did not achieve other notable impacts in the framework of the bipolar world order. With the end of the Cold War, their first opportunity to engage as a main outside actor in conflict resolution came as the crisis in Yugoslavia erupted. But even though they were negotiating the text of the future Treaty on European Union, they were unable to make a decisive contribution to peace; as the crisis escalated, they found that they did not have the necessary instruments nor the political will to intervene, and instead saw their ability to maintain a common position on Yugoslavia (an internal objective) as one of their main achievements (*cf.* EPC Bulletin 1992, 226–227). On the other hand, the EEC and its countries had a crucial impact on the stabilisation in Europe with regard to the CEECs when they were reforming, and attracted them to the European integration process, first through EEC framework, and later through a comprehensive new enlargement policy. With regard to this, and in contrast with the way EEC countries handled the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, their action concerning the CEECs represented a case of openness (flexibility) of the idea of EU identity in world politics, which resulted in a new enlargement process and had an impact on regional stabilisation in Europe which was, at that time, also important from the perspective of the changes going on in world politics.

Establishing the formal bases for the implementation of EU foreign policy took place in two steps: the Treaty on European Union (1992) introduced the instrument of joint actions; and following the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), in the period from 1999 to 2001, ESDP was set up the substance of which was written in the Treaty of Lisbon (2001). Through this process, defence policy became an integral part of EU foreign policy. The process of establishing ESDP demonstrated that EU member states did not need treaty bases to establish the capacity to act within the realm of EU foreign policy if they agreed politically. In the years following the signature of the Treaty of Lisbon (2001), discussions within the European Council as well as of the foreign ministers concerning the ability to act in the area of EU foreign policy focused on the security and defence policy. However, although several ESDP missions have been launched by December 2009, these missions were mostly of a regional nature with focus on Europe and Africa, and the crux of the conflicts tackled by them was being addressed by actors other than the EU while ESDP missions mostly worked to support those solutions.

Impacts of EU foreign policy can be found on a more abstract level, of EU foreign policy as a whole – from about 2004, beside the pragmatic developments with respect to the security and defence policy, another development could be detected in EU foreign policy, as

the discussions within the European Council and by the foreign ministers started to cover the totality of foreign policy topics stretching from enlargement and neighbourhood policies, the relations with other regions, organizations and (strategic) partners, to world order as such (e.g. European Council 2004b; 2004d). This was so different from previous documents and discussions on EU foreign policy that we might speak about the crystallisation of a global perspective of EU foreign policy (which was also present in the European Security Strategy – European Council 2003g; and the Treaty of Lisbon 2007). However, although this wider perspective could be detected in the discussions and documents on EU foreign policy, it has not been explicitly noted nor reflected by EU foreign policy before the end of the period observed.

Significantly, this wider perspective has, since the 1990s, included the development of specific forms of relationships between the EU and third countries, regions and organizations, most of which have been labelled *partnerships*, but some *strategic partnerships*; however the criteria for the designation of a partnership as strategic were not applied in a consistent manner by the EU which suggests that the designation of the partnerships as strategic has been done with reference to the EU's political objectives, including identity objectives. Namely, the partnerships, and in particular strategic partnerships, have been used by the EU, in the discourse of its documents and discussions on and its dealings with the partners, including summit meetings, to assert the idea of the EU as one of the important players in world politics, i.e. its identity in world politics. This has been performed through *identity-casting* discourses which included *alter-casting* (the casting of relevant third countries or organizations as the EU's partners) as well as *self-casting* (the casting of the EU as an equal partner of these countries and organizations, especially of the USA, Russia and China). This identity-casting has mostly been *indirect* (also in discourses accompanying ESDP missions), but EU foreign policy also performed *direct* EU self-casting (in cases where the EU has been labelled by its foreign policy discourse as an important global player).

Regarding this, although the discourse of EU foreign policy has tended to picture the E(E)C/ EU as one of the important actors in world politics, its impacts have rather been regional, with a focus on Europe, even when they have been important from a world-political perspective (e.g. the enlargement policy following the end of the Cold War). Beyond Europe, EU foreign policy has, rather, tended to produce outputs which has been noted and criticized by the European Parliament and the public opinion. In addition, its key strategic partners (the USA, Russia and China) have mostly viewed the EU as a regional and economic actor.

Finally, considering the discourse and implementation of EU foreign policy together with the relevant context of world politics, EU foreign policy discourse has retained its key features throughout the period from 1969 to 2009; however, it has been brought into action through policy implementation as the context of world politics changed following the end of the Cold War, and it has also developed a comprehensive (global) and structured, albeit unreflected, perspective of the EU's external environment. The process of the development of EU foreign policy has thus represented a movement towards realisation of a pre-conceived idea of EU identity in world politics (of having an important role and responsibilities in world politics) to the extent that the internal and external circumstances permitted.

The partners that have been most important to the EU in world politics, and at the same time those powers that have been most important for world politics in the beginning of the 21st century, have had a different conception of the identity of the EU in world politics to that which has been held by the EU. Therefore we might speak about *relativity of the social world* as perceived and constructed by these different social entities: within the EU and for the EU, the idea of EU identity in world politics that has been (re)produced since 1969 has represented a reality which has been cultivated and built upon; however, this has not been taken up by the other social entities outside the EU which themselves formed an important part of world politics (such as the USA, Russia and China).

This has not been recognised by EU foreign policy; in fact, EU foreign policy has been othering some of these powers, in particular Russia and China, as its main approach to them has been to see them as being in need of integration in the international community. On the other hand, since the end of the Cold War, EU foreign policy orientated its objectives in line with those of the US. Thus, at least until December 2009, as the analysis has shown, EU foreign policy has been ignoring the views of some of the crucial third countries which were at the same time (in the process of becoming) key players in world politics. By the end of 2009, there have been indications that this approach has not been beneficial to EU foreign policy, as some of the key EU concerns have been ignored by these actors, for example in the climate change negotiations (*cf.* Keukeleire and Bruyninckx 2011, 399–400), and regarding EU calls for cooperation with China on Africa which has not materialized.

Therefore, EU foreign policy could benefit from performing the final step of deconstruction: an *inversion* of the main binary oppositions that have been underpinning its discourse and actions. If we were to remain true to the form of deconstruction, this would mean letting go of the idea that there exists an agreed image of the international community; and taking into account that different powers in world politics might each be constructing

their own visions of international community (each in accordance with their own vision of themselves in world politics). However, an incomplete version of the deconstructive reversal would entail a recognition that, in the fluid conditions of world politics in the beginning of the 21st century, all (key) actors in world politics (including Russia, China, as well as the USA, and the EU) *co-construct those discourses, actions and contexts that are* (socially recognised as) *world politics*. Such an outlook would be more in line with the current realities of world politics and would assist EU foreign policy by allowing the EU to approach the (other) key actors in world politics on equal terms with regard to resolving global issues and important international negotiations, and thus avoid being sidelined.

### **3.4 (Re)production of EU identity in world politics 2009-2014**

#### 3.4.1 Mapping of those foreign and related issues that were discussed most often by the European Council in the period 2009-2014

For the period starting with December 2009 and ending in November 2014, foreign or related issues that have been discussed by the European Council are shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B. Looking at this table, it can be observed that in the period concerned, foreign or related issues were dealt with at 27 meetings of the European Council i.e. they have been discussed at every European Council meeting during this period. This shows the importance of foreign or related issues for the EU in the first five years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. This is not surprising, as this was a period of turbulences in the EU's surroundings (Arab Spring which began in 2011 and spread to a number of countries in North Africa and the Middle East, and crisis in Ukraine which began in 2013).

To obtain a summary table of the number of appearance of foreign or related issues, the method from the beginning of analysis (subchapter 3.1) has been used; however, as we are looking at a shorter period of time (5 years), all those issues have been included in the Table 3.2 below which have been discussed at least at three sessions of the European Council during the period observed (European Council 2009f-2014e). The results obtained in this manner are interesting, as the issues that have been dealt with most frequently (under different signifiers) have been climate change and enlargement (in comparison to the period 1975-2009 when the Middle East was most discussed, followed by enlargement). Climate change has also been the only non-geographically related issue, apart from CSDP, that has been dealt with by the European Council more than ten times during 1975-2009. Its number of appearance has been related to the EU's efforts to obtain a global climate deal that would replace the Kyoto Protocol following its expiry. Enlargement has been dealt with as frequently as climate change, which shows a continued importance of enlargement for the EU also in the period 2009-2014. But, strikingly, the issue that has been appearing most often in the European Council's discussions as a single issue has been Syria. It has also been discussed together with other countries under the EU's umbrella concept of (Southern) neighbourhood. All these three issues (climate change, enlargement and Syria) have been discussed at about a third of the European Council's sessions during the period from 2009 to 2014.



Table 3.2: Number of appearance of foreign and related issues discussed by the European Council, December 2009 – November 2014

<b>External or related issue discussed by the European Council /different signifiers</b>	<b>Number of appearance /of different signifiers</b>	<b>Number of appearance - TOTAL</b>
Climate change/ climate and energy	7/ 3	10
Enlargement (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)/ Croatia, Iceland	8/ 2	10
Syria	9	9
Ukraine	7	7
Iran	6	6
Eastern partnership	5	5
G20	5	5
Southern neighbourhood	5	5
Doha (round)	4	4
Libya	4	4
Middle East/ Gaza	2/ 2	4
Strategic partners	4	4
Egypt	3	3
Migration flows	3	3
Moldova	3	3
US(A)/ transatlantic	2/ 1	3

Ukraine (as a single issue but also as belonging to the EU's concept of Eastern neighbourhood) has been discussed almost as often as Syria (at seven sessions during the period observed). In fact, if we combine all the signifiers belonging to the EU's concept of its neighbourhood and look at the Tables B.1 and 3.2, in the period from December 2009 to the end of November 2014, the European Council has discussed issues related to the EU's concept of the neighbourhood (Eastern partnership, Southern neighbourhood, Libya, Egypt and Moldova in addition to Syria and Ukraine) at 20 i.e. at two thirds of its sessions during this period. On the other hand, the Middle East (encompassing the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians) has been discussed only four times.

These findings substantiate the appropriateness of the operational approach adopted in the introductory part, covering the period to December 2009 for the first three analytical studies, to compare those findings with the period from December 2009 to December 2014.

As can be seen from the Table 3.2 above, in the period 2009-2014, the order of those EU foreign policy issues that were discussed most often by the European Council has changed significantly in comparison to the period 1975-2009: from the Middle East, enlargement and the Mediterranean for 1975-2009 to the neighbourhood (East and South), climate change and enlargement in 2009-2014.

The foreign or related issues that have been most important for the EU in the period 2009-2014 as discussed by the European Council have therefore been climate change, enlargement, and the EU's concept of (Southern and Eastern) neighbourhood particularly Syria and Ukraine; these issues will be the subject of analysis in this subchapter. In addition, to follow the development of EU foreign policy during this period, discussions on EU foreign policy as such will be analysed, as well as attitudes of the EU's most important strategic partners towards the EU as an actor in world politics.

Some other observations regarding EU foreign policy in the period 2009-2014 can be made if we look at the Table 3.2. The EU has been participating in Iran nuclear negotiations – the European Council discussed Iran at six of its sessions in this period. Also, its discussions show a growing importance of the G-20 and thus the relations with the emerging economies for the EU; the G-20 was discussed at five sessions. Global trade relations have been discussed at four sessions (Doha round), and also relations with strategic partners. However, from individual strategic partners, only the relations with the US have been discussed at three sessions. The table also shows that migration flows were becoming a growing concern for the EU, as they were also discussed at three sessions in 2009-2014.

Looking at this table, it is questionable whether EU foreign policy followed its global approach to the EU's surroundings by the end of 2014. In fact, the signifiers for the EU's neighbourhood (the issue it has been most preoccupied with) have diversified in the period from 2009 to 2014, and have included its concepts of Southern neighbourhood, Eastern partnership, but most often single countries such as Syria or Ukraine. This does not point to a more unified approach of EU foreign policy, but rather its fragmentation in the period from 2009 to 2014. On the other hand, this diversification of the signifiers for the neighbourhood exhibits a pattern similar to the diversification of the signifiers denoting the USSR/ Russia and the CEECs from 1988 to 1992 i.e. in the period when the circumstances in Europe were changing dramatically and the EU was innovating new ways of dealing with them which also showed through the changes of the signifiers the European Council had been using in its discussions. It would appear that a similar process has been going on in relation to the EU's (concept of) its neighbourhood in the period from 2009 to 2014.

To allow for a comprehensive analysis, despite the shorter period observed, the types of documents analysed in this subchapter include, apart from the documents of the European Council and the Council (Environment and General Affairs Councils in addition to Foreign Affairs Council), also European Commission documents, documents related to the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS), and documents of the (other) powers in world politics that conveyed their views of the EU.

### 3.4.2 Climate change

For the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in mid-December 2009, the EU adopted ambitious positions. At its sessions in October and in the beginning of December, the European Council (2009e; 2009f) stated that the EU was “fully determined to play a leading role”, saw the EU as being “at the forefront of efforts to fight climate change”, and stipulated the following elements of a global climate agreement: clear commitments to emissions reductions by 2020 by developed countries, contribution to this and mitigation measures by developing countries, provisions on the objective of staying below two degrees Celsius global warming (compared to the pre-industrial period), provisions on immediate action starting with 2010, and above all a political agreement to adopt a legally binding instrument to replace the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC with 2013 (*ibid.*). To apply discourse analysis, the European Council (*ibid.*) used authoritative verbs in adopting these positions: it stated that the parties “*must* devote themselves” to a binding agreement, that the “*common objective must be*” to stay below two-degree warming, and that the parties “*should* take immediate action” (emphases added). This and the European Council’s discourse about the EU playing a leading role in the negotiations (*ibid.*) revealed that the EU saw its identity in world politics as that of a leading actor before the Copenhagen climate negotiations. With regard to the needs of the developing countries, the European Council only mentioned the need to provide for appropriate financing for their share of climate measures (*ibid.*).

The negotiations in Copenhagen however took a different turn: the final proposal adopted was elaborated by the US in cooperation with China, Brazil, India and South Africa; this happened as China turned to the other emerging economies and the US after being pressed by the EU to adopt ambitious emissions cuts (Vincenti 2009; Zimin 2012). The Copenhagen Accord was not binding, did not include emission reduction targets the EU had wanted, and only stated that global temperature increase “should be below 2 degrees Celsius” (UN 2009; Vincenti 2009). Taking into account EU discourse and approach to the

negotiations in practice, this outcome demonstrated that, in the Copenhagen climate negotiations, the EU failed to take account of the changing circumstances of world politics characterized by the growing significance and cooperation of the emerging economies between themselves and with other key actors in world politics, as its positions for the negotiations, apart from the financing, did not consider the needs and interests of the emerging economies nor their growing power. Moreover it showed that the internal EU vision of its identity in world politics was out of step with how it was actually perceived by the (other) crucial actors in world politics.

From the perspective of EU approach to international negotiations on climate change, 2010 was a year of reflection. In his speeches, President of the European Council Van Rompuy (2010a; 2010b) referred to a “rapidly changing world” and stated that the Copenhagen conference was an “*eye-opener*” to the fact that power was shifting and that new players were emerging with their own worldviews and interests (emphasis added); that there was a perception in EU member states that the EU was sidelined at the Copenhagen negotiations, and that the EU was beginning to realise that the emerging economies had political and not only economic power. He thus used the unexpected results of the Copenhagen climate conference in his speeches as a *metaphor* (“eye-opener”) to illustrate the necessity for the EU to become aware of the changing world-political context.

Also, in February and March 2010, the Council and the European Council began adjusting EU approach to the international climate negotiations, towards improving “efficiency” of the EU’s “relations with its partners” (Council of Ministers 2010b). In particular, the European Council decided to strengthen EU “outreach to third countries” by addressing climate change at “all” regional, bilateral and summit meetings as well as within fora such as the G-20, and called for quick identification of common interests with the emerging economies “which could create leverage” in the climate negotiations (European Council 2010b). This approach began to be realized in practice for example at the meetings President Van Rompuy held with third countries at which he also addressed climate change; most importantly, with China (at the EU-China business summit) where he underlined climate change as a key common challenge (in addition to energy supply) that the EU and China shared as “two main economic powers” that not only had common interests “but also common responsibilities” (Van Rompuy 2010c). In his discourse, he thus used the strategy of *alter-casting* China as a power which was close to the EU not only regarding economy, but also in relation to the climate negotiations.

The new approach seemed to have worked, as the European Council (2010f) welcomed the results of the Cancun climate conference in December 2010, and “noted with satisfaction the successful implementation of the strategy agreed in March”. In the Cancun negotiations, UN documents were adopted which recognized the common objective of limiting global warming to two degrees, and listed the emissions reductions pledges made so far (Euractiv 2010). However there was no agreement to prolong the period of validity of the Kyoto Protocol which was to end with 2012 (such extension was necessary to ensure some sort of an international climate regime in the absence of a comprehensive agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol with 2013), nor regarding commitments to a second period of emissions reductions under this Protocol (*ibid.*). Also, reports from the negotiations showed that it had been difficult for the EU to achieve a common EU position for the negotiations, as EU representatives to the negotiations presented as an achievement that the EU “succeeded in speaking *with one voice*” (*cf. ibid.*; emphasis added).

In an effort to work towards a future global framework to address climate change, EU institutions launched an initiative on climate diplomacy. In July 2011, Foreign Affairs Council (demonstrating the importance of global climate change negotiations for EU foreign policy, as conclusions on climate change were otherwise the subject of Environment Council) adopted Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy which stated that “the EU has been at the forefront of raising awareness” regarding climate change and that it needed to increase its “efforts on climate diplomacy” and strengthen its “*voice and activities internationally*”, on all political levels, through regional initiatives as well as through complementary efforts to those within the UNFCCC (Council of Ministers 2011a; emphases added). These Conclusions were based on a Joint Reflection Paper (2011) by EU High Representative and the Commission on climate diplomacy that emphasised that climate change had “security implications” and was a “threat multiplier”, and that systemic climate-related risks needed to be addressed before they became systemic crises. The Reflection Paper also highlighted that the EU had been “at the forefront” in climate change debates, and saw the EU as “a *global actor* in climate change diplomacy” (*ibid.*; emphasis added). Regarding this, it brought recommendations for action on “EU climate diplomacy”; in particular, the EU was urged to strengthen its engagement with third countries, especially those with a key role in the climate negotiations – namely Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa and the US (*ibid.*).

If we analyse this discourse of EU bodies in the given context of world politics, firstly, it can be observed that a new phrase and initiative has been invented – “climate diplomacy” that encapsulated awareness by the EU of a need to reorient and strengthen its foreign policy

efforts if it wanted a global climate deal to be achieved. Also, it can be seen that the EU has been constructing its identity in world politics through profiling itself as a global actor that was “at the forefront” of global efforts to address climate change, and (re)produced EU climate diplomacy in such a manner as to remain so. In other words, an important part of the idea of EU identity in world politics has been connected to its standing in the international climate change negotiations. Moreover EU institutions, and particularly the Joint Reflection Paper (2011, above) used securitizing discourse (*cf.* Wæver 1995; 2005a; 2005b) in presenting the issue of climate change and in highlighting the need for the EU to achieve success in the international negotiations on this issue. Climate change has thus been (re)produced as an existential issue for the EU in two ways: on the one hand through its connection to (international) security; and on the other through positing it as a key issue of the EU’s international standing and of its positioning in the changing context of world politics vis-à-vis the other key players such as the US and the emerging economies.

In October 2011, the European Council (2011e), in endorsing the EU’s positions for Durban Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC from November to December 2011, underlined the need to achieve a global legally binding agreement, and in this context mentioned EU openness to a second period of emissions reductions commitments and thus a prolongation of the Kyoto Protocol regime. In fact, the Durban negotiations represented a success for the EU and its climate diplomacy: the final agreements were made through cooperation of China, India, the EU and the US, and contained provisions to extend the Kyoto Protocol by 2017 or 2020 and a commitment by the parties to start working in 2012 on a new legally binding agreement to be made by 2015 and to come into force by 2020 (Euractiv 2011; UN 2011). These agreements, together with an agreement that there would be a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol by the developed countries starting in 2013 and ending in 2020, were codified at the December 2012 Conference of the Parties, through Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol; in addition, financing for climate change adaptation was agreed for developing countries (UN 2012a; 2012b).

In view of the coming negotiations on a new global agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol, EU institutions reflected on climate diplomacy in 2013. In a joint paper, the EEAS and the Commission again saw the EU in “*a leading role*” and recommended that, for an “effective EU climate diplomacy” and to project its “*voice internationally*”, the EU should systematically and in a coordinated manner address climate change in bilateral contacts, multilateral fora (G20) and “mainstream” it into discussions dealing with “*strategic foreign policy threats*” (Reflection Paper 2013; emphases added). It was novel that the paper

recommended that, in its efforts, the EU should have a “deep understanding” of its partners’ positions and constraints, or “the underlying political economy” that was conditioning their positions (*ibid.*). This paper, together with the one from 2011, showed that the EU began to see its efforts in addressing global climate change more and more in terms of EU foreign policy, and that it also started to realise the importance of taking into account other countries’ positions in the negotiations. However, the discourse in this and the previous papers also showed that the main signifiers describing the idea of EU identity in world politics (having a voice and role and being an actor in world politics) remained unchanged also in 2009-2014, in the area of climate change.

In connection to this, in June 2013, Foreign Affairs Council adopted conclusions on climate diplomacy in which it saw climate change as a “global challenge” that would put at risk not only the environment, but also stability and security if left unaddressed (Council of Ministers 2013a). With regard to the necessity of achieving a global legally binding agreement by 2015, it saw “a distinctive *role* for the EU”, and underlined the need for a proactive “EU climate diplomacy” that should enhance “EU *climate voice internationally*”, raise the profile of climate change in political dialogues, mainstream climate change in EU and member states’ agendas, and allow for cooperation with partners; these were seen as tasks for a “*21st century foreign policy*” (*ibid.*; emphases added). If we apply discourse analysis, these discourses demonstrated that climate change began to be closely connected to EU foreign policy; in fact, the key signifiers that had been used in EU foreign policy discourse since its beginnings and illustrated how the EU imagined itself in world politics – the signifiers of “voice” and “role” for the EU in world politics – were now also being applied, or spilled over, in EU discourses regarding global negotiations on climate change (and remained the same as in the previous period i.e. until 2009). Furthermore, the securitizing discourse that implied that climate change represented a global threat began to be more widely used in the discourses of the EEAS, the Commission and the Council in 2013.

In practice that year, however, outcomes of UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in November 2013 in Warsaw were modest – there was an agreement that a new regime, to be agreed in Paris in December 2015 and begin in 2020, would consist of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions commitments by developed as well as developing countries that would be nationally determined, and a mechanism was agreed to help developing countries deal with damage from climate change (Euractiv 2013; UN 2013).

In 2014, the European Council (2014a; 2014e) adopted the commitment by the EU to reduce GHG emissions by 40 % by 2030 in comparison to 1990, and decided that this and

other climate change-related EU commitments would be submitted to the UNFCCC in the first quarter of 2015; it saw this as a way of confirming “the EU’s *role globally*” and urged other “major economies” to submit their contributions by the first quarter of 2015 as well (emphasis added). Nevertheless, in the final text adopted by UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Lima in December, which confirmed the agreement to adopt a legally binding instrument under the UNFCCC in 2015, the parties were only invited to submit their contributions in advance of the Paris summit scheduled for December 2015 (this included developed as well as developing countries); again, these were to be “nationally determined” commitments (Collyns 2014; Euractiv 2014; UN 2014). Thus, the final agreement incorporated Chinese, Indian and US positions, as emissions reductions commitments were to be non-obligatory and not compulsory as the EU would have preferred (*cf.* Collyns 2014; Euractiv 2014). This again demonstrated a disregard for the EU, and its idea of identity in world politics, by the (other) key actors in world politics.

In the period 2009-2014, as the analysis has shown, the issue of climate change has been incorporated and enshrined in the discourse of EU foreign policy, as climate change has been the issue through which the EU has been profiling itself on the global stage. At the same time, and possibly because of this, climate change during this period has been the foreign policy issue through which the EU has been coming to terms with and adapting to the new realities of world politics. The EU has been compelled to adjust its approach to international climate change negotiations and lower its expectations if it wanted to remain a meaningful participant, and it succeeded in this to some extent (particularly by paying attention to the views of key third countries in the negotiations). However, even with this, it did not have an impact in the negotiations in practice that it had envisioned, as a certain disconnect could be observed between the self-image of the EU with regard to the negotiations and their eventual course and outcomes.

Considering this, an axis of valorization (*cf.* Greimas 1977) can be observed in EU discourse on international climate change negotiations: reaching a global agreement on a regime to succeed the Kyoto Protocol has been valued highly; while the possibility of not achieving it has been securitized. A final question concerns whether, through the transformations of EU approach to international climate change negotiations there have been any changes in the idea of EU identity in world politics. Some adjustments and openness could be observed in the EU’s realisation of the need to take into account other countries’ needs and positions in the negotiations. However, at the same time, the modifications in this direction have been made to EU foreign policy with the aim of achieving the EU’s primary



objective, a global legally binding agreement to address climate change. Thus it seemed, rather, that EU foreign policy on climate change has been adjusted in 2009-2014 with the aim of realising the imagined EU identity of having a (key) role in the global efforts to address climate change.

### 3.4.3 Enlargement

If we analyse the documents of key EU institutions regarding enlargement in the period 2009-2014, it can be observed that a number of the features of enlargement discourse and practice have been continued from the previous period (analysed in the second case study), but also that both discourse and practice have evolved to some degree in consideration of the changing context of world politics.

Both the Council and the Commission continued to connect enlargement to EU foreign policy objectives: for example, by emphasizing that enlargement was reinforcing peace and stability in Europe, contributing to “pulling our weight on the world stage”, and demonstrating “the EU’s capacity” as a global actor (European Commission 2010b; 2012a; Council of Ministers 2009f; 2010b; 2011b; 2012a). But over a relatively short period of five years, these discourses acquired new elements: in its Communication on enlargement in 2010, the Commission (2010b) stated that enlargement was giving the EU “greater weight” and strengthening its “*voice* in international fora” in a world where emerging powers were “playing an increasing *role*” (emphases added). In 2011 it referred to the events in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the global financial crisis, and found that enlargement was gaining relevance in the light of these; and, in its 2014 Communication, it stated that developments in “the EU’s neighbourhood” showed “the importance of enlargement as a tool” for cooperation on “foreign policy issues” (*ibid.* 2011; 2014a). Also, from 2010, the Council has been adding to its discourse a sentence saying that enlargement served the EU’s “*strategic* interests” (Council of Ministers 2010b; 2011b; 2012a; 2013b; emphasis added). In 2011, 2012 and 2013, it added that enlargement allowed the EU “to be better positioned to address global challenges” (a sentence that originated in the Commission’s Communications; *ibid.*). These discourses (in the case of the Commission’s 2014 Communication explicitly) constructed enlargement policy as a foreign policy tool for addressing developments in the evolving context of world politics that were of interest to the EU: Arab Spring, financial crisis, emerging powers as well as crises in the neighbourhood. Moreover they showed that the Council began seeing enlargement from a strategic perspective in relation to the EU’s (foreign policy) interests. However, also with regard to the

subject of enlargement, the key signifiers describing EU identity (having a voice and role) in world politics remained the same as in the previous period.

Regarding the countries that were the subject of enlargement policy in this period, enlargement discourses exhibited another characteristic, as the countries were grouped: the Council thus usually discussed, under enlargement, first Turkey, than Croatia, followed by Iceland and Western Balkans countries; while the Commission Communications focused first on the Western Balkans, then Turkey and Iceland (European Commission 2010b; 2011a; 2012a; Council of Ministers 2009f; 2010b; 2011b; 2012a; 2013b). This shows that EU institutions saw the countries subject to enlargement as belonging to at least three distinct groups. In the remainder of this section, therefore, the discourses on Croatia and Western Balkans countries (with Montenegro first as it became a candidate in the period observed), on Turkey and Iceland are analysed separately.

Before continuing, another feature of enlargement discourse during this period needs to be noted. In all the discourses of the Council and the Commission, a recurring discursive structure could be observed which concerned “renewed consensus on enlargement” of 2006 and which summarized, in one sentence, the essence of the enlargement process: it stated that the renewed consensus on enlargement was “*based on consolidation of commitments [by the prospective countries], /.../ rigorous conditionality, /.../ and the EU’s capacity to integrate new members, /.../ each country being assessed on its own merits*” (cf. European Commission 2010b; 2011a; 2012a; 2014a; Council of Ministers 2009f; 2010b; 2011b; 2012a; 2013b; emphases added). This discursive structure conveyed that if the enlargement countries became like EU countries, by fulfilling the conditions set by the EU, they could become EU members. It thus consisted of three key elements: conditions set by the EU, their acceptance and fulfilment by the enlargement countries, and their prospect of integration into the EU. Also, this replicated the implicit process of EU identity construction via setting conditions for the countries subject to enlargement and monitoring of their fulfilment of these conditions.

From the enlargement countries, Croatia transited from candidate to member status in the period observed. Some of the key issues that were the focus of EU institutions in its accession negotiations and whose resolution contributed to Croatia’s progress were its cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), reforms in judiciary sector, and cooperation with Slovenia to address a bilateral border dispute (Council of Ministers 2010b; European Commission 2011a). In June 2011 the European Council decided that the negotiations with Croatia would be concluded by the end of the month; its accession treaty was signed in December 2011, and Croatia became the 28th

member of the EU with July 2013 (Council of Ministers 2011b; European Council 2011d; 2011f). In the views of EU institutions, the successful completion of Croatia's accession negotiations confirmed the EU's "commitment" and brought "new momentum" to enlargement perspective of Western Balkans countries provided they continued with reforms, and demonstrated "the transformational power" of the enlargement policy (Council of Ministers 2011b; European Commission 2011a; European Council 2011d). In the words of the President of the European Council, it "reconfirmed" the EU's founding values and proved that, "through hard work", EU membership was within reach; he also stated that the future of the whole Western Balkans was in the EU (Van Rompuy 2011a). An analysis of these discourses shows that, for EU institutions, Croatia's accession process represented an opportunity to reconfirm and (re)produce EU identity (among others by confirming the EU's values) and demonstrate the EU's continued appeal; but also to reconfirm the identity of the Western Balkans as an area under EU purview.

This was also noticeable in enlargement discourses on the Western Balkans as a whole. In its conclusions, the Council repeated its "unequivocal commitment" to the European perspective of the Western Balkans which it saw as "essential" for stability in the region, and that, by fulfilling the conditions in the framework of the Copenhagen criteria and the stabilisation and association process, these countries "should achieve candidate status", with EU membership as the final goal; while the Commission noted that the accession process with the Western Balkans and Turkey gave the EU "greater interest and influence" in the Mediterranean, Black Sea as well as Danube regions (Council of Ministers 2010c; 2011b; 2012a; 2013b; European Commission 2010b). These discourses moreover again connected enlargement to EU foreign policy objectives.

Montenegro was the first of the remaining Western Balkans countries to progress in its status. In December 2011, the European Council (2011f) tasked the Council to examine Montenegro's progress in implementation of reforms, particularly regarding the rule of law and fundamental rights. In June 2012, the Council decided that Montenegro had progressed enough with regard to the Copenhagen political criteria to start accession negotiations, but that Montenegro should continue with the reforms during the negotiations (Council of Ministers 2012b); accession negotiations were opened by the European Council (2012b) in the end of June. Thus, in the negotiations with both Croatia as well as Montenegro, EU institutions focused on the principled issues of consolidating fundamental EU values, notably the rule of law.

The processes with Kosovo and Serbia were connected to each other as the EU conditioned the progress of both with significant improvements in their mutual relations. Also, in the case of Serbia, the Council underlined the importance of its full cooperation with the ICTY to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria (Council of Ministers 2010c; 2010d). Serbia submitted its membership application in December 2009 (Council of Ministers 2010c). In June 2011, the European Council (2011d) welcomed the transfer to the ICTY by Serbia of Ratko Mladić, accused of war crimes during the war in Bosnia. But the biggest breakthrough in Serbia's progress came in 2011 when the Commission recommended that, in view of the agreements reached in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, Serbia should be granted candidate status; in the end of that year the Council noted the importance of dialogue for EU perspective of Serbia as well as Kosovo (Council of Ministers 2011b; European Commission 2011b). In February 2012, the Council recommended granting Serbia candidate status (which was granted by the European Council in March 2012), and took note of the Commission's intention to launch a feasibility study on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Kosovo (the study, conducted later that year, found that agreement by EU member states was not necessary for the conclusion of SAA; Council of Ministers 2012c; European Commission 2012a). In June 2013, the European Council (2012b) decided to open accession negotiations with Serbia as well as negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo. In the cases of Kosovo and Serbia, it can therefore be noted that the EU actively used the prospect of these countries nearing the EU to stabilise their bilateral relations; and that EU discourses were in line with actual practice/ policy implementation, as they were also for other Western Balkans countries.

The last Western Balkans country to progress in its status in the period observed was Albania; in December 2013, in view of granting Albania candidate status, the Council decided to examine its implementation of anti-corruption and judicial reforms (Council of Ministers 2013b). Candidate status was granted by the Council and endorsed by the European Council in June 2014, while the importance of continued dialogue between Albanian government and opposition was underlined (*ibid.* 2014a; European Commission 2014a). Thus, with regard to Albania, Kosovo and Serbia, discourse and practice of EU institutions in the context of enlargement again focused on principled issues that were related to key EU values, but also and in connection to stabilisation (and thus implicitly contributed to the (re)production of the idea of EU identity through the setting and monitoring of the conditions for partnership/ accession).

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) represented special cases in that their status did not change in the period 2009-2014. Regarding FYROM, the Commission noted in its 2012 Communication on enlargement that FYROM fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria as of 2009 and that the Commission (2012a) has been recommending opening accession negotiations with it since then but that the dispute over FYROM's name with Greece remained unresolved. However, in its Conclusions, the Council only underlined the importance of finding a "mutually accepted solution to the name issue", noted the Commission's recommendation and decided to return to this issue (Council of Ministers 2013b). In effect, this meant that FYROM, despite fulfilling the benchmarks, could not progress to candidate status because of the name issue.

BiH was a different case as it did not progress due to internal political disarray. In its discourse, the Council repeated its "unequivocal commitment" to BiH's territorial integrity "as a sovereign and united country" as well as to its EU perspective; but underlined the importance of fulfilling the political criteria, including through the formation of government at every level, implementation of Sejdić-Finci ruling of European Court of Human Rights (which found that also people of Roma and Jewish ethnicities were eligible for highest state functions) and discontinuation of divisive rhetoric by BiH politicians (Council of Ministers 2011c; 2012a; 2013b; 2013c; 2014b). Towards the end of the period observed, the Council noted a "lack of political will" in BiH regarding its EU integration process, as a number of meetings between BiH and EU representatives could not take place due to internal political disagreements (Council of Ministers 2013b; 2014b). At the same time, the Council highlighted the role of the EU in BiH, through EU Special Representative and CSDP missions, assisting BiH in approaching the EU (*ibid.*). Thus, although there was no progress in the process of BiH's EU integration in the period observed, the Council expended a considerable amount of discourse to express its views on BiH, focusing on upholding key principles of the post-Cold War order in Europe (such as territorial integrity), EU values as well as EU connection with and its presence in BiH.

As mentioned, Turkey was treated separately in EU enlargement discourses. To analyse, on Turkey as a candidate country, the discourses of the Council and the Commission emphasized the importance of fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria, particularly regarding fundamental rights and freedoms (Turkey embarked on a reform of its constitution in 2010 to bring it closer to EU standards which was welcomed by the Commission), and consistently drew attention to the lack of progress in normalisation of relations between Turkey and Cyprus (Council of Ministers 2009f; 2010b; 2011b; 2012a; 2013b; European

Commission 2010b; 2014a). At the same time, particularly from 2011 on, Turkey also began to be seen as “a key partner” and even “a strategic partner” (e.g. Council of Ministers 2011b; European Commission 2014a). This was related to Turkey as “an important regional player” in the Middle East and Southern Caucasus regarding among others energy supply and cooperation on migration issues, and starting with 2011 also regarding the developments in the EU’s “neighbourhood”, particularly Syria, but also Ukraine (Council of Ministers 2009f; 2011b; 2012a; 2013b; European Commission 2014a). European Commission (2010b) stated that if Turkey developed its “role *in its own region*” complementary to the accession process, this could give both Turkey and the EU “greater weight in world affairs” (emphasis added). Moreover since 2010, Turkey has been the only acceding country to have been repeatedly encouraged “to develop its *foreign policy* as a complement to and in coordination with the EU” (Council of Ministers 2010b; 2011b; European Commission 2014a; emphasis added). To sum up, on the one hand, Turkey was seen as belonging to a region different than Europe and a strategic partner, while on the other, its accession process was used as a means of bringing its foreign policy in line with that of the EU. In practice, its accession process was slow and the Council specifically highlighted the occasion of opening of one of the negotiating chapters (Council of Ministers 2013d; 2013e). Considering EU discourses related to Turkey’s integration process, we can thus find that, while, with Western Balkans countries, the EU focused on upholding its values and principles, Turkey was perhaps more important for it from the perspective of its strategic interests. Also, discourse and practice of EU institutions regarding Turkey have been evolving in step with the changing circumstances of world politics, particularly regarding the developments in the EU’s “neighbourhood”<sup>78</sup> (as EU institutions have developed regular dialogue with Turkey on related issues such as migration; *cf. ibid.*).

Regarding Iceland, the European Council (2010c) noted in June 2010 that Iceland fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and decided to open accession negotiations which began in July 2010 (Council of Ministers 2010b). In December 2011, the Council found that accession negotiations brought “solid results” and that Iceland’s preparedness with regard to EU *acquis* was high due to Iceland’s membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Schengen Agreement (Council of Ministers 2011a). However, after general elections in Iceland in April 2013 the Icelandic Government informed the EU in May 2013 of its decision to put accession negotiations on hold (Council of Ministers 2013b; European Commission

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<sup>78</sup> The word »neighbourhood” has been put in brackets as it refers to the EU's concept of its neighbourhood which will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

2014a). By this time, Iceland began to address the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 and doubts were arising over EU accession process which could affect key sectors of Icelandic economy such as fisheries. Nevertheless, the Council underlined that Iceland's membership was "a matter of mutual benefit" and expressed its readiness to continue the negotiations; and the European Commission (2014a) continued to include Iceland in its annual Communications on enlargement.

Regarding the analysis above, it can be observed that EU institutions grouped the countries included in the enlargement process in consideration of the regional and even geopolitical aspect (the case of Turkey, for example), and according to the EU's (strategic) interests. Also, in general, for the period 2009-2014, it can be observed that enlargement retained its significance for the EU in terms of the (re)production of EU identity and pursuit of EU foreign policy objectives; and even acquired new meanings with regard to the evolving context of world politics. However, the changing context of world politics was mostly reflected in the aims which were pursued in the already existing negotiating frameworks, most clearly with regard to discourse; new practice mostly included discussing issues in the neighbourhood within enlargement negotiations and did not imply, for example, including a new group of countries in the enlargement process or reconceptualising the whole idea of enlargement.

Therefore, on enlargement in the period 2009-2014, it would be difficult to speak about true flexibility or openness of EU foreign policy; also taking into account that Turkey was othered, to some degree, as it was seen as belonging more to Turkey's own or even Middle Eastern region than to Europe. Moreover, while present throughout the previous enlargements, the repetition of the signifier and the narrative of a "united Europe" was conspicuously absent in the period 2009-2014. This might testify of a dwindling strength of EU enlargement policy in practice despite discursive declarations about its importance. In turn, this might imply that strategic action within EU foreign policy was moving from the area of enlargement to other areas (such as the neighbourhood).

Considering this, particularly with regard to the evolving context of world politics in the vicinity of the EU (in North Africa, the Middle East and beyond the EU's Eastern borders), a deconstructive reflection might be significant for EU foreign policy. This is because a deconstructive reversal of the discourses analysed above asks what would happen if the countries which were included in the enlargement process (Western Balkans countries, or Turkey) would abandon enlargement with the EU and instead decided to either form their own association or to associate with an actor other than the EU or with another group of

countries. This happened in the case of Iceland which decided to continue on its own after it began to address the consequences of the financial crisis. Such reflections were becoming necessary towards the end of the period observed when it could be noticed that the Council was considering enlargement much less often, but was becoming more and more occupied with the developments in the “neighbourhood”, which are analysed in the following section.

#### 3.4.4 Neighbourhood

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) originated in the approach the EU devised to the countries that would surround it to the East and South following the fifth enlargement in 2004. It was introduced in European Commission (2003) Communication “Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood” which stated the EU should develop a “friendly neighbourhood”, a “ring of friends” with which it would have peaceful and cooperative relations. Importantly, this Communication mentioned the idea of enlargement in relation to the “neighbourhood”: while stating the EU would offer its neighbours a stake in its internal market, it was found that the question of membership “has been ruled out” with regard to “non-European Mediterranean partners”, but that other cases remained “open”, however, new forms of relationships were not planned in the medium term (*ibid.*, 4–5). Already this earliest discourse on neighbourhood policy implicitly equated European identity with the idea of EU identity, which was of crucial significance from the perspective of different aspects of the neighbourhood policy (but also enlargement policy), as shown in the analysis below.

The neighbourhood policy was incorporated in the Treaty of Lisbon whose Article 7a provided that the EU would develop “a special relationship with neighbouring countries”, or as the French version stated, “des relations privilégiées, en vue d’établir *un espace* de prospérité et de bon voisinage, *fondé sur les valeurs de l’Union*” (emphases added; Eur-lex 2016). In other words, from Article 7a of the French version of the Treaty of Lisbon it can be seen that the EU intended to establish an area of good neighbourliness around itself based on its values. This discourse, which established the EU as the dominant partner in the envisioned relationship with its neighbouring countries, has represented the basis for the development of the EU’s policy towards these countries since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.

Since approximately that time, also, the EU’s neighbourhood policy has been divided into Eastern and Southern dimensions. The Eastern dimension, or “Eastern partnership” (EaP), has included relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and has been elaborated in a Commission Communication in December 2008 and launched at the first EaP Summit in May 2009 in Prague (European Council 2009f; Joint Staff Working Paper



2011). The Southern dimension that originated in the Barcelona process that began in 1995 and was re-launched in 2008 in the form of the Union for the Mediterranean has included relations with countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia; European Commission 2011c; EEAS 2016).

As mentioned, the relations with these countries have been handled by the EU via its conception of European neighbourhood which contains a key valorization (*cf.* Greimas 1977). Firstly, this conception categorises the diverse countries around the EU as “neighbourhood” i.e. from the perspective of the EU the distinguishing characteristic of these countries is that they are *its neighbours*. Secondly, in categorising these countries using the adjective of “*European* neighbourhood” an element of ownership is involved; in sum, the policy that is described using the verb “neighbourhood” and the adjective “European” locates the countries concerned on the periphery of the EU, but foresees, at the same time, that they should gravitate towards the EU. Thus, from the perspective of the (re)production of the idea of EU identity, the phrase “European neighbourhood” was a *speech act* through which these countries were (re)produced (or *alter-cast*) as European neighbourhood (*cf.* Van Houtum and Boedeltje 2011). At the same time, the EU *cast* itself as the main object of attraction in the locale encompassing what it saw as its neighbourhood. The conception of the European neighbourhood is nevertheless used hereafter because it was used in EU discourses.

Important changes on a world-political scale have been occurring in the EU’s neighbourhood in 2009-2014. In 2011, many countries in North Africa and the Middle East, starting with Tunisia, have been engulfed in popular uprisings dubbed “Arab Spring”; from 2013-2014, in the aftermath of these uprisings particularly in Syria, this led to spread of radical religious movements. Also, from 2013-2014, popular uprisings have taken place in Ukraine that have been connected to its relationship with the EU. Thus, due to the density of events in these countries in 2009-2014, the analysis in this part will look at the related developments within EU foreign policy consecutively, as they were occurring.

In 2009-2010, the EU was focused on developing its relationship with its Eastern neighbours. It began negotiations on a new Association Agreement with Moldova in January 2010 (Council of Ministers 2011d). In October, the Council acknowledged Moldova’s “European aspirations” and expressed support for its efforts towards “political association and economic integration” with the EU; more concretely, Moldova was granted macro-financial assistance and economic advice to implement reforms that would enable it to start negotiations with the EU on a “deep and comprehensive free trade area” (DCFTA; *ibid.*

2010e). The explicit acknowledgement of Moldova's *European aspirations* was crucial taking into account that previous EU foreign policy discourses (as observed in the previous analytical studies) equated EU identity with European identity, at least on a political level.

The same approach was used for three South Caucasus countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: the Council authorised the start of negotiations with them on new Association Agreements to replace their EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in May 2010; the negotiations began in July 2010 (Council of Ministers 2011d). The Council's discourse stated it wanted to establish "political association" and "gradual economic integration" of these countries with the EU, including DCFTAs, once the countries "have met the necessary conditions"; but also that this required "active engagement" by the countries and their "commitment to shared values and principles" (*ibid.* 2010c). The emphasis of the EU's conditions and (shared) values and principles was important from the perspective of EU identity construction, as it firstly (re)produced the identity of the EU on the basis of these principles and as a European identity, and secondly, also the identity of the neighbouring countries concerned was *cast* as converging on those values and principles (while, in addition, for Eastern neighbourhood countries, their European qualities – choices and aspirations – were highlighted).

From the three countries, Georgia was the focus of EU interest: the Prime Minister and President of Georgia visited the President of the European Council in Brussels in March and November 2010; on these occasions, the President of the European Council underlined EU support to Georgia's "sovereignty and territorial integrity", EU expectation for Russia to honour the ceasefire in Georgia, as well as importance of EU CSDP Monitoring Mission in Georgia, and stated that the EU had "strategic interest" in the stability of its Eastern neighbourhood (Van Rompuy 20101d; 2010e).

With Ukraine, the EU was already in the negotiation stage on an Association Agreement that would include DCFTA; discourses of EU institutions showed that these negotiations were of considerable importance to the EU. In February 2010, the Council of Ministers (2010b) discussed measures that the EU could offer Ukraine "in return for implementing internal reforms". In March 2010, European Council President met the newly appointed Ukrainian President Yanukovich in Brussels and spoke about Ukraine as EU partner "of strategic importance", and of the importance of "rapid conclusion" of the negotiations in the context of Ukraine's "political association and economic integration with the EU" (Van Rompuy 2010f). Van Rompuy travelled to Kyiv in July 2010, and met Ukrainian President again in Brussels in September 2010; after the meeting, he stated that

Ukraine was “a European country”, that the Free Trade Agreement with it would be the most developed agreement of this kind “the EU has ever concluded”, and noted the importance of Russia as a “strategic partner” for Ukraine and the EU (*ibid.* 2010g).

With regard to the analysis above, a number of common features of EU discourses and practices regarding the countries of Eastern neighbourhood can be noted, including their connection to enlargement. The discourses mentioned the “European choice” of the countries concerned and spoke about their “political association and economic integration” with the EU, under the condition that these countries implement reforms in the context of negotiations on Association Agreements. Thus, in comparison to the enlargement discourses in the period 2009-2014 (analysed in the previous section), the relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours included two of the three main rhetorical elements related to enlargement, i.e. conditions set by the EU and their acceptance and fulfilment by the countries concerned; but, instead of the prospect of enlargement, political association and economic integration were offered. Eastern neighbourhood discourse was the closest to enlargement discourse with regard to Ukraine which was characterized by EU discourses as a “European country” (which was important considering that previous EU foreign policy discourses have habitually equated European identity with EU identity). In practice, negotiations took place which included financial support and advice by the EU, and in the case of Georgia the EU CSDP mission. With regard to the context of world politics, the EU noted the importance of Russia for its relations with Georgia as well as Ukraine, and mentioned the strategic importance of both of these countries for the EU.

These features of EU discourse and practice were connected to the *modus operandi* of EU neighbourhood policy. In 2010, European Commission (2010c) published a Communication and the Council adopted conclusions on ENP (Council of Ministers 2010g). The countries concerned were seen as being of “strategic importance” to the EU (Council of Ministers 2010g). However ENP was devised as a partnership of “more for more”: the more the countries concerned would engage, including by implementing reforms, the more the EU would respond to them; the progress of the partnerships would depend on how “willing” the countries concerned were to undertake reforms (Council of Ministers 2011g; European Commission 2011c). But, at the same time, it was noted by the Council already in 2010 that “unresolved conflicts in the neighbourhood” hampered reform efforts by ENP countries (*ibid.*). This showed that, although it handled countries of strategic importance to the EU, ENP did not contain a reflection on the issue of addressing the conflicts in these countries and

was based on a presupposition that, for these countries, undertaking reforms that would bring them on a course closer to the EU was solely a matter of choice.

In the beginning of 2011, a series of uprisings cascaded in the countries of Southern neighbourhood following self-immolation of Tunisian salesman Mohammed Bouazizi in December 2010 in Tunis and his death in January 2011. The EU was unprepared for these developments; for example, Commission Communication on ENP of 2010 reported that Association Agreement with Syria was “ready for signature” (European Commission 2010c).

As the events progressed, the European Council, the Council and the High Representative made numerous declarations; for the purposes of discourse analysis, these declarations are condensed here to their key messages. Firstly, in the beginning of 2011, the EU expressed support to demonstrators in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East: the European Council (2011a; 2011b) “saluted” the expressions of their aspirations by Tunisian and Egyptian people, and “democratic uprisings” as well as preparations in Tunisia and Morocco for reforms were seen as bringing “new hope” to Southern neighbourhood; at the same time, declaratory verbs were used with regard to rising violence, as the European Council “condemned” and expressed “deep concern” regarding repression of protests in Egypt and Libya, and “called on” the parties to engage in dialogue (*ibid.*). The European Council (2011a; 2011b), the Council (2011c; 2011e) as well as the High Representative (2011b; 2011c) saw the uprisings as processes of “democratic *transition*” (emphasis added; this was a term reminiscent of the transitions in the CEECs in the period 1988-1992). The European Council (2011a; 2011b) decided the EU would support the “transition processes” through a new “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” for Southern neighbourhood that would entail political cooperation, deeper economic integration and more market access, but based on the condition that the countries would undertake political and economic reforms i.e. progress “towards transformation”. The Council (Council of Ministers 2011e) and the High Representative (2011b; 2011c) compared this explicitly to the transition processes in Central and Eastern Europe “two decades ago”, and the High Representative saw the support for reforms as a “positive conditionality”; he added that, “/a/s long as a club has candidate members, it is on the right track” (this statement will be discussed in the end of this section; *cf.* Wæver 1998). Along these lines, in terms of concrete engagement, the High Representative travelled to Tunisia and Egypt; it was also decided that talks would begin with Tunisia for its “advanced status” within ENP, and an offer was made for a humanitarian assistance CSDP mission to Libya (European Council 2011a; 2011b; Council of Ministers 2011c; 2011e).

In this manner, regarding the above analysis, EU response to the developments in the beginning of 2011 in Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia but also Syria was put in the context of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Also, through these early responses by the EU, an *analogy* was established between the processes that were beginning in these countries, and the transition processes that took place in the CEECs in the period 1988-1992. Discourses on this functioned as a lens through which the events in the Southern neighbourhood were interpreted as familiar and manageable, provided the countries in which the uprisings were taking place would proceed with political and economic reforms, as foreseen by EU responses. But it could also be seen that the EU did not have an impact on the developments, since it produced declaratory verbs with regard to the rising violence in some of these countries; also, the actions the EU was taking were not aimed towards addressing the rising violence and conflicts but towards supporting (its vision of) reforms.

As the violence in Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen continued towards spring and summer 2011, EU discourses continued using declaratory verbs, expressing “utmost concern”, condemning the violence and urging the parties to engage in dialogue, while on the other hand, “democratic transformation” and constitutional reforms in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia were welcomed (European Council 2011c; 2011d). In terms of concrete engagement, the EU implemented UN sanctions (flight ban and restrictive measures) towards Gaddafi regime in Libya, and readiness was again expressed to conduct a CSDP mission for humanitarian support; regarding Syria, activities for bilateral cooperation including on Association Agreement were suspended, and EU restrictive measures towards the regime in Syria were adopted including suspension of European Investment Bank loans (Council of Ministers 2011f; European Council 2011c). With regard to addressing the conflict in Libya, however, the European Council (2011c) stated that, “in finding a political solution to the crisis”, Arab countries, in particular Arab League, had “the key role”. It thus did not consider the EU as having a role in addressing this conflict in its Southern neighbourhood.

By June 2011, a reviewed southern branch of ENP was elaborated as a central element of EU response to the changes in its Southern neighbourhood. A Joint Communication (2011a) was published by the Commission and the High Representative in March on a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the countries of Southern Mediterranean, and another one in May 2011 (Joint Communication 2011b). The events unfolding in these countries were seen as being of “historic proportions”, and it was found the EU should support the transformations, as a “strategic option”, and due to its “own experience of democratic transitions” in Southern Europe and the CEECs (Joint Communication 2011a;

2011b). The Joint Communications stated that reforms should be supported based on the principles of partnership and conditionality (i.e. consolidating democracy and the rule of law); at the same time, it was found that “protracted conflicts” in a “number of partner countries” represented “a serious security challenge” to the region (*ibid.*). Based on these Communications, the Council decided that, on the condition that they reformed, Southern neighbourhood countries that were “willing and able” would be offered political association and negotiations on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) that could lead towards integration with EU internal market, as well as visa facilitation and increased EU financial support (Council of Ministers 2011g).

Thus, through the revision of ENP in response to the shifts in Southern neighbourhood in the first half of 2011, the main thrust of EU response in practice was to introduce the ENP approach that was already in place for the countries of Eastern neighbourhood (political association and negotiations in the direction of integration of the countries concerned in EU internal market) also for the countries of its Southern neighbourhood, under the condition that they would pursue reforms. This was done with reference to past democratic transformations in Europe (Southern Europe, the CEECs); however, in the case of Southern neighbourhood countries, there was no hint by the EU that enlargement with them might be an option, as was the case with the countries of Eastern neighbourhood (and EU discourses also did not mention “European choice” in relation to Southern neighbourhood countries as they did for Eastern neighbourhood countries; EU identity in the case of these countries was thus implicitly (re)produced mainly through the setting of the conditions for closer association by the EU). Also, a contradiction was inherent in the policy that was being conceived: the Council stated that closer relations would be developed with those Southern neighbourhood countries that were “able and willing” to do this (Council of Ministers 2011g). This approach did not take into account a key finding of the Joint Communication of May 2011 (2011b) that conflicts were affecting a number of these countries, which would probably not be able to pursue the reforms that represented the main condition for political association and economic integration with the EU until the conflicts troubling them were addressed.

In line with the orientations of the reviewed ENP, the EU stepped up its cooperation with Tunisia; following democratic elections in October 2011, it began a dialogue on migration with Tunisia and increased its financial support, subject to further reforms by Tunisia (Council of Ministers 2011h; European Council 2011e). The situation was different with Syria: while welcoming Syrian opposition’s efforts and condemning the regime’s actions, the EU took restrictive measures against the regime and expressed readiness to

develop a new partnership with Syria once President Assad stepped down (Council of Ministers 2011h; 2011i; 2012a). On resolving the conflict, the EU called on the Syrian regime to comply with a Plan of Action that was developed by the League of Arab States in late 2011, repeatedly urged “all members of the United Nations Security Council to assume their responsibilities” regarding the situation in Syria, and pressed internationally for stronger UN action (Council of Ministers 2011h; 2011i; European Council 2011e; 2011f). After the death of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, the EU established its delegation in Libya in November 2011; however, its offer of a CSDP mission in Libya was not taken up – a UN mission was established in 2011, and the EU participated in Libya’s needs assessment with the UN (Council of Ministers 2011h; 2011i; 2012d).

These developments in the countries of the EU’s Southern neighbourhood showed that the EU depended on circumstances (of world politics and on the ground) that were beyond its control if it wanted to be an actor or engage in practice. The EU engaged with Tunisia after democratic elections took place. Regarding Syria, EU discourse pointed to the dependence of the situation in Syria, and thus also of potential EU engagement, on the circumstances of world politics, that is UNSC (in)action, as well as on the ground. Also, following Gaddafi’s death, the EU was not able to engage in Libya independently but did so in cooperation with the UN.

Although its main focus of attention was in the South in 2011, the EU also engaged with the countries of Eastern neighbourhood. An Eastern partnership summit with these countries took place in Warsaw in September 2011, where the EU acknowledged “European aspirations and European choice of some partners” (Van Rompuy 2011d; this was in contrast with EU discourses on its Southern neighbours). The EU expressed support to its Eastern partners if they pursued genuine reforms, and mentioned its vision of “a democratic Belarus” in the context of Eastern partnership (*ibid.*). With Ukraine, negotiations on its Association Agreement were finalised (*ibid.* 2011e).

In 2012, the European Council (2012a) defined EU orientations for further engagement in Southern neighbourhood: among others, it emphasized that EU support to these countries would be matched with “the level of democratic reform” while support would be reconsidered in cases of oppression and systematic violations of human rights. Syria was a case in point: with regard to the conflict in Syria, the European Council expressed support to the efforts of the League of Arab States and UN Special Envoy, and repeatedly called on all members of the UNSC “particularly Russia and China” to act together (*ibid.* 2012a; 2012b; 2012c). Apart from discourse, in practice, the EU provided humanitarian assistance to Syria (*ibid.* 2012c).

This approach was in line with ENP as delineated in Joint Communication on ENP prepared by the Commission and the High Representative in May 2012 (Joint Communication 2012, 3 and 4), which reinstated the policy of “more for more” for Southern neighbourhood countries – “only those partners willing” to pursue political reforms would be offered “the most rewarding aspects” of ENP i.e. the prospect of integration in EU internal market, visa facilitation and financial assistance. With regard to resolving the conflicts in these countries, the Communication (*ibid.*, 8) saw “/t/he main *responsibility*” lying with “the conflicting parties” without whose agreement “international mediation efforts” could not be expected to succeed; “*conversely*”, the Communication stated, the EU stood “ready” to support “implementation of settlements *once* they have been agreed” (emphases added). This analysis of the developing EU response to the crises in what it saw as its Southern neighbourhood shows that EU discourse produced a *binary opposition* between addressing the conflicts (which was not seen as within EU purview), and implementation of peace settlements with regard to which the EU expressed its readiness for assistance, through the developing ENP. Therefore, not only was EU approach to the turbulences in its Southern neighbourhood modelled on its approaches towards the democratising CEECs in the 1990s and the EU-aspiring countries in its Eastern neighbourhood; it also closely resembled EU foreign policy approach to the Middle East (as analysed in the first case study), particularly regarding the EU’s declared readiness to assist in *implementing* peace and its avoidance of a potential role of an actor that would be involved in a significant manner in addressing these conflicts. In effect, to use the terminology related to the analysis of identities from the introduction, through its discourses on its Southern neighbourhood, EU identity in world politics was thus implicitly *cast* as one of an actor who did not carry responsibility with regard to resolving these conflicts.

In practice, with regard to the situation in Syria, the Council adopted further restrictive measures against the regime in 2012 and urged the international community to do so too (e.g. Council of Ministers 2012e). It declared the EU’s intention to remain in contact with the UN and relevant regional organisations to provide “a forum for coordinating their action on Syria”, and in view of the UNSC’s inability to act, welcomed a resolution on Syria that was adopted by the UNGA in February 2012 and co-sponsored by all EU member states (*ibid.* 2012f). In April 2012, it welcomed the adoption of UNSC Resolutions dispatching observers to Syria and offered its support “that might be requested” to guarantee the mission’s success (*ibid.* 2012g). By the end of 2012, direct contact with Syrian opposition was established – the Council held an exchange of views with the President of National Coalition for Syrian



Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in December 2012 (*ibid.* 2012h). This pattern of indirect engagement resembled EU practice in the case of the Middle East (first case study), as it did not directly pertain to addressing the conflict but to supporting and facilitating other actors' efforts for conflict resolution. Also, EU discourse expressed readiness for direct engagement which was however not taken up on the level of world politics. Regarding overall EU practice towards the countries of its Southern neighbourhood, there were indications by the end of 2012 that it was not as effective as initially intended, as CFSP report for 2012 noted the "EU laid down stepping stones for renewed partnerships" but that progress was uneven "as partners were sometimes reluctant to embrace" EU offer or were "unable or unwilling" to pursue the reforms required by the EU (Council of Ministers 2013f).

In 2013, the EU moved to conclude the negotiations with key Eastern neighbours on the new Association Agreements. In relation to new EU financial framework 2014-2020, the European Council (2013a; 2013f) called for finalisation of the Agreements the EU was negotiating with Armenia, Georgia and Moldova by the time of Eastern partnership summit that was to take place in November and where they could be initialled, and expressed EU commitment to signing the Agreement with Ukraine. In January, the Council acknowledged again the "European aspirations and the European choice" of some Eastern partners, and noted this partnership was dedicated to supporting "those who seek an ever closer relationship with the EU" (Council of Ministers 2013g). If we analyse this discourse, the signifiers of "European aspirations" and "European choice" which have been repeated a number of times by the Council as well as the European Council had the discursive role of *substitutes* – they were used in EU discourses *instead of* other signifiers that might have been interpreted as implying enlargement, and their use in EU discourses has been specific to the countries of Eastern neighbourhood, signifying a liminal position of these countries as neither third countries nor candidates for accession. (On the other hand, and from the perspective of EU identity construction, for Southern neighbourhood countries, signifiers that would imply European qualities were not used at all by EU discourses.) From an operational perspective, the Council (*ibid.*) reiterated that intensity of cooperation with these countries depended on the pace of their reforms, and mentioned Ukraine which needed to show progress with regard to compliance of its 2012 parliamentary elections with democratic standards before its Association Agreement could be signed.

By October 2013, the Council's discourse became more urgent, as it emphasized the importance of taking relations with Eastern partners "to a new stage" with regard to the Agreements; and stressed, in this context, that the countries concerned were "free to make

own choices”, that DCFTAs were not directed towards “any other third country” but that they were also “not compatible” with a customs union with a third country, and that “pressures exerted by Russia” on Eastern partnership countries were “unacceptable” (Council of Ministers 2013h). This discourse testified to a strained relationship with Russia towards the end of 2013 in the wake of concluding the negotiations on the new Agreements with Eastern partners. The High Representative stated during his visit to Saint Petersburg in September 2013 that these agreements needed not be a case of “either/ or” (Van Rompuy 2013a). Also in September, the European Parliament (2013a) adopted a resolution “on the pressure exerted by Russia on Eastern partnership countries” in which it mentioned that Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine were facing sanctions and threats aimed at forcing them not to sign the Association Agreements and to join a Customs Union with Russia that would later be transformed into a Eurasian Union, and called on the Commission and the EEAS to take action.

At Eastern partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013, the Association Agreements with Georgia and Moldova were initialled, and the European Council (2013g) expressed readiness to sign them by the end of August 2014. On the other hand, such an agreement was not initialled with Armenia which declared it would join the customs union with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, while negotiations continued with Azerbaijan (European Commission 2014b). Also in November, Ukrainian President Yanukovich announced Ukraine was abandoning its pursuit of the Association Agreement with the EU, and following this, protests (so-called Euromaidan) erupted in Ukraine. As a reaction to this, a Joint Statement was adopted by European Council and Commission Presidents that stated the EU was aware of “the external pressure” on Ukraine, that EU offer of the Association Agreement and DCFTA remained, and that the EU was “ready to clarify to the Russian Federation” the common benefits of the agreement (Van Rompuy 2013b). The developments in 2013 with regard to what the EU constructed as its Eastern neighbourhood thus demonstrated how EU foreign policy (in the form of ENP) was delimited to the East by the circumstances of world politics, in this case through its own and the concerned third countries’ relationships with (another) key power of the emerging world. Also, considering this (and bearing in mind the deliberate non-definition of European identity by EU institutions in the case study on enlargement), Ukraine could be seen as the case and area where the question of the definition of European or EU identity was being decided in practice.

Regarding Southern neighbourhood, EU discourse and practice developed the ENP approach further in 2013: the European Council (2013a) saw the EU and Southern Mediterranean countries as sharing a “common neighbourhood” and interests, and stated the

EU would engage in “mutually beneficial partnership” with the objective of “closer political association” and “economic integration” founded on universal values (including gender equality) with these countries. This discourse repeated the key elements of previous EU discourses on Southern neighbourhood, the signifiers of “closer political association” and deeper “economic integration”. The logic of signifiers referring to association that were used as *substitutes* (instead of signifiers that might imply enlargement) thus also applied to the Southern neighbourhood countries; however, the signifiers that were used for them set these countries apart from Eastern neighbourhood countries, whose “European aspirations” and “European choice” were explicitly acknowledged, while only “closer political association” and “economic integration” were emphasized for Southern neighbourhood countries. In addition, one value in particular was added to the values the EU was promoting in its neighbourhood with regard to the South: gender equality. The ENP approach for the South was implemented in the case of Morocco with which the EU began to negotiate a DCFTA and signed a mobility partnership in 2013 (European Commission 2014b).

The situation in Syria worsened further in 2013; the EU (Council of Ministers 2013c; 2013g; 2013i) expressed its concern using declarative verbs (such as “condemns”, “is appalled”) and with regard to involvement of extremist and foreign fighters, and use of chemical weapons by the regime, welcoming UNSC measures on this. On resolving the conflict, the EU (*ibid.*; Joint Communication 2013) supported efforts by UN Special Envoy and Secretary-General, welcomed “US/ Russia efforts to revive political negotiations”, and promoted the idea of a peace conference. From its side, it expressed readiness “to provide all support” for a settlement; however, on the ground, its main role was as the biggest donor of humanitarian assistance (Joint Communication 2013; Van Rompuy 2013c). The situation also deteriorated in Egypt where protests erupted again and President Mohammed Morsi was removed from power in July 2013; the EU decided to review its assistance to Egypt under its Association Agreement and to suspend exports to Egypt of equipment that might be used for repression (Council of Ministers 2013j). Moreover the security situation in Libya was unstable; however, in this case, the EU was able to act, through financial assistance, among others to reduce illicit small arms trade, and through establishment of a CSDP Border Assistance Mission with the objective of capacity building (EUBAM Libya; *ibid.* 2013a; 2013k). With regard to implementation of EU foreign policy in practice in its Southern neighbourhood, the EU therefore depended on the circumstances on the ground and efforts for peace by (other) key actors on the level of world politics, including the US, Russia, and the

UN, since this was a precondition for its own actions which encompassed the development of its relations with Southern neighbourhood countries within the framework of ENP.

In 2014, a large portion of EU foreign policy on the neighbourhood was dedicated to Ukraine. In mid-February, protests against Ukrainian government escalated, in connection to its decision to suspend the negotiations with the EU on the Association Agreement. On 21 February, an agreement on early elections to take place in December was reached between the government and opposition, with assistance of representatives of France, Germany, Poland, EU High Representative and the Commissioner for enlargement as well as Russia (Van Rompuy 2014a). The protests in Ukraine continued and by the end of February, President Yanukovich eloped to Russia and an acting President was selected; at the same time, pro-Russian forces seized control of Ukrainian region of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and a decision was adopted by Russia to send its forces there. EU Council of Ministers (2014c) reacted by condemning this as a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and called on Russia to withdraw its forces. It decided that the EU and its member states would not cooperate at an upcoming G-8 meeting in Sochi in Russia, and reconfirmed the EU's offer to Ukraine of the Association Agreement with a DCFTA, stating this Agreement would "not constitute the final goal in EU-Ukraine cooperation" (*ibid.*). EU discourse as well as actions (the Commissioner for enlargement was included in finding a solution to the political crisis in Ukraine) showed that it saw the events in Ukraine, at least in part, also from an enlargement perspective, as well as of the idea of EU identity. In March, the Council (*ibid.* 2014d) emphasized the EU would not recognize a referendum that had been held in Crimea on joining Russia, and adopted travel restrictions and asset freeze against persons related to these actions, calling for an OSCE monitoring mission to be sent to Ukraine. From a world-political perspective, EU engagement regarding Ukraine thus implied that its relations with Russia, a key world power which was also the power closest to it geographically, were deteriorating.

On 21 March 2014, the EU and Ukraine signed the political provisions of the Association Agreement, with the remaining provisions to be signed in June, and the first meeting of EU-Ukraine political dialogue was held in April (European Council 2014a). The split of the provisions of the Association Agreement that allowed the political provisions to be signed first represented EU foreign policy innovation and demonstrated the importance the EU ascribed to accelerated political cooperation with Ukraine. In April, the Council adopted decisions on reduction or elimination of customs duties for Ukraine and macro-financial assistance to Ukraine amounting to 1 billion EUR (Council of Ministers 2014a). On Russia,

further visa bans and asset freezes were adopted, the EU decided not to hold bilateral summits with Russia, to participate at the G-7 meetings that took place without the participation of Russia, and to suspend negotiations with regard to Russia's OECD membership (European Council 2014a). European Council's discourse on Ukraine (*ibid.*) also contained a reconfirmation of the EU's objective of signing Association Agreements with Georgia and Moldova which indicated that EU relationship with Ukraine was seen within a wider context of the EU's relations with the countries to its East, i.e. in geopolitical terms. Yet, on an operational level, it was becoming clear that the EU, Russia and Ukraine were tied together in a relationship of co-dependence, as the Council of Ministers (2014e) welcomed energy talks between the three focusing on natural gas supplies that took place in May in Warsaw.

With regard to resolving the conflict in Ukraine, the EU (Council of Ministers 2014b) called for a "multilateral mechanism" through which Russia and Ukraine would engage in dialogue and in which the EU would participate. But, in fact, the US began to pronounce itself in relation to the conflict and Russia's actions already in March, and a meeting on de-escalation was held in April 2014 with the participation of the US, Russia, Ukraine and the EU.

On 27 June 2014, Association Agreements with Georgia and Moldova and the remaining provisions of the Association Agreement with Ukraine were signed in Brussels; European Council President said, on this occasion, that the Agreements represented "milestones /.../ for Europe as a whole", that they were "not the final stage of our cooperation", and that a shared goal was "full integration" of these countries into EU internal market (Van Rompuy 2014b). This discourse mentioned the goal of these countries joining the internal market, but was similar to previous EU enlargement discourses in that it alluded to the importance of the Association Agreements for *Europe as a whole*. On the other hand, the EU's relations with Russia were deteriorating further: while the European Council supported a peace plan by the Ukrainian President announced in June, with the OSCE monitoring its implementation, it noted that Russia did not take into account its request to hinder the flow of weapons and militants from Russia to Ukraine (European Council 2014b; 2014c). Restrictive measures against Russian entities supporting actions in Ukraine were adopted, and European Investment Bank was requested to suspend new financing operations in Russia (*ibid.* 2014c). The Council adopted a ban on imports from Crimea and Sevastopol (Council of Ministers 2014f). In response, Russia adopted a ban on imports of certain agricultural products from the EU in August. Nevertheless, despite mutual economic sanctions between the EU and Russia, consultations were ongoing between Russia, Ukraine

and the European Commission regarding gas supplies and questions of implementation of the free trade area to be established between the EU and Ukraine in the context of the Association Agreement (*ibid.* 2014f; 2014g). This underlined the complexity of the relations between Ukraine, Russia and the EU, as discussions on vital economic issues took place at the same time as mutual restrictions were being adopted by the EU and Russia, and as both the EU and Russia were leading antagonistic policies on Ukraine.

Efforts at conflict resolution with regard to Ukraine proceeded in the late 2014, but the EU was not involved in them. With regard to two Ukrainian separatist republics, Donetsk and Lugansk, an agreement for peace was reached in September in Minsk, Belarus, between the leaders of the republics, Ukraine and Russia with the engagement of the OSCE; the European Council (2014e) welcomed this agreement and stated the EU was “*fully engaged in support of a political solution*”, through its contribution to the OSCE, humanitarian and financial assistance to Ukraine (emphases added). The Council supported an OSCE Observer Mission that was established in Ukraine, and called for implementation of the commitment to peace and further talks in the trilateral format between the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine (Council of Ministers 2014h; 2014i). Also, the Council launched a CSDP advisory mission for civilian security sector reform in Ukraine (*ibid.*). By the end of October 2014, an agreement was reached in the talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia on winter gas supplies to Ukraine (*ibid.*).

With regard to the analysis above, it can be found the EU applied practically all the tools available within its foreign policy with regard to Ukraine in 2014. Despite this, and despite EU energy dependence on gas supplies from Ukraine and consequently from Russia, in practice, the EU was not involved in resolving the conflict; instead, this role fell to the OSCE and also the US as a counterpart of Russia. As can be seen above, EU discourses worked to magnify EU involvement in addressing the conflict. But the main role of the EU was to support efforts for resolution by other actors, to provide humanitarian and financial assistance, and to cooperate with Ukraine in the context of the Association Agreement. Therefore, in practice, the performance by the EU in terms of conflict resolution in its Eastern as well as Southern neighbourhoods was in the margins of (other) key actors in world politics; this had consequences for how the identity of the EU in world politics was seen from the outside and by those other actors.

Despite the revised ENP approach towards Southern neighbourhood, also the situation in Syria and Libya worsened in 2014. In Syria, while the government was still implementing its obligations with regard to chemical weapons in accordance with UNSC resolution, radical

groups gained advances on the ground, also in northern Iraq. The EU expressed its dismay at the situation, and deplored abuses committed by radical groups; it also called for compliance of the regime with its obligations regarding chemical weapons and underlined the seriousness of the humanitarian situation and the need for humanitarian assistance (Council of Ministers 2014b; 2014h; 2014j; European Council 2014d). With regard to countering radical movements, the European Council (2014d) emphasized the need for coordinated action “by countries from the region” and welcomed the efforts of the US and its partners. The Council (Council of Ministers 2014b) called on “those with influence on the Syrian regime to put pressure on it”, supported efforts for peace by UN Special Representative, and called on the UNSC to address the situation in Syria. The role of the EU with regard to the conflict was seen by the Council in terms of the EU as “an important actor /.../ in *post-conflict reconstruction*” and of *supporting* “all efforts for a political solution” (Council of Ministers 2014h; 2014j; emphases added). In their discourses, and from the perspective of the idea of EU identity in world politics therefore, the European Council and the Council did not conceive of the EU as an actor that could have a role in addressing the conflict; instead, other actors were called on to do this.

This was similar to EU approach to Libya in 2014, as the conflict in Libya escalated again between an elected government and the opposing factions. The EU condemned the fighting, called on the parties to engage in dialogue, and supported efforts in this direction by the UN, through UN Support Mission in Libya (UNISMIL), and UN-facilitated dialogue between the parties (Council of Ministers 2014h; European Council 2014d). The EU assisted Libya in specific sectors, including through its continued (training-oriented) CSDP Border Assistance Mission (Council of Ministers 2014h). In the view of these crises in the EU’s Southern neighbourhood, a new Joint Communication (2014) by the High Representative and the Commission recognized a need for the EU “to reflect on how” the ENP could “better respond” to these security challenges, through “additional policy instruments” and simplified and quicker “decision-making procedures for the use of CSDP instruments”.

This shows that EU institutions were aware, in the end of the period observed, that ENP as it had been set up did not represent an adequate response to the crises in the area the EU constructed as its neighbourhood. From a genealogical perspective, it might be remarked that ENP, in its key characteristics, had been set up to address the consequences of the biggest EU enlargement in the period 2002-2004. As the crises in what the EU saw as its neighbourhood escalated, the choice of ENP to address them was understandable, as it was, at the time, the only comprehensive policy the EU had in place with regard to its neighbourhood. But the

developments by 2014 showed that this policy did not address the main underlying issues in the EU's Southern neighbourhood i.e. social fissures in Southern Mediterranean countries that fostered the quick spread of Arab Spring in 2011 and led to the conflicts in many of the countries. ENP revision in 2012 assumed that, in the countries of its Southern neighbourhood, the EU would be able to address legitimate authorities as its counterparts in negotiating mutual cooperation. In reality, this was not always the case. EU foreign policy under the umbrella of ENP also saw conflict resolution in Southern Mediterranean countries as a responsibility of other actors, either in the countries concerned or in the region, or of (other) powers in world politics. This had implications also from the perspective of the idea of EU identity in world politics, as the EU has been cast, by its foreign policy discourses as well as due to the circumstances on the ground and on the level of world politics, as an actor on the margins, with key issues being decided between (other) key players. Under these circumstances, EU offer of cooperation within Association Agreements, with the envisaged free trade areas with Southern neighbourhood countries, functioned as a *figured world* the EU projected towards these countries even though it was not clear when the conditions might be in place for this vision to be realised.

In their discourses when responding to Arab Spring EU institutions used an *analogy* with EU enlargements that did not take into account that Southern European countries and the CEECs were usually already in a post-transition phase when the EU initiated formal cooperation with them; and that they had a strong incentive to keep up their reform momentum in their prospect of EU membership. This was not the case for Southern neighbourhood countries in the period 2009-2014. EU discourses mentioned their "European choice" and "European aspirations" with respect to Eastern neighbourhood countries but explicitly excluded any possibility of nearing the EU for Southern neighbourhood countries, save from their prospect of inclusion into EU internal market. There was also a difference between these two groups of countries regarding EU approach to conflict resolution: while this was mainly not seen as EU responsibility in the South, the EU explicitly offered its services with the aim of addressing the conflict a number of times in the case of Ukraine, although this was not taken up by the other key actors with regard to the conflict.

A question therefore arises with regard to the character of the policy the EU led in its neighbourhood in the period 2009-2014. This policy resembled the initial approach of enlargement with regard to the EU offer of Association Agreements and free trade areas; this was particularly visible in the East where "European aspirations" and "European choice" of the countries concerned were regularly referred to. From this perspective, the EU seemed to



have continued with its familiar approach of “concentric circles” (Wæver 1998, 99), repeating the pattern of some countries moving closer to the EU while other, new countries began to be attracted to the EU. In fact, this has been referred to by EU institutions themselves, for example the High Representative (Van Rompuy 2011b – “/a/s long as a club has candidate members, it is on the right track”). On the other hand, EU policy with regard to its neighbourhood, even more so in the South, was similar to its policy on the Middle East in the period 1975-2009 since EU discourses *supported* conflict resolution by *other* actors and expressed EU readiness to participate in *implementing* peace agreements. With regard to its Eastern neighbourhood, the EU appeared to have led a policy of maintaining or increasing its influence in the countries concerned (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). Moreover, taking into account EU discourses on the countries concerned which mentioned their “European” qualities (choices and aspirations), it also appeared that, for the EU, the idea of European or EU identity has been involved in its efforts with regard to these countries.

Perhaps, from the perspective of the conditions of world politics as the context of EU foreign policy in 2009-2014, a realisation would be needed that the countries to the East and South of the EU are *a neighbourhood* in the full sense of the word: not only the EU’s own and as seen by the EU, but also of Russia, and in Southern Mediterranean, of Arabic and African countries. Regarding this, in 2009-2014, an underlying (discursive and practical) conception of the EU as consisting of layers of concentric circles of Europeanness collided with other underlying conceptions on the level of (discourses and practices of) world politics, as the EU, through its neighbourhood policy, came into contact with (another) world power in its East, and with social and political contexts that were new to it in its South. In the period 2009-2014, EU foreign policy, as led via ENP, did not acknowledge nor reflect this.

If openness of EU foreign policy/ identity nexus is understood as a reflected change of the conception of EU identity in world politics with regard to the relevant circumstances of world politics, it can be said that, via EU neighbourhood policy in 2009-2014, EU foreign policy/ identity nexus reacted to the changes in world politics. However this reaction was not in the sense as defined here, as the EU continued to apply the patterns that had been established in its foreign policy in the period 1975-2009 to the new developments and circumstances that arose in the period 2009-2014. In particular, its neighbourhood policy combined EU foreign policy discourses and practices that have been characteristic, in the period 1975-2009, for its enlargement and Middle Eastern policies (as shown in the two preceding case studies).

### 3.4.5 Development of EU foreign policy

From 2010, an awareness of the changes in world politics was noticeable in discourses related to EU foreign policy. In September 2010, the European Council (2010d) adopted a declaration on “Relations with strategic partners” under which it discussed “/a/ changing world” as a challenge for the EU. In the declaration, it observed that the economic and financial crisis had demonstrated how Europeans depended “on external developments”, and that “new players” had emerged “with their own world views and interests” (*ibid.*). It found the EU had to be “an effective *global actor*”, sharing “*responsibility* for global security” (*ibid.*; emphases added). A main orientation in view of this was for the EU and its member states to “act more *strategically*”, in the sense of identifying their “*strategic interests*” as well as the means to achieve them (*ibid.*; emphases added). With regard to the EU’s strategic partnerships, the European Council emphasised a need for “full participation of emerging economies in the international system”, to share in the associated benefits as well as responsibilities (*ibid.*). It was also decided that strategic orientations would in future be adopted for all important international events (*ibid.*). Finally, internal arrangements on improving EU foreign policy were discussed where it was found that “synergies” needed to be developed between the EU’s and member states’ relations with third countries, including information sharing (*ibid.*), pointing to a deficiency in this area. Therefore, the European Council’s discourse revealed that the European Council endeavoured to adjust EU foreign policy to the developing circumstances of world politics. Many of the key elements of its discourse (which spoke about the EU as a global actor, sharing responsibility for global security, and saw the emerging economies as being in need of integration into the international community) were the same as in the period 1975-2009. There was one key new element in comparison to the previous period: a repetition of the adjective and adverb “strategic(ally)”. However the EU’s “strategic interests and objectives” (*ibid.*) were not defined by the European Council, and its discourse seemed to refer more to the form or *modus operandi* than to the substance of EU foreign policy.

A need for strategic directions of EU foreign policy during this period was also identified by the High Representative who remarked in September 2010 that the Copenhagen climate summit of December 2009 “was an eye-opener” to the fact that power was shifting in the world, and stated that the European Council “should define” the EU’s “strategic objectives and interests”, also mentioning that this was required by the Treaty of Lisbon (Van Rompuy 2010a; 2010b). However the European Council of September 2010 did not explicitly define the EU’s strategic interests; rather, key issues and messages for future development of EU

foreign policy were surmised by the High Representative after that European Council meeting on the basis of the debate during the meeting (*ibid.* 2010b).

In 2011, UN General Assembly (2011) adopted a Resolution (65/276) on the participation of the EU in the work of the UN which allowed EU representatives to participate as observers in UNGA work and that of its bodies. This development was in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon and strengthened EU actorness internationally. At the same time, the High Representative observed that other actors were gaining power in world politics, stating that increased political cooperation between BRICS countries was evident in the UNSC, the G-20 as well as in the climate change negotiations, and that the EU “should find a way to better engage” them; he also found that while the twentieth century was an “Atlantic century”, the twenty-first would be “a Pacific one” (Van Rompuy 2011g). He expressed his belief that the EU’s “credibility as a global player” was going to be judged by its actions in its neighbourhood; and saw the EU’s range as “limited” with regard to “hard power”, stating the EU should use its “soft power” effectively to achieve its objectives (*ibid.*). The High Representative thus used a *binary opposition* between hard and soft power in his discourse on EU foreign policy, and saw EU identity (in world politics) as that of a “soft power”.

The discourse on the EU’s “*determination to develop its role as an active player on the international scene*” was continued by the European Council (2013a; emphases added) in February 2013 as it adopted financial allocation for the budget heading “Global Europe” for EU financial perspective 2014-2020. The allocation of 58 billion EUR was made to foster EU cooperation with its partners, promote EU values abroad, allow the EU to address global challenges, and for development cooperation and support to the EU’s neighbourhood (*ibid.*). This as well as previous European Council’s discourses (2010d; 2013a) showed that the European Council continued to use the habitual signifiers describing the idea of EU identity in world politics (having a role and being a player in world politics) and to apply to them the discursive action of *différance* (*cf.* Derrida 1972/1982), as its discourse communicated that the EU still had not fulfilled itself as a global actor, and again postponed this fulfilment to an undefined future. Thus, EU identity in world politics continued to be seen or *cast* as an *ideal* that has not been achieved yet. Similarly, the High Representative observed in his address to EU Heads of Delegation in September 2013 that the events in Southern neighbourhood reminded the EU of the “*limits*” of “political and military action”, and of its influence; and, in Saint Petersburg, that these events required a reflection by Europe and the West of their power “to shape events abroad at will”, and found that the world was not multi-polar

anymore, but rather “a-polar” (Van Rompuy 2013a; 2013d; emphasis added). In his discourse, the High Representative used one half of a binary opposition (“the West”) which showed that he saw world politics in the terms of East and West, placing the EU in the West. In addition, his statement showed awareness that EU foreign policy action faced *limits* on the level of world politics.

The escalation of events in Ukraine with the end of 2013 appeared to have compelled the EU to endeavour to fully use its foreign policy; this was commented by the High Representative in April 2014 when he stated that the EU was “much more united” than some thought which was shown in its, for some, “unexpectedly strong response” to Russia with regard to Ukraine (Van Rompuy 2014c). He also stated that there was a new realisation shared by the member states that the events in Eastern neighbourhood with 2013, as well as in Southern neighbourhood, were issues “of common concern”, and felt that the EU could “build on this new sense of shared responsibility” in the future (*ibid.*). This comment by the High Representative is significant as it shows that finding consensus among the member states in the realm of EU foreign policy, firstly with regard to the question which issues were to be handled via EU foreign policy, and secondly, on a common approach to these issues, was still a main concern for EU foreign policy even in the period 2009-2014, as it had been in the beginning of EU foreign policy.

The crisis in Ukraine also seemed to have brought the member states closer in the field of EU foreign policy: the Council adopted a declaration in June 2014 on “Strategic agenda” for the EU “in times of change”, in which it discussed the EU “as a strong global actor” (Council of Ministers 2014b). In the declaration, it stated that “/r/cent events” have shown “how fast-changing the strategic and geopolitical environment” has become, and that, consequently, the EU needed to engage “its partners on issues of mutual or global interest”, and to engage more strongly in world affairs (*ibid.*). Even though it did not reflect on strategic orientations for EU foreign policy, it identified, on an operational level, four foreign policy priorities: maximising EU influence through better coherence of different EU and member state policies; being a strong partner to the neighbourhood; engaging with “global strategic partners” particularly the US; and developing security and defence cooperation and capabilities (*ibid.*). EU foreign policy discourse and practice in 2014, particularly on its neighbourhood, thus demonstrated that the EU and its member states were able to define key orientations of EU foreign policy, but in an ad hoc manner and on concrete issues (e.g. Ukraine) which were considered to be of (vital) interest to the EU. Also, the key responses

that were elaborated applied the already established policies and structures of EU foreign policy (for example neighbourhood policy and strategic partnerships).

In terms of implementation of EU foreign policy in the period 2009-2014, the focus was on the establishment and functioning of European External Action Service (EEAS) and strengthening of CSDP. The EEAS was established by a Council Decision in July 2010, with the aim of making EU external action “more coherent and efficient”, and thus increase “the EU’s influence in the world “; it began functioning on 1 December 2010 (Council of Ministers 2010g; 2011d). In 2011, the High Representative defined three internal EEAS priorities – setting it up as an institution, developing the EU’s strategic partnerships, and strengthening ENP in consideration of Arab Spring (Special Report 2014). In addition, in 2009-2014, the EEAS scored two successes: fostering the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia in the context of enlargement, and ensuring EU participation and initiative in international negotiations on Iran nuclear programme (*ibid.*). In December 2013, the Council, in a review of the EEAS, found that integrated CSDP and crisis management approaches needed to be strengthened within the EEAS and tasked the High Representative to present to it a report on this in 2015 (Council of Ministers 2013b).

Common Security and Defence Policy was thus gaining importance in EU foreign policy in 2009-2014. This was visible in relation to the neighbourhood: in December 2012, the European Council (2012d) discussed CSDP, noting that, in “today’s changing world”, the EU needed to assume “increased *responsibilities*” for “international peace and security”, and that “cooperation with interested partners” in the neighbourhood was particularly important (emphasis added). In that year, also, the Council discussed a need for military capability development to enhance CSDP (Council of Ministers 2012i; 2012j). In December 2013, the European Council (2013g) held a thematic debate on CSDP, stating in the beginning that an effective CSDP contributed to the security of the Europeans as well as “in our neighbourhood” and the world. Regarding this, the European Council expressed “a strong commitment” to further development of CSDP and called on the member states to bear more responsibility in this regard and to deepen their defence cooperation (*ibid.*). In November 2014, the Council discussed the outlook for CSDP, and found that “Europe’s security environment” was evolving dramatically with regard to instability in its neighbourhood, demonstrating a close link between internal and external aspects of security (Council of Ministers 2014i). In view of this, the Council expressed “the urgent need” for the EU and its members “to assume increased *responsibilities*” and “act as a security provider”, particularly “in the neighbourhood”; it resolved to strengthen CSDP and work with international partners

who shared EU values (*ibid.*; emphasis added). It thus appeared that, with regard to the changing circumstances of world politics, a key policy response in practice by the EU was to try to strengthen the security and defence aspect of EU identity in world politics. However, with regard to concrete implementation of CSDP in 2009-2014, only two new advisory or training missions (EUAM Ukraine established in November 2014 and EUBAM Libya established in 2013) were explicitly related to the crises in the EU's neighbourhood, while EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia was continued from the previous period.

The EU's relationship with its key strategic partners, the USA, Russia and China, evolved in the period 2009-2014; the development of these relationships also exhibited how the idea of EU identity in world politics implicitly developed in this period. As the European Council (2010d) discussed the relations with strategic partners in September 2010, it explicitly mentioned "transatlantic relationship", seeing it as "*a core element* of the international system" (emphasis added). It reflected on how to create "a true partnership", and expressed its conviction that the partnership should focus on developing the economic relationship with the US (*ibid.*). In 2013, negotiations began on a new transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP) with the US (*ibid.* 2013e). As the partnership was launched in June 2013, the High Representative noted that the partnership was of "*strategic significance*", bringing "*transatlantic destinies*" closer together, and that, by engaging with each other, the EU and the US would engage with the world (Van Rompuy 2013e; emphases added). The (closer) partnership with the US was thus treated in EU discourses in the same manner as EU foreign policy itself, and it was felt that, by engaging with the US, the EU could engage in the world. On the other hand, the partnership with Russia deteriorated significantly. While a "strong strategic partnership" was still seen as essential in 2010, with the EU identifying a need for principled engagement with Russia and for its integration into the international system (Council of Ministers 2011), political contacts with Russia ceased completely following the crisis in Ukraine with the end of 2013. Finally, China was cast in the speeches of the High Representative as a partner of the EU which had a responsibility to contribute to world stability, also by safeguarding human rights (e.g. Van Rompuy 2011f).

The developments on the level of world politics (EU and global financial and economic crisis, emergence of new actors, crises in Southern Mediterranean as well as Ukraine) brought many challenges for EU foreign policy in the period 2009-2014. However, as has been shown in the analysis above, EU foreign policy reacted to these developments by adhering to its accustomed means and modes of action which were set up in the period before 2009, including in the Treaty of Lisbon. It is questionable whether these responses were adequate

with regard to the scale and character of the challenges of world politics. The developments in the EU's neighbourhood to the East and South, particularly towards the end of the period observed, were showing that they might not have been, as the crises in the EU's neighbourhood have deepened in most cases, to a disadvantage of the EU. Inadequacies in EU foreign policy were also noted by the European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors: the European Parliament (2013b) noted in its Report on the implementation of CSDP that the EU needed to redefine its strategic interests with an emphasis on the protection of its citizens and the neighbourhood, and requested the European Council to launch a debate on a strategic framework for the EU. The European Court of Auditors adopted a Special Report (2014, 9–12) on the EEAS in which it found that the EEAS had no departments to deal with global issues of importance to the EU such as climate change, and that strategic partnerships were being developed on an ad hoc basis instead of an overarching approach; and recommended the EEAS to examine the possibility of developing “a new overarching strategic framework” for EU foreign and security policy (*ibid.*, 24).

#### 3.4.6 How the EU has been seen by others

In the period observed, the US continued to support European integration and partnership “with a stronger European Union to advance our shared goals”, the first of which was to promote democratic transition in Eastern European countries (National Security Strategy 2010, 42). In US discourse, the objectives regarding the EU, which were set in the context of European integration, were seen separately from US security interests with regard to “our European allies” which were put in the context of bilateral relations with these allies (*ibid.*, 41). The relationship with its European allies was seen as “the cornerstone for U.S. engagement with the world”, on security and economic issues. It thus seemed that the US continued to see the EU through the lens of European integration and its importance for development of relations with Eastern European countries; but from the perspective of security and world politics, bilateral relations with its European allies were crucial for the US.

Russia started an integration project with Kazakhstan and Belarus in 2011-2012 when steps were made to create a common economic space comprising these three countries. Russian Prime Minister Putin wrote with regard to the project that, in starting the project, Russia was drawing on EU experience, but that the ambition was for the project to achieve an even higher degree of integration than the EU and also include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Putin 2011). This initiative showed that Russia looked up to the EU with regard to EU successes in European integration, but also that Russia's longer-term objective was to gain

advantage over the EU by fostering Eurasian integration. In its foreign policy, Russia continued to see world politics as “characterized by profound changes” which were leading towards a “polycentric system of international relations” (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013). In Russia’s view, this was decreasing the ability of the West to dominate world politics whose centre of gravity was shifting to the East (*ibid.*). With regard to this, Russia’s foreign policy plans included increasing its participation in the G-20, with the BRICS, and in the Eurasian Economic Union, and the intention to strengthen its relationship with Ukraine to contribute to Ukraine’s participation in these integration processes (*ibid.*). At the same time, with regard to the EU, Russia saw itself “as an integral and inseparable part of European civilization”, with the aim of strengthening its cooperation with the EU and to establish the four common spaces, as agreed by the EU and Russia in 2003 (*ibid.*). An analysis of Russia’s foreign policy discourses in relation to the EU thus shows that, interestingly, the most important aspect of the EU from Russia’s perspective was European integration, which was also the main EU characteristic that was emphasized by US foreign policy discourse on the EU. Russia also saw world politics in terms of the East-West binary opposition, and saw itself as cooperating with the East. But at the same time, Russia saw itself as having a European identity, as being part of the European civilization; and its key foreign policy goal from this perspective was to remain engaged in Europe, through the idea of the four common spaces.

China continued to see the EU as an important player in world politics, on a par with China, but noted the effects of the financial and economic crisis on the EU. In 2014, China adopted a new policy paper on the EU (China’s Policy Paper on the EU 2014) in which the impact of the global financial crisis was seen as the most serious challenge for the EU since the Cold War which the EU needed to address. While the EU was seen as “the biggest economy in the world” and a “global player of great strategic importance”, China saw itself as having an “important role in major international” affairs, and as sharing with the EU a “strategic consensus on building a multi-polar world” (*ibid.*). Chinese discourses on the EU thus showed that China saw the EU more or less as an equal, and that the EU continued to be important for China with regard to the Chinese objective of achieving multi-polar world politics. This was, for example, visible in practice in international climate change negotiations, in which the Copenhagen climate conference of 2009 did not succeed, partially, due to the disagreement between China and the EU on how to reach the international climate objectives (*cf.* Zimin 2012); while negotiations in the later years were successful and were



leading towards a global agreement also because China and the EU managed to find a mutually acceptable approach (see subchapter 3.5.2 on climate change).

### 3.4.7 Reflection

To reflect EU foreign policy in 2009-2014, we first need to reflect the characteristics of world politics during this period, or rather, how world politics has been constructed by key actors during this period. Firstly, world politics has been seen by a number of actors, including the EU, as a system without clearly predominating powers – in Russian perspective as developing towards a polycentric system, while EU High Representative spoke about a-polar world and China about the development of multi-polar world politics. Yet, at the same time, a number of actors as well as some key authors used discourses in relation to world politics which applied (familiar) binary oppositions: both the EU and the US, and Russia, spoke about the West (vs. the East), and the EU has seen world politics also in terms of an Atlantic-Pacific binary opposition, along which power was shifting. These views were similar to Keukeleire and Hooijmaijers' (2014) observations on power shifts that were occurring in world politics. A question could thus be posed how these discourses that used (in some cases, well-established) binary oppositions with regard to world politics could be reconciled with the declared intention of a number of key actors in world politics to build effective multilateralism or a multi-polar world.

Tensions between these different visions or modes of operation of world politics (in particular bipolarity vs. multi-polarity) could be observed in the period 2009-2014 in the manner in which some of the key escalating conflicts developed and were (not) addressed by the international community, such as conflicts in Libya, Syria or Ukraine. Yet, another characteristic was key for world politics during this period, which was exemplified by an increased interdependence of the key actors of world politics in addressing the consequences of the global financial and economic crisis (in some cases, crucial financing for addressing these consequences in the EU and the US came from the emerging powers) as well as interdependence in the area of energy production and consumption (which could be observed, with regard to the EU, in relation to the conflict in Ukraine). All of this was related to another key developing characteristic of world politics, namely that a number of powers were emerging and gaining importance during this period. Crucially, *all of these characteristics* existed and were evolving in world politics in the period 2009-2014, and none was predominating; i.e. it could not be said for any of these characteristics that it was the defining one. Rather, in 2009-2014, an overwhelming characteristic of world politics has been

*uncertainty* as to which of these characteristics would be decisive and would come to define world politics. Thus, world politics itself during this period has had an *emergent* quality to the point where we might speak about an *emerging world*.

Perhaps this has affected EU foreign policy, as, despite the number of different trends that have been showing in world politics, there has not been an overall political approach within EU foreign policy to deal specifically with these changes by December 2014. In fact, strategic directions for EU foreign policy have not been defined by the European Council during this period, even though this has been foreseen in the Treaty of Lisbon. Rather, as the analysis in this subchapter has shown, the EU has been profiling itself in world politics in the period 2009-2014 through separate policies that dealt with climate change, enlargement, and the area the EU saw as its neighbourhood. Moreover, it became clear by the end of the period observed that a consensus between the member states as to what *constituted* EU foreign policy was as difficult to reach in the fifth decade of existence of EU foreign policy as it had been during its beginnings.

As the analysis has shown, discursive structures used by EU discourses that referred to or implied EU identity (in world politics) in 2009-2014 have mostly been similar to the previous period; although there has been a new addition of a repeated reference to the EU's strategic objectives and interests. Also foreign policy practices have been continued from the previous period, most prominently with regard to the EU's strategic partnerships, enlargement and the neighbourhood. The EU has adjusted its foreign policy discourse and practice in the case of international climate change negotiations where it started to take into account the positions of key emerging powers; however, in doing so, the EU's conception of its own identity in world politics remained unchanged.

Also, for the period 2009-2014, it cannot be said that EU foreign policy has become more unified – rather, it was fragmented, especially if compared to the beginning of the 21st century when European Security Strategy (2003) was elaborated. This was particularly visible with regard to the EU's neighbourhood as the EU was developing its responses to the crises in the neighbourhood in a post-hoc manner, sporadically, after the conflicts have escalated. Other deficiencies of EU foreign policy during this period have been found in the analysis. In the case of EU neighbourhood policy, the genealogical approach has shown that ENP was used as a framework to address the crises in the neighbourhood among others because this has been an already existing policy that dealt with the neighbourhood. This was so even though ENP did not contain tools that could address the crux of the crises in the neighbourhood, i.e. the underlying conflicts which have mostly continued to escalate. The deconstructive

approach revealed another underlying issue with regard to the main challenge that EU foreign policy has been dealing with in 2009-2014, that is, the conflicts in the neighbourhood: there has been no explicit reflection within EU foreign policy of a possibility that the countries of the EU's neighbourhood, which were in a liminal position with regard to the EU, and were defined as such by the EU, might decide to side with other countries or powers that they were neighbours to, such as Russia (in the East) or Arab countries or Iran (in the South).

The changing circumstances of world politics in the period 2009-2014 have been reflected by EU foreign policy to some degree, but the conception of EU identity and EU role in world politics have largely remained unchanged in comparison to 1975-2009. At the same time, the continued occupation of the EU with enlargement, and particularly the increased importance of dealing with the neighbourhood have implied that, recently, the EU has been paying particular attention to its borders or limits, to what defines it and to how it defines itself with regard to its (immediate) exterior, i.e. *to its own identity*. Thus, the nexus of EU identity and EU foreign policy has been most noticeable precisely in the attitudes of the EU towards its neighbourhood. By the end of the period observed, it has become apparent that through this process of defining its own identity through its foreign policy, the EU has been encountering areas which were, in some cases, also in the interest of other powers in world politics.

In the light of these developments, it seems that EU foreign policy could benefit from self-reflection. Nevertheless it is questionable whether a single strategic approach that might be elaborated within EU foreign policy would be an appropriate response to these challenges. World politics particularly in the beginning of the 21st century seems to be a fluid phenomenon that is still changing and a single approach to it might only prove useful for a short period of time and for specific issues. Also, EU member states have shown in practice in a number of cases (e.g. the development of CSDP) that they are capable of achieving consensus on specific issues that are considered to be of vital interest on the basis of political agreements, without pre-existing arrangements. Thus, perhaps, a consensus between EU member states could suffice on a *mode* of achieving joint foreign policy discourse and action that would allow for *flexibility* of EU foreign policy and its prompt and ongoing *adaptation* to the changing circumstances of world politics (and thus for an openness of EU foreign policy/identity nexus in the sense that has been used here); after all, such consensus had been, as has been shown in the historical study of the development of EU foreign policy, how EU foreign policy began between EEC member states.

## **4. SYNTHESIS**

The aim of this chapter is to gather together the findings made in the analysis with regard to EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics and evaluate them in the light of the research model developed in the introductory part, including a comparison of the findings of the four studies. Furthermore, since we are dealing with the idea of EU identity (in world politics), this chapter contains a reflection about ethical aspects of such writing; and on possible implications of the findings for the future of the EU and its foreign policy in the changing context of world politics.

### **4.1 Evaluation**

#### 4.1.1 Research findings

On the basis of the analysis of EU foreign policy discourse, practice and context with regard to the Middle East, enlargement, and EU foreign policy from the 1970s to 2009, as well as the development of EU foreign policy in 2009-2014, responses can be given to the two research questions and three research theses with regard to the studies from the analysis, and also more generally on EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics.

In general, importance and a crucial need for openness or flexibility can be highlighted, in the sense of new ways and frameworks of thought and action in EU foreign policy about the EU in world politics. That is, it is not enough to define a route of action or even a number of policies and thus fix (or close the meaning of) EU foreign policy; constant preparedness for change is needed, primarily with regard to world politics, and for monitoring and anticipation of change. For example, this mode of thinking and action had been exhibited in the history of EU foreign policy in the process of enlargement with the Mediterranean candidates in the 1970s, but most clearly with the CEECs in the 1990s. Conversely, a lack of this mode of thought and action could be observed in the case of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, where established patterns of EU foreign policy had been adhered to, with devastating consequences. Therefore, openness is needed in the very process of signification, of creating meanings within EU foreign policy about the EU in world politics.

Turning to the analytical studies, the first case study on EU Middle Eastern policy has shown that EU foreign policy discourse on the Middle East contained EU identity stipulations since its early days, in relation to an underlying idea of EPC/ EU assertiveness in the Middle East in the context of world politics. The discursive level of EU foreign policy on the Middle East which highlighted EPC/ EU role in the Middle East was however not consistent with EU foreign policy practice in the context of world politics, as EU role in the Middle East had

mostly been one of support and in the margins of other actors. Even when EU foreign policy was able to produce outputs on the level of world politics (such as the Middle Eastern Quartet, or the Roadmap), these were not translated into impacts. The meaning of EU identity in world politics conveyed through EU foreign policy discourse on the Middle East remained mostly unchanged by 2009, but EU foreign policy managed to realise this idea of identity to some extent in the 1990s and 2000s as the circumstances of world politics became more conducive to EU cooperation in addressing the conflict. Thus, a positive answer can be given to the first research question and thesis from the perspective of EU Middle Eastern policy: EU foreign policy/ identity nexus has been observed here, and the meaning of EU identity in world politics has been closed because it was important from an internal EU perspective to have an involvement in the Middle East. With regard to the second research question and second and third theses, in the relationship between EU foreign policy and world politics in the case of the Middle East, world politics functioned as a Derridean *blind spot* of EU foreign policy, delimiting EU action and discourse on the Middle East without this being recognised by EU foreign policy. Thus, the third research thesis has to be supplemented with regard to EU Middle Eastern policy: an impact of EU foreign policy in world politics may be looked for in the cases *where such an impact is possible* in the given context of world politics. In addition, the case of the Middle East has also shown that EU identity in world politics may be (re)produced implicitly through EU foreign policy, without making explicit references to EU identity.

EU foreign policy/ identity nexus was pronounced in the case of enlargement. Enlargement as a process began in 1970-1973 to allow for political cooperation between EEC member states, but developed in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s into a key policy through which the EU responded to world-political changes taking place on the European continent. In the case of enlargement (and in contrast to the case of the Middle East), world politics functioned as an enabling context in which EU foreign policy discourse was aligned with EU foreign policy practice, both of which championed the idea of *openness* of EU identity (in world politics). In this respect, a positive response may be given to the third thesis: in this case, EU identity was seen as open, and consequently EU foreign policy had an impact in world politics (in Europe). Nevertheless, this idea of identity referred to a *united Europe* and has not been modified, and was thus closed in on Europe even though the limits of enlargement have not been defined. Also, with regard to the first thesis (which states that there has been a closure of the meaning of EU identity in world politics made mostly for internal reasons of EU integration), a narrative about a united Europe has been (re)produced

through the enlargement process which functioned in a retroactive fashion: with each new enlargement, the story about united Europe was re-told, shaping anew the time before that enlargement. In the case of enlargement, moreover, EU foreign policy represented a part of the EU integration process itself, as EU outside has been transformed, but also the EU as it progressed from a six- to 28-member agglomerate. Also, each of the enlargements fuelled first the beginning and then further development of EU foreign policy, from the first enlargement with the UK, through unification of Germany, to development of neighbourhood policies and Western Balkans policy. Enlargement thus seems to have represented a vital part of EU identity in world politics as well as EU identity as such, and this has been confirmed by the underlying valorizations that have accompanied enlargement discourses.

The third (historical) study, of EU foreign policy by December 2009, has shown that the idea of EU identity in world politics has been embedded in EU foreign policy since its beginning and that this embeddedness has since been taken for granted even though it has been constantly (re)produced by EU foreign policy discourses. The idea, or problematization, of forming EU identity in world politics has been shaped in the 1970s and 1980s, and the floating signifiers that have referred to this idea (about voice, role and responsibilities of the EU in world politics) have since remained unchanged in EU foreign policy discourses; however their meaning has been adjusted or contextualised with regard to the changing context of world politics. In relation to this, through the years, a narrative has been developed about the EU in world politics which built on the constitutive split of EU foreign policy, of seeing EU identity in world politics as a pre-given idea(1) of identity which has, at the same time, not yet been fully realised, which has been a key argument for further development of EU foreign policy. That is, in the earliest documents related to EU foreign policy, an ideal image of Europe/ the EU in world politics has been created, which has since represented a main goal of EU foreign policy that it has strived to attain. With regard to the first research thesis, the discourse of EU foreign policy on EU identity in world politics therefore exhibited a (flexible) closure which has not only been made for internal reasons of European integration but also with the objective of the EU having an influence in world politics. In line with this, EU foreign policy/ identity nexus has reacted to the changing circumstances of world politics by introspection (by elaborating political and legal bases for further development of EU foreign policy) and by realising the idea of EU identity in world politics to the extent that the circumstances of world politics permitted. This could be observed in the case of the CEECs in the beginning of the 1990s, as well as in the development of CSDP and joint actions, and the relations with strategic partners. On the other hand, there has been a prominent case (breakup

of the former Yugoslavia) where there was little openness or flexibility of the idea of EU identity in world politics, due to a lack of consensus among the member states, and there was a lack of EU impact. With regard to the second and third research theses, it can therefore be found that the impact of EU foreign policy in world politics cannot be judged in general, but needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; and that, in addition to the circumstances of world politics, lack of consensus among the member states has historically represented a key limitation of EU foreign policy.

The studies in the analysis that have covered the period by December 2009 have therefore shown that there has been a particular self-conception of the EU in world politics that has been influencing the development of all the main strands of EU foreign policy in this period from the background. This intrinsic logic or meta-discourse of EU identity in world politics has existed mostly through EU foreign policy and its specific issues; nevertheless, EU foreign policy responses have continued to draw on it. One key element of it have been (Derridean) *différences* – with regard to the Middle East, the EU has been portrayed as being on the verge of engaging in addressing the conflict; in the case of enlargement, a united Europe has remained an objective; and the EU has been continuously presented as being in the process of becoming a global actor.

Developments from 2009 to 2014 also exhibited a close interconnection between EU foreign policy and the idea of EU identity, and a specific relationship of this nexus with world politics. Where the circumstances of world politics were conducive to EU foreign policy action and the idea of EU identity in world politics was flexible or open (climate change negotiations after 2009, enlargement), EU foreign policy had an impact in world politics; but this was again seen as a realisation of a pre-existing idea of EU identity. This means, crucially, that EU foreign policy was able to impact world politics in the cases where it was explicitly oriented towards changing its own ways and where world politics represented an enabling context (yet, also in these cases, EU foreign policy discourses continued to use fixed discursive structures referring to the EU as a global actor or having a role in world politics). There were also cases where the circumstances of world politics and on the ground did not allow for greater EU foreign policy engagement, such as in Southern neighbourhood. Also, with regard to the neighbourhood policy (particularly in the South), EU foreign policy has repeated a pattern (similar to the case of the former Yugoslavia) where existing foreign policy instruments proved to be inadequate to the situation and there was insufficient EU foreign policy innovation to remedy this. The fourth study in the analysis, particularly taking into account the genealogical approach, has furthermore shown that EU neighbourhood policy

from 2009 to 2014 exhibited the characteristics of EU Middle Eastern policy as well as enlargement policy from the previous period i.e. before 2009.

Thus, if we look at all of these policies and all the four analytical studies together, there has been persistent retention of historical patterns in EU foreign policy-making which raises the issue of flexibility of EU foreign policy in practice and its preparedness for timely adaptation to the changing circumstances of world politics. Also, it could be observed that EU foreign policy has had most impact in those cases where external problems of EEC countries/ the EU have been internalised and addressed through EEC/ EU policies (as in the case of enlargement and related policies).

The findings of the four analytical studies can be summarized as follows:

**Table 4.1: Summary of research findings with regard to research questions and theses**

<b>Research question/ thesis</b>	<b>Case study I: Middle East</b>	<b>Case study II: enlargement</b>	<b>Historical study of EU foreign policy</b>	<b>EU foreign policy 2009-2014</b>
<u>Research question</u> a) Might we speak about an EU foreign policy/ identity nexus?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>Research question</u> b) Character of the relationship between EU foreign policy/ identity nexus and world politics?	World politics delimited EU foreign policy.	World-political changes took place in Europe, enabling EU foreign policy.	When not delimited by world politics or inability of consensus, EU foreign policy reacted to changes in world politics by developing itself and realising a pre-conceived idea of EU identity.	Mutual influences between EU foreign policy and world politics in specific cases (e.g. climate change negotiations).
<u>Thesis</u> 1. There has been a closure of the meaning of EU identity in world politics mainly for internal reasons of EU integration.	Yes, however not only for internal reasons but also due to delimitation through the circumstances of world politics.	Yes, but retroactively i.e. constructing the narrative about a united Europe – enlargement has been the most dynamic aspect of EU identity in world politics.	Yes, the main goal has been and continues to be “common voice”; but also for external reasons – desire to influence world politics.	Yes, but the desire to influence world politics (external reason) has been more prominent in recent years.
<u>Thesis</u> 2. A specific relationship has developed between EU foreign policy/ identity nexus and world politics.	Yes	Yes	Yes: there had been action by EU foreign policy in cases when world politics was enabling and there was consensus btw. member states.	Yes: world politics has either enabled or constrained action by EU foreign policy or its reaction to changes in world politics.



<u>Thesis</u> 3. When EU identity in world politics has been (re)produced as open, EU foreign policy was able to have an impact in world politics.	An answer cannot be given as EU foreign policy has been delimited by the circumstances of world politics.	Yes, through the process of enlargement.	A conclusive answer cannot be given: there were not enough cases where world politics has represented an enabling context and where there was also action by EU foreign policy.	Yes: climate change negotiations and enlargement (but the basic idea of EU identity did not change); the case of neighbourhood demonstrated delimitation through the circumstances of world politics.
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In sum, the Table 4.1 above shows that the following could be established in the analysis about the relationship between EU foreign policy and world politics: firstly, when observing EU foreign policy, with regard to a specific issue, a key question is whether the circumstances of world politics have represented an enabling or limiting context; the second question is whether there has been a common will to act and consensus among EU member states; and, if this has been so, and EU foreign policy has adapted or transformed the conception or idea of EU identity in world politics that it has been (re)producing (as defined in the introductory part), then, in those cases, EU foreign policy was able to have an impact in world politics.

In addition, the table above shows two main remaining principled reservations with regard to the research findings and the conclusions that might be drawn from them. Firstly, the relationship between openness of the idea of EU identity in world politics conveyed through EU foreign policy could only be observed in the cases where EU foreign policy was able to act within the given context of world politics. Secondly, looking at EU foreign policy as a whole, there was not enough of such cases overall (i.e. where the circumstances of world politics were enabling and there was also action by EU foreign policy) to draw definitive conclusions about the relationship between the openness of the idea of EU identity in world politics and the impact of EU foreign policy in world politics. In part, this is due to the selection of the case studies (there have been few cases which have clearly been discussed most often by the European Council in the history of EU foreign policy); but it is also due to the nature of how EU foreign policy has functioned, as it has tended to focus on a smaller number of distinct areas (such as enlargement, the Middle East, and recently climate change or the neighbourhood).

#### 4.1.2 Analytical insights and implications

The analysis has shown that EU foreign policy has functioned as a problematization of EU identity in world politics: EU identity in world politics has been posited as an ideal early in

the development of EU foreign policy, and since that time EU foreign policy has been coping with the challenges of making this idea(l) of EU identity relevant with regard to the changing context of world politics. The finding that EU foreign policy has been among others a problematization of EU identity in world politics is important due to the character of problematizations: new solutions that might be added to existing problematizations need to be in line with them and can only modify some of their postulates (Foucault in Rabinow 1984; cf. Ashley 1989). Similarly, it can be observed, new solutions have usually been added to EU foreign policy that had been in accordance with its established premises. This, together with the development of EU foreign policy as showcased in the analytical studies, indicates that EU foreign policy might be capable only of smaller modifications in line with its existing premises and patterns, which represents a concern in the light of the changing circumstances of world politics that might come to necessitate more substantial changes.

Discourse analysis has allowed for the uncovering of discursive figures that have underpinned EU foreign policy/ identity nexus, some of which have been found in addition to those anticipated in the introductory part: *magnifiers* that have served to discursively magnify EU foreign policy contributions; *direct* and *indirect self-casting* of the EU as a global actor and partner to other powers; and new *contextualisations* of existing signifiers that have been important for the (re)production of EU identity in world politics. Discourse analysis has also illuminated instances of othering in EU foreign policy discourse, in particular temporal othering of the EU through reminiscences to its own turbulent past in relation to the narrative about a united Europe in the case of enlargement; othering of the great powers (the US and USSR/ Russia) to distance EU foreign policy from them during its formative years; and North-South othering that has been present also in recent EU foreign policy discourses on the emerging powers. In relation to this, the deconstructive approach has shown that, through its foreign policy, the EU has been constructing its identity (in world politics) by presenting it as something not yet fully achieved (cf. Derrida in Grilc 1999) *as well as* by making (negative) references to other actors who were seen as representing the opposite to what EU identity has tried to represent (cf. Žižek 1991/2008).

The analysis has also highlighted the processes of (re)production of the idea of EU identity in world politics. Establishing of this identity began as a political project with the Final communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or Government on 1 and 2 December 1969 at The Hague, and continued with the 1973 Document on the European identity. However, in later documents, such as Tindemans report of 1976, EU identity in world politics was featured as an idea of collective identity existing separately from and prior to the

documents that mentioned it i.e. it was being retroactively constructed. Also, the desire to distance the EU from the US and USSR (an external identity objective) had been, in the beginnings of EU foreign policy, key to its strengthening, aside from the fact that EEC member states had felt close enough to each other to have initiated cooperation in the field of foreign policy. After its main tenets were constructed, EU identity in world politics has functioned as a specific discursive structure marked by stable signifiers (of voice, role and responsibilities of the EU in world politics), which at the same time represented the building blocks of a narrative about the EU becoming a global actor.

With regard to the third and fourth analytical studies, the initial observation regarding the content of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) that EU identity in world politics might have begun to change could not be confirmed, as signifiers and the narrative related to this identity have largely remained unchanged in EU foreign policy discourses by December 2014. It would rather appear that the signifiers about a voice, role and responsibilities of the EU in world politics and the narrative about the EU becoming a global actor have represented *the stable core of the EU's self-image* with respect to its exterior, and that, so far, a potential need for a modification of this self-image has not been identified (*cf.* Wæver 1996; 2005b). Thus it seems that a modification of the EU's self-image that has been based on these signifiers would only be possible through conscious (political) effort at self-reflection (as in the beginning of EU foreign policy via European political cooperation – EPC).

In relation to this, the genealogy of EU foreign policy in the analysis has shown that key policies such as EU neighbourhood policy which has been crucial in the period 2009-2014 have been based to a large extent on previous policies that have mostly (re)produced a fixed idea of EU identity in world politics, such as Middle Eastern and enlargement policies, or EU approach to international climate change negotiations which has been a recent expression of the idea of the EU as a global actor. These findings imply that *key elements of EU foreign policy have been formed in the past, but have, despite the changes in world politics, come to exert a decisive influence on the current directions of EU foreign policy.* Together with the finding that EU foreign policy has been permeated with identity goals to the point that its implicit main objective has been to pursue those goals, this could mean that EU foreign policy has remained introverted, turned towards the EU's inside, and not to so much to the changing realities of world politics. On the one hand, this observation can be said to be a product of the approach adopted in this thesis. It may thus be found that considering their own identities when facing external world is probably characteristic for political communities in general. But on the other hand, the analysis has shown that discursive structures focusing on the

*building* of EU identity (such as “common voice”) have been very pervasive in EU foreign policy discourses, more so than similar structures in discourses of other actors that have been observed in the framework of this thesis. It seems that this might be characteristic for the EU as a polity which has been a conglomerate of different polities, and which has needed to focus on maintaining its own unity even in its foreign policy. However, such an implicit main orientation of EU foreign policy could be counter-productive as it could distance the EU from its declared aim of becoming a global actor.

This is also because the findings in the analysis point to a *relativity of the social world* as constructed by EU foreign policy in contrast to the level of world politics: within the EU, the idea of EU identity in world politics has represented a social reality to be taken into account and built upon. This has mostly not been translated onto the level of world politics within which, and for other actors, EU identity in world politics has not necessarily been a reality they recognise, as the analytical studies have shown. As mentioned in the introductory part, world politics can be seen as encompassing also the processes of identity-building of the actors that are involved in it (*cf.* Gamble 2006). From this perspective, world politics is, among others, re-created by the actors that participate in it. Thus, it could be said that a process of co-construction has been going on between world politics and EU foreign policy which has been closely connected to the functioning of EU foreign policy (e.g. in the case of the Middle East) which has however not been recognised by EU foreign policy. This appears to have resulted in some of the key incongruities of EU foreign policy: even though EU discourses have tended to picture the EU as a global actor, it has been recognised as such only by China; and despite the discursive labelling of emerging powers as partners, EU discourses have tended to treat them as not yet being full members of the international community.

This might represent a key policy implication. The analysis for 2009-2014 has shown that those emerging actors that have been seen as key partners by the EU may have no interest to cooperate if treated in a Eurocentric manner, in the sense of the EU elaborating its positions and then expecting that these positions would be accepted by other actors in world politics; and that these actors may, in such cases, decide to minimise their relations with the EU and rather choose to cooperate with other actors more amenable to their positions. In this sense, it may be argued, recognition carries power: if (current) world politics is, among others, an emerging reality generated by all the actors that can affect it, it might be expected that the EU would be recognized as an actor in world politics (or a global actor) by other (particularly emerging) actors to the extent that it recognizes them as such. If models of ordering the international community have been formed in Europe in the past, the beginning of the 21st

century has shown that ideas about this have also started to emerge elsewhere in the world. It is up to the EU to reflect these processes and decide how to proceed with regard to them (*cf.* Onar and Nicolaïdis 2013).

Regarding the analytical approach adopted in this thesis, it may thus be found that it was appropriate and necessary to develop a theoretical as well as methodological approach specifically suited to the research problem. This enabled the observation and analysis of the problem in most of its complexity. The three-pronged (integrative) approach allowed for the observation of the interplay between EU foreign policy, the idea of EU identity, and world politics. As a methodological extension of this approach, the case studies, historical study and the study of the more recent development of EU foreign policy have allowed the analysis to focus on the most crucial aspects of EU foreign policy. In connection to this, the historical approach and genealogy have been of key importance as they allowed the observation of the formation and development of patterns within EU foreign policy since its early beginnings. If EU foreign policy is observed within a shorter period of time (e.g. 5 years or less), it might appear to correspond to the EU's external environment as it is, while the historical analysis has revealed that the key tools and approaches of EU foreign policy have been maintained in many cases as relics of much older policies and solutions. The narrative approach (with its methodological parallels of discourse analysis and deconstruction) enabled the observation of how patterns were formed and (re)produced through EU foreign policy discourses. Finally, the focus on openness which has been connected to ethics has served as a constant reference to and reminder of the issues highlighted in the research questions and theses during the course of the analysis.

#### 4.1.3 Limitations and further research

A difficulty with the three-pronged analytical approach has been how to allow for its complexity, taking into account all relevant developments, discourses and practices, and at the same time abstract these enough for analysis. On the other hand, even though discourse and practice of EU foreign policy have been included in the analysis together with the context of world politics, there may be other elements of EU foreign policy as well as world politics that merit further study. In relation to this, while this thesis has been focusing on the issue of openness of EU foreign policy, taking into account the observed state of EU foreign policy in relation to world politics, there are probably other issues that deserve in-depth analysis with regard to EU foreign policy (some of which have been mentioned in this thesis such as an inability to find consensus to act externally among the member states).

The selection of the case studies, mentioned in the end of the subchapter on research findings, could be seen as another limitation. Since there have been few cases of EU foreign policy topics that have been discussed most often by the European Council (such as the Middle East, enlargement), and there were also few areas where there was adaptation or openness of the idea of EU identity and where EU foreign policy had an impact in world politics (enlargement, and also climate change), the results as well as impacts of EU foreign policy need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. For example, without observing enlargement, the case of EU foreign policy having an impact in world politics would not be as strong. However, it needs to be borne in mind, as has been shown in the second case study and in the second subchapter of the fourth analytical study (for the period 2009-2014) that policies related to enlargement have been seen as external (and thus foreign, as defined in this thesis) policies of prime importance by the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the High Representative. In December 2014, for example, the Council again proclaimed that enlargement remained a “key policy” contributing to “peace, democracy, security /.../ in Europe” (Council of Ministers 2014k).

A similar observation can be made with regard to the selection of the time periods for the analytical studies (until December 2009 for the first three studies, and from December 2009 to December 2014 for the last one). It could be revealing to observe how EU foreign policy has been developing every five years or every decade of its existence until 2009 (and whether the frequency of discussions of EU foreign policy issues by the European Council remained the same for all the periods up to December 2009). However, this would exceed the scope of the present thesis which has focused on observing the established patterns of EU foreign policy-making and comparing these with the developments in the more recent period, after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.

Also, one caveat of the analytical approach adopted in this thesis has been that, on many of the issues EU foreign policy has been dealing with, there has been action by some member states or groups of member states (e.g. the cases of the Middle East or Southern neighbourhood) which has usually been commended by EU foreign policy even though it has formally not represented part of it. The approaches of discourse analysis, deconstruction as well as genealogy are formal in the sense that they focus on what is observable in a social practice such as EU foreign policy, and on the trail of actual texts and implementation; i.e. using them, this thesis has had to focus on what has actually been commonly agreed, adopted or implemented in EU foreign policy. This has meant that the informal part of EU foreign policy (which may however be very important under certain circumstances, as it was in the

case of establishing ESDP), represented by initiatives, talks and agreements between EU member states, has not prominently featured here.

In addition to the principled reservations with regard to the research findings that have been mentioned in the end of the previous subchapter, the biases mentioned in the introductory part have been relevant. The EU has favoured further development of EU foreign policy (which represents the main valorization of EU foreign policy); and perhaps not stability of world politics as such but the preservation of *status quo* in world politics. The anthropomorphising of the EU has been necessary for the analysis of its foreign policy even though the EU is not a person and also not a unitary actor. Furthermore, the analytical framework to study the research problem could probably be set up differently using different schools of thought within European Studies or International Relations; nevertheless the reservations still hold with respect to the gaps in some of these approaches that have been identified in the first and second chapters of this thesis.

To conclude the evaluation, the findings from the analysis as well as introductory part point to themes that might be promising for further research. Firstly, it has been found that world politics has been developing in new and complex ways since the beginning of the 21st century; however the character of current world politics and its changes could not be analysed in depth as the present thesis has focused on the development of EU foreign policy. Secondly, the phenomenon of identities or ideas about them in connection to foreign policies could be researched further, particularly with regard to the character of identities as political projects and/ or collective identities held by societies, as well as the question to what extent are such identities formed through internal processes within societies or as a reaction to (developments in) their surroundings. Thirdly, it might be expected that EU foreign policy as well as world politics will continue to evolve, providing content for further study. In addition, it would be interesting to compare the research findings made with regard to the historical development of EU foreign policy to historical development of foreign policies of other contemporary actors such as other powers in world politics as well as EU member states.

## **4.2 Ethics**

It may be said that every discourse is (re)produced by someone in certain circumstances, with reference to certain cases or developments, and represents a product of its time. This should be taken into account also with regard to the present writing, as well as with respect to the discourses that this writing has analysed. Thus, a reflection is in order concerning general applicability of findings, as well as on the fact that specific circumstances or times necessitate

and/ or produce specific theories or solutions to cope with those circumstances. The present thesis has endeavoured to remind the reader in a number of places that behind every discourse, there is an author. In connection to this, one needs to be aware that the choice of the texts and parts of texts that have been highlighted here represents the analytical decision of the author. The reader is therefore invited to form their own view about the present writing, or arrive at their own reflection about the subject of this writing, EU foreign policy as a process of EU identity formation in world politics.

This is important because the analysis in this thesis has demonstrated a crucial interconnection between external identity of an actor in world politics (the EU) with world politics as well as (EU) foreign policy. This interconnection could be observed not only with regard to the EU, but also in some of the foreign policy discourses of its key partners – the US, Russia and China. It would thus appear that in the cases analysed, external identity or identities have been closely connected to political purposes, which necessitates a need for awareness by (foreign) policy-makers that identities are (also) constructed through foreign policy. This is so particularly because the findings from the analysis indicate that in the current complex, interrelated, interdependent but also *uncertain* circumstances of world politics, *a number* of external identities might be competing for recognition, and that this number of identities is one of the highest seen in world politics (aside from the 19th century competition between European powers in the European system of international relations). Thus, together with the processes of external identity-formation in world politics, awareness should be reproduced that such identities may be dangerous if they are securitized and taken too far as a response to internal or external developments. An ethical perspective on identities might acknowledge that, at least in part, identity construction takes place with reference and is thus indebted to others (*cf.* Coicaud and Warner 2001), as also the analysis here has shown; taking into account that recognising others does not necessarily imply agreeing with them.

This touches the issue of ethics in relation to EU foreign policy. Discourses on the EU have tended to present the EU and its foreign policy as ethical (e.g. Tindemans report – Bulletin EC 1976, Supplement 1/76; and Leaken Declaration – European Council 2001e). Although this in itself would require a separate study, the present writing has reflected whether EU foreign policy has produced appropriate responses with regard to the circumstances of world politics; how these responses have been motivated (among others) by identity objectives; and whether, in the given circumstances, all available foreign policy instruments have been used, in an appropriate manner. With respect to this, it has been found that there is a crucial need to explicitly reflect EU foreign policy as discrepancies have been



observed in the analysis between EU discourses about having a voice, role and responsibilities in world politics, and between concrete realisation of such discourses through EU foreign policy practice including speech acts and relations with (other) key actors in world politics, in the context of providing appropriate responses to the changing circumstances of world politics.

In relation to this, it has been mentioned in the beginning (*cf.* Coicaud and Warner 2001) that ethics means taking into account others as well as ourselves as human beings and parts of humanity. From the perspective of the writer of this thesis, and from Slovenia, prominent EU foreign policy topics that have been analysed in the analytical studies have appeared mostly as human tragedies: the breakup of the former Yugoslavia has led to bloody wars in Croatia and Bosnia in 1992-1995 and thousands of refugees who have been accommodated also in Slovenia; and the consequences of the protracted conflict in Syria from 2011-2016 have led to hundreds of thousands of refugees who have crossed into EU countries, including Slovenia, in 2015-2016. From this perspective, it has been obvious that the conflicts concerned cannot be seen in an abstract manner, only as points on the agenda of successive EU Councils of Ministers, for example. No matter how distant the countries in which conflicts are raging might seem to be from the EU, points on the agenda of EU foreign policy-related meetings cover issues that have concrete consequences for the lives of the people concerned. Also, in the fluid context of world politics in the beginning of the 21st century, any foreign policy decisions that the EU makes or does not make might ultimately have a feedback effect on the EU itself.

An awareness of the closures and openings of meanings that are being made in foreign policy discussions, taking into account the need for closures (but also openings) mentioned in the introductory part (end of subchapter 1.1), might contribute to such reflection. Relativism (of openness of meanings) versus adherence to foundations (or closures of meanings) do not need to be the only two or exclusive options. On the one hand, there is a real need to have closures of meanings, foundations, and criteria by which things could be judged; however awareness is needed that such closures are being made and of the reasons why they are being made. On the other hand, openness to new ways of thinking and new possibilities should be allowed for, as it is necessary for further development, to adequately respond to changes in the conditions that underpin the existence of human societies, i.e. to external as well as internal challenges.

In this light, it can be asked what openness of signification implies from the perspective of EU foreign policy/ identity nexus in the current fluid circumstances of world politics. It

might perhaps necessitate an effort by EU policy-makers, heads of state and government as well as foreign ministers to pay attention to the processes of EU identity formation and to recognise and, if possible, avoid solidification of the EU's own idea of identity to a degree which would limit the options available to EU foreign policy. It might also entail carrying out such reflection with regard to world politics, to steer the processes of world politics away from or mitigate the consequences of solidification of the identities of (other) key actors to a degree which could have damaging consequences. For example, a continued policy that sees other actors or powers in black-and-white terms is likely to lead to solidification of identities in the medium or long term and could thus result in hostilities.

Also, in this respect, and taking into account the changing circumstances of world politics, "the West" (as frequently used by EU foreign policy discourses) could be seen as another closure of meaning. This is so particularly because Europe (as the refugee crisis has illustrated) is not isolated geographically: "Europe" is also East of West, and has a number of umbilical cords to the South, particularly the Mediterranean. And, looking from the perspective of climate change, it might only be a couple of decades before Europe represents a South to a rapidly developing North. As the analysis has shown, the EU possesses an important power that EU foreign policy has not been reflecting: it contributes to (re)producing the identities of its "partners" in world politics (through the mechanism of *alter-casting* that has been mentioned in the analysis), and to their solidification (or change). This is a power the EU could be more aware of. And, from this, consequences might be drawn for its foreign policy, which will be looked into in the concluding part.

On a final note, it also needs to be reflected what closures have been made in this thesis. One prominent and necessary closure has been allowing for the possibility of EU identity: as we have seen in the analysis, identities can be (re)produced through the very act of speaking or writing about them. Nevertheless, this thesis has tried to remain open with regard to the signification(s) and direction(s) of EU foreign policy. In some parts of the analysis, this has been difficult as the discourse of EU foreign policy has tended to construct figured worlds that have invited their audiences to them (e.g. of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, of a united Europe, of the EU as a global actor). Thus, to the extent that this thesis had to follow and analyse the discourses of EU foreign policy, it has (re)produced certain meanings connected to the EU and its identity in world politics. A final step in the discussion of ethical aspects of writing about EU identity in world politics may thus be to expose own "EU identity-casting": this has been present in the underlying assumption that the EU, its identity, and its foreign policy would continue to evolve. However, this is not a given – further

development of the EU, its foreign policy, and its idea of identity, also with regard to the changing context of world politics, may take any direction.

### **4.3 Future developments**

A key motive of this thesis has been the observation of the development of EU foreign policy with reference to the changing context of world politics particularly since the end of the Cold War. In the final analytical study which has covered the period of the first five years since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, i.e. from December 2009 to December 2014, it has been observed that the changes taking place in world politics in this period have not abated but have mostly continued and accelerated. Beyond the scope of this thesis, this has also been so with regard to developments in 2015 (particularly in the EU's neighbourhood). Thus, the currently predictable constant in world politics seems to be its changing character. As has been seen in the analysis, this has been impacting EU foreign policy.

Moreover, in the recent years, world politics has exhibited a multitude of different characteristics with varying degrees of involvement by EU foreign policy. In addressing prominent conflicts e.g. in Syria since 2011 or Ukraine since 2014, for example, a number of actors have been involved (including the EU, China, Russia and the USA); however, agreements have usually been achieved when there were the USA on the one and Russia on the other side. In addition, on some issues such as climate change negotiations and security in Asia it has appeared that a key axis of confrontation has been between the USA and China (*cf.* Wæver 2016). Some of the solutions to salient issues in world politics such as climate change have been made in the framework of the UN in its role as the main pillar of the current world order; while other solutions, in particular with reference to the growing significance of the emerging powers, have been sought through developing forms of cooperation such as the G-20. Interdependence between key actors in world politics has been prominent in the cases of resolving the global economic crisis as well as production and consumption of energy, particularly oil and gas. It thus seems that it would be difficult if not impossible to characterize world politics by any single characteristic; also because it has not been clear which of the trends that have been showing in it might prevail and whether and which new trends might still be in the making.

In relation to this, it has been mentioned in the introductory part that world politics has, in some aspects, also been functioning as a complex or chaotic system (*cf.* Banerjee, Erçetin, Tekin 2014); for example, the start and spread of Arab Spring since the beginning of 2011 has shown that unforeseen and seemingly small events or trends might, in a matter of years,

develop into a determining characteristic of a certain period or area of world politics, particularly in connection to the related circumstances (such as social and political situation in the Middle East and North Africa). In perspective, Arab Spring has had a significant impact on the EU since 2011 and has also led to internal political challenges that the EU has been grappling with, such as the refugee crisis.

Other trends in world politics could be observed with regard to the mutual relations between key powers in world politics. The analysis for 2009-2014 has shown a trend of increasing cooperation between the EU and the USA. At the same time, the US has been increasing its cooperation with its Asian partners (e.g. negotiations and agreement that has been reached in 2016 on a Trans-Pacific Partnership). On the other hand, the period from 2009-2014, but also after, has shown a deterioration in the relationship between the EU and Russia, while Russia has been intensifying its relations with other emerging powers, especially China. This means that, of the (other) powers in world politics, both the EU's closest partner, the USA, and its closest neighbour, Russia, have been intensifying their relationship with the emerging and Asian powers. Apart from the speeches of EU High Representative which have mentioned an Atlantic vs. Pacific binary opposition, these developments have not been reflected by EU foreign policy in the period observed in this thesis.

A process of such reflection might have begun more recently, in 2015, on the basis of a report by High Representative Federica Mogherini (*cf.* Tocci 2015). In December 2013, the European Council (2013g) mandated the High Representative to present a report to it in 2015 on challenges and opportunities for the EU with regard to the changes in the global environment. This report was presented to the European Council in June 2015 and found that, in the view of the global power shifts, the EU needed a consistent global strategy (High representative 2015). It stated that the EU did not have the "luxury of turning inwards", and highlighted the need for direction, innovation and flexibility in EU foreign policy (*ibid.*, 4, 19–20). On the basis of the report, the European Council (2015a) decided that the High Representative was to prepare a global EU strategy for foreign and security policy by June 2016.

With reference to this, and in terms of the specific issues that have been dealt with by EU foreign policy and have been analysed in this thesis, developments in the recent period have shown continuing instability in a number of countries of the Middle East and North Africa which have been the referent subject of EU neighbourhood policy; this has led to internal problems for the EU through an increased inflow of refugees and migrants particularly

in 2015, but also a deterioration in security situation in a number of EU member states. Moreover, EU neighbourhood policy has been connected more closely to its enlargement policy through concessions offered to Turkey in its EU accession process in exchange for implementation of measures related to refugees. Also, with 2016, full application began of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine (i.e. including the deep and comprehensive free trade area). In international climate change negotiations, a global climate agreement has been reached in Paris in the end of 2015 as the EU continued its climate diplomacy through which it worked on approximating its positions to those of its partners, including the emerging powers.

With the circumstances of world politics which have continued to change and in which new trends have continued to emerge, the character of EU foreign policy so far may be contrasted. As has been found in the analysis, EU foreign policy has tended not to reflect its limitations including its delimitation through the circumstances of world politics in the cases of the Middle East and (Southern) neighbourhood, and its inability to provide innovative solutions to pressing external issues due to a lack of consensus among the member states (dissolution of the former Yugoslavia but also Southern neighbourhood – the EU did not take CSDP action with regard to Libya in 2011 due to a lack of consensus). When EU foreign policy was successful, in the case of enlargement particularly the democratising CEECs, this was achieved predominantly through Community instruments. On the other hand, a comprehensive response of EU foreign policy could be seen with regard to the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, but this has led to a deterioration of the relations with (another) key world power, Russia. EU foreign policy has tended to continue othering the emerging powers i.e. seeing them as in need of being integrated into the international community. Moreover a general characteristic of EU foreign policy that has been observed in the analysis has been its adherence to its established patterns and premises.

In the medium term, a number of external challenges for the EU might be expected based on the recent trends. Instability and emerging situations in the EU's neighbourhood to the South and East could be expected to continue, and through these, EU foreign policy would probably continue to be faced with issues regarding development of the EU's relations with (other) powers in world politics, such as Arab countries, Iran, Turkey and Russia. This could also be connected to the issue or question of further enlargement of the EU (notwithstanding the Western Balkans countries) based on an underlying idea of ever-spreading concentric circles of Europeaness (*cf.* Wæver 1998). Also, the need to address global issues and global governance may be expected to challenge the EU's perspectives on the other, especially

emerging powers in world politics. This is without taking into account possible unforeseen developments that might impact world politics and EU foreign policy.

It needs to be asked whether EU foreign policy as it stands is able to react in a timely and adequate manner to the continuously changing circumstances of world politics. With regard to its Middle Eastern policy, for example, it might be expected that if the current circumstances of world politics continue, particularly the role of the USA, the EU would continue to express its readiness to cooperate while its role in practice would be one of support. The EU might also be expected to continue its enlargement policy, particularly with regard to Western Balkans countries, all of which have been included and have progressed in this process; and to express its interest for Iceland to return to its accession negotiations. EU foreign policy in general may be expected to continue to build on its previous achievements and policies if the main contours or premises of world politics remain the same for a foreseeable period of time. However, if there was or there were (one or more) serious, prolonged and/ or global destabilisation(s) that would impact the character of world politics itself, it is questionable whether EU foreign policy would be able to react timely and effectively enough to enable EU member states to produce an adequate common response.

## CONCLUSION

As the observation, interrogation and contextualisation of EU foreign policy that have been performed in this thesis have shown, EU foreign policy is a reality much more complex than the day-to-day business of what appears as EU foreign policy discussions, on the surface so to speak; it is a social and political process that has been (re)produced on many different levels since 1969, has been inextricably intertwined with the construction of EU identity, and has been part of a co-construction with and of the processes of world politics. It has consisted of underlying patterns that have been established and maintained since its beginnings, of narratives, discursive figures, but also of evolving tools for concrete action such as CFSP and ESDP, and of relations with a growing number of external actors. It has transformed the EU's outside and the EU itself. In this regard EU foreign policy and its processes of (re)production may be seen as an exquisite immaterial but also material structure that has consisted of countless evolving social and political elements and bonds; and which represents a feat of the European integration process.

As has been found in this thesis, EU foreign policy and the idea of EU identity in world politics have been so closely interconnected that they have been functioning as EU foreign policy/ identity nexus. In relation to this, also, EU foreign policy has been a problematization of the idea of EU identity in world politics, as it has been trying to fit the idea of EU identity in world politics it has been constructing in the changing context of world politics. Researching the development of this reality from its formal beginning in 1969 to December 2014 has thus also been complex and could not be easily adjusted to the abstract research questions and theses that have been posed in the beginning. Nevertheless the analysis has shown that world politics has functioned as a specific environment of EU foreign policy which has enabled but also constrained it; and also that EU foreign policy has endeavoured to influence world politics. This has mostly been achieved in circumstances in which world politics has represented an enabling context, where there was political will among EEC/ EU member states for common action, and where the idea of EU identity in world politics was conceived of as something malleable, something that could be changed (i.e. as open). But the analysis has also shown that the reality of EU foreign policy/ identity nexus in the context of world politics has been so complex that findings have to be seen in a relative sense, from case to case, and taking into account multiple factors and possibilities.

If EU foreign policy could be seen in a simplified manner as a common social and political reality (re)produced by EU member states, and if all the findings that have been

made in this thesis could be distilled in one main observation, this would relate to the conduct of EU foreign policy with reference to the changing conditions of world politics. As has been seen in the analysis, with the end of the Cold War and with the beginning of the 21st century, ground-breaking changes have been occurring in world politics. Yet discourse and practice of EU foreign policy (including speech acts) have been gradual and have built on previous achievements of foreign policy cooperation among EEC/ EU member states. In the last five years covered by the analysis, in which world politics has experienced even more changes, patterns have been retained and (re)produced in EU foreign policy which have been shaped and formed through the history of EU foreign policy, very early in some cases. On the one hand, this could be seen in a positive light as it shows that EU member states have preserved a continuity of their cooperation and common action in the field of foreign policy in the face of the changes in world politics. But on the other hand, this could also be pointing to complacency by EU member states, as if they did not realise the seriousness and the fast pace of the changes in world politics, and as if they believed that the changing conditions of world politics would necessarily be favourable for the EU. By December 2014, EU foreign policy has not developed a flexible common approach that would be suited specifically to the changing conditions of world politics; even though, already in 2014, further developments were noticeable in the EU's neighbourhood that were becoming a cause of concern – a deteriorating situation in Ukraine in connection to the EU's relationship with Russia, and a growing number of refugees from the war-torn Syria. The situation might have begun to change in 2015 and 2016 with the initiative of the European Council and the High Representative for CFSP to develop a global EU strategy but it remains to be seen how the strategy and its implementation turn out, particularly in relation to the changing context of world politics, and whether the EU is able to change the patterns that its foreign policy has been (re)producing.

Such awareness of world politics is significant because, as has been mentioned in the analysis, the changes that have been occurring in world politics have also opened up the question of what *is* world politics. What is this stage that the EU and its member states have jointly wanted to be recognized on? What is it defined by? It seems that, as has been demonstrated by the changes that have been going on in world politics particularly since the beginning of the 21st century, world politics has been defined from one moment, year or period to the next, as all the actors that recognised themselves and that were recognised as actors in world politics were trying to influence or define world politics. In other words, what has appeared as world politics has been the result of actions by a variety of actors, as well as



numerous other developments and (also unforeseen) circumstances. Also, it could be observed in the recent years that world politics has not been something static, but a series of developments, continually moving and changing, and that it has been, through the years, characterized by relations on the axes between different powers and developments in different geographical and issue areas. That is, world politics has not only been an emergent, but also a constantly emerging reality. With reference to this, particularly the most recent developments, it may be asked whether, in world politics, conditions that are permanently evolving or unstable (lacking clear underpinnings of stability, such as the USA in the 1990s or the bipolar structure of world politics during the Cold War) may lead to a kind of stability, especially if none of the trends and powers in world politics are clearly prevalent. To some extent, it seems that this has been going on since the beginning of the 21st century.

If world politics is an emergent, constantly changing reality, composed among others from actors and affairs that are mutually recognised as significant during a certain period of time, and if the periods of time during which characteristics of world politics are constant or unchanging are becoming shorter, this is important also from the perspective of the EU. This is because such circumstances of world politics open up the opportunity or, rather, multiple opportunities for action by individual actors in world politics to try to influence and change the circumstances or the course of world politics. But, as well, it might be expected that, since world politics is also (re)produced from one period of time to the next, it could be successfully influenced by those actors who would be attuned to the present state of world politics, but also to the potential for and direction of changes, and would thus be able to use the present conditions of world politics to bring about or facilitate the changes that they desire.

It thus seems significant to reflect that the EU and its foreign policy too are emergent, constantly (re)produced social and political reality and are, therefore, capable of adapting to the changing conditions of world politics – namely, as the results of the four analytical studies have shown, there have been cases in the past as well as in more recent years when the EU and its foreign policy have adapted to the changing circumstances in the world (such as enlargement, climate change, but also the establishment of CFSP itself and EPC before it).<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> As mentioned in the prolegomena, there are authors in the field of mostly rationalist or neorealist schools of international relations who have argued that the EU was not an actor or could not yet be an actor in world politics (e.g. Kagan 2003; Hyde-Price 2006; Krotz 2009). Their views, which have implicitly contributed to the reification of the idea of EU identity in world politics (by denying the possibility of such identity, or defining the conditions for it) have been discussed in the first part of this thesis leading to the analysis – but even these authors have allowed the possibility of the EU being or becoming an actor in world politics (*ibid.*; among others by acquiring more capacity for autonomous action and more martial capabilities).

What consequences could follow from this from the perspective of EU foreign policy? Firstly, the patterns of foreign policy-making that EU foreign policy has been (re)producing could be explicitly recognized and reflected. In a large part, these patterns have pursued the internal goals of European integration (as exemplified by the frequently used simile of achieving “one voice” in world politics). However, regarding the changing conditions of world politics, EU foreign policy needs to be explicitly (re)oriented towards achieving (mainly) external goals. Moreover it would need to be considered how flexibility or openness of EU foreign policy and of the idea of EU identity in world politics could be realised in practice with reference to the most pressing external issues as well as in world politics in general (also with regard to other actors), and with respect to achieving consensus among the member states. Also, although with regard to a number of past issues that EU foreign policy was dealing with already full use of existing possibilities available within EU foreign policy might have sufficed to address those issues there have been a number of cases where this has not been done. It would therefore need to be reflected how to allow for the full use of the existing possibilities available within EU foreign policy in the first place, as well as, as has been mentioned, how existing EU foreign policy could be re-oriented to address the continuing changes in world politics.

Regarding this, it does not seem to be useful to categorise EU foreign policy within the binary oppositions that have been characteristic for it such as soft vs. hard power, for example. In its history, it has appeared to have functioned at its best when it had been able not only to respond but also to anticipate new developments in world politics and when it had adapted and transformed its reactions and the idea of EU identity in world politics it had been (re)producing in accordance with this, such as in the case of the beginning of the end of the Cold War in Europe. With respect to the fast pace of changes in world politics, a course of action to take these changes into account might therefore be to pay attention to the changes, to have awareness and the possibilities to act when a need for this is identified, to regularly reflect and change the course of foreign policy if needed, and to be open and adaptable to new ways of thinking and action.

Having reflected the situation of the EU and its foreign policy in world politics, a response may be pondered to the question that arose in the analysis, of whether the EU could be seen as one of the key powers in world politics. Considering the discussion above, an answer to this would probably have to take into account the prevailing circumstances of world politics, the specific issues and geographical areas in question, as well as whether, from an

internal EU perspective, those areas and issues are such that a consensus on how to approach them might be achieved between EU member states.

Such reflection of EU foreign policy also has consequences with regard to the idea of EU identity in world politics that EU foreign policy has been (re)producing. As found in the analysis, EU foreign policy has usually been implicitly understood as a process of EU identity formation in world politics. However this has meant that EU identity in world politics has been imagined and thus fixed in advance, and that EU foreign policy has been seen as a process of realising this pre-conceived idea(1) of identity. Conversely, as the analysis of EU foreign policy has shown, EU foreign policy has had a demonstrable impact in world politics in those cases where, among other factors affecting EU foreign policy, EU identity in world politics has been seen as flexible, i.e. where the conception of this identity, of what the EU could be and do in world politics, was remoulded by the actors participating in EU foreign policy with regard to the changing circumstances of world politics.

Also, as has been seen in the analysis with respect to the beginning of cooperation in the field of foreign policy among EEC member states, an agreed vision of EU identity in world politics does not represent a necessary precondition for cooperation in the field of foreign policy. The establishing of EU identity in world politics namely began as a political project after cooperation in the field of foreign policy had already been underway, in 1973 with the adoption of the Document on the European Identity. This shows that, for the beginning of foreign policy cooperation among EEC member states, shared agreement on or assessment of the external situation was needed, and a recognition that it would be more beneficial for EEC member states to address this situation jointly than on their own. From this perspective, the quest to realise the envisaged EU identity in world politics (in the sense of fulfilling the EU's role and responsibilities in world politics) seems to have functioned, in the history of EU foreign policy following its establishment, as an ongoing implicit reconfirmation of the will of EEC/ EU member states to work together in the field of foreign policy and thus, on some occasions, also as a substitute for lack of common external action when this happened to be the case.

Conceived in this manner, the idea of EU identity in world politics might be seen as something that is actually always open and that may be filled with different meanings. This paves the way to a deconstructive reversal of the binary oppositions that EU foreign policy discourse has been using with regard to world politics, particularly some of the emerging powers. A deconstructive reversal is the final step of the approach of deconstruction, where the main binary oppositions that have been found in a discourse are reversed so that the term

which has previously been denigrated is privileged, and vice versa. In case of the discourse of EU foreign policy, one of its main binary oppositions has been that between the EU as a member of the international community and the emerging powers which have been seen as in need of being socialized into the international community. The perspective of reversing this binary opposition would ask whether perhaps the actor in need of being socialized into the current circumstances of world politics are not (only) the emerging powers, but (also) the EU itself. In this light, the EU could engage in each of the issues in world politics anew, without fixed expectations with regard to its own role, and without using stereotypical rhetoric towards other actors. Thus, the EU could build its identity in the current changing circumstances of world politics as it goes, and as possible in each of the developing situations, in accordance with the emergent character of current world politics. A successful foreign policy in the current circumstances of world politics, which has already been initiated by the EU in some areas (such as international climate change negotiations), could therefore mean a series of small successes in the sense of achieving the EU's own cooperation, input and recognition in those cases where issues of global importance, but also those issues of regional importance that may affect the EU, are discussed and decided on the level of world politics. From the perspective of the reversal of the main binary oppositions that EU foreign policy has been using, consequently, the EU could also see and construct its own identity in world politics as that of an emerging power. Although some EU member states had been world powers by themselves in the past, it should not be forgotten that the EU as such is only trying to establish itself as a global power. To succeed, perhaps it would need to see itself in this light, and not as if it already was a global actor (an image that has often been conveyed by the discourses of EU foreign policy), particularly in relation to the emerging powers and with reference to the changing circumstances of world politics.

The discussion of the idea of EU identity in world politics also touches the issue of openness as opposed to closure of social ideas and discourses. On the one hand, as mentioned in the introductory part, societies need to define the bases of their existence and they also need to delimit themselves from their outside. Thus, closures of meaning or signification are being made. On the other hand, awareness of the closures of meaning they are (re)producing, of the way closures may delimit ideas and action, and of possibilities of their change may allow societies to develop and adapt to new circumstances. This is encapsulated in the processes of signification as contained in key binary oppositions or axes of valorization that discourses use: every process of signification, of creating meaning means that a universe of possibilities is closed and narrowed down to certain relations as circumscribed by the axes of

valorization or binary oppositions of the discourse concerned. Thus, to have any possibility of signification, infinite possibilities of signification are made finite. This, in turn, raises the question of how to allow for adjustment of meanings or development of new meanings if a need for this arises. With respect to the EU, for example, a necessary precondition for any EU foreign policy discourse and thus also a vital closure is represented by the continued existence of the EU and its integration process. Another closure which represents a basis of the EU as well as its foreign policy would be respect for the fundamental values that have been defined in the Treaty of Lisbon. But this kind of closure needs to be differentiated from the closures that have been made in the discourse of EU foreign policy due to unreflected historical repetition of a number of established narratives and other discursive figures. In this case, awareness is possible that these closures have been made and that they may be adjusted to new circumstances, particularly with regard to the changing conditions of world politics. In other words, if we apply this to the idea of EU identity in world politics, this identity may be expected to reflect the basic premises that the EU has been founded upon such as the values mentioned in the Treaty of Lisbon; but it may also be adjusted taking into account, among others, the changing circumstances of world politics.

In relation to this, it may be recalled that the EU itself, and European Economic Community and European Coal and Steel Community before it, have been constructed as responses to addressing a key issue of peaceful coexistence of the countries on the European continent following the Second World War. Moreover, also EU foreign policy has been created as a mechanism to address a common problem identified by EEC member states in the 1960s, of how they could increase their political weight and impact in world politics through political cooperation, among others in the field of foreign policy, and in the context of the first EEC enlargement.

It is perhaps significant that this also indicates that, in the history of EU identity formation, politically-led projects on the basis of necessity seem to have been crucial while there was less link to bottom-up processes of construction of this identity. In the case of the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe, this has led to rejection of the results of the political project agreed at EU level on popular referenda in individual member states. If EU identity, together with its external dimension, is seen as mainly a political project, this entails a risk that this idea of identity can only be accessed and shaped by those who have access to the political project. This is in contrast with the perspective (observed e.g. by Eurobarometer) of identity as something that can be possessed by individuals. But although the interactions between these different perspectives would merit a detailed analysis by themselves, the

analysis in this thesis has shown that both top-down as well as bottom-up processes have been involved in the construction of the external aspect of the idea of EU identity, as there have been cases where they had fed into each other (such as enlargement).

Notwithstanding this, the success of the EU and its foreign policy shows that in the past, when sufficiently great challenges have arisen in their surroundings or external environment the states on the European continent have been capable of inventing new mechanisms for cooperation or adapting or changing their existing mechanisms of cooperation to enable themselves to respond to the challenges they have been encountering. This has been so also with regard to EU foreign policy which demonstrates that EU foreign policy is an emergent social and political reality which may be changed if a sufficiently large need for this is identified by a sufficient number of the actors concerned. Such changes may be facilitated if the bottom-up aspects of EU identity-formation are taken into account.

By way of a conclusion, assumptions and binary oppositions that have underpinned this thesis need to be illuminated and reflected. A premise which has affected this writing but has not been mentioned explicitly has been that it has been written from an internal EU perspective; from its outside, as mentioned before, the EU could look markedly different. Also, this writing has been affected by the fact that it has mainly taken place in the period during which world politics particularly in the EU's neighbourhood, as well as EU foreign policy, have been experiencing the most noticeable changes in recent history, aside from the processes that have ended the Cold War in the beginning of the 1990s. This may have led to an even greater impression of the changes taking place in world politics and of a need for a reflected response by EU foreign policy. A main binary opposition that has been underlying this writing, including the research questions and theses posed in the beginning may be identified: closure or inability to adapt EU foreign policy/ identity nexus to the circumstances of world politics versus its flexibility or openness.

This is not the only and perhaps not even the most important binary opposition along which EU foreign policy/ identity nexus might develop. It is not necessary that the conditions of world politics and EU foreign policy would revolve in the future in the framework of these binary oppositions. It is possible that EU foreign policy continues to develop in the future in a manner of its own, a pragmatic manner based on the historical development of EU foreign policy. It is also possible that it might develop in a completely new, different manner.

However, this may be expected if world politics remains largely as it is (*ceteris paribus*), relatively balanced and peaceful. Under these circumstances, EU foreign policy may be expected to continue developing as it has been used to working in such environment. But if

a greater destabilisation occurs in world politics, it is not necessary that EU foreign policy would be able to react in time nor appropriately. Consequences of this could be serious and could lead to a decomposition of political cooperation in the EU. So far, EU foreign policy has been giving an impression of bureaucracy due to its intransigence and adherence to its established patterns. In the beginning of this thesis, it has been argued that EU foreign policy needed to respond to the changes in world politics in a flexible manner that would adapt continuously to emerging challenges. However, as the analysis has shown, the main concern is rather whether EU foreign policy reacts at all.

In this regard, it should not be forgotten that EU foreign policy is not only *policy* but also *politics* i.e. it is of a political nature. Therefore, including in its discourse, it uses political tools. It should avoid falling under its own spell. Namely, from the analysis in this thesis it has been seen that the idea of EU identity has already been open, i.e. it has already *been changing*, all the time of its existence, among others via the process of enlargement as well as through the actions of fabulous retroactivity (through which it has been filled with meanings in a manner that made this production of meanings look as if the meanings produced have already existed prior to the act of producing them). In other words, *de facto*, the idea of EU identity has been changing all the time even though its signifiers have been giving it an appearance of closure. In turn, this means that the idea of EU identity *is* changing all the time (for example, most recently in the process of enlargement, it has ceased to refer to a united Europe). Therefore, the question is only whether this factual constant *change* of the idea of EU identity could be explicitly acknowledged, discussed and perhaps re-conceptualized, with regard to the changing circumstances of world politics. Also, considering previous experience, among others with the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe, such re-conceptualization of the idea of EU identity would need to take account of the bottom-up processes of identity construction, and/ or any processes of collective identity formation that might already be going on.

In practice, for EU foreign policy within the changing context of world politics (and while any prescriptions that close off other policy options should be avoided), this would mean being aware of own identity and the identity of others in world politics, and paying attention to the processes of identity formation that underlie foreign policy-making. Any closures should only be made following a conscious, reflected decision. In terms of the meta-discourse of EU foreign policy, this could be illustrated through a different approach that might be adopted with regard to the main strategies of othering that have been present in EU foreign policy discourses: temporal othering, geopolitical othering and North-South othering.

With regard to the first, while EU discourses have used the picture of Europe as it had been during the two World Wars to remind the EU what it should avoid, in the present circumstances of world politics, such reminders probably apply not only to Europe internally, but might need to be voiced on the level of the world as a whole. Secondly, EU foreign policy discourses have been using, in the past, geopolitical othering referring to the US as well as the USSR/ Russia and China (as well as North-South othering with regard to Russia and China). However, it would be probably more in line with the present realities of world politics if such key actors were seen and acknowledged as powers in their own right. This holds also for the EU's neighbourhood, for which EU foreign policy discourses and practice have been using North-South othering. Each of the countries in the neighbourhood could be seen and approached as a power and culture in its own right, in line with the EU's motto: *e pluribus unum*. In addition, an equal approach to all the countries in the neighbourhood might be beneficial for both the EU and its neighbours, but might involve a different perspective on the idea of EU identity.

Finally, the metaphor of the elephant whose shape the four blind men tried to comprehend from the introductory part (*cf.* Puchala 1972) could also be applied to the current circumstances of world politics and the actors participating in it: world politics is not something external to the EU, USA, Russia or China or other countries and actors who participate in it. It exists *through* the actors (i.e. the social world) that (co-)create it. Whether they are aware of this or not, this is the responsibility that all the actors in world politics including the EU hold in their hands: *they are* the elephant.



## **POST SCRIPTUM 2015-2016**

Since December 2014, the cut-off date for the analysis in this thesis, much has been going on in the EU's vicinity, on the level of world politics, and in connection to the policies which have been considered in the analysis: among others further unrest in the EU's neighbourhood (Syria, Libya and Ukraine) which has been connected to the refugee crisis, and June 2016 British referendum decision to leave the EU (Brexit). While the intention of this part is not to provide further analysis up to the current date, it is useful to look into the developments that have been occurring in 2015-2016 that might have a bearing (also in the future) on the workings of EU foreign policy. Specifically, with regard to the findings made in the thesis, the main question with regard to the events in 2015-2016 is whether and in what manner EU foreign policy has been able to react to the new events; and whether EU foreign policy/identity nexus has retained the patterns and the idea of EU identity it had been (re)producing in the past, or have perhaps new patterns/ new perspective on the idea of EU identity been developed. With this purpose, this postscript briefly looks into EU foreign policy in the main areas where the new developments have been occurring: neighbourhood policy in connection to the refugee crisis, enlargement policy and new developments (also with regard to Turkey), climate change policy following the climate deal made in Paris in December 2015, and the development of EU foreign policy as such, to which the issue of Brexit and the relations with (other) key world powers are connected.

### **Neighbourhood: refugee crisis**

Syria represented a crucial crisis area in the EU's Southern neighbourhood connected to a host of other issues (millions of refugees and strained relations with Turkey) in the period 2015-2016. In the end of 2014 and the first half of 2015, the EU expressed support for the efforts of UN Special Envoy for Syria to achieve a de-escalation of the crisis, and *called on* regional and international actors "with influence over the Syria parties" to play a constructive role (Council of Ministers 2014l; Joint Communication 2015a). In concrete terms, the EU provided humanitarian aid in response to the crisis, and implemented sanctions against Syrian regime (*ibid.*). In February 2015, the Commission and the High Representative published a Joint Communication on an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq, in which, in addition to this, high-level diplomacy in the region was foreseen as a key tool for EU response, and support was expressed to (US-led) Global Coalition to counter ISIL; at the same time, the Joint Communication mentioned that EU Council of Ministers has not adopted any decision

on EU operational engagement, nor has the EU been tasked with coordinating such efforts (Joint Communication 2015a, 7-8). As a main line of action, seeking of international consensus on Syria on the level of the UNSC was foreseen and preparing for “the ‘day after’” (*ibid.*). The EU thus did not put forward own proposals on how to approach resolving the conflict; and saw its role (i.e. constructed its idea of identity) with regard to this conflict as supporting the efforts of (other) key actors on the level of world politics.

In November 2015, EU foreign ministers discussed Syria with UN Special Envoy and stated that the EU *stood ready* to continue contributing via humanitarian aid, and on a political level, by bringing the opposing parties to a negotiating table (Council of Ministers 2015a). In December 2015, the European Council (2015b) expressed full support to efforts of International Syria Support Group to end the conflict, and stated the EU was committed to its “*active engagement*” in this group (emphasis added). In terms of discourse analysis, this was a *magnifying* adjective – International Syria Support Group was formed on US and Russian initiative in November 2015 following Russian aerial attacks in Syria in September 2015; the EU was its member but the group was led by the US and Russia. Nevertheless, the EU’s participation in the group also indicated that the EU managed to become included in efforts to address the conflict on the level of world politics.

In February 2016, EU foreign ministers expressed support to UNSC resolution 2254 which contained a “roadmap” for a Syrian peace process that was agreed by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) in December 2015 (Council of Ministers 2016a). In May 2016, EU foreign ministers’ discourse on Syria continued to feature magnifying adjectives, as the ministers discussed stepping up “*active support*” by the EU to UN Special Envoy and saw the EU as an “*active member*” of ISSG (*ibid.* 2016b). In terms of concrete practice, engagement with regional actors towards implementation of the UN roadmap was foreseen and contribution to ISSG’s humanitarian efforts (*ibid.*). Therefore, the discourse and actions of the European Council and EU foreign ministers on Syria in 2015-2016 were similar to the previous period as the EU supported the actions of other players in world politics and was itself involved on the margins, through humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. In addition, this resembled the pattern of EU foreign policy on the Middle East (as shown in the first case study) due to the indirect manner of engagement by the EU and the dependence of EU foreign policy on the circumstances in world politics – but it was different from the EU’s policy on the Middle East in that, for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU has been putting forward its proposals for conflict resolution and missions, which was not the case for Syria. Therefore, with regard to this crisis, in practice, the identity of the EU in world politics was constructed

by EU foreign policy and visible to the (other) key actors on the level of world politics as that of supporting those (other) key actors.

EU foreign policy discourse and actions on Libya were similar to those on Syria. Also with regard to the situation in Libya, in the first half of 2015, the European Council and EU foreign ministers expressed support to UN-facilitated dialogue between the parties and to efforts of Special Representative of UN Secretary-General; and called on regional actors and neighbours of Libya to “use *their* influence” for a positive outcome of the peace talks (emphasis added; Council of Ministers 2015b; 2015c; European Council 2015c). They also stated the EU *stood ready* to support *implementation* of a peace agreement once a Government of National Unity was formed in Libya (*ibid.*). This was similar to EU discourses on the Middle East which had also anticipated EU participation with regard to the conflict with respect to *implementation* of a peace agreement once it was reached.

Towards the second half of 2015, EU foreign policy discourses in connection to Libya started to mention the refugee/ migrant crisis in Central Mediterranean. In April, at a special meeting of the European Council (2015c), support was expressed to UN-led efforts in Libya, and reinforcement was decided of EU border agency Frontex operations Triton and Poseidon (naval operations with regard to illegal migrations in the Mediterranean led by Italy and Greece, respectively); also, discussions started on a CSDP mission in this vein. In October, the foreign ministers emphasised that solution of the Libyan conflict was crucial for addressing migratory flows in Central Mediterranean and expressed readiness to support Libyan authorities in addressing illegal migration (Council of Ministers 2015d).

Although the EU was directly affected and participated in resolving the refugee/ migrant crisis in Central Mediterranean, it was not directly involved in addressing the conflict in Libya on the level of world politics. In January 2016, EU foreign ministers expressed support for political agreement between the Libyan parties that was reached in December 2015 within UN-facilitated dialogue which enabled the formation of a Government of National Unity; and expressed readiness to support Libyan authorities through aid and assistance in security sector reform (Council of Ministers 2016c). In June 2016, the Council enhanced CSDP naval operation Sophia in Central Mediterranean (that was launched in June 2015 within EU approach to migration – more on this will be said below) with tasks to enforce arms embargo on Libya and train Libyan coastguard which was noted by the UNSC in its resolution 2292 (*ibid.* 2016d). Thus, the discourse and actions of EU foreign policy with regard to Libya replicated those in the case of the Middle East, as well as on Syria, as the EU (and thus its idea of identity) came to be acknowledged on the level of world politics as an

actor; but the EU was not directly involved in the peace efforts on the level of world politics and rather worked to support the implementation of the peace agreement.

The focus on Southern neighbourhood meant that less attention was dedicated by the European Council and EU foreign ministers to Eastern neighbourhood in 2015-2016; nevertheless, the EU continued its policy of deepening its relations with its Eastern partners, including Belarus. On Ukraine, the December 2014 and March 2015 European Council (2014f; 2015c) repeated the EU's intention of not recognizing "the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol" and of continuing EU sanctions against Russia until full implementation of the Minsk agreement. The European Council also decided on further macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, and, with regard to the peace process, stated that the EU *stood ready* to support the OSCE's capacity to monitor the implementation of the Minsk agreements, as well as to continue the trilateral process with Russia and Ukraine on energy cooperation and implementation of EU-Ukraine free trade area (*ibid.*). This statement showed that, also with regard to Ukraine, the EU did not manage to become directly involved in addressing the conflict with Russia, and that there was continued interdependence, despite the deterioration in their political relations, between the EU, Russia and Ukraine in the areas of energy as well as trade.

On 1 January 2016, the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) between the EU and Ukraine began to be implemented. Furthermore, the EU took steps to finalize association agreements with Georgia and Moldova, and in May 2016, the Council decided they would enter into force with July 2016 (Council of Ministers 2016b). Furthermore, a framework to deepen bilateral relations was opened with Armenia in December 2015, and the Council stated the EU's readiness to deepen its relations with Azerbaijan (*ibid.* 2015). In February 2016, the Council highlighted the importance of the relations with Belarus, and decided, in view of Belarus' cooperation, including within the Eastern partnership, and the release of political prisoners in Belarus, to continue with suspension of most of the EU's restrictive measures against Belarus (*ibid.* 2016a). This policy of deepening of the relations with partners further to the East in 2015-2016 in the framework of the EU's neighbourhood policy meant that, in practice, the idea of EU identity (in world politics) was evolving; however this was not acknowledged or reflected in EU foreign policy discourses.

The unsettled situation in the EU's Southern neighbourhood – Syria and Libya – fuelled the *refugee* (or *migrant*, as sometimes called in EU discourses) crisis that the EU was faced with in 2015-2016: in the spring and early summer of 2015, it became apparent that there was a crisis, as tens of thousands of *people* (mostly from Syria and Iraq, but also sub-Saharan

Africa, Afghanistan and other countries) tried to cross into EU countries, on the one hand from Libya through Central Mediterranean to Italy, and on the other from Turkey to Greece, through Western Balkans countries Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary and then to Austria, Germany and further EU countries (during the crossing, thousands died in Central and Eastern Mediterranean waters). The EU first reacted to this in a statement made by the June 2015 European Council (2015a), highlighting the launch of CSDP operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia with the mandate to disrupt human smuggling networks and prevent loss of life at sea in Central Mediterranean; the European Council also emphasised the importance of developing a partnership with African countries to handle illegal migration, and of stepping up cooperation with Turkey and other relevant countries in the Middle East. In July 2015, the Council of Ministers (2015f) issued another statement mentioning that the impact of migration needed to be “adequately reflected” in implementation of “European external policy”.

The refugee crisis continued with tens of thousands of people crossing mostly through Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary during the summer of 2015; Hungary started closing its borders in mid-September 2015, which caused the flow of people to be re-oriented from Serbia through Croatia and Slovenia to Austria. A first response on EU level was at the meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Council in mid-September (2015g), which decided on support to capacities of affected Western Balkans countries to manage borders and process refugee/ migrant flows, and on a relocation scheme of refugees from Italy and Greece to other EU countries. Also, in September, a Joint Communication by the Commission and the High Representative was published on the role of EU external action in addressing the crisis (Joint Communication 2015b). While the Communication recognized that the crisis originated in the conflicts in the neighbourhood, it repeated EU foreign policy discourse that, on Syria and Iraq, the EU was “supporting initiatives” to find a political solution, and that the EU mobilised humanitarian assistance and stabilisation funding (*ibid.*, 4). It also announced that a dialogue on supporting refugees and enhancing border controls had been started with Turkey (*ibid.*, 5). With regard to Libya, the Communication stated the EU was “actively supporting” the UN-facilitated dialogue and assisting the migrant populations in Libya (*ibid.*, 7). Although it dwelled on the conflicts in Syria and Libya, the Communication did not mention European Neighbourhood Policy.

EU approach to addressing the refugee crisis was defined via a series of meetings in October 2015. On 8 October, a conference on the Western Balkans route took place in Luxembourg between EU countries and the third countries concerned (Western Balkans third

countries, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon). On 12 October, Foreign Affairs Council stated that the “crises in and beyond our neighbourhood” were underlining a need for an “external migration and asylum policy for the EU”, but that, with regard to addressing the conflicts in Syria and Libya, the Council continued to “support diplomatic initiatives by the UN” (Council of Ministers 2015d). In concrete terms, it mentioned the work to elaborate an Action Plan with Turkey on refugees and migration, and Valetta Summit with African countries of origin that took place from 11 to 12 November (*ibid.*). Thus, the main line of action that the EU took, besides CSDP operation Sophia, was the Action Plan agreed with Turkey on 15 October, welcomed by a statement of the European Council on the same day which also mentioned that Turkey’s accession process needed to be re-energized, and activated through a joint EU-Turkey statement following the meeting of EU heads of state or government with Turkey on 29 November (European Commission 2015a; European Council 2015e; EU-Turkey statement 2015): on EU side, it foresaw financial assistance to Turkey of an initial three billion EUR, and steps to complete visa liberalisation process with Turkey by autumn 2016, and on Turkey’s side strengthened border controls and measures to assist refugees in Turkey, as well as a readmission regime by Turkey to be in force from June 2016. It thus seemed that, with regard to the refugee crisis, EU foreign policy focused on dealing with the flow of people, while the EU saw the resolution of the conflicts producing these flows as responsibility of other actors on the level of world politics; and that a key thrust of EU foreign policy in practice was to work on the EU’s relations with Turkey, among others in connection to enlargement.

This policy continued in the first half of 2016 – in February and March 2016, the European Council stated that full implementation of the Action Plan with Turkey remained a priority, and called for strengthened cooperation with Western Balkans countries in view of handling the refugee crisis (European Council 2016a; 2016b). On 18 March 2016, a second EU-Turkey Statement was adopted that declared that the EU began to disburse the three billion EUR of assistance to Turkey, and that contained a new agreement that, from March 2016, all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to Greek islands would be returned to Turkey while the EU would instead accept Syrian refugees from Turkey. In the end of June, the European Council (2016c) found that crossings from Turkey to Greek islands “have sharply decreased” while the flows of people in Central Mediterranean remained on the same level as in 2015; considering this, it announced an “External Investment Plan” targeting the countries of origin to be proposed by the European Commission by September 2016.

Concerning the refugee crisis overall, therefore, it may be found that EU foreign policy reacted, but was able to act with regard to the consequences and not the causes of the events in world politics to which the crisis the EU faced was related. Significantly perhaps, European Council and Council discourses on the crisis in general did not mention signifiers related to the idea of EU identity but rather focused on dealing with how to “stem migration flows” (European Council 2016a); one mention of signifiers related to identity however was in the Commission and High Representative’s Joint Communication on the external dimension of the refugee crisis (Joint Communication 2015b), which mentioned values when it stated that “solidarity, responsibility and unity” were needed “to live up to the legal, institutional and moral obligations” the EU faced. Moreover, it might be found that, taking into account the definition of identity provided in the introductory part (which includes how the EU appears to other actors in world politics), an image of the EU and thus its identity in world politics has been produced through EU foreign policy dealings in connection to this crisis, including EU interactions with the main outside actors, i.e. Turkey, Western Balkans and Middle Eastern countries, and (other) actors on the level of world politics.

In November 2015, the Commission and High Representative published a Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy – ENP (Joint Communication 2015c). The Communication emphasised the interdependence between the EU and its neighbours as demonstrated by the refugee crisis, energy crises as well as terrorist acts in the EU; in view of this, it recognized that a main challenge in many neighbouring countries was stabilisation, to be addressed by alleviating poverty and inequality, as well as engagement with these countries in security sector (*ibid.*, 2-4). Due to a need for flexibility identified in a public consultation prior to the Communication, the ENP review foresaw DCFTAs for those neighbouring countries who wanted them, and flexible trade agreements for other countries (*ibid.*, 7). It also declared the intention of full energy market integration with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine through Energy Community (*ibid.*, 12). With regard to addressing the conflicts in the neighbourhood, it stated the intention of using “where necessary, CSDP missions” or EU Special Representatives “to support” the settlement of conflicts (*ibid.*, 14). In its response to the Communication, the Council agreed with this and called for better coherence of ENP with “the EU’s other actions abroad” (Council of Ministers 2015e). Thus, although the ENP review recognised the impacts that conflicts in the neighbourhood had for the EU, and a need for greater flexibility of the instruments used in the management of the EU’s relations with its neighbours, ENP continued to be based on the assumption that the EU would be able to work with the countries that had stable institutions in place, without taking into account that in

some of the neighbouring countries, those institutions were not there due to the entrenched conflicts. Also, the Communication did not mention what needed to be done on the level of world politics to address those conflicts. In this respect, from the perspective of discourse analysis, the EU's vision of its neighbourhood contained in the reviewed ENP continued to represent a *figured world* the EU has constructed for its neighbourhood.

In sum, regarding EU foreign policy discourse and actions on its neighbourhood in 2015-2016, it may be said that EU foreign policy *reacted* to the events *after* they unfolded, and that its reactions were effective in addressing the consequences of the developments in the neighbourhood – but not their causes. Also, EU foreign policy seemed to have an impact in mitigating the consequences of these developments limited to the area of the EU/ Europe, but did not produce foreign policy outputs nor impacts on the level of world politics. As shown above, EU foreign policy patterns from 2009-2014, and also from before 2009, were retained in 2015-2016. The idea of EU identity did not seem to change – in fact, signifiers implying identity considerations were in general not mentioned in European Council's and the Council's discourses with regard to the neighbourhood in 2015-2016. It thus seems as if an idea of EU identity has been (re)produced through their dealing with the events related to the neighbourhood in practice, but without this having been acknowledged or reflected by EU foreign policy discourses.

### **Enlargement: slow-down/ Turkey**

In December 2014, the Council reaffirmed enlargement as a “key policy” for the EU contributing to “peace, democracy, security and prosperity in Europe” together with a need for “rigorous conditionality”; but there was a new element in its discourse emphasising the importance of “deepening cooperation on foreign policy issues” with the countries included in this process, such as on Russia and Ukraine (Council of Ministers 2014m). Thus, enlargement was connected to crucial EU foreign policy issues in 2015-2016 also from a new perspective, in consideration of the developments in the EU's neighbourhood as well as on the level of world politics that were relevant to the EU. The Council dedicated particular attention to Turkey as a “candidate country” and “a key partner”, in the light of its “important *regional* role” particularly regarding developments in Syria and Iraq, and highlighted a need for dialogue with Turkey on foreign policy issues (*ibid.*; emphasis added). Nevertheless, it also noted there has been no progress in Turkey's relations with the Republic of Cyprus (*ibid.*).



Attention was also given to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), as the Council of Ministers (2014l) required written commitment by BiH Presidency and Parliament to undertake reforms within BiH's EU accession process, and only agreed with the conclusion and entry into force of BiH's Stabilisation and Association Agreement in March 2015 after this commitment was made by BiH (*ibid.* 2015c; 2015h). Thus, in practice, the EU used BiH's accession process to steer this country in the direction of reforms it saw as necessary for it nearing the EU. There was also a new development with regard to Iceland, which informed the Council in March 2015 that it should not be regarded as a candidate country (*ibid.*).

However, potentially the most significant development with regard to the enlargement process 2015-2016 was Commission Communication on EU enlargement strategy of September 2015 (European Commission 2015b). In this Communication, the Commission firstly acknowledged enlargement as "an investment in peace, security and stability in Europe"; but, in continuation, stated that the challenges faced by all the countries covered by enlargement policy including Turkey were "such that *none*" would be ready to join the EU by the end of 2019 (*ibid.*, 2; emphasis added). This was the first Commission Communication on enlargement that explicitly excluded the possibility of any of the countries included in this process acceding to the EU in the period covered by the Communication. At the same time, the Commission found that, since the Western Balkans and Turkey have both been affected by the refugee crisis, "increased cooperation with the wider region" was needed to address this (*ibid.*, 3). It also stated that commitment to "core EU values" would represent the backbone of enlargement policy (*ibid.*). Thus, the Commission implicitly highlighted the idea of EU identity in the discourse of its enlargement Communication by referring to EU values, but announced a slow-down of the enlargement process in practice until the end of 2019. This was in contrast with the discourse of the European Council both on the Western Balkans and Turkey, which, regarding the refugee crisis, called for a "strengthening of cooperation with the Western Balkans countries" in March 2016, and stated already in October 2015 that the accession process with Turkey needed to be re-energized (European Council 2015e; 2016a).

It thus seemed as if, from the perspective of EU foreign policy and with regard to the process of enlargement, the refugee crisis, and the relations with Western Balkans countries and Turkey, the European Council and the Commission were working on cross-purposes. Also, with regard to the handling of the refugee crisis, a differentiation in EU approach to the Western Balkans and Turkey could be observed: while Turkey had been announced a boost in its accession process, this was not the case for Western Balkans countries (e.g. Serbia and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) although they too represented key transit countries.

Thus, considering EU foreign policy, the enlargement process in connection to the handling of the refugee crisis exhibited a misalignment and fragmentation of policies in 2015-2016.

This question became more pertinent with July 2015, following a failed coup d'état in Turkey. EU Council of Ministers (2016e) reacted to this by condemning the coup, highlighting Turkey as a candidate country and key partner, and calling for observance of the rule of law and constitutional order in Turkey. But following the coup, voices were raised by some EU members that Turkey could not be seen as possible EU member due to an un-European manner in which the state reacted to the coup. Thus, even though EU door might appear to be shut to the candidates for accession until the end of 2019, also during this period, the process of enlargement would probably continue to represent a crucial ground for the (re)production of the idea of EU identity.

### **Climate change: Paris**

In 2015-2016, in view of the climate summit (21th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change – COP 21) in Paris in December 2015, climate change was discussed twice by the European Council and twice by the Council, and in March 2016, following the agreement reached in Paris, the Commission published a Communication on the next steps for the EU (European Commission 2016).

Ahead of the Paris summit, in March 2015, the European Council (2015c) emphasised “active European climate diplomacy”, and the need to work on financing “technology transfer and capacity building” as key issues for reaching an agreement in Paris. It discussed this under *energy union*, i.e. the objective of the EU to build “strategic energy partnerships” with energy producing and transit countries to promote energy security (*ibid.*). In July 2015, the Council discussed climate diplomacy as an “inherent part” of (EU) foreign policy, and, with the aim of achieving a binding agreement in Paris in December, stressed the need to address finance and capacity building, and stated the agreement would need to reflect “the *world’s evolving geopolitical and economic realities*”; it also underlined the EU’s cooperation with the developing and emerging countries and the EU’s contribution to climate change finance (Council of Ministers 2015f; emphasis added). This shows that, ahead of the Paris summit, the EU was aware of the changed realities of world politics and of the need to take them into account in order to reach an agreement, and also of the importance of taking care of the needs of the developing countries. Therefore, EU foreign policy discourses before the Paris summit

indicated flexibility (openness) of EU foreign policy, with regard to the changing context of world politics.

In December 2015, the European Council welcomed the agreement reached in Paris – the legally binding agreement with the aim of keeping global warming below 2°C and political commitment to pursue efforts to keep global warming below 1.5°C; it again discussed climate change together with energy union (European Council 2015b). The Council discussed climate diplomacy in February 2016 and stated that, before the Paris summit, the EU and its member states engaged in a “High Ambition Coalition” consisting of developed and developing countries which played a “critical role” in the negotiations and on which a coalition could also be built to support ratification and implementation of the Paris agreement (Council of Ministers 2016a). It announced further climate-related action by the EU in high-level bilateral and multilateral fora, and underlined that the EU and its member states were providing climate finance to assist developing countries (*ibid.*).

In its Communication on further steps from Paris, also the European Commission (2016, 2) highlighted a “high level of political coherence in Paris” by EU member states, and that the EU “acted as one”, speaking “with a single and unified *voice*”, together with building “a broad coalition of developed and developing countries” (emphasis added). On the basis of these and the European Council’s and Council’s statements, it can be observed that achieving an agreement in Paris had in practice also been important from two aspects of the idea of EU identity in world politics: firstly, achieving a unified *common voice*, which has been a key signifier as well as an objective related to EU identity in world politics in the discourse of EU foreign policy since its beginnings; as well as cooperating with the other actors in world politics within the changed realities of world politics, which meant finding common ground with the emerging and developing countries (i.e. achieving an agreement in Paris was thus significant for EU identity also from the perspective of how the EU was seen by the other actors in world politics). Furthermore, in this light, the Commission’s Communication outlined further steps for the EU after the Paris agreement: to maintain climate advocacy, ensure implementation of the Paris agreement, and mobilise climate finance for the developing countries (*ibid.*).

In 2015-2016, with regard to climate change policy, it might therefore be concluded that the EU represented one of the makers of this policy on the level of world politics (i.e. it was *proactive*); its foreign policy not only produced outputs but managed to have an impact on the level of world politics (although it remains to be seen when the Paris agreement enters into force and how it will be implemented). The actions of EU foreign policy were in line with the

idea of EU identity in world politics; and the manner in which this idea was expressed through EU foreign policy was adapted to the changed context of world politics as the EU worked on building its cooperation with the emerging as well as developing countries. At the same time, the core idea of EU identity remained the same as it still referred to maintaining a common voice externally. In addition, it also seemed, with regard to the discourse of the European Council, that EU reflections on climate change were related to its sense of security, in particular energy security.

### **Development of EU foreign policy**

The development of EU foreign policy as such in 2015-2016 was marked by rising challenges internally and externally: unstable external environment to the East and South, refugee crisis, terrorist attacks in the EU, and the changing dynamics of world politics due to the emerging powers as well as shifting nature of relations between and with the established as well as emerging powers. From the perspective of EU foreign policy, it represented a positive development that this resulted in a reflection process that produced, in June 2015, a strategic assessment by the High Representative on the EU in a changing global environment (High Representative 2015), and A Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in June 2016 (*ibid.* 2016). Regarding implementation in practice, further CSDP missions were launched (mostly in Africa), relations were developed or deteriorated with (other) key powers in world politics – the US, Russia and China, and EU foreign policy achieved an important success in the form of an agreement on Iran nuclear programme in July 2015. However, from an internal perspective (which has been crucial for EU foreign policy since its inception), EU foreign policy also faced a period of uncertainty due to the result of British referendum to leave the EU in June 2016.

As requested by the European Council in 2013, EU High Representative presented a strategic assessment of the EU in the global environment in June 2015, as a step towards the preparation of a new foreign and security policy strategy. The assessment focused on the character of the new global environment and challenges facing the EU. A discourse analysis shows that the assessment brought new elements and considerations into EU foreign policy, but also retained its key (discursive) patterns. Firstly, it recognized that the world was becoming more *complex, connected*, but also *contested* (these were the main signifiers with which the observed changes in world politics were described; High Representative 2015). It presented the US and the EU in contrasting terms: the US as enjoying “comprehensive global

reach”, and the EU as having “one of the highest per capita incomes”, and saw a “privileged relationship across the Atlantic” as key for the EU; on the other hand, it highlighted the rising power of the emerging countries, China first among them (*ibid.*). In terms of the idea of EU identity in world politics, it thus characterised the EU as a predominantly economic power, and the US and transatlantic relations as the main bilateral relationship the EU should be developing. Moreover, a key *binary opposition* could be recognised in the discourse of the assessment: between the EU and the US on the one hand, and the emerging powers with China at the forefront on the other.

The strategic assessment identified the main challenges it saw for the EU in the “emerging global environment”, and divided these challenges in geographic terms – into “European Neighbours”, “North Africa and the Middle East”, “Africa”, “Atlantic Partnerships” and “Asia” (High Representative 2015). Under European neighbours, the Western Balkans, Turkey as well as Eastern partners were considered – here, the assessment found that, due to the conflict in Ukraine, energy security challenges and “Turkey’s rise as a regional power”, there was a need for “genuine common foreign policy” or “special relationship” with these countries that would include but would not be limited to accession or association (*ibid.*). On the one hand, this indicated an implicit admission that enlargement as well as ENP have so far been the main EU external policies towards these neighbours. Significantly, on the other hand, the assessment recognized that the nature of the relationships the EU was developing with some of its neighbours (to the East and with Turkey) was qualitatively different and could not be subsumed under enlargement policy or ENP. Moreover, the assessment found that ENP was “ill-equipped” for “hard state-building challenges” in the neighbourhood (*ibid.*); it did not, however, reflect on possible alternative policies by the EU. Also, from the perspective of EU foreign policy as well as the idea of EU identity in world politics, it was significant that, in the report, the EU’s relations with the countries in North Africa and the Middle East were not included under the heading that considered the EU’s neighbourhood and enlargement policies, but were discussed separately.

The discourse in the report included a number of new *signifiers* describing the envisaged new modes of action of EU foreign policy: one was *leverage* that it saw the EU as having in trade and development policy, and which the EU could use with regard to its trading partners and neighbours; another was *joined up* EU external action which described a need for EU foreign policy actors to develop closer links between different strands of EU foreign policy (such as enlargement, neighbourhood, migration, or defence policies; High Representative 2015). Due to the “uncertainty” the EU was facing in the world, the strategic

assessment used a binary opposition between EU “agency” in shaping its future versus “turning inwards” to underline the EU’s responsibility to promote “our interests and universal values” (*ibid.*). Nevertheless, the report also stated that the EU had all the means “to be an influential *global player in the future*” – which showed that EU foreign policy discourse continued to use the signifier of the EU as a global player in the framework of a discursive *différance*, as the envisaged state of the EU in the world was different from the current state, and was yet to be achieved (*ibid.*; emphases added). The signifier of the EU as a global player was thus still an ideal that would need to be reached – and was perhaps farther in the future than before, as EU foreign policy discourse now explicitly mentioned that this was a potential future state.

On world politics in general, the assessment found that “the very notion of polarity” was in question, and that there existed a challenge to facilitate a transition towards “a new global order”, which would take account of the “global power shift” (High Representative 2016). It underlined that this required an “ability to adjust” and innovate by the EU; and also mentioned the *simile* of speaking with one voice – it stated that, rather than speaking with one voice, there was a need “for a multitude of voices speaking in unison” (*ibid.*).

Overall, therefore, the strategic assessment was significant for EU foreign policy as the High Representative’s report endeavoured to comprehensively map the shifting nature of world politics from the perspective of the EU. It also contained the first explicit reference in EU foreign policy discourse of a need for flexibility (ability to adapt and innovate). But, at the same time, it seemed compelled to (re)produce the discursive strategies that have been pervasive in EU foreign policy discourses already before 2009 and since its beginning: the simile of speaking with one voice (although the assessment contained a variation on this theme, of a variety of voices speaking in unison); as well as the discursive strategy of *différance*, of the EU not yet being but potentially becoming a global player, at some time in the future. With reference to the discussion on the development of EU foreign policy following the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) from the introductory part (subchapter 2.2.2), it also seemed to be more pragmatically oriented with regard to the changing global environment than previous strategic EU foreign policy documents, such as the European Security Strategy of 2003.

In June 2015, the European Council (2015a) mentioned the High Representative’s strategic assessment as part of the process of strategic reflection to prepare an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy; this was mentioned as the second component of action with regard to the EU’s changing security environment – the first component was (internal)

EU Agenda on Security, and the third further development of CSDP. This showed that the new strategic orientations of EU foreign policy were put in the framework of the EU's reaction to the changes in the security situation in and around the EU.

With regard to implementation of EU foreign policy in practice, on an operational level, in January and March 2015, CSDP missions EUCAP SAHEL Mali to advise and train internal security forces, and EU military advisory mission in Central African Republic were launched (Council of Ministers 2015c; 2015i). At the same time, an electoral observation mission was deployed to Burundi, and negotiations started between the EU and the UN for an agreement on cooperation in crisis management operations (*ibid.* 2015c). EU foreign policy thus continued working in support of crisis management and peace-building in selected countries and areas.

Furthermore, with regard to concrete practice, EU foreign policy achieved an important success in July 2015 when an agreement was reached on Iran nuclear programme in the form of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in Vienna between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US with the coordination of EU High Representative; the Plan was endorsed by the UNSC in its Resolution 2231, and provided for lifting of sanctions against Iran subject to the Plan's provisions (Council of Ministers 2015f). With regard to implementation in practice, this showed that EU foreign policy was capable of achieving impacts of importance on the level of world politics with regard to targeted or regional issues (such as also climate change), and in the role of a mediator between the (other) key actors in world politics. In turn, this contributed to the building of EU identity in world politics in the sense of how the EU was perceived by the (other) actors in world politics; and thus indicated a possible new venue of action for EU foreign policy in the changing context of world politics (that could perhaps be used also with regard to other issues of importance to the EU, such as Libya or Syria).

Another key area where the idea of EU identity in world politics has been developed in 2015-2016 in practice was through the EU's relations with (other) main actors in world politics, the US, Russia and China. With the US, EU foreign policy endeavoured for even closer relations, as negotiations on Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US were finalised. EU economic sanctions against Russia due to its "destabilising role in Eastern Ukraine" (Council of Ministers 2015j) were extended first by the end of 2015, and then by January 2017. In March 2016, the Council discussed the relations with Russia and repeated the principles of the EU's policy toward Russia, including implementation of the Minsk agreements as a condition for change in the EU's position

towards Russia, and possibility of selective engagement with Russia on issues of interest to the EU (*ibid.* 2016f). The relations with Russia thus continued to be on a low level but with an awareness of the EU's interdependence with Russia, and with an open question regarding their further development.

On the relations with China, the Commission and the High Representative published a Joint Communication (2016) for a new EU strategy. It underlined that, in view of China seeking a bigger role internationally, the EU needed "its own strategy", putting "its own interests at the forefront", and one which would help "*define* an increased *role* for China in the international system" (*ibid.*, 2; emphases added). It stressed the EU should have a "unified voice" also with regard to China (*ibid.*, 4). It found the challenge for the EU was "to channel China's participation into positive areas" e.g. peace in Africa, and based on the example of Iran negotiations, areas such as Afghanistan, Syria and Libya (*ibid.*, 12-13). It considered China also with regard to the neighbourhood and stated the EU should work with China to ensure that Chinese investments "in the EU's Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods" reinforced "rules-based governance" (*ibid.*, 13). With respect to global governance, it underlined the EU should encourage China to support global standards and institutions; and that the EU should find policy linkages to "exert more *leverage*" to achieve these interests (*ibid.*, 15, 19; emphasis added). The Communication thus saw China as a rising power in world politics, and treated it in discursive and substantive terms as a power more on par with the EU than previous EU Communications on China. Even so, China was *othered* to a certain degree, as the EU was seen in the position of defining a role for China in the international community. The Communication also applied the new signifier of *leverage* to EU foreign policy practice in its relations with China. Significantly, in discussing this strategy, the Council explicitly mentioned "openness", together with a "level playing field" and "genuine mutual benefits" that were seen as being needed in the EU's relations with China (Council of Ministers 2016e). It stated it expected "China to assume its responsibilities in line with its global impact" and to support the international order from which it benefitted; and also that EU ambitions regarding China encompassed a potential free trade agreement (*ibid.*). It thus appears that China was seen by EU foreign policy as an important global economic actor, but one which still needed to be socialized into the international community that the EU saw itself as being representative of; which was also a continuation of EU foreign policy discourses from the previous period.

In June 2016, the High Representative (2016) presented A Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy that contained the principles and priorities for EU external action



in view of the challenges identified in the High Representative's strategic assessment of 2015. In terms of characterisation of the EU in the changing context of world politics, the Strategy mentioned that the EU had "prided itself on its *soft power*", but that being a "*civilian power*" was not in line with the changing global realities, in which "*soft and hard power*" went "hand in hand" (*ibid.*, 4, 44; emphases added). In terms of discourse analysis, this indicated that academic debates on the EU as a soft or civilian power have found their way into EU foreign policy discourse and implementation at the highest level; and that the Strategy used the *binary opposition* between the EU as a hard versus soft power to underline its vision of how the EU should adapt to the changing context of world politics. In turn, in terms of the process of signification, of creating meanings with regard to EU identity in world politics, this meant that the idea of EU identity in world politics has been narrowed down to this binary opposition. Furthermore, the Strategy stated the EU would share "*global responsibilities* with its partners", that the EU needed an "*outward and forward-looking*" foreign and security policy, and that a stronger EU was needed "*playing its collective role in the world*" (*ibid.*, 4-7; emphases added). The Strategy thus identified a need (which was also identified in the strategic assessment of 2015) to explicitly re-orient EU foreign policy towards the EU's outside, but used the same (floating) signifiers (of role and responsibilities) to describe the idea of EU identity in world politics that have been used by EU foreign policy discourses since its beginning, and also in the same manner, as part of a narrative about the EU becoming a global actor. To these, it added a new signifier, namely on the EU needing to use a *joined up* approach of the different strands of its foreign policy to respond to the changes in world politics (*ibid.*, 11).

The Strategy in fact offered a global as well as structured perspective of EU foreign policy, as it considered the EU's security, its neighbourhood, as well as "global governance for the 21st century", and relations with key (other) powers in world politics (in this, its view was similar to but also developed the vision from the European Security Strategy of 2003; High Representative 2016). It stated the EU would be guided by a sense of "responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions", with "targeted engagement further afield" (*ibid.*, 18; emphases added). Therefore, in practice, the Strategy saw the EU's identity in world politics as that of a mostly regional actor. In connection to this, it announced the EU would work more closely with NATO, but also needed to be able to "act autonomously" if needed including by strengthening capabilities and response capacity within CSDP, and underlined the importance of "European security order" as challenged by Russia's actions to the East; regarding this, also a stronger EU contribution within the OSCE was highlighted

(*ibid.*, 19, 33-34). In this, the Strategy differed from the European Security Strategy of 2003 which did not devote as much attention to the European security order, which indicated a change in perception of the circumstances in Europe by EU foreign policy. With regard to the EU's neighbourhood, the Strategy still mentioned enlargement policy and ENP, but also underlined a need to strengthen the “*resilience*” of the neighbouring countries, also beyond ENP (*ibid.*, 9). *Resilience* was thus another new signifier in EU foreign policy discourse, describing EU foreign policy approach to the countries in its neighbourhood and beyond. Apart from the importance of engaging with Russia, also due to the EU's interdependence with it, the relations with the US and China were discussed, with a focus on TTIP with the US, and on “respect for the rule of law” with China (*ibid.*, 37). Finally, with regard to world order, the Strategy (similarly to the European Security Strategy of 2003) highlighted “multilateralism” with the UN at its centre, but also a need for UN reform including the UNSC and international financial institutions (*ibid.*, 8, 39).

In the end, the Strategy mentioned that a “new process of strategic reflection” would be started when necessary with regard to the changing times (High Representative 2016). Therefore, the Strategy included a provision foreseeing flexibility in the strategic planning of EU foreign policy with regard to future circumstances. In this sense, and overall, the Strategy represented a crucial adjustment of EU foreign policy and its approaches to the changing circumstances of world politics. Nevertheless, it did not include provisions that would be aimed specifically at enabling EU foreign policy to react flexibly to the changing circumstances of world politics as an inherent part of EU foreign policy and its day-to-day functioning.

In June 2016, the European Council (2016c) welcomed the Strategy and invited the High Representative, the Council and the Commission to “take the work forward”. It however did not discuss the Strategy. It focused on enhancement of EU-NATO cooperation which was discussed in the presence of the NATO Secretary-General (*ibid.*). Following this, in July, EU-NATO cooperation was deepened through a Joint Declaration by the Presidents of the European Council, the Commission and the NATO Secretary-General, which, among others, provided that the EEAS and NATO would develop concrete options for cooperation including staff coordination mechanisms by December 2016 (Joint Declaration 2016). This represented a step towards concrete implementation of the orientations of EU Global Strategy of June 2016 in practice; and a definition of EU identity in world politics in practice by building tighter transatlantic relations.

Thus, in June 2016, the European Council did not yet define the strategic orientations of EU foreign policy, in relation to the High Representative's Global Strategy of June 2016, and in the sense of Article 10B of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) which states: “/.../ *the European Council* shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union” (emphasis added). Instead, in June 2016, the European Council only welcomed the provisions of the Global Strategy.

A reason for this might have been the outcome of UK referendum on leaving the EU (Brexit) in June 2016 that decided in favour of leaving. In June 2015, UK Prime Minister announced an in/ out referendum at a European Council session (European Council 2015a). A process of negotiations between the UK and other EU members on UK demands to remain in the EU took place and arrangements for re-defined UK membership conditions were agreed and announced by the European Council in February 2016 (2016a). Nevertheless, the result of the British referendum was negative by a narrow margin, and UK Prime Minister informed the June 2016 European Council of the results of the referendum (*ibid.*, 2016c). However, as Article 49A of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) provides, an EU member that decides to leave the EU “shall notify the European Council”, in which case a withdrawal agreement would be negotiated; in the absence of an agreement, the Treaties would cease to apply to that country two years after the notification to the European Council. As of mid-2016, it was not clear when a UK notification on withdrawing from the EU would be made to the European Council.

This highlighted a new uncertainty for EU foreign policy with regard to Europe (as well as for the EU's relations with the US), but also that EU foreign policy has other crucial dimensions in addition to its external one. Namely, a conventional paradigm of looking at EU foreign policy is in the sense of an external policy of the EU towards third countries and its external environment. However, as mentioned in some sections of this thesis, there has been a *second* dimension of EU foreign policy, one related to countries that have been, are or would be members (*cf.* Wæver 1998) – this connection to enlargement has, in many aspects, *enabled* the EU to have a foreign policy in the first place (including through the first enlargement related to UK membership and institution of EPC, the second enlargement with the Mediterranean countries, the reunification of Germany, and the enlargement process with the CEECs that contributed to stabilisation in Europe following the end of the Cold War). In addition to this, the possibility of withdrawal from the EU that has been opened with the Treaty of Lisbon has highlighted a *third* dimension of EU foreign policy: the importance of building relations and understanding in the area of foreign policy between EU member states

themselves, or between a majority group of member states and an individual (departing) member state.

This is one reason why EU foreign policy in the middle of the second decade of the 21st century could be seen in terms of ‘back to the future’: also in 1969, when European Political Cooperation was being established, the relations of EEC member states with the UK were crucial for cooperation in the area of EU foreign policy. Secondly, EU foreign policy has been marked by the same key signifiers and discursive strategies that had characterised the idea of EU identity in world politics in the first decades of EU foreign policy: the signifiers of a common voice, role and responsibilities in world politics that are part of the narrative about the EU becoming a global actor; and the discursive strategy of *différance* applied to the idea(l) of the EU becoming a global player, but at an undefined future time. Thirdly, with regard to its position in world politics, also in relation to (other) key actors (which is also part of EU identity in world politics), the EU in many ways in practice, and EU foreign policy with it, as during the Cold War, has been functioning as a mediating power between the (other) key actors in world politics.

*Summa summarum*, with regard to EU foreign policy in 2015-2016, it may be found that a lot has happened (a lot of new developments have occurred); however, at the same time, a lot has not happened (as some of the key underpinning patterns of EU foreign policy and the idea of EU identity in world politics remained the same). A main finding from the synthesis could be corroborated: EU foreign policy/ identity nexus has been able to have an impact in world politics where there has been consensus among the member states and the circumstances of world politics supported EU foreign policy initiative. In other words, the EU has so far been a co-creator of the circumstances of world politics in topical and regional issues, such as climate change and the area of Europe. In turn, for the issues where this has not been the case and where EU foreign policy/ identity nexus has not had an impact, the circumstances of world politics have represented a key factor determining whether EU foreign policy would be able to act. With reference to this, the idea of EU identity in world politics has provided the conceptual ground within EU foreign policy through which the intricate relationships between the EU and world politics have been reflected and enacted.

A final reflection: how could one conclude a *postscript*? By its nature, a postscript is unfinished and *incomplete*; it does not have a full identity with itself, nor does the text that the postscript has been added to. By virtue of this, therefore, the postscript testifies to *incompleteness*, of the text that precedes it as well as of itself. Perhaps an analogy could be drawn between the incompleteness of the postscript and of discourse about identity: as soon as the word *identity* is mentioned (as in the Document on the European Identity of 1973, for example), the need for explicit reference to identity has been revealed, which means that the referent subject of such discourse is not complete in itself, does not feel a full-identity-with-itself. And, for EU foreign policy as well as world politics, the need for a postscript reveals that EU foreign policy cannot be seen as being complete within itself, as it cannot be, *has not been* fully encompassed by the text describing it (as has been demonstrated by the need to add the postscript). Thus, the postscript shows that the subject of the text, EU foreign policy, *is still developing, because* it is (co-)dependent with world politics; which is also not complete and is still developing into undefined future.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A

Table A.1: Foreign and related issues discussed by the European Council, March 1975 – November 2009

European Council date and location	Foreign issues	Related issues
10-11 March 1975, Dublin	CSCE Cyprus World economic situation	New Zealand Energy policy Raw materials and the developing countries
16-17 July 1975, Brussels	United Nations (statement) CSCE (statement)	Portugal China Raw materials
1-2 December 1975, Rome		Conference on international economic cooperation
1-2 April 1976, Luxembourg	Rhodesia (declaration)	Lomé Convention (declaration)
12-13 July 1976, Brussels	Terrorism	Puerto Rico Conference
29-30 November 1976, The Hague	Japan (statement) Terrorism	Conference on international economic cooperation (statement)
25-26 March 1977, Rome	Japan North-South dialogue	Downing street summit Enlargement
29-30 June 1977, London	Middle East (statement)	Europe plus thirty
7-8 April 1978, Copenhagen	Japan East-West relations Middle East Africa Terrorism	Declaration on democracy Turkey and other third countries
6-7 July 1978, Bremen	Relations with developing countries Africa Middle East	International trade
4-5 December 1978, Brussels		Enlargement
21-22 June 1979, Strasbourg	Japan Refugees from Indochina	
29-30 November 1979, Dublin	Iran Cambodia	
27-28 April 1980, Luxembourg	North-South dialogue Declaration on international situation (Afghanistan, Iran, Middle	

	East)	
12-13 June 1980, Venice	Middle East Euro-Arab dialogue Lebanon Afghanistan Southern Africa	
1-2 December 1980, Luxembourg	Middle East East-West relations Lebanon Jordan/ Syria	International trade
23-24 March 1981, Maastricht	Spain North-South relations Middle East Lebanon Afghanistan Poland	
29-30 June 1981, Luxembourg	North-South dialogue Afghanistan Middle East Lebanon Cambodia Namibia	Monetary relations with United States Trade relations with Japan
26-27 November 1981, London	Schmidt-Brezhnev meeting Disarmament CSCE Poland Afghanistan	Enlargement (Spain and Portugal)
29-30 March 1982, Brussels	Transatlantic relations East-West relations Afghanistan Middle East Central America Turkey	International economic policy
28-29 June 1982, Brussels	Middle East Latin America Iraq-Iran	United States (relations)
3-4 December 1982, Copenhagen	East-West relations Poland Afghanistan Middle East	Enlargement (Spain and Portugal) Relations with third countries
21-22 March 1983, Brussels	Middle East Iran and Iraq	Economic summit in Williamsburg Enlargement (Spain and Portugal)
17-19 June 1983, Stuttgart	Poland CSCE Middle East Central America	Enlargement (Spain and Portugal) UNCTAD VI Environment
25-26 June 1984,		Enlargement

Fontainebleau		
3-4 December 1984, Dublin	Middle East (Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Iran- Iraq) East-West relations Central America Terrorism	Famine in Africa
29-30 March 1985, Brussels	Hunger in the world	Enlargement (Spain and Portugal)
28-29 June 1985, Milan		Japan Famine in Africa EEC – Comecon
2-3 December 1985, Luxembourg		Draft Treaty on European cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy
26-27 June 1986, The Hague	South Africa (statement)	International cooperation (Community) Chernobyl disaster Latin America Drugs
5-6 December 1986, London	Afghanistan (statement)	Terrorism Drugs
4-5 December 1987, Copenhagen	East-West relations Middle East (declaration) Afghanistan (declaration)	
27-28 June 1988, Hanover	East-West relations Afghanistan Middle East South Africa Southern Africa Latin America	Environment
2-3 December 1988, Rhodes	East-West relations Middle East (Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon) Cyprus	International role of the European Community Environment
26-27 June 1989, Madrid	East-West relations Middle East (declaration) Maghreb Cyprus Latin America Asia (China – declaration) Southern Africa	Environment
18 November 1989, Paris (informal)		Eastern Europe
8-9 December 1989, Strasbourg	Cyprus Central and Eastern Europe (declaration) Middle East (declaration) Lebanon (declaration)	EFTA Central and Eastern Europe Mediterranean Latin America and ACP states



	<p>Euro-Arab conference (declaration)</p> <p>Southern Africa (declaration)</p> <p>Ethiopia (statement)</p> <p>Chile (declaration)</p> <p>Central America (statement)</p> <p>Human rights (statement)</p>	
28 April 1990, Dublin (special)	<p>Drugs and international organized crime</p> <p>Cyprus</p> <p>CSCE (guidelines)</p>	<p>German unification</p> <p>External development of the Community</p> <p>Central and Eastern Europe</p> <p>Other countries</p> <p>Political union</p>
25-26 June 1990, Dublin	<p>CSCE</p> <p>Central and Eastern Europe</p> <p>Mediterranean</p> <p>EFTA</p> <p>USSR</p> <p>Transatlantic relations</p> <p>Africa (Southern Africa – declaration, Sub-Saharan Africa)</p> <p>Middle East (declaration)</p> <p>Nuclear non-proliferation (declaration)</p> <p>Iran earthquake (declaration)</p> <p>Cyprus (declaration)</p> <p>Kashmir</p>	<p>Political union</p> <p>German unification</p> <p>Uruguay Round</p> <p>Environment (global issues)</p>
27-28 October 1990, Rome	<p>Central and East European countries</p> <p>Gulf crisis (declaration)</p> <p>Middle East (declaration)</p> <p>CSCE (declaration)</p> <p>United States and Canada</p>	<p>Political union</p> <p>USSR</p> <p>Uruguay Round</p>
14-15 December 1990, Rome	<p>Central and Eastern European countries</p> <p>USSR</p> <p>EFTA countries</p> <p>Mediterranean policy</p> <p>Latin America</p> <p>ACP countries</p> <p>GATT</p> <p>Gulf crisis (declaration)</p> <p>Middle East (declaration)</p> <p>South Africa (declaration)</p> <p>Lebanon (declaration)</p>	<p>Political union</p>
8 April 1991, Luxembourg	<p>Gulf war</p>	

(informal)	<b>Middle East</b> Lebanon Cyprus Mediterranean	
28-29 June 1991, Luxembourg	USSR European economic area Central and Eastern Europe European Energy Charter Yugoslavia Baltic states <b>Middle East (declaration)</b> Western Sahara Algeria Developing countries United States, Canada and Japan Southern Africa South Africa (declaration) Human rights (declaration) Emergency assistance Non-proliferation (declaration) Tropical forests Iraq (declaration)	Political union Uruguay Round
8-10 December 1991, Maastricht	<b>Middle East (declaration)</b> Soviet Union (declaration) New European states Enquiries in the bombing of flights PAN AM 103 and UTA 772	<b>Enlargement (new applicants)</b> Uruguay Round Food supply situation in Moscow and St. Petersburg
26-27 June 1992, Lisbon	Rio conference Uruguay Round Central and Eastern Europe CIS (Community of Independent States) Nuclear safety European Energy Charter Yugoslavia (declaration) <b>Middle East (declaration)</b> Mediterranean European Economic Area Latin America Developing countries CSCE Non-proliferation Southern Africa Maghreb (declaration)	<b>Enlargement (new applicants)</b> Common Foreign and Security Policy
16 October 1992, Birmingham (special)	Former Yugoslavia (declaration) Somalia (declaration)	Uruguay Round

<p>11-12 December 1992, Edinburgh</p>	<p>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Turkey, Cyprus and Malta Central and Eastern Europe Former Soviet Union (declaration) Nuclear safety PHARE Programme European Energy Charter Iran Africa El Salvador Former Yugoslavia (declaration) Treatment of Muslim women in former Yugoslavia (declaration) Russia (declaration) Middle East (declaration)</p>	<p>Accession of new Member States GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) Draft Treaty on European Union CFSP Accession of new Member States</p>
<p>21-22 June 1993, Copenhagen</p>	<p>Malta and Cyprus Turkey Central and Eastern Europe Pact on Stability in Europe Russia Ukraine Former Yugoslavia Maghreb countries Cooperation with associated countries Bosnia-Herzegovina (declaration)</p>	<p>GATT Common Foreign and Security Policy Enlargement</p>
<p>29 October 1993, Brussels</p>	<p>Promotion of stability and peace in Europe Middle East South Africa Former Yugoslavia (declaration) Russia</p>	<p>Common Foreign and Security Policy Enlargement (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Norway)</p>
<p>10-11 December 1993, Brussels</p>	<p>Stability Pact Former Yugoslavia (declaration) Middle East Israel</p>	<p>GATT</p>
<p>24-25 June 1994, Corfu</p>	<p>Mediterranean countries Middle East Central and Eastern Europe Pact on Stability Rwanda Southern Africa ACP States</p>	<p>Applicant countries</p>

	<p>Ukraine  North Korea  Latin America  Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation  Former Yugoslavia</p>	
<p>9-10 December 1994,  Essen</p>	<p>United States and Canada  Russia  Ukraine  Central and Eastern Europe  Mediterranean policy  Former Yugoslavia  Human rights  CSCE  Asia  Latin America  Africa  Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty  Nuclear smuggling  World summit on social development in Copenhagen  Climate change (Berlin Conference on the Framework Convention on Climate Change)</p>	
<p>26-27 June 1995, Cannes</p>	<p>Former Yugoslavia  Fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations  Message to the 31st summit of the OAU  Burundi  EDF (European Development Fund)  Russia  Ukraine  United States and Canada  Iran  WTO (World Trade Organisation)  Middle East</p>	<p>Europe Agreements  Mediterranean</p>
<p>15-16 December 1995,  Madrid</p>	<p>Former Yugoslavia (declaration)  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  Slovenia  Baltic Sea region  Russia (Declaration)</p>	<p>Enlargement (associated countries)</p>

	<p>TACIS programme  Ukraine  Turkey  Cyprus  Security  OSCE  Andorra  Transatlantic relations  Mediterranean  Middle East  Iran  Latin America  Lomé Convention  Africa  Asia  United Nations</p>	
21-22 June 1996, Florence	<p>Turkey  Middle East (declaration)  Mediterranean  Regional cooperation in Europe  Latin America and the Caribbean  EU-US relations  Asia  Africa  Security  WTO  Former Yugoslavia (declaration)  Russia (declaration)</p>	Enlargement
13-14 December 1996, Dublin	<p>Russia  Ukraine  Belarus  Council of Europe  Regional cooperation in Europe  Mediterranean  Turkey  EU-US relations  EU-Canada relations  Great Lakes  East Timor  Cuba  Hong Kong and Macao  WTO  Former Yugoslavia (declaration)  Middle East (declaration)</p>	Enlargement
16-17 June 1997,	Trade questions	Enlargement

Amsterdam	EU-US relations Mediterranean Russia South Africa Middle East (call for peace) Former Yugoslavia Albania Congo Hong Kong and Macau Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa Arms exports	Climate change
12-13 December 1997, Luxembourg	WTO (financial services) Regional cooperation in Europe 50th anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights (declaration) Middle East	Enlargement Turkey Climate change
15-16 June 1998, Cardiff	International trade Russia Kosovo (declaration) Southern Africa Middle East Indonesia/ East Timor India/ Pakistan nuclear tests Mediterranean International Criminal Court Northern Ireland Ethiopia/ Eritrea dispute	Enlargement
11-12 December 1998, Vienna	Human rights Switzerland International trade/ WTO Transatlantic relations South Africa South-East Europe Western Balkans Northern dimension Russia Newly independent states Ukraine Mediterranean Middle East Cyprus Iraq Great Lakes region East Timor	Europe as a global player (introduction of the euro) Enlargement Northern Ireland

	Macao Hurricane Mitch	
24-25 March 1999, Berlin	Kosovo (statement) Middle east (declaration) South Africa	Enlargement
3-4 June 1999, Cologne	Kosovo (declaration) Western Balkans Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe Russia (common strategy) Other common strategies Ukraine Transatlantic relations Japan Middle East Mediterranean EU-Latin America Summit Northern Dimension Transcaucasian Summit East Timor Macao WTO	International financial system Indebtedness of poorest countries Climate policy European security and defence policy (declaration) Enlargement
15-16 October 1999, Tampere		Stronger external action – Justice and Home Affairs
10-11 December 1999, Helsinki	Chechnya (declaration) Common strategies Stability for South-Eastern Europe Northern Dimension Mexico Human rights Middle East WTO Macao Ukraine (common strategy)	Enlargement Environment and sustainable development Common European security and defence policy
23-24 March 2000, Lisbon	Western Balkans Russia	Common European security and defence policy
19-20 June 2000, Santa Maria Da Feira	Russia Mediterranean Middle East Western Balkans Northern Dimension Africa Ethiopia-Eritrea (declaration)	Common European security and defence policy Enlargement Environment and sustainable development
13-14 October 2000, Biarritz	Middle East (declaration)	
7-11 December 2000, Nice	Cyprus Mediterranean Western Balkans	Enlargement Common European security and defence policy

	Development <b>Middle East (declaration)</b>	Climate change Environment and sustainable development
23-24 March 2001, Stockholm	Russia WTO <b>Middle East</b> Western Balkans Korean peninsula Climate change (declaration) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (declaration)	
15-16 June 2001, Gothenburg	EU-US relations EU-Canada relations EU-Russia Northern Dimension Western Balkans <b>Middle East</b> Algeria East Timor Korean peninsula Prevention of proliferation of ballistic missiles (declaration) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (declaration)	<b>Enlargement</b> Ukraine (cooperation) Strategy for sustainable development – global dimension Climate change WTO European Security and Defence Policy Conflict prevention EU-UN cooperation
21 September 2001 (extraordinary)	Solidarity and cooperation with United States Union's involvement in the world World economic prospects	
19 October 2001, Ghent (informal)	Follow-up to the September 11 attacks and the fight against terrorism	
14-15 December 2001, Laeken	Union's action following the attacks in the USA on 11 September (Afghanistan, Combating terrorism) <b>Middle East (declaration)</b> Western Balkans Africa Russia Development cooperation	Common European Security and Defence Policy (declaration on operational capability) <b>Enlargement</b>
15-16 March 2002, Barcelona	Mediterranean Northern Dimension Western Balkans Serbia and Montenegro Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	US measures on steel Environment (sustainable development strategy)



	<p><b>Middle East (declaration)</b>  Zimbabwe  Angola  Democratic Republic of Congo  Nigeria</p>	
21-22 June 2002, Seville	<p>Kaliningrad  <b>Middle East (declaration)</b>  India and Pakistan (declaration)  Contribution of the CFSP, including the ESDP, to the fight against terrorism (declaration)</p>	<p>European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)  <b>Enlargement</b>  Integration of immigration policy into Union's relations with third countries  Johannesburg (World Summit on Sustainable Development)</p>
24-25 October 2002, Brussels	<p>Kaliningrad  EU-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) cooperation  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  Terrorist attacks in Russia</p>	<p><b>Enlargement</b></p>
12-13 December 2002, Copenhagen	<p>The enlarged Union and its neighbours  <b>Middle East (declaration)</b>  Iraq (declaration)</p>	<p><b>Enlargement</b>  Cyprus  Bulgaria and Romania  Turkey  ESDP</p>
17 February 2003, Brussels (extraordinary)	<p>Iraq</p>	
20-21 March 2003, Brussels	<p>Sustainable development  Iraq  <b>Middle East</b>  Western Balkans  Cyprus  North Korea</p>	<p><b>Enlargement</b></p>
16 April 2003, Athens (informal)	<p>Iraq</p>	<p><b>Enlargement</b></p>
19-20 June 2003, Thessaloniki	<p>Western Balkans  Wider Europe/ New Neighbourhood  Weapons of mass destruction (declaration)  Relations with the Arab world  Mediterranean  USA  Common strategies  Combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria</p>	<p><b>Enlargement</b>  Cyprus  EU Security Strategy  ESDP  Agency in the field of defence capabilities</p>

	<p>International humanitarian law  International Criminal Court  Green diplomacy  <b>Middle East</b>  Iraq  Iran  North Korea  East Timor  Burma  Cuba  Central Africa</p>	
<p>16-17 October 2003,  Brussels</p>	<p>WTO  Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood  Mediterranean  Northern Dimension  Moldova  Relations with the Arab world  <b>Middle East</b>  Iraq  Iran  Nobel Prize for Peace  Kosovo  Bolivia  Guatemala  Great Lakes region</p>	
<p>12-13 December 2003,  Brussels</p>	<p>Western Balkans  Mediterranean  Iraq  Terrorism  <b>Middle East</b>  Arab world  Transatlantic relations (declaration)  Russian federation  Ukraine  China  Latin America and the Caribbean  Africa  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea  Green Diplomacy  Olympic truce</p>	<p><b>Enlargement</b> (new Member States, Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey)  Cyprus  Security Strategy  ESDP  EU-UN relations</p>
<p>25-26 March 2004,  Brussels</p>	<p><b>Middle East</b>  Mediterranean (EU Strategic Partnership with</p>	<p>Terrorism (declaration)  Cyprus</p>

	<p>Mediterranean and Middle East)</p> <p>Iraq</p> <p>Afghanistan</p> <p>Serbia and Montenegro/</p> <p>Kosovo</p> <p>Russia</p> <p>Côte d'Ivoire</p>	
17-18 June 2004, Brussels	<p>Fighting poverty and HIV/AIDS</p> <p>Addressing policy challenges</p> <p>A more active and capable EU</p> <p>European Neighbourhood Policy</p> <p>Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean region and the Middle East</p> <p>Regional relationships (EU-Africa, EU-Latin America)</p> <p>Sudan/ Darfur</p> <p>Democratic Republic of Congo</p> <p>Iran</p> <p>Appointment of the United Nations Secretary-General</p> <p>Special Representative for Kosovo</p> <p>Presidential election in Serbia</p> <p>European defence</p> <p>Middle East (declaration)</p>	<p>Terrorism</p> <p>Enlargement (Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey, Croatia)</p> <p>Northern Ireland</p> <p>European Security Strategy</p>
4-5 November 2004, Brussels	<p>US presidential election</p> <p>Sudan</p> <p>Iraq (declaration)</p> <p>Middle East</p> <p>Iran</p> <p>Ukraine</p> <p>Mediterranean (common strategy)</p>	<p>Enlargement</p> <p>External relations – freedom, security and justice</p>
16-17 December 2004, Brussels	<p>Weapons of mass destruction</p> <p>Iran</p> <p>Iraq</p> <p>Afghanistan</p> <p>Neighbourhood</p> <p>Ukraine (declaration)</p> <p>Middle East (declaration)</p>	<p>Enlargement</p> <p>Terrorism</p> <p>ESDP</p> <p>European External Action Service</p>

	<p>An international order based of effective multilateralism</p> <p>Working with partners (United States, Russia, Asian partners, China, African Union, Latin America and the Caribbean)</p> <p>International cooperation</p>	
22-23 March 2005, Brussels	<p>UN Summit in September 2005</p> <p>Lebanon</p>	Climate change
16-17 June 2005, Brussels	<p>September 2005 United Nations Summit</p> <p>Western Balkans</p> <p>European Neighbourhood Policy</p> <p>Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean region and the Middle East</p> <p>Barcelona process</p> <p>Iraq</p> <p>Iran</p> <p>Middle East (declaration)</p> <p>Transatlantic relations</p> <p>Russia</p> <p>Asia (Japan, China, India)</p> <p>Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP)</p> <p>Africa</p> <p>Latin America</p> <p>Green diplomacy initiative</p> <p>Kosovo (declaration)</p> <p>Lebanon (declaration)</p>	ESDP
15-16 December 2005, Brussels	<p>Africa</p> <p>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</p> <p>Iran</p> <p>Iraq</p> <p>Lebanon</p> <p>Middle East</p> <p>Regional stability</p> <p>Political, social and economic reform</p> <p>Barcelona process</p> <p>Libya</p>	<p>Global approach to migration</p> <p>Climate change</p> <p>ESDP</p>
23-24 March 2006, Brussels	<p>Belarus (declaration)</p>	
15-16 June 2006, Brussels	<p>Western Balkans</p>	External dimension –

	(declaration) European Neighbourhood Policy Council of Europe Iran (declaration) Iraq (declaration) <b>Middle East (declaration)</b> Africa (declaration) Lebanon (declaration) Timor-Leste (declaration)	justice and home affairs Climate change Improving efficiency, coherence and visibility of Union's external policies <b>Enlargement</b>
14-15 December 2006, Brussels	Africa Kosovo European Neighbourhood Policy Central Asia Doha development agenda Coherence in the use of external policy instruments <b>Middle East (declaration)</b> Lebanon (declaration) Iran (declaration) Afghanistan (declaration) African issues (declaration – Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Côte d'Ivoire)	<b>Enlargement (strategy)</b> Migration – dialogue with third countries Climate change
8-9 March 2007, Brussels	EU-Africa Summit <b>Middle East</b> Lebanon	Climate protection
21-22 June 2007, Brussels	European Neighbourhood Policy Central Asia Heiligendamm process (emerging economies) EU-Africa	Climate change ESDP
14 December 2007, Brussels	EU's relations with partners Brazil EU/ Africa Summit Kosovo Western Balkans European Neighbourhood Policy Mediterranean Libya Transatlantic Economic Council Situations of fragility Millennium Development Goals	Climate change European Security Strategy EU Declaration on Globalisation

	<p>EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Burma/ Myanmar Iran Annapolis conference (relations between Palestinians and Israelis) Lebanon Eastern Congo</p>	
13-14 March 2008, Brussels	Barcelona process (Union for the Mediterranean)	<p>External dimension of the renewed Lisbon Strategy Climate change Stability of financial markets</p>
19-20 June 2008, Brussels	<p>Western Balkans (declaration) Millennium Development Goals Barcelona process (Union for the Mediterranean) Eastern Partnership Central Asia Zimbabwe Sudan Burma/ Myanmar Lima Declaration Rights of the child European Year of Intercultural Dialogue</p>	ESDP
1 September 2008, Brussels (extraordinary)	Georgia	
15-16 October 2008, Brussels	South Ossetia and Abkhazia	
10-11 December 2008, Brussels	<p>European Neighbourhood Policy Middle East (declaration) Zimbabwe (declaration)</p>	<p>Energy and climate change ESDP (declaration)</p>
1 March 2009, Brussels (informal)		Working together at the global level
19-20 March 2009, Brussels	<p>European Neighbourhood Policy (Eastern Partnership, Union for the Mediterranean) EU-US relations Eastern Partnership (declaration)</p>	<p>Agreed language with a view to the G20 summit in London Energy and climate change Copenhagen conference on climate change</p>
18-19 June 2009, Brussels	<p>Eastern partnership Middle East Transatlantic relations Pakistan and Afghanistan</p>	Climate change and sustainable development

	(declaration) Burma/ Myanmar (declaration) Democratic People's Republic of Korea (declaration) Iran (declaration)	
17 September 2009, Brussels (informal)		Agreed language for the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit
29-30 October 2009, Brussels	Afghanistan and Pakistan Iran (declaration)	Climate change

(Source: Summarized according to the Presidency Conclusions of the relevant sessions of the European Council, European Council 1975a – 2009e; *cf.* General Secretariat of the Council 2011)

## Appendix B

Table B.1: Foreign and related issues discussed by the European Council, December 2009 – November 2014

European Council date	Foreign issues	Related issues
10-11 December 2009	Copenhagen Conference on climate change Enlargement Development Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean Iran (declaration) Afghanistan (declaration)	European External Action Service Role of Europe in a globalised world
25-26 March 2010	Climate change	
17 June 2010	G20 Toronto Summit Millennium Development Goals Climate change Iran	Reflection Group Iceland (application for membership)
16 September 2010	Relations with strategic partners (A changing world, Orientations for upcoming events – ASEM, EU/ China summit, G20 summit, transatlantic relationship, Cancun conference on climate change, ENP, EU/ Africa relations, Millennium Development Goals, summits with Ukraine, Russia, Latin American and Caribbean partners) Pakistan (declaration) Middle East peace process (declaration)	Internal arrangements to improve the EU's external policy
28-29 October 2010	Seoul G20 summit Cancun conference on climate change Summits with third countries	
16-17 December 2010	Relations with strategic partners Montenegro (enlargement) Côte d'Ivoire Cancun (climate change)	



4 February 2011	Egypt (declaration) Mediterranean region and the Middle East Belarus	Energy
11 March 2011	Libya and the Southern Neighbourhood – Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt (declaration)	
24-25 March 2011	Libya/ Southern neighbourhood Japan	
23-24 June 2011	Southern neighbourhood (declaration)	Doha development round European neighbourhood policy Croatia
23 October 2011	G20 Climate change Southern neighbourhood (Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria) Iran Eastern partnership	Doha round Neighbouring regions External aspects of sectoral policies
9 December 2011	Iran Syria Afghanistan	Enlargement (Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia)
1-2 March 2012	G20 and G8 Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development Southern Neighbourhood Syria Somalia Eastern partnership Belarus	Serbia (enlargement)
28-29 June 2012	Syria Iran Human rights and democracy Official development assistance	Enlargement (Montenegro)
18-19 October 2012	Strategic partners Syria Iran Mali	Nobel Prize for Peace
13-14 December 2012	Syria	CSDP Regional strategies Enlargement
7-8 February 2013	Arab spring Syria Mali	Trade (WTO, Doha development agenda, bilateral trade agenda)

14-15 March 2013	Strategic partners	
22 May 2013		Diversification of Europe's energy supply Taxation
27-28 June 2013		Trade partnership with the US Enlargement (Serbia, Kosovo)
24-25 October 2013	Eastern partnership Migration flows	Economic and trade agreement with Canada Intelligence issues (USA)
19-20 December 2013	Syria Central African Republic Eastern partnership (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine)	CSDP Migration flows Enlargement WTO (Doha round)
20-21 March 2014	Cyprus Ukraine Georgia and Moldova EU-Africa relations Sri Lanka	Climate and energy
26-27 June 2014	Ukraine	Migration flows Climate and energy Strategic agenda for the Union in times of change
16 July 2014	Ukraine Gaza	
30 August 2014	Ukraine Iraq/ Syria Gaza Libya Ebola	
23-24 October 2014	Ebola Ukraine Moldova Cyprus	2030 climate and energy policy framework EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region

(Source: Summarized according to the Conclusions of the relevant sessions of the European Council, European Council 2009f – 2014e)

## **POVZETEK V SLOVENSKEM JEZIKU**

### Uvod

V zadnjih letih je bilo zaznati veliko hitrih sprememb v svetovni politiki, ki so potekale tudi v okolici EU, in so imele posledice za EU. K sedanji svetovni politiki je prispevalo več trendov – med njimi konec hladne vojne ter razpad bipolarne strukture svetovnega reda; spremembe v zunanji politiki Kitajske in njeno odpiranje navzven po letu 1997; vzpon novih gospodarskih in političnih sil (Brazilije, Kitajske, Indije, Rusije, Južne Afrike – t.i. BRICS) ter naraščajoče sodelovanje med njimi; od 2008 pa tudi vpliv posledic globalne ekonomske krize, ki so bile vidne v razvitem in razvijajočem se svetu, in so vplivale na spremenjeno razmerje moči med razvitimi silami in silami v razvoju. V zadnjem obdobju je poleg tega prišlo do t.i. arabske pomladi, ki se je začela v 2011, in vzpona radikalnih verskih gibanj. Spremembe, ki jih je to in drugo dogajanje prineslo v svetovno politiko pomenijo, da se svetovna politika danes bistveno razlikuje od svetovne politike v 1970-ih, 1990-ih ali celo 2000-ih; hkrati pa se spremembe v njej še vedno odvijajo.

Spreminjajoči se svet je tudi svet izginjajoče gotovosti, saj za očitnimi bitkami za prevlado v svetovni politiki poteka še ena, manj vidna, to je bitka za prevladujočo interpretacijo obstoječih razmer svetovne politike. V takšnih okoliščinah je zunanja politika bistvenega pomena, saj predstavlja področje, prek katerega akterji v svetovni politiki uvajajo nove načine razmišljanja in nove prakse, namenjene vplivanju na druge akterje.

Če opazujemo zunanjo politiko EU ter njen razvoj od začetkov v okviru Evropskega političnega sodelovanja (EPS), kot tudi v novejšem obdobju (od vstopa Lizbonske pogodbe v veljavo decembra 2009), je bilo zanjo bolj značilno, da se jo je videlo kot dosežek samo po sebi. Zunanja politika EU se je oblikovala v obdobju, ko je EGS predstavljala območje miru in blagostanja med dvema velesilama; že dejstvo sodelovanja med šestimi državami EGS na zunanjepolitičnem področju je predstavljalo uspeh in je bilo videno v smislu prispevka k skupni identiteti teh držav. To videnje zunanje politike EU v smislu prispevka k skupni identiteti držav EGS se je nadaljevalo tudi v nadaljnjem razvoju zunanje politike EU; kar nakazuje, da je v procesu razvoja zunanje politike EU verjetno prišlo do zaprtja pomena ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki, na katero se je zunanja politika EU nanašala.

Če gledamo zunanjo politiko EU ne le z notranjega vidika, temveč z zunanje perspektive tektonskih sprememb v svetovni politiki, bo zato njena slika najverjetneje drugačna. Predvsem je možno, da zunanja politika EU ni prilagojena novemu kontekstu svetovne politike, saj se je ta od takrat, ko je nastajala, bistveno spremenil.

Glede na to disertacija raziskuje, kako je zunanja politika EU nastala kot proces oblikovanja identitete EU v svetovni politiki, s kakšnimi pomeni je bil pojem identitete EU v svetovni politiki napolnjen, kot tudi, ali in na kakšen način je bil njegov pomen zaprt; ter kako to vpliva na zmožnost prilagajanja EU na sedanje spreminjajoče se razmere svetovne politike.

## 1. Prolegomena

### 1.1 Opredelitev problema/ problematizacija

Disertacija uporablja pristop problematizacije (cf. Foucault 1985), in sicer v smislu dveh ravni problematizacije: a) problematizacija, ki jo izvaja neko družbeno okolje v zvezi z določeno prakso tj. osredotočanje na neko prakso kot problematično; in b) problematizacija teh družbenih procesov s strani zunanjega opazovalca, z določeno (zgodovinsko) distanco. Disertacija na ta način proučuje problematizacijo zunanje politike EU kot procesa oblikovanja identitete EU v svetovni politiki: kako in zakaj je v procesu razvoja zunanje politike EU identiteta EU v svetovni politiki postala problem, v zvezi s katerim je bilo treba iskati rešitve v okviru zunanje politike EU.

S tega vidika je mogoče v razvoju zunanje politike EU ter njenega osredotočanja na idejo identitete EU v svetovni politiki opaziti temeljno napetost med tendenco konstruiranja identitete EU v svetovni politiki po eni strani, ter po drugi strani predpostavko in pogostimi sklici na abstraktno idejo te identitete, ki je videna kot že obstoječ ideal z zaprtim pomenom. Ta temeljni razcep vodi do problema, da se je zunanja politika EU v diskurzu in praksi osredotočala večinoma na notranje cilje vzpostavljanja identitete EU v svetovni politiki, kljub spremembam, do katerih prihaja v svetovni politiki.

Glede na to si lahko postavimo vprašanje zapore diskurza in prakse zunanje politike EU: do kakšne mere so bili pomeni v okviru zunanje politike EU zaprti, ali je zunanja politika EU omogočala spremembe ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki, oziroma ali je tega zmožna, kadar je to potrebno? Zapore so namreč po eni strani nujne za obstoj družbe in njenih sistemov ter za vzpostavljanje pomenov; hkrati pa je treba omogočiti odprtost oziroma prilagodljivost družbenih sistemov na spremembe v njihovem zunanjem okolju.

### 1.2 Znanstvena relevantnost

Z vidika zunanje politike EU ter pojma identitete EU v svetovni politiki so opazne tri ključne pomanjkljivosti v literaturi s tega področja. Prvič, več avtorjev vzpostavlja povezavo med zunanjo politiko EU ter idejo identitete EU na svetovnem odru; vendar ta povezava ni eksplicitno omenjena in tudi ne pretehtana. Tako je veliko prispevkov k razpravam v zvezi z

zunanjo politiko EU so-konstruiralo idejo identitete EU v svetovni politiki (kot »civilne sile«, »normativne sile«, »globalne sile« ipd.), ne da bi bilo to omenjeno ali opaženo v samem prispevku oziroma razpravi.

Drugič, v razpravah o zunanji politiki EU je pogosto prisotna predpostavka, da že obstaja neka identiteta EU v svetovni politiki (v smislu ideala), ki jo je mogoče ugotoviti ali dognati prek konceptualizacije. Tretjič, čeprav so nekateri od prispevkov k razpravam o zunanji politiki EU izpostavili pomen odzivanja na spreminjajoče se razmere svetovne politike, se po navadi predpiše eno smer delovanja; manjka premislek, da bi morala biti zunanja politika oziroma ideja identitete EU v svetovni politiki fleksibilna in odprta različnim možnostim, da bi se EU lahko ustrezno odzivala na te spremembe.

Te pomanjkljivosti je zaznati tudi v dokumentih EU, kjer se identiteto EU v svetovni politiki pogosto vidi kot nespremenljiv ideal, in ni premisleka, da je treba dopustiti možnost različnih načinov mišljenja in delovanja v zvezi s to idejo identitete oziroma zunanjo politiko EU. Iz teh diskurzov in dokumentov je izšla določena podoba EU v svetovni politiki. Ta proces še ni bil podvržen temeljitemu premisleku; kar je namen te disertacije.

### 1.3 Raziskovalna vprašanja in teze

S tem namenom disertacija opredeljuje dve raziskovalni vprašanji:

a) ali sta zunanja politika EU in ideja identitete EU v svetovni politiki tako tesno povezani, da lahko govorimo o prepletu zunanje politike in identitete EU?

b) kakšno je razmerje med prepletom zunanje politike in identitete EU ter svetovno politiko?

Prvo raziskovalno vprašanje je predmet konceptualizacije v drugem poglavju disertacije; poleg tega ga na posameznih primerih diskurza in prakse zunanje politike EU opazujejo analitična poglavja. Analiza drugega raziskovalnega vprašanja terja konkretizacijo glede na družbene in politične razmere v zvezi z zunanjo politiko EU in svetovno politiko. S tega vidika so postavljene tri teze, ki usmerjajo raziskovanje v analitičnem delu disertacije:

1. prišlo je do zapore pomena identitete EU v svetovni politiki, in sicer večinoma zaradi notranjih razlogov evropske integracije;
2. obstaja specifično razmerje, ki se je razvilo med prepletom zunanje politike in identitete EU ter svetovno politiko; tj.
3. kadar se je identiteto EU v svetovni politiki (re)produciralo kot odprto, je zunanja politika EU imela vpliv v svetovni politiki.

#### 1.4 Prispevek k znanosti

Prispevek k znanosti predstavljata opazovanje in analiza vzorcev zamišljanja in udejanjanja ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki prek zunanje politike EU, v preteklosti in v zadnjem obdobju. Te vzorce disertacija opazuje prek analize zunanje politike EU glede na okoliščine svetovne politike, ki so vladale v času, ko sta se oblikovala določen diskurz ali praksa zunanje politike EU. Poleg tega disertacija izvede primerjavo ugotovljenih vzorcev iz preteklosti zunanje politike EU z vzorci, ki so se pojavljali v zadnjem času.

Za proučitev povezav med zunanjo politiko EU ter idejo identitete EU v svetovni politiki je postavljen teoretski okvir, ki je prilagojen proučevani temi. Disertacija tudi podaja konceptualizacijo identitete EU v svetovni politiki kot predmeta proučevanja. Z empiričnega vidika prispevek predstavlja zgodovinska študija procesa, v katerem je bila prek ukvarjanja s posameznimi zunanjimi zadevami v okviru zunanje politike EU, kot tudi v okviru procesov razvoja same zunanje politike EU, oblikovana ideja identitete EU v svetovni politiki; študija poleg zunanjepolitičnih diskurzov opazuje tudi pripadajoče prakse ter relevantni kontekst svetovne politike.

#### 1.5 Operacionalizacija

Z namenom, da temeljito osvetli raziskovalni problem, disertacija uporabi več kvantitativnih in kvalitativnih metod. Empirični pristop se prične z analizo diskurza, ki ji je z namenom celovitega pristopa dodana analiza izvedbe oziroma prakse zunanje politike EU; tretji ključni element celovitega pristopa predstavlja opazovanje pripadajočega konteksta svetovne politike.

Analiza diskurza je primarno izvedena na zunanjepolitičnem diskurzu Evropskega sveta. Ta je najprej kvantificiran, kar pokaže, katere zunanjepolitične zadeve so bile s strani Evropskega sveta obravnavane najpogosteje. Dve študiji primera v analizi tako opazujeta razvoj zunanje politike EU na primerih dveh najpogosteje obravnavanih zunanjepolitičnih zadev. Študijama primera sledi zgodovinska študija, ki analizira razvoj zunanje politike EU kot take, kar omogoča primerjavo z ugotovitvami dveh študij primera. Medtem, ko prve tri študije v analizi sledijo zgodovinskemu razvoju zunanje politike EU od njenega začetka, se zadnja (četrt) študija osredotoča na razvoj zunanje politike EU v obdobju zadnjih petih let po vstopu Lizbonske pogodbe v veljavo, tj. od decembra 2009 do decembra 2014.

Drugo raven analize v študijah predstavlja opazovanje izvedbe oziroma prakse zunanje politike EU predvsem na ravni zunanjih ministrov držav članic; tretjo raven pa opazovanje povezanega dogajanja v svetovni politiki. Da bi se izognili esencionaliziranju ideje identitete EU

v svetovni politiki, je poleg tega v analizi za opazovanje diskurzov uporabljen pristop dekonstrukcije, za opazovanje razvoja materialnih praks pa pristop genealogije.

## 2. Lociranje problema

### 2.1 Svetovna politika kot kontekst zunanje politike EU

Opredeljen je koncept svetovne politike, v smislu politike, ki se odvija na ravni sveta kot celote. Uporabljena je definicija politike, ki se manifestira v treh dimenzijah (*cf.* Gamble 2006): z vidika *upravljanja* lahko svetovno politiko razumemo kot strukture, odnose in načine reševanja odprtih vprašanj v svetu; lahko jo razumemo v smislu tekmovanja in bojev za *moč*, pa tudi z vidika odnosov soodvisnosti; in kot skupek procesov konstrukcije *identitete*, do katerih prihaja na svetovni ravni. Slednje je pomembno z vidika identitete EU v svetovni politiki, tj. vprašanja, kako se EU vključuje v te procese na svetovni ravni. Evropa je bila v preteklosti sicer tesno povezana s svetovno politiko, saj velik del tega, kar danes predstavlja svetovno politiko, izvira iz Evrope (npr. koncept suverene države). Vendar so se s koncem druge svetovne vojne vzvodi moči v svetovni politiki preselili izven Evrope (*cf.* Morgenthau 1948).

Podpoglavje nakaže zgodovinske povezave med svetovno politiko ter zunanjo politiko EU; do vidnih povezav med njima je prihajalo predvsem v času vzpostavljanja sodelovanja na zunanjepolitičnem področju med državami EGS, in ko je nastajala skupna zunanja in varnostna politika EU (SZVP). Do začetka sodelovanja na zunanjepolitičnem področju med državami članicami EGS je tako prišlo decembra 1969, kot posledica otoplitve odnosov med Vzhodom in Zahodom, zaradi zaposlenosti ZDA z vojno v Vietnamu, ter zaradi želje držav EGS, da bi lahko močnejše nastopale v dogajanju na mednarodni ravni, predvsem na Bližnjem vzhodu. Obdobje velikih sprememb v svetovni politiki 1988-1992 je prav tako prineslo spodbude za sodelovanje na zunanjepolitičnem področju, kar je pripeljalo do vzpostavitve SZVP. To pa ne pomeni, da so bili za razvoj zunanje politike EU pomembni le primeri, ko se je zunanja politika EU spremenila kot posledica dogodkov v svetovni politiki; prav tako so bili pomembni primeri, ko je bila že obstoječa zunanja politika EU ustrezno uporabljena, kot tudi primeri, ko sploh ni bila uporabljena (npr. razpad nekdanje Jugoslavije).

Po koncu hladne vojne in z začetkom 21. stoletja se je v svetovni politiki pokazalo več tendenc, pomembnih za zunanjo politiko EU. En trend je spreminjanje razmerij moči v svetovni politiki zaradi vzpona novih akterjev, kot so Brazilija, Kitajska, Indija in Južna Afrika, ki pogosto nastopajo skupaj (kot skupina BRICS); to spremenjeno razmerje moči je bilo med drugim opazno v načinu reševanja posledic globalne gospodarske krize, ki se je

začela leta 2008 (ko se je težišče reševanja svetovnih gospodarskih vprašanj premaknilo s skupine G-8 na skupino G-20). Poleg tega avtorji na tem področju opažajo, da so si sile v svetovni politiki po moči v zadnjem obdobju zelo podobne, zato je težko napovedovati prihodnje odnose med njimi. Hkrati so za svetovno politiko v tem obdobju značilni *ad hoc* pristopi k reševanju skupnih problemov; zato je le redko vnaprej jasno, kako se bo pristopilo k naslavljanju posameznih svetovno pomembnih vprašanj ali kriz.

## 2.2 Konceptualizacija

### 2.2.1 Identiteta EU v povezavi z zunanjo politiko EU

V smislu predmeta opazovanja je opredeljen pojem identitete EU v svetovni politiki. To identiteto se glede na literaturo s področja socialne psihologije lahko razume kot zunanji vidik potencialne zamišljene družbene identitete, ki se nanaša na družbene in politične procese evropske integracije. Ob tem je pomembno tudi, kaj se dogaja na ravni posameznikov: Cerutti (2008) razume kot pomembne tudi samo-opise ljudi kot Evropejcev; po drugi strani pa npr. Žižek (1990/1992) opozarja, da je kolektivni samo-opis stvar verjetja v kolektivno identiteto na ravni posameznikov.

Glede na teoretske podlage je oblikovana delovna definicija identitete EU v svetovni politiki: identiteta EU v svetovni politiki pomeni, kako EU vidi sebe v svetovni politiki, kako vidi svetovno politiko, kaj stori ali ne stori v svetovni politiki, ko tudi, kako meni, da jo v svetovni politiki vidijo drugi subjekti, ki so pomembni zanjo. Povedano krajše, identiteta EU v svetovni politiki pomeni samo-razumevanje EU v svetovni politiki.

Če analiziramo dokumente, ki so bili sprejeti na najvišji politični ravni v okviru EGS, kot tudi pogodbe EU, je mogoče ugotoviti, da so države EGS/ EU vzpostavljale idejo identitete EU, in del tega procesa je bila podoba EU v svetovni politiki. Pri tem je pogosto prihajalo do t.i. bajne retroaktivnosti tj. retroaktivnosti, ki pomeni bajko, saj nek dokument stanje, ki ga šele vzpostavlja, predstavlja kot stanje, ki je že ves čas obstajalo (kar je na primeru ameriške Deklaracije neodvisnosti osvetlil Derrida 2002). Čeprav v primerih dokumentov in pogodb EGS/ EU politike EGS/ EU, o katerih so ti dokumenti govorili (npr. SZVP v Enotni evropski listini), še niso obstajale, so namreč dokumenti in pogodbe pogosto poudarjali, da te politike prispevajo k identiteti EU. Disertacija glede na to opazuje tudi primere vzpostavljanja identitete EU v svetovni politiki prek dokumentov EGS/ EPS/ EU.

Poleg tega je za nadaljnjo analizo pomembno opazovanje, kaj je bilo tisto, kar je predstavnike držav EGS privedlo do sodelovanja na področju zunanje politike: so bili to zgolj politični interesi (pristop od zgoraj navzdol) ali pa so si predstavniki delili neko idejo



kolektivne identitete EU? Je šlo le za notranji vidik občutka skupne identitete ali pa so se države EGS/ EU predvsem želele razlikovati od zunanjih akterjev?

### 2.2.2 Zunanja politika EU kot proces oblikovanja identitete EU v svetovni politiki

Kot je ugotovilo več avtorjev (npr. Bretherton in Vogler 1999; Ginsberg 2001; Hill 2003) EU ni mogoče zadovoljivo konceptualizirati v okviru dihotomije medvladno – nadnacionalno, zato se EU pogosto proučuje kot t.i. *sui generis* akterja v svetovni politiki. Za proučevanje zunanje politike EU pa avtorji uporabljajo pristope, ki gredo prek državo-centričnega pogleda (npr. White 1999; 2001; Carlsnaes, Sjursen in White 2004; Kajnc 2006) in koncept države nadomeščajo s konceptom akterja (EU) ter koncept vlade s konceptom upravljanja.

Poleg tega je pri analizi EU in njene zunanje politike treba upoštevati, da je EU kot ideja in družbena resničnost ves čas v procesu konstrukcije, kar je zanjo bistveno: socialni antropologi so izpostavili, da končni politični cilj evropskega projekta ni bil nikoli definiran, saj ta projekt izziva staro koncepcijo identitete, ki je zakoreninjena v ozemlju; čeprav se evropski projekt eksplicitno ne nanaša na identitete in kulture, spreminja in oblikuje prav njih, saj kot politično-ekonomski projekt ne bi mogel uspeti brez legitimacije prek kulturne infrastrukture (npr. Abélès 2000; Bellier in Wilson 2000).

Glede na to je treba zunanjo politiko EU opredeliti široko, ob upoštevanju vseh njenih pojavnih oblik od začetka tovrstnega sodelovanja med državami EGS. Izraz »zunanja politika EU« zato v disertaciji označuje vse politike v zvezi z zunanjimi odnosi, ki so bile povezane z okvirjem EGS/ EU od začetka sodelovanja na političnem področju. To je smiselno tudi zato, ker je bil proces sodelovanja na področju zunanje politike že od svojih začetkov tesno povezan s političnim projektom vzpostavljanja Evropske unije. Poleg tega je pri proučevanju zunanje politike EU smiselno razlikovati med zunanjepolitičnimi rezultati in izidi; do slednjih pride zgolj, če ima zunanja politika tudi vpliv (*cf.* Ginsberg 2001).

Analiza dokumentov, ki so predstavljali osnovo zunanje politike EU od nastanka EPS leta 1969 nakazuje, da se je v zunanji politiki EU oblikovala zgodba (narativa) o identiteti EU v svetovni politiki. To podpira prvo tezo v smislu zapiranja pomena identitete EU v svetovni politiki v zgodovini zunanje politike EU, saj je bilo definiranje oziroma zapiranje pomena ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki funkcionalno z vidika doseganja notranjih ciljev integracije EU. Potrebna je podrobnejša analiza, da se ugotovi, kakšni so bili konkretni izrazi poskusov zapiranja te identitete, in kakšno je bilo njihovo razmerje z dogajanjem v svetovni politiki. To podčrtuje težavo zunanje politike EU kot problematizacije identitete EU v svetovni politiki: če je zapora pomena identitete EU v svetovni politiki služila večinoma

notranjim ciljem integracije EU, to nakazuje, da so bili v tem procesu zanemarjeni zunanji cilji oziroma povezava s svetovno politiko.

### 2.3 Teoretski pristop

Teoretski pristop ne sledi specifični teoriji ali pristopu k mednarodnim odnosom oziroma evropskim študijam, temveč ga usmerja problem, ki je bil izpostavljen na začetku disertacije. Zato je razvit okvir, ki je namenjen proučevanju tega problema, in temelji na petih teoretskih elementih: opazovanju zgodb, zgodovinski perspektivi, celovitem pristopu, upoštevanju odprtosti pomenov ter etiki pisanja.

Disertacija opazuje oblikovanje zgodb v zgodovini delovanja zunanje politike EU. Zgodbe so specifične oblike diskurzov; na podlagi ugotovitev avtorjev na tem področju disertacija poda definicijo, da je zgodba (narativa) družbeno pomenljiv opis serije dogodkov ali delovanj, ki je namenjen nekemu občinstvu in ki podaja poanto o nečem.

Zgodovinska perspektiva je pomembna, ker je mogoče izvesti poglobljene analize predvsem na podlagi védenja o tem, kako so se relevantni družbeni pojavi razvijali skozi čas, do sedanjega trenutka. To je pomembno z vidika analize zunanje politike EU, če naj pokažemo, kako se je oblikovala zgodba o identiteti EU v svetovni politiki, in kako je prišlo do zaprtja pomena te identitete v zgodovini zunanje politike EU.

Disertacija, kot že omenjeno, uporablja celovit (tristranski) pristop k analizi, saj upošteva ne le diskurz zunanje politike EU, temveč hkrati opazuje tudi njeno prakso oziroma izvedbo, kot tudi razvoj relevantnih dogodkov v kontekstu svetovne politike.

Pomembno je tudi upoštevanje odprtosti pomenov, saj lahko EU in njeno zunanjo politiko razumemo kot resničnost, ki se stalno spreminja in je ves čas v nastajanju, v njej pa je vedno možen pojav novih praks in delovanja (npr. Hay 2002; Bauer in Brighi 2009).

Prav tako je pomemben etični pristop, saj ne le svetovna politika, temveč tudi zunanja politika EU in identiteta EU predstavljata politična predmeta proučevanja. Ta ugotovitev terja introspekcijo: kakšne diskurze, inter-subjektivne resničnosti in odnose moči reproduciram s svojim pisanjem?

### 2.4 Metodološki pristop

Disertacija poleg kvantifikacije zunanjepolitičnih tem, ki jih je obravnaval Evropski svet v obdobju do decembra 2009 ter od decembra 2009 do decembra 2014, uporablja štiri glavne metodološke pristope: študije primerov, analizo diskurza, pristop dekonstrukcije kot posebno obliko analize diskurzov, ter pristop genealogije za analizo materialnih praks.

Študije primerov so pogosto orodje v družbenih znanostih, ki se uporablja tako za preverjanje pojasnjevalne moči teorij in hipotez, kot tudi za reševanje problemov in prispevanje k razvoju širših teorij oziroma pristopov. Študije primerov na ta način povezujejo teorije s konkretno družbeno/ politično resničnostjo.

Če se pojem diskurza nanaša na rabo jezika v praksi, analiza diskurza opazuje, na kakšen način se jezik uporablja v družbenem in političnem svetu za (re)produciranje stvari, za polnjenje pojmov s pomeni. Analiza diskurza opazuje razpoložljive diskurze v različnih oblikah, da se ugotovi, kako se stvarjem daje pomen; po drugi strani pa opazuje t.i. performativnost diskurzov – kako diskurzi ustvarjajo družbeni svet. V ta namen analiza diskurza uporablja vrsto različnih orodij, ki so opredeljena v tem podpoglavju.

Dekonstrukcija (npr. Derrida 1967/1997) predstavlja specifičen pristop k analizi diskurza, ki opazuje, kako je zunanost nekega sistema, ki jo ta sistem prepoznava in izključuje, na delu znotraj sistema, saj zanikanje zunanosti ali oblikovanje meja predstavlja ključen element identitete sistema, ki je tako odvisen od izključene, zunanje drugosti.

Genealogijo (npr. Foucault 1997) je mogoče videti v smislu dopolnjevanja diskurzivnega pristopa, saj analizira konkretne družbene prakse, skupaj z relevantnimi diskurzi. Gre za potrpežljivo zgodovino tega, kako so se prakse, ki danes delujejo kot brezčasne oziroma dane oblike znanja, oblikovale prek naključnih dogodkov v preteklosti.

### 3. Analiza

Prvi del analize predstavlja analiza diskurza Evropskega sveta, ki se je nanašal na zunanje in z njimi povezane zadeve, saj Evropski svet v okviru zunanje politike EU predstavlja najvišjo institucijo, poleg tega pa je najdlje obstoječa institucija, ki se je ukvarjala s temi zadevami. Diskurz Evropskega sveta je v analizi uporabljen na dva načina: najprej za opredelitev vseh zunanjih in z njimi povezanih zadev, s katerimi se je Evropski svet ukvarjal ter za kvantifikacijo, s katerimi od teh zadev se je ukvarjal najpogosteje; poleg tega raven diskurza Evropskega sveta predstavlja prvi element celovitega analitičnega pristopa.

Prvi korak analize je izveden v Tabeli A.1 v Prilogi A (»Zunanje in z njimi povezane zadeve, ki jih je obravnaval Evropski svet v obdobju od januarja 1975 do novembra 2009«). Z uporabo te tabele je narejena zbirna Tabela 3.1.1 v prvem delu analize, ki prikazuje pogostost zunanjih in z njimi povezanih zadev, s katerimi se je ukvarjal Evropski svet v obdobju 1975-2009. Iz Tabele 3.1.1 je razvidno, da je Evropski svet v tem obdobju največkrat razpravljal o Bližnjem vzhodu, in sicer na približno polovici vseh svojih zasedanj med 1975 in 2009.

Druga najpogostejša zadeva, o kateri je Evropski svet razpravljajal v tem obdobju, je bila širitev, o kateri je Evropski svet razpravljajal na približno tretjini zasedanj.

Na tej podlagi prva in druga študija primera v analizi obravnavata razvoj zunanje politike EU v obdobju do decembra 2009 na primerih Bližnjega vzhoda ter širitve. Tretja (zgodovinska) študija opazuje razvoj same zunanje politike EU v tem obdobju, ob uporabi dokumentov Evropskega sveta in drugih relevantnih zbirk dokumentov; hkrati rezultati te študije omogočajo primerjavo razvoja zunanje politike EU z rezultati prvih dveh študij tj. študij primerov.

Zadnja študija v analizi najprej izvede kvantifikacijo zunanjih in z njimi povezanih zadev, s katerimi se je Evropski svet ukvarjal v obdobju od decembra 2009 do decembra 2014; nato izvede analizo najpogosteje obravnavanih zadev v tem obdobju, kot tudi analizo razvoja zunanje politike EU. Rezultati te študije zato omogočajo primerjavo z rezultati za obdobje do decembra 2009. Na ta način je možno ugotoviti, kaj zunanja politika EU kot proces oblikovanja identitete EU pomeni v kontekstu spreminjajoče se svetovne politike v začetku 21. stoletja.

### 3.1 Prva študija primera: Bližnji vzhod

Ker je zgodbo ali narativo treba pripovedovati, da se jo pojasni, študije v analizi, vključno s študijami primerov, vse relevantne dokumente in diskurze opazujejo vzporedno, v ustreznem časovnem zaporedju.

#### Prolog

Konflikt med Izraelom in Palestinci ima dolgo zgodovino, ki je študija primera ne obravnava, osvetljuje pa nekatere dogodke v zgodovini tega konflikta, ki predstavljajo širši kontekst za njegovo razumevanje; npr. sporazum Sykes-Picot, ki je bil skrivaj sklenjen med Veliko Britanijo in Francijo leta 1916 in s katerim sta si obe med seboj razdelili bližnjezhodna ozemlja razpadajočega osmanskega imperija.

Bližnji vzhod je predstavljal prvo od dveh glavnih tem, ki sta bili obravnavani na prvem zasedanju zunanjih ministrov držav EGS v okviru EPS leta 1970, skupaj s Konferenco za varnost in sodelovanje v Evropi (KVSE), kar priča o njegovem pomenu za zunanjo politiko EU. Druga konferenca zunanjih ministrov je prinesla prvi javni diskurz zunanje politike EU o Bližnjem vzhodu, ki je izpostavljal označevalca »dolgo obstoječih in tesnih vezi« med Evropo in državami Bližnjega vzhoda ter »njihovih skupnih interesov« (Bulletin of the European Communities 1971). Ta označevalca sta poslej predstavljala stalnico diskurza zunanje politike

EU o Bližnjem vzhodu. Imela sta značilnosti praznih ali lebdečih označevalcev, saj njuna vsebina ni bila podrobneje pojasnjena, čeprav sta bila uporabljena v smislu utemeljitve ključnih usmeritev nastajajoče zunanje politike EU.

Naslednji pomemben korak je predstavljala Deklaracija o situaciji na Bližnjem vzhodu, ki so jo zunanji ministri držav EGS sprejeli novembra 1973 (*Bulletin of the European Communities* 1973). Ta Deklaracija (*ibid.*) je imela več namenov oziroma posledic: opredelila je namero držav EGS, da do Bližnjega vzhoda vodijo svojo politiko; pojasnila njihovo stališče do tega konflikta; ter dala pozitiven signal državam arabskega sveta, saj je zagovarjala pravice Palestincev.

Vsebina korakov v začetkih bližnjevzhodne politike držav EGS je pomenila, da je bila zunanja politika EU glede Bližnjega vzhoda že v svoji najbolj zgodnji fazi prežeta s premislekom in povezavami z identiteto EU. Konkretno izvedbe politike je bilo v tem obdobju malo, obstajala je predvsem v smislu pomoči; vendar se je skladala z zunanjepolitičnim diskurzom. Po drugi strani kontekst svetovne politike angažmaju držav EGS na Bližnjem vzhodu ni bil naklonjen, saj so se ZDA izrekle proti njemu.

### 1975-1990

V obdobju 1975 do 1990 so napore zunanje politike EU v zvezi z Bližnjim vzhodom zaznamovali diskurzivni mehanizmi (v smislu izražanja podpore naporom za rešitev konflikta na ravni svetovne politike, ki so jih vodile ZDA), ki so jih od leta 1980, ko je bila sprejeta Beneška deklaracija o Bližnjem vzhodu, dopolnjevala konkretnija dejanja, ki so države EGS približevala dogajanju na ravni svetovne politike. Diskurz je obsegal klasična orodja diplomacije v smislu deklaracij, odzivov na trenutno dogajanje in skupnih demarš; države EGS pa so tudi iznašle nova orodja za skupno delovanje, npr. prek usklajenega delovanja rezidenčnih ambasadorjev v Izraelu. Od leta 1980 so poleg tega države EGS v okviru političnega sodelovanja imele kontakte s stranmi v konfliktu, ki jih je ohranjalo vsakokratno predsedstvo, prav tako pa so se vzpostavile kot sogovornik v odnosu do ključnih zunanjih akterjev v zvezi s tem konfliktom, ZDA in ZSSR.

Države EGS v okviru zunanje politike EU sicer niso imele vpliva na dogajanje na ravni svetovne politike v zvezi s tem konfliktom in so podpirale pobude drugih, predvsem ZDA. Kljub temu jim je uspelo oblikovati lasten pogled na to, kako bi bilo treba pristopiti k reševanju konflikta; ta pogled je vključeval zamišljen svet celovite mirovne rešitve. Diskurz in delovanje držav EGS sta torej te države vzpostavila kot akterja, ki se zanima za reševanje konflikta na ravni svetovne politike, in v povezavi s tem za človekove pravice.

## 1991-2000

1990-a so zaznamovale mirovne pobude na ravni svetovne politike za rešitev konflikta na Bližnjem vzhodu. Prva je bila mirovna konferenca v Madridu oktobra 1991, ki je bila sklicana na pobudo ZDA, države EGS pa so bile v okviru svojega političnega sodelovanja nanjo povabljeni. Ključen del mirovnih pogovorov se je odvijal na bilateralni ravni, kjer so sodelovale ZDA in Rusija; države EGS so se morale potruditi, da so bile vključene v širšo multilateralno raven pogajanj. Kljub temu je že dejstvo, da se jih je vključilo, predstavljalo bistveno spremembo z vidika njihovega sodelovanja v mirovnem procesu.

Za diskurz zunanje politike EU je bilo v tem obdobju značilno izražanje podpore mirovnim procesom na ravni svetovne politike. Če gledamo diskurz zunanje politike EU glede Bližnjega vzhoda v tem in predhodnem obdobju v celoti, je v njem mogoče opaziti ponavljajočo se diskurzivno strukturo: v okviru te strukture je diskurz zunanje politike EU najprej izrazil podporo ključnim zunanjim akterjem glede naslavljanja bližnjevzhodnega konflikta, predvsem ZDA; temu pa so sledili izrazi pripravljenosti oziroma volje EU, da nase prevzame del odgovornosti za reševanje konflikta na ravni svetovne politike, oziroma da igra aktivno vlogo.

Kljub temu diskurzu, ki je kazal na neupoštevanje EU na ravni svetovne politike, so bila leta od 1993 dalje (ko je stopila v veljavo Maastrichtska pogodba) zaznamovana s hitrim razvojem instrumentov skupne zunanje in varnostne politike (SZVP), kar je EU omogočilo konkretnije vključevanje v zvezi z naslavljanjem konflikta, vendar v smislu praktičnih vidikov izvedbe ter v podporo mirovnim naporom na ravni svetovne politike. Pomemben dolgoročni vidik zunanje politike EU glede Bližnjega vzhoda je z vidika konkretne izvedbe, ki se je razvijala v tem obdobju, predstavljala rastoča pomoč palestinskim ozemljem. Poleg tega je zunanja politika EU pričela prevzemati del odgovornosti, kar se tiče ekonomskega vidika naslavljanja posledic konflikta, prek svoje vloge v zbiranju sredstev na mednarodni ravni za pomoč Palestincem ter palestinskim ozemljem.

Čeprav je zunanja politika EU torej bila v stiku z dogodki na ravni svetovne politike glede bližnjevzhodnega mirovnega procesa, pa ni bila vključena v sama mirovna pogajanja. Kljub temu, da so bili predstavniki EU vabljeni na najbolj vidne dogodke na mednarodni ravni, še posebej od leta 1999 dalje, je analiza diskurzov zunanje politike EU, kot tudi diskurzov na ravni svetovne politike (ZDA in Varnostnega sveta Združenih narodov) pokazala, da pobude EU niso vplivale na dinamiko bližnjevzhodnega mirovnega procesa, saj je do ključnih pogajanj prihajalo na pobudo drugih akterjev, najbolj ZDA.

## 2000-a

Z vidika tristranskega pristopa k analizi, ob upoštevanju diskurza, izvedbe in konteksta zunanje politike EU, je prvo desetletje 21. stoletja predstavljalo obdobje, ko je zunanja politika EU z vidika angažmaja EU na Bližnjem vzhodu dosegla dva pomembna uspeha, in sicer sodelovanje v bližnjevzhodnem Kvartetu ter sprejem t.i. zemljevida (*Roadmap*) k trajni rešitvi izraelsko-palestinskega konflikta s strani Kvarteta.

Bližnjevzhodni Kvartet je bil oblikovan in priznan s strani Varnostnega sveta Združenih narodov v letu 2002; EU ni le sodelovala v okviru tega neformalnega telesa za obravnavo bližnjevzhodnega konflikta (poleg Združenih narodov, ZDA in Ruske federacije), temveč je prvotna pobuda za oblikovanje tega telesa bila podana s strani EU. S tega vidika Kvartet predstavlja prvi konkretni rezultat z vidika zunanjepolitičnega angažmaja EU na Bližnjem vzhodu. Poleg tega je bil s strani EU podan predlog za sprejem t.i. zemljevida (*Roadmap*) k trajni rešitvi bližnjevzhodnega konflikta, ki ga je Kvartet sprejel in predstavil obema stranema v konfliktu v letu 2003. Vendar v nadaljnjih letih izvajanje zemljevida, ki ga je sprejel Kvartet, ni potekalo kot predvideno; poleg tega tudi Kvartet ni deloval, kot je prvotno pričakovala EU (tj. kot telo, ki bi se neposredno ukvarjalo z reševanjem konflikta), temveč je deloval v smislu zbiranja podpore za pobude ZDA za reševanje bližnjevzhodnega konflikta. Oba najvidnejša rezultata zunanje politike EU glede Bližnjega vzhoda se torej nista prelila v dejanske izide na ravni svetovne politike.

Z vidika izvedbe v praksi so bili napori EU pomembni predvsem za ohranjanje podpore gospodarskemu delovanju in stabilnosti palestinske strani v konfliktu, ter v smislu mikro-diplomacije tj. reševanja posameznih diplomatskih vprašanj na terenu. Največji materialni prispevek s strani EU v opazovanem obdobju sta predstavljali dve misiji evropske varnostne in obrambne politike na palestinskih ozemljih, in sicer policijska misija EUPOL COPPS ter misija za pomoč pri izvajanju nadzora na mejnem prehodu v Rafi (EUBAM), ki sta bili vzpostavljeni v letu 2005.

Pri vzpostavitvi in izvajanju obeh misij je bila zunanja politika EU odvisna od razmer na terenu in od svetovne politike. Poleg tega so z vidika splošnega političnega reševanja konflikta tudi v tem obdobju glavno vlogo še naprej imeli drugi akterji, ne EU, predvsem ZDA, pa tudi regionalni akterji, kot sta Egipt in Turčija. S tega vidika je mogoče zaključiti, da so razmere svetovne politike v primeru bližnjevzhodnega konflikta predstavljale t.i. »slepo pego« (cf. Derrida 1967/1997) zunanje politike EU na Bližnjem vzhodu, saj so diskurz in delovanje EU ves čas zamejevale, vendar zunanja politika EU tega ni omenila ali naslovila; to

hkrati pomeni, da je bilo oblikovanje identitete EU v svetovni politiki na primeru Bližnjega vzhoda tesno povezano z zamejenostjo s strani okoliščin svetovne politike.

### Premislek

Analiza je pokazala, da je bilo ukvarjanje z Bližnjim vzhodom ključnega pomena za zunanjo politiko EU že od njenega začetka; kot tudi, da je zunanja politika EU prek ukvarjanja z Bližnjim vzhodom implicitno vzpostavljala države EGS/ EU kot (pomembnega) akterja v svetovni politiki, predvsem do drugih (vele)sil v svetovni politiki in v zvezi s tem konfliktom.

Kljub temu je bila zunanja politika EU ob koncu opazovanega obdobja v naslavljanje bližnjevzhodnega konflikta vključena ob robu in v smislu podpore naporom za reševanje konflikta s strani drugih akterjev, predvsem ZDA. Ne glede na to je zunanja politika EU k mirovnemu procesu precej prispevala na posreden način, saj je EU podpirala in stabilizirala delovanje palestinskih oblasti.

Sicer se je pri proučevanju primera Bližnjega vzhoda pokazalo, da je z vidika analize zunanje politike EU nujno razlikovati med rezultati zunanje politike ter dejanskimi izidi, do katerih pride, ko ima zunanja politika vpliv. Pokazal se je tudi pomen ukvarjanja z Bližnjim vzhodom za EU tj. z vidika notranjih razlogov, saj se je EU ukvarjala z Bližnjim vzhodom tudi takrat, ko ni bilo zunanjih pobud za to.

To nakazuje, da so obstajali implicitni razlogi za ukvarjanje zunanje politike EU z Bližnjim vzhodom, ki so segali prek nujnosti dobave nafte in želje po stabilizaciji regije Bližnjega vzhoda, in so bili povezani med drugim z identitetnimi potrebami, in v povezavi s tem s položajem EU v svetovni politiki.

### 3.2 Druga študija primera: Širitev

Od leta 1960, ko so države EGS prvič uradno razmišljale o širitvi (v povezavi z Veliko Britanijo), se je širitvena politika dotaknila skoraj vsake države na evropski celini ter številnih držav na mejah EU; kar z vidika diskurza in prakse pomeni, da širitev sega v samo srce ideje evropske identitete oziroma identitete EU.

### Prolog

Prva širitev EGS je bila posledica dejstva, da Velika Britanija ni sodelovala v ustanovitvi EGS leta 1957, saj si je želela ustanovitve manj ambicioznega prostotrgovinskega območja. Kot posledica tega je bila prva širitev, do dogovora o kateri je prišlo na zasedanju vodij držav EGS v Haagu decembra 1969 (*Final communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or*



*Government on 1 and 2 December 1969 at The Hague*), neposredno povezana z dogovorom o vzpostavitvi političnega sodelovanja med članicami EGS. Do dogovora o prvi širitvi je namreč prišlo, ker je Velika Britanija večino članic prepričala, da politično sodelovanje držav EGS ni mogoče brez britanskega članstva EGS (cf. Möckli 2009). Veliki Britaniji sta ob prvi širitvi v EGS, ki je bila udejanjena leta 1973, zaradi zgodovinske povezanosti sledili Irska in Danska; do norveškega članstva v EGS pa ni prišlo zaradi negativnega izida referendumu na Norveškem.

Prva širitev EGS je tako z genealoškega vidika predstavljala posledico vprašanj, ki so se postavila ob ustanovitvi EGS, in je bila povezana z vzpostavitvijo političnega sodelovanja med članicami EGS. Države prve širitve se je videlo kot tako podobne obstoječim članicam, da jim ni bilo treba izpolnjevati dodatnih pogojev za članstvo. Po drugi strani povezava s takratnimi okoliščinami svetovne politike ni igrala neposredne vloge pri prvi širitvi. To kaže na naključni izvor postopka širitve EU, ki se ga danes vidi kot samoumevnega. Hkrati analiza procesa prve širitve razkriva tudi začetke političnega projekta združevanja Evrope in s tem povezavo s konceptom identitete EU.

### Sredozemski krog širitve

V okviru naslednjih širitev, z Grčijo ter Španijo in Portugalsko, so se države EGS soočale s posledicami padcev nedemokratskih režimov v teh treh državah v 1970-ih. Značilno za diskurz Evropskega sveta je bilo, da je v obdobju nestabilnosti te države pozival k spremembam in reformam, v kontekstu širitve. Predvsem pa je bilo pomembno, da se je z ozirom na te tri države prek diskurza Evropskega sveta oblikovala prva pogojenost v procesu širitve, z začetkom leta 1978, ko je Evropski svet sprejel Deklaracijo o demokraciji (1978a), v kateri je poudaril, da reprezentativna demokracija in spoštovanje človekovih pravic predstavljata temelj članstva v Skupnostih. Hkrati je ta izjava pokazala, da so članice EGS države, ki so bile predmet sredozemske širitve, dojemale kot drugačne od sebe, in so imele potrebo, da pred širitvijo z njimi opredelijo svojo (evropsko) identiteto.

Z vidika svetovne politike so se prek sredozemskih krogov širitve države članice EGS soočale s spremembami v svoji soseski v Evropi (z razpadi nedemokratskih režimov), in jih tudi uspešno naslovile. Hkrati sta obe širitvi (Grčija je podpisala svojo pristopno pogodbo leta 1979, Španija in Portugalska pa 1985) pokazali na širitev kot orodje zunanje politike EU, tj. kot način, da se tiste elemente, ki so bili za države EGS ključni elementi njihove skupne identitete, razširi prek njihovih skupnih meja. Obe sredozemski širitvi sta bili poleg tega pospremljeni z diskurzom, ki je vse bolj govoril o združevanju Evrope.

Širitvi sta bili v kontekstu procesa širitve pomembni tudi z drugih vidikov. Ob zaključevanju obeh širitih je EGS razvila novo »Sredozemsko politiko«, ki je predstavljala zametek sosedske politike EU. Poleg tega je prišlo do prvega izključevanja: leta 1987 je bila prošnja Maroka za članstvo v EGS zavrnjena z obrazložitvijo, da Maroko ni evropska država.

#### Ključno obdobje: 1988-1993

Spremembe, do katerih je prihajalo v Evropi po letu 1985, ko so bile razglašene ključne reforme v Sovjetski zvezi, so z letom 1988 EGS in njene države članice izkoristile z navezavo stikov z državami srednje in vzhodne Evrope (SVE), ki so se osamosvajale. Hkrati se je v okviru EGS začelo s pogovori o sporazumih o trgovini in sodelovanju s tistimi državami SVE, za katere se je presodilo, da so na poti reform – najprej z Madžarsko, nato tudi s Čehoslovaško in ostalimi.

V tem kontekstu je mejnik predstavljala Rodoška izjava Evropskega sveta (1988b), v kateri je Evropski svet izrazil odločenost, da premosti delitve na evropskem kontinentu ter da spodbuja zahodne vrednote v državah SVE, najprej prek zagotavljanja spoštovanja določil Helsinške sklepne listine. Na ta način so EGS in njene članice aktivno posegle v spremembe, do katerih je prihajalo v SVE, in sicer z intenzivnejšo podporo spoštovanju človekovih pravic iz Helsinške sklepne listine, ter konkretneje prek pogajanj v okviru EGS o sklenitvi sporazumov o trgovini in sodelovanju z državami SVE, ki so se demokratizirale.

Ti napori so postali bolj vidni v letu 1989; decembra 1989 je Evropski svet opredelil nov pristop do držav SVE, v katerih je prihajalo do sprememb (1989c): kot je ugotovil, je EGS predstavljala tisto evropsko entiteto, h kateri so se obračale države SVE, zato je sprejel odločitev, da EGS razišče ustrezne oblike sodelovanja z njimi. Pri tem je Evropski svet poudaril voljo EGS do odprtosti do demokratizirajočih se držav SVE. EGS je tudi videl kot ključni steber nove evropske arhitekture in ravnotežja.

V praksi je v prvi polovici leta 1990 prišlo do zaključka pogajanj in sklenitve prvih sporazumov o trgovini in sodelovanju. Poleg tega je bil državam SVE s strani EGS ponujen program pomoči PHARE. Ta pristop se je v letih 1990-1991 razširil tudi na tri baltske države Estonijo, Latvijo in Litvo, ki so se osamosvojile.

Hkrati s temi procesi, ki so se nanašali na države, ki so se osamosvajale izpod vpliva Sovjetske zveze v Evropi, je za članstvo v EGS zaprosilo več držav članic EFTA (Evropske prostotrgovinske zveze). Zato je Evropski svet konec 1992 in v začetku 1993 sprejel odločitev, da EGS začne pogajanja o naslednji širitvi s temi državami (Avstrijo, Finsko, Švedsko in Norveško).

Evropski svet (1993a) je v zvezi z državami SVE junija 1993 v Kopenhagnu sprejel ključno deklaracijo, v kateri je izjavil, da bodo države SVE postale članice EGS, vendar je hkrati opredelil tudi jasne ekonomske in politične kriterije za njihovo članstvo. Prek tega procesa opredeljevanja do držav SVE v kontekstu svetovno političnih sprememb ob koncu hladne vojne v Evropi so bili na ta način opredeljeni nadaljnji sestavni elementi koncepcije identitete EU v povezavi z zunanjo politiko EU v okviru procesa širitve.

### Koraki k širitvi »velikega poka«

Sledilo je obdobje, v katerem se je proces širitve najprej osredotočil na izvedbo naslednjega kroga širitve z državami EFTA Avstrijo, Finsko in Švedsko (Norvežani so se na ponovnem referendumu izrekli proti članstvu) – njihova pristopna pogodba je bila podpisana junija 1994. Od leta 1994 pa se je razvila tudi praksa v zvezi s kandidatkami za naslednjo širitev, državami SVE – vse več teh držav je prosilo za članstvo, in sprejeta je bila odločitev, da se z njimi sklene »Evropske sporazume« v okviru priprav na širitev (z vidika analize diskurza je bil v teh sporazumih označevalec »evropski« torej vsebovan že v samem naslovu sporazumov).

V naslednjih letih je bila na ravni teles EU razvita praksa za podporo novim kandidatkam, in sicer tako prek t.i. »strukturiranega odnosa« z EGS, ki je vključeval redne sestanke, kot tudi obnovljenega programa pomoči PHARE. V letu 1997 so bile na ravni Evropskega sveta sprejete odločitve, da se začno pogajanja s prvo skupino prosilk za članstvo, v kateri je bilo šest držav.

Ta dejanja je spremljal razvoj diskurza na ravni teles EU (Evropskega sveta, Sveta in Komisije), ki je razvijal zgodbo o združevanju Evrope ter ji dodajal nove elemente, saj jo je povezal s preteklostjo in vizijo ustanoviteljev EGS, in jo s tem približal domeni mita. Ves proces, ki je vodil proti peti širitvi EGS/ EU je bil prek teh diskurzov poleg tega že od svojih začetkov v letih 1998-1993 eksplicitno povezan z doseganjem zunanjepolitičnih ciljev na evropski celini, predvsem miru, varnosti in stabilnosti.

Hkrati s pogajanja z državami SVE so države EGS začenjale še en proces, in sicer proces stabilizacije z državami jugovzhodne Evrope (JVE), ki je obsegal tudi evropsko perspektivo teh držav; v ta namen je bila na ravni Sveta EU razvita kompleksnejša pogojenost za članstvo teh držav, ki je bila povezana med drugim z njihovim medsebojnim regionalnim sodelovanjem. Na ta način je v okviru procesa širitve EGS/ EU mogoče razločiti »štiri kroge drugosti«: države prve širitve, ki so bile dojete kot tako podobne državam EGS, da jim niso bili postavljeni dodatni pogoji za članstvo; sredozemske evropske države druge in tretje širitve; države SVE, Malta in Ciper; ter države JVE, ki se jih je videlo kot najbolj drugačne.

Izvedba petega kroga širitve je bila končana v obdobju 2002-2004: v letu 2002 je bilo odločeno, da deset kandidatk izpolnjuje pogoje za članstvo (Ciper, Češka, Estonija, Litva, Latvija, Madžarska, Malta, Poljska, Slovaška in Slovenija), in te so postale članice EGS/ EU z majem 2004. Njihova pristopna pogodba je vključevala Skupno izjavo o eni Evropi, ki je ostale pristopne pogodbe niso poznale (in je s tem z vidika analize diskurza predstavljala zaključno stopnjo zgodbe in mita o združeni Evropi). Hkrati s tem procesom je bila v okviru EU oblikovana nova sosedska politika, ki je opredelila razmerje EU do držav, ki so postale njene nove sosede s širitvijo, izvedeno maja 2004.

### Po »velikem poku« in nove perspektive

Po izvedbi pete širitve z desetimi novimi članicami se je proces širitve nadaljeval, in sicer s treh vidikov. Dokončan je bil šesti krog širitve z Bolgarijo in Romunijo, ki sta postali članici januarja 2007. Nadaljevala so se pogajanja z državami zahodnega Balkana in Turčijo, hkrati pa so za članstvo začele zaprositi prve države zahodnega Balkana – junija 2004 je Hrvaška postala prva kandidatka za članstvo od teh držav. S temi državami je bilo podpisanih več novih Sporazumov o stabilizaciji in pridruženju. Poleg tega se je razvijala razširjena sosedska politika EU, ki je vse bolj merila na nekdanje države Sovjetske zveze na vzhodu, ki so se želele približevati EU, predvsem Gruzijo in Ukrajino.

Tudi v tem obdobju so telesa EU, predvsem Evropska komisija, nadaljevala z diskurzom o širitvi, prek katerega se je idejo in proces širitve povezovalo z zunanjepolitičnimi cilji kot tudi z identiteto EU.

Poleg tega je ob koncu opazovanega obdobja prišlo do novega razvoja dogodkov v vzhodni soseski EU: do revolucije v Gruziji leta 2008 in do menjave vodstva v Ukrajini, pri čemer si je novo vodstvo postavilo politični cilj približevanja Ukrajine EU. Uspeh širitvene politike do konca opazovanega obdobja je tako izkazal pomembnost tega vidika zunanje politike EU, saj se je prek procesa širitve vpliv EGS/ EU razširil praktično na vso evropsko celino, hkrati pa se je prek procesa širitve EU spremenila v enovitega regionalnega akterja, kar predstavlja uspeh tudi z vidika svetovne politike.

### Premislek

Proces širitve je bil funkcionalen z vidika zunanje politike EU na vsaj tri načine. Prvič, tretje države, ki jim je bil namenjen, je pripravil do tega, da so postale podobne državam članicam EU, še preden so same postale članice. Izvedba vsake širitve je pomenila, da je zunanost EU postala njena nova notranost, s čimer je EU pridobila nova obzorja v odnosu do svojih novih

sosed. Poleg tega je prek tega procesa EU pridobila nove članice in s tem dodatno težo v mednarodni skupnosti, kar je okrepilo identiteto EU v svetovni politiki.

Ob tem je diskurz širitve proizvajal pomene v zvezi z evropsko identiteto oziroma identiteto EU, in je prispeval k izgradnji te identitete, saj so morale med drugim tiste tretje države, ki so želele postati članice, in za katere je bilo ocenjeno, da obstoječim državam članicam EGS/ EU še niso dovolj podobne, postati dovolj podobne tem državam, še preden so lahko postale kandidatke (primera pete in šeste širitve). Hkrati je proces širitve predstavljal odpiranje pojma identitete EU, prek odločitev, ki se jih je sprejemalo o vključevanju novih krogov držav v proces širitve. Po drugi strani pa je bilo tudi to odpiranje pojma identitete EU v procesu širitve videno v smislu realizacije nekega že obstoječega pojma ali predstave evropske identitete.

Z vidika svetovne politike je proces širitve predstavljal uspeh, saj je zunanja politika EU prek njega uspešno naslavljala svetovno politične spremembe, do katerih je prihajalo v Evropi. Vendar je treba s tega vidika upoštevati, da je širitev predstavljala specifičen odziv na specifične razmere v svetovni politiki ob koncu 20. stoletja. Te razmere so se z začetkom 21. stoletja spremenile, zato je vprašanje, ali širitev oziroma širitveni proces še predstavlja ustrezen odziv nanje.

### 3.3 Tretja (zgodovinska) študija: (Re)produkcija identitete EU v svetovni politiki do 2009

Ta študija analizira eksplicitno izražanje identitete v diskurzih zunanje politike EU, kot tudi njen implicitne izraze; z vidika izvedbe pa reagiranje držav EGS/ EU na ključne značilnosti in dogodke v svetovni politiki, njihove odnose z drugimi (vele)silami, kot tudi konkretno prakso, ki se je razvila v okviru skupne zunanje in varnostne politike (SZVP) ter evropske ali skupne varnostne in obrambne politike (EVOP/ SVOP), in ostalih politik na področju zunanje politike, kot je npr. sosedska politika.

#### Ideja identitete

V začetnem obdobju zunanje politike EU je bila slednja najbolj jasno definirana v zaključnem komunikeju konference vodij držav in vlad EGS decembra 1969 (*Final communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or Government on 1 and 2 December 1969 at The Hague*), ki je vseboval tudi identitetni diskurz, saj je govoril o »odgovornostih« in »vlogi« združene Evrope v svetu prihodnosti. Ta diskurz je bil ponovljen v kasnejših komunikejih s strani vodij vlad in držav, kot tudi v poročilih zunanjih ministrov držav EGS o razvijajočem se sodelovanju na

področju zunanje politike; poleg tega mu je bil pridružen diskurz, ki je uporabil prisposodbo o »skupnem glasu«, ki ga morajo navzven imeti države EGS.

Z vidika prakse se je zunanja politika EU v tem, zgodnjem obdobju, oblikovala v odnosu do dveh pomembnih »drugih«, ZDA in ZSSR. ZSSR je v začetku 1970-ih podala pobudo za evropsko varnostno konferenco, do katere (tj. KVSE) je prišlo leta 1973. Čeprav je bil namen ZSSR s tem oslabiti enotnost držav EGS, je dosegla nasprotno, saj je KVSE predstavljala prvo konkretno priložnost za države EGS, da oblikujejo skupna stališča na področju zunanje politike EU, kar so tudi storile.

ZDA so prav tako v letu 1973 podale pobudo o »letu Evrope«, v kateri so sebe označile kot globalnega akterja, države EGS oziroma EGS pa le kot regionalnega. Države EGS so na to reagirale z eksplicitno definicijo evropske identitete, ki so jo opredelile konec tega leta v Dokumentu o evropski identiteti (*Document on the European Identity* 1973). Ta dokument je predstavljal govorno dejanje, s katerim so države EGS eksplicitno vzpostavile svojo skupno identiteto, in to tudi navzven. Hkrati pa je to pomenilo, da se je identiteta EU v svetovni politiki v svojih začetkih pomembno oblikovala prek odnosa držav EGS do ZDA ter ZSSR.

### Govoriti z enim glasom

V letih po ustanovitvi zunanje politike EU v okviru EPS so države EGS začele izvajati deklarirani namen, da navzven govorijo s skupnim glasom. To je najprej potekalo prek deklaracij, ki jih je sprejemal Evropski svet, ustanovljen leta 1975. V tem obdobju se je poleg tega nadaljeval in razvijal skupni nastop držav EGS v okviru KVSE, države EGS pa so tudi začele izvajati dogovor o skupnem nastopu v okviru zasedanj Generalne skupščine Združenih narodov.

Proces oblikovanja skupnega glasu držav EGS navzven je bil tesno povezan s procesom nastajanja Evropske unije; belgijski premier Tindemans je v svojem poročilu o Evropski uniji skupen nastop navzven omenil kot njen prvi element (Bulletin EC 1976). Ob tem so bili za razvoj zunanje politike EU kot celote pomembni tudi zunanji vidiki delovanja EGS, ki so bili razviti v tem obdobju; v tem okviru je Evropska komisija med drugim vzpostavila trgovinske in kasneje celovitejše gospodarske odnose EGS s Kitajsko.

Države EGS pa niso mogle vplivati na širši kontekst svetovne politike tj. na odnose med velesilama ZDA in ZSSR – v okviru EPS so se predvsem odzivale na razvoj odnosov med velesilama s sprejemanjem izjav na ravni Evropskega sveta in ministrov – npr. z deklaracijo Evropskega sveta (1983b) o Evropski uniji, v kateri so izrazile željo, da bi EGS prevzela več odgovornosti v svetu. S postopnim izboljševanjem odnosov med obema velesilama proti

sredini 1980-ih so države EGS začele aktivneje razvijati odnose z državami vzhodnega bloka (to je med drugim pokazalo, da so bile tudi v razvoju teh odnosov odvisne od svojega zunanjskega konteksta tj. svetovne politike).

V letu 1986 je bilo jedro dotedanjih dosežkov in političnih soglasij med državami EGS na področju zunanje politike EU zapisano v Enotno evropsko listino (*Single European Act*), katere diskurz je v povezavi z zunanjo politiko EU neposredno omenjal identiteto EU, poleg tega pa je oboje povezal z novo, varnostno dimenzijo. V praksi pa je bilo v tem obdobju, tj. drugi polovici 1980-ih, skupno zunanje delovanje držav EGS namenjeno vzpostavljanju odnosov z državami srednje in vzhodne Evrope, ki so se osamosvajale od Sovjetske zveze.

### Skupno delovanje

Obdobje transformacij v svetovni politiki, na katere se je zunanja politika EU začela odzivati z letom 1988, je sprožilo tudi transformacije evropskega integracijskega procesa, vključno z zunanjo politiko EU. Odločitve Evropskega sveta v letu 1989 so pomenile začetek pristopa, ki je aktivno posegel v spremembe v Evropi, in je predstavljal prvo takšno priložnost z vidika zunanje politike EU; in sicer, da se je zunanja politika EU neposredno vključila v spremembe, ki so potekale na svetovno politični ravni (vendar geografsko v Evropi) kot glavni zunanji akter. Evropski svet (1989b) se je med drugim odločil, da države EGS aktivno podpro demokratične spremembe v državah SVE. Hkrati je Evropski svet (1989c) zunanjepolitični diskurz EU, o vlogi in odgovornostih EGS v svetovni politiki, neposredno povezal s svetovno političnimi spremembami, do katerih je prihajalo v Evropi. V tem kontekstu je Evropski svet tudi neposredno govoril o namenu *odprtosti* EGS do ostalih evropskih držav. Zato je mogoče ugotoviti, da so te odločitve Evropskega sveta predstavljale ključno križišče med zunanjo politiko EU ter dogodki v takratni svetovni politiki.

Vendar so svetovno politične spremembe v Evropi prvi in najbolj neposreden učinek imele z internega vidika evropskega integracijskega procesa, v katerem so se države EGS torej najprej obrnile navznoter, saj so se v letu 1990 na pobudo francoskega in nemškega predsednika odločile, da se poleg konference o gospodarski in monetarni uniji skliče še eno, o politični uniji – posledica je bil nastanek političnega dela Pogodbe o Evropski uniji, podpisane leta 1992, vključno s poglavjem o SZVP.

V tem obdobju so bili na novo definirani odnosi s ključnimi ostalimi (vele)silami v svetovni politiki. Po dogodkih na trgu Tiananmen je Evropski svet (1989a) izrazil prvo večjo kritiko notranje politike Kitajske, kar je vplivalo na odnose EU s Kitajsko v prihodnjih letih. Prišlo je do otoplitve v odnosih z ZSSR oziroma njeno naslednico Rusijo; med drugim so

države EGS priznale, da do demokratizacije v državah SVE ne bi prišlo brez predhodnih reform v ZSSR. V začetku 1990-ih so bile sprejete odločitve o programu pomoči za Rusijo, kjer je prav tako prihajalo do reform. Predvsem pa je prišlo do velikega zblizanja v odnosih z ZDA; leta 1990 je bila sprejeta skupna deklaracija o novem čezatlantskem partnerstvu.

Delovanje zunanje politike EU v tem obdobju sta najbolj ponazarjala po eni strani razvijajoč se odnos EU do držav SVE; po drugi strani pa neuspešen angažma držav EGS/ EU v zvezi z razpadom nekdanje Jugoslavije. Politika EU do držav SVE, ki so bile vključene v proces približevanja EU in glede katerih so bile kasneje sprejete odločitve, da se jih vključi v nov krog širitve (opisano v drugi študiji primera), je predstavljala uspeh zunanje politike EU. Drugače je bilo v primeru razpada nekdanje Jugoslavije. V začetnem obdobju sredi leta 1991 so v zvezi s krizo v Jugoslaviji države EGS menile, da jo lahko uspešno naslovijo prek zunanje politike EU; njihov pristop se je sestajal iz diplomatskih orodij (Konferenca o Jugoslaviji) ter opazovalne misije. Vendar je do konca leta, ko je prihajalo do bojov in zasedanja delov Hrvaške, postalo jasno, da zunanja politika EU z orodji, ki so jih države EGS bile voljne in zmožne uporabiti (med njimi namreč ni bilo političnega konsenza glede odločnejšega pristopa k reševanju krize), krize ni mogla nasloviti, in reševanje krize je bilo v nadaljnjih letih prepuščeno ZDA in Združenim narodom.

Po drugi strani je izvedba na drugih področjih zunanje politike EU napredovala po sprejetju Maastrichtske pogodbe leta 1992, ki je prav tako omenjala namen, da se s SZVP in SVOP okrepi evropsko identiteto in neodvisnost. Sprejeti so bili prvi skupni ukrepi v okviru nove SZVP (o humanitarni pomoči za Bosno in Hercegovino, opazovanju volitev v Rusiji in o tranziciji v Južni Afriki). V okviru širitvene politike je napredovalo sklepanje in izvajanje Evropskih sporazumov z državami SVE, in njihovo približevanje EU. Z Rusijo je bil leta 1995 sklenjen Sporazum o partnerstvu in sodelovanju. Leta 1995 je bila podpisana nova čezatlantska deklaracija z ZDA. EU je tudi na novo začela graditi odnose s Kitajsko, ki je sredi 1990-ih začela postajati vse pomembnejša svetovna sila.

Na ta način je zunanja politika EU do druge polovice 1990-ih razvila globalno perspektivo. Storjen je bil napredek pri njenem izvajanju, prek instrumentov SZVP in odnosov z državami SVE v okviru širitve. Ob tem je zunanja politika EU še vedno imela regionalen doseg. Prek diskurza zunanje politike o vlogi, odgovornostih in skupnem glasu držav EU v svetovni politiki je bila oblikovana zgodba o EU v svetovni politiki; hkrati pa se je EU prek diskurza in odnosov svoje zunanje politike vzpostavljala kot partner ostalih svetovnih (vele)sil.



### Zmogljivosti in globalna perspektiva

Amsterdamska pogodba, podpisana leta 1997, je eksplicitno omenila evropsko identiteto v povezavi s skupno obrambo, ki naj bi to identiteto okrepila. Vsebina Pogodbe je s tem razkrivala dvojno pojmovanje identitete EU v povezavi z zunanjo politiko EU: po eni strani kot ideala kolektivne identitete; in po drugi strani kot političnega projekta gradnje te identitete, ki se sestajal iz več vidikov, med njimi zunanjega, pri čemer naj bi skupno delovanje prek tega zunanjega vidika omogočilo varovanje kolektivne identitete.

V letu 1998 je prišlo do eskalacije konflikta na Kosovu; države EU so se ob spremljanju tega konflikta, na pobudo Francije in Velike Britanije, odločile za korake v smeri operativne vzpostavitve skupne varnostne in obrambne politike (SVOP). Njihovi dogovori glede operativnega vidika te politike so bili zapisani v Pogodbo iz Nice, ki je bila podpisana leta 2001; čeprav je bil njen namen predvsem priprava na največjo širitev EU, je prinesla tudi pomembne dopolnitve na področjih zunanje in obrambne politike EU. Vidik izvedbe zunanje politike EU se je tako v letih od 1997 osredotočil na varnostno in obrambno dimenzijo.

Poleg tega so bile na podlagi Amsterdamske pogodbe sprejete tri skupne strategije, ki so usmerjale zunanjo politiko EU: prva glede Rusije, ki je izkazovala pomen Rusije kot »drugega« EU; ter strategiji glede Ukrajine in Sredozemlja, ki sta pričali o strateškem pomenu teh območij za EU.

S terorističnimi napadi na ZDA septembra 2001 je zunanja politika EU začela izpostavljanje tudi pomen boja proti terorizmu, hkrati pa je kazala večjo povezanost z ZDA in zunanjepolitičnimi cilji ZDA. To je bilo izpostavljeno tudi v Laekenski deklaraciji Evropskega sveta (2001e), v kateri sta bila »lebdeča« označevalca, ki sta govorila o vlogi in odgovornostih EU v svetovni politiki, na novo kontekstualizirana, in sta se zdaj nanašala na vlogo in odgovornosti EU v okviru spreminjajočega se večpolnega sveta, ter na pomen ustreznega upravljanja globalizacije. V tem obdobju, z vstopom Lizbonske pogodbe v veljavo, so bile vzpostavljene tudi prve misije SVOP, v začetku predvsem z namenom prispevka k stabilizaciji v državah zahodnega Balkana, nato pa tudi v Afriki.

Decembra 2003 je Evropski svet (2003f; 2003g) sprejel Evropsko varnostno strategijo; ta je bila pomembna z vidika zunanje politike EU, saj je uporabljala diskurz, ki je izkazoval željo, da bi EU imela več vpliva v svetovni politiki. Hkrati je ta varnostna strategija skupaj s kasnejšimi deklaracijami Evropskega sveta v 2003 in 2004 kazala nov, ciljno naravnani in celovit oziroma globalen pogled zunanje politike EU, ki je svet z vidika EU ter njenega pristopa strukturiral v: sosesko (sem so spadale države, ki so bile predmet sosedске politike,

kot tudi države zahodnega Balkana); partnerje (kamor so spadali tako t.i. strateški kot tudi drugi partnerji); ter mednarodno ureditev kot celoto, z Združenimi narodi na čelu.

Analiza je tako pokazala, da je zunanja politika EU prek svojega diskurza in delovanja v obdobju od podpisa Amsterdamske pogodbe do vstopa Lizbonske pogodbe v veljavo implicitno vzpostavila globalen pogled na svet. Z vidika delovanja pa je bilo pomembno predvsem vzpostavljanje odnosov s (strateškimi) partnerji ter podpora delovanju Združenih narodov kot nosilca mednarodnega reda; po drugi strani so misije SVOP predstavljale bolj rezultate kot dejanske izide, saj so imele večinoma regionalen domet, in delovale so v podporo rešitev, ki so bile uveljavljene s strani drugih akterjev v zadevnih tretjih državah oziroma na posameznih konfliktnih območjih.

EU je prek odnosov s svojimi strateškimi partnerji ter povezanih diskurzov samo sebe vzpostavljala kot enakovrednega akterja v svetovni politiki. Iz diskurzov zunanje politike EU je bilo razvidno, da so bili zanjo najbolj pomembni strateški partnerji ZDA, Rusija in Kitajska. Pri razvijanju odnosov s temi partnerji, predvsem Rusijo in Kitajsko, pa je EU izhajala iz svojih stališč, brez upoštevanja pogledov partnerjev. Tako je npr. glede Rusije in Kitajske izpostavljala potrebo, da se ju integrira v mednarodno skupnost, kar je implicitno pomenilo, da ju ni videla kot enakovrednih članic mednarodne skupnosti.

Zunanji politiki EU je v opazovanem obdobju glede na to manjkalo premislek, s katerim bi zaznala in reflektirala dejstvo, da je prek svojih diskurzov in delovanja vzpostavljala globalen in strukturiran pogled EU na svetovno politiko. Poleg tega je zunanji politiki EU manjkalo spoznanje, da bi se morala EU za uresničitev svojih ciljev v svetovni politiki v začetku 21. stoletja z vsemi svojimi strateškimi partnerji (tudi Rusijo in Kitajsko) angažirati enakovredno.

#### Kako so EGS/ EU videli drugi

Kljub izboljšanju odnosov med EGS/ EU in ZDA po koncu hladne vojne so ZDA EU še vedno videle kot regionalno organizacijo za gospodarsko integracijo; Evropo pa so ZDA videle kot območje svojega vpliva, še posebej zaradi varnostnih interesov, s središčem v Organizaciji severnoatlantske pogodbe (NATO). Po drugi strani je bil odnos z ZDA kljub svoji ambivalentnosti konstitutiven za vzpostavitev in razvoj zunanje politike EU – ta se je na začetku od ZDA distancirala, v 1990-ih pa je sledilo približevanje, in ob koncu opazovanega obdobja je EU ZDA videla kot subjekta, s katerim se je nameravala še naprej povezovati.

Rusija je od konca hladne vojne imela konsistenten pristop glede Evrope in EU, saj je spodbujala idejo Evrope kot skupnega prostora varnosti in gospodarskega sodelovanja, ki bi

vključeval tudi Rusijo ter upošteval njene interese. Zunanja politika EU se je odzvala na nekatere od teh pobud, vendar v omejenem obsegu, med drugim zato, da bi angažirala Rusijo kot strateškega partnerja EU. Poleg tega je bila ideja identitete EU prek zunanje politike EU do neke mere oblikovana kot posledica odzivov EU na pobude ZSSR oziroma Rusije. EU je Rusijo, podobno kot ZDA, videla kot »drugega«, vendar s precej manj zaupanja, hkrati pa je bila Rusija za idejo identitete EU v svetovni politiki manj formativna kot ZDA.

S Kitajsko je EGS na pobudo Evropske komisije že od sredine 1970-ih razvijala ekonomske odnose, od sredine 1990-ih pa, prav tako na pobudo Evropske komisije, ki je opozorila na rastoči pomen Kitajske v svetovni politiki, tudi odnose strateškega partnerstva. Kitajska je v svojih zunanjepolitičnih dokumentih EU videla kot pomembno oz. kot pomembnega partnerja, vendar je pomen EU v očeh Kitajske upadel po izbruhu gospodarske krize v ZDA in EU 2008.

Glede na razvoj odnosov EGS/ EU s temi (vele)silami, in ob opazovanju notranjega procesa konstrukcije in (re)produkcije pojma identitete EU v svetovni politiki je mogoče ugotoviti, da je bila ideja identitete EU v pomembnem delu vzpostavljena prek sklicevanja na drugost in drugačnost njenih partnerjev. Po drugi strani pa se je pokazalo, da so pogledi njenih glavnih strateških partnerjev na EU v svetovni politiki bistveno drugačni od njenih, saj so vsi videli EU kot manj pomembno, kot se je videla sama.

### Premislek

Zgodovinska študija zunanje politike EU je pokazala, da je bilo v dokumentih, ki so povezani z zunanjo politiko EU, veliko eksplicitnih pa tudi implicitnih povezav z zunanjim vidikom ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki. Te povezave so bile poleg tega, a ne vedno, narejene z ozirom na trenutno dogajanje v svetovni politiki. Preplet zunanje politike in identitete EU je bil hkrati povezan s procesom ustanavljanja Evropske unije.

Kot je pokazala analiza diskurza, je bil diskurz zunanje politike EU v vsem obdobju do decembra 2009 konsistentno zaznamovan s tremi označevalci – o vlogi, odgovornostih in skupnem glasu držav EGS oziroma EU v svetovni politiki. Ti trije označevalci so v vsem opazovanem obdobju ostali nespremenjeni in jih lahko razumemo kot lebdeče označevalce, saj so bili v različnih obdobjih napolnjeni z različnimi pomeni, tudi glede na okoliščine svetovne politike. Hkrati so ti trije označevalci tvorili diskurzivno strukturo, ki se je uporabljala za utemeljevanje nadaljnjega razvoja zunanje politike EU. Vsi trije označevalci skupaj s to diskurzivno oziroma retorično strukturo so hkrati oblikovali zgodbo ali narativo o EU v svetovni politiki, ki je, glede na vsakokratno dogajanje v svetovni politiki in z ozirom na

zunanjo politiko EU sporočala, da EGS/ EU ima vlogo in odgovornosti v svetovni politiki, kot tudi, kako bo EGS/ EU z izpolnjevanjem te vloge in teh odgovornosti postala eden od pomembnih akterjev v svetovni politiki.

Hkrati diskurz zunanje politike EU ni zaznal ali reflektiral dejstva, da vzpostavlja identiteto EU v svetovni politiki. Tako je mogoče reči, da je prišlo do zapore ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki. V diskurzu zunanje politike EU je bilo torej moč opaziti glavno osrednotenje (cf. Greimas 1977): diskurz je pripisoval visoko vrednost temu, da bi EU imela vlogo, odgovornosti in skupen glas (identiteto) v svetovni politiki.

Izvedbo zunanje politike EU je bilo mogoče opazovati po eni strani v razvoju orodij SZVP, kot tudi misij EVOP, ki pa so imele regionalen doseg in ne tudi dejanskega vpliva na ravni svetovne politike; tak vpliv je še najbolj imela širitvena politika (a je bil omejen na Evropo). Za EU je bilo na izvedbeni ravni pomembno še vzpostavljanje odnosov s partnerji, predvsem strateškimi, saj se je prek tega tudi sama vzpostavljala kot eden od pomembnih akterjev v svetovni politiki. Zunanja politika EU je do konca opazovanega obdobja razvila globalen pogled na svet, ki pa ga ni eksplicitno zaznala ali premislila.

Ugotoviti je mogoče, da so bili učinki zunanje politike EU predvsem regionalni, čeprav je diskurz zunanje politike EU slednjo po navadi prikazoval kot pomembnega akterja v svetovni politiki. Tudi ključni strateški partnerji (ZDA, Rusija in Kitajska) so EU večinoma videli kot regionalnega in gospodarskega akterja. Tako je mogoče govoriti o *relativnosti družbenega sveta*: znotraj EU in za EU je ideja identitete EU v svetovni politiki, ki se jo je prek diskurzov zunanje politike EU (re)produciralo od leta 1969, predstavljala družbeno resničnost; kar pa ni bil tudi pogled pomembnih družbenih skupnosti zunaj EU. Nasprotno, EU je nekatere od teh pomembnih držav (Rusijo in Kitajsko) kljub njihovem rastočemu pomenu v svetovni politiki ob koncu opazovanega obdobja obravnavala kot »druge«.

### 3.4 Četrta študija: (Re)produkcija identitete EU v svetovni politiki v obdobju 2009-2014

#### Kartiranje zunanjih in z njimi povezanih zadev, ki jih je Evropski svet najpogosteje obravnaval v obdobju 2009-2014

Evropski svet je v obdobju med decembrom 2009 in decembrom 2014 zunanje oziroma z njimi povezane zadeve obravnaval na vsakem od svojih zasedanj, kar kaže na povečan pomen zunanjih zadev v zadnjem obdobju. Če gledamo pogostost obravnave zadev, je Evropski svet najpogosteje obravnaval podnebne spremembe, širitev, pa tudi sosese, pod različnimi označevalci – največ je govoril o Siriji, pa tudi Ukrajini, Libiji ipd. Zato posamezna

podpoglavja v zadnji analitični študiji obravnavajo razvoj teh zadev v zadnjem opazovanem obdobju, skupaj z razvojem zunanje politike EU kot take.

Ob tem ni bilo zaznati, da bi se ohranil celoviti pristop k zunanji politiki EU, ki se je razvil v prvem desetletju 21. stoletja; nasprotno, označevalci glede soseske, s katero se je Evropski svet ukvarjal na dveh tretjinah svojih zasedanj v tem obdobju, so se diverzificirali.

### Podnebne spremembe

EU je na podnebnem vrhu v Kopenhagenu decembra 2009 zastopala ambiciozno stališče, da je treba sprejeti zavezujoč sporazum, ki bi nasledil Kjotski protokol k Okvirni konvenciji Združenih narodov o podnebnih spremembah (UNFCCC). Pogajanja so dejansko stekla v smeri, ki je izključila EU, saj so na zasedanju ZDA v sodelovanju s Kitajsko, Brazilijo, Indijo in Južno Afriko sprejele precej bolj medel končni kompromis. Do tega je med drugim prišlo, ker se je Kitajska potem, ko je nanjo pritisnila EU, da bi sprejela ambiciozno zmanjšanje emisij, obrnila k ostalim novim silam, in skupaj z njimi sodelovala za končni kompromis.

Z vidika EU je bilo 2010 zato obdobje premisleka, ko je ugotovila, da imajo nove sile v svetovni politiki vedno več moči, in da mora svoja stališča približati njim oziroma njihovim potrebam. Da bi v prihodnosti na globalni ravni dosegli dogovor o globalnem okvirju za naslovitev podnebnih sprememb, so institucije EU v 2011 sprožile pobudo za podnebno diplomacijo, ki so jo v 2013 še okrepile. EU se je tako prek svojih pobud za naslovitev podnebnih sprememb v svetovni politiki profilirala kot globalen akter na področju podnebnih sprememb. Iz diskurza EU v zvezi s tem pa je bilo razvidno, da sta se označevalca, ki sta govorila o skupnem glasu in vlogi EU v svetovni politiki iz zunanjepolitičnega diskurza prelila tudi v diskurz na področju podnebnih sprememb.

Kljub naporom EU je bil dogovor, ki je bil sprejet na svetovnem podnebnem vrhu decembra 2014 v Limi manj ambiciozen, saj je le pozval pogodbenice Okvirne konvencije, da podajo nacionalno določene predloge za zmanjšanje emisij v letu 2015, medtem ko naj bi bil končni dogovor o režimu, ki bo nasledil Kjotski protokol, dosežen na podnebnem vrhu v Parizu decembra 2015. Ta dogovor je odražal predvsem stališča ZDA, Kitajske in Indije.

V 2009-2014 so tako podnebne spremembe predstavljale področje, prek katerega se je zunanja politika EU soočala z novo resničnostjo svetovne politike in z večjo močjo novih sil v njej. EU je glede na to sicer prilagodila svoj pristop, ko je začela upoštevati potrebe in stališča teh drugih akterjev v pogajanjih. Ob tem pa se pojem identitete EU v svetovni politiki v diskurzu zunanje politike EU ni spremenil; namesto tega je bil pristop EU prilagojen z namenom, da bi EU ohranila tisto vlogo v podnebnih pogajanjih, ki si jo je zamislila.

## Širitev

Tako diskurz kot praksa glede širitve sta v obdobju 2009-2014 ohranila večino značilnosti iz prejšnjega obdobja (druga študija primera); hkrati sta se diskurz in praksa tudi razvila glede na spreminjajoči se kontekst svetovne politike.

Evropski svet, Svet in Komisija so v svojih diskurzih še naprej povezovali širitev z zunanje-političnimi cilji EU. Države, ki so bile predmet širitve, so bile razdeljene na tri skupine: države zahodnega Balkana, Turčija in Islandija. Poleg tega je analiza diskurza pokazala, da je imel širitveni diskurz tri bistvene značilnosti, in sicer je govoril o pogojih, ki jih je postavila EU, njihovem sprejemanju in izpolnitvi s strani prosilk za članstvo, ter o možnosti njihovega članstva v EU, če izpolnijo te pogoje.

Od kandidatke za članstvo je Hrvaška v opazovanem obdobju (2013) postala članica EU. Njen pristopni proces je za EU predstavljal priložnost, da potrdi in (re)producira vrednote in s tem identiteto EU, in da potrdi identiteto držav zahodnega Balkana kot držav pod vplivom EU. To je bilo razvidno tudi v širitvenih diskurzih, ki so se nanašali na zahodni Balkan kot celoto. V opazovanem obdobju je v status kandidatke napredovala Črna gora, ob koncu opazovanega obdobja pa tudi Srbija. Proces širitve s Srbijo je bil povezan s Kosovom, saj je EU približevanje obeh pogojevala z naslovitvijo sporov med njima; ko je Srbija napredovala v status kandidatke, je EU začela tudi pogajanja s Kosovom o sporazumu o stabilizaciji in pridružitvi. Prav tako je ob koncu opazovanega obdobja v status kandidatke napredovala Albanija. To pa ni uspelo Makedoniji, zaradi nerazrešenega spora z Grčijo glede imena; kot tudi ne Bosni in Hercegovini, zaradi notranjih političnih delitev.

Islandija in Turčija sta tudi v tem obdobju predstavljali posebna primera. Islandija se je 2013 odločila za prekinitev procesa približevanja EU. Po drugi strani je EU Turčijo hkrati obravnavala kot kandidatko, a tudi kot strateškega partnerja; in je uporabljala njen proces približevanja, da bi vplivala na skladnost zunanje politike Turčije s svojo zunanjo politiko.

Proces širitve se je tako v obdobju 2009-2014 nadaljeval; vendar se temeljna ideja širitve ni spremenila v smislu, da bi se ta proces na novo konceptualiziralo ali vanj vključilo novo skupino držav. Zato ne moremo govoriti o dejanski odprtosti pojma identitete EU v povezavi s širitvijo v obdobju 2009-2014.

## Soseska

Evropska sosedna politika (ENP) je izvirala iz pristopa, ki ga je EU razvila do držav na svojih novih mejah s širitvijo leta 2004; uvedena je bila s sporočilom Evropske komisije

(2003) ter razdeljena na vzhodno in južno dimenzijo. V obdobju 2009-2014, ko je prišlo do kriz v soseski EU tako na vzhodu (Ukrajina) kot jugu (arabska pomlad, ki se je začela 2011), je bila sosedska politika uporabljena kot glavni okvir za naslovitev teh sprememb.

V letih 2009-2010 se je EU osredotočala na vzhodno sosesko; začela je pogajanja o sporazumih o pridružitvi z Moldavijo ter tremi državami južnega Kavkaza Armenijo, Azerbajdžanom in Gruzijo. Z Ukrajino so pogajanja o sporazumu o pridružitvi, ki bi vključeval tudi prostotrgovinsko območje, že potekala, in diskurz zunanje politike EU je kazal, da so bila pomembna za EU. Predvsem pa je diskurz EU glede držav vzhodne soseske izpostavljal njihovo »evropsko izbiro« ter govoril o njihovem »političnem pridruževanju ter ekonomski integraciji« z EU, pod pogojem, da izvedejo ustrezne reforme. Na ta način je diskurz EU glede vzhodnega dela soseske vključeval dva elementa diskurza o širitvi, in sicer pogojevanje s strani EU in izpolnjevanje postavljenih pogojev s strani tretjih držav; ne pa tudi tretjega elementa tj. možnosti članstva v EU.

V letu 2011 je po revoluciji v Tuniziji prišlo do serije vstaj v večini držav severne Afrike, pa tudi nekaj državah Bližnjega vzhoda tj. južne soseske EU. Institucije EU so te vstaje pozdravile kot procese demokratične tranzicije ter s tem vzpostavile analogijo s procesi tranzicije v državah SVE v začetku 1990-ih. Tudi, ko se je nasilje v več državah južne soseske (Bahrajnu, Libiji, Siriji, Jemnu) konec 2011 stopnjevalo, so institucije EU še naprej uporabljale deklarativne diskurze; EU niso videle v vlogi, v kateri bi naslovlila vse resnejše konflikte v južni soseski.

Z vidika izvedbe je bil kot odziv na spremembe sprejet okrepljen pristop EU k južni soseski v okviru Evropske sosedске politike. Na podlagi sporočil Komisije je Svet odločil, da EU tem državam pod pogojem, da se reformirajo, ponudi politično povezovanje ter pogajanja o prostotrgovinskih območjih, ki bi lahko vodila do dostopa na notranji trg EU, kot tudi pogajanja o odpravi vizumov ter povečano finančno podporo – tj. pristop, ki je že bil v veljavi glede vzhodnih sosed. Ta pristop pa ni upošteval, da zaradi konfliktov, ki so se širili v njih, veliko južnih sosed ni bilo zmožnih zasledovati reform, ki so bile pogoj za tesnejše sodelovanje z EU.

Nadaljnja eskalacija konfliktov v ključnih državah južne soseske v 2012 in 2013 (Egiptu, Libiji, Siriji) je pokazala, da novi sosedski pristop EU ni deloval, kot je bilo prvotno zamišljeno; poleg tega je bila EU za konkreten angažma v praksi odvisna od zunanjih akterjev, ki so stabilizirali situacijo (npr. ZDA in Združenih narodov v Libiji).

Leta 2013 je EU izvedla korake v smeri sklenitve sporazumov o pridružitvi s ključnimi vzhodnimi sosedami. Na vrhu Vzhodnega partnerstva v Vilni novembra 2013 sta bila

sklenjena pridružitvena sporazuma z Gruzijo in Moldavijo; Armenija je od teh pogajanj odstopila z namenom, da se pridruži prostotrgovinski uniji z Rusijo. Hkrati je ukrajinski predsednik Janukovič razglasil, da pogajanja o pridružitvenem sporazumu opušča tudi Ukrajina. Sledili so protesti v Ukrajini konec 2013 in v začetku 2014 (t.i. *Euromaidan*), ki so se končali z Janukovičevim odstopom in izvolitvijo nove vlade, ki se je vrnila k zasledovanju tesnejšega povezovanja z EU.

Tudi v južni soseski EU se je situacija v 2013 slabšala, najbolj v Siriji; diskurz Evropskega sveta in Sveta je v zvezi s tem še naprej uporabljal deklarativne glagole v smislu obsojanja vse hujšega nasilja. Hkrati je diskurz EU izražal mnenje, da leži odgovornost za naslovitev tega konflikta na notranjih akterjih, kot tudi arabskih državah in članicah Varnostnega sveta Združenih narodov. EU je v skladu s tem izrazila pripravljenost, da pomaga pri naporih *drugih* akterjev v južni soseski in pri *izvajanju* mirovnih rešitev.

Marca 2014 je EU z Ukrajino podpisala politična določila Sporazuma o pridružitvi, ostala določila so bila podpisana junija istega leta; ta razdelitev določil Sporazuma kaže na inovacijo zunanje politike EU, ki je pričala o pomenu sodelovanja z Ukrajino za EU. Po drugi strani EU sama ni bila zmožna nasloviti konflikta v Ukrajini, temveč je bilo to storjeno s strani Organizacije za varnost in sodelovanje v Evropi (OVSE), ob sodelovanju ZDA in Rusije. Junija 2014 sta bila tudi podpisana pridružitvena sporazuma z Gruzijo in Moldavijo. Hkrati so med Rusijo, Ukrajino in EU na nižjih ravneh potekali pogovori o dobavi zemeljskega plina ter načinu izvajanja prostotrgovinskega sporazuma Ukrajine z EU, kar je kljub konfliktu v Ukrajini kazalo na pomembno soodvisnost med temi tremi akterji.

Kljub dopolnjenemu pristopu sosedske politike k južni soseski se je stanje v Siriji in Libiji slabšalo tudi v 2014. Evropski svet in Svet v svojih diskurzih EU kljub temu nista dojemala kot akterja, ki bi imel odgovornost v zvezi z naslovitvijo teh konfliktov. Ob koncu opazovanega obdobja je bilo sprejeto skupno sporočilo Visoke predstavnice za SZVP ter Evropske komisije o južni soseski (*Joint Communication* 2014), ki je kazalo zavedanje, da sosedska politika ne predstavlja ustreznega orodja za naslovitev kriz v južni soseski.

Zunanja politika, ki jo je EU vodila v soseski v obdobju 2009-2014, je, kot je pokazala analiza, (re)producirala vzorce tako širitvene politike EU, kot tudi politike EU glede Bližnjega vzhoda. Hkrati ni ozavestila dejstva, da se je EU prek ukvarjanja s svojimi mejami soočila z drugimi silami in novimi okoliščinami svetovne politike. Glede na to in glede na reproduciranje preteklih vzorcev zunanje politike EU zato v primeru soseske ni mogoče govoriti o fleksibilnosti zunanje politike EU ali odprtosti pojma njene identitete.



### Razvoj zunanje politike EU 2009-2014

Od leta 2010 je bilo v diskurzih, povezanih z zunanjo politiko EU, opaziti zavedanje sprememb v svetovni politiki. Septembra 2010 je Evropski svet (2010d) sprejel deklaracijo o odnosih s strateškimi partnerji, v kateri je govoril o spreminjajočem se svetu kot izzivu za EU. Leta 2011 je Generalna skupščina Združenih narodov sprejela Resolucijo (65/278) o sodelovanju EU v delu Združenih narodov; to je bilo v skladu z določili Lizbonske pogodbe in je okrepilo mednarodno subjektiviteto EU.

Glede splošnih usmeritev zunanje politike EU je Evropski svet še naprej uporabljal diskurz razlike (*cf.* Derrida 1972/1982), ki je govoril o ideji EU kot globalnega akterja oziroma aktivnega igralca na mednarodni sceni, ki pa še ni bila dosežena, in katere uresničitev se je prelagalo v nedoločeno prihodnost. Kriza v Ukrajini s koncem 2013 je sicer EU pripravila do tega, da je uporabila vsa orodja zunanje politike, ki jih je imela na voljo. Na ta način sta ta kriza, kot tudi krize v južni soseski, prisilili države članice EU k iskanju medsebojnega konsenza na področju zunanje politike EU.

Strateške usmeritve zunanje politike EU kot take v petih letih po vstopu Lizbonske pogodbe v veljavo niso bile opredeljene, čeprav je Lizbonska pogodba to predvidela. Namesto tega je Svet na operativni ravni junija 2014 sprejel »Agendo« za EU »v času sprememb« (Council of Ministers 2014b). Na ta način so bile na ravni Sveta opredeljene štiri prednostne naloge zunanje politike EU, in sicer: večanje vpliva EU prek večje skladnosti politik EU in držav članic; krepitev partnerstva s sosesko; angažma s strateškimi partnerji, še posebej ZDA; in razvoj varnostnih in obrambnih zmogljivosti. Z vidika izvedbe je bila poleg tega v tem obdobju pomembna vzpostavitev Evropske službe za zunanje delovanje (EEAS).

Glede odnosov z ostalimi (vele)silami so zunanjepolitični diskurzi EU vzpostavljane tesnejšega partnerstva z ZDA, predvsem prek krepitev gospodarskega sodelovanja, obravnavali na enaki ravni kot samo zunanjo politiko EU, in sporočali, da se bo EU prek angažmaja z ZDA lahko angažirala v svetu. Nasprotno so se odnosi z Rusijo zaradi konflikta v Ukrajini precej poslabšali. Odnosi s Kitajsko so zasledovali pragmatično sodelovanje zaradi rastočega pomena Kitajske v svetu.

Glede na analizo je mogoče ugotoviti, da je EU na spremembe v svetovni politiki v obdobju do decembra 2014 reagirala predvsem z uporabo sredstev in načinov delovanja, kot tudi vzorcev, ki jih je zunanja politika EU vzpostavila v svoji preteklosti. Vprašljivo je, ali so bili ti odzivi ustrezni glede na obseg in značaj sprememb ter izzivov na ravni svetovne politike.

### Kako so EU videli drugi

V obdobju 2009-2014 so ZDA še naprej podpirale evropsko integracijo ter partnerstvo z EU za uresničevanje skupnih ciljev. Rusija je s Kazahstanom in Belorusijo v 2011-2012 začela projekt integracije, katerega cilj je bil ustvariti skupen gospodarski prostor, in h kateremu so bile nato povabljene in vanj vključene nekatere druge bivše države Sovjetske zveze. Dolgoročni cilj Rusije je bil pridobiti prednost pred EU s spodbujanjem evrazijske gospodarske integracije. Kitajska je EU še naprej videla kot pomembnega igralca v svetovni politiki, vendar je opazila tudi učinke gospodarske krize na EU, ki so EU oslabil.

### Premislek

Kljub velikemu številu različnih trendov, ki so se v 2009-2014 kazali v svetovni politiki, zunanja politika EU ni oblikovala splošnega pristopa, ki bi naslovil te spremembe. Strateških usmeritev zunanje politike EU se v tem obdobju ni določilo, čeprav je to predvidela Lizbonska pogodba, ki je stopila v veljavo decembra 2009.

Namesto tega se je EU, kot je pokazala analiza v tem poglavju, v svetovni politiki v obdobju 2009-2014 profilirala prek dejavnosti v zvezi s sektorskimi politikami na področjih podnebnih sprememb, širitve in svoje soseske. Poleg tega so diskurzi na področju zunanje politike EU ob koncu opazovanega obdobja kazali, da je bilo med državami članicami EU, podobno kot ob začetkih zunanje politike EU, težko doseči temeljni konsenz o tem, kaj sploh spada v obseg zunanje politike EU.

Analiza je tudi pokazala, da so bile diskurzivne strukture zunanje politike EU, ki so se nanašale na identiteto EU (v svetovni politiki) podobne kot v prejšnjem obdobju. Ob tem ni bilo opaziti, da bi zunanja politika EU postajala bolj poenotena; namesto tega je za obdobje 2009-2014 bolj opazen trend fragmentacije, še posebej, če njena področja in način ravnanja primerjamo z obdobjem okrog 2003, ko je bila sprejeta Evropska varnostna strategija. Spremembe v svetovni politiki so tako v obdobju 2009-2014 sicer bile opažene s strani zunanje politike EU, ki je deloma reagirala nanje; vendar je temeljna koncepcija identitete EU v svetovni politiki v primerjavi z obdobjem do 2009 ostala nespremenjena.

## 4. Sinteza

### 4.1 Vrednotenje

Prva študija primera o bližnjevzhodni politiki EU je pokazala, da je diskurz zunanje politike EU o Bližnjem vzhodu od svojih začetkov vseboval identitetne premisleke, povezane z željo po uveljavitvi EGS/ EU kot akterja na Bližnjem vzhodu v kontekstu svetovne politike.

Diskurzivna raven politike EGS/ EU glede Bližnjega vzhoda se ni skladala z izvedbo v praksi, v kateri je bila EGS/ EU za svoj prispevek odvisna od ključnih akterjev v zvezi s tem konfliktom na ravni svetovne politike. S tega vidika lahko v primeru zunanje politike EU do Bližnjega vzhoda govorimo o prepletu z idejo identitete EU v svetovni politiki, in o zapori pojma te identitete, saj je bil za EGS/ EU angažma na Bližnjem vzhodu pomemben med drugim zaradi notranjih razlogov, kot tudi zaradi njenega ugleda v svetovni politiki. Poleg tega je treba z ozirom na prvo študijo primera prilagoditi tretjo tezo: vpliv zunanje politike EU v svetovni politiki lahko iščemo tam, kjer je bil ta vpliv možen v danem kontekstu svetovne politike.

Preplet zunanje politike in ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki je bil očiten tudi v drugi študiji primera, ki je opazovala proces širitve. Z vidika te študije je tudi mogoče podati pozitiven odziv na tretjo tezo: v tem primeru je bila identiteta EU pojmovana kot fleksibilna, odprta, in zato je zunanja politika EU imela vpliv v svetovni politiki (omejen na Evropo). Kljub temu pa se je ta ideja identitete EU nanašala na združeno Evropo in se ni spreminjala, kar pomeni, da je hkrati šlo za (deloma) zaprt pojem identitete. Študija je poleg tega pokazala, da je širitev v tem obdobju predstavljala bistven element ideje identitete EU.

Tretja, zgodovinska študija zunanje politike EU do decembra 2009 je pokazala, da je bila ideja identitete EU del zunanje politike EU od njenih začetkov, in da se je to prepletenost med zunanjo politiko in identiteto EU jemalo kot samoumevno, čeprav je bila prek zunanjepolitičnih diskurzov EU (re)producirana vedno znova. Z vidika prve teze je diskurz zunanje politike EU o identiteti EU v svetovni politiki izkazoval fleksibilno zaporo, saj so bili uporabljeni označevalci identitete vedno enaki, vendar so se nanašali na nove kontekste in pomene; zapora pojma identitete EU pa je bila storjena z notranjega vidika procesa evropske integracije, kot tudi z namenom doseganja vpliva EU v svetovni politiki. Preplet zunanje politike in identitete EU je reagiral na razmere svetovne politike z obračanjem navznoter (tj. nadaljnjim razvojem zunanje politike EU) ter z razvijanjem identitete EU v svetovni politiki, kolikor so to dopuščale okoliščine svetovne politike. Glede na to lahko ugotovimo tudi, da vpliva zunanje politike EU v svetovni politiki ni mogoče presojati na splošno, temveč ga je treba presojati od primera do primera; in da je glavno omejevalno okoliščino za razvoj zunanje politike EU poleg razmer svetovne politike predstavljala možnost doseganja konsenza med državami članicami EGS/ EU.

Tudi razvoj dogodkov od 2009 do 2014 je izkazoval prepletenost zunanje politike EU z idejo identitete EU, kot tudi specifično razmerje z okoliščinami svetovne politike. Kjer so bile te okoliščine ugodne za zunanjepolitično delovanje EU, in je bila identiteta EU v svetovni

politiki videna kot odprta (podnebna pogajanja, širitev), je EU imela vpliv v svetovni politiki; a tudi v teh primerih se je to videlo kot realizacijo vnaprej zamišljene ideje identitete EU. Ohranjali so se vzorci diskurza in delovanja zunanje politike EU iz preteklega obdobja.

Kot je pokazala analiza, je torej zunanja politika EU delovala kot problematizacija ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki; takšne problematizacije pa se lahko spreminjajo le, v kolikor se novi diskurzi in načini delovanja skladajo z že obstoječo problematizacijo. Poleg tega je identiteta EU v svetovni politiki delovala kot stalna diskurzivna struktura s tremi glavnimi označevalci (vloge, odgovornosti in skupnega glasu v svetovni politiki), ki so bili sestavni del zgodbe ali narative o tem, kako EU postaja globalen akter. V povezavi s tem je genealoški pogled na razvoj zunanje politike EU pokazal, da imajo glavni vzorci zunanje politike EU, ki so se oblikovali v preteklosti, kljub spremembam v svetovni politiki še vedno odločujoč vpliv na zunanjo politiko EU v zadnjem obdobju. Takšna implicitna naravnost zunanje politike EU predstavlja slabost, saj lahko pomeni, da se zunanja politika EU osredotoča na EU in na ohranjanje preteklih vzorcev, kar EU oddaljuje od cilja, da postane globalen akter.

#### 4.2 Etika

Podpoglavje bralko/ bralca vabi, da si o prebranem oziroma predmetu pisanja, zunanji politiki EU kot procesu oblikovanja identitete EU v svetovni politiki, ustvari lastno mnenje.

Hkrati je etični pogled nujen zato, ker je analiza v disertaciji pokazala bistveno povezavo med zunanjo identiteto akterja v svetovni politiki (EU) z zunanjo politiko EU in tudi samo svetovno politiko. Tovrstne povezave pa ni bilo mogoče opaziti le glede EU, ampak tudi v zunanjepolitičnih diskurzih njenih strateških partnerjev in ostalih ključnih akterjev v svetovni politiki, tj. ZDA, Rusije in Kitajske. V analiziranih primerih so bile torej zunanjepolitične identitete tesno povezane s političnimi nameni, kar podčrtuje potrebo po zavedanju s strani oblikovalcev politik, da se identitete sooblikuje tudi prek zunanjih politik.

#### 4.3 Prihodnje dogajanje

Glede na analizo je mogoče ugotoviti kontrast med okoliščinami svetovne politike, ki se še vedno spreminjajo, in v katerih prihaja do novih trendov, ter značajem zunanje politike EU. Slednja namreč ni izvedla premisleka o svojih ključnih omejitvah, npr. zaradi okoliščin svetovne politike (kar je bilo vidno na primerih Bližnjega vzhoda in južne soseseke), kot tudi ne o svoji nezmožnosti oblikovanja inovativnih rešitev zaradi pomanjkanja konsenza med državami članicami (primer razpada Jugoslavije).

Na srednji rok je z vidika okoliščin svetovne politike na podlagi dosedanjih trendov mogoče pričakovati več izzivov za EU. Med njimi so nadaljevanje nestabilnosti v soseski EU na jugu in vzhodu, kot tudi vprašanja nadaljnjih odnosov EU z drugimi (vele)silami v svetovni politiki, vključno z Rusijo, arabskimi državami in Iranom. Sem spada tudi vprašanje nadaljevanja procesa širitve.

Glede na dosedanji razvoj zunanje politike EU se postavlja vprašanje, ali bo EU sposobna pravočasno in ustrezno reagirati na izzive spreminjajočih se okoliščin svetovne politike. Če se bo svetovna politika v glavnih potezah ohranjala, je pričakovati, da bo zunanja politika EU nadaljevala z obstoječimi vzorci delovanja, med drugim glede Bližnjega vzhoda in širitve. Če pa pride do večje ali daljše globalne destabilizacije, ki bi vplivala na sam značaj ali predpostavke svetovne politike, je vprašljivo, ali bi bila zunanja politika EU sposobna reagirati dovolj pravočasno in učinkovito, da bi državam članicam EU lahko omogočila primeren skupen odziv.

### Sklep

Disertacija ugotavlja, da sta zunanja politika EU in ideja identitete EU v svetovni politiki tako tesno povezani, da delujeta kot preplet zunanje politike in identitete. Poleg tega zunanja politika EU deluje kot problematizacija identitete EU v svetovni politiki, prek katere se idejo te identitete poskuša vključiti v spreminjajoči se kontekst svetovne politike.

Analiza je pokazala, da je svetovna politika delovala kot specifično okolje zunanje politike EU, ki je zunanjo politiko EU omogočalo, a tudi omejevalo; hkrati je EU prek svoje zunanje politike skušala vplivati na svetovno politiko. To je večinoma dosegala v okoliščinah, ko je svetovna politika predstavljal podporen kontekst, ko je med državami članicami EGS/EU prišlo do konsenza o skupnem delovanju, in ko se je identiteto EU v svetovni politiki videlo kot nekaj, kar je mogoče spremeniti (kot odprto). Analiza je tudi pokazala, da je delovanje prepleta zunanje politike in identitete EU v kontekstu svetovne politike tako kompleksno, da je treba ugotovitve razumeti relativno, od primera do primera.

Opazno je ohranjanje vzorcev v zunanji politiki EU od začetka do konca opazovanega obdobja tj. od 1960-ih do 2014; kar je po eni strani lahko pozitivno, po drugi strani pa kaže na to, da se države EU ne zavedajo resnosti in pomena sprememb, do katerih prihaja v svetovni politiki. Takšno zavedanje je pomembno ravno zato, ker se svetovna politika v tem obdobju spreminja. Glede na to, da gre za spreminjajočo se resničnost, gre pričakovati, da bodo nanjo lahko uspešno vplivali tisti akterji, ki se bodo prilagodili trenutnemu stanju svetovne politike,

in ki bodo imeli občutek za smer sprememb; in bodo na ta način lahko vplivali na njeno prihodnje stanje oziroma dosegli spremembe, ki jih želijo.

Posledično je z vidika zunanje politike EU bistvena sposobnost prilagajanja na spremembe v svetovni politiki. V ta namen bi EU morala najprej ozavestiti in premisliti svoje zunanjepolitične vzorce delovanja, saj so ti vzorci do sedaj odsevali predvsem notranje cilje evropske integracije. V prihodnje bi bila zato potrebna eksplicitna, namenska naravnost navzven; kot tudi premislek, kako je v praksi mogoče uresniči fleksibilnost oziroma odprtost ideje identitete EU v svetovni politiki, z vidika omejitev na ravni svetovne politike, kot tudi možnosti doseganja konsenza med državami članicami EU.

Identiteto EU v svetovni politiki je s tega vidika mogoče razumeti kot nekaj, česar pomen je odprt oziroma kot nekaj, kar je mogoče napolniti z različnimi pomeni. To odpre pot obratu binarnih nasprotij, ki jih je do sedaj uporabljal diskurz zunanje politike EU: namesto, da EU kot akterje, ki se šele uveljavljajo v svetovni politiki, vidi le druge akterje (Rusijo in Kitajsko), bi lahko kot takšnega akterja videla tudi sebe, in bi lahko svojo identiteto v svetovni politiki vzpostavljala sproti, glede na razvoj posameznih situacij.

Določena zapora pomena identitete EU je seveda potrebna, da se zagotovi spoštovanje temeljnih vrednot EU, kot tudi nadaljevanje procesa integracije EU. Hkrati pa je potrebno zavedanje, da do zapore pomena identitete EU v svetovni politiki prihaja zaradi reproduciranja vzorcev iz preteklosti, ki jih je mogoče prilagoditi, še posebej glede na spreminjajoče se razmere svetovne politike. Že sam proces nastanka EGS in EU, kot tudi oblikovanja zunanje politike EU je pokazal, da gre v primeru EU in njenih politik za spremenljivo resničnost, ki je vedno v procesu nastajanja, kar pomeni, da je te politike mogoče spremeniti oziroma prilagoditi.

Glede na ugotovitve je mogoče zaključiti, da bo zunanja politika EU uspevala, če se bodo splošne okoliščine in značilnosti svetovne politike nadaljevale. Če pa pride do večjih sprememb v svetovni politiki, je vprašljivo, ali bo zunanja politika EU lahko reagirala dovolj hitro oziroma učinkovito. Do sedaj se je držala ustaljenih vzorcev. V začetku disertacije je bil izpostavljen premislek, da bi zunanja politika EU morala fleksibilno reagirati na spremembe v svetovni politiki, da bi se lahko prilagajala na njene izzive. Analiza pa je pokazala, da je vprašanje, ali zunanja politika EU reagira na spremembe v svetovni politiki.

#### *Post scriptum*

Po zaključku je dodan pripis, ki pokriva obdobje 2015-2016, ki ni zajeto v analizi. V tem obdobju so se nadaljevali konflikti v soseski EU, ki so bili med drugim povezani z begunsko

krizo, s katero se je soočala EU. Na referendumu v Veliki Britaniji je bil junija 2016 izglasovan izstop iz EU. Pripis v luči tega opazuje, ali so se v obdobju 2015-2016 spreminjali ključni vzorci ter koncepcija identitete EU v zunanji politiki EU.

Glede Sirije so diskurzi zunanje politike EU tudi v obdobju 2015-2016 identiteto EU vzpostavljali v smislu akterja, ki podpira delovanje (drugih) glavnih akterjev v svetovni politiki. Diskurz in delovanje zunanje politike EU v primeru Libije sta, tako kot v primeru Sirije, ponavljala vzorec (in s tem tudi idejo identitete), ki ga je zunanja politika EU vzpostavila glede Bližnjega vzhoda; le da v primeru Libije in Sirije EU ni podala svojih predlogov za razrešitev teh konfliktov. V zvezi z begunsko krizo se je zunanja politika EU osredotočala na to, kako upravljati s tokom ljudi, medtem ko je EU razreševanje konfliktov, ki so proizvedli te tokove ljudi, videla kot odgovornost drugih akterjev na ravni svetovne politike. Glavnina delovanja zunanje politike EU v praksi je bila namenjena razmerju med EU in Turčijo, za naslovitev begunske krize med drugim v povezavi s širitvijo EU.

Pod črto je glede na diskurz in delovanje zunanje politike EU v zvezi s sosesko EU v obdobju 2015-2016 mogoče ugotoviti, da je zunanja politika EU reagirala na dogodke potem, ko so se začeli odvijati, in da je bilo njeno delovanje učinkovito v smislu naslavljanja posledic razvoja dogodkov v soseski; ne pa tudi vzrokov teh dogodkov. Poleg tega je zunanja politika EU imela vpliv na blaženje posledic teh dogodkov, ki pa je bil omejen na območje EU oziroma Evrope, ni pa proizvedla zunanjepolitičnih rezultatov, ki bi imeli vpliv na ravni svetovne politike. Prav tako ni prihajalo do sprememb v koncepciji identitete EU – nasprotno, označevalcev, ki bi se nanašali na idejo identitete EU ali Evrope, diskurzi Evropskega sveta in Sveta za zunanje zadeve v povezavi z begunsko krizo niso omenjali.

Na področju širitve je politika EU v obdobju 2015-2016 zastala; Evropska komisija je septembra 2015 objavila Sporočilo (European Commission 2015b), v katerem je eksplicitno izključila možnost, da bi lahko katera od kandidatki za širitev pristopila k EU pred koncem leta 2019; to je bilo prvo Sporočilo Komisije, ki je v povezavi s procesom širitve vsebovalo tako napoved. Tako je ob upoštevanju odzivov EU v okviru reševanja begunske krize, v odnosih s Turčijo ter glede na širitveno politiko zunanja politika EU na teh področjih v obdobju 2015-2016 izkazovala neusklajenost ter fragmentacijo politik.

Glede podnebnih sprememb je bil decembra 2015 v Parizu v okviru 21. zasedanja pogodbenic Okvirne konvencije ZN o podnebnih spremembah dosežen dogovor o tem, kako na globalni ravni omejiti segrevanje ozračja v prihodnjem obdobju. Na doseganje tega dogovora je imela vpliv tudi zunanja politika EU; EU je bila s tem eden od tvorcev podnebne politike na globalni ravni. Delovanje zunanje politike EU je bilo v skladu z idejo identitete

EU, ki se je izražala prek zunanje politike, to izražanje pa je bilo prilagojeno spremenjenim razmeram v svetovni politiki, saj je zunanja politika EU upoštevala potrebo po sodelovanju z novimi silami in državami v razvoju.

Zunanjo politiko EU kot tako so v obdobju 2015-2016 zaznamovali vse večji zunanji in notranji izzivi, vključno z rezultatom referendumu junija 2016 v Veliki Britaniji. Z namenom opredelitve usmeritev EU v teh okoliščinah sta bila oblikovana dva nova strateška dokumenta. Junija 2015 je Visoka predstavnica podala strateško oceno EU v globalnem okolju; dokument je skušal zaobseči spremenljivo naravo svetovne politike in je vseboval eksplicitno omembo potrebe po fleksibilnosti (sposobnosti prilagajanja in inovacij) v zunanji politiki EU. Hkrati je dokument reproduciral več obstoječih vzorcev zunanje politike EU, npr. označevalce in zgodbo o skupnem glasu, vlogi in odgovornostih EU v svetovni politiki.

Z vidika konkretnega delovanja je EU nadaljevala z misijami SVOP, nove misije so bile poslani v Afriko, v podporo naporom za vzpostavljanje miru. Zunanja politika EU je dosegla pomemben uspeh julija 2016 prek vloge Visoke predstavnice EU pri doseganju dogovora o iranskem jedrskem programu. Pomembno področje (re)produkcije identitete EU navzven so bili tudi odnosi z drugimi (glavnimi) akterji v svetovni politiki: odnosi z ZDA so se krepili prek nadaljevanja pogajanj o trans-atlantskem trgovinskem in investicijskem partnerstvu, glede Rusije je EU nadaljevala sankcije, vzpostavljene zaradi dogajanja v Ukrajini, glede Kitajske je bila sprejeta nova strategija (Joint Communication 2016), ki je poudarjala pomen zagotovitve upoštevanja mednarodnih načel in vladavine prava s strani Kitajske.

Junija 2016 je Visoka predstavnica objavila Globalno strategijo za zunanjo in varnostno politiko EU. Strategija je poudarjala pomen fleksibilnosti v strateškem načrtovanju zunanje politike EU, vendar fleksibilnosti ni predvidela kot sestavni del vsakodnevne delovanja zunanje politike EU. Kljub temu je Strategija predstavljala pomembno prilagoditev zunanje politike EU spremenjenim okoliščinam svetovne politike.

Negotovost glede prihodnosti je predstavljal rezultat referendumu o izstopu iz EU v Veliki Britaniji junija 2016. Kljub temu Velika Britanija sredi 2016 ni uradno naznanila svojega izstopa iz EU. Tako je bila zunanja politika EU sredi drugega desetletja 21. stoletja v marsičem podobna svojim začetkom: tudi leta 1969 je bilo vprašanje sodelovanja z Veliko Britanijo ključno za vzpostavitev (zunanje)političnega sodelovanja med državami članicami EGS; poleg tega so zunanjo politiko EU še vedno zaznamovali označevalci in diskurzivne strukture, ki so jo zaznamovali v prvem desetletju njenega delovanja; hkrati pa je bil položaj EU v svetovni politiki podoben tistemu iz obdobja hladne vojne med obema velesilama.