CONTENTIOUS PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR OF THE
CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA:
CASE STUDY OF NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO

BACHELORS WORK

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LIST OF ABRREVIATIONS

BIH  Bosna i Hercegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
CEE  Central Eastern Europe
CEFTA  Central European Free Trade Agreement
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CEI  Central European Initiative
ČSFR  Česká á Slovenská Federativna Republika (Czech and Slovak Federative Republic)
ČSSD  Česká Strana Sociálné Demokratická (Czech Social Democratic Party)
EC  European Communities
EFTA  European Free Trade Agreement
EU  European Union
FRY  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
IDPs  Internally Displaced Persons
IFOR  Intervention Forces
IGO  Inter Governmental Organization
ITF  International Trust Fund for De-mining
JA  Jugoslovenska Armija (Yugoslav Army)
JNA  Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav National Army)
KDOM  Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission
KDU-ČSL  Krestansko-Demokratická Unie-Československá Strana Lidová (The Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party)
KFOR  Kosovo Forces
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës)
KSČM  Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)
KVM  Kosovo Verification Mission
LDS  Liberalna Demokracija Slovenije (Liberal Democracy of Slovenia)
MoFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  Non Governmental Organization
ODA  Občanská Demokratická Alliance (Civic Democratic Alliance)
ODS  Občanská Demokratická Strana (Civil Democratic Party)
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP  Partnership for Peace
SC  Security Council
SDS  Socialni Demokrati Slovenije (Social Democrats of Slovenia)
SECI  Southeastern European Co-operative Initiative
SEE  South Eastern Europe
SFOR  Stabilization Force
SFRY  Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SKD  Slovenski Krščanski Demokrati (Christian Democrats of Slovenia)
SNS  Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka (Slovenian National Party)
STEM  Střediska Empirických Výzkumů (Center for Empirical Research)
UN  United Nations
UNMIK  United Nations Mission in Kosovo
US  Unie Svobody (Freedom Union)
ZLSD  Združena Lista Socialnih Demokratov (United List of Social Democrats)
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INTRODUCTION

The Czech Republic and Slovenia are two of the most recent newcomer states in international relations. Their independence was a combination of the redrawing of Central Eastern European regional maps at the end of the Cold War as well as a historical fulfillment of their national aspirations. After independent projects were completed their policy focus had been directed into transition of political, social and economic life from communist-socialist to market-capitalist. One of policy area that presented a wholly new challenge was certainly that of defining and articulating of an independent foreign policy, which in its core reflects conceptions of both societies of their wider place in the world. Independence itself was seen as only a first step of a natural move into the Western security, political and economic structures (e.g. NATO, WEU, EU, EC, EFTA) in search of political stability and economic prosperity for its populations. But while general national (foreign policy) consensus on these goals existed, there lacked a thorough political consideration of cost and benefit, i.e. political strategies that would have to be met in order to fulfil the above set of goals.

The Kosovo crisis and NATO intervention opened a controversial chapter in international politics and law. It was the first time that NATO, a defensive alliance initially created to protect the Western states against the Soviet Union, unleashed a military campaign against a third state. While it was not the first time in history that humanitarian intervention was conducted on legally spurious grounds it had been an unmatched precedence that this would take place on the doorstep of Europe. Domestically, Western statesmen had quite a problem in justifying the need to use military force against a particular regime that was violating human rights of part of its population. In this context, the Czech Republic and Slovenia were also in precarious position. While the Czech Republic had become a NATO member only weeks before the intervention, Slovenia had been faced with potential security threat, influx of Kosovo refugees and request to use its land and air-space for successful conduct of NATO operations. Moreover, since Slovenia had been promised but not accepted as a new member of NATO at the Madrid Summit in 1997 the intervention offered itself as a valuable opportunity to demonstrate its ability and willingness to meet obligations and duties set for member states.
From this alone, it is clear that foreign policy in both states during the NATO intervention in Kosovo would be primarily conducted in realm of attained (i.e. the Czech Republic) or aspired (i.e. Slovenia) candidacy for NATO membership. Since both are small states in terms of their influence and power in international relations their central foreign policy focus is naturally their geographical region, i.e. Central Eastern (CEE) and South Eastern Europe (SEE). The Balkans and therefore the Kosovo conflict naturally falling within their interest spectrum. Both of these factors put NATO intervention at the forefront of foreign policy agenda of the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Since at the time of the intervention the setting of foreign policy strategy was only in its making this issue presented a considerable challenge for decision-makers of both states. While the outcome of the intervention did not influence foreign policy of both states dramatically, it nevertheless reflected one of greatest contentious problems both countries were facing in their foreign policy articulation and implementation, i.e. lack of clear national consensus on foreign policy goals and strategies in their pursuit. While both governments and majority of population supported NATO intervention, questions about the costs and benefits of NATO membership and more profoundly, considerations of a viable Balkan policy, i.e. national interests of the Czech Republic and Slovenia in the Balkans were raised for the first time.

Strategically, the choice to support intervention could and was expected. Methodologically, however, we will observe foreign policy behaviour of both countries during that time through an analysis of factors that will be based on material/objective and non-material/(inter)-subjective factor distinction. It will be acknowledged that much of the explanation for any engagement of a particular state with its surrounding is determined by a set of purely objective or material factors (i.e. geographic position, military, economic factors). However, since practiced foreign policy behaviour during the intervention reflected the problem of consensus on foreign policy, i.e. conceptions of the wider place of both nations in the word, we will also take (inter)subjective or non-material factors into account. We expect that their incorporation into our analysis will better explain encountered behaviour in both countries. As the analysis will try to show, past historical experience of the nations and the recent traces left by forty years of communist-socialist rule, i.e. change in formation of a new national identity and political culture springing thereof, played a pivotal role in shaping and determining mentioned (re)actions or behaviour. Since
these factors are socially constructed they are limited in their capacity as observable realities. Methodological limitations will, therefore allow us to analyse the role of (inter)subjective factors in foreign policy behaviour in foreign policy texts and documents reflecting actual (re)actions, i.e. in its manifested form. These will be weighted against the expected, or desired, behaviour both states have laid down in their political and legal framework (e.g. the constitution, legislation in foreign policy area and foreign policy strategy) bearing in mind the existing scientific tools in social science research.

The first chapter will start by outlining methodological framework of our analysis and set parameters on which it will be conducted, e.g. validation of case study states, comparability, definition of subject, unit of analysis and factor distinction. The contentious problems in foreign policy of the Czech Republic and Slovenia will be addressed in a systematic and comprehensive way and finally, limits of scope and content of this analysis will be set. The Kosovo crisis and NATO intervention, as well as its result and outcome, will briefly be explained in the second chapter. While understanding the whole complexity of the crisis and intervention itself as well as the multitude of challenges it raised in international relations is beyond the scope of this analysis, there will be a short introduction to the relevant events during the crisis and the intervention. This should enable the reader to understand better the context and (re)actions of the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Chapter three and four will concentrate on looking at the sequence of behaviour in both the Czech Republic and Slovenia in the diplomatic, intervention and post-intervention phase (as outlined in chapter two). The overview of foreign policy behaviour in both states will serve to galvanize arguments on which analysis of factors in chapter five will base. This analysis will first look at factors that affected foreign policy behaviour during NATO intervention in a particular state and finally compare behaviour in both states. For this purpose, official documents and texts by the relevant foreign policy actors (both, domestic and foreign) will be analysed. The conclusion will follow to summarise the answers that analysis has facilitated and possibly point to questions that appeared during it. Due to the obvious limits of scope of our analysis these have not been discussed at length. Lastly, the author will conclude with possible prospects for both states’ foreign policy in the Balkans.
1. THE LOGIC AND METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS

As the building of an ordinary house or a scientific grand theory goes, our research too, must be built on solid ground, i.e. scholarly upheld methodological and theoretical foundations. The first chapter before the reader is therefore, constructed of subchapter “bricks” that will hopefully build a firm framework for our empirical study. While observing basic positivist assumptions in social science research when building our methodological framework, in theory we will try to follow the approach similar to one taken by Goldstein and Keohane (1993) in their analysis of ideas and foreign policy. Their approach builds on rational models of traditional theories (e.g. realist, institutional liberalism) but goes beyond them in trying to overcome deficiencies that these theories entail (e.g. such as minimized role of non-material/(inter)subjective factors or what they call ideas). While they look at similar set of factors affecting foreign policy as the reflectivist authors they stay within the positivist methodological framework. Step by step, our research will be laid down following the outlined tenants in order to validate its results as well as to devise the logic of our analysis. Firstly, the two states will be presented and a case will be put forward to validate their comparability.

1.1. THE CASE STUDIES AND THEIR COMPARABILITY

The Czech Republic and Slovenia are both bestowed with a set of determinants, which similarly enhance and limit their behaviour in relations to the environment surrounding them. First, both are bound by their geo-strategic and geographical positions in CEE. For the most part of modern European history they presented a political periphery of significant strategic importance to the Great Powers (e.g. the US, Russia, Germany) and their allies in defining their mutual relationships.

Second, in terms of size of population and territory they are both regarded as small to medium size states.1 This smallness has limited them from capitalising their strategic position and economic-technological advancement to that of their bigger

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1 Both states definition of terms of size has been outlined in their basic foreign policy documents. Declaration on the foreign policy of the Republic of Slovenia (Deklaracija o zunanji politiki Republike Slovenije) (1999) defines Slovenia as small state. The conceptual basis of the foreign policy of the Czech Republic (Koncepce zahraniční politiky Česke Republike) (1999) identifies the Czech Republic as medium to small state.
neighbours. It has further put them as a bargaining chip in hands of the global Moscow trade-off in ‘the sphere of influence’ deal between Stalin and Churchill in October 1944 and confirmed at the Yalta conference in February 1945. The ensuing collapse of this bargaining deal with the end of the Cold War has unleashed a new re-conception of their smallness through independent and sovereign states and opened a path for reconsidering a more active role in shaping regional and global relations between the East and West as well as that to the South.

Third, similar availability of physical and human resources determine their economic factor endowment. Furthermore, they have both just recently undergone comparable historical paths with regards to their political, economic and social systems. The change occurring in both can be depicted in the transition from a state-controlled and communist-socialist system to a market-oriented and democratic system. In terms of transition in political systems another similarity can be observed, as both have become independent states by dissolution of federal states.

Last, two more factors, that are predominately of methodological significance to our analysis, must be put forward. First, as any other state in international relations both the Czech Republic and Slovenia do not operate in a vacuum. They operate in an environment surrounding them that is neither one-fold or stable through time as well as to a certain extent being shaped by them and not only vice versa. While the theoretical debate on the significance of environment as the primary explanatory factor for the behaviour of states will be put aside here, it must be recognised that any environment that a state faces can for the sake of methodology be divided into what Waltz saw as systemic and Mouritzen as salient environment. (Mouritzen, 1998: 1-25) The former presenting a whole, while the later only a part of “the total aggregate of factors in space and time, to which an individual’s (a unit’s) behaviour may be

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2 In a comparative study of both economies Černoša (2000) observed similarities in connection to their trade relations. Similarly as in their first transition years the European Union is still the underlying characteristic of economic development in both countries. Furthermore, they are both small economies heavily dependent on exports where they have both taken up a strategy of high-quality products, while offering lower production costs and prices to the West as their main advantage to penetrate the saturated Western markets.

3 The Republic of Slovenia proclaimed its independence on 25 June 1991, six months after a straight majority for independence in a referendum unleashed the slow process of Slovenia’s withdrawal from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The European Communities (EC) decided to extend recognition to Slovenia (i.e. under Austrian and German lead) on 15 January 1992 based on the opinions of the Badinter Commission (Opinions 8, 9 and 10) that the SFRY no longer existed. Other countries followed suit in the next few months. (Türk, 1993) The Czech Republic became an independent state with the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (ČSFR). An obvious difference in visions of the political elite in the1992 elections led to the formal declaration on 26 August 1992 that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic would separate into two independent states on 1 January 1993, thus dissolving the 74-year-old federation in a peaceful manner. In response to the imminent break-up the federal government was dismantled and drafts of new Czech and Slovak constitutions were drawn up. (Basic facts about the Czech Republic, 2002)
oriented or otherwise related (excepting only the environed individual’s (unit’s) own hereditary structure and characteristics).” (Sprouts in Mouritzen, 1998: 33) While in Waltz’s (1975) perception of environment, all states face one and same condition, or a whole that none of them acting alone, in turn, is able to control, in Mouritzen’s view “each state faces a specific and stable salient environment, rather then the international system as a whole”. (1998:1) This leads to the assumption that the salient rather then the systemic environment will carry greater explanatory weight in relations to state’s behaviour in the conduct of our analysis. (ibid.: 1) Taking into account both of these two assumptions leads to believe that due to already mentioned and explained determinants (e.g. geo-strategic, geographical position, size of population and territory, availability of mentioned physical and human resources) we will observe the Czech Republic and Slovenia as affected by similar environmental stimuli, i.e. we will be looking at the effect of (aspired) NATO membership and their Balkan engagement.

Second, a valid relationship between the comparative method used in our analysis and the case study states at hand, is established only when comparability between them exists. Carlnaes (1986) used notion of comparability in Ideology and Foreign Policy to make a clear distinction between the former and comparative method itself. Comparability serves then not to denote the procedure that constitutes the comparative method as such, but rather “a prime logical requirement underlying or permitting adequate comparative analysis”. (ibid.: 76) Furthermore, to be valid this holds in as much units of current analysis comply with two relevant conditions. First, according to Zelditch (ibid.: 76-77), a variable common to compared units of analysis and second, the same meaning of variable for all units of observation must exist. (ibid.:76-77) Furthermore, since problems besetting our analysis are the same or similar to those encountered in the field of foreign policy research itself, a few words will here be devoted to additional methodological and theoretical considerations in this field.

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4 In this context James Rosenau (1971) addressed another important question about the distinction between comparative method and comparative study. In this study, comparison will be used as a method and not as a body of knowledge, i.e. in methodological terms and not in terms of subject matter.
1.2 THE SUBJECT AND THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

Up to this day, there does not exist a single agreed-upon definition of what a phenomenon of foreign policy, i.e. the subject of the discipline and our analysis, should really include. All attempts, however valuable they may be, fall short of the ability to encompass the complexity of the phenomenon they try to define. James Rosenau (1971), who focused his attempts on outlining a coherent and scientific framework for the foreign policy analysts to rely upon, made his first valuable step in this direction in the 60s and 70s. He also caused the rise of a special discipline based on a scientific study of foreign policy. Through basic conceptual equipment, as he called it, he set the most essential framework for pre-theories of foreign policy. (ibid.: ix, 108) Although the most entrepreneurial endeavor to define the discipline of foreign policy to this day, by outlining the crude methodological instrument that most scholars seem to be generally following in the back of their minds, the definition itself still largely depends on author’s intellectual approach and general philosophical outlook on the subject matter. According to their outlook, authors define and put emphasis on basically same, but differently re-configured, elements making them into a patchwork of definitions that the ‘black box’ of foreign policy entails. By and large, we can conclude that a classical positivist would study foreign policy as objectively observable state-centered phenomenon. A constructivist would define it as distinctive political practice of setting boundaries to constitute, re-produce and maintain a state and its political identity. (Campbell, 1998: 36,42) The centrality of a state to the study of foreign policy, putting aside its concrete conception is, therefore, the single focal point in which the discipline itself can be distinguished from the other scholarly endeavours in international relations studies. (Vukadinović, 1989: 104-105)

We can see that what both positivist and constructivist observations were seeing foreign policy as a kind of a ‘bridging’, ‘boundary’ activity or a ‘linkage’ (e.g. Campbell, 1998; Carlnaes, 1986; Hudson, 1997; Mouritzen, 1998; Rosenau, 1971) of

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5 Positivism as a scientific approach in social science lies on four main assumptions: 1) utility of science, i.e. that the same methodologies apply in both the scientific and non-scientific worlds, 2) there is a distinction between facts and values as the former are neutral in terms of theories, 3) social world has regularities, i.e. what we could call consistent practices or patterns of human behaviour, which can be discovered by our theories, 4) use of empirical epistemology, i.e. that the way to determine the truth of statements is by appealing to the neutral facts. This approach has been, however, wholly refuted by post-positivist approaches in social science research known under the guise of reflectivist theories (among them also constructivism). Post-positivist theories, although very different in its core, all believe that theory can not be neutral in terms of theory (in words of Robert Cox: “Theory is always for someone and some purpose”. (In Smith and Baylis, 2001: 177)) with the aim of uncovering pre-existing facts or regularities in an independent external world. (ibid.: 168)
a state/nation actor be it acting, reacting or interacting with its environment. What we
will here understand as the lowest common denominator or better, a minimal
definition of foreign policy. Now having agreed on the subject, we must ask ourselves
how are we going to be able to observe our phenomenon in reality, or in other words,
how are we going to make this definition usable and operational for our research?
Unfortunately, it is not possible to read the minds behind foreign policy strategies and
decisions to understand the inner motives that prompted a certain decision or
behaviour. And even if this was the case, access to foreign policy materials that might
contain such information is highly sensitive and classified, therefore, making it
unreachable for our analysis. Regardless of these limits, we can still conduct an
empirical study that offers us valid results.

Here, as the above minimal definition already implies, the most valuable course of
pursuit of an empirical study on foreign policy is to observe it in terms of a certain
action or patterns of action it follows, i.e. behaviour that can be depicted through an
empirical study of following daily foreign policy (re)actions. What follows, therefore,
is that here a unit of observation and subsequent analysis is not foreign policy defined
and observed as an ‘actor’, a ‘process’, a ‘structure’ or an ‘outcome’ but rather as a
foreign policy action defined as “actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly
stated directives, and performed by governmental representatives acting on behalf of
their sovereign communities, are manifestly directed towards objectives, conditions
and actors—both governmental and non-governmental—which clearly lie beyond their
sphere of territorial legitimacy”. (Carlinaes, 1986: 70) In this way, the available
resources on foreign policy can be best utilized to produce a coherent, and above all,
scholarly study of foreign policy based on basic empirical (i.e. positivist) tools of
social science.
1.3. FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPTUALIZED AND MEASURED

The subject and the unit of analysis have now been defined for the limited purpose of our analysis. However, a relationship between the two needs to be established if we are to make it methodologically and theoretically valid. In other words, we need to define our meter upon which the analysed behaviour can be measured.

So far, many authors have outlined research of foreign policy along the same line of argumentation. According to Carlnaes (1986: 52-104) any foreign policy action is to be understood in the framework of three of its most distinct dimensions under presumption that foreign policy is a specific class of action; intentional (i.e. here intent should be understood in terms of purpose, which should not be narrowly understood as rational but as an action underlined by a motivation in its pursuit), dispositional (i.e. deriving from observing cognitive disposition in terms of values-context towards a particular intention) and situational (i.e. environmental factors not in terms of constraints of actor’s behaviour or a single acting but in its affect on the actor whether it be single individual or a groups of individuals acting as a body).

Rosenau (1971), the chief advocate in the behaviourist approach to the study of foreign policy similarly argued that at the core of of foreign policy analysis is a concern with sequences of interaction, perceptual or behavioural, which span national boundaries and which unfold in three basic stages. Whether it be initiatory, implementing and responsive behaviour, they encompass foreign policy as an independent, intervening and dependent variable, respectively, i.e. in all of its observable dimensions. (ibid.: 80-82)

In their conceptualising how foreign policy is actually observable in reality (as a sequence of interaction or a class of action) both Carlnaes (1986) and Rosenau (1971) go beyond what we have narrowly defined as our unit of analysis, i.e. foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, foreign policy will concentrate only on state’s manifested (re)actions as a consequence of the decision-making process or a reaction to activities, pressure, threat and any other stimuli stemming from the environment. Our analysis will be limited to observe actual behaviour and actions as manifested in obtained foreign policy documents and texts such as speeches, statements, positions, initiatives and (written) decisions by foreign policy makers, political executive, elites, bureaucracy, legislature and indirectly in reactions to internal (e.g. media, general public, interest groups, political opposition, civil
society) and external environment (e.g. foreign governments or public, IGOs). Since politicians tend to produce or (mis)use foreign policy texts for defending particular (e.g. party, interest, lobby groups) rather than interests as laid down in the political and legal foundations of a state, i.e. national interests, one should be careful in their use for purposes of scientific research. That is also one of the primary reasons why a meter must be drawn to measure observed behaviour of a certain foreign policy.

When a state is created, its political and legal foundations are laid down in constitution and legislation in all areas needed for its normal functioning, among them in the foreign policy area. Broadly speaking, this legal framework delimits not only the organization of the administration and the treaty-making process but also possibly the foreign policy strategy, that encompassed “some directional decisions, a plan of action, in our case of the state, that influences its long run performance“. (Svetličič, 1998: 6) What this strategy does for a state is more than enactment of internal consensus (or in case of the absence of such a strategy, might point to lack of thereof) on what are the long-term values and objectives to be defended by a state. It, furthermore, devises tactics in reference to different instruments (e.g. diplomacy, economic sanctions, military force) to be used in pursuance of long-term strategy goals that are usually hauled out of identified strategic options open to a state in its environment. By and large, we can say that the legal foundation, and above all the foreign policy strategy, presents the expected behaviour or successful result of thereof that the state has set for itself in the conduct of its foreign relations. If this standard is to be tested, however, we must look into the actual behaviour and conduct in the foreign policy of a certain state.

In our case, this will be done by identifying actions and behaviour through matching the set (legally or at least declaratory) foreign policy strategy with the actual behaviour of foreign policy decision-makers as observed during the NATO intervention in Kosovo. We will try to observe the actual behaviour of both states from the perspective of their foreign policy courses that were set before the intervention happened and by juxtaposing observed behaviour to the set foreign policy strategy, assess the influence the intervention had, or did not have, on the set foreign policy priorities. Our analysis, however, will not only try to measure the actual against the expected behaviour but will further try to identify which factors (material/objective vs. non-material/(inter)-subjective) primarily explain the behaviour and reactions in the given context (chapter 1.4.). Therefore, as the most
suitable theoretical framework for our reference will serve Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993) approach that looks into the role of ideas in foreign policy. While they methodologically stays within the positivist limits they go beyond traditional (e.g. realist and institutional liberalism) theoretical approaches, which minimized the role of non-material/(inter)subjective factors in foreign policy. As they, we believe that the only way the role of non-material/(inter)subjective factors in foreign policy can be validly explored is by using methodological tools based on positivist tenants in social science research. As we seek to find factors that prompted actual foreign policy behaviour that we will present, non-material/(inter)subjective factors, especially national identity and political culture, will be taken into account.

Furthermore, by using the comparative method the actual behaviour of the Czech Republic and Slovenia will be compared in order to enhance our ability to explain the reasons and factors that prompted such behaviour and to uncover contentious problems and limits that both states are facing in conduct of an independent foreign policy.

1.4. ANALYSIS OF FACTORS

Opening up the factor analysis in the present research feels like an endeavour similar to attempting to close the Pandora’s box once it has been opened. However, analysis of factors presents a rule rather then an exception in studying particular foreign policy. Our analysis of factors too, will build on already developed methodology and gathered evidence.

Skimming through some of most prominent names in foreign policy research around the world, while under different terms (e.g. factors, determinants, ingredients, attributes) they all basically describe and conceptualise the same, or similar, observable patterns determining the foreign policy behaviour (i.e. structured or individual) of a state. While James Rosenau (1971: 111) identified size, degree of economic development and political system, Drulák and Druláková (2000: 41-43) added national identity (also mentality or political culture) and geographical position

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6 In Science of international relations (Znanost o mednarodnih odnosih) Benko (1997: 229-233) devotes an extensive part of his chapter on foreign policy to the debate on the methodological and substantial distinction made in literature on foreign policy between factors and determinates. Based on his observation, we can conclude that while most authors use the term factor to denote intermediary and dynamical, the term determinant is used to address constant sources of influence on foreign policy behaviour of a state. Taking this into account we will be using the term factors in our research.
to the core factors affecting, limiting, or facilitating, the foreign policy behaviour of a state. Benko (1997: 233-238) went a step further in outlining several other factors under the heading of internal and external environment. Among the former are society with a territory and its structure as well as its historical development or historical memory, national integration, economic, cultural, health, civilisation, political and military determinants to name only a few. While for the latter type of state, situation, state behaviour, uniting and divisive elements, communication and symbol flow, significance of economic and political factors in international community, power of transitional processes and actors, role of international law as well as of international governmental (IGO) and non-governmental organisations (NGO) are to be of significant importance.

The presented conceptualisation is, as any other, although an abstraction in itself, a necessary precondition for a survey to be conducted in a systematic and valid way as well as to make reality graspable, understandable and conclusively explainable. Stemming from the fact that the phenomena of foreign policy is defined as a boundary, or bridging, as well as a linking activity between the ‘internal/inside’ and ‘external/outside’, delimiting factors that affect it can simply follow the same line of argumentation, i.e. external vs. internal factors. How one defines external/internal factors depends again on the approach one is taking towards understating and defining foreign policy. Here the subject, in most cases a state, is juxtaposed to the environment, or to other particular actors and entities in international relations outside of its realm that are observable and definable elements of reality. This ecological typology can be, however, complemented, or wholly replaced, by taking an epistemological approach as a parameter of distinction.

Distinction between material/objective and non-material/(inter)subjective factors has received its come back from a back-stage loft of ‘explanation of last resort’ (Lapid in Drušák, 2001a: 11; Pye in Hudson, 1997: 2), especially in regard to the latter element. As Benko (1997: 229) observed this distinction has already been used by classical authors such as Morgenthau himself. However, the evidence provided by the end of the Cold War as well as theoretical need to advance from ‘understanding’ to ‘explaining’ in the study of international relations and foreign policy in particular, have been two pivotal reasons that any valid research today in foreign policy can not brush aside the explanatory role of non-material/(inter)subjective factors (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 3-11; Drušák, 2001b: 11). But while this might be recognised as a
trend towards in-depth analysis and the subsequent possibility of greater theory-building, new problems have also emerged with it. Objective factors pertain to material, easily observable categories such as the physical, economic, political, military, technological and structural characteristics of a state. (Inter)subjective ones, however, pertain to factors that are socially constructed, e.g. ideas, beliefs and values, ideology and culture as well as identity (i.e. individual and national). While both are open to change and interpretation the (inter)subjective factors are harder to measure due to their discursive (denoted by ‘inter’ part of the name) and constructive (denoted by the ‘subjective’ part of the name) nature. However, since in its nexus they are bound to describe conceptions of the world by a state, or its polity, their study lies at the heart of understanding the shape and subtle motors of foreign policy behaviour of any state. As factors, they can influence foreign policy behaviour and outcomes as causes. (Parsons, 2002: 78-79)

However, more convincing is the approach taken by Goldstein and Keohane (1993), which tries to bridge the gap between foundational/traditional and anti-foundational/reflectivist theories. In their belief, “ideas matter, as a result of a system of interacting multiple causes of which they are part”. (ibid.: 29). Ideas in a narrower or non-material/(inter)subjective factors in broader sense then, should not be divorced from analysing influence of material/objective factors in any analysis of foreign policy, but both should be integrated and concentrated on how and not whether they matter. Rather then causes, they see ideas as conditions for reasoned discourse or switchboards, which influence foreign policy in at least three researched casual pathways, i.e. they can provide road maps that limit policy choices, help explain expected effects and determine the means and strategies, which will be used to reach desired goals. Second, ideas can act as focal points and glue, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations, in which there is no unique equilibrium (i.e. when decision based solely on interest and strategic interaction can lead to multiple results and choices). And last, ideas can influence change in existing norms and rules and

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7 Generally, ideas and in its narrower meaning culture are seen as an indirect explanatory factor affecting foreign policy through variables as such as geopolitical visions (Dijkink, 1996: 16); worldview, practical or casual beliefs (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 7-26) or as organisation of meaning, value preference or templates for human strategy (Hudson, 1997: 7-9). In short, as Hudson (ibid.) observes, for culture to be the “body talk of states” this can easily be the popular characteristic for other (inter)subjective factors. Ideology, further, has been divorced as a separate factor and put forward as a dependent explanatory variable of foreign policy behaviour rather than speaking of it when referring to mere nature, essence or an approach to foreign policy in its analysis as well as crowding it into general categories of ideas and belief systems. (Carlnaes, 1986: 4, 166-180)
“become embedded in political institutions, which have a lasting effect on political behaviour”. (ibid.: 8-24)

The purpose of our analysis, as has been laid out, is firstly to compare actual and expected behaviour of the Czech Republic and Slovenia during the NATO intervention in Kosovo. However, if we are to understand what actually prompted any behaviour that we will find, we need to look into this behaviour through an analysis of (material/objective vs. non-material/(inter)subjective) factors.8 Our basic premise will follow Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993) null hypothesis requirement that “actions described can be understood on the basis of egoistic interests in the context of power realities”. (ibid.: 26) We will expect that the influence of physical, economic, political, military, legal and structural factors can explain foreign policy behaviour. However, we will also incorporate ideas or more accurately political culture and national identity in our analysis. In doing so, we expect a more thorough, complete and valid factor-influences can be found for uncovered patterns of behaviour and consequently for explaining problems in political consensus in foreign policy in the Czech Republic and Slovenia.

In other words, by incorporating national identities and political culture, we expect to explain political behaviour and their outcomes during the time of NATO intervention more sufficiently. National identities and political culture are both reflected in three types of beliefs that Goldstein and Keohane (1993) identify: worldviews (that are most distinctively entwined in people’s conceptions of their identity), principled (normative ideas that translate fundamental doctrines into guidance for human action) and casual beliefs (about cause-effect relationships, which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognised elites). (ibid.: 7-11) But no matter in which capacity, especially the role of ideas as road maps will have played a pivotal role in the foreign policy behaviour of the Czech Republic and Slovenia.

As the pro-Western foreign policy orientation has been set as the top priority in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the NATO membership became its pro-Western priority in the realm of security. While this choice has been guided by set of strategic interest and power factors, it nevertheless served as confirmation and proof for both countries Western orientations in identities. In the wake of the intervention in Kosovo the choice of actions was naturally limited by their Western and NATO adherence.

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8 While Goldstein and Keohane (1993) used the term ideas we have covered this with a broader term of non-material/(inter)subjective factors.
This also limited expected effects and behaviour of Czech and Slovenian policy-makers, means that they used to show (or lack of) support for NATO policies and it helped to provide strategies that would soon also become embodied in political and legal foreign policy framework. While we will try to show a casual pathway impact of national identity (in substance) and political culture (in form) as road maps, we shall now first define them both.

Identity, especial at a national level, has been one of the most explored factors in regions where the re-emergence of nationalism has taken place (cf. Drulák, 2001b; Hansen, 1993; Pryzel, 1998) while the personal identity through the role conception of decision-makers in foreign policy realm has also been the object of extensive research (cf. Aggestam, 1999; Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Bloom, 1990; Parsons, 2002). By a positivist definition, national identity has been minimised and closely related to political culture, or mentality. As a scientific tool and political concept it has been understood as primordial, unchanging and residue variable. While in the post-modernist thought identity has been used as concept constructed through higher dialectical relationship between the nation and the other. (Pryzel, 1998; Drulák, 2001b)

This radical, i.e. constructivist perspective puts identity at the forefront as the driving factor, as it constructs, reproduces and maintains the political identity of a state (Campbell, 1998: 8) or “provides a psychological frame of reference in which to function”. (Pryzel, 1998: 2) However the constructivist conception seems to be attractive for empirical observation in new or newly-independent nations, its methodological problems will here prevent us in following the constructivist line of argumentation. Our research will be based only on particular observation made by Pryzel (1998) about the role of national identity in foreign policy formation of newly-independent states, i.e. that national identity is of “particular importance in newly emerging or re-emerging states since nationalism and national identity are often the main, if not the sole force binding these societies together”. (ibid.: 2) What Pryzel (1998) actually points out is valid for our case since both the Czech Republic and Slovenia became independent states only recently. With independence also came identification and definition of both societies and states place in the world. While foreign policy goals were identified quickly and reflected a pro-Western orientation of both states, it took some time till political consensus was reached on how to implement these goals. In this respect we are interested to explore how national
identity reflected in foreign policy behaviour of the Czech Republic and Slovenia at the time of the NATO intervention in Kosovo. We expect national identity to play a conclusive role in behaviour, since the intervention surfaced the basic foreign policy parameters, i.e. goals both states have set itself.

Finally, while authors have problems in agreeing on a single common definition of national identity, it will be here defined broadly as involving of “a growing sense among people that they belong naturally together, that they share common interest, a common history, and a common destiny. The search for an identity in this sense is a major political motive”. (Scruton, 1983: 230)\(^9\)

Academics in both countries (Bučar, 2001; Pehe, 1998, 1999) have also uncovered a close relationship between foreign and domestic politics and therefore, with political and social consensus on basic foreign policy goals and orientations. The only exemption seems to be in cases where their pursuance offers a pragmatic solution, which produces a win-win situation for all political parties. (Bučar, 2001: 149) These means that in absence of a consensus on foreign policy a situation might occur, where a state would be pursuing a foreign policy goal as in case a strategy for its pursuance would be in place, if there would actually be no political disagreement on the way implementation of the goal is being conducted. However, this pragmatic approach would never work in the long-run, since a win-lose situation for a political party would naturally occur in a pursuance of other foreign policy goals. That is why we will here be looking at the fact that the basic tenets of foreign policy in any state encompass a polity’s beliefs and core values that had been laid down on basis of a political consensus in its legal and political foundations and which it is prepared to defend by any (e.g. political, economic, military) means at it disposal.

Political culture is defined, be it in its broader or narrower sense, as a whole program of political behaviour that is externally manifested in actual behaviour as well as inner motives, believes and values.\(^10\) In other words, political culture encompasses all the images people have about politics. (Južnič, 1973: 192-93) While the concept itself has been the subject of many researches in political science since the 50s and 60s (cf. Almond, 1956; Verba, 1965; Holy, 1979; Widawsky, 1990 all in

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\(^9\) Not authoritative, however, the above definition fits into our theoretical and methodological approach taken from Goldstein and Keohane (1993).

\(^10\) Political culture is narrowly defined as subjective orientations of nations, social groups or individuals about politics, i.e. it is a system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values. (Verba in Kuper and Kuper, 1996: 626) Broadly, however, it also includes patterns of political behaviour, i.e. is the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located. (White in Kuper and Kuper, 1996: 626)
Kuper and Kuper, 1996) they have been mainly devoted to the question of possible changes in political culture in the context of communism that misleadingly offered such a possibility. These researches tried to uncover actual factors that influence and shape political culture, never doubting the fact that political culture itself is one of the main explanatory factors behind explaining actual political behaviour. Since available research does not appear to be making a distinction between influences on domestic and foreign policy, we will presume that the established and manifested patterns of political culture influence foreign policy identically or similarly as domestic policy. Noted should be also the fact that motives and causes of perpetual behaviour are derived primarily out of attitudes of a polity or individuals toward the outside world. However, since we will be able to observe only manifested patterns of behaviour these facts will not prevent us from translating and using already discovered patterns of political behaviour in the domestic in the foreign policy area.

1.5. CONTENTIOUS PROBLEMS AND NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON FOREIGN POLICY

As we will try to show how both the Czech Republic and Slovenia have acted in the context of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in reference to their set political and legal framework, we will also try to demonstrate the greatest contentious problem both foreign policies were dealing with at that time, i.e. problem of consensus on foreign policy. Generally, independence in both countries was naturally marked with political visions about foreign policy goals, however, their definition and legal foundation was lacking. There was little cost and benefit debate and strategic planning about the generally professed goals, i.e. integration in Western security, political and economic structures.

While it is true also that both foreign policies are burdened with a set of country-specific problems, we can nevertheless find similarities in some of the profound contentious problems both are still facing. Bučar (2001: 148) systematically outlined three basic segments of problems in Slovenian foreign policy, namely: conceptual-strategic (planning), organizational-technical (implementation) and political-personnel. A set of identical problems can be identified for the Czech Republic.

The conceptual-strategic problems are seen in the area of planning foreign policy. Both states needed quite a considerable amount of time to adopt legally framed
foreign policy strategies. The most important reason for this being the existing low consensus among political parties on the national interest and values to be defined and defended. But while these strategies have been adopted with a considerable amount of energy, they still lack implementation because an illusion is being kept, where foreign policy strategy is expected to produce a domestic consensus, while this process, in reality, should be vice versa. (ibid.: 149) Again, a similar low domestic consensus is observed in the Czech Republic, where foreign policy issues tend to be used in domestic politics similarly as in Slovenia (e.g. the case of the Temelin nuclear power plant and relations with Austria and Krško in connection to relations with Croatia). Furthermore, lacking consensus enables political parties to conduct their particular foreign policies and internationalise domestic dissent or opposition to the foreign policy course the Government is taking. The relationship between domestic (foreign policy) consensus and foreign policy strategy is therefore dialectical.

Secondly, the foreign policy pillars in both countries, i.e. the President, the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), often tend to be ‘speaking different languages’, act in an uncoordinated manner and therefore, give out often different and confusing signals. Additionally, in the Czech Republic this situation has further been complicated with the 1996 parliamentary elections, when a fourth foreign policy center was added to the already three existing ones, namely, the Speaker of the House. (Pehe, 1998: 63) Furthermore, in both countries too, the constitutional framework on the division of labour in the foreign policy area and personal philosophies of incumbents profoundly influencing the course of policies where foreign policy consensus is low, can be two further reasons for adding to the confusing situation. Also similar is the role the MoFA has been unsuccessful in establishing in both countries in the conduct of foreign affairs, since both are hindered by lack of professionalism, co-ordination with other domestic actors in foreign policy and personnel problems.

This last also points to the third segment of identified problems that many authors point to (e.g. Bučar: 2001; Pehe: 1998, 1999), i.e. the tendency to politicise state

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11 The Czech Parliament legally laid foreign policy foundations in on 9 June 1999, when the Parliament approved The Conceptual Basis of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic (Koncepce zahraniční politiky Česke Republike), while the Slovenian Parliament formally adopted its first foreign policy strategy related document with The Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (Deklaracija o zunanji politiki Republike Slovenije,) on 17 December 1999. Interestingly enough, both were approved during and adopted only a short time after the NATO intervention.
administration in foreign policy as is the case in other areas of administration and due
to known patterns of political culture in smaller societies where conflicts tend to be
personalized. This hinders or practically disables its solution.

Finally, both Bučar (2001) and Pehe (1998, 1999) point to special importance of
domestic consensus in foreign policy of small states, such as the Czech Republic and
Slovenia. This assumption derives from the basic fact that small states have limited
options and resources at their disposal on which means they can rely on and should,
therefore, base their conduct of foreign policy on a wide consensus within the society.
(Benko, 1992: 8) Since the resources of smaller states are naturally smaller, they are
usually only able to concentrate on defending and implementing core values and the
national interests such as security, the well-being of the state and its citizens as well as
the preservation of national identity. Therefore, the foreign policy of such states
should not be led astray by a lack of consensus or if this exists, by sheer (party)
pragmatism. And as Benko (1992) concludes, if this last can work for a state in the
short-term, it surely will bring considerable problems in the future, where the lack of
consensus will hinder the conduct of an effective and viable foreign policy.

1.6. LIMITS OF SCOPE AND SUBSTANCE

Now that the case has been made to validate the subject and the context of
observation let as now proceed with setting the framework, i.e. the limits of this work.
The study has been limited in space and time to compare the foreign policy behaviour
of only two states in a relatively short period of time. The time-frame has been set to
the period between January and July 1999, although a brief analysis of the roots and
dynamics of the conflict will be outlined in chapter two. In this interval the conflict
climaxed from a political into a direct military confrontation started on 24 March
1999 by NATO Operation Allied Force and ended with the signing of the Military
Technical Agreement (also know as the Kumanovo Agreement) and the withdrawal
of Serbian forces from the territory of Kosovo thereafter.

As to the methodological limits, qualitative comparison of official statements,
newspaper articles etc. will be based on comparing identical levels (e.g.
governmental, presidential, parliamentary) and time-frame in both countries.
Quantitative comparison will only be made, if methodological preconditions will so
allow (e.g. same pattern, approx. same date, similarity of issues or questions posed).
Finally, the reader should observe the theoretical limits due to the socially constructed rather than pre-given nature of the analysed factors involved.
2. THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND NATO INTERVENTION

The Kosovo crisis leading to the NATO military intervention has been one of the most thoroughly analyzed and disputed subjects among the scholars of international relations (e.g. Chomsky, 1999; Fromkin, 1999; Ignatieff, 2000; Kissinger, 1999; Mertus, 2000; Posen, 2000; Schnabel & Thakur, 2000; Schwartz, 2000). Its consequences bare a profound mark in world politics and a sui generis case in international law has been created in Kosovo. Today, United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) heads the international civil administration and Kosovo Forces (KFOR) guarantee and protect security of the Kosovo population and its borders. However, we will refrain ourselves here from going deeper into historical reasons for the conflict, its implications and consequences of the intervention itself. We will limit ourselves only to outlining most important developments, i.e. the external context in which we will observe foreign policy behaviour of the Czech Republic and Slovenia.

The international community itself was obviously ill equipped to stand unchallenged to the ‘Kosovo test’, however, its demands and interest ultimately prevailed over the nationalist-driven policy of Milošević in Kosovo. The Czech Republic and Slovenia were, as we will see, neither clear policy-makers nor only policy-takers in their pro-Western oriented foreign policy on this particular issue. Nevertheless, before moving to a final observation of their behaviour we will delimit three phases that will encompass their behaviour observed in the course of our analysis. The author has drawn a delineation of these phases arbitrary with the purpose to clearly and in a most systematic manner explore (re)actions and behaviour by both countries during the crisis and the intervention without jeopardizing the understanding of the sequence of events that actually took place. The time frame will range from the culmination of the Kosovo crisis and diplomatic efforts to end the conflict, through to its peak with the launching of the NATO air campaign and its resolution that led to the end of fighting and international administration and military presence in Kosovo.
2.1. THE CULMINATION OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO END THE CONFLICT

The diplomatic effort to bring about a political and peaceful solution to the mounted fighting in Kosovo started in late February and early March 1998, a year before the intervention. Excessive accumulation of Serbian military forces and indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population finally brought the international community together to condemn the excessive use of force against civilians with the Security Council (SC) Resolution 1160 on 31 March. The internationalisation of the Kosovo crisis in 1998 produced, however, weak results. The embargo on arms and material against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) with the SC Resolution 1160 did not achieve its goal of ending the military fighting on the ground. The Contact Group for the former Yugoslavia (the US, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) as well as special envoys Richard Holbrooke (for the US) and Wolfgang Petrisch (for the EU) meeting in different capacities throughout the spring and summer could only push the Albanian side and Milošević to sit at the same negotiating table but with no effective impact on the ground. After the Yeltsin-Milošević meeting on 6 June the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) was launched under US-Russian auspices. The Mission did present an international presence that took note of widespread violations of human rights but could not effectively bring it to a halt. Only smaller improvements of the situation and the imminent danger of a humanitarian catastrophe in the coming winter led to the further stepping up of pressure.

The diplomatic effort proceeded in its second phase in autumn, backed formally on 23 September by SC Resolution 1199. The Resolution called for “additional measures” to be taken “to restore peace and stability in the region” in case of continued fighting. NATO provided a deterrent factor on 13 October, for the first time approving possible air strikes on the FRY in case of non-compliance. The US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke on behalf of the Contact Group and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević again reached an agreement, based on the demands in

14 Ibid.
Resolution 1199 and under the NATO threat. The Holbrooke- Milošević agreed on a pull back of FRY security forces, allow access to aid groups, and this time accept the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), a team of 2000 civilian observers who would monitor the enforcement of the agreement. Although there came to a partial withdrawal of FRY forces, both the FRY authorities and the armed Kosovo elements (i.e. Kosovo Liberation Army – KLA (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës)) failed to fully comply with the demands of the SC resolutions (e.g. 1160, 1199) and the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement.15

Extensive fighting continued through the winter into the year of 1999. The US and its allies were running out of patience as well as alternatives to diplomatic sources for a resolution of the conflict. The time was nearing when the threat would have to be met with the use of force in order to restore the credibility of NATO and its leading country the US. (Schnabel and Thakur, 2000) The cries of outrage over the Račak massacre at the obvious systematic and gross brutality and the violation of human rights brought about the realisation in the international community as well as preparing the world for the first military intervention in NATO’s history that would be conducted on moral grounds. The reaction to Račak points most clearly to the issues that were raised as the reasons for the following intervention, i.e. gross and systematic abuse and violation of human rights, charges of ethnic cleansing and genocide, violations of the rules of war.16 They further point out to the fact that the massacre was a clear result of the failure on the part of the international community to prevent and once again successfully bring about an end to another Balkan conflict. A final push for a diplomatic solution at the peace talks that started in the Chateau Rambouillet in France on 6 February 1999 cornered all sides17; Milošević in failing to cede to demands was to meet military punishment for his non-compliance by NATO that was reluctant to use it, but unable to withdraw from its position without a consequential damage to its credibility. The Albanians, finally signing an agreement not to their full liking, were mostly to profit from the materialisation of the threat.18 The obvious failure of the talks led just to that.

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
2.2. THE NATO MILITARY INTERVENTION

The military phase itself started on 24 March with the NATO-led air-campaign hitting military targets in FRY. In the following two weeks the action was intensified with no sign of surrender. The military calculation of NATO strategists was on the side of a short, high altitude bombing with low human casualties. Political calculations too, were based on a sweeping action providing fast results that the public would embrace victoriously, while a pessimistic scenario was feared and not really counted on. (Isbister, 2000) Both calculations were soon to be proven miscalculated and premature as in the first weeks of the campaign the only results were the deepening humanitarian catastrophe and further destabilisation of neighbouring Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FRYOM) and Albania. NATO strategy in phasing the operation on non-military targets at beginning of April brought dissenting voices into the heated debate and sympathies with the Serbs. (Schnabel and Thakur, 2000)

On the eve of marking the NATO’s 50th birthday (15 April) officially denied, but in informal consultations vigorously thought, was the possibility of a military ground operation if Milošević was not to give into the NATO five-point demand list soon. Diplomatic efforts were again stepped up in order to delay serious consideration of a ground operation that would demand higher human and material costs than the NATO members were at that time prepared to concede to. (ibid.) At that stage, diplomacy again offered a more legitimate and plausible means for implementing NATO military goals. For this purpose, Russian involvement through Viktor Chernomyrdin, a special envoy of President Yeltsin, after direct communication with Miloševic was broken off was especially valuable. This was also done with consideration for sensitivity of NATO engagement in the CEE and SEE in the Russian Federation.¹⁹ The G-8 Foreign Ministers further adopted a serious of general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis at a meeting held in Petersburg on 6 May 1999, which served as the minimum benchmark that FRY would have to accept in order to stop NATO bombing. By the end of May obvious signs were given that it was only a matter of time before the Yugoslav leadership and JA (Jugoslovenska armija-Yugoslav army)

¹⁹At that time Russia was preparing itself for parliamentary elections and the opposition, the president and a few of the republic’s leaders saw in this an opportunity to take votes from a successful government led under Jevgenij Primakov (Soukup, 1999: 29).Also Levitin, 2000: 136-7 and The Kosovo Report (2000). Independent International Commission on Kosovo, October.
forces would yield to these demands. The joint EU-Russian effort (Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin), backed by US, brought a face-saving agreement for Milošević on the withdrawal of Serbian military forces from Kosovo and handing over Kosovo to NATO led KFOR forces and later to be administered by an international authority under the UN auspices. 20

2.3. THE END OF NATO INTERVENTION AND RESOLUTION OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS

The third and the last phase of the resolution of the crisis and a plan to build a peaceful future in Kosovo started immediately after the pullout. The Military Technical Agreement signed between Serbian and NATO military officials on 9 June enabled the suspension of air-strikes, the adoption of the SC Resolution 1244 and the drafting of a G8 plan for economic reconstruction of Kosovo at a meeting in Cologne on 10 June. The initial surprise of a quick Russian army entry in Kosovo was a face-saving operation for the waning complacent military establishment in Russia and the ultimate beginning of the fall of Milošević. 21 Albanian retaliation, however, could not be stopped and remaining Serbs and other non-Albanian ethnic groups (e.g. Roma, Bosniacs, Gorans), accused of collaborating with the Serbs, evacuated together with the Serbian forces. 22 This demonstrated just how costly reaching a stable peace in the province would be.

Russia proved to be a nutcracker for diplomats of high stature such as US State Secretary Albright herself, insisting on cutting-up Kosovo in sectors as were defeated Germany and Austria after the WWII, as this would de facto mean confirmation of its old Cold War glory and the strategic counterbalance of Russia in the region. On 18 June, the Russians finally gave into the establishment of international security forces under unifies NATO lead command in the Helsinki Agreement. 23

These three phases highlight the main events around the Kosovo crisis and NATO intervention. The diplomatic efforts failed to prevent atrocities such as the Račak

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21 As Levitin (2000) observed, the race to seize the Pristina airport by Russian forces was an example of the lack of co-ordination between MoFA and the general staff, and also of the increased access by the military to the decision-making in foreign affairs. However, “the seizure could not be followed by any serious Russian military build-up”. (ibid.: 138)
23 Chronology of Events, Official site of KFOR.
massacre in January 1999 and bring about a political solution to Kosovo. The military effort that for the first time in NATO’s history used its advanced military technology without a single human loss in combat on solely moral grounds, challenged its changing role in the new world as well as bringing an end to Milošević’s widespread policy of violation of human rights of the Albanian population in Kosovo. And finally, the resolution of the crisis brought Serbian military defeat on the ground and part of its territory, i.e. Kosovo under international authority of the UN and the KFOR, which were to prepare the way for a democratic and stable future as outlined in the SC Resolution 1244. We have seen that the main actors involved, i.e. NATO members, countries in the region directly involved or affected by the conflict, and the members of the SC had different motives and (lack) of interest in seeing, solving and acting upon the Kosovo crisis. In the next two coming chapters we shall ask ourselves what were then the motives of the Czech and Slovenian foreign policy behaviour during these three phases?
3. THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO

At the time of the height of the international diplomatic effort to bring about an end to the Kosovo crisis, the Czech Republic was in full preparation for its historic accession to NATO. After a short period of advocating the Pan-European project, made operational through the stabilization of the Dienstbier plan\textsuperscript{24}, NATO membership had been set as a major cornerstone of its national security and foreign policy as early as 1993. With the invitation extended to join NATO at the 1997 Madrid Summit, it naturally turned into its first priority. (Khol, 2000: 53; Riishoj, 1998: 16-17) With the Social Democrat Government taking over the steering wheel of the country in July 1998, a comprehensive foreign policy strategy, i.e. The conceptual basis of the foreign policy of the Czech Republic, was submitted to the Parliament that clearly specified long- and short-term objectives and the means to be pursued in its realisation. In short, the document continued the Western course of the preceding center-right government, i.e. integration and an as soon as possible entry into NATO and EU, while returning to the importance of regional presence that Klaus’ Government thoroughly neglected. The Balkans, however, remained of peripheral importance.

As a part of a swift transition to full membership, the Czech Republic had been \textit{de facto} involved in daily consultations and decision-making in NATO through its representative Karel Kovanda. He was present at decision taking and informed about a possible military intervention in FRY and its obligations deriving there from at least from January 1999 on.\textsuperscript{25} And although the issue NATO was tackling with was politically and legally tenuous, the Czech actions and behaviour during the intervention based on the mentioned political and legal framework would be expected to strongly and clearly support NATO policy. It would also be expected to show preparedness to share its burden as a sign of commitment, solidarity and credibility of

\textsuperscript{24} The Pan-European project marked the first phase of at that time still Czechoslovak foreign policy. Its primary goal was aimed at building and connecting the West and the East equally. The idea was translated into a plan, named after the Czechoslovak foreign minister Jiří Dienstbier that envisioned economic and political stabilisation and consolidation in CEE and in the Community of Independent States. However, the leading Western countries failed to support this plan and soon after the dissolution of the ČSFR, the then independent Czech foreign policy moved into its second, Western-oriented phase. (Riishoj, 1998: 16-18)

its membership in NATO. The Kosovo test, however, proved to be a real credibility challenge for its professed Western – coursed foreign policy.

3.1. PAST ENGAGEMENT IN THE BALKANS

Traditionally, the Czechs nurtured great respect and sympathies for Tito’s Yugoslavia as it allegedly stood up courageously to Russian hegemony in 1948 in CEE and at the stifling of the Prague Spring in 1968. Its beautiful coast of “thousand islands” provided them with a place of summer retreat and possibly, a window of escape to freedom in the West. In brief, the SFRY was the nearest approximation of the political, economic and social living conditions they aspired for before the final fall of communism. The raging Balkan wars in 1990s, however, shattered the idealized picture about the South-Slavic nations living brotherly in a socialist paradise on earth.26

The center-right Government under the steering of Vaclav Klaus in power from June 1992 to November 1997 built its foreign policy on an ideology of Czech exceptionalism and superiority to all of its neighbours to the East and South alike; thus to the irritation of Western leaders going as far as to imply that the West should join the Czech Republic and not vice versa. (Vachudová, 1999: 24) In its political pragmatism and free market ideology serving primarily to its domestic public, regional engagement and co-operation in CEE as well as in the Balkans was seen as something undesirable and artificial. Something, which in fact the West was trying to foist on Prague in order to keep it out of the West. (Blank in Kinsky, 1996: 6) Exceptionally, a plausible cause for Czech engagement in the region, especially in the Balkans, was made if it served to further its broader goal of “returning to Europe”, marked by raising its chances for an as early as possible entry into its most significant security, political and economic institutions, i.e. NATO and EU. Namely, in 1995 a 850-man mechanical battalion was dispatched to join the Implementation/ Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia. Shortly thereafter, transit of NATO and other foreign troops across the Czech Republic was approved. While demonstrating its commitment not to isolate itself from regional trouble-spot engagement, the primary task of Czech participation in peacekeeping missions on the territory of

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26 Interview with Petr Drulák, Deputy Director and Filip Tesář, Researcher at the Institute of International Relations and former employee in the Department on Former Yugoslavia in the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2002.
former Yugoslavia has been to gain experience of day-to-day work with the NATO partners it was striving to join. (Khol, 2000: 43)

In The conceptual basis of the foreign policy of the Czech Republic the policy and interests in the Balkans were defined only in terms of universal values the Czech Republic would support (e.g. human rights, democracy) and its broader regional engagement in the UN, or NATO-led peacekeeping operations as well as participation in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its diplomatic and verification missions in the region. However, the doors were not fully closed to a possible deeper involvement building on the past amicable relations between ex-federations of Czechoslovakia and the SFRY that had not materialised thus far. (Tesař, 2001: 20)

3.2. THE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE KOSOVO CRISIS

The Western strong condemnation of the massacre that took place in the village of Račak on 15 January 1999, although condemning it, was not supplemented by a correspondingly sturdy position of the Czech Government towards the Serbian policy of widespread attacks on the civilian population leading to disappearances, ill-treatment, forced expulsion from the territory or arbitrary killings. The statement of MoFA issued in condemnation of this attack on 18 January, used very vague language that did not in any way point its finger at the responsibility of Serbian authorities for these hideous crimes (as did i.e. the head of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) William Walker and other Western diplomats27).28 Interestingly enough, since the Czech Republic itself had a considerable presence in the KVM mission on the ground.29 However, the Government did signal its readiness to support and take part in any joint initiative by the international community (e.g. the Contac Group, the EU common position) and therefore confirm its policy alignment with the states and institutions it was striving to join. Since at that time the issue was naturally of low-importance to the Czech foreign policy preoccupations Zeman’s Czech Social

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27 This American diplomat was declared persona non grata by the FRY authorities because of condemning the massacre and accusing Serbian forces outrightly for the crime. Under pressure, however, the FRY authorities reconsidered and suspended its decision. (Serbs snub massacre probe (1999). BBC, 19 January.


Democratic Party (ČSSD - Česká Strana Sociálne Demokratická) Government as Riishoj (1998) observed followed the path of a policy-taker and bandwagoning with the West. Other official statements as it will be shown also indicated that the Government saw possible Czech involvement in the crisis solving only reluctantly; if this would be demanded as its duty in NATO. Factors prompting these are not only the government’s weak position but also an impression that the former Balkan political engagement and foreign policy climate produced a paradox in its perception of the Serb-Albanian conflict. This was communicated mostly through the media as geographically remote and at the same time psychologically close to the Czech politicians. Similarly, as with the other Balkan conflicts in 1990s, the consequences of the ongoing conflict were not directly felt in Czech politics or daily life. But when the issue appeared on the political agenda politicians and commentators in the media would raise the described brotherhood and amicability among the Slavs would be raised. The definition of Slav brothers, however, became defused and blurred into a mythical historical friendship with the collapse of the SFRY. Actual (personal) relations might have only persisted at the level of members of the ex-communist nomenclature then mostly within ČSSD and KSČM. For the general public, confused after the ensuing of ‘barbaric’ wars, the territory of ex-Yugoslavia became what one would call “the unknown other” in the Czech mind, with the exception of Croatia (due to economic relations, especially tourism) and Slovenia (due to political and economic co-operation through Central European Initiative (CEI), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)).

The vagueness and neutral stance of the minority center-left Government towards Milošević’s policy in Kosovo was also due to its weak position and maneuvering space, which emerged after the general elections in June 1998. The ČSSD winning by a small margin signed a minority Government agreement with the Civil Democratic

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30 While the school of adaptation follows classical lines of dividing states into policy-makers/policy-taker or regime-makers/regime-taker (Riishoj, 1998), a more developed classification of adaptation specific for small socio-economically strong states was made by Martin Kelstrup (in Riishoj (1998)), among them policy of bandwagoning, defined as the one in which small state, in order to seek protection and avoid conflict, aligns itself with a big state, thus supporting this state and (maybe) profiting from this support. In our case, it is obvious that the Czech Republic was not aligning with a particular state, except maybe the US, but with two Western institutions that it was trying to join, i.e. NATO and EU.

31 Interview with Petr Drulák, Deputy Director and Filip Tesař, Researcher at the Institute of International Relations and former employee in the Department on Former Yugoslavia in the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2002.


33 Interview with Filip Tesař, February 2002.
Party (ODS - Občanská Demokратická Strana) and took power after the seven years long reign of Klaus’ right-wing government. Secondly, the Social Democrats were left with implementing policies of Klaus’ Government that were not of their making and would presumably have been formulated differently due to its different political portfolio (e.g. less pro-West and conservative Thatcherism and a more engaged policy of regional co-operation and the social state). There was, however, some similarity and continuity with the Klaus’ Government as they both heavily depended on the existing domestic situation and derived at their foreign policy from a purely ruling party’s platform. (Pehe, 1998: 62) Lack of stronger anti-Western and the mentioned existing pro-Serb sentiments within its electorate and among ČSSD rank and file could also have been of significant importance.

Among the foreign policy voices most articulated and engaged was the humanist President and former dissident play-writer, Vaclav Havel. He engaged himself in the diplomatic efforts personally and tried to draw Czech and world attention to the crisis from its beginning. In an interview on 30 January for the Czech daily Právo he drew broader consequences from the crisis and envisaged the emergence of a new era where the human rights of individual(s) would reign over the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of a state as one of the basic principles of international law.34

His political rival, Vaclav Klaus, Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament and the President of the largest opposition party ODS known for his dubious and pragmatic politics, showed his face outright in the case of Račak massacre and hinted at what his future position in case of a military intervention would be. While he steadfastly condemned it at a conference in Istanbul as the Vice-President of the European Democratic Union, he oddly enough went on to criticize Western policy towards Serbia in a meeting at the FRY embassy in Prague on 24 January.35

Other opinions of prominent Czech political figures were reflecting ambiguity and an incoherent policy towards the Kosovo crisis, which did not show any real interest in meddling in the conflict and therefore, also did not want to be engaged in operations that could bring human of financial burdens to the country. Such insights prompted the case of the discussion of possible Czech participation in NATO

manoeuvres in the region before the actual military campaign took place. While Michael Žantovsky (ODA-Civil Democratic Alliance), the President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, openly expressed his personal disapproval, Vladimir Vetchy, the Defense Minister, did not exclude the possibility of considering such participation at the annual Munich conference on security, if NATO would so request.\textsuperscript{36} In this rhetorical “battle” among politicians about participation of Czech forces, however, none of them except for the Foreign Minister Jan Kavan himself ever actually clarified whether they were referring to direct military or only peace-keeping participation.\textsuperscript{37} Even after the failed Rambouillet peace talks, when it was obvious that the NATO military intervention was only a matter of time, no action to clarify this position was taken.

With no effective constitutional mechanism in place, apart from normal consultations to ensure that all three centers of foreign policy would speak the same language and in a co-ordinated manner generally (Pehe, 1998: 63), the Czech foreign policy articulation at the diplomatic stage of solving the Kosovo crisis was determined by a similar lack of a comprehensive policy towards the turbulent region. It can be said that it had been thoroughly marked by its need to accord it with its general pro-Western oriented policies, i.e. to support existing initiatives put forward by its strategic partners and grant if only minimal preparedness to use necessary means to implement it. The rhetorical commitment in this initial phase put against the later actual behaviour of decision-makers, however, displayed lack of a clearer definition of identified interest and the necessary burden sharing within the NATO.


\textsuperscript{37} At a press conference on 19 February Foreign Minister Jan Kavan declared that the Czech Republic would provide and therefore take part in the international forces for Kosovo that were discussed at the international level with the technical and support effort, namely, a field hospital to be situated on the territory of the FYROM. (Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky Unor 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic February 1999), 19 February.
3.3. NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO

After being a member of NATO for less than two weeks, the country stood before a real test as the organization unanimously launched military attacks against FRY.38 As we have seen there had been little discussion on the part of the Government of a possible Czech participation in international forces in event of an agreement between the Yugoslav authorities and representatives of the Kosovo Albanians could be reached before the actual strikes began on the eve of 24 March. Though, the Senate had on 10 March approved the sending of a field hospital and technical air support.39 The Parliament gave its approval, however, only on 24 March after a heated and controversial parliamentary debate, meeting with fierce opposition from the Communists (officially called Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia - Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy - KSČM).

The issue sparked an outright debate not only on the intervention and role the Czech Republic should play in it but also as it turned out, into a debate on NATO itself. The majority of the representatives in Parliament, except for the KSČM, managed to consolidate and expressed collective support for NATO policy towards the FRY, terming the attacks as "appropriate and necessary for the credibility of the Alliance".40 The dissenting opinion of the Communists, opposing Czech membership in NATO and having strong sentiments for the old Serbian Communist nomenclatura could have been expected. But in the case of Klaus´ opposition, not only the larger public but his electorate and party colleagues themselves were caught by surprise when, the up until then strongly pro-Western oriented leader, had turned wholly anti-NATO in a single night.41 His ‘disappointing’ stance was not of one-day-making (and as we have observed, could have been anticipated from his cordial sentiments towards the Serbs and Yugoslavia in the preceding months) that in days to come escalated into


41 He previously extended support to the Government of the FRY, but up until the intervention he has never connected it with attack on Western or NATO policies. (Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999). Zahraniční politika České Republiky leden 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic January 1999), 24 January.
a clear condemnation of Western policies and actions taken in Kosovo (e.g. he accused NATO of provoking the humanitarian catastrophe and going as far as to accuse the US in securing bombing of FRY in order to try out its newest military technology).42

More anticipated was the statement issued by the President, in which he confirmed the Czech support for the attack as a responsible member of the Alliance. He went on to repeat the position of NATO that the attacks were not directed towards the Serbian people but its leader Slobodan Milošević and that due to his unacceptable position and violations of human rights he left the international community no choice but to resort to the use of force.43 The two most prominent voices of the Senate (vice-President of the Senate Petr Pithart, Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU – ČSL - Krestansko-Demokratická Unie-Československá Stran Lidová) and Michael Žantovsky (ODA) joined the President’s support. The leadership of these two minor parliamentary parties, along with the Freedom Union (US - Unie Svobody) together representing the liberal political camp, were also the only ones to give a clear guiding light to its electorate. They derived position from their deeper liberal policy program and the view that the Government’s credibility as well as that of the country was on the line.44

In a most surprisingly short and mild statement, the Government expressed its support and solidarity as one of the members of NATO, but still stressing ”the preference for diplomatic means in settling the crisis” as well as “seeing the use of force as means to prevent further escalation of the Kosovo crisis and humanitarian catastrophe”.45 Furthermore, it was clearly stressed that ”the decision on the use of military means was made before the Czech Republic was admitted to NATO as its member”46, trying to distant itself from its responsibility as a full member and reconciling its different view on the issue. Five days later, it was forced to admit

43 Prohlášení prezidenta republiky Vaclava Havla k utokom NATO na Jugoslavii (Declaration of the President of the Republic Vaclav Havel on the NATO attacks on Yugoslavia) (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky březen 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic March 1999), 25 March.
46 Ibid.
under external pressure that it had indeed given its go-ahead for the beginning of the operation in the NATO Council. As Vachudová (1999) observed, “it [the Government] had apparently felt compelled to cover up its assent for fear of loosing public support”. (ibid.: 29) Indeed, the public was disappointed at the lack of leadership by the political elite. Except for the President and leaders of minor democratic parties (ODA, KDU - ČSL, US), their reactions were varying on a scale from feeling uncomfortable to openly opposing the intervention. Interestingly enough, their statements reflected many sentiments and themes that historically haunted the Czech mind (e.g. Western betrayal of Czechs and a clear history of an appeasement policy with dictators, the experience of two painful occupations by Germans and Russians as well as the experience with where the political demands of a minority can lead too (Sudeten Germans) rather than defending national interests and the country’s credibility within NATO). Lastly, we should not forget the negative reputation the Albanian community has in the Czech Republic since its members are very often know as members of organized crime groups.

While the Czech politicians could have dragged their feet on the issue before joining NATO, after the official joining the eyes of other members were clearly set on testing how the newcomers, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland would behave. The first signals from the Czech Republic were mixed. The Government taking a very vague position when the action was launched and denying its involvement in any way. Klaus’ pro-Western voice so far, only second to that of the President’s, expressing his outrage and the accusation that not Miloševič but NATO policy had led to the humanitarian catastrophe and violations of human rights, added to initial confusing signals. While domestically, political and public dissent and critique of the government’s handling of the crisis can be justified and could have possibly forced it to clarify and define Czech interests, if only to show its commitment to NATO, it failed to do so. The inconsistency and crossfire among the Czech politicians continued and the variation of opinions on policy course persisted throughout the intervention in failing to galvanize broader political and public consensus. The political elite clearly lacking a tradition of leading public opinion in times of crisis rather then following it, further failed to properly justify and let itself and the wider public be caught up in a debate of irrational historical sentiments without being addressed by factual assessment and the changed international reality.
There were several attempts to consolidate a common position on the issue, but were mainly unsuccessful, since they failed to define clear objectives and interests in the intervention and Kosovo. As one of the first domestic critics, it was the President who accused the Czech politicians of behaving in "isolationistic manner, which could in the long-term create extremely dangerous sentiments in the society"\(^{47}\), pointing his finger at the Communists as well as at Vaclav Klaus, his primary political rival. The latter defended his position and also put forward an array of interesting arguments that revealed the multitude of questions the intervention opened. In the first among a series of articles, he observed that “there were no Czech national interests involved in the Balkans and that support was derived from a feeling of Švejk - like courage that grew out of a few-days membership in NATO”.\(^{48}\) He warned that Czechs should be better pupils of history and reminded them about the Czech past inability to decide as to the time of the Warsaw Pact, when there was no possibility of having many loyalties. Lastly, as for the war, in his opinion it is neither in the Czech national interests neither it is a battle between Communism and freedom.\(^{49}\) Although populist, his rhetoric demonstrated that the Kosovo issue was not only a test of credibility to NATO but that it also touched on the problem of lacking clearer definition of national interest (if any) in the Balkans.

During the first week of the air campaign, most prominent members of the ruling ČSSD made several public statements that added to the mixed signals the Government was giving as a junior-member of NATO. On 26 March two members of the ruling ČSSD Miloš Koužvart, Minister for Environmental Protection and Petr Smutny, a Senator, went the farthest, by openly demanding that the attacks cease immediately. The same statement tried stressing, however, that there seem to be only some reservations on the part of ČSSD and that most of the politicians accepted the attacks with understanding and hoped that the use of force would bring Belgrade to the signing of the peace agreement on Kosovo.\(^{50}\)

The diversity and controversy of opinions in the Government and ruling party was to some extent cleared by the statement issue on 30 March, in which Jan Kavan, the Foreign Minister explained that the Government did not take a vote giving its consent

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49 Ibid.

to the NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. In Kavan’s opinion, it was at that time unnecessary to consult with other cabinet members.\footnote{Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky březen 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic March 1999), 26 March.} Further statements and opinions from the MoFA show that during the first week of the campaign the Ministry worked on lowering the dissenting tones in public opinion and among individual politicians and factions within the ruling party.\footnote{For example see Statement by Pavel Rychrtsky on the work of the Governmental Legislative Council (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky březen 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic March 1999), 25 March.} After the go-ahead given by the Government, it had to act primarily as a “defender” of Government’s policy against the domestic criticism instead of being able to carry out its primary task of co-ordinating actions of foreign policy actors and serving as a primary mediator between the home Government and its allies. However, in an interview on 26 March for daily Slovo Radim Palouš, the Deputy Foreign Minister, when taking about ethnic cleansing, stated that "I would be cautious, when referring to the conduct of the Serbs towards Albanians"\footnote{Koukal, Josef (1999) Akce v Kosovo musí byt dovedena do konce (Action must be brought to an end) Interview with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Radim Palouš, Slovo, 26 March.}, confirming that fact, that the Government did not want to take sides in the conflict or wished to be neutral as “the Czech Republic has always had a tradition of friendly relations with the Serb nation”\footnote{Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky duben 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic April 1999), 1 April.}, clearly stressing the neutral stance Czech policy was striving for.

On 31 March Karel Kovanda, permanent representative of the Czech Republic in NATO reported of expressed amazement over the reaction of some of the Czech politicians, which seemed to be vetoing the Government’s decision in the backstage. He stated that "as we have taken the decision, we should now speak with one voice".\footnote{Statement by Karel Kovanda (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky březen 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic March 1999), 31 March.} Clearly, such a position on the part of NATO could have been expected as the spotlight was clearly on the new members' performance. This ‘warning’ from the NATO allies might have caused President Havel and Prime Minister Zeman to reconcile and consolidate their positions in a meeting on 1 April. But Kovanda was accused of disloyalty, since he first informed the Czech public and not the Government about pressure and criticism he had been exposed to at NATO headquarters because of the Czech Republic’s position.\footnote{Joint statement by Vaclav Havel and Miloš Zeman (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky duben 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic April 1999), 1 April.} Therefore, the problem not
being the dissent itself, as various opinions in politics are legitimate, but that this
dissent had not been translated and communicated through internal channels.

Second among the tests in consolidating power and taking leadership came soon
after, when NATO officially extended a request to the Czech Republic over the use of
its airspace for the over-flight of NATO bombers. This time, the Government
convened an extraordinary meeting on 2 April, probably not to repeat the mistake of
overriding inner political dissent in light of the coming ruling party’s Congress. Still,
the Government was not unanimous on the decision as four ministers decided to
abstain from the vote (rather than voting against, which could provoke an
international scandal as the country would obviously be failing to fulfil its obligations
deriving from NATO membership). This difference of opinion in the Cabinet, and
within the ruling party, reached its peak at the party Congress on 10 April. Zeman,
runtime for the presidency of the party again, wanted preferably to avoid this issue not
to endanger his re-election. In spite of his effort, a heated debate erupted. Foreign
Minister Kavan tried to calm the rhetoric and lower the volume of dissatisfied
delegates. He managed to push through a decree in which the Congress supported the
position of the Government and distanced itself from the petition that condemned the
attacks as an aggression signed in disapproval by some 150 (more then half) delegates
as a ‘private initiative’. The ‘rebels’ within the party drove their defiance to actually
participating in a ‘friendly expedition’, as did the Communists, to the Serbian capital
of Belgrade that followed at the beginning of May. In the meantime, the leadership
managed to survive the inner criticism while another test of its credibility in foreign
affairs was waiting for it in weeks to come as the Washington summit was drawing
near. In this inner party struggle and the need for inner consolidation the ČSSD was
not unique. Although later, the ODS too had to put great energy into reconciling its
position in meeting NATO obligations, while on the issue of NATO intervention
itself, it remained split.

The air-campaign was escalating, as a swift victory was nowhere in sight,
speculations in political and public debate was raised over a possible NATO ground

57 Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky duben 1999 (Foreign
policy of the Czech Republic April 1999), 2 April.
58 Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky duben 1999 (Foreign
policy of the Czech Republic April 1999), 11 April.
59 Adoption of a resolution took place a month later after the ČSSD Congress, but the party positions in ODS were
opposite to that in the ČSSD. The ‘rebels’ were party members supporting the attacks, while members close to the
president Klaus took up his anti-NATO position (Statement by Vaclav Klaus (1999). Zahranična politika České
Republiky kveten 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic May 1999), 3 May.
operation in Kosovo. Meeting heavy domestic and foreign criticisms, the Czech Government at that time decided to end any speculations and domestic fears that Czech soldiers would be participating in any operation of such kind. Domestically, it would virtually have been political suicide if the Government were to accept such a decision as public support for air-strikes, in which Czech forces were not taking part (and based on military capability at that time, would not be able to), was steadily dropping. Adding to the turmoil was without a doubt the described strong political dissent.

On 11 April a clear signal was given as the decision against Czech military participation in an event of a NATO ground invasion of Kosovo was accepted unanimously, although reportedly not without some discontent at the irreconcilability of Government’s position about the unpreparedness of Czech forces to take part on possible ground military operation. Not excluded, however, was the possibility that Czech soldiers would perform technical and humanitarian tasks in countries neighbouring Kosovo in order to alleviate the on-going humanitarian catastrophe.

This hasty decision probably served primarily to calm the domestic criticism (or Zeman might have even made such concession to his dissenting membership at the Congress in exchange for his re-election). It later proved to be unnecessary, as NATO never formally discussed the issue or issued such a request.

Past fiascoes and dubious behaviour prompted the President and the Prime Minister to try to consolidate their different positions before flying over to Washington for the 50th NATO Summit. There the transformation of NATO through a new strategic concept was officially to take place and the new members were for the first time, the Czech Republic being among them, to participate in such an important decision. Havel, to say the least, was very much disappointed and, as he himself said, ashamed as he believed Czech unpreparedness to meet obligations of NATO membership did not only mean the loss of credibility among NATO allies but also raised fears that this might halt further enlargement to the East, which was clearly one of Prague’s main foreign policy preoccupations. Presumably, the President and Prime Minister might

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60 Support for the air strikes against Yugoslavia was rising from 35% on 25 March up to 40% and reaching its peak on 2 April. Later support, probably due to unsuccessful first victory by NATO fell to 34% on 16 April and reaching its nadir on 22 April, when only 29% still supported the continuation of air campaign (Do you agree with the NATO attacks against Yugoslavia. March-May 1999 (1999). STEM. In Šedivy, 1999: 44).


have decided on a compromise at that time. In the following days Havel defended the Government’s position that he himself condemned before.\[^{63}\] Meanwhile Zeman offered to “compensate” for the Czech Republic’s lagging behind in the support for the attacks with a proportionately higher degree of humanitarian aid than the other two new members, Hungary and Poland. Libor Rouček the Spokesperson for the Government announced on 11 April that the Czech Republic would donate one milliard of Czech crowns.\[^{64}\] The offer of humanitarian aid built on Czech generosity and successfulness of such efforts in alleviating civilian population in previous Balkan conflicts in 1990s as well giving positive signals to both the allies and Serbia. While the President and the Government clearly often split on the foreign policy issues, the uncoordinated manner of foreign policy articulation became a problem only when this would also raise irreconcilable differences with the position taken by states or alliances of strategic importance to the Czech Republic. Therefore, a situation was created where generally defined goals were met with its realisation. But since a strategy based on cost-benefit assessment was lacking this produced often confusing and pragmatic behaviour.

Various prominent voices of the Czech society added to the politicized debate. While the majority of them was rising against the intervention they used different arguments as to explain the reasons for their opinion. Luňák (1999: 7-9) criticized Czech intellectuals for failing to provide a meaningful debate and present shallow arguments. These opinions were based on four weak and politicized arguments. Václav Bělohradsky (1999) argumented that the intervention was conducted by the left political forces. Hynek Fajmon and Bohumil Pečinka (in Luňák (1999: 7-9) concentrated on the legal consequences of the argument of coming anarchy in the international relations with the age of humanitarian intervention. Realists criticized the intervention on the ground of lacking national interest of states involved in the operation and a clear example of the collapse of the balance of power. Karel Kosík (ibid.: 7-9) disagreed with the intervention on moral grounds, conducted as virtual-reality war being justified by the (ab)use of moral and ethical standards by the US. And finally Miroslav Macek’s (ibid.: 7-9) argument was based on anti-Americanism and American imperialism of Europe.

\[^{63}\] Statement by the President Vaclav Havel (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky duben 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic April 1999), 14 April.

\[^{64}\] Statement by Libor Rouček (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky duben 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic April 1999), 11 April.
From the onset of the crisis leading to the intervention it was obvious that the preference of the Czech Government was on the side of diplomacy and political solution. Primarily, this was an issue that only concerned Czech foreign policy objectives indirectly, proving as in any other issue its ‘Westernness’ in words as well as in deeds. In the heat of the crisis the Government found itself in a very hard position, attacked from all sides, first for its vague and later for its too strong position. For this and other related reasons (e.g. personal proliferation of politicians and decision-makers, need to lower dissenting voices within the ruling party, political establishment as well as in the general public, strive for greater role of the Czech Republic in the solving of the crisis) there were signals from the ČSSD Congress on, although denied for some time (e.g. Egon Lansky, 2 April), that the Czech Republic might be striving to launch its own diplomatic initiative.

Clear foreign signals were given to the Czech Government (e.g. a French senior official on a visit to Prague, pointed at the unique role the Czech Republic could play in finding a diplomatic solution) to use its historical relationship with the Balkans region and Serbs in particular.\(^{65}\) Zeman, returning from his Central-Asian tour at the end of April started to vigorously advocate for a greater role for Russia as in his opinion “it was practically the only state, which would be able to compel Milošević to accept a political solution offered to him”.\(^{66}\) Similarly, the EU and the US at that time realised that Russia could prove valuable in pressing Milošević to meet their demands as well as to avoid marginalizing its already diminished role in the world and pushing its leadership into the orbit of extremists. Kavan stressed the importance of the role Russia could have played at the outset of the intervention.\(^{67}\) ‘Playing on the Russian card’ apparently served two purposes. First, it followed its primary security needs to engage Russia in dialogue and co-operation with the West as the Czech Republic would found itself on the front-line in case of any confrontation among the two and second, it enabled support for its allies’ policy towards Russia.

Simultaneously, with the renewed diplomatic efforts on an international level at the beginning of May (e.g. G8, German initiative), something was undoubtedly in the making, especially on the part of Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kavan. The Czech

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\(^{66}\) Statement by Prime Minister Miloš Zeman (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky duben 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic April 1999), 23 April.  
\(^{67}\) Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Kavan (1999). Zahranična politika České Republiky duben 1999 (Foreign policy of the Czech Republic April 1999), 11 April.
initiative, later to be known as the Czech-Greek initiative, was the result of this effort. However, it could be termed ‘too little to late’. Why? Prague had obviously decided on a very awkward partner for this initiative. Greece, due to loud pro-Serb voices at home, had a similar problem of having to defend itself before the other allies. (Schnabel and Thakur, 2000) The launch of the initiative in Beijing (allegedly because of pragmatic reasons since both foreign ministers drafting the initiative were on an Asian tour) on 23 May, might have been directed at raising support from China, a permanent SC member. But the signal coming from the Western capitals was that of surprise and awkwardness at the ‘naughty kids’. The initiative itself contained points that to a great extent repeated and supplemented the G8 demands of 6 May but it strayed away from the primary condition and its gradual fulfillment that NATO had set for Milošević. Thus, the initiative called for a simultaneous 48-hour halt to NATO bombing and partial (but not total) withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo, concessions that could deprive the West of a clear victory at its realisation. Such proposals raised eyebrows in Brussels as majority of NATO allies even refused to put the proposal on the agenda of the NATO Council and showing total disinterest in it. 68

At home, the initiative was welcomed only by the loudest political anti-NATO campaign voices (among them the pro-Klaus part of ODS, ‘rebels’ in ČSSD, KSČM).69

The failed initiative continued to preoccupy the MoFA and the Foreign Minister himself, while the daily political debate and Governments’ decision-making returned to closer and more immediate ‘dangers’ to Czech interests. As the public opinion polls conducted by STEM on 7 May showed 59% of respondents no longer believed that the ruling ČSSD could solve country’s growing economic downturn, while only 14% still had confidence in the Government.70 From this perspective, it is understandable that the Government trying to stop its dropping public support that can also be contributed to its performance during the Kosovo intervention and calls for a non-confidence vote, wanted to sweep this issue under the carpet and attend to issues that could change this negative trend. The issue of the Temelin nuclear-power plant served

70 Ibid.
to galvanise support by the public and within its own party. The economic downturn, on the other hand, also started to present an additional serious obstacle to further Czech support of its credibility as a sympathetic ally that promised to compensate military with financial and humanitarian support.

When Milošević gave his first signals at the end of May 1999 that he would opt for meeting the terms set to him and strike a deal with NATO, the preparation for dispatching international units under the SC mandate was launched. The Czech Government faced with fulfilling its given commitment had problems in finding the means to allocate for this purpose. Similar problems were raised in regard to its promise of greater humanitarian aid for alleviating the humanitarian problems of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP’s).

3.4. THE RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS AND END OF INTERVENTION

The official signing of agreement and the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the territory of Kosovo brought a sigh of relief to the Government, hoping that the issue would soon slip from the international and domestic agenda. All politicians welcomed the agreement signed on 9 June 1999, but their view on the future of Kosovo and the Czech role in building a stable and lasting peace in the province again differed. This difference, as we observed in the diplomatic stage of the crisis, originated in the definition of Czech national interest of each of its actors. Among them, Havel and Zeman managed to meet halfway. The first defended a more engaged and internationalist policy and the latter, more realistically (supposedly due to budget constrains) a minimalist policy of balancing interests and relations between its allies and Belgrade. Each of them acting in their personal capacity as well as when representing Czech interests tended to favour their own position rather then realigning with each other. For example, when Havel decided to make an unannounced visit to Kosovo on 27 June, on the presupposition that Kosovo was under the international authority, and therefore, that he did not need an invitation from the Yugoslav authorities, he did not bother to consult the Government. The Government obviously

71 The Government had to decide whether it would complete construction of the controversial nuclear-power plant. The issue sparked especially negative voices in neighbouring Austria, due to fears that the plant combining Western and Russian technology would not meet all the required safety measures for its operation and be another potential Chernobile located in vicinity of the Czech-Austrian border.

disapproved, since this could further hinder bilateral relations between the countries and Czech efforts to normalise the ongoing economic exchange with the region. However, no real signals were given at that time that the Czech Republic was willing to involve itself in the economic revitalisation of the region under the German initiative of developing a kind of a Marshall plan for the Balkans.73

Zeman’s further criticism of NATO’s policy towards the KLA (i.e. in most of his statements he called them terrorists), which was to be demilitarised, confirmed that the intervention did not bring about a revision of substance in the Czech policy towards Belgrade and the Albanian cause as it did in Havel’s case (e.g. calling the Kosovo crisis a turning point and a precedence for the future of international relations). The Government followed a strictly legalistic position that Kosovo, while de facto under international authority, is still de jure under the sovereignty of FRY. On the question of the future of Kosovo, Havel clearly stated that Kosovo as well as Montenegro should under current conditions be allowed to seek future to their liking, if necessary independently from Serbia.

Lastly, during the crisis it became and expedient to speed up and smooth the legal and parliamentary procedures for measures that need to be taken in managing a crisis (e.g. approval of a support for participation in foreign conflicts, imposing sanctions regimes) as well as the changes the decision-making procedure would have to meet with NATO membership (e.g. use of air space and territory by foreign forces). (Khol, 2000: 56; Šedivy, 1999: 45) While obvious institutional changes were a direct consequence of NATO intervention, there did not seem to be any direct link towards a change in policy. And possibly only by coincident the Parliament adopted the first foreign policy document in the history of the independent Czech Republic that outlined comprehensive goals and strategy in foreign policy on 9 June, the day that the NATO intervention ended.

73 The Czech Republic joined the Stability Pact in 2002.
The Kosovo issue brought Slovenian foreign policy virtually back to the Balkans. Internally, Slovenia’s involvement in the quest for a solution to the end of the Balkan conflicts has been rejected by the general public and political parties throughout the Balkan ordeal. (Bučar, 1999: 138) Furthermore, there was an existing lack of consensus in other areas of foreign policy that prevented adoption of legally framed strategies for its successful conduct. Based on these two facts, the policy towards the Balkans has been pragmatically dictated by the need to resolve its most immediate problems, e.g. succession issues following the dissolution of the SFRY, loss of Yugoslav markets, security and the general political-strategic situation. The last among the conflicts between Serbian authorities and armed Albanians in Kosovo further inflicted economic losses (e.g. cancellation of tourist reservation in the upcoming summer) and posed a potential threat to Slovenian internal stability, with the rising influx of refugees, the spread of infectious diseases, the illegal arms trade and crime.

By roughly 1996, two strategic goals in conduct of a pro-Western foreign policy had been identified, i.e. the EU and NATO. The two institutions were seen as the best option to other alternatives identified in developing a firm economic and security foundations of the country. However, the need for a comprehensive strategy for the successful realization of both has became obvious, when difficulties and obstacles in joining them arise (e.g. the Italian veto on signing the association agreement with the EC and non-extended invitation to Slovenia at the 1997 Madrid Summit to join the first wave of NATO enlargement). (Svetličič, 1998: 26-29)
Changes or gradual formation of policy towards the Balkans could be observed even before the intervention, in light of pursuance of its later goal, i.e. NATO membership. In December 1996 the US launched and sponsored the South-Eastern European Co-operative Initiative (SECI). If Slovenia were to join the initiative, its Government feared that the opposition would interpret it as an act of re-establishing the former Yugoslavia. When the Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Drnovšek received a letter on 17 March 1997 from the US President Bill Clinton initiating stronger involvement in the Balkans, hinting that it could bring Slovenia closer to NATO membership, the Government immediately declared it would participate in the initiative while not becoming a member (forgetting that there was no membership status in the SECI). (Bučar and Šterbenc, 2002: 105) From thereon, the continuous absence of a more engaged Balkan policy was impossible, if only even in the context of attaining NATO membership. The intervention in Kosovo again confirmed the need for a stronger Balkan engagement. But how has Slovenian foreign policy, in fact, coped with the intervention?

4.1. PAST ENGAGEMENT IN THE BALKANS

Slovenia gained its independence by way of dissolution of the SFRY, which in the 80s was mounting under economic and political problems. After Tito’s death the political vacuum was challenged and aggravated by nationalist claims with Serbia and Milošević at its lead. Therefore, two options emerged as an attempt to solve existing problems. The centralist approach, advocated by the federal Government and the initially less developed republics, and the decentralization of the federation advocated by the richer republics, among them Slovenia. (Bučar, 1991: 94-95)

This multitude of problems reflected itself also on the particular issue of the federal (i.e. Serbian) policy towards Kosovo in 1989, when a longstanding state of emergency was imposed due to Albanian miners' strikes demanding greater autonomy for the province. (Stokes, 1993: 237) The Slovenian political elite jointly condemned the federal policy and organised a meeting in Cankarjev dom on 27 February 1989 in support of the miners. The Slovenian elite closing its ranks with this act manifested most vividly its disapproval of the federal policies that eventually led to its decision for independence. (Žerdin, 1999: 21)
But while Slovenia declared independence from SFRY almost cost-free (i.e. the armed conflict between the Slovenian armed Territorial Defense Forces and Yugoslav National Army (JNA – Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija) lasted only a short time and in comparison with the ravaging conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, the casualty list in human and material costs was nearly negligible), it had to substitute the loss of main markets for its products and cheap labour force with a much competitive markets in the EC. Politically, it had to face an entirely new situation rising on the turbulent international scene after the Cold War ended. The fundamental principles of Slovenia’s state-building and policy formation were laid on 26 March 1991 in the *Foundation of the foreign policy of the Republic of Slovenia*. In brief, this was done by the natural negating of any present (if it could not do so in terms of its recent past) as well as of possible future connection with the turbulent Balkans in the process of the ‘normalisation’ of its statehood. The primary course under Janez Drnovšek, President of the ruling Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS - Liberalna Demokracija Slovenije) and former member of the SFRY rotating presidency, was set for as soon as possible accession to the EU and NATO, confirming its stability and normality; both essential elements that the Balkans were lacking at that time. Probably a natural and normal reaction of a state that had just recently gained its first ever historical independence but nevertheless not sufficiently based on strategic (e.g. security, political, economic) interest of the country.

However, Slovenia subsequently recognised all the new states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and established diplomatic relations with all of them, with the exception of the FRY. The latter supported an unacceptable position for Slovenia on succession, when claiming continuity of the former federal state with the FRY and the secession of other ex-republics. Slovenia again re-established trade relations after the conflicts had ended with the exception of the FRY. While it is showing a constant surplus, the trade relations have never again risen to the same level as during the former state. (Bučar, 1991: 138) Therefore, Slovenia’s factual, but gradual, involvement came about with the NATO peacekeeping operation in BIH after the signing of the Dayton peace-agreement in December 1995 and reached well beyond previous diplomatic efforts (e.g. joining SECI, the CEI initiative by Foreign Minister Rupel). Slovenia initially offered only transit across its territory as a member of the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. With the status of forces changing from IFOR (intervention) to SFOR (stabilisation) in December 1996, Slovenian territory was used for the stationing of NATO transport aircraft and personnel used for non-combat assignments. Only in July 1997, did Slovenia decide to participate with ground troops, its contribution rising in the years 1998 and 2000, respectively. (Bučar and Šterbenc, 2002: 117) In addition to its military co-operation, Slovenia launched its so far most successful multilateral initiative, the International Trust Fund for De-mining (ITF) in 1998, to help in the land-mind clearing, first in Bosnia, and later in other parts of ex-Yugoslavia coping with the same problem.

These obvious problems, adding up to the domestic unreadiness and the lack of consensus already mentioned, however, hindered more independent active engagement in the crisis-solution. Domestic foreign policy experts and experts on the region criticised several aspects of its Balkan policy. Namely, the Balkans was almost neglected in daily foreign policy agenda as well as in proposed foreign policy strategies laid before the Parliament for approval. (Svetličič, 1998: 26) Povše-Tasić (1997) observed that the Balkans policy was beset with “national realpolitik and Slovenian-type pragmatism” that built its interest in the region only in the short-term in solving the immediate crisis, while its long-term interests were defined exclusively outside of the Balkan. (ibid.: 7) In Žagar’s (1995) opinion any foreign policy strategy towards the Balkans should encompass the need to regain old markets, regional influence, stability with the utilisation of valuable know-how and a deeper understanding of the roots and interests behind the Balkan nations' policy (especially Serbian and of Milošević himself), the distinctive cultural traits of each of the Balkan nation’s culture and their languages that the Western diplomats always had a hard time understanding. (ibid.: 111-12) Rightly so, Slovenian Balkan policy up to the Kosovo crisis was inconsistent (Žerdin, 1999: 20) and uncovered most evidently the deeper problems and fallacies that this small new country was facing in finding its own success strategy in the international community demanding ever-greater adaptability and resourcefulness.

77 Slovenia decided to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in March 1994. Legal framework for its participation was laid with the signing of an agreement on the transit of NATO forces and the Status of Forces Agreement. Slovenia finished the Individual Dialogue on 30 September 1996 as the first partner state. (Bučar and Šterbenc, 2002: 116)
4.2. THE DIPLOMATIC SOLVING OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS

As an elected non-permanent member of the SC on 1 January 1998, Slovenia was together with the rest of other members constantly seized by the crisis evolving in and around Kosovo. Its spectrum of goals and interests set for its two year term gave considerable attention to problems in the Balkan region, expecting that Slovenia’s knowledge could be utilized in the SC debate. Furthermore, its positions in the SC debates and decisions would reflect its association status in the EU and candidacy for NATO membership.78

In a statement issued regarding the Račak massacre on 18 January the MoFA warned the international community that if it again failed to calm down the situation and bring both sides to the negotiating table the situation might lead to another ferocious Balkan conflict. The position further outlined its multilateral approach by stressing support for the existing multilateral efforts (e.g. OVSE observation and verification missions in Kosovo, NATO threat on the use of force, the Contact Group demands). By knowing the situation on the ground, the need to respect international law was especially stressed. Therefore, outlining the responsibility on the side of the international community as a whole and especially of all the permanent SC members.79 In its two year term in the SC Slovenia put special emphasis in seeking a consensus on issues of great importance (e.g. Kosovo). (Report of the MoFA 1999, 2000: 59-60) Similarly, MoFA was stressing that the drafting of the Contact Group initiative as well, must indispensably be based on consensus within the group.80

Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Drnovšek joined in the search for a political solution in his personal capacity. At the time, the Western officials and political representatives of the Kosovo Albanians were trying to find a suitable method of communication with each other. Slovenia provided both the means and the channel. For example, on 19 February, the head of the Kosovo Albanian delegation at Rambouillet, Hashim Taqi met with political representative of the KLA Adem Demaqi in order to ‘adjust stances’, agree on negotiators and further steps for negotiations taking place in Rambouillet. Upon the initiative of Prime Minister

79 Here, clearly referring to China and Russia, which either abstained when voting on the issue or in drafting out resolutions, softened the language in it. (The situation in Kosovo, FRY. Statement by H.E. Danilo Türk, Ambassador Permanent Representative of Slovenia in the United Nations Security Council (1999), 24 March. New York; United Nation Security Council voting records available on the UN Internet site)
Drnovšek a personal telephone conversation took place between the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright and Adem Demaqi. This proved a very valuable solution for pressuring the Kosovars, however reluctantly, to sign the peace agreement and gave NATO a blank cheque as Milošević gave his last signal of non-compliance to NATO when the Yugoslav delegation refused to sign the agreement. Based on the available sources it is certain that Drnovšek played a role in softening the Albanian position, if only based on the fact that as the President of the SFRY rotating presidency he signed an amnesty for Adem Demaqi, setting the ‘Yugoslav Nelson Mandela’ free after almost 28 years imprisonment. Demaqi, residing in Slovenia during the crisis, had several consultations with Drnovšek. Since his stance had been firmly against Albanian signing the Rambouillet peace agreement, the Slovenian Prime Minister's advice might have prompted a change in his position. (Žerdin, 1999: 22)

Simultaneously, offers were being extended by countries to participate in light of a possible signing of Rambouillet peace agreement in the international forces for Kosovo to provide a safe return of refugees and IDPs as well as to prevent further spreading of violence and revenge among the different ethnic groups. On 10 March, the Government approved (although, without any consultation with the Parliament) the sending of six officers, three for the signal group, two for the press-center and one for civil-military relations within the framework of its co-operation with NATO as a member of PfP.

Domestic political agenda was burning at the time. Among the already traditional domestic-international preoccupations such as the question of delimitation the boarder on the sea with Croatia, parliamentarians were dealing with approving personnel changes in the Government (e.g. appointing of a new Defense Minister) and discussing about the change of the election system (from proportional to a majority one). Therefore, as our research showed the domestic political debate on the Kosovo crisis was little or none. The only exception mentioned might be the consultation of the Overseeing committee for the implementation of the resolution on the Principles of National Security of Slovenia on 26 January. Initiated by the Slovenian expert

83 The Resolution adopted in 1993 proclaimed Slovenia's commitment to the peaceful resolution of inter-state conflicts. In case of an attack, though, Slovenia would exercise its right under the UN Charter (Art. 51) to defend
4.3. NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO

Throughout the campaign Slovenia acted in accordance with its striving to become a member of NATO in the second round of enlargement to the East. The Government immediately approved the use of its airspace by NATO aircraft. An extraordinary meeting of both the Council on National Security and the Parliament were convened on 25 March, but both were only informed about the security measures that were undertaken and did not actually play any role on the decision to approve the air-strikes. Since the later was done in a somewhat dubious legal way, the Government had to defend its position in the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs. The argument of some of its Committee members was that it was the prerogative of the Parliament and not the Government to approve air strikes. (Bučar and Šterbenc, 2002: 106) Drnovšek explained the Cabinet’s action on 31 March: “If Slovenia had refused NATO the use of Slovenian airspace for its air raids on Yugoslavia, its gesture would have been interpreted as a withdrawal of its candidacy for NATO membership”. Obviously, there was discontent over the procedural way the action had been approved, however, the issue was never further explored because of NATO involvement (Bučar and Šterbenc, 2002: 106, also see Lojze Peterle, President of the Christian Social Democrats – SKD, Socialni Demokrati Slovenije). Similarly, the Government had only informed but not consulted with the Defense Committee in the Parliament on signing an agreement with NATO on transport of technical and military equipment over its territory for its future peacekeeping needs in Kosovo. At this time, no notable critical voices had been raised, probably out of the same reason.

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85 Odbor za obrambo o kosovski križi (Defense Committee on Kosovo crisis) (1999). Delo Vol. (41) 82, 10 April, 2.
90 Odbor za obrambo o kosovski križi. (Defense Committee on Kosovo crisis) (1999). Delo Vol. (41) 82, 10 April, 2.
In the SC, too, Slovenia’s representative Danilo Türk, vigorously defended the NATO intervention as inevitable, putting the blame exclusively on the erroneous policy of the Belgrade regime. Since it alone refused to accept a peaceful solution to the crisis and consistently violated the SC resolutions that characterised the situation in the province as a threat to international peace and security, left NATO with no choice but to prevent the growing humanitarian catastrophe.\(^91\) Understanding that Milošević would probably carry on with his policy of non-compliance, in spite of the ongoing bombing, Slovenia’s representative in the SC, even at that time warned and regretted that not all permanent members (e.g. Russia and China) were willing to act in accordance with their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the very fact Milošević was exploiting all along.\(^92\) Slovenia’s Prime Minister further observed on 31 March that while NATO military action might prevent further escalation of the humanitarian catastrophe much of the responsibility lay with the SC members who were basing decisions primarily on their geo-strategic interests and historical alliances (e.g. the US and Russia).\(^93\) Slovenia was advocating more engagement from all sides, stressing that the inability of the SC to act decisively on matters of importance to world security once again proved to lead to one-sided solution of the West to deal on its own and with the silent concession of the two non-Western permanent members.

Obviously taking legal and strategic factors into account regarding NATO intervention in the SC, Drnovšek stressed the long-reaching consequences that the action would have for the region and Europe. On 26 March he noted that the intervention has “triggered a far-reaching process that would bring about new security and co-operation in Europe”.\(^94\) The military involvement of the West, therefore, was hoped to be bringing the West back to the Balkans in seeking a durable solution with a long-term commitment, protracted after the violence had ceased and when resources would needed to be drawn upon for the reconstruction and rebuilding of the region. Milan Kučan, the ex-Communist President made a more personal and historical assessment of the NATO action, steaming from his personal experience in dealing


\(^{92}\) Ibid.

\(^{93}\) Statement by Prime Minister Janez Drnovšek (1999). \(STA\), 31 March.

\(^{94}\) Slovenia’s Officials on NATO Intervention in Kosovo (1999). \(Government of the Republic of Slovenia Public Relations and Media Office\), 26 March.
with Serbian politicians and Milošević personally. “It has happened what was supposed to happen”, he summarised in a historical trajectory on 26 March. ⁹⁵

What then were political voices of Slovenia saying at the launching of the intervention? Although unequivocal in their support for the Governments’ actions, they did not signal any thorough revision of the Governments’ policy and foreign policy goals focused on NATO membership in light of the Kosovo crisis. The Parliament played a very marginal role. This also steered little political debate on the issue, except on the procedural matter, which had to do more with the domestic political situation than with real substantive dissent. Zmago Jelinčič Plemeniti, the leader of the marginal Slovenian National Party (SNS - Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka), based his dissenting views on populist, narrow political ambitions and the fact that it was the only party ever opposed to NATO membership. ⁹⁶ Janez Janša, ex-Defense Minister and leader of the opposition Social Democrats of Slovenia (SDS - Socialni Demokrati Slovenije) issued the only substantive dissent that is worth noting, however, supporting the attacks all along. His criticism was directed towards Slovenian Governments’ activities and at NATO policies, which were based on mistakes originating in the lack of knowledge about the historical-cultural background of the conflict. By being more active on the diplomatic front Slovenia could, in his opinion, help the NATO policy to overcome these deficiencies. ⁹⁷ The executive (the President, the Prime Minster and the MoFA), therefore, was leading all the diplomatic efforts in multilateral forums in the context of raising its prospects as a candidate for NATO. Furthermore, there were no indications leading us to conclude that there had been any consideration of an independent policy towards the Balkans.

On 30 March a peaceful but noisy demonstrations of between 3.000 and 5.000 Serbs living in Slovenia were held (some Chinese residents joining them) in a candle-lit protest outside the US Embassy and a march to the Orthodox Church, where they had peacefully dispersed. ⁹⁸ This minority of dissenting voices in public was later joined by some anti-NATO and neutrality voices, as the media and the general public started to think more practically what costs the membership in NATO would demand

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⁹⁵ Ibid.
⁹⁶ Shod brez strankarskih prvakov. Mirna zbiranja in javna zborovanja so po mnenju vseh demokratična oblika izražanja mnenja (Gathering without party leaders. Peaceful gathering and public association democratic way of expressing ones opinion according to all) (1999). Dnevnik, 31 March.
of their small country. Prominent figures, intellectuals and opinion leader (e.g. Mencinger, Stres, Škrk, Štuhec, Novak) voiced different opinion on the issue of legality, however, all of them felt a relief and *fait-accomplie* by the realization of NATO intervention.\(^9\) Public opinion polls also reflected this concern as the initial support for the attack dropped from 53.2% measured at its launching between 23 and 29 March to 49.6% two months later on 18 May.\(^{10}\) Furthermore, fresh memories of Slovenia’s short war and personal encounters with refugee accounts of savage Serbian war tactics determined public reaction. The public sentiment reflected feelings of a kind of self-confirmation mixed with relief that the West was finally ‘coming to it senses’ in realising what Slovenians had 10 years ago and dissatisfaction with the ineffective policies and threats to stop Milošević’s policy of ethnic cleansing. However, we can not say that a thorough debate had been steered either regarding the relationship towards the Balkans or towards NATO.

Politicians in NATO member states had to tackle with the issue of the possible deployment and participation of its soldiers in a ground invasion. As Slovenia was yet not a member its actions were throughout April directed towards managing the immediate consequences of the humanitarian catastrophe and participation in humanitarian efforts. Its foreign policy was trying to use this activity to project Slovenia’s credibility and usefulness that would show in deeds its different-ness from the 19th century behaviour of nations in the Balkans and therefore confirm its right to claims of being *de facto* part of the West. (Kučan, 1999a) In this, it followed a clear EU policy as regards the burden-sharing principle in the refugee issue. On 7 April on the eve of EU meeting in Luxemburg to discuss the EU policy on refugees, the Government proposed to the Parliament the application of the provisions of the Law on Temporary Shelter (passed to solve the status of refugees from BIH) to legalise the residence of persons from Kosovo already residing in Slovenia (an estimated 2,477 persons) and guarantee identical protection as under international standards for an additional 1,600 Kosovars.\(^{101}\) In an extraordinary session the Parliament approved the proposal in full. The debate before the actual approval concentrated on the question of how many not if the refugees should be admitted to Slovenia. While The United List of

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\(^9\) Če minister reče, da letala letijo… (If the Minister says the airplanes fly…) (1999). *Delo* Vol. (41) 73, 31 March, 3.

\(^{10}\) Slovenci in vojaški poseg zveze NATO na Kosovo (Slovenians and military action of the NATO Alliance in Kosovo) (1999). *CATI Center*, 23 to 29 March; Odnos Slovencev do NATA konec maja 1999 in primerjava z marčevsko anketo (Slovenian’s attitudes towards NATO at the end of May 1999 and comparison with the march survey). (1999). *CATI Center*, 18 May.

\(^{101}\) Ibid.
Social Democrats (ZLSD - Združena Lista Socialnih Demokratov) advocated a bigger number, SNS and SKD voiced for a lesser number that was actually proposed.\textsuperscript{102}

Similarly, Slovenia financially (46.6 million SIT or approx. 260,000 USD) and in the form of expertise, launched its participation in joint NATO humanitarian efforts in countries neighbours to Kosovo. With a medical field unit and 25 members of a medical team it joined the NATO countries relief efforts in Albania, while to FRYOM a convoy of humanitarian help as well as a special medical team was sent.\textsuperscript{103} There was a meeting called by Slovenia on 7 April in Brussels, where William Cohen, the US Defense Minister met with representatives of the states bordering to FRY and Slovenia to brief them about the military and humanitarian aspects of NATO's operation in the region. With all of these actions, Slovenia tried to partly take its share of the burden, while also raising its NATO prospects with the Western Governments.\textsuperscript{104}

Parallel to joining the EU and NATO efforts, other Slovenian officials sought every opportunity to show its usefulness and preparedness to co-operate on the issue on a regional level. At a trilateral meeting Speakers of the Slovenian (Janez Podobnik), Italian (Luciano Violante) and Hungarian (Janos Ader) parliaments on 7 April issued a joint Declaration on Kosovo.\textsuperscript{105} Such was also the occasion of Lvov meeting of CEE Head of States on 14 May. (Kučan, 1999b)

After two weeks of the escalated bombing did not meet the desired military objectives, the ceased diplomatic effort was again resumed at the beginning of April. This time, the key role that Russia could play in the effort was signaled as well as a long-term economic and political commitment in the region of key Western partners as proposed by the German presidency of the EU.\textsuperscript{106} Slovenia’s Foreign Minister Boris Frlec welcomed this initiative, as it would be “among others, bringing elements of Europeanisation, which is the only solution for the region”.\textsuperscript{107} Slovenian diplomats welcomed Russian signals and activities. Russia deep understands and interest involved in stability and rebuilding of the region required a commitment on its part too. Since Slovenian diplomats were experienced in dealing with Serbian politicians

\textsuperscript{102} Je 1600 begunec preveč? (Is 1600 of refugees to many?) (1999). DeloVol. (41) 85, 14 April, 2.
\textsuperscript{103} Slovenia’s Humanitarian Initiatives in Respect to Kosovo Crisis (1999). Government of the Republic of Slovenia Public Relations and Media Office, 20 April.
\textsuperscript{104} Statement (1999). STA, 7 April.
\textsuperscript{105} Parliamentarians on the Kosovo Crisis (1999). Slovenia Weekly, No. 14, 7 April.
they had profound knowledge and understanding of the Russian connection to the
Serbs. Drnovšek assessed on 9 April that “the conflict might be settled if Yugoslavia,
plus Russia, accept a slightly altered Rambouillet peace deal (however, not explaining
the points in the draft agreement to be altered). This envisaged the presence of an
international implementation and peace-keeping force in Kosovo under the UN
mandate. In summary, the Slovenian approach to the solution was 3-step: stop
fighting, agree on a political settlement and most importantly, work out a long-term
plan towards stability, rule of law, democracy and prosperity in the region.

The 50th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty brought mixed
emotions for Slovenia. The failed entry in the first enlargement took Slovenia by
surprise. Domestically, the Government and not external reasons (e.g. slow de-
nationalisation, privatisation, an unfavourable climate for FDI, purchase of arms
outside of the US) had been blamed for the failure. (Bučar and Šterbenc, 2002: 115)
In this situation, the Government sought to turn the intervention on the eve of the
Washington Summit into an opportunity to project its active engagement in the crisis
solving and in alleviating the rising burdens as a credible candidate for the second
NATO enlargement to the East. Slovenia tried to act according to NATO demands
and expectations, it approved the use of its airspace and territory, co-operated in
NATO humanitarian operations and PfP and offered its participation in international
forces, when a political agreement could be reached.

With the launching of air strikes, the argument about the need for a stable and active
country within the region as well as the strengthening of NATO's southern
flank (Slovenia would provide a territorial connection between Italy and Hungary)
became even more compelling. Kučan observed another very important fact that
should in his opinion become obvious to NATO members with the Kosovo crisis, i.e.
that Slovenia is “according to its civilisation’s characteristics and values, already a
constituent part of the future Europe”. On a later visit to a refugee camp in FRYOM
on 13 May, he went to stress not only Western, but global, responsibility as “Slovenia
feels responsibility for resolving the Kosovo crisis because it knows that in a global
world responsibility is also global”. Out of the same argument, Drnovšek reported

on 20 April that Slovenia’s participation was its moral and political duty. The reading of the political and public discourse showed that the Slovenian public as much as its decision makers, dealing again with the troubled region they were desperately trying to escape, had again raised deeper questions over defining the national interests of the country and regions of its primary orientation. More paradoxically then ever before, in order to fulfill the projection of what was to be desired (being a part of Europe, democratic, civilised and cultured community of states), the object of desire (NATO and EU membership) demanded or required involvement and the passing of ‘an entrance examination’ in the playground that was being excluded from Slovenia’s desired area of action in as far as the realization of NATO membership did not so demand. Similar to what happened in 1997, when Slovenia joined the SECI.

In May, two diplomatic engagements put Slovenia under the spotlight again. At the sixth meeting of CEE Head of States in Lvov, Ukraine on 14 May full support was given for Kučan’s initiative to organise a Balkan peace conference (the Czech President Vaclav Havel suggested Ljubljana should be its host) in order to discuss and find a long-term solution for a political and economical reconstruction by way of the Slovenian example. In this long-term effort three facts needed to be taken into account. The statement issued that profound understanding and addressing of the problem must stem from understanding the deeper roots of unresolved national questions and methods of historically belated solutions that must surpass all divisive remnants in Europe and in which Russia must play a special role. The CEE countries have recognised the positive role Slovenia had and could play in the future of the region. Kučan and Drnovšek were both stressing the importance in finding a long-term regional settlement, as the German led initiative proposed a sort of a stability pact for SEE, addressing the political as well as economic problems the region had been facing as the result of the end of Cold War (Interview with Kučan, Neue Züricher Zeitung and Drnovšek, Die Welt, 24 May). By further attending the meeting of foreign ministry envoys in Bonn on 27 May to discuss this initiative, Slovenia practically confirmed its readiness to actively engage itself in the future.

Among Slovenian Government officially fears were raised that Slovenia’s participation in the Stability Pact, as it became to be called, could mean that the country would be once again coupled in an unprestigious group of unstable countries from the Balkan region. Drnovšek tried to remove any such fears in an interview on 25 May, when he stressed that Slovenia was entering such initiatives only as a stabilised country on the periphery of the region which has experience with the SEE region and can help the Western allies solve what is today the greatest political, military and economic crisis in the world. This justification was needed to calm down Slovenia’s domestic fears and to position the country, as Frlec figuratively noted, rather as ‘a doctor’ than as ‘a patient’.116 Again, this would be done only on a multilateral basis.

4.4. THE RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS AND THE END OF THE INTERVENTION

Slovenian officials were obviously uncomfortable with the superficial grouping of Slovenia with countries of the troubled region in working out a long-term plan for the region, since Slovenia could never accede to re-establishing even a loose Yugoslavia-type integration. As much as there were initiatives and willingness on its part to make further active engagement in the region, it could only come by way of recognising its different position and the positive role it could play in stabilising and leading the region towards stability and prosperity. The main obstacle was the lack of clearly set goals and a consensus on Slovenian interest in the region. On 2 June, Drnovšek returned from a visit to Brussels, where he participated in a 19 plus 2 consultative forum for SEE attended by NATO countries, Slovenia and the states bordering FRY. To his relief, it was made clear that Slovenia would be in a position equal to NATO members, drawing therefore a clear distinction between Slovenia and the other six countries from the region.117 Again this last distinction was made obvious that inasmuch there lay interests and opportunities for Slovenia in the Balkans, they were only seen as a way to advance the speediest possible accession to the West.

On the eve of the resolution of the crisis, Prime Minister Drnovšek issued a strong and clear message to Milošević and the Yugoslav political leadership, in which he
outlined one more last warning as most Western diplomats had done before him. Namely, by refusing all the peace proposals put forward, Milošević and alike have not only wasted an opportunity of finding a peaceful and civilised solution for the existing situation in Kosovo, but had also “missed a great historical opportunity for the FRY to take its place within a democratic and creative international development process that recognises differences, freedom and the equality of nations and nationalities and rejects violence as the only method of settling relations between peoples”. Milošević did yield to demands and start withdrawing from Kosovo as a first step towards the ending of NATO bombing. But as Slovenia’s representative in the SC, Türk observed, this should not have served to lessen the pressure exerted on Milošević to terminate the state of war in the country immediately, as there were justified fears and expectations that end of the Kosovo crisis would not bring an immediate end to his rule in Yugoslavia.

As in other opportunities, Slovenia advocated for a differentiated view in Western policy towards Montenegro, which was moving away from Belgrade's orbit and striving for a more democratic future. As a one of the co-sponsors of the SC Resolution 1244 on 10 June, Slovenia praised the adopted resolution as “the platform for further engagement of the entire international community in the effort to resolve the Kosovo crisis”. Of profound importance was Türk’s mentioning of the two groups of implications this brought about. The international community had pledged with its military and civilian presence in Kosovo to establish a safe and secure environment for its returning inhabitants. However, the fact that there would have to be created “something that did not exist in Kosovo for many years” was to demand the fulfillment of three essential tasks from them: preventing the spread of an atmosphere of insecurity; bringing the rule of law as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms to the province. Second, in bringing the SC and the UN to the forefront of the future management of the situation would present a test of the ability to sustain unity within the SC itself as well as in working out and defining the patterns of the division of work and new forms of co-operation between the UN and the regional organizations.

120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
As the Stability Pact was being created at a ministerial conference in Cologne on 10 June Slovenia offered to organise round tables in the framework of the pact on the development of small and medium enterprises and on the protection of national minorities. Furthermore, its delegation offered to contribute its positive experience in de-mining and the rehabilitation of the victims of landmines in Bosnia by extending its fund’s activities to Kosovo. The highest praise for the German led initiative were outlined by its Foreign Minister Frlec as it was not based exclusively on a standard form of international help and was oriented toward the Europeanisation of the region.\textsuperscript{122} This last fact being stressed many times before by other Slovenian officials was a projection of what Slovenia hoped for the orientation of the region as well as what Western involvement would bring. Other more immediate commitment came in the renewed offer to send a small group of experts familiar with the territory and language to participate in KFOR, considering options of liaison officers, civilian-military relations unit and interpreters for communication. At a donor conference convened in Brussels later on 28 July, the Stability Pact was fused with the over two milliard USD of financial resources it needed to start fulfilling its settled goals in the economic and political reconstruction of the region.\textsuperscript{123} While Slovenia allocated less financial means for this project, it strove to put into operation its special know-how in the region. Apart from the already valuable military and humanitarian help, its advantages in co-operating on technical and development project (e.g. rebuilding of infrastructure such as houses, the supply of electricity and water as well as economical rebuilding) were preferred.\textsuperscript{124}

While there were no indications that the obvious military defeat of Milošević and JA would bring an end to his authoritarian rule, Slovenia moved on to boost bilateral relations with the officially recognised leadership of the Kosovo Albanians and Albania, which was striving to find its own path towards stability and democracy (e.g. Drnovšek’s visit to Albania, 10 June and Thaqi’s visit to Ljubljana, 14 June).

The culmination of all the efforts of Slovenia to actively engage itself in the crisis solving that would show its usefulness to NATO it wanted so much to join was the visit by US President William J. Clinton on a rainy 21 June.\textsuperscript{125} In his speech before a

\textsuperscript{122} Balkan Crisis: Active Role in Stability Pact (1999). Slovenian Weekly, No. 23, 10 June.
\textsuperscript{123} Donors allocate more then two milliard USD (1999). STa, 28 July.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
general audience he praised Slovenia’s success story, the highest recognition by a US diplomat to the little country of which creation it was always suspicious.
5. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR

Observations presented so far have confirmed that the actual foreign policy behaviour in both countries has been officially conducted within the set foreign policy strategies, i.e. within the expected patterns of behaviour. In Slovenia the actual behaviour was conducted within the presented foreign policy legal and political framework, however, it basis followed a pragmatic direction in pursuit of its membership in NATO at all costs. In the Czech Republic, the Kosovo test proved to be a real challenge in terms of the credibility of the newly acquired membership in NATO. However dubious and evasive its behaviour might have been, it officially always stayed in line with NATO policy. While in line, the behaviour of both countries as will be analyzed in this chapter has been pragmatic and problematic, primarily reflecting traditional problems besetting their foreign policy orientation, strategy and articulation from independence on. This was mostly due to the lack of a national political and public consensus and foreign policy strategies that would weigh-out cost and benefits the country need to carry out in its pursuance. Additionally, it prompted and opened a series of new questions and challenges that would have to be met in the future, especially if they were to produce a more engaged regional Balkan policy and through it a strategically oriented pro-Western policy.

5.1. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The left-of-center Government survived the first test of its credibility in NATO. However, it did not perform with flying colours. The set foreign policy course that rushed only for the soon-as-possible entry into NATO failed to prepare the key decision-making players and the public for the hard task of burden sharing and consenting to policies that were far from the public and political sentiment in the country. The intervention in Kosovo, therefore, actually facilitated real public and political debate on the pros and cons of NATO membership. (Kohl, 2000; Šedivy, 1999) This debate was further aggravated by the demanding tasks, speeded up changes in the legal provisions for future crisis-management and inter-operability that the new NATO strategic transformation brought. Furthermore, traditional strategic and structural problems that were outlined in chapter 1.5. hindered better decision-making and consequently, proper and strategically-oriented (re)actions. Since our
intent is not only to compare the expected to actual behaviour but rather to explain it, analysis of factors and their extent of influence will now follow.

5.1.1. GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS

For one, the conflict was geographically remote, seen as being without any direct affect on the Czech Republic. As strategically defined, the issue would fall within the scope of its regional concerns (e.g. the EU, OSCE). In political, as well as public debate little attention had been devoted to the Kosovo problem before the intervention, although first mentioning dates back to the internationalization of the Kosovo conflict in March 1998, when the SC Resolution 1160 was adopted. Even then concerns were predominately of a humanitarian nature. By acting as a de facto member of NATO, at least since January 1999 and with the intervention looming large in NATO debate, the Czech Government could have been expected to engage itself or at least elaborate a clearer position in its efforts to show commitment and credibility as a new member of NATO. Using information, possibly from its representatives on the ground (e.g. OSCE-KVM, diplomatic mission in Belgrade), and general knowledge of the region could have also been helpful in its efforts. So with a virtually non-existent Balkan policy, the Kosovo issue made it to the agenda of the Government before the actual launch of air strikes on 24 March, therefore becoming an issue of NATO credibility, only when it involved extending support for the policies of strategic partners and their multilateral efforts (e.g. EU sanctions, the Contact Group initiatives, OVSE-KVM mission).

We can observe another phenomena in connection to the role of geographical factors, i.e. how (meaning of the perception of) distance or proximity play a large role in foreign policy behaviour of smaller states. As could be expected, such was the issue of the Temelin nuclear power plant that made its appearance on the political agenda towards the end of May 1999, when the Czech Government was to decide if it was to proceed with its construction. In contrast to NATO intervention in Kosovo, the Government took a strong and clear position in spite of economic slowdown (which has officially been one of the primary reasons why the Czech Republic could not take bigger part in peace-keeping forces in Kosovo) and with heavy pressure from Austria. For the case in point another characteristic could be observed, i.e. the tendency to play down foreign policy issues as domestic issues in order to obtain political points
among voters. In the Kosovo issue, this was in the thinking of some of the ČSSD members and the Communists, which according to STEM opinion pools managed to take 6% of ‘disappointed’ ČSSD voters and using it as a convenient tool for striking political opponents.\textsuperscript{126} This has been, however, mostly the case in issues “nearer to home”, where a more compelling case could be put forward by politicians of the direct consequences of their action for voters. In issues such as Kosovo, policy has not been clear, or has not identified vital interests. But at a point when it has become the main issue on the international agenda, it was natural that the Czech Republic would follow the position of its strategic partners, in this case the membership in NATO and especially its strongest bilateral partners the US, Russia and for historical reasons also the FRY. While the Government tried to follow this line of strategic policy, domestic and structural (e.g. low consensus, an unclearly defined position by the Government and the MoFA) problems hindered its ability to do so whole-heartedly. The themes connected with the Kosovo issues vs. that of Temelin were universalist and complicated in nature, since it demanded a clear position on a spectrum of issues (e.g. war, intervention in the internal affairs of a state, human rights, regional policy towards the Balkans)

5.1.2 LEGAL FACTORS

The Czech Republic as a small country finding a safe heaven in international law took a pragmatic approach to the issue on the intervention and the status of Kosovo. The former, especially, is demonstrated as a clearly pragmatic and inconsistent position, since \textit{The Conceptual Basis of the Czech Republic} clearly stated that “the Czech Republic deems it desirable that NATO out-of-area missions be carried out under a mandate from the SC or the OSCE”.

5.1.3. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FACTORS

Economic and military factors can be seen as searching further reasons for the limited Czech engagement in the intervention and in alleviation of the consequences of the conflict. As already mentioned, an economic downturn hit the Czech Republic in 1999 making it hard for the Government to justify the allocation of the promised amount of one milliard of crowns for the humanitarian plight and expensive peace-keeping operations. Militarily, it was only able and ready to participate in humanitarian and technical efforts with attested equipment and soldiers from other crisis areas in the region in the past. However, even hypothetically, if the Government would have agreed to participate in a ground invasion, it was stressed that its ground troops were unprepared and incompatible with NATO forces that would have been deployed in such an event.

5.1.4. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN POLITICAL DEBATE AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE

The military sanctions against the Milošević regime by NATO air strikes unleashed a hot political debate among political elite and the general public. As has been noted the debate in the Parliament spilled over into a writing contest by all parliamentarian party leaders in most prominent Czech dailies and magazines. The content of the discussion struck at the heart of the hottest political issue in the Czech Republic at the time, i.e. NATO membership. In short, what happened was that the intervention cleared and corrected Czech perceptions of NATO as a defensive alliance, joined primarily in order to receive military support of its allies against external threat. These did not take into account the burdens and costs it would have to share, especially in light of the new strategic concept in the out-of-area operations and NATO peace-keeping efforts. The citizens had been given, however belatedly, an opportunity to think and demand a clearly, and realistically, defined policy on membership and the

127 Klaus, Vaclav (1999) Kosovo. Nevytvářejme nové falešné mýty (Kosovo. We shouldn’t make new false myths). Lidové Noviny, 30 March; Pithart, Petr (1999a) Ustupovat před zlem dokonečně nelze (It is ultimately impossible to counter evil ) Mladá Fronta Dnes, 1 April; Ruhml, Jan (1999) Jak je to s falešnými mýty kolem Kosova (Concerning the false myths over Kosovo). Lidové Noviny, 3 April; Pithart, Petr (1999b) Naštěstí česká vláda nakonec zvládla (The Czech government has handled it after all). Mladá Fronta Dnes, 3 April; Žantovski Michael (1999) V kosovu jde i o budoucnosti Evropy (Kosovo is also about the future of Europe). Mladá Fronta Dnes, 14 April.
cost it brought. Up until then, the Czech public had not been engaged in a real cost-benefit discussion and the Government had avoided launching a referendum or at least a public debate on NATO membership due to its weak political position. Furthermore, political strategists had even seen it as redundant since the NATO issue had been a part of the election platform of all parties in June 1998 parliamentary elections, therefore expecting that the votes cast corresponded to a voters' referendum on NATO. (Khol, 2000: 55)

In terms of the debate that the intervention in Kosovo produced among ordinary citizens, one could observe two characteristics. On the one hand, disappointment with the lack of leadership by the political elite was high since the two main political parties (ČSSD, ODS) were unable to secure a clear position and arguments for the conduct of the Czech foreign policy, consequently disabling the Government from generating a consensus and support for its position. On the other hand, having the feeling they were unable to influence the outcomes of foreign events and political agendas, the public debate itself failed to produce public consensus on the intervention, while it unleashed a belated debate on NATO membership. Public concerns and efforts were directed towards the humanitarian area, a level on which Czech public sympathies translated themselves into actions.

Furthermore, the debate among Czech politicians and the public was primarily shaped by its historical experience and political culture reflected in the rhetoric used in public debates and in observed reactions. The Czech national identity has strongly identified itself with Western Europe although defined differently in certain periods of time throughout history. (Drulak, 2002: 8) However it has remained beset with communist remnants (Brodský, 2001: 29-32) of ‘Homo sovieticus’, similar to its political culture that affected the foreign policy discourse and as well as being reflecting in the Government’s positions and (re)actions.  

We can roughly say that there were two political camps, one opposing and other defending the intervention and therefore NATO policy. These two political arguments 

128 In his article about post-communist mentality Fibich (1995) concluded that Czech society is still burdened with “real socialist” deformations of the Czech national character that had been defined in the 1970s and 1980s in a discussion in the journal Svědectví. Among the observed negative features of the Czech national character are: a) a collaborationists anxiety and tendency to submissiveness vis-à-vis pressure by the big powers and super-powers, b) subservience, abuse of power and artificial search for enemies, c) concealing moral weaknesses behind ideological duplicity and adherence to cliques, d) the upsurge of narrow personal careerism and isolationisms, e) the transformation of national and moral inertia into disrespect not only from national traditions but for all traditions and values, f) obscuring moral irresponsibility by expediency, distorting reality and hypocrisy.
reflected the previous political platforms on NATO membership in the June 1998 elections, except on the part of ODS and its leader, Vaclav Klaus. The Communists outrightly opposed NATO membership in the first place, so their opposition to Czech NATO involvement in the intervention was expected (while they did support the Czech-Greek initiative). The liberal political camp (ODA, KDU-ČSL, US) with the President at its head, being the strongest and most consistent suppliers of support for NATO membership, embraced NATO position in approaching the issue as a test of credibility of its NATO membership.

The most intriguing ‘contribution’ to the Czech debate had been again made by the leader of ODS, Vaclav Klaus. With typical populist rhetoric he took his electorate and associates by surprise in defying NATO objectives. This obvious shift from his pro-Western orientation can according to Znoj (1999) be attributed to his aim of slowly re-fashioning his party’s libertarian free market ideology with the idea of a strong national state based on the example of the national bourgeois Czech National Democratic Party from the First Republic. Moreover, he concluded, based on his statements and speeches, his attitude may probably be attributed to simply looking for a new package for selling the old libertarian ideology to voters, as the free-market model had obviously failed to provide the expected results under the economical downturn the country was dealing with at the time of the intervention. The ruling ČSSD supported NATO membership for the Czech Republic. However, its leadership as well as its rank and file had problems in justifying NATO policy in Kosovo, since its Government failed to defend the clearly stated objective of attained NATO membership. There was a lack of leadership and consensus building within the party and the Cabinet in terms of putting forward and defining a clear position for the Czech official policy especially before the domestic public. Regardless of the fact that official statements did not wholly reflect the NATO position, inner consolidation and consensus with such (un-identical) position would have allowed for better manoeuvrability with its partners in NATO. When arriving at key decisions (e.g. support of the air strike, non-participation in possible ground invasion) the Government stressed more the need to preserve friendly relations with the FRY than to confirm its Western orientations by way of actual behaviour. Justification of its NATO policy before the Parliament also lacked clearly defined arguments. The Parliament, especially the Lower House where the ruling ČSSD was in minority position, had been divided on the issue on strictly party platforms and failed to
generate a general political consensus beyond the support for the intervention on the grounds of the argument that the credibility of NATO membership is at stake. The MoFA used its resources to lower domestic dissent and it was only later able to work out an alternative diplomatic approach with the Czech-Greek initiative. Therefore, the main foreign policy actors’ problems primarily derived from lack of clearer definition and debate on the importance and costs of NATO membership, and also unidentified national interests or lack of thereof in the Balkans.

Arguments used in the debate and in justifying foreign policy decisions had been taken out of undefined historical, cultural, humanitarian and even humanist-philosophical (Havel) concerns, while strategic and geographical events were raised together with economic and other objective criteria that are usual in defending and implementing the foreign policy goals of a state. Psychological anxiety and the feeling of an inability to influence key decisions had also played a role. Czech public and political sentiment was reliving the old days of de facto ultimatums for the execution of policies ordered from Moscow or elsewhere that it could not influence (e.g. the Czech de ja vue of Munich in 1938 and Prague 1968). This psychological Angst manifested itself most vividly in the discontent and disillusion of Czechs with the performance of their political elite to manage a crisis-situation. This again actualised the feeling of the inability of an ordinary citizen to influence a political agenda and accelerated the general feeling of the already existing alienation between the electorate and the political elite that could communicate sensibly only at the time of elections. Finally, the strong-weak dialectic also might better explain the Government's behaviour vis-à-vis the foreign expectations of its allies and vis-à-vis possible realisation of desired goals that could be reached only by way of foreign (Western) approval.

Stronger and more articulate voices against the intervention came from the intellectual ranks. The most striking and provoking was without a doubt the thesis of a leftist war by Václav Bělohradsky (1999). Many other intellectuals (e.g. Kosík, Macek, Fajmon, Pečinka all in Luňák: 1999) joined him, but as Luňák (ibid.: 7-9) pointed out, all arguments lost weight since they failed in producing a substantive public discussion. Furthermore, the distinction between the support/opposition on the issue of NATO and the support/opposition on the issue of intervention became blurred.

129 This argument has been rather used in two ways, to show factual distance and the absence of a direct threat and to underline historical regional and cultural connection with the Serbs and the region itself.
in the flood of arguments. The former was equaled with the later and the intellectuals as the politicians failed to give a clear signal to the confused public.

The rhetorical support for the professed and desired objectives that were unclearly defined or rather based on the lack of experience before the intervention led to a reality-check. Although its interests were basically similar its shape took a different form precisely because of different history, culture and identity. Across the political spectrum, arguments produced in the debate were based on Czech ideas of the ideological, moral and realistic conceptions of the world. The liberal camp made a compelling case that the main issue for the Czech Republic was credibility within NATO. However, it mostly resorted to humanistic and moral arguments, such as “display of loyalty” (Lobkowicz (1999), member of the US), “the war of freedom against communism as the later represents denial of same rights and freedoms to the citizen as a systematic slaughter of human rights by the Milošević regime” (Jan Ruml (1999), leader of the US) and “the war against evil, which must be confronted no matter its scale” (Petr Pithart (1999a,b), leader of the KDU-ČSL). The peak of Klaus’ arguments took the ordinary populist form with a display of typical totalitarian and parochial characteristics of discourse by building one’s position on negating and offending the opponent, without providing any alternative for a possible solution. However, Klaus’ arguments in content stumbled upon some profound questions that were calling for an answer, e.g. lacking definition of Czech interest in the Balkans as well as their policy within NATO it was to pursue. Lastly, the discourse of the ruling party with the other domestic and foreign actors as well as within its rank and file took on an ideologised form, which was stronger only in the Communist camp. Zeman’s autocratic rhetoric (e.g. he often used terms such as troglodytes, terrorists, fools ) and Kavan’s pragmatic and careful rhetorical statements were showing two faces of the same logic of thinking and acting. This highlighted the obvious problems Czech foreign policy was facing in applying the out-of-date mental-schemes of thinking and debating on wholly new situations that in turn hindered its ability to cope with them more independently and actively.

130 Similar are already mentioned observations by Petr Luňák (1999: 7-9).
5.2. THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

The first conclusion about Slovenia’s behaviour can be that it reflected the expectations according to its set foreign policy agenda. In short, behaviour had been realigned with its striving towards NATO membership, while we have seen the lack of debate or consensus formation with regard to an independent Balkan policy. The executive (the President, the Prime Minster and the MoFA) was performing vast diplomatic effort in various multilateral forums (e.g. SC, EU, NATO). The Parliament and the general public meanwhile largely remained coy throughout the intervention. They were only briefed by actions undertaken by the Government but not taken into account when taking them. Past burdens connected to the troubled region and a general lack of consensus on a coherent foreign policy at that time were hindering identification of Slovenian interests in the Balkans. It did however, open some intrinsic questions that Slovenia would have to deal with before becoming a member of NATO (e.g. the participation of its soldiers in peacekeeping corps and the stationing of foreign combat troops on its territory).

The lack of a thorough debate on the Balkans and NATO pointed to the deeper problem of the political elite to generate a foreign policy consensus. In comparison to the SECI, Slovenia this time clearly knew what its strategic partners (especially here the US) expected of the country, if it was to successfully join their ranks. It is probably no coincidence that on 17 December the same year the Slovenian Parliament had approved *The Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia*, its first coherent foreign policy platform. This had clearly anchored the already set pro-Western foreign policy course, however, for the first time also envisioning a more active engagement in the Balkans.

5.2.1. GEGRAPHICAL FACTORS

Obvious geographical factors put Slovenia in a position so that it could not ignore the situation in the FRY and Kosovo. The growing refuge influx and pressure for burden sharing among affected states, concerns over increased illegal trade in arms, crime and the spread of infectious diseases as reported posed further reasons for concern and action to secure stability and security of the country. The latter had, however, never been directly threatened by the Kosovo conflict itself. Furthermore,
Javier Solana Secretary General of NATO and the US President Clinton gave assurances to the Government that NATO forces would defend Slovenia in case of an outright attack on its territory.  

5.2.2. LEGAL FACTORS

Slovenia hadn’t set any clear guidelines for the legal norms to be observed during NATO operations. However, principles that were to be observed in drafting its position in the SC encompass respect for the UN Charter and basic principles of international law such as morality, equity and justice (Report of the MoFA 1998, 1999: 59). Its behaviour did not correspond to the above outlined norms it set. It rather followed US policy as the decisive policy-maker on the issue. Slovenia vigorously defended NATO intervention in the SC debate and its multilateral efforts. The arguments put forward based on tenuous legal grounds (e.g. disrespect for the SC resolutions, which, however, had not given a clear mandate to NATO operations). Domestically, some parliamentarians (e.g. Jelinčič, Janša) raised legal considerations when the power of the Parliament to approve the use of its airspace has been overridden. But as Bučar and Šterbenc (2002) observed the question was never thoroughly explored as a high political risk, i.e. NATO membership was involved.

5.2.3. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FACTORS

Observed negative economic effects and the military threat, however small, of the spread of the conflict prompted the Slovenian Government to remain seized of the matter and to support all multilateral efforts for an immediate and peaceful diplomatic resolution with as little blood spilled as possible (it did so mainly as the non-permanent member of the SC). As during the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia, Slovenian tourism suffered the most significant losses compared to other sectors of the economy. The Government took several measures to counter these negative trends such as subventions, removing visa and other barriers to entry. The other

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132 E.g. see Škoda zaradi vojne (Damage due to war) (1999). Delo Vol. (41) 73, 31 March, 3; Zaradi vojne v ZRJ odpovedi turistov. (Tourist cancellations due to war in FR Yugoslavia) (1999). Delo Vol. (41) 76, 2 April, 8.
sectors had managed to substitute the loss of Yugoslav markets with EU and CEFTA markets.

5.2.4. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN POLITICAL DEBATE AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE

Political parties, unusual for foreign policy issues in the past, held similar views or at least abstained from issuing criticism about the actions of the executive. The only discrepancy worth mentioning was that of Janez Janša, leader of the opposition SDS. While as other politicians supporting the intervention itself, he criticized the lack of more active conduct of Slovenian foreign policy by the Government. Its special know-how about the history and culture of the parties involved in the conflict and the personality of Milošević could, in his opinion, have helped NATO advance to its ultimate goal, i.e. ousting Milošević from power. He also voiced criticism about the procedural handling of the Government, when approving use of its airspace by NATO aircrafts. The position of the SNS and its leader Zmago Jelinčič Plemeniti had been expected, since the party had also opposed the country’s membership in NATO. His party disapproved of NATO operation without the SC mandate and Government’s policy, which in his opinion did not represent the Slovenian national interests that should strive for reconciliation and improvement of the non-existent bilateral relations with the FRY. Despite these discrepancies, consensus or to a point even indifference can only be understood as a reflection of the support by the Parliament that it had already given to the Government in pursuance of NATO membership and not as a newly emerged consensus on the policy towards the Balkans, which was still lacking.

The general impression of a coordinated action among the constitutional foreign policy pillars (the President, the Prime Minister, the MoFA and the Parliament) was based on the identification of strategic interests and standpoints on the issue, i.e. NATO membership. Looking at them procedurally and structurally, however, they

134Shod brez strankarskih prvakov. Mirna zbiranja in javna zborovanja so po mnenju vseh demokratična oblika izražanja mnenja (Gathering without party leaders. Peaceful gathering and public association democratic way of expressing ones opinion according to all) (1999). Dnevnik, 31 March.
135E.g. see Joint statement of Slovenian parliamentarians in support of Slovenia joining the NATO Alliance, 10 November 1996.
have been taken up based on personal initiatives (e.g. Drnovšek’s personal mediation with the Kosovar leaders, Kučan’s initiatives on the CEE countries’ meeting in Lvov) rather than relying on a coordinated foreign policy decision-making process with the MoFA and to some part the Parliament. That is also why an impression about a consolidated position is false, when one is taking into account the general structure and conduct of inner institution and political decision-making. It is a characteristic of a small decision-making system that decisions tend to be based on personal choices of decision-makers and therefore are less transparent. (Bučar, 2001: 150) However, bearers of foreign policy except for the Parliament, actually worked and were able to produce similar outcomes (we can actually say that the foreign policy actors spoke with one voice), as it would be in the case of coordinated and well-planned action.

While Slovenian politicians might have seized the opportunity pragmatically to lend usefulness to the world’s policy makers and be reactive to the challenges from the external environment as in the past (Bučar and Brinar, 1993: 443), it had nevertheless done this in a reluctant way. Base on the analyzed foreign policy text used in our analysis, it can be inferred that the Government offered its good offices to the Western diplomats only upon their request. The experience of Slovenian officials with Serbian politicians, Milošević personally and established contacts and understanding for the Albanian position seemed a valuable asset at the height of the diplomatic activity in Rambouillet. It was a time when alternatives were running short and such experience could have enabled Western pressure to be utilized with most effect on both sides. In issues controversial for the Government domestically, e.g. receiving additional numbers of refugees that was meeting with growing public disapproval, the Government would act only in following suit to the EU and other non-EU West countries. This would facilitate arguments for taking controversial decisions and to disable criticism of the unpopular decisions it had to take in pursuance of its strategic goals.

Marjeta Douponova Horvat (1999) showed that the media in general and editorial policies during the Kosovo crisis and intervention reflected incoherence and disdain of Slovenian policy towards the issue. This manifested itself in traditional identity and cultural traits when describing the alleged victims and perpetrators. This was ultimately aiming at psychologically distancing Slovenia from the conflict by way of strong-weak argumentation. The general public raised little dissent on Slovenia’s policy or the general NATO policy. Dissenting voices were raised in the Serbian
community, due to obvious personal connections. When the actions failed to produce fast results marginal dissent came from Neutro; a society that focuses on informing the general public and campaigning against Slovenia’s NATO membership. Ever since, controversies in and around the intervention were used as one of its main arguments why Slovenia should not join NATO.

We have observed that the intervention initiated little debate on substantial issues either in the general public or among the political parties. Nevertheless, available foreign policy and other documents from that time point to several conclusions about the influence of traits of traditional political culture and national identity in Slovenia’s foreign policy. The debate and lack of thereof in public and among political elite as well as the positions drawn to defend the policy course set by the executive have been primarily dictated by the pragmatic need to accord its actions with its strategic partners. Furthermore, it had been dictated by lacking foreign policy consensus on a region intrinsically connected to Slovenia’s past and probably its future.

Two distinctive elements have been reflected in the existing political culture and the state of national identity through the lack of foreign policy consensus on the Balkans. One of primary and strongest constructive elements of Slovenian national and political identity after independence has been the commonly identified and built on anti-Yugoslav/Balkan sentiments and experience versus the desired European/Western identity that it was reflected in its culture, traditions and way of thinking. (Bebler, 1994/95: 28-30; Hansen, 1993: 13-17; Plavšak, 2001: 81) The meaning of the Balkans in Slovenian mind has similarly as in Europe became a dumping ground of negative characteristics juxtaposed to the positive and self-satisfactory mirror image of ‘Europeaness’ and ‘the West’. (Todorova, 2001: 287) Close historical contact further complicates relations of Slovenian national identity to the Balkans. While past Slovenian sentiments might have been negative in excluding the Balkans from Europe (Hansen, 1993:14), relations to the future in the Balkans

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136 Kolenc (1993) discovered in his extensive research that traditional patterns of political culture have been preserved in Slovenia. He found the following characteristic to be typical for Slovenian political culture: egocentric personality, social, political and national characteristics and orientations as narrow loyalty, patriarchy, displayed in respect for hierarchical relations within the family, social and political life, subordination of children and socialisation towards obedience and subjugation to authority, high value of honour, reputation, wealth and orientations towards success, envy and mischief. Further, conformity, uniformity in thinking towards identical and exclusivity towards difference of options in political life and thinking that further limits the ability to arrive at consensual and compromising positions. Lukšič (1992) discovering similar patters explains that these elements have historically evolved already in pre-communist times. Communism might have served as a ‘new façade’ for old communal patterns of behaviour that comprehend individual only as a part of a community versus the liberal conception of the freedom of individual.
were stressed in its ‘coming to Europe’ but only ‘if Europe comes to the Balkans’ first. (Kučan, 1999c)

In our research, at any point when Slovenia would be connected to the troubled region in terms of needing help or other kind of ‘treatment’ from the West, its politicians would be swift to protest and point to the obvious differences between Slovenia and other countries in the region (e.g. negotiations on the Stability Pact). However, an interesting interplay of issues occurred. The undesirable former Balkan identity acquired a negative form in determining Slovenian policy thus far. At the same time Slovenian officials were trying to show its ability to stand up to the test as a credible candidate for NATO membership, which obviously was defined within the positive identity pole of the desired future. As the West gave clear signals that Slovenia’s useful know-how of the Balkans might improved its chances for achieving its desired goal. Paradoxically, the Balkans more than before proved to be a possible entry ticket for NATO membership. Furthermore, one of commonly used arguments for Slovenia’s support for the NATO operations as its confirmation of its adherence to civilised rules of peaceful resolution and preparedness for co-operation (e.g. Kučan, 1999b). Empirically, the above argument can also be easily confirmed. As was in the case of SECI in 1997, Slovenia again received incentives to engage itself more actively, first in form of a letter, later a visit by the US President Clinton on 21 June and a NATO defense guarantee. With the incentive, however, there was now a possible reward, i.e. its primary foreign policy goal, NATO membership. Slovenia acted, therefore, accordingly.

The selection of rhetoric and the arguments used to defend Slovenia’s position depended on the audience. In the SC sessions Slovenian position stressed the need, but not the necessity, of the SC authorisation of the NATO campaign. The rhetoric used was surprisingly strong and clear in its purpose. This was to support, however it tried to balance positions of the permanent members, the US position. The Government and other foreign policy actors primarily used non-objective reasons for supporting the NATO-lead actions based on proximity of experience, re-living and visualisation of what Serbian nationalist policy might inflict on Slovenia in a worst-case scenario. Furthermore, moral and humanitarian grounds were among the strongest components determining the position as well as references to being “duty bound to help the people of the Balkans to find a formula for a life together”. (Kučan, 1999c) Therefore, the traditional political culture shaped the discourse and determined
the entry points of reference as well as the rhetoric manifested and the shape of debate.

Similarly important, the strong/weak historical discourse caused psychological anxieties that reverberated only indirectly in media and society, which understood the position of the Government as being ready to serve other countries and especially big powers' (e.g. the US, Germany) interest. This feeling was further connected with the struggle of coping with the historical experience of being neglected or pushed into an undesired position, the feeling of an inability to influence the outcomes or to employ strategies to use policy-maker polices to one own’s advantage.

Conclusively, we can say that the intervention might have been one of the reasons in finally generating wide enough political support to adopt a first coherent foreign policy strategy on 17 December 1999. If nothing else, it was for the first time able to define some basic interests in the Balkans. In short, the Balkans was defined as an area where Slovenia could prove its preparedness as a credible candidate for NATO membership. Independently, succession issues as well as future political, security and economic interests are to be pursued in multilateral engagements (i.e. the Stability Pact) and in advancing bilateral relations with all states and especially with striving to normalise relations with Serbia and the FRY.

5.3. COMPARISON OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

Finally, we have arrived at a stage, where some conclusions as to the similarities and differences in foreign policy behaviour of both states can be observed.

First, their geographical distance, e.g. proximity to the region, where the conflict was taking place, determined the preparedness of both countries when the issue took hold of the international agenda in January 1999. Similarly, economic and security factors played a role not only in their preparedness to involve themselves in the solving of the crisis but also interests or lack of thereof that both countries had in the region. However, primarily fora for raising such concerns were sessions of the Government (e.g. session on 25 March and 22 April). Here, the Czech Republic was faced with a position different from Slovenia's. The latter’s connection to the region has been vital in its political, economic, cultural and social life for almost a 100 years, while the former’s connection had been sporadic and based on more particular
interests. For all of the above-mentioned reasons, Slovenia could not have ignored the problem in Kosovo, while the Czech Republic managed to push it to the periphery of its foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, the timing and degree of the involvement into the crisis and its solution, therefore, depended heavily on geographical factors.

Similarly, although to a different degree, both lacked a clearly defined and viable policy towards the region. Slovenia’s policy was, in short, based on its need to tackle problems arising from succession of the SFRY as well as to secure stability and peace in the region, the lack of which, negatively influenced its economy. Czech policy was based on pragmatism and projected economic opportunities that would utilize the past Slavic friendship and Czech knowledge of the region. The Czech Republic’s foreign policy before the crisis, dealing with an array of problems deriving from its independence and the subsequent need to establish and confirm its position in the world, could be anticipated. Slovenia’s pragmatic policy of distance and only multilateral diplomatic engagement, however, was harder to explain in terms of distance and economic interest factors.

The Kosovo crisis and especially the involvement of NATO by military means, brought a wholly new perspective and interests involved for both countries. The Czech Republic entered NATO on the wake of the intervention, while Slovenia being rejected in the first round of enlargement needed to secure fulfillment of all the criteria for the anticipated second round. Therefore, both foreign policy preoccupations at the very time of the launch of the campaign have been the need to prove its capability to stand up to the test of credibility and loyalty to NATO. And more subtly, both professed adherence to the values of the Western/European civilization were put to the ultimate test. In the Czech Republic the NATO intervention facilitated a clearing ground, where ideas and conceptions of what was desired and striven for met the undesired consequences and side effects this could demand. It was a situation where Czech society was presented with a mirror reflection of itself and finally given a chance to rethink illusions it fostered of ‘the desired’, i.e. NATO. Both small and newly emerged states, their foreign policy activity was not only a function of the development of their societies (Bučar, 1992: 485) but more so a reflection of their distinct national identities. In Slovenia, where the identity and policy formation based itself on the discourse between the Balkans identity and the Western/European one, the Kosovo crisis and the experience during the intervention equally facilitated the possibility for Slovenian society and especially for its political
elite to conclude that the illusion of evading and negating its Balkan past would upgrade chances for its Westernisation (e.g. more engagement in the Balkans offered better chances for NATO membership). The need to exclude itself from the Balkan experience after its independence can be partly justified and understood, by the need for a new country to position itself onto the political map from oblivion and distance itself from the past. But for any long-term definition of its foreign policy a haphazard and non-defined policy in the region could prove to be harmful.

Both national identities and political cultures were beset with historical experience based on the lack of a strong state tradition, communist totalitarian regimes that further amplified traits of little-ness, parochialism, pragmatism, narrow-mindedness and transitional state of the national mind. National identity and culture confronted with an entirely new historical situation significantly influenced the reactions and behaviour of both states during the crisis and intervention. Both the rhetoric and arguments used in discussing, defending or opposing the issue of intervention as well as on the resolution of the conflict similarly displayed traits of tradition political culture, while in each country materialized in a distinctive way. In the Czech Republic, where both the political elite and society were deeply split on the Kosovo problem and intervention, the influence of traditional political culture could be extensively observed in shaping the debate that used the media as the ultimate tool of communication. In terms of identity, the NATO illusions were crushed by the obvious display of differences in Czech perception of the Kosovo crisis and subsequent needs and Czech participation in NATO-led operations. While, Western/European identity has not been challenged or transformed, the Czechs did realize that their historical experience has necessarily influenced some differences in their identity as opposed to the Western/European. This was, however, not in terms of opposition to it but more in terms of degree and distinctiveness of particular elements/traits.

In Slovenia, the political culture shaped the pursuance and naturally expected behaviour towards the Kosovo problem and NATO intervention. In terms of national identity an interesting two-fold effect was its consequence. The Western/Europe identity has been confirmed by its self-assertions and confirmation from the West. Secondly, this fact prompted a shift in foreign policy orientation towards a more engaged policy (e.g. the Stability Pact), since the need of Slovenian identity to be based exclusively on the diametric opposition of Western versus Balkan identity was now weakening with a parallel more engaged European policy in the Balkans.
Conclusively, in both countries there was lack of clearly identified foreign policy interests and goals as well as lack of general foreign policy consensus on the Balkans. But since NATO involvement happened in the Balkans, their regional policy was determined by their strategic partners and the goal of NATO membership.

Theoretically, several material/objective factors were being considered when trying to find causes and conditions for the foreign policy behaviour of the Czech Republic and Slovenia. We have also shown that ideas as embodied in national identity and political culture had an impact as road maps for the foreign policy behaviour of the Czech Republic and Slovenia. The pro-Western foreign policy orientation that emerged in both countries soon after independence was not based only on material factors, but also on the need to find and confirm their own identity and role in the world. Initially, other security options from independent to pan-European security frameworks had been explored in both countries. NATO, however, was chosen only later, based on consideration of set of material factors as well as the desire to become part of the West through joining its most important institutions, among them NATO.

Other foreign policy areas such as politics towards the Balkans remained obscured, since it embodied issues of the past from which both countries were trying to move away. Once both states limited their choice towards pro-Western policy this turned into a road map for their future strategies, means and limits for their expected behaviour. This choice was put to the test during NATO intervention. While in the Czech Republic we have seen the Government’s actions, no matter how they were arrived at and how they were defended, reflect this choice. While at least at the time of the intervention NATO membership has been primary understood as constraint on independent and more neutral action, it also determined means and strategies to be employed by the Government. When decisions would be countered, the Government officials would be quick to invoke their obligation under NATO. There were also discrepancies and dissent that emerged among the politicians and public, which reflected competed notions and ideas of the Czechs about the role of their country in NATO and the Balkans, as well as on the structural problems and solutions to the conduct of foreign policy. In Slovenia, however, NATO intervention did not provide a constraint but an opportunity to advance its goal of becoming a member of NATO. Similarly as in the Czech Republic, a choice for NATO membership soon after Slovenia’s independence was based on material factors, while also marking the desire for final confirmation of its Western identity. Its Balkan past with the conflicting
parties was being denied in as much it did not serve to further this goal. While in the
Czech Republic the past had to some extent played a different role, e.g. it had raised
dissent as to the cost the country would be prepared to bare for its Western oriented
policy. In both, the past had nevertheless opened new opportunities for furthering
their attained or aspired goal of NATO membership and broader goal of inclusion into
political and economic institutions of the West.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS OR PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Two issues had been raised during the Kosovo crisis and the NATO intervention. First, there was the existence and definition of a regional policy of both states, with special emphasis on the turbulent Balkans (i.e. existence of a viable Balkan policy). Second, there was their policy towards the West and NATO (the main issue that dictated actual behaviour) membership as a vital goal defined in both states. The foreign policy behaviour of the Czech Republic and Slovenia on both issues has been reactionary rather than predetermined in its articulation, while it nevertheless followed and reflected their choice for NATO. NATO policy, however, had not been clearly outlined apart from the attainment of membership. Primarily because of those two main characteristics and other deeper problems besetting their foreign policy the strategic options for greater activity during the diplomatic phase, when the West was dealing with the issue only selectively and case of emergency, had not been fully exhausted by both states. (Re)actions were initiated and prompted by the choice of NATO rather than by independent and coherent foreign policy course. Such a strategy could have proved to be very valuable as both possessed experience and other knowledge (e.g. language, culture, economy) about the region. Slovenia as the non-permanent member of the SC at the time of the crisis did partly utilise this ‘special know-how’. However, because of a lack of strategic definition of interest in the region and its clear articulation based on independent assessment rather than on projections of what is expected from ‘the outside’ and desired from ‘the inside’, both states’ reactions had been mainly under the influence of their pro-Western orientation as embodied in attained or desired NATO membership.

In the past years we have witnessed changes in regard to the issue of NATO membership and the wider definition and position of both states’ interests in the West. However, we are yet to see a move to a more consistent, viable and actively defined foreign policy of both states in the Balkans. The last, is in author’s belief, needed for identifying Czech and Slovenian ‘space in the world’ and in utilising the special role they could play in the CFSP that is presently taking over the steering wheel from the US in the Balkans. Furthermore, they could contribute immensely in laying a firm ground for a long-term regional stability and prosperity that should build on applying Western models of societal, economic and political life only by way of taking into account its distinctive history, culture and (regional and national) identities.
7. SUMMARY/POVZETEK

V diplomski nalogi smo skozi študijo primera NATO intervencije na Kosovu primerjali obnašanje zunanje politike v Češki Republiki in Republiki Sloveniji. S tem smo najprej poskušali primerjati pričakovano obnašanje politično obnašanje kot ga je definiral dan pravni in politični okvir v posamezni državi s konkretnim obnašanjem v času intervencije. Sledila je analiza faktorjev, s katero smo preučili vpliv materialnih oz. objektivnih (npr. geografski položaj, pravni, ekonomski in vojaški) in nematerialnih oz. (inter)subjektivnih (npr. nacionalna identiteta in politična kultura) faktorjev na dano zunanjepolitično obnašanje. Pri tem nam je kot teoretičen in metodološki okvir služila šudija Goldsteina in Keohanea (1993:3-84) o vplivu idej v zunanji politiki. Slednja sta na podlagi empiričnih proučevanj med drugim definirale vlogo idej, kamor spadata tudi nacionalna identiteta in politična kultura, kot zemljevidov, ki vodijo izbiro zunanje-političnih prioritet in s tem tudi strategij in načine za njihovo uresničevanje. Ugotovili smo, da je bilo formalno zunanjepolitično obnašanje v obeh državah v skladu s pričakovanim, vendar so se pojavili problemi, ki so po naših ugotovitvah odražali dano politično kulturo in nacionalno identiteto. S tem smo potrdili začetno domnevo, da zunanjepolitično obnašanje obeh držav v veliki meri lahko pojasnimo z materialnimi oz. objektivnimi faktorji, vendar pa večjo razlagalno težo nosi vključitev (inter)subjektivnih oz. nematerialnih faktorjev v analizo. Slednji odražajo glavno problematiko, ki sta jo državi sicer kasneje uspeli v veliki meri preseči, t.j. pomanjkanje konsenca o identificiranih in definiranih zunanjepolitičnih interesih in ciljih na splošno, in posebej na Balkanu. V zaključku je avtorica sklenila, da regionalna politika obeh držav do Balkana ne bo diktiralo samo članstvo v NATU, ampak bo z vstopom v EU to njuno primarno področje delovanje v okrepljeni Skupni zunanji in varnostni politiki.
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