UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI

FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE

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Will and Subject: Radical Political Theory and Action

Volja in subjekt: radikalna politična teorija in delovanje

Diplomsko delo

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The research question that I put forward is what constitutes political subjectivity nowadays and how the subject can be politically empowered. In order to do so, I analyze the implication of Schopenhauer's thought in the political field. After exploring the influence of his work in both Nietzsche and (to a certain extent) Deleuze I move the debate to the realm of radical political theory. I do so by contrasting (and aligning) these theoretical insights with Laclau's chain of equivalence. Finally, I make some remarks on the relevance of this research by demonstrating how Schopenhauer thought is in a way analogous to the theoretical investigations in contemporary Latin American critical thinking. In sum it is a work of theoretical investigation as well as of comparative political thought.

Keywords: political subject, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, political theory, subalternity.

Volja in subjekt: radikalna politična teorija in delovanje/akcija

Raziskovalno vprašanje, ki si ga v nalogi postavljam, je, kaj dandanes konstituira politično subjektivnost in kako se subjekt lahko politično opolnomoči. V raziskavi bom analiziral implikacije Schopenhauerjeve misli znotraj polja političnega. Raziskal bom vpliv Schopnehauerja na razvoj Nietzschejevega in (do neke mere tudi) Deleuzovega toka misli, debato pa potem preusmeril v polje radikalne politične teorije, kar bom dosegel z iskanjem razlik in podobnosti omenjenih teoretskih vpogledov omenjenih avtorjev z Laclauovim konecptom verige enakosti. Ob koncu bom tako prikazal, da je Schopenhauerjeva misel do neke mere analogna teoretskim razmišljanjem sodobnim kritičnih mislecev Latinske Amerike, kar predstavlja tudi namen mojega raziskovanja. Diplomsko delo je torej teoretska raziskava, a obenem posega tudi v polje primerjalne politične misli.

Ključne besede: politični subjekt, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, politična teorija, subalternost.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Contemporary political theory that goes beyond post-politics – the idea that there is a consensus prevailing in the political field and we live in a post-ideological world – aims at reconceptualizing the notion of politics. By drifting away from an understanding of politics as simply, a governmental technique, it proposes a revitalization of political life that came to be called radical political theory. Its interlocutors include names such as Alain Badiou, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek among others. However innovation in the discipline also occurs in the works of Aníbal Quijano, Arturo Escobar, Walter Mignolo and Enrique Dussel i.e. the Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality (M/C/D) group.

This work is an attempt to approach the question of political subjectivity and political practice from another angle. Firstly I consider the work of Arthur Schopenhauer and his influence on Friedrich Nietzsche. Secondly I put in parallel their notion of the will with Ernesto Laclau's chain of equivalence. Thirdly, after a brief consideration of contemporary radical political theory, I intent to bridge contemporary critical thought in both Latin America and Europe through the legacy of Schopenhauer. At the end I propose how thinking Schopenhauer politically prove to be analogous to the endeavors of the M/C/D as much as it provides a different perspective on Laclau's theory.

Thus this is mainly a theoretical work with focus on comparative political thought to the extent that I bring together the works of thinkers from different historical periods in order to discuss the question of subjectivity and political action.

2 ORIGINS

This section is dedicated to elucidate the contrary assertions on the notion of will in Hegel and Schopenhauer. As I intend to address the implications of these thinkers in the social and political realms, my focus is in the way subject and action are understood. For the purpose of this research I refer to the aforementioned as affirmation or negation of will. That is to say, the ability or inability of a subject to carry on a will or a demand to the social and political realms. If Hegel is often appropriated by Political Theory, Schopenhauer is not. Therefore I would also like to address how Schopenhauer's work can be thought politically.

The objectification of the will is the underlying theme in the works of both philosophers. Also the result of their grievances. As I will further explore in this section historical determinism plays a major role in Hegel's understanding of the world and this is expressed in his conceptualization of the will. While Schopenhauer values cognitive sensory prior to concepts. They both were influenced by Immanuel Kant. But Schopenhauer departures from the Kantian legacy, rejecting the later's premises in order to postulate his own notion of the will.

The differences among these thinkers become salient if one engages with their works through a global perspective, which is now a common exercise in our century. But of course it was as well an intrinsic part of philosophical investigations in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe. In this respect, Schopenhauer had a rather radical attitude compared to that of Kant or Hegel. I return to this issue in my concluding remarks of this section. In addition Schopenhauer's work ultimately goes against the idea of Europe as the epicenter of modernity.

And as I suggest at the end of this research, he opens the possibility for the coexisting of different worldviews.

I now turn to Hegel's thought in order to briefly expose his dialectical thinking and later discuss his notion of will.

2.1 Will and Subject: Hegel

Hegel explained the unfolding of world's spirit – the Geist – through time. According to which in every specific moment in the world's history there were opposing forces, internal contradictions within the state of the spirit or anything at that time (Schecter 2007, 10). To overcome these contradictions a new higher version of itself were to be forged. That is usually described as thesis and antithesis, being the synthesis a result of the collision of these contradicting forces. Hegel himself does not refer to dialectics in these terms but often the notion is understood in such a way. Dialectical reasoning leads him to conclude that history ultimately lead us to an increasing level of perfection. He identifies in Plato's Parmenides the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic (1979, 44, §71).

Phenomenology of the Spirit has in its early section the elaboration of dialectical thinking that permeates Hegel's entire work. By scavenging on the fundamental nature and conditions of human knowledge he identifies a tension in universal concepts and the way in which one perceives the things in the world through his/her own mental capacities. That is to say, the knowledge I have about something and the knowledge ascribed to something by a universal concept. In his own words: "The knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our object cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself, a knowledge of the immediate or of what simply is." (Hegel 1979, 58, §90). "But when we look carefully at this *pure being* which constitutes the essence of this certainty, and which this certainty pronounces to be its truth, we see that much more is involved. An actual sense-certainty is not merely this pure immediacy, but an *instance* of it." (Hegel 1979, 59, §92).

Hegel is pointing out to the existence of difference on modes of consciousness. These are three: *meaning* or *sense-certainty*, *perception* and *understanding*. The first mode of consciousness entails my immediate apprehension of the knowledge I have about an object, what *simply is* as he writes in the aforementioned passage. Once I acquire this knowledge, the *pure being* of a thing, I soon realize that sense-certainty is not grounded on *pure immediacy* and is an unstable apprehension of reality. And as if it were, there are different versions of reality but I grasp only a part of this reality, an *instance* of it. When I say *Now* I have knowledge of what *Now* means to me. But the same *Now* can be used to describe a period of night or day. Or better as soon as I say *Now* another period has succeeded that of which I have just referred to. The point being there are series of certainties, instances of knowing, and experience is episodic. A moment is succeed by another which can be affirmed through the *negation* of the moment that preceded it. The negation of what *is neither This nor That* but rather, *a not-This*, is what Hegel asserts to be the *true [content] of sense-certainty* and he calls it *a universal* (Hegel 1979, 60, §96). Not the universal but *a universal* from the viewpoint of an observer, the I. Therefore an object is what it is in the mode of consciousness of sense-certainty by being mediated and negated by an observer. As Hegel goes on to explain: "[T]his 'I', see the tree and assert that 'Here' is a tree; but another 'I' sees the house and maintains that 'Here' is not a tree but a house instead. Both truths have the same authentication, viz. the immediacy of seeing, and the certainty and assurance that both have about their knowing; but the one truth vanishes in the other" (Hegel 1979, 61, §101).

Based on this premise Hegel concludes that the I is as universal as the concepts of *Here* or *Now*. Two individuals who mutually recognize themselves will arrive at two distinct conclusions of how they perceive the world by the use of universal concepts. Thus Hegel affirms, sense-certainty is but a mode of consciousness that operates by *exclud(ing) from itself the opposition* (Hegel 1979, 62, §103) which is an inherent part of it. What is left then is the immediacy of perception.

Therefore perception is the second mode of consciousness, a mediated form of consciousness that is forged through dialectical reasoning. Different people make sense of the world through the articulation of categories of thought which is done by the language we speak. This process of knowing through language does not happen *ex nihilo* but is a historical process in which

one crafts the knowledge – and for that matter, the language – altering, mediating and negating it in order to fit its content to the present, making sense of his/her reality. Due to this difference between how I make sense of things through perception and the inputs I acquire from sense-certainty that I become aware of the inner contradictions in the categories of thought.

Consciousness separated between meaning or sense-certainty and perception calls for a resolution. That is the third mode of consciousness, understanding. This unsettling condition leads consciousness to forge new concepts that better represents reality. Striving takes place as I realize the categories of thought became inadequate and by a learning process I am able to come up with more adequate categories of thought. Therefore by forging an understanding of things based on previous experience mind move forward to a higher mode of consciousness. This is the essence of Hegel's dialects. In a historical sense there is subjective and collective moments of understanding. I understand the world from my viewpoint and I mediate with other individuals' understanding of the world. Consciousness cannot move on until all the epistemological resources have been exhausted. Karl Marx will attribute the same characteristics to economic resources. Post-Marxists will signal the limitations of Marx in analyzing the world. While Postmodernism will prove to be a fertile soil for a multiplicity of theoretical investigations that in great extent looses the ability to explain the world in plane concepts and ontological foundations such as that of Hegel.

The Philosophy of Right gives us a clear-cut understanding of Hegel's notion of the *will* (2008, 50). He does not want to locate the will but refers to it as if it is in a liminal or transitional zone. The will crosses the threshold between consciousness and objective mind. There is will between intention and *real-ization*. When I impose my will on the world I am *pushing it out* so I can impress it on the world. That is what we do in order to make our rights. A right is the externalization of will. As if it were, from a *free* mind – e.g. a mind that has freedom to decide – a determination arises and it is followed by will which embeds intent and realization. The objectification of will or its realization is a right and Hegel needs it to fit within his totalizing line of thought. It goes on that the right to property is will in the thing that is realized through a contract i.e. a mutual recognition of this right. The will:

> *That is free in and for itself, at the stage when its concept is abstract, has the determinate character of immediacy. Accordingly this stage is its abstractly self-related actuality, which is negative in contrast with reality—the inherently individual will of a subject. According to the moment of the particularity of the will it has in addition a content consisting of determinate aims, and, as exclusive individuality, it has this content at the same time as an external world directly confronting it (Hegel 2008, 37, §36).*

It is free since it is not mediated and it is essentially particular. This will which is generated by individual freedom and has *an external world directly confronting it* (ibid.), has to be externalized in order to exist (Hegel 1979,40, §41). Property is the first form of objectification of the will followed by law, morality and the state. The individual mind is the first stage that, through contradictions, raise to a higher level, that of mind objectified in law, morality, and the State.

Having said that, Hegel assumed that everything can be thought with dialectics[1]. Furthermore Hegel argued that humanity once enjoyed a relationship of unmediated unity with nature, which was broken – or alienated – in the realization that consciousness is always consciousness of something foreign to one's own consciousness (Schecter 2007, 4). That marks his dialectical logic. In the Philosophy of Right he consider the point of view of an individual willing subject but unlike social contract theories – e.g. that of Locke – the individual is not conceived as a singular atom but he goes on to present the understanding that any single willing and right-bearing subject only gains its determinacy in virtue of a place it

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1   And there is quite some literature that purport to explain the condition of life and human association in our times in a very similar fashion although sometimes not directly related to the dialectics of Hegel. Let it be through the idea that as history unfolds our everyday life interactions take us to higher forms of human association; through a cognitive expansion of human abilities we acquire a higher level of consciousness. That is to say, from formations based on the family, then tribe, religious groups, the national identity and beyond. That has been referred to as the *empathic civilization* (Rifkin 2009). But empathy is but a stage of compassion. So I would rather relate it with the importance of compassion for Schopenhauer as I will later address. The notion of *biological programming* associated with sociobiologists (Dawkins 2006; see Heywood 1994, 18) may also resemble a Hegelian standpoint. At the heart of *biological programming* lies an attempt to rationalize, administrate and predict human behavior applying social engineering mechanisms i.e., the possibility to create or ameliorate human beings by constructing the appropriate social environment (Heywood 1994, 20) as in the work of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Which does not mean that Hegel himself would corroborate with such ideas but certainly in his thought there is scientific, natural and social elements that where an intrinsic part of the time he lived.

finds for himself/herself in a larger social, and ultimately historical, structure or process. Consequently: *I can claim to be a knight and to be engaging in acts of chivalry, but if the social world in which I live cannot recognize such a status or such deeds, then I am a comic imitation of a knight, a Don Quixote* (Pippin 2007, 67).

Pippin's example illustrates the limits imposed by Hegel on agency. That is, the objectification of one's will. The condition is that others recognize me as having the social status I attribute to myself (ibid.). I agree with the argument that Hegel is not limiting agency but rather describing how a will that does not convene with historical and structural processes is perceived (Pippin 2007, 78). It is but a diagnosis of agency not a normative statement which, to my view, follows a similar approach to that adopted by Machiavelli on the nature of politics or that of Michel Foucault on the notion of power. Although I endorse this interpretation, I would rather assume that Hegel is at least skeptical from any alternative to his system of thought. But before we turn our attention to Schopenhauer I would like to mention a passage from the introduction of the Philosophy of Right, more precisely §4, §5 and §6. There Hegel briefly discusses another viewpoint on the notion of will, one he highly disagreed with. But nonetheless is the one I decided to apply in this research.

The division of will and thought is unacceptable for Hegel and will without freedom has no sense at all. Thought distinguishes human beings from animals. But thought and will are not distinctive *faculties*. The will is rather a *practical* attitude toward life while the ability of thinking describes a *theoretical* attitude. Both are two instances of a same faculty. Dialectically speaking when I think of an object I *deprive it of its sensuous aspect*. Therefore I appropriate myself of its qualities in order to *understand* it – remember the dialectics of consciousness aforementioned. Once I do understand it, appropriation is completed and the object no longer stands in opposition against me (Hegel 2008, 27, §4).

If there is no dissociation between thinking and willing, theoretical and practical attitudes are interconnected and we can come to this conclusion by acknowledging the objectification of the will I have already described. The spirit is intelligence developing from feeling and representational thinking to finally be embedded on the will which represents a higher stage in practical terms, a truth of intelligence (Hegel 2008, 28) and its

development. Hence will is understood as something positive, a stance which Hegel later employs to describe its forms of objectification. But he is well aware of the possibility for other formulations on the notion of the will: "Anyone can discover in himself the ability to abstract from everything whatever, and in the same way to determine himself, to posit any content in himself by his own effort; and similarly the other specific characteristics of the will are exemplified for him in his own consciousness" (ibid.).

Hegel condemns the absolute abstraction involved in detaching the will from any form of immediacy of the empirical world restrictively as a form of ignorance (Hegel 2008, 29). This absolute possibility of abstraction from every determination is a one-sided view which does not corresponds to the reality of things but it is rather a very particular way of perceiving things. If the will is approached from this viewpoint it paves the way to an understanding of will by the characteristics it possesses in itself. That can only lead to *negative freedom* or the *freedom of the void* (ibid.).

Hegel asserts that, theoretically, this approach is essentially related to Hindu fanaticism of pure contemplation and in practice as an element of destruction in politics and religion that tends to annihilate the individual in the name of the whole. Although seemingly ascribing a common denominator for individuals and particularities in the name of equality or universal religious life, negative freedom denies the will and he calls any endorser of this view as guided by *the fury of destruction*. And w*hatever negative freedom means to will can never be anything in itself but an abstract idea* (Hegel 2008, 29). Hegel recalls the idea of unifying oneself with Brahman in Hinduism and the French Revolution as two examples that put forward a common notion of will. They reinforce the idea of two moments of the I as finite and particular, an other as *negativity* and *cancelation*.

The determination and differentiation of these two moments are part of the philosophies of Fichte and Kant as well, Hegel remembers. But Fichte stresses the first moment and understands the second as merely an addition to it. On the contrary the example of the French Revolution – and also Buddhism – contemplates the negative feature of this process. And that is why:

This period was an upheaval, an agitation, an intolerance of everything particular.
Since fanaticism wills an abstraction only, nothing articulated, it follows that, when
distinctions appear, it finds them antagonistic to its own indeterminacy and annuls
them. For this reason, the people during the French Revolution destroyed once
more the institutions which they had made themselves, since any institution
whatever is antagonistic to the abstract self-consciousness of equality (Hegel 2008,
30).

By paring an unrestricted understanding of the will with both Hindu philosophy and the French Revolution, Hegel in a certain extent, evokes the political implications of will as developed by Schopenhauer. In order words, Hegel himself connects the potentiality of the later's work to the political realm. Certainly what he criticizes in the French Revolution can be also related to Jacques Rousseau. But Schopenhauer provided an interesting diagnosis of the will that has – to my view – intrinsic relevance for social and political philosophy very distinct from Rousseau's philosophy. Schopenhauer, I believe, seems to be more acute with the current state of affairs then Hegel is. The affirmation of will considered within his totalizing system can only lead to a limit scope of agency since it does not emphasize enough the contingent feature of the unfolds of history.

I hereafter turn to the understanding of the will in the work of Schopenhauer in opposition to Hegel. My emphasizes lies on his geographical decentering of knowledge and his forms of negating the will: aesthetics appreciation and compassion. At the end of this section I conclude that his innovative philosophy provided an epistemological break. And also a rejection to modernity as conceived by Kant and Hegel. Furthermore his approach, I believe, provides a tool of analysis that can serve for a better understanding of (post)modernity and for that matter subjectivity – with a critical angle. But for now let's turn to the entirety of his thought.

2.2 Will and Subject: Schopenhauer

Thus, no truth is more certain, no truth is more independent of all others and no
truth is less in need of proof than this one: that everything there is for cognition

(i.e. the whole world) is only an object in relation to a subject, an intuition of a beholder, is, in a word, representation (Schopenhauer 2010, 24).

(M)ost important and most significant appearance that the world can show us is not someone who conquers the world, but rather someone who overcomes it; and this is, in fact, nothing other than the quiet, unnoticed life of someone who has achieved the cognition that leads him to renounce and negate the will to life that fills all things and drives and strives in all things. The freedom of this will first emerges in him alone, making his deeds anything but ordinary (Schopenhauer 2010, 412).

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860)[2] in his far most known work *The World as Will and Representation* (2010) - originally published in 1818 – conceives the natural world and human life notably different from the tradition of his time. The predominant ideas since then were the interpretation of a phenomenal and noumenal world in Kant's (1724-1804) philosophy and the dialectics of Hegel (1770-1831). But for now I would like not to call attention for the originality of his thought but rather the underpinning concern in his work. A concern that can be broadly related to the core purpose in human activities. As Georg Simmel quoting Johann Wolfgang von Goethe on Schopenhauer suggests, what is objective in the later originates from not only within himself as a philosopher and a man but from the interior of humanity as a whole (2010, 11)[3].

Schopenhauer moves remarkably in the opposite direction of Hegel by considering history as only a zoology of the human species (Bowie 2003, 102). He discards the notion that history moves toward a final movement of full realization of the spirit in history and referred to the dialectics as a rather empty concept. He departs from a conceptual viewpoint based on the

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2   Schopenhauer was born in Danzig, today's Gdansk in Poland. He was born into a middle class family, his father was quite a successful merchant in Danzig which is a free trading city. His mother was a successful literary figure in her own right, later in life. And there was a bit of a mismatch between his parents. He was destined for a career in trade. His name Arthur was selected because it was a pan-European name which would fit him for this role, as an European business man.

3   Georg Simmel's original book written in German language was published in 1907 and entitled *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche: Ein Vortragszyklus. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot*. An english version appears in 1991 published by the University of Illinois Press. My research uses the Portuguese version first published in 2010 translated from the original text in German by César Benjamim and published by Contraponto (see references).

distinction of a phenomenal world and a noumenal world – that of Kant's philosophy – and goes on to stress an idea of subjectivity and agency that on one hand, liberates the subject from historical determinism – i.e. that of Hegel – and on the other, limits actions through another logic. Hence, it liberates in the extent he interprets Kant's philosophy and goes on to constitute his own notion of the noumenal world, which for Schopenhauer is the will. But it seems as if he encage the subject in the very concept of the will he puts forward.

Kant in his essay *What is Enlightenment?* presents a pro-Enlightenment argument. On political grounds he addresses the added value of knowledge and new forms of thinking for the entire society. Despite the political elite fear that once people had access to information they would not willingly subject themselves to their leaders, Kant saw the Enlightenment project as good for both individuals and the State. Therefore not a threat to the Establishment. On scientific grounds his philosophy was marked by the Copernican Revolution in philosophy (Skirbekk and Gilje 2001, 275; Hannan 2009, 36), the explorations of the new world by European powers and an increasing separation between reason and religion. It is in this conjuncture that he attempts to find a third way between these two extremes (reason and religion).

In his own words he had to *"annul knowledge in order to make room for faith"* (Burnham and Young 2007, 160). That is how he formulates a dualism between the *phenomenal* world and the *noumenal* world. For him, the *phenomenal* world is the world as we perceive it through the causality of time and space. That is to say, the world as it is dependent on a set of perceptual conditions – time and space – and conceptual conditions – the law of causality. The *noumenal* world is what is left in the absence of these conditions, the world as it is. Kant also asserts that we cannot know the noumenal world – or the thing-in-itself as he calls it – since it is beyond our experience of living. In this respect, I believe his formulation has a conservative component which inhibits agency and the possibility for radical change. Which clearly was far from his concerns[4].

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4   Much of contemporary physics when endeavoring in topics such as quantum mechanics or negative matter would not do so, if it were to strictly follow the Kantian prohibition. Anyhow in the natural sciences and social sciences still prevails a Kantian-Hegelian paradigm which some have rebelled against. On the topic of radical thinking Nietzsche – inspired by Schopenhauer – was one of them, which I will later discuss. Simmel who found in Schopenhauer's work the antagonisms of modern man. Freud who went as far as to declare his endeavors in the desires and passions of unconscious mind as not natural sciences but Schopenhauer's philosophy. And Horkheimer who used to be called "Schoppen" by his students due to his reverence to Schopenhauer, and understood the barbarism of his time as result of blind endorsement to rationality. But also

The core of Schopenhauer's thought lies in part in the distinction of phenomenal world and thing-in-itself as put forward by Kant. However Kant's dualism is then revitalized by Schopenhauer in the notion of the world as will and representation. That is, the phenomenal world or the world as representation and the noumenal world as will. While the will is a bridge between the halves. This is also an interesting feature of his thought. The world as representation or appearances (both as a whole and its parts) is the site where the *will* become object. Therefore he also addresses the world as representation as the *objecthood of the will* (2010, 191). That does echoes Hegel's understanding of the objectification of will. But notice that I establish a distinction between both philosophers by referring to Schopenhauer's will as *the* will. For Hegel mind or consciousness when objectifies itself it does through willing i.e. imposing its will on what has no will – things. Whereas for Schopenhauer consciousness is the state of cognition where the will is objectified but not the will of a free mind rather, the will in itself.

He moves on to explore a linkage between the halves – will or idea, and representation – and he does so by ascribing to the will this role. While Hegel would rather focus on the forms of objectification of the will in the phenomenal world. Therefore Schopenhauer endorses Kant until a certain extent. He affirms that we can have access to the *thing-in-itself* but not through the kind of knowledge we acquire in the sciences (Bowie 2003, 173). The access occurs through the *will*. That is the idea underlying his philosophy. What drives our actions is a will to life. This will is the highest common denominator to all living things. That is to say, everything in the world is united by not just a will to live but a will to life. Which for him can be seen in the way our actions ultimately lead to the perpetuation of the species. In search for the fulfillment of the will one can never be fully satisfied, since as soon as we have the object of desire, it loses its value. This in turn leads to boredom or suffering. Life swings like a pendulum between pain and boredom (Schopenhauer 2010, 338).

His conclusion is the result of a scavenging of Hindu and Buddhist philosophy which is combined with Continental philosophy. And goes on to refer to Heraclitus and the eternal flux of things, Plato and objects as eternally becoming and Spinoza's doctrine of the mere

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the Frankfurt School and the postmodernists, I believe, have much in common with Schopenhauer's philosophy than is usually acknowledged.

accidents of a single substance, which is the only thing that exists or endures (Schopenhauer 2010, 28, §9). He sees in different traditions (Schopenhauer 2010, 118) - that of the Stoics or Christianity – conceptions that contradicts the essence of humanity by tending to idealize it or conform – e.g. in the figure of a Christian savior[5]. Therefore never fully addressing the matter of suffering and how to overcome it.

What constitutes us are desires and drives, the *will*. To be specific, the world of appearances merely produce experience for the subject. Whereas the Kantian noumenal world, for Schopenhauer, is the very experience of living. He praises observation instead of conceptual formulation. He is interested in our passions and desires and the struggle (both internally and collectively) that takes place when I aim to achieve a goal. Not so much interested in the formalities that follows my intention. But rather the antagonisms within actions. That is why, I believe, he accomplishes an epistemological break. A break that sharply contrasts with the legacy of both Kant and Hegel. Also, if in Hegel's philosophy humanity is moving toward perfection, for Schopenhauer there is no ending point since the will cannot ever be satisfied. As soon as the object of desire is achieved, another emerges. That is what makes him a pessimistic. But I would like to call attention for how Schopenhauer solves the problem himself poses e.g. the will.

2.2.1 The Possibility of Negation in Schopenhauer

He argues that the possibility of ceasing desire is through self-denial. Human beings are for him the highest form of a will that is an intrinsic part of everything in the world[6]. Therefore individuality only exists in the world as representations. To cease the will requires great effort.

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5   ⌐ I recently attended (May 18th , 2013) a lecture by Slavoj Žižek in the International Film Festival (Zagreb, Croatia) entitled *Love as a Political Category*. There Žižek presented an alternative reading of the Bible where Jesus – according to his logic – is a revolutionary figure and a savior. This is in accordance with Hegel's view on Christianity. For him Christianity an inspiration for his dialectical thinking. The idea of the son of a God – an absolute form of being – being incarnated in the world i.e. being physically merged in the world for him follows a dialectical logic. Hence dialectics as collisions and historical transformations that will always have embedded in it elements of the past in a higher form. Schopenhauer – as aforementioned – would refute such argument on the basis that this conception contradicts the essence of humanity and leads to an idealization and conformism toward the essence of the world.

6   The thought he takes from Hindu and Buddhist philosophy is that through compassion it is possible to realize that our essence is the same of that of all other phenomena. And therefore these phenomena that strive and agitate the empirical world, could be overcome if we identify with other beings and understand if in harming them we harm ourselves as well.

Self-denial or aesthetic appreciation can momentarily provide an escape away from the pursuing of a will that is by definition infinite and meaningless. The *negation of the will to life* self-denying human beings is a tranquillizer of all willing and comes on the scene after complete recognition of its own essence (Schopenhauer 2010, 410). That is to say, when I recognize the mutual relation of the will from both world as representation with its individual forms and the thing-in-itself, the result is either negation or affirmation of the will to life. The former – endorsed by Schopenhauer – has been practiced by saints and ascetics in Indian, Christian or Lamaist traditions who have the same inner recognition but articulated it in very different ways. He suggests: *Only his deeds confirm him to be a saint: because morally, his deeds do not come from abstract cognition, but from an intuitively grasped, direct cognition of the world and its essence, and he filters this through some dogma only to satisfy his reason* (ibid.). And goes on:

> *(T)he description I gave above of the negation of the will to life or the conduct of a beautiful soul, of a resigned, voluntarily penitent saint, was itself only abstract, universal, and therefore cold. Since the cognition that gives rise to the negation of the will is intuitive and not abstract, it is not expressed perfectly through abstract concepts either, but rather only through deeds and conduct* (ibid.).

Thus Schopenhauer criticizes Kant, Hegel and other systematizers and develops a notion of goodwill – which soon I will refer to as compassion. He thinks that egoism is the root to evil and so did Kant[7]. But he is also saying that instead of abiding to some dogma the individual through his cognitive capacity is able to perform noble actions. And if saints and ascetics went through this process of cognition and chose the path of self-abnegation, they did so nurtured by the principles Schopenhauer defended. That is to say, they were aware of our commonalities and the fact that we all share the same will to life. And from this point on adopted a posture towards life nurtured by co-suffering and co-responsibility which, for Schopenhauer, is compassion as an alternative to rationality. This line of thought does not only represents a critique to totalizing systems but inscribes a priority to intuition and experience.

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7   Egoism can also take place when an individual decides to act morally only to avoid the suffering entailed when recognizing the condition of the world.

Simmel admired Schopenhauer's philosophy because it treated of a subject which is intrinsic to human existence and has for long predominated before the era of rationalism. That is, human suffering vis-a-vis happiness (Simmel 2010, 75-101; see also Meštrović 1993, 95). Schopenhauer derives his arguments from the experience of life, life as such. It is not an ahistorical metaphysics but rather an epistemology that intent to reveal irrational passions and desires uncovered by the veil of rationality. Which is indeed a logical line of thought. Men of science are themselves driven by a passion for knowledge (Meštrović 1993, 250). *Will is stronger to rationality* and as Meštrović contends *enlightenment cannot contain the forces of barbarism* (Meštrović 1993, 278).

According to this view Schopenhauer's insights lead to the conclusion that a distinction between modern and non-modern societies is inaccurate since passions and desires – will to life – is what prevails in individuals and any human form of association. Economic and technological advancements are not a sign of superiority or rationality but rather provide new ways to mask and perpetuate barbaric tendencies that are intrinsic to human life. Thus forces of barbarism calls for reason as a counterbalance. Doing so, idealizes man as a rational being detached from its passions and desires. Then again according to Schopenhauer violence and compassion are two-halves of the same will. And his philosophy contends the possibility to activate an opposition to unrestricted will.

To be specific, he does allow for agency. But this can also be read as a form of negation. And he asserts in the plurality of being an underlying condition that reverberates within each and very being despite the many ways in which one try to make sense of it in a structural and historical level. He also offers a possibility within the unfolding of world's history. He embraces a denial of self-love to a love not restricted to the human race but rather encompassing all living things. That is to say, a state of harmony among all living things[8]. He calls this state as the *eternal subject of cognition* (Schopenhauer 2010, 417) and asserts that this state can be maintained or regained by steady struggle. Through personal experience of suffering not only through the recognition of suffering is that resignation can take place. Moreover the eternal subject of cognition leads to universal human kindness and

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8   That resembles in a sense contemporary Posthumanist thought.

enables one to recognize all the suffering in the world as their own, thus bringing about the negation of the will (Schopenhauer 2010, 419).

Another possibility of overcoming the will is through aesthetic appreciation. For Schopenhauer it tranquilizes the will and, among the arts, music is in the top of his hierarchy. Music is an unmediated objectification, a copy of the entire will, just as the world itself is. While music speaks of the essence of the will, other arts can only speak of its shadow (Schopenhauer 2010, 348). Accordingly one can find in melody the *many different forms of the striving of the will* (Schopenhauer 2010, 288)[9]. He goes on to argue that music does not express appearances but the inner essence. It goes beyond the individual or particularities (Schopenhauer 2010, 289).

The escapes Schopenhauer provides through negation of the will to life have in common the connection of the thing-in-itself. Whether through acknowledge of suffering through personal experience or identifying in music the structure and essence of the will. These are two conductors that lead one to suppress – even if momentarily – the affirmation of the particular will. Whether one agrees with his conclusion or not Schopenhauer's work clearly underpins the possibility of mediation between affirmation and negation of the will. Even if one rejects his final prescription in favor to the negation of will to life it is evident he acknowledges the particular in its different forms of representation but also asserts a universal bond.

Furthermore Schopenhauer reveals the irrational drive of passions and desires in the guise of rationality. Doing so, he allows for a better understanding of its interplay with both individual and societal conduct. Both his eternal cognitive subject – e.g. a subject of compassion – and his theory of music refuse to establish a hierarchy among human beings. Moreover I believe his aesthetic notion of music and the idea of compassion are intrinsically related. If not two-halves of the same whole. Both denote a capacity to go beyond individuals and particularities. In order words, (1) it is a way of looking at human condition through sensory cognition in contrast to concepts: e.g. Kant or Hegel. Consequently (2) being is not a transcendental quality. But it is through my acts that I can become an eternal

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9   For example a melody that invites me to feel sentiments of pain or happiness is not a representation of these sentiments but pain or happiness in themselves. The same melody can also express satisfaction *by eventually regaining a harmonic interval and, even more, the tonic* (ibid.).

subject of cognition or a saint in his notion. Thus being is becoming. Notwithstanding, along with the entirety of his thought, (3) denotes a skeptical attitude towards modernity. These three assertions were also addressed as the commonalities of aesthetic politics in Machiavelli and Nietzsche (Vacano 2007). Since it is not the focus of this research, I will not induce to a conclusion that Nietzsche's admiration of the Florentine political theorist has allowed him to develop a notion of the will in sharp contrast with that of Schopenhauer. But I would like to suggest that if both Machiavelli and Nietzsche saw sensory cognition as fundamental to political practice, so did Schopenhauer in his philosophy.

His notion of compassion was further developed as social solidarity in the works of Durkheim, one of the founding fathers of sociology. Schopenhauer was not a political philosopher. Nonetheless his concerns centered in the idea that we are under an illusion of free agency. Another great merit in his work, in my opinion, was to accept the possibility of merging European and non-European knowledge. It was undoubtedly an audacious move for the time he lived. Such move can be seen as an alternative production of knowledge. For Hegel, after translating Kant's racialized distribution of continents – or tetragon of barbarians – in a linear and historical sense, Europe was then living in the present – e.g. modernity – while the rest of the world was living in the past (Mignolo 2012, 151; Mignolo 2005, 65; Salamanca 2002; Eze 1997; see also Isaac 2006, 12).

The implication of Hegel's legacy still resonates in much of contemporary interpretations of the world. Also conventional wisdom in the social and political terrain is not indifferent to these conceptual assumptions.

3 SEQUEL

Nietzsche had already warned us to beware of great systematizers, because the will to impose systems eventually leads to the hangman and the gallows. Hegel and Marx believed that they could predict or hasten the end of history (Meštrović 1993, xiii, xiv). So did Fukuyama (1992) in his appropriation of Hegelian dialectics. Schopenhauer started a radical intervention in philosophy, one that acquires expression in the works of Nietzsche. This section is dedicated to expose Nietzsche's own understanding of the will and its social and political implications. As a further matter I also consider the reverberation of these ideas in the works of Deleuze.

3.1 Will and Subject: Nietzsche & Deleuze

> *A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Observe, it is the tablet of their overcomings; observe, it is the voice of their will to power* (Nietzsche 2006, 42).

The metaphysical will in its absolute unity before the human intellect has particularized it in determined forms is in the centre of Schopenhauer's work. That is to say, in other words, to

approach *the (pure) empirical object at the point of its entering human reason*[10]. But he finds evidence for his assertions in everyday life experiences. The nature of willing and pessimism has also inspired Friedrich Nietzsche[11]. He develop the notion of will to power throughout his work with a remarkable different approach from that of Schopenhauer.

The book Thus Spoke Zarathustra written in between 1883 and 1885 represents a valiant attempt at turning morality upside down for the purpose of affirming the will to life. It is also the first comprehensively description of the will to power.

On a Thousand and One Goals Nietzsche contends the same tablets that dictate a people's values – that what is good or right – are the tablets of this people's overcoming (2006, 42). *On Self-Overcoming*, Nietzsche alludes an interpretation of the will that in a manner resembles that of Schopenhauer[12]. The will is beyond the opposition of good and evil (see also Schopenhauer 2010a, 209-232). It is unleashed as the current of a river and it has no constraints. Thus it is a will to power, the very *unexhausted begetting will of life* (Nietzsche *2010,* 88). As if in Schopenhauer's expansion of the Kantian thing-in-itself, the will to power in Nietzsche is an intrinsic feature of life itself underlying a condition for all living things. But he adds a remarkable twist. Life *must always overcome itself* (ibid.). And he goes on to explain his argument in a similar way of how Schopenhauer did. The later purported to explain the drives of the will from observation of the natural world. Nietzsche will also make use of this artifice in order to relate will with power: T*o be sure, you call it will to beget or drive to a purpose, to something higher, more distant, more manifold: but all this is one, and one secret /.../ I would rather perish than renounce this one thing; and truly, wherever there is decline and the falling of leaves, behold, there life sacrifices itself – for power!* (Nietzsche 2010, 89).

Therefore it is not simply a will to life, but a will to power. Will to power overcomes itself for the sake of power. Moreover life overcomes itself (ibid.). Yet there is another distinction

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10   ⌐ I own this passage to Lenart Škof who kindly provided me his unpublished text of his own.

11   Nietzsche found Schopenhauer by chance in a bookshop while studying in Leipzig (Acampora 2011, 3).

12   For Schopenhauer the same will can be converted in good will as in acts of compassion.

between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, a diversion from homogeneity to plurality. The later contends a plurality of wills to power (ibid.) whether the former referred to the will in the singular. To be precise, Schopenhauer did admit a plethora of representations of the will in the world as representation. But Nietzsche gives particular emphasizes to this quality.

The will to power of Nietzsche has this plurality of claims (2002, 22, §22). As if it were, a conflict of goals derived from a plurality of wills occur. It follows that life is permeated by conflicts since there are conflicting wills which in turn result in different overcomings – which I will soon explain. Nonetheless Schopenhauer also acknowledges that what gets things going in the world are individuals' will. Again, the objectification of the will, of course, acquires many different instantiations in the world as representation. But Nietzsche – as Deleuze develops on it later – has a micro-perspective on the interaction of wills. Thus he gives a paramount relevance for these instantiations[13].

On Old and New Tablets symbolizes the moral framework upon which human association is structured. He is aware of the intrinsic temporal and contingent category of moral norms and his protagonist, Zarathustra, is engaged on releasing humanity which is kept as a hostage by these tablets. In his view, we take morality for granted with an unquestioned assumption there are immutable characteristics ascribed to the norms governing our lives. He also asserts that tablets arise from *rotten laziness* or *weariness*. Tablets provide the basis for human association and for the sake of stability its content is sealed against scrutiny. Here again, Nietzsche depicts Schopenhauer's radical intervention in relation to Kant or Hegel. The moral framework of the phenomenal world contents Kant's philosophical project based on linearity and cohesion (Tonder 2012, 94). Nietzsche upholds the preponderance of the will and the need to introduce new tablets if humanity aspires to continuously development and achieve great knowledge. This is a recurrent theme in Nietzsche's philosophy, that of revaluation which in his work goes by the name of a *transvaluation* of all values.

Once liberated from the claws of history, one is free to endeavor into human existence and its potentialities. Here Nietzsche articulates the idea of the *Übermensch* (Overman). Man not as a mean in himself but something that *shall be overcome,* a bridge to a new form of life. One that could ascribe a new tablet i.e. a new moral basis upon which humanity shall

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13   Nietzsche's will also acquire expression in Marxism as power relations.

redefine a new goal. Moreover it is not about the superiority of the *Übermensch* but rather an engine for social regeneration (Alfred in Moore and Spence 2004, 10). This development is vehemently denied to us every time we consensually decide to enslave ourselves to the past in order to protect ourselves from an immanent new reality that poses a threat to inscribed premises on our old moral tablets. The only way to overcome man and set anew human experience is to bring into being a new form of nobility, a noble man guided by *atemporal* values and principles regardless of the past, a landless walker who does not fall prostrated before anyone or any set of norms. As radical as it may sound, I believe, Nietzsche wants to depict the struggle of active forces against reactive ones. That is to say, it is not a normative statement but rather a diagnosis of struggle and different claims, similar to that one can find in the works of Machiavelli.

The starting point of Beyond Good and Evil is to understand what in us wants truth (Nietzsche 2002, 1, 11, 16; see also Acampora 2011, 31). Again his concern is due to the normative feature truth acquires. Instead of an opposition between truth and untruth, he suggests *shades of truth and apparentness* (Nietzsche 2002, 32). It is *faith in opposite values* he contends that leads us to philosophical deadlocks. This opposition is misleading since a will to life prevails and – under certain circumstances – I can opt for the untruth if it will help me fulfill this will. The very tittle of the book implies an intention to find an alternative to this misleading opposition. Pursuing something that is untruth denotes a bad thing. Therefore I may not pursue something that could ultimately lead to my satisfaction since I am supposed to feel bad about it. These assertions relates to the proximity of his thought to Machiavelli's aesthetic politics (Vacano 2007) - as I briefly mentioned in the previous section.

Nietzsche engages with the notion of will to life. Since for him the negation of such and its manifestations as selfless may not be precisely truth. But the same values can be ascribed to the affirmation of life, even if it is based on untruth. Precisely because if it is a matter of preservation of life it can acquire higher value (importance) than the truth (Nietzsche 2002, 24). In this sense, the will may desire for untruth.

The framework Nietzsche works out these ideas are that of Schopenhauer's philosophy. He is clinging to the notion of will and representations and bending them both to their extremities.

And that is how he breaks away with Schopenhauer. By realizing that if all else that exists is will and this will desires the untruth, it has to accept the untruth in order to attain its goal. Thus the will to life prevails, a will for expansion that leads to preservation. But what it seeks is power (Nietzsche 2002, 3,6,9). That is a breakaway with Schopenhauer as Nietzsche goes through the negation to the affirmation of life. The former is referred to as a *weaker* will (Nietzsche 2002, 2, 22) that does not evolve, enhance itself but is locked in a cycle of suffering and negation that is common to many. Or as he puts it: *it is the same drama just with different actors* (Nietzsche 2002, 58). Some authors affirm that Nietzsche only saw the dark side of the will and mocked his master 's exposition of the tender side of the will – compassion (Meštrović 1993, 75-76). Or perhaps, this move was an instrument to his philosophy in order to depict what is really going on in the political and social life just like Machiavelli did before him.

Nietzsche is also skeptical of an idealization of man. But he aims to affirm the potentialities of the will to life aware of its antagonisms. That is to say, a will to ignorance that does in opposition to knowledge but rather serves to select elements of the untruth that can help us to relish the will to life and thus move forward. Therefore is not a mere tension between truth and untruth that is in question. But rather our ability to *refine* this content in the name of life. There is no meaning in life but the meaning one gives to it. Hence science is rather deceiving by ascribing to life a normative stable condition that goes against its very nature of contingency and conflict. In other words, Nietzsche rebels against dogmas and systematizing philosophies as much as Schopenhauer did. I enable life – i.e. the will to life – by organizing the world in a way that allows me to move on. Again, the drives behind the will to life is the will to power. That is his answer since truth is

> *A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins* (Nietzsche 1977, 46-47).

Instead eternal truths, affirmation – as Deleuze will later argue – relates to resistance in the sense that is not a move toward acceptance but a possibility *to release, set free what lives*

(Deleuze 2002, 3; see also Hoy 2005, 24). As Nietzsche puts it: *...we are sailing straight over and away from morality; we are crushing and perhaps destroying the remnants of our own morality by daring to travel there – but what do we matter! Never before have intrepid voyagers and adventurers opened up a more profound world of insight...* (2002, 23).

This *profound world of insight* is Schopenhauer's epistemological break. I insist on his radical intervention in philosophy and on the role morality plays in the work of Nietzsche and my premises are in accordance with the account of Georg Simmel (2010): that Schopenhauer was a greater philosopher than Nietzsche. The latter built the grounds and refined the investigations of the former.

Nonetheless I only know what is moral if my morality is opposed by immoral forces or actions. That goes back to the very nature of will to power[14]. In my opinion Nietzsche's will to power is a diagnosis of contingent forces that – within the individual or the whole of society – allows for change. Again, it is not a normative statement. The political and social implications, I believe, lies in its potential as a theory of revolutionary forces. Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche provides us with the contours of political change. Active and reactive forces constitutes the will to power. It is the active forces that escape from the order of things and set anew forms of being through a process of revaluation. Therefore provides the theoretical grounds for Deleuze's line of flight. The concept is related to a *deterritorialization* where *multiplicities are defined by the outside* (Deleuze and Guatarri 1980, 9-10). In a plurality of instantiations of active will to power, these forces have diverse origins and claims. Nietzsche praises the instability of this forces as a germinal potentiality of change. Life as becoming. So does Deleuze since *regardless of their number and dimensions*, this multiplicity finds *consistency* (ibid.).

Moreover active forces can become reactive in an attempt to maintain the offsprings of its revaluation. Otherwise it is bond to constantly overcome itself by destroying what it has consolidated and once again becoming. This alludes the passage from Hegel I quoted in the second section where he shares his impressions of the French Revolution. But it also entails that Nietzsche's analysis of the will is non-doctrinal and nonhierarchical. That is to say, it

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14   A concept that has in the past served as ideological endorsement to fascist and authoritarian regimes.

proffers potentiality over actuality and allows a will – e.g. a political claim – to thrive since contingency is intrinsic to a relation between active and reactive forces.

Schopenhauer investigated the features of the will Hegel refused to. Nietzsche – following the steps of Schopenhauer – unleashed this will, split it in a plurality of forces and provided a micro-analyses of its logics[15]. Nietzsche's theory of revolution in the concept of will to power, I believe, is scattered throughout his works just as much of his great ideas. And is also, to my view, a fertile soil to radical political theory.

The first element of similarity within the works of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Deleuze is a rejection of dialectical reasoning. But how to conciliate these thinkers on the notion of subjectivity and political action? Deleuze develops an ontology of essence (Widder 2012, 21-59) and adheres to a non-essentialist ontology by proclaiming that *there is no essence beneath appearance, behind the curtain there is nothing to see* (Deleuze 2004, 17 quoted in Widder 2012, 23).

His ontology of sense is a cognitive process, one in which sense in the world of appearances reveals how these appearances *seems to conceal another, essential world*. Therefore sense and appearances implies an excess. Instead of dialectical opposition – one in which sense relates to both immediate external aspect of existence and its inner essence (Hegel, quoted in Hyppolite 1997, 24) – sense for Deleuze is a surface that separates two opposites as much as it constitutes and exceeds these opposites. Following his ontology, being is expression instead of a division of thought and action.

It is thus an anthropology of being as Widder (2012, 24-25) points out. One in which Deleuze relates to Spinoza's infinite substance (ibid.). This substance or Spinoza's one (ibid.) express itself in various forms in infinite ways. This in turn relates to Schopenhauer in the sense that he also saw in Spinoza's absolute a manifestation of his world as representation with a plurality of appearances connected to one absolute, the will to life. I read this as an intention to articulate a dialogue between singularities and pluralities in both Spinoza and

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15   What wraps together the content of his will to power and gives an alternative understanding than that of fascist and authoritarian doctrines is the notion of eternal return. This notion – I get back to it in the next section – ascribes a chaotic and contingent feature for the active and reactive forces.

Schopenhauer. And in this way the two halves of will and representation do not contradicts with Deleuze's ontology. Since, I believe, this excess can be read as the manifestation of the will in the world as representation. Also, Deleuze argued for the interconnectedness of being as much as Schopenhauer did.

The immanent substance, for Deleuze, is the *univocity of being* – which echoes the medieval theologian John Duns Scotus (Widder 2009, 27-43). That is to say, our individuality contrasts a univocal being (Deleuze 1994, 39). This assertion take us to the ontologies of the One and the Many (Magun 2013) – which I briefly discuss in the next section. Whether Deleuze affirms the universal or the particular is a matter of interpretation. Some authors considered his declaration of *[a] single and same voice for the whole of thousand-voiced multiple, a single and same Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings* (Deleuze 1994, 304 quoted in Badiou 2000, 10). Others highlighted how this passage continues affirming that univocity occurs *on condition that each being, each drop and each voice has reached the state of excess – in other words, the difference which displaces and disguises them and, in turning upon its mobile cusp, causes them to return* (Deleuze 1994, 304 quoted in Widder 2012, 27; see also Conway 2010, 190).

Widder (2012, 27) also suggests that eternal return is the structure of self-overcoming, and it is the expressive sense of being as such. Therefore he clarifies the interpretation of Deleuze as a philosopher of the One by the acknowledge that univocity is but momentary, intrinsic to all beings and serves the purpose of self-overcoming. Again, to me, this reveals the underlying radical orientation of Deleuze's philosophy. It goes beyond dialectics in a Schopenhauerian-Nietzschean sense. Let me explain. Instead of separation between either One or Many (Magun 2013), Deleuze allows for its interconnectedness. In Schopenhauer's world as representation I am not aware that I partake in the same condition of all living things, the will to life. According to a Deleuzian interpretation of Nietzsche the affirmation of each individual will is not in opposition of the whole but are clustered. Each individual will enables change, pushes forward society as a whole. Doing so, morality is put upside down since this affirmation calls for a revaluation of values. In other words, the potential for rejuvenation of social and political structures.

On the principle of univocity Deleuze intends the same resolution. That is, he acknowledges the particular but also the excess in the particular. This excess clusters with other particularities and, as if it were, active forces are clustered and able to reclaim a new social order. But this movement is one of plurality not of singularity. Not the faceless tumultuous crowd of the multitude rather, a plethora, an amalgam of active forces.

Social and political order is plastered under morality and rationality. Schopenhauer's will goes beyond the order of things and is only *normalized* in the world of appearances. But for Nietzsche a blatant affirmation of the will escapes the order of things. And that, in my opinion, allures Deleuze's lines of flight.

4 RADICAL POLITICAL THEORY AND ACTION

Since my aim is to provide an alternative approach to the insights Schopenhauer offered via his original work and his impact in Nietzsche which consequently permeates the work of Deleuze, I proceeded by an investigation of these three philosophers. I focused on the concept of will and action. I traced it back to Schopenhauer sine his epistemological break opens a whole new position of inquiry.

If the application of his insights in the political terrain seems unusual, the importance of Nietzsche for political theory has long been admitted. To situate the radical intervention I purported to explain in the previous sections in contemporary theoretical investigations calls for a brief consideration of recent developments in the discipline. In line with the purpose of this research, my investigation is rooted in the grounds of what is called radical political theories.

4.1 Tortuous paths of Political Theory & Radical Approach

Peter Laslett declared the death of Political Theory in the 50s. This was a provocation due to the demise of Western Political Thought after in the years succeeding World War II. The political atmosphere of the time could not conceive a clear picture of the political order and re-articulate a new political imaginary without falling in the fallacies of the past. It was a period of stagnation in the field of political theory. Hence Laslett's pessimism. Few years later, Isaiah Berlin responded to this provocation in an article entitled *Does Political Theory still exist?* His point being that Political Theory still alive and essentially relevant. However in the twentieth-century's absence of grand theories – e.g. those of Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke – the scope of analysis provided by meta-narratives was hindered.

Berlin asserted that the grand theories of Political Theory had the ability to turn paradoxes into platitudes and vice-versa. And goes on to suggest that in the future that may be more platitudes being converted into paradoxes than the reverse. Stephen White (2002) reviving this debate, contends that Berlin's suggestive speculation has actually pervaded contemporary political theory. He recalls *the challenges of feminism, multiculturalism, environmentalism, critical race theory, and novel c1aims on the part of both nationalism and cosmopolitanism.* White quotes James Tully as another way of questioning the same dilemmas: *How do we attend to the strange multiplicity of political voices and activities without distorting or disqualifying them in the very way we approach them?* (Tully in White 2002, 477).

For White the possibility to do so can be done by distancing ourselves from a mode of thinking that focus on our *existing political practices* and addresses to it *normative guidelines with universal reach*. That is done not by a complete rejection to the Kantian legacy but rather *an emphasis on different strands of the Enlightenment legacy and the careful cultivation of a "subaltern" tradition* (White 2002, 478). I follow, to a certain extent, White's argumentation in this respect. But what possibilities do we have then?

This *cultivation of a subaltern tradition* sounds remarkably similar to what Santos (2009) coined as *ecologies of knowledge* i.e. we enter the terrain of M/C/D. But Berlin has also suggested that political theory as a field remains obstinately philosophical (Grant 2002, 577). So let's consider the implications of this obstinacy in tackling the question of possibility and subjectivity before I intervene with another question: the place of M/D/C in this debate.

Political Theory and philosophy tackle the question of possibility in a variety of ways. Often this question arises as either a potential to change political order or the impossibility to do so (Potočnik et al 2011, 7-9). That is to say, the state of a political situation is contingent and can be set anew or the possibility of change is con-substantiated within this very order. We can address the variations of this duality in four categories:

> *There are philosophers who have insisted on thinking the actual as the realm of the potential (e.g. Kant, Foucault), those who have asserted the primacy of the potential over any actualization (e.g. Agamben, Deleuze), those who have insisted on the actualization as prior to any form of potential (e.g. Lacan, Badiou), and finally those who conceptualized the potential of another actual (e.g. Marx, Mao)* (ibid.).

It is a plurality of ontologies and epistemologies. Most of which aspire to understand democracy beyond the limitations of liberal thought. Consequently this debate is often put as an opposition to John Rawls' theory of justice. Within these plurality each variation imply a manner of acting politically. If one focus in the extremities of these variations another diversion occurs. That of an opposition between lack and abundance (Tønder and Thomassen 2006). In other words, political subjectivity either understood through theories of lack inspired by Lacanian psychoanalyses or theories of abundance inspired by Deleuze. What these theories share in common is that they inhabit the terrain of so-called radical democracy theories.

Moreover radical democracy theory propose a radical interventions in the realm of political theory through a rejection of Marxist authoritarianism, skepticism toward social democracy and blatant affirmation of pluralism and diversity (Johnson 2012, 4, 11; Widder 2012, 1; Newman 2012, 84-87,150; Tormey in Simons 2011, 144). That is to say, a push forward in what were to be a post-political era. As such, radical democracy theory has diverse interlocutors with distinct positions.

Yet there is another distinction worthwhile. Theories of the One or the Many. The possibility of mediation alludes Jean-Luc Nancy's *singular-plural* thinking (Magun 2013). These categorizations may not be optimal but do enhance our capacity to envision political imaginaries. Here I have opted for the primacy of potential over the actual.

Theories that focus on *the actual as the real of the potential* and *the actualization as any form of potential* (Potočnik et al 2011, 7-9) have an intrinsic conservative character. If the aim is to address a radical political theory of resistance these approaches tend to reveal its limitations. As e.g. the capacity to *articulate* a *chain of equivalence,* between a plurality of social and political demands, structured within an *empty signifier* under the figure of a charismatic leader (Laclau 2005; 2007; Laclau and Mouffe 1992; see also quoted in Tormey in Simons et al 2011, 150). Or the appropriation of the State and the possibility of a revolutionary act as in the works of Žižek (Johnson 2012, 42-43). The latter dates back to the Marx-Bakunin debate that split the First International in the 1870s (Newman 2011, 46).

Nonetheless, what these theoretical insights – e.g. that of Laclau or Žižek – do share is the common ground they inhabit, *a common political frontier*: that of global capitalism (Newman 2012, 185). This common ground represents a challenge for the formation of political subjectivities and theoretical analysis since it increases antagonisms in a global level. Saul Newman (ibid.) argues for the need to *construct alliances and forms of solidarity across national boundaries and develop a new international populism*. But how to understand the political subject and political action in this tumultuous and tortuous context? Newman, after an evaluation of contemporary radical political theory, emphasizes the potential of Laclau's chain of equivalence. But his aware of its downside as it idealizes the figure of a charismatic leader. Although not often acknowledged, Laclau is, first of all, a Latin American theorist and his thought is in consonance with the idea that Postmodernity implies a weakening of the absolutist character of Enlightenment modernity (Berkeley et al 1995, 15, 112).

This is my line of departure. Therefore in what follows I apply an analyses of comparative political thought contrasting Schopenhauer's legacy with Laclau's theory in order to provide an argument in the field of radical political theory.

4.2 Eternal Subject of Cognition and Pluriversality

Laclau is aware of the antagonisms of Eurocentric pretensions and endorses a systematic decentering of the West (2007, 34). He goes on to postulates a *chain of equivalence* among social movements. His focus on social movements situates his thought in line with radical

democratic theory. Radical implies *democracy freed from the limited understanding of the use and legitimacy of power deployed by dominant social groups* (Tormey in Simons et al 2011, 150). But instead of a complete rejection of liberal-democratic ideology he argues for a deepen an expanded version of it *in the direction of a radical and plural democracy* (Laclau and Mouffe 1992, 176 also quoted in Tormey in Simons et al 2011, 150).

Laclau's chain of equivalence[16] is an attempt to mediate a plurality of struggles. As if it were, a plurality of wills or active forces which claim for affirmation above all else. Also he and Mouffe emphasize that there is no evolutionary path that society must follow (Laclau and Mouffe 1992, chapter I; see also Tormey and Simons et al 2011, 149) as well as no necessity of a revolutionary event – e.g. unlike Badiou or Žižek. Thus the contingent cluster of wills is what enables political change. In other words, articulation in the plurality of struggles is what allows for disenfranchised political subjects to create a chain of equivalence that alludes a universalism that is empty. This void of universal ideals is due to the fact that the social is a discontinuous terrain in which concepts are fixed and unfixed (Tormey and Simons et al: 2011, 148). Thus the social calls for continuous interpretation. That resembles Nietzsche's insistence on the affirmation of will to power as something to be pursuit. Not a move against the social but against the actual as the very possibility to revitalize the social. Also to accept a weak universality as Laclau does relates to the shades of truth I discussed before. Furthermore to externalize a will opens the possibility to eventually alter political reality. It is a singular step amidst a plurality of claims, the very contingent instability that allows for political alternative. Laclau attempts to mediate this condition with a chain of equivalence.

Within the Lacanian-inspired ontologies of the lack (Newman 2007, 142), Laclau (2007, 36) put forward the idea of an *empty signifier*. That is to say, a sign that embedded in a discourse would be not empty but equivocal, no matter the issue that is being addressed its function of signification would meet the expectations of the signified. He goes on to explain the logic of the empty signifier by evoking an account of Rosa Luxemburg on the constitution of the unity

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16   He consider the chain of equivalence as the ability of different social forces to articulate its demands under the same umbrella is crucial otherwise. If e.g. the working-class would succeed in promoting its objectives as a project of liberation to all social forces, although this would represent a hegemonic- which he borrows from Gramsci victory since the whole of society can relate to a particular agenda in turn it with the forces that gave impetus for change within the chain of equivalence (Laclau and Mouffe 1992, 44-45).

of the working class previously discussed in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. As it follows, the unity derives from *the accumulated effects of the internal split of all partial mobilizations*, rather than a consensus about *either political struggle or the economic struggle*. Given this scenario a mobilization envisaging a specific demand will both address a partial struggle and also perform an act of opposition against the system (Laclau 2007, 42).

Doing so difference is replace by equivalence. If this chain of equivalence encompasses more and more movements and demands it becomes harder to be separated from other identities based on the principle of difference what is for Laclau (ibid.) to *remain closed in a differential self*. At the same time, a great plurality of *differential identities* within a chain of equivalence leads to an equivalence that is not very concrete. What to Laclau is the body of a communitarian being. Hence repressive power will act accordingly expressing itself increasingly against the communitarian body rather than against specific movements. Laclau believes that community the way he envisages is marked by an *absent fulness without a form of representation*. The emergence of the people as a collective actor is based on the impossibility of ultimate universality within community as a whole and collective wills (Laclau 2007, 49). Representation is suspended by an absent fulness. And, as if it were, a divide between the plurality of manifestations of the will and the possibility to cease these via a linkage is describe.

Moreover in order to conceive how this political order could take shape, Laclau establishes an antagonistic relation between Hobbes' Leviathan as the undivided will of an absolute ruler and Marx's universal subject of a classless society (Laclau 2005, 48). As he points out two opposing versions of demos: a fraction within the community and community as a whole. His attempt is to redefine populism as not part of political and ideological content but as a mode of articulation which produces structuring effects in the modes of representation (Laclau 2007, 34).

Laclau's recourse to Hobbes and Marx is a recourse to understand the political from an aesthetic view point. Again, he suspends the political and ideological content in order to enact a convergence among social movements. That takes us back to the question at the end of last section referring to Newman. Aesthetic political theory is also what links Machiavelli and Nietzsche. Politics as *a human endeavor that is rooted in individuals' desire that helps us*

shape the world by representing and misrepresenting ideas (Vacano 2007, 185). If aesthetic political theory was a contribution of both Machiavelli and Nietzsche that can help us understand politics in a realistic manner (Vacano 2007, 186), the same intention is seen in the efforts of Laclau. This is analogous to the reading I make of Nietzsche through the insights of Schopenhauer. But how to think of compassion instead of Laclau's populism?

Meštrović remind us that *Horkheimer remained faithful to his Schopenhauerian leaning, and criticized the Marxists who rationalized widespread human suffering in the name of the idealized Marxist utopia* (1993, 177). Also Schopenhauer's philosophy is widely acknowledged to be socialist in its core, because of its extreme emphasis on compassion and the breaking down of the artificial barriers among individuals (Magee 1983 quoted in Meštrović 1993, 117). Nietzschean focus on power, missed again the Schopenhauerian element of compassion as an important ingredient in social relations (ibid.). The metaphysics of the will allows Schopenhauer to put forward an ethics of compassion through the primary anthropological phenomenon of the body and through conscience originating in it (Škof 2006, 16). These statements, I believe – along with the other argumentations I developed so far – corroborate my insistence on how to think Schopenhauer socially and politically.

Schopenhauer's will which was abstract for Hegel and refuted it as been single-sided, from my perspective, echoes the notion of pluriversality. That is to say, a plethora of claims which is the embedment of various representation of wills aiming at a will lo life or to (em)power, coexisting. Schopenhauer expressed it as the will since relates to all human suffering and reflects the ways we pursuit to achieve our goals. It is nonhierarchical which led to the interpretation of his thought as having a socialist leaning. Therefore all representations of will are equally esteemed. So are its means to achieve goals. On theoretical and practical grounds this is analogous to pluriversality. That is the possibility of many worlds coexisting. So is compassion in relation to a mediation of these worlds through border-thinking. That is the kind of universality and cosmopolitanism in parenthesis that Mignolo refers to.

4.3 Political Imaginaries and (De) Coloniality of Power

Kant developed a moral framework establishing an immutable character which contents his philosophical project based on linearity and cohesion (Tønder 2012, 94). His phenomenal

world is sealed against scrutiny. Whereas Schopenhauer divergences from this tradition. Since the latter refuses to accept a transcendental hierarchy or state among men. So what could be the other half of this historical and meta-geographical determinism?

M/D/C insights start as a reaction to this legacy. The concept of *coloniality of power*, coined by Aníbal Quijano[17], embeds the viewpoint of a people that neither partake as the harbinger in the unfolding of history, nor were at the epicenter of Kant's emancipation project. The interlocutors of Subalternity and coloniality of power propose to think anew social and political constellations. They intent to deploy relations of solidarity and reconceptualize postcolonial politics vis-a-vis the division between global north and south (Escobar 2004, 208; 2005, 63-92). In contrast to the intensifying inequality and against scientific universalism (Moreiras 2001, 12), they advocate for *a new geocultural and epistemological location* (Mignolo 2012a, 309). These tenets of Subalternity resonate with unanimity among its interlocutors. Furthermore (relations of) solidarity is but a derivation of compassion and *a new geocultural and epistemological location* seems to me in line with Schopenhauer's endeavors.

Coloniality of power refers to imperial appropriation of land, exploitation of labor, control of finance, control of authority, control of gender and sexuality, and control of knowledge and subjectivity (Mignolo 2006, 33; Mignolo in Walsh 2006, 13). Thus intrinsically related to national identities and national consciousness. It also echoes Frantz Fanon's (2006, 22) elaboration of the *decolonizing paradigm*. When analyzing independency struggles the preponderance of an Enlightenment narrative is explicit. Some authors emphasize the role of the *creole* elites in bringing enlightened ideas (Anderson 1983). Others identify in this

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17 Ileana Rodríguez (2001), the editor of *The Latin American Subaltern Studies Reader*, explains the Subalternity project which began in India as a political and epistemological criticism of history. In the year 1981, Ranajit Guha defined the subaltern very broadly as anyone who is subordinated in terms of class, caste, age, gender and office or in any other way. Historical knowledge, subalternity contended, organized the past in line with the governmental efforts of the modern state. Opposition to state policy was deemed logical and political if carried out in a language that the state could contest and eventually incorporate. In the funding statement of Latin American Subaltern Studies Group (LASSG), which was released in 1993, this intention was once again revitalized. The idea of nation relating to creole elites is conceived in terms of reintroducing the mechanisms of domination present in the sixteenth and seventeenth century to contemporary local elites. Whilst putting the emphasis of European ideals and overshadowing the role played by subaltern social subjects in Latin American history. Therefore the group proposed an analysis of pre-Colombian and colonial forms of pre-national territorialization as well as forward to think about newly emerging territorial subdivisions, permeable frontiers, regional logics, and concepts such as Commonwealth or Pan-Americanism (LASSG founding statement). This is the starting point of Aníbal Quijano's critical approach as he develops the notion of *coloniality*.

approach a negligence toward the role played by subaltern groups (Itzigsohn and Hau 2006). Even within the Marxist tradition a persistence in acknowledging the other is found. Álvaro García Linera, current vice-president of Bolivia, suggests there was no social identity besides a strictly economic one in Marxist tradition (Itzigsohn and Hau 2006, 377) inspiring countless struggles in the region also in his own country. According to him, the ancient identities of the Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní were significantly underplayed in liberation discourses. These were considered as *subordinated allies of the working class* (Itzigsohn and Hau 2006, 126-127) since they worked the land and fell into the category of small landowners.

To be specific, there are three mechanisms of coloniality of power and its cognitive experience. Quijano (2007, 94-95): systems of hierarchies, systems of knowledge and cultural systems. The first is the result of a Eurocentric perspective which emphasized European supremacy on the basis of race which resulted in a racial division of labor. The second is the systems of knowledge which entails that Europe has hegemony over the production of knowledge hence control over forms of subjectivity that led to the marginalization of epistemologies of the south. The Indians of Ibero-america as Quijano (2000, 541) reminds us, *were condemned to be an illiterate peasant subculture stripped of their objectified intellectual legacy*. The third mechanism that is to say, cultural systems, revolves around the idea that European cultures are the only truly modern cultures.

Moreover primacy of cognitive sense in contraposition to the veal of rationalism over the modernity project, is also a component of the radical epistemological break I have put forward. Schopenhauer debunked aggression as the emancipated will, a will whose blind fury could be channeled against the self or others, depending on circumstances (Meštrović 1993, 97). Here we stumble upon what I earlier referred to as an *interpretation* of Schopenhauer's will in the work of Hegel. The access to the thing-in-itself Schopenhauer purported to explain as the will had a purpose to reveal irrationality in the guise of progress. Whereas Hegel restricted his notion of the will to the realms of phenomenal world. Also condemned and demystified explorations of the unconscious passions and desires away from any form of immediacy of the empirical world (Hegel 2008, 29). Consequently Hegel validated his notion of the will as well as the coherence of his ideas. But Schopenhauer is not an endorser of a *fury of destruction*. And if he negates the will to life he does not through *an abstract idea*. Rather he is attentive of the antagonisms of the modern man.

Subalternity and coloniality of power bring to the surface contradictions of a metal construction which hinders agency and inhibits the representation of a plurality of wills. This is detrimental to formation of political subjectivity as Quijano and Mignolo suggests: coercion and subjugation in the form of expropriation of the land and appropriation of subjectivities. Furthermore it justifies the emancipated will to subjugate other cultures by the criteria of supremacy: e.g. Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda depicted the indigenous tribes in New Spain as been predisposed to be enslaved in the Valladolid debate (1550–1551). Schopenhauer did not agree with this type of argumentation. He saw different shades of meaning in trivial actions of everyday life. Which makes him skeptical of systematizers and debunk the argument humanity moves toward an increasing level of perfection through time. That is why, his work was acclaimed by many philosophers who experienced the degradation of society in the *fin de siècle* (Meštrović 1993, xv).

Hegel himself – as I argued – identified the social and political implications of Schopenhauer's philosophical endeavors. There has been also recent interest in allying Schopenhauer's work to anthropology and sociology (Meštrović 1993). I hope this and other points I claimed so far substantiate my argument to think of Schopenhauer's work politically. Therefore I intend to advance this discussion in the light of radical politics, (post)modernity and subaltern knowledges. In the subsequent section I turn my attention to his influence in Nietzsche and – to a certain extent – Deleuze, in the fourth chapter I will allude Schopenhauer's thought in contrast to Laclau's *chain of equivalence*.

Finally, it is evident to me so far that if the philosophy of Schopenhauer had acquired as much attention as that of Hegel, we perhaps would have arrived earlier to the same debates that permeate society nowadays.

Concerning potentiality in the political imaginary of M/D/C Therefore I would like to call attention for the intertwining of three key ideas in the works of Latin Americanists where potentiality is manifested in consonance with the radical intervention put forward in this research. These are: decoloniality of power, border-thinking and pluriversality, as the subaltern conceptual matrix in Latin America.

Decoloniality of power define a strategy of disengaging and delinking from Western epistemology, thinking beyond European legacies – Greece or the Enlightenment – through epistemic diversity in regard to marginalized and subaltern memories, a plurality of narratives (Quijano 2000, 533-580; Mignolo 2012, xxv, 250). It questions the terms of the conversation. And avoids the pitfalls of fundamentalism by reactivating the past only in order to re-inscribe it into the future with critical border-thinking. That is to say, in the frontier of imperial economic liberalism, salvationist Christianity and revolutionary Marxism. Therefore, decoloniality comes off categories of thought in the modern rhetoric, holds off neoliberal philosophy with the priority of markets and concepts of democracy linked to the market. So does Marxism although it retains these elements in economy and politics (Mignolo in Walsh 2006, 13-18). Hence the critical approach here is to understand political subjectivity and knowledge based on the role played by culture. Mignolo reminds, the decolonial turn is complementary but distinct of critical theory (Mignolo in Walsh 2006, 15,19)[18] – e.g. Postcolonial, Poststructuralistm, Lacanianism, etc. It engages with thoughts of coexistence and double critics. Hence the necessity to disaggregate, negotiate and transgress (Walsh 2006, 57).

The matter is thus dealt in the confines of the pontential rather than the actual[19]. The desire for *bien vivir* (to live well) instead of *bien acumular* (to accumulate well) reorient aloof from debates of 'posts'. Decoloniality thus entails the end of hegemonic thought oriented toward Eurocentrism as no longer the linking point of humanity. As Quijano (2000, 574) suggests: *it is time to learn to for ourselves from the Eurocentric mirror where our image is always, necessarily, distorted. It is time, finally, to cease being what we are not.* The potential to liberation in the concept amidst the political turmoil in post-Washington consensus Latin America has another theoretical developed that connects all three concepts aforementioned.

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18   [] It is about decolonial thought and the contributions of Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala in Virreinato del Peru, Mahatma Gandhi in India, Amilcar Cabral in North Africa, Gloria Anzaldua in the US. These are irreducible to the 'isms' afore mentioned (Mignolo in Walsh 2006, 19).

19   See also Ribeiro (2011) on *nationality of power* and the limitations involved in applying decoloniality of power in distinct countries such as Bolivia and Brazil.

The actions of the Zapatista Army of Liberation (EZLN) headed by Sub-commander Marcos still inspired diverse movements through out the globe through an affirmative refusal to be subjugated. *We seek a world in which there is room for many worlds* or *Another world is possible* are ideas that move through time and often relate to various forms of resistance, subversive actions and to subaltern forms of thinking. Even though they are result of actions in a very specific context (Lenco 2012, 22; Moreiras 2001,122). The Zapatista theoretical revolution as have been described (Dussel 2007; Moreiras 2001; Mignolo 2012) endorses the conviction that another worlds are possible, worlds of coexistence of many worlds away from mechanisms of control – e.g. the Church, The Soviet or the Washington Consensus (Mignolo in Walsh 2006, 15,19). The actuality of this coexistence can be understood as a *pluriversality* ('pluriversalidad') which was sprouted when diverse local histories were discontinued and linked to the European local history (Mignolo in Walsh 2006, 16). Philosophically is a claim for transmodern thinking: pluriversality as a universal project instead of postmodern (Dussel 2006; see also Mignolo 2012, 208).

Thus Subalternists in Latin America bring to surface the voice of those who were entitled to be unheard by the *Geist* of history or the racialized meta-geography. And they do acknowledge the potential to bridge these worlds by intellectuals of both Europe and Latin America via a fair critique of Enlightened ideals[20] via border-thinking. Furthermore the Subalternists do not ignore the contribution of the occident in the history of humanity but suggest that this contributions may not be solutions for all humanity.

I shed light on the concepts of decoloniality, border-thinking and pluriversality. Intrinsically to these concepts are some elements of a kind of cosmopolitanism. Not globalism or cosmopolitanism but cosmopolitan localism which means decolonial cosmopolitanism (Mignolo 2012, 294). Which can also be understood as a globalization from below. In practical grounds, the three concepts are used to describe the plurinational states in Bolivia and Ecuador follow this logic (Mignolo 2012, 293).

If the Subalternists propose an epistemic rupture, others – still in the realm of radical politics – aim at debunking this claim on the basis that, given today's expansion of global

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20   See Mignolo (2012, 292-294) as he suggests Bruno Latour's pluriveral cosmopolis could join forces with his own notion of decolonial cosmopolitan localism and thus, contribute to *the coexistence of cosmopolitanism, with modifiers and in parenthesis.*

capitalism, a Marxist-Hegelian logic should be the departure for radical social and political change (Žižek 1998; Vivek 2013). A proposal which is pervaded by the same legacy Subalternists strive against. That leads to the conclusion that enlightened institutions imported through colonial domination where the same which enabled emancipation. Thus defending the Hegelian Geist of history (Žižek 1998) or the Marxist possibility for change over other claims (Vivek 2013). Certainly, the Subalternists are correct to affirm Marxism retains economic and political determinisms (Mignolo in Walsh 2006, 13-18) equivalent to capitalist liberal democracy. As if this tradition simply tries to catch up with the current order instead of creating anew. Consequently they often tend to ignore the production of knowledge in Latin America (Mignolo 2013).

Here we stumble upon what Nietzsche referred as *shades of truth and apparentness* (2002: 32). In which one chooses for the untruth if it helps fulfill a will – or e.g. a claim. Therefore even within the realm of radical politics an opposition of claims occur in the form of different wills to life or wills to (em)power. A refinement of truth exposes this will. Hence it is a matter of preservation which acquires higher value than the truth itself (Nietzsche 2002, 24). And that is why Nietzsche calls it a will to power instead of a will to truth (Von Vacano 2007, 100).

If Nietzsche praises the instability of forces as a germinal potentiality of change and life as becoming. Deleuze corroborate with this premise since *regardless of their number and dimensions*, this multiplicity finds *consistency* (Deleuze and Guatarri 1980, 9-10). Seize being what we are not (Quijano 2000, 574) opens the possibility of becoming vis-a-vis the demise of global coloniality (see also Quijano 2012, 26), ascribing the contingency of power relations. Furthermore Nietzsche's active forces escaping from the order of things and setting anew forms of being – and in a certain extent also Deleuze's – through a process of revaluation, seems to be, compatible with the intentions behind coloniality and decoloniality of power. Modernity, as it was conceived in a Eurocentric viewpoint, plasters progress and action but it cannot contain these forces and that is why it calls for new tablets. That is – in the case of Subalternists – pluriversality. Transmodernity or pluriversality is a form of decolonization entailing ecological awareness, popular democracy and economic justice (Dussel 1992, 147) meaningly, changing the term of the conversation in epistemological terms.

The center cannot hold the plurality of these forces and history has no master only a will to life and a plethora of wills or claims. In this sense the philosophy of Nietzsche and Deleuze agrees and legitimises the drives of Subalternity. The emphasis in culture underlines this line of thought. But I would like to argue that it does not seem to flirt with the pitfalls of cultural relativism. It is but the emergence of active forces aiming at breaking away with its old tablets. Nietzsche's theory of revolutionary forces accepts the plurality of positions, a plurality of claims which are embodied in the individuals' will to (em)power. Affirmation of a people – e.g. leading to its empowerment – Deleuze argues, relates to resistance in the sense that is not a move toward acceptance but a possibility *to release, set free what lives* (Deleuze in Hoy 2005, 24) – as I have already mentioned. The Subaltern perspective has such intent.

Hence, I argue, the radical intervention of Schopenhauer and later Nietzsche and Deleuze in this research is not completely exogenous to Subalternity, as it may seem. But rather an admission of its premises. Again if a dogmatic Marxist establishes a hierarchical perspective of the world base on the way he/she approaches the phenomena, it produces a sense of power, and may lead to actual worldly power (note 113 in Vacano 2007, 110). Whereas Schopenhauer approach to the phenomena put in a condition of equality the many appearances of the will in the world as representation and emphasizes its aesthetic appearance. If one understands decoloniality as overcoming it leads to a similar resolution under the name of pluriversality.

The implications of this reading of Schopenhauer in radical politics, I believe, can be fruitful in the contemporary social and political conjuncture. Recently, in the aftermath of social unrest taking place in Europe under austerity measures, Greek intellectual Costas Douzinas recognizes the limitations in political thought concerning the metaphysics of will. In the Hegelian terms – which I discussed in the second section – a legal right is a recognized and effective capacity to enforce our will, allowing the subject to rule over his property, body and private life (Douzinas 2013, 85). But as Douzinas goes on to suggest: "We are all legally free and nominally equal, unless of course we are improper men, in other words men of no property, women, colonials, of the wrong colour, religion or belonging /.../ For the wretched of the earth, right is not about law and judges, a game they cannot play. It

is a battle-cry, the subjective factor in a struggle, which asks to be raised to the level of the universal" (ibid.).

The struggle to decolonize a people involves thinking in potentialities outside the actual. Some authors referred to the same aforementioned in relation to the recent Arab Spring and the possibility of a history without master (Damashi 2012, 138-154).This in turn has lead, in the case of Latin Americanists, to the notion of pluriversality (Mignolo 2012, 208) in the demise of global coloniality (Quijano 2000; see also Damashi 2012, 138-154). Once again, these claims seem to fit the diagnosis of the modern world I presented in the works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. But how to think of radical political theory and resistance in these lines?

To be specific, this can be the chain of equivalence instead of the personification of power in a leader. The eternal subject of cognition – in the work of Schopenhauer – or a *pluriversal* subject instead of Hobbes' Leviathan or Marx's universal subject. Such political subject acknowledges the will as the root of all striving as its own. Consequently in the grounds of radical political theory a pluriversal perspective heads to a catalogue or an ecology of political practices. This myriad of practices or techniques not necessarily divided by normative statements of time and modernity grounded on the supremacy of one-sided rationality. Since it is part of the subject's cognition to achieve its goals by means that seem fit respecting, of course, the element of compassion that hinders a ceaseless will to power.

If one accepts this argument, then the affirmation of will in contemporary radical political practices, what would be be consequences? I believe it entails a decentering of power and the end of a Postcolonial theory. Just as on the chapters *The Center Cannot Hold* and *The End of Postcolonial Theory* of Damashi's acclaimed book on the Arab Spring (2012, 138-170). And Douzinas statement of neocolonial relations in Europe toward Greece (Douzinas and Papaconstantinou 2013) is but a manifestation of active forces willing to set anew forms of association against reactive forces who do not recognize new revolutionary forms of political subjectivity but desire these to be channelized through institutions ascribed in old tablets. Alexis Tsipras, head of the SYRIZA, has recently stated that his close to many progressive leaders in South America and he sees some political practices in the region as potentially

viable to be implemented in Greece. To my view, this dynamic also emulates the core ideas in the concept of decoloniality of power.

Finally, it is not a matter of imposing a view with the task to ultimately prescribe a diagnosis and course of action for radical politics. Nor it is a matter of simply advancing the discipline of political theory by advocating the preponderance of a line of thought over others. In this respect, the recent revival of Marxist legacy falls within these terms (Žižek 1998; Vivek 2013). For political action, appropriations of the Latin American Subalternists, Žižek, Laclau or the line of reasoning I put forward, may serve as it fits the context. That is to say, cognition, experience and practice are vital rather then the primacy of concepts that may plaster the capacity for action. In other words, it is a matter of recognizing and advancing, potentialities and pluralities of being, through a standpoint in which, in my view, Schopenhauer has highly contributed.

5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

I have considered the implications of Schopenhauer on rethinking will and political subjectivity. He saw shades of meaning in trivial actions of everyday life. In this regard, he diverges from Kant and Hegel in what I interpreted as an epistemological break. The very nature of inquiry in Political Theory often precludes orthodox investigations in the realm of politics and action as in the case with Subalternity and geographies of knowledge. That's why I proposed an alternative account centered in the work of Schopenhauer in order to discuss coloniality of power. After addressing his influence on Nietzsche in what I referred to a theory of revolutionary forces and, to a certain extent Deleuze, I also considered the concepts of decoloniality of power, border-thinking and pluriversality. These endeavors of Subaltern Latin Americanists are, in a sense, analogous to that of Schopenhauer and the Deleuzian interpretation of Nietzsche in active and reactive forces. They all depart from a rejection to immutability and linearity as based on rationality. Hence, I suggested that if the philosophy of Schopenhauer had acquired as much attention as that of Hegel, we perhaps would have arrived earlier to the same debates that permeate society nowadays. Radical Political Theories

are predisposed to go beyond the deadlocks of post-political era. But within these deadlocks there is also a prevailing discussion on geographies of knowledge and political practices. In this respect, I recognized some of the fallacies of Eurocentric thinking and did a revaluation of Laclau's chain of equivalence through the notion of compassion and cognition in political action.

The metaphysics of will in Schopenhauer and the aesthetic political theory of Nietzsche, in my view, provided an account in the current state of affairs of critical thinking. Then, I suggested that the eternal subject of cognition – or as I referred to, a pluriversal subject – that, following the line of thought in Schopenhauer, recognize all human suffering as its on, can be relevant in apprehending contemporary political subjectivities and struggles in a transcontinental perspective. Having said that, Schopenhauer's radical intervention acknowledges the plurality of representations of the will but also its commonalities, and the primacy of experience over concepts. Finally, radical political theory, I believe, could benefit and be revitalized by this insights.

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SLOVENSKI POVZETEK

Sodobna politična teorija, ki presega post-političnost (idejo, da obstaja konsenz znotraj političnega polja ter, da živimo v post-ideološkem svetu), stremi k rekonceptualiczaciji pojma politike. Z oddaljevanjem od razumevanja politike kot preproste tehnike vladanja, predlaga revitalizacijo političnega življenja, ki ga poimenujemo kot radikalno politično teorijo. Predstavniki omenjene smeri so, med drugimi, Alain Badiou, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau in Slavoj Žižek. Inovacije znotraj discipline pa predstavljajo tudi dela Anibala Quijana, Artura Escobarja, Walterja Mignola in Enriqueja Dussela, ki jih uvrščamo v skupino, katera preučuje odnose modernosti/kolonialnosti/dekolonialnosti (M/C/D).

Pričujoče delo je poskus raziskovanja politične subjektivitete in politične prakse z neobičajnim pristopom. V nalogi preučujem delo Arthura Schopenhauerja in njegovega vpliva na Fridericha Nietzscheja, ter nadaljujem z vzpostavljanjem vzporednic med njuno konceptualizacijo volje z konceptom verige enakosti, ki ga uporablja Ernesto Laclau. Tretji del naloge predstavi krajše premišljevanje o radikalni politični teoriji, nadaljujem pa s poskusom vzpostavitve povezave med kritično mislijo Latinske Amerike in Evrope s pomočjo Schopenhauerjeve zapuščine. Na koncu tako predlagam, da politično premišljevanje Schopenhauerja prikaže analognost njegove misli z prizadevanji skupine M/C/D, obenem pa zagotovi tudi drugačno perspektivo na teorijo Ernesta Laclaua. Diplomsko delo je tako predvsem teoretske narave, saj se osredotoča na primerjalno politično misel do razsežnosti, ko povežem dela mislecev, ki prihajajo iz različnih časovnih obdobij z namenom preučevanja vprašanja subjektivnosti in političnega delovanja.

Na začetku opišem Heglovo konceptualizacijo volje, ki temelji na historičnem materializmu in dialektiki, ter sintezi kot gonilu razvoja. Pomemben poudarek je na Heglovem razumevanju volje, ki je le del razuma, kar primerjam s Schopenhauerjevo konceptualizacijo volje, kjer gre predvsem za delovanje. Opazna je torej razlika v razumevanju človekovega delovanja, kar prikažem z primerom razumevanja volje pri obeh avtorjih skozi razumevanje končnosti oziroma smotra, kjer se Hegel zanaša na krščansko tradicijo odrešitve, Schopenhauer pa je navdih iskal predvsem v hindujski tradiciji neskončnosti.

Okvir, v katerem Nietzsche razvije te ideje, predstavlja Schopenhauerjeva filozofija. Oklepa se konceptov volje in reprezentacije in ju preizprašuje do njunih ekstremov, s tem pa se loči od Schopenhauerja. Razumevanje, da v kolikor vse ostalo, kar obstaja, je volja in ta volja predstavlja željo po neresnici, moramo sprejeti neresnico, če želimo doseči njen cilj. Kljub temu, da volja do življenja prevlada, je volja do širitve tista, ki vodi do ohranjanja. Ampak, kar volja išče, je moč (Nietzsche 2002, 3,6,9). To je prelom s Schopenhauerjem preko katerega Nietzsche preide skozi negacijo do afirmacije življenja. Tako je negacija tista, ki jo naziva kot slabotno voljo (Nietzsche 2002, 2, 22), ki se ne razvija, temveč je zaklenjena v cikel trpljenja in negacije. Ali kot pravi Nietzsche "gre za enako dramo, le igralci so drugi" (Nietzsche 2002, 58). Nekateri avtorji pritrjujejo, da je omenjeni avtor raziskoval le "temno stran" volje in se tako posmehoval tendenci svojega učitelja do poudarjanja čutne strani volje – sočutja (Meštrović 1993, 75-76). Mogoče pa je bila ta poteza instrument v njegovi filozofiji z namenom, da odkrije dejansko dogajanje političnega in družbenega življenja, po Machiavellijevem vzoru.

Če Nietzsche poudarja nestabilnost sil kot potencialnost spremembe in življenja kot postajanja, pa Deleuze kolaborira s to premiso, saj ne glede na njihovo število in dimenzije, multipliciteta vedno najde konsistentnost (Deleuze and Guatarri 1980, 9-10). Preseči oblike biti, kakršna nismo (Quijano 2000, 574), odprejo možnosti postajanja v globalni kolonialnosti, ki predpisujejo kontingenco odnosov moči (see also Quijano 2012, 26). Nietzschejev koncept aktivnih sil, ki uhajajo iz reda stvari in tvorijo nove oblike biti, omenimo tu tudi Deleuzeve linije bega, skozi proces revalvacije predstavljajo skladnost z nameni, ki so v ozadju kolonialnosti in dekolonialnosti moči. Modernost, kakršna je bila skovana znotraj evropocentričnega pogleda, omogoča napredek in delovanje, a ne more zadržati teh sil in zato se pojavi potreba po novih strukturah in konceptih.V primeru subalternosti je ta "nov" koncept koncept pluriverzalnosti. Transmodernost ali pluriverzalnost je oblika dekolonizacije, ki vsebuje ekološko osveščenost, demokracijo in ekonomsko pravičnost, kar pomeni, da se spreminja diskurze v njihovi epistemološki določenosti (Dussel 1992, 147).

Kant je razvil moralni okvir, ki je vzpostavil nespremenljiv karakter, ki vsebuje njegov filozofski projekt, ki je osnovan na linearnosti in koheziji (Tønder 2012, 94). Njegov fenomenološki svet je zapečaten proti skrunjenju, medtem ko se Schopenhauer odmakne od

te tradicije, saj zavrne sprejemanje transcedentalne hierarhije oziroma odnosov med ljudmi. Kaj bi torej lahko bila druga polovica tega historičnega in meta-geografskega determinizma?

Pogledi skupine M/D/C se pričnejo kot reakcija na to zapuščino. Koncept kolonialnosti moči, ki ga je skoval Aníbal Quijano, vsebuje pogled, da ljudje niti ne sodelujejo kot začetniki v razvoju zgodovine, niti ljudje niso epicentri Kantovega emancipatornega projekta. Posredniki subalternosti in kolonialnosti moči predlagajo novo razmišljanje o družbenih in političnih konstelacijah. Njihov namen je razvoj odnosov solidarnosti in rekonceptualizacija postkolonialnih politik ter preseganje delitve med globalnim severom in jugom (Escobar 2004, 208; 2005, 63-92). V nasprotju z intenzifikacijo neenakosti in proti znanstvenemu univerzalizmu (Moreiras 2001, 12), se oni zavzemajo za novo geokulturno in epistemološko lokacijo (Mignolo 2012a, 309). Glavna ideja subalternosti odzvanja s soglasjem med njenimi predstavniki. Tako opazimo povezavo, da je solidarnost le derivat sočutja in koncept nove geokulturne in epistemološke lokacije, ki sovpada s Schopenhauerjevimi preučevanji.

V nalogi sem se osredotočil torej na implikacije, ki jih ponujajo Schopenhauerjeva dela pri ponovnem premišljevanju volje in politične subjektivitete. Sam je namreč opazil sence pomenov v trivialnostih vsakdanjega življenja. V tem oziru se razlikuje od Hegla in Kanta, to sem interpretiral kot prikaz epistemološkega preboja. Narava raziskovanja znotraj politične teorije pogosto preprečuje ortodoksna razmišljanja in raziskovanja znotraj polja politike in delovanja, kar opazimo na primeru subalternosti in geografij znanja. Zato sam ponudim alternativen pristop, osredotočen na delu Schopenhauerja z namenom, da preučujem kolonialnost moči. Vpliv, ki ga je omenjeni avtor imel na Nietzscheja na področju, ki ga jaz naslavljam kot teorijo revolucionarnih sil, sem do določene mere povezal tudi z Deleuzom, predvsem pa z koncepti dekolonialnosti moči, mejnega mišljenja in pluriverzalnosti.

Prizadevanja subalternistov iz Latinske Amerike so tako, do določene mere, analogna misli Schopenhauerja in Deleuzejeve interpretacije Nietzscheja na polju aktivnih in reaktivnih sil. Vsem je skupna začetna točka zavrnitve nespremenljivosti in lineranosti, ki sta obe utemeljeni na racionalnosti. Tako sem prišel do predloga, da če bi Schopenhauerjeva filozofska misel bila deležna enake pozornosti kot jo posvečamo Heglovim delom, bi lahko do ključnih družbenih vprašanj in debat o njih, ki prežemajo današnjo družbo, lahko prišli prej. Radikalne politične

teorije imajo predispozicijo da presegajo zastoje post-politične ere, a ravno znotraj omenjenih zastojev obstajajo prevladujoče diskusije o geografijah znanja in političnih praksah. V tem oziru sem prepoznal nekatere zmote evropocentričenga razmišljanja in tako opravil revalvacijo Laclavove verige enakosti s pomočjo Schopenhaverjevih konceptov sočutja in spoznanja znotraj političnega delovanja.

Metafizika volje pri Schopenhauerju in Nietzschejeva aestetska politična teorija, po mojem mnenju, zagotovita nov pogled znotraj sedanjega stanja kritičnega razmišljanja. Predlagal sem tudi, da večni subjekt spoznanja, ali kot sem ga sam poimenoval – pluriverzalen subjekt, ki sledi Schopenhaverjevi miselni liniji, prepozna vso človeško trpljenje kot tako in ga postavi v pomembno vlogo v razumevanju sodbne politične subjektivitete in bojev v transkontinentalni perpsektivi. Tako Schopenhauerjeva radikalna intervencija pripozna pluralnost reprezentacij volje in obenem tudi njene podorbnosti ter primarnosti izkušnje pred koncepti. Na koncu verjamem, da bi radikalna politična teorija z zgoraj preučevanimi vpogledi lahko veliko pridobila in bila poživljena.