

UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE

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Strategies of truths?

Strategije resnic?

Diplomsko delo

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ZAHVALA

*A Spacious Hive well stock'd with Bees,
That lived in Luxury and Ease;
And yet as fam'd for Laws and Arms,
As yielding large and early Swarms;
Was counted the great Nursery
Of Sciences and Industry.
No Bees had better Government,
More Fickleness, or less Content.
They were not Slaves to Tyranny,
Nor ruled by wild Democracy;
But Kings, that could not wrong, because
Their Power was circumscrib'd by Laws.*

(Bernard de Mandeville 1714)

Vsem mojim Staršem, še posebej pa mami in očetu ter njej.

STRATEGIES OF TRUTHS?

The preface of our paper briefly touches on a pair of influential contemporary discourses in the field of International Relations, the theses on the *End of History* and the *Clash of Civilizations*; while trying to relativize some of their postulates via an examination of the ambiguity of the Confucian civilization's legacy. The main part of our work exposes and juxtaposes some theoretical premises involved in the abovementioned theses with the analytics of Michel Foucault, namely his *archeology of knowledge* and *genealogy of power*. This analytical pair deals with "the social" not in terms of historically progressive evolution, forestalled only by negative effects of power relations, but suggests a temporarily, spatially and spherically delimited analysis of constellations of different strategies of truths. In the conclusion we have briefly indicated the necessity of a thorough acquaintance with Foucault's statements prior to any independent foucauldian analytics, including an analysis of the international.

Key words: archeology, genealogy, knowledge, power, strategies of truths

STRATEGIJE RESNIC?

Uvod diplomskega dela na kratko oriše par pomembnih diskurzov na polju mednarodnega, tezi o *koncu zgodovine* in *spopadu civilizacij*; zaključili pa z relativizacijo vsebovanih predpostavk prek osvetlitve dvoumnosti zapuščine Konfucijske civilizacije. Osrednji del zoperstavi nekatere teoretične premise uvodnih diskurzov analitiki Michela Foucaulta, bolj natančno njegovi artikulaciji *arheologije* in *genealogije*, metodama preučevanja vzajemne postavitve in delovanja *vednosti* ter *konstelacij oblastnih razmerij*. Namesto analiz družbenega, ki slednje preučujejo prek predpostavk progresivnega zgodovinskega napredka, ki pa je vendarle otežen z negativnimi učinki oblastnih odnosov, naša diplomska naloga ponuja pregled analitike časovno, prostorsko ter sferično zamejenih konstelacij bojev med različnimi strategijami resnic. V zaključku se diplomska naloga vrne v polje mednarodnega ter nakaže zakaj naj bi temeljito poznavanje Foucaultovih izjav predhodilo njihovi uporabi v samostojnih analizah, vključno seveda s sfero mednarodnih odnosov.

Ključne besede: arheologija, genealogija, vednost, oblast, strategije resnic

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1 PROLEGOMENON

Yesterday has come anew, unpretentiously as always, wearing fresh second-hand clothes, personalized to fit her character. It was clear from the start that it was just a visit, she was not going to stay long, then again, she never does. Even if only momentarily, this visit made us feel good, at ease with ourselves, confident, for a moment even invincible. We are talking about that Yesterday, when, as *The Beatles* put it, on some different day, our ‘troubles seemed so far away’. And in fact it even might have been yesterday, that an unquestionable certainty, one could call it faith, could be felt in our society. The world was considered ‘thought-through’, the only thing needed were certain cosmetic modifications or even just the full hearted defense of the already existing.

The day after, we woke to the news of a new battlefield which signaled that this time, things are getting serious: to *the Clash of Civilizations* we have added an *Inconvenient Truth*¹ revealing a *Planet in Peril*² and to make things worse, just when some were proclaiming that a tranquil *End of History*³ was turning from an utopia into a mirage and from a mirage into a reality, the blurry spot that ended up being ‘that thing’ on the horizon was *Le krach du libéralisme*.⁴

What are we to make of this ‘severe’ level of alertness we have woken up into? Is our reality in fact so gloomy, was yesterday really so wonderful and is tomorrow indeed so categorically uncertain? Are we facing ‘eternal condemnation’ or are we falling into a ‘pit of doom’ only to find a trampoline at the bottom that will launch us to yet greater heights and reveal new horizons? Answering this question is not the purpose of this paper, on the contrary, we believe that this kind of ‘future predicting enterprises’ should be considered peripheral to most philosophical or political investigations, for as it seems, *Yesterdays* have hardly ever kept their capitals and after *Today* there was (at least for now) always *a tomorrow*.

¹ See Huntington (1993) and Gore (2006) respectively.

² An influential CNN television program covering the topic of environmental conflicts. For further information see: Cable News Network (2009).

³ See Fukuyama (1989).

⁴ *Le Monde diplomatique*'s bimonthly supplement ‘*Manière de voir*’, N. 102 (Déc 2008 – Jan 2009).

1.1 IS THAT *ALL* FOLKS?

[...] it's fashionable to make fun of Fukuyama now,
Ooh, that idiot who thought history is over.
But aren't we all today, de facto, even the leftists,
what would be the adverb, Fukuyamaists?
Žižek (2009)

With labeling himself '*Fukuyamaist*', we believe that Žižek was trying to partly support Fukuyama's main thesis, namely, that we may be witnessing "an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism" (Fukuyama 1989, 1), while not necessarily confirming that this represents the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (ibid.). Since both Fukuyama and Žižek are known for their controversial and provocative styles of statement-making, both the original hypothesis and its subsequent 'confirmation' by Žižek are in need of some clarification.⁵

As Fukuyama elaborates in his text for *The National Interest*, he believes, that we are witnessing an advent of a "de-ideologized world" (ibid., 14). *Fascism and Marxism-Leninism*, the main adversaries of what he calls the 'liberal' paradigm, have died away and the (in)famous 'irresolvable internal contradictions' of capitalism, as the materialization of 'liberal' consciousness and idea(l)s, are nowhere to be found. He does admit however, that an expansion of 'religious fundamentalism' or "nationalism and other forms of racial and ethnic consciousness" (ibid., 13) is in fact a possibility, but sees these movements as being benign in the long run.

While Fukuyama does not rule out "the sudden appearance of new ideologies or previously unrecognized contradictions in liberal societies", he still subscribes to a Kojévian reading of Hegel that does not see any significant advance in "the fundamental principles of sociopolitical organization [...] since 1806" (ibid., 14). Contrary to

⁵ Žižek recently stated that "While liberalism is presenting itself as the embodiment of 'anti-utopia' and neo-liberalism as the sign of a new era of humanity, that renounced utopian projects which are to blame for totalitarian horrors of the 20th century; it is now more and more clear, that the time or real utopia were Clinton's nineties, with their conviction, that we have reached 'the end of history' (Fukuyama), that humanity has found the formula for an optimal socio-economic order" (Žižek 2008, 2).

common belief, this state of affairs is not a positive one for Fukuyama, since he declares that the end of history will be “a very sad time” (ibid., 17) and finishes his text with the following timid plea: “Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again” (ibid., 19).

Many things have been said and written on this thesis announcing the *End*, or perhaps even more accurately, a *Pause* of History. Renowned scholars have pointed to certain lacunae in Fukuyama’s premises and interpretations, some were more harsh than others.⁶ Nevertheless, all of these authors felt the need to engage in a dialogue with this daring statement, no matter how true or false they took it to be, which means that at the end of the day it should be taken and examined seriously. Its theoretical premises must be studied carefully, presuppositions that were faithfully followed through must be acknowledged, and those that were not approached critically enough to begin with, and whose practical implications are therefore necessarily lacking in reach, exposed. But above all it must be emphasized that the mere fact that some of Fukuyama’s conclusions make us feel uncomfortable, does not make them false, or even better, they cannot be dismissed solely on the grounds of our aesthetic disapproval or a judgment of radical improbability.

As we have outlined above, Fukuyama is putting forward an argument for a possible advent of the *End*, or *Pause* of History. He bases his premise on a particular interpretation of the writings of Georg W. F. Hegel, namely that of an influential Russian born French scholar Alexandre Kojève. A reading of Hegel’s works that interprets History as “a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle and an end” (ibid., 2) is indeed not an uncommon one. The central agent of History’s progressive evolution is supposed to be the consciousness of mankind which is to “culminate in an absolute moment – a moment in which final, rational form of society and state became victorious” (ibid.). Kojève and Fukuyama believe, and attribute to Hegel the same belief, that this ‘absolute moment’ was the French Revolution of 1789. With opposing this reading of Hegel to that of Karl Marx, Fukuyama is clearly stating that Marx and the subsequent Marxist line of thought did not interpret Hegel correctly, since they

⁶ Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* can be considered as such a critic, as well as Fareed Zakaria’s article *The Rise of Illiberal Democracy* in *Foreign Affairs* (Zakaria 1997). For perhaps one of the most dismissive critics of Fukuyama see the chapter entitled ‘*conjuring – marxism*’ in Jacques Derrida’s *Spectres de Marx* (Derrida 1994, 49–77).

believed that “the direction of historical development was a purposeful one determined by material forces, and would come to an end only with the achievement of a communist utopia that would finally resolve all prior contradictions” (ibid.).

We do not wish to take sides in this attempt to dismantle the communist paradigm which was present in the *Zeitgeist* of both thinkers: in pre-war France, Fukuyama sees Kojève as one of the philosophers who tried to “save Hegel from his Marxist interpreters” (ibid.) and restore a genuine, correct and true reading of Hegel’s thought (the ‘death of communism’ appeared to be even more evident at the time of Fukuyama’s text in 1989). Neither is our aim to defend a supposedly Marxist or Marx’s interpretation of Hegel. Both approaches have their respective lacunae and strong points. But more importantly they both share the same ‘Achilles heel’: they believe that a ‘correct’ and therefore ‘true’ reading of Hegel is possible, and that they are the only ones that ‘got it right’.

In the first half of the previous century, France was an exceptionally fruitful *milieu* of Hegelian interpretations, within which three main figures can be discerned: Alexandre Koyré, Jean Hyppolite – author of the first French translation of Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and the abovementioned Alexandre Kojève who succeeded Koyré at the *École Pratique des Hautes Études* in Paris as the lecturer on Hegel. These three scholars have influenced most of the subsequent French *intelligentsia* and their lectures were attended, among others, by the likes of Louis Althusser, Raymond Aron, Georges Bataille, André Breton, Jacques Lacan, Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre.⁷

Why this long list of names? Precisely because all of these great names, that could, to rephrase Derrida, represent the French ‘Specters of Hegel’,⁸ had the same tutors on Hegel, yet came to a range of differing conclusions. Some of them even deeply disagreed on the most core elements contingent to Hegel’s thought. If the above premise of Francis Fukuyama is to be faithfully followed through, which of the theses of authors listed above are to be considered “nonsense” (ibid., 12) and which of the challenges

⁷ See Heckman (1984) and Butler (1987).

⁸ An account of this phenomenon is proposed by Judith Butler in her book *Subjects of desire – Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (Butler 1987).

posed by these authors to what Fukuyama calls ‘liberalism’ can be equated to those of a “crackpot messiah” (ibid., 7)?

What are we to do with Althusser’s (1969, 87–128) concept of ‘overdetermination’ or his conceptualization of *Ideology* (1995); the psychoanalysis of Lacan, his theory of *The four discourses* (2008) and the ‘incantation’ he once uttered to a tightly-packed audience attending one of his lectures in 1970: “rhégélez-vous”?⁹ Last but not least, in defining the following words pronounced on the occasion of his Inaugural Lesson at Collège de France by Michel Foucault in 1971 (Foucault 1991, 24):

[...] what I have just attempted to explain in relation to discourse is evidently not faithful to Hegel’s logos. However a real escape from Hegel presupposes an exact evaluation of the weight of this divorce. It presupposes that we know, to what extent Hegel has, perhaps deceivingly, approached us; it presupposes that we know what is still Hegelian in that which allows us to think against Hegel; and it presupposes that we measure the extent to which our barrier against him is perhaps only a trick that he has set against us and behind which he is hiding still and elsewhere [...]

we are apparently left to choose only between blasphemy and madness.

Refraining from making hasty judgments considering the validity of above statements, we will even try to show, how the prevalent conception (one to which we believe Fukuyama can be ascribed to) of ‘accuracy’ assertion, should probably be abandoned for the sake of a different type of analysis of knowledge as such.

Finally, we would like to call attention to the following lines that we believe can be considered as an extremely accurate account of the philosophical stance of Jean Hyppolite, written by the translator John Heckman in the English introduction to his *Genèse et Structure de la Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel*: “The question is whether a given reading of Hegel is arbitrary, or whether it both conforms to the text and is a projection through time of a certain tendency or aspect of Hegel’s work which is illuminated by the current situation” (Heckman in Hyppolite 1984, XVI).

⁹ The quote is taken from Lacan’s seminar entitled *L’envers de la psychanalyse* (lecture of June 17th, 1970). It was brought to our attention by Peter Klepec, who also points out to the ambiguous place Hegel plays in Lacan’s thought since he is (in this particular instance) simultaneously “someone that functions conjointly with the university discourse (perhaps because of his trust in knowledge), as its rule, and as somebody pronouncing its truth” (Klepec 2004, 153).

Another delicate claim in Fukuyama's essay touches on the differing assignments of 'primacy' in the constitution of what might be defined as 'Reality' or 'History'. He challenges the Marxist view that "the direction of historical development" is "a purposeful one determined by material [sic]¹⁰ forces" (Fukuyama 1989, 2). In opposition to a supposedly Marxist line of thought, he sees the determinant factor driving world history elsewhere: "For Hegel, all human behavior in the material world, and hence all human history, is rooted in a prior [sic] state of consciousness". He adds that "consciousness is cause and not effect" and can therefore "develop autonomously from the material world" (ibid., 4).

To reiterate: we have chosen to examine Fukuyama's text alone and do not have any pretensions in resolving the question of primacy of factors in the constitution of world history. While we cannot agree completely with either of the above theses, we believe it necessary to point to what might be seen as a hurried conclusion in the authors interpretation of the 'autonomy' of human consciousness and its ability to develop independently from the 'material world'.

In addition to what many authors have already written on this subject, we would like to direct attention to an entire chapter in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, which is based on transcripts from the philosopher's own notes and those of his students, from lectures made at the University of Berlin during the 1820's. In this chapter, entitled *Geographical Basis of History*, Hegel explains his views on how geography influences and in a certain way conditions particular aspects (of particular nations, peoples etc.) of human consciousness, freedom and world history.

At the outset of these lectures Hegel clearly states his view that "Contrasted with the universality of the moral Whole and with the unity of that individuality which is its active principle, the natural connection [sic] that helps to produce the Spirit of a People, appears an extrinsic element; but inasmuch as we must regard it as the ground on which that Spirit plays its part, it is an essential and necessary [sic] basis" (Hegel 2001, 96).

Nature therefore, or perhaps more accurately, one of its components, geography, is an essential component in the process of the constitution of consciousness or *Spirit*. This

¹⁰ The emphasis in this quotation is ours. All further accentuations bearing the same form [sic] should be considered as such unless otherwise exposed.

does not imply however, that nature is an objective reality according to which consciousness evolves, or an element according to which it is to check its coherence. It should rather be understood as “Spirit, clothing itself in this form of nature” and analyzed in terms of one of the “special possibilities, from which the Spirit of the people in question germinates” (ibid., 96–7).

It seems that Hegel is well aware of the dangers that this sort of invocation of a ‘material’ or natural ‘basis’ of history is susceptible to, since he directly warns against any type of reductionism: “Nature should not be rated too high nor too low: the mild Ionic sky certainly contributed much to the charm of the Homeric poems, yet this alone can produce no Homers” (ibid., 97). He continues explaining his view on particular factors influencing the degree of self-consciousness of particular peoples on different continents and suggests that there are certain natural pre-dispositions that can be thought of as presenting ‘fertile-ground’, for “awakening consciousness takes its rise surrounded by natural influences alone, and every development of it is the reflection of Spirit back upon itself in opposition to the immediate, unreflected character of mere nature” (ibid., 97).

As we have pointed out above, the latter part of our paper was not meant to be a rebuttal of Fukuyama’s theses. We believe that both the American author and his Marxist-Leninist counterparts seem to have succumbed to their respective sirens of determinism, material or that of ideas. We are therefore reluctant to take sides concerning the determining factors that are supposed to be driving world history. What we hope we were able to show in the paragraphs above, is that in all likelihood this question is far more complex than it might seem at first sight and that it probably does not lead to a univocal conclusion or even a straightforward answer.

1.2 DON'T GO AWAY .. WE'VE GOT MORE!

Woman at rally: *I don't trust Obama. I have read about him and he's an Arab.*

Sen. John McCain: *No ma'am, no ma'am. He's a decent family man [...] He's not, thank you.*¹¹

In the fourth year of 'post-history', or to put it in more familiar terms, in 1993, Samuel P. Huntington published an article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled *The Clash of Civilizations?* In this paper, he claims that a significant part of the future of world politics can be comprehended as conflict among differing civilizations and, to a lower degree, cooperation among people within the same civilization.

Many distinguished scholars have written on this matter and we leave it to them to 'diagnose' the validity of Huntington's premises and the accuracy of his conclusions. What we would like to do at this point is to outline some of the possible implications that this paper has for the apprehension of contemporary developments in the field of international relations and the underlying concepts that form an important part of its dynamics.

Huntington's opens his case with a hypothesis that "the fundamental source of conflict in this world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural" (Huntington 1993, 22). He adds strength to this thesis by briefly sketching out a chronology of conflicts since the establishment of the modern Westphalian international system. The line "princes, nation states and ideologies" (ibid., 23) can be linked to three major events in world history, the Peace of Westphalia, the French Revolution and the Cold War. One could interpret this claim by assigning a considerably high level of autonomy in the workings of mechanisms pertinent to economy, ideology and culture. In stretching this hypothesis perhaps even further, it would be possible to claim that a rather clear-cut division can be made between social phenomena that are ideological, others that are economic and the only recently prevailing 'cultural' phenomena.

¹¹ The dialogue originally took place during the 2008 United States Presidential Elections; our quotation is from a Cable News Network (CNN) journalist Cambell Brown's (2008) commentary.

It is possible to defend this view up to a certain degree, and while a thorough overview of the current sociological understanding of *culture* cannot be elaborated at this point, we will nonetheless try to briefly sketch out an argument for a more profound interconnectedness between the spheres of economy, ideology and culture.

Firstly, the presumption that the Cold War was primarily an ideological conflict, should at least be broadened by the recognition that the question of economic organization or to a significant extent even the concept of economy itself, played a substantial role in the ‘ideological’ conflict of that era and must therefore be considered as its constitutive part. It should not be downplayed or viewed as irrelevant to say the least. After all, even if assigning the *Non-Aligned Movement*¹² its place in this ‘ideological’ conflict is certainly debatable, *The New International Economic Order* proposals (United Nations General Assembly 1974) put forward during the 1970’s through the *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*¹³ were a potent statement of that time.

Moreover, since much has been said and written on Huntington’s definition and more or less arbitrary¹⁴ designation of “seven or eight major civilizations” (ibid., 25) we will shortly examine his first argument for the virtually inevitable clash.¹⁵

The author believes that “differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic” (ibid.). Huntington’s ‘civilization’: “[...] views on the relations between God and

¹² Founded in 1955, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was created by countries that at the time considered themselves as not formally aligned with, nor against, any of the major blocks in the Cold War. As Fidel Castro stated in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in his position as NAM chairman on October 12th 1979, the organization’s goal is ensuring “the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security” of member countries in their struggle against “imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as great power and bloc politics” (Castro 1979). For a synchronous ‘insider’s’ account of the movement and the role of one of its founding members within it, see Kardelj’s *Yugoslavia in International Relations and in the Non-Aligned Movement* (Kardelj 1979); furthermore a thorough and systematic description of the NAM, building on a distinction between “the non-alignment as a principle of foreign policy in individual countries and the Non-Aligned as a collective Movement in world politics” (Mazrui 1978, xiii) can be found in Willets (1978).

¹³ The United Nations Conference on Trade and Cooperation (UNCTAD) was created in 1964; its mandate and structure were laid down through a resolution of the General Assembly 1995 (XIX). For the text of the entire resolution see UNGA (1964).

¹⁴ See, among others, reviews of Huntington’s book by Senghaas (1998) and Russett, Oneal and Fox (2000).

¹⁵ Huntington proposes five further ‘facts’ in favor of his argument: the increasing ‘smallness’ of the world; economic modernization and subsequent societal changes which are detaching people from their ‘basic identities’ and weakening the nation state as the pivotal point of identity; the increase in a ‘return to the roots’ phenomenon in non-Western civilizations triggered by the fact that the West is at its power maximum; the specificity of cultural characteristics that are harder to change than political or economic ones; and finally the reality of increasing economic regionalization (Huntington 1993, 25–9).

man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife [...]” (ibid.) could perhaps find its conceptual equivalent in what is commonly referred to as ‘*weltanschauung*’ – a ‘world-view’. He also states that the differences between civilizations are “far more fundamental [sic] than differences among political ideologies and political regimes” (ibid.).

A more detailed account of the fragility of things we consider ‘basic’ and the necessity to ‘break them open’ will be proposed later on, so let us just emphasize (again) the intertwined nature of political ideology, political regimes and civilizations. If we, for now at least, legitimize the use of ‘civilization’ and interpret it in the sense of a ‘*weltanschauung*’, we still find it difficult to subscribe to the hypothesis that the constitution of perceptions with the value of ‘knowledge’ can be separated and treated independently from the political ideology or the political regime in which they have emerged.

In order to avoid that this part of the paper turns into a rebuttal of Huntington’s premises, it is necessary to admit that some of his predictions did indeed turn out to be accurate:

[...] conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict; international relations, historically a game played out within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects; successful political, security and economic international institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization [...] (ibid., 48).

International relations have indeed become a game where non-Western players have emerged and became actors instead of mere objects. They have not yet succeeded in receiving ‘full-membership’¹⁶ but their actions and presence on the international scene are increasingly important. The relative impotence of ‘world-wide’ institutions if

¹⁶ For example the permanent members of the United Nation’s Security Council have not changed from the Second World War, despite numerous claims that its constitution should be altered to account for the new geopolitical reality. One of the most prominent calls for such re-distribution was the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report on UN reform entitled ‘In Larger Freedom’. For the full report see United Nations Secretary General (2005).

compared to the regional economic and political counterparts is also fairly obvious. Yet one can still find several problems in Huntington's presumptions, which could be considered as the cause of failure of his predictions.

First of all, there is the classically realist, even 'reductionist' understanding of power, which became blatantly obvious when the "unrivaled"¹⁷ (ibid., 39) military power of the United States was unable to defeat much smaller and 'weaker' terrorist or guerilla groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another prediction that fell short of its mark is that of the comparatively larger degree of inter-civilization compared to intra-civilization violence. Arguably¹⁸ the bloodiest conflict since the break-up of Yugoslavia is 'intra-Islamic' and has claimed the lives of more than 100.000 civilians, some agencies even suggest that the 'real' death toll might be nearer to 1.000.000 (Opinion Research Business 2007) lives lost in the conflict between the Sunni and Shia 'components' of this 'civilization'; a conflict originally triggered by the American intervention in Iraq in 2003. The last premise that was just recently proven to be, to use an extremely blunt formulation: 'dead wrong', and in Huntington's defense, economy was not his expertise and even economy's 'great minds' "didn't see it coming" (as Paul Krugman wrote in his 2007 article for *The New York Times*), is that "the West faces no economic challenge" (ibid.).

It might be plausible to argue that recent developments in the world of finance and economy do not signal the end of Western predominance. A recent report by the IMF (2009) however estimates that in 2010, economies of developing countries will nevertheless continue to grow almost twice as fast as their 'advanced' counterparts. If we add to the following prediction the fact that China's GDP in terms of purchasing

¹⁷ In order to avoid possible reproaches of "miss-quoting" we are referring to a quotation that goes as follows: "Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled" (Huntington 1993, 39). Even if Huntington did not explicitly write down that it is the US' military power that is unrivaled, it is indeed plausible to assume that the US' military is the most powerful in 'the West' and hence it is likewise unrivaled.

¹⁸ Civil wars in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo are two additional possibilities. In Darfur the death toll seems to have passed 2 million in 2002; and the conflict in Congo (RDC) has cost 2.5 million lives by the end of 2001; this information was gained from Human Security Centre (2005). While the definition of both conflicts is definitely debatable, the former being closer to an 'inter-civilization' and the other to 'intra-civilization' conflict, this fact only shows how such interpretations are extremely precarious.

power parity, combined with that of India and Brazil, is extremely near to that of the United States,¹⁹ the ‘unrivaled’ status of the latter might call for some reconsideration.

Nevertheless, the paper was written a decade before the Second Gulf War and even fifteen years before the ‘Global Financial Crisis’ of 2008. It could be considered a bit harsh to reproach a hypothesis with events that could ‘not be imagined’. But this is precisely the point we are trying to make. Firstly, most of the social phenomena that Huntington dealt with in his article, culture, identity, economy etc. cannot and should not be taken for granted, considered ‘given’, non-relational, or hardly mutable. Furthermore, cultural, political and economic components (this list is far from exhaustive and the concepts should be considered ‘arbitrary’ or the names given to them at least ‘temporary’) of our lives are to be analyzed in their relations, as intertwining and mutable elements, as parts of a structure that is not deterministic, whose *sine qua none* is possibility.

1.3 .. AND MORE ..

One generation plants a tree;
the next sits in its shade.

Chinese Proverb

In 2006 the ‘Confucian civilization’ emitted in 2006 around 6200 megatonnes of CO₂ into our atmosphere, and thus succeeded in surpassing the United States of America in the ‘greatest overall polluter on the planet’ category even earlier than most of the experts predicted (NEAA 2006). British Petrol’s *Statistical Review of World Energy*²⁰ from 2008 shows that in a period of ten years, China has almost doubled its daily oil consumption measured in one thousand barrels units from 4179 units in 1997 to 7855 only a decade later. For the sake of comparison, the United States of America consumed 18621 thousand barrels a day in 1997 and 20698 thousand barrels in 2007. During approximately the same period, China’s government spent 15.7 billion dollars on environmental initiatives (Greenpeace 2008, 9).

¹⁹ Data is taken from a *World Bank* 2007 survey (revised on 17th October 2008).

²⁰ Further information and more valuable data can be accessed through British Petrol (2008).

The *Environmental Performance Index 2008*, a collaboration research project between Yale and Columbia Universities (2008), ranks China as the 105th ‘best’ environmental performer among 149 countries, in a study that examines various indicators, from water resources to biodiversity, exploitation of natural resources and the quality of air. Another study shows that in the period of roughly 40 years China has successfully accomplished its transformation from an ‘ecological debtor’ to an ‘ecological creditor’. According to World Wildlife Fund’s (WWF) annual *Living Planet Report* published in 2008, China’s ecological footprint in relation to its ‘biocapacity’ is greater than 150 %. In 1961, when the country was still a ‘creditor’, it was lower than 50 % (World Wildlife Fund 2008). The WWF measures humankind’s demand on the biosphere in terms of the “area of biologically productive land and sea required to provide the resources we use and to absorb our waste” and defines a country’s footprint as “the sum of all the cropland, grazing land, forest and fishing grounds required to produce the food, fiber and timber it consumes, to absorb the wastes emitted when it uses energy, and to provide space for its infrastructures” (World Wildlife Fund 2008, 14). According to WWF data, humanity’s footprint surpassed the planet’s total capacity during the 1980s. In 2005 it reached a ratio of 13.6 billion global hectares²¹ still available for ‘use’ to human beings in relation to 17.5 billion global hectares that were already in use (ibid.).

In order to avoid possible misinterpretations, we are in no way claiming that the statistics presented above should be uncritically accepted and considered as an objective indicator providing future guidelines for environment related policy-making, nor that China represents the embodiment of the world’s most wanted ‘eco-villain’. We do not agree with the thesis that we should seek, in what is popularly termed ‘eastern philosophy’, the gateway back to a pure and untainted relation with mother-nature; or that on the other hand, ‘Western civilization’ with its Christian tradition and liberal values, consistently following through the principles of enlightenment is progressing more and more, in relation to other peoples, nations, civilizations of the world and will accordingly triumph over the current set-backs which should be considered as the result of misunderstanding, pure manipulations or just an unfortunate set of circumstances.

²¹ A ‘global hectare’ is defined by the WWF as “a hectare with world-average ability to produce resources and absorb wastes” (World Wildlife Fund 2008, 14).

Let us now suppose for a moment, that we consider the aforementioned hypotheses of the two distinguished American scholars to be fully valid and all-encompassing as they claim them to be. To sum them up: *firstly*, that ‘liberalism’, ‘liberal’ democracy and the current economic ‘world-order’ are the peak-point in the evolution of human consciousness, that there are no viable alternatives in sight; *secondly*, a somewhat conflicting claim that culture, as opposed to ideology or economy is the basic and hardly mutable element of different world ‘civilizations’ and it is for that reason that history will continue, its dialectical nature, its conflicting nature materialized in inter-cultural struggles.

What can we therefore make of a country that just hosted the first ‘Green Olympics’ with the famous ‘Water Cube’ structure as one of the best examples of energy saving architecture in the world; a country that cut down the percentage of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, nitric oxide and other inhalable particles in the atmosphere by an average of 13.8 percent in the last six years (Beijing Organization Committee 2008); a country where Shanghai’s local government has undertaken one of the most ambitious environmental projects to date: *Dongtan* – the first eco-city in the world; a country that simultaneously with all of the above environment-friendly projects, is planning a relocation of around 4 million people from more than 200 cities in the next 10 to 15 years in order to compensate for the inhabited land that will be flooded by water with the building of a massive dam named ‘The Three Gorges Dam’ and labeled “*the largest construction in China since the Great Wall*” (Cable News Network 2009)?

Are we to label this schizophrenia, Orwell’s ‘doublespeak’ or just plain hypocrisy? Could the behavior of the ‘Confucian civilization’ in relation to the ancient wisdom quoted above be an international equivalent of the experience described by Ivan Cankar, a Slovenian writer who renounced his mother when she came to visit him in Ljubljana²² where he was studying, in fear that she looked and behaved in a ‘peasant’ manner and would therefore ruin his reputation in this cosmopolitan metropolis? Is it possible to tie this extremely vehement behavior in relation to our planet to the process of commercial and economic opening-up that began at the third plenary session of the Communist party on December 18th 1978 that, among other things, endorsed small-scale private farming, thus abandoning Mao Zedong’s vision of agriculture and industry being

²² For the entire story see Cankar (1948, 35–8).

organized by communities? Why was that decision taken in the first place? Was it because the 'Marxist' idea was proving to be unworkable or was it a sign of a certain 'updating' of that idea in the light of the then contemporary developments in world economy?

Last but not least, how are we to interpret the following words of John Stuart Mill, one of the most influential thinkers in the liberal tradition, a paradigm on which much of our Western civilization's conduct is supposed to be based, a paradigm for which we assume to be the driving force behind the current 'savage capitalism':

If the earth must lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it owes to things that the unlimited increase of wealth and population would extirpate from it, for the mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger, but not a better or a happier population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that they will be content to be stationary, long before necessity compels them to it (Mill 2004, 191)?

The list of similar questions is immense to say the least, and we have no ambition to answer them all, in fact not even a few of them, since this would entail a detailed analysis of the discursive field pertinent to the currently well publicized, dramatized and politically thoroughly utilized battleground of the 'environmental discourse'. We have no intention of siding with any of the two main (and extreme one might add) lines combating in the abovementioned battlefields: neither with the apocalyptic prophecies of eternal damnation of human-kind as a result of pure folly and juvenile irresponsibility reflected in our relation to planet Earth; nor with the 'objective' expert analysis stating that human activity plays no role in changes of temperature on our planet and that the real reasons driving the theory of 'anthropogenic' Global Warming is the enhancement of power and 'jurisdiction' of the United Nations and the gradual establishment of some kind of a world government.²³

We believe that the latter examples of truth-claims can be considered as exhibiting two of the most common fallacies resulting from universal presumptions and therefore transforming their conclusions into universal judgments or truths. The first one bases its strength on the presumption of the 'universality of nature' (nature as true substance and

²³ For further information see Fred Singer's (2008) interview in Mladina entitled *V ozračju bi si morali želeli čim več ogljikovega dioksida*.

aim) from which we have wandered astray and to which we must return by re-inventing ourselves, rediscovering our true ‘essence’ in symbiosis with mother-earth. The other is in a way subscribing to a particular understanding of the enlightenment concept of a ‘*raison tout puissant*’ whose objectiveness can help us see past the clouds that are obstructing reality, the real order of things.

These types of extremes have a tendency to be rather appealing and binary judgments are much easier to make and stick by than more subtle and complex analysis which in the end might even exclude the possibility of positive or objective knowledge intended for use in informed and therefore correct decisions, judgments etc. To these types of intellectual endeavors, whose main purpose is ‘legitimizing what we already know’ we will try to put forward an argument for different guidelines in accordance with which we are to analyze comparable social phenomena. Guidelines which, to put in terms of Georges Canguilhem, encourage “the enterprise, that consists in searching to know how and exactly where it might be possible to think otherwise” (Canguilhem 1989, 11).

1.4 .. AND MORE??

I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.

We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind.

We have before us many, many long months of struggle and of suffering [...]

You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: Victory.

Winston Churchill²⁴

How are we therefore to conceive of reality and how are we to approach the most basic questions that seem to be murmuring ceaselessly in the consciousness of humankind, yet are to be considered as highly differing in their character since they were formulated in various socio-historical contexts?

²⁴ For the entire speech see Churchill (1999).

In the previous segments of our paper we aimed at a sketch that would indicate how such endeavors of ‘sense-searching’ can all too often be based on conceptualizations and presuppositions that were not approached critically enough in the first place, and can therefore easily lead to hurried simplifications, generalizations and universalizations.

The theoretical stances as well as slightly more practical contemporary developments delineated above can be thought of as sharing the following relatively problematic presumptions:

- (a) that ‘truth’ is an ‘universality’ and can therefore be considered, examined, tested and ultimately its essence grasped independently from any socio-historic, political, ideological, economic, aesthetic or other pertinent contextual factors;
- (b) that knowledge, which stems from this ‘grasping of truth’ and can therefore consequently lead to newer and progressively ‘higher’ forms of truth and consciousness, is, can be, and should be, objective;
- (c) the conception of power as being predominantly vertical, essentially repressive and embodied in particular institutions – power as a shackling force from which we must liberate ourselves in order to attain the highest and noblest of all human causes; freedom.

This is not an uncommon mistake, and should not, at least in the cases above, be assigned the label of ‘unscholarly behavior’. A cunning articulation of this human desire was put forward by Jacques Lacan in his XVII seminar: “[...] because of our urge for meaning, as if the system needs meaning. The system needs nothing, but we, weak creatures [...] we need meaning” (Lacan 2008, 12).²⁵

We are in no way pretending to have a ready-made solution, answer or guideline on approaching the analysis of social phenomena. What we would like to propose in our essay, is not the replacement of the already existing concepts or methods of research,

²⁵ It must be stressed, however, that Lacan was addressing another area and another type of 'sense-searching'. In spite of this difference, we still believe that the quote can be legitimately borrowed for the purposes of illuminating what we were trying to show in the above paragraph.

but an examination of the viability of a certain type of displacement, a possible shift or perhaps merely a complementation.

One of ‘Western’ thought’s main preoccupations seem to be the epistemological contemplations on the nature, sources and limits of human knowledge. How are we to differentiate mere ‘arbitrary belief’ from ‘true belief’ and what characteristics is this ‘true belief’ to exhibit, if we were to legitimize its ‘truth-claims’ and elevate its value to that of ‘knowledge’?²⁶

In response, we would propose a two-folded complement to the classical and “central question in epistemology” namely: “what must be added to true beliefs to convert them into knowledge?” (Klein 1998, 2492).

The ‘origins’ of our proposal are many, and cannot be simply ascribed to one thinker or even one school of thought. However, the actual proposed complementation can be thought of as following the direction set forth in the work of Michel Foucault, combining two modalities of his approach to the research of History: (i) the *archeology of knowledge* and (ii) the *genealogy of power*. Since a more comprehensive presentation of the basic conceptualizations underlying these analytical approaches will be put forward in the following parts of our paper, we will now proceed with a brief outline of only certain elements that seem most pertinent for elucidating their connection with the questions raised above.

(i) The archeology of knowledge

“All of Foucault’s major works are histories of a sort, which is enough to make him a historian of a sort” (Flynn 1994, 28) is the opening statement of Thomas Flynn’s essay entitled *Foucault’s mapping of history*. Many authors would probably disagree with this statement, if we think of historical research as a quest aimed at discerning ‘continuities’ that is. Continuity implies uniformity, gradual homogenization, and progressive rationalization; Foucault was on the contrary more interested in discontinuities and aimed at describing singularities, his archeological analysis wished to open up history to a “temporality that would not promise the return of any dawn” (Foucault 2008, 224).

²⁶ Posing this question in the above manner falls under the ‘justified true belief’ definition of knowledge which does not take into account an article by Edmund Gettier in which he provides examples of beliefs that are both true and justified, yet should not so easily be labeled as knowledge in the traditional meaning (Gettier 1963).

It was according to this intellectual stance that he proposed respective archeological accounts of madness, clinical medicine and the social sciences. Instead of succumbing to the classical historical method of discovering the ‘origins’ of madness or social sciences, his work focused on the examination of “systems that establish statements as events (with their own conditions and domain of appearance) and things (with their own possibility and field of use)” (ibid., 145). By attempting to describe historically delimited mechanisms guiding the relations between statements, Foucault developed a method which would refrain placing itself outside History and thus claiming competency for objective judgment of knowledge. Instead of pinpointing the end-point of humankind’s intellectual evolution, archeology examines the preconditions necessary for such a claim to exist in the first place. Rather than ascribing transcendental value to notions such as culture, ideology, economy, politics etc. it analyzes the discursive practices and their internal elements, with which they mutually constitute and transform each other. Archeology is therefore to be considered as a purely descriptive method of analysis, whose object of inquiry is ‘the archive’ – a complex and heterogeneous volume of systems of statements (whether in the form of events or things), whose main aim is, as Alain Badiou puts it, to dispose of the “tyranny of all-encompassing discourses” (Badiou 2007a, 13).

What are therefore the ‘tasks’ implicit in the archeological approach to research of History? We will temporarily borrow the explanation put forward by Gilles Deleuze, according to which, archeological research must “open up [sic] words, phrases and propositions, open up qualities, things and objects. It must extract [sic] from words and language the statements corresponding to each stratum and its thresholds, but equally extract from things and sight the visibilities and ‘self-evidences’ unique to each stratum” (Deleuze 2006, 45).

(ii) The genealogy of power

*A Young Conservative, perverse philosopher, promiscuous, ultra-radical, infantile leftism.*²⁷ It might be needless to point out but still, Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of power, essential for comprehending his genealogical method, was not as positively accepted as his, arguably no less radical, (re)conceptualization of guidelines involved in

²⁷ For these characterizations see Fraser (1985); Žižek (2000, 251); Green (1998, 6771); Lukes (2005, 88–99); Walzer (1991, 51) respectively.

the archeological research of history. Since his audacious conceptualization of power relations is the core element of Foucault's genealogies, it transforms History "from a project of meaning and communication toward a 'micro-physics of power'" (Flynn 1994, 34). This transformation includes the introduction of concepts such as 'strategy' and 'tactics' in the understanding of the mechanisms of History and has led Foucault to turn the famous dictum of Karl von Clausewitz upside down in one of his most known statements claiming that "politics is war continued by other means" (Foucault 1997, 16).

On a more general level, it is necessary to point out, that the emphasis in Foucault's genealogical approach is, in relation to the classical descriptive and origin-searching theories marked with great continuities and even greater ruptures, shifted in order to account for transformations, displacements, discontinuities, perturbations and chance occurrences in history with a view of maintaining "passing events in their proper dispersion" (Foucault 2005, 1009).

With this last characteristic of the genealogical approach that borders, and is in its essence easily assimilated to the core principles of archeology, we were aiming to show, how these approaches are in no way opposed to each other. Their coupling which is most commonly referred to as *power/knowledge*, should not be viewed as an analytical method capable of 'providing solutions' but as a "heuristic device, a pragmatic construction to be tested in terms of its value in reconstructing the history of sciences of man and of society" (Hoy 1991, 129). Archeology and genealogy should therefore be considered "complementary rather than contradictory" (Davidson 1991, 227) in relation to each other as well as to the already well established approaches in the field of historical research. They should be practiced side by side and their rigor reciprocally checked, or as Michel Foucault himself put it: "Critical [archeological] and genealogical descriptions are to alternate, support and complement each other" (Foucault 1991, 23).

Our essay will be divided into two separate chapters dealing with the abovementioned analytical approaches respectively. The interior structure of the chapters will aim at delineating key elements in the archeological and genealogical approaches; primarily by examining the relevant works by Michel Foucault and comparing them to pertinent secondary interpretative literature.

2 Ceci n'est pas ..

*Do not ask me what I am and
do not ask me to remain the same.*

Michel Foucault

Foucault's request taken from his foreword to *Archeology of Knowledge* can also be read as a program statement. By 'breaking it up', one can find what was already there, the core elements of Foucault's thought, his blunt anti-essentialism and a profound interest in transformation. We do not wish to 'label' Michel Foucault and thus ascribe him to a certain school of thought, a research program or an ideological stance. As he admitted on numerous occasions, the 'concepts' influencing him were many: from pathways he chose to follow and prolong into the 'unknown', to routes he judged as leading to a dead end, whose conditions of existence he wanted to research.

Two figures with which he is most commonly associated are Friederich Nietzsche and Immanuel Kant. He was labeled 'nihilist' and ascribed the pretensions of being 'superhuman' due to his affinity for the writings of the former and accused of miscomprehending, misrepresenting and even 'inventing' his genealogical roots in the Enlightenment.²⁸ Yet Kant and Nietzsche are not the only ones that influenced Foucault. In *L'ordre du discours*, his Inaugural lesson at Collège de France in 1971, he expressed his indebtedness to Bataille, Canguilhem, Dumézil, Hyppolite, and noted Marx as a fellow 'dodger' of Hegel's logics and epistemology. However, if there was a label with which Foucault was most commonly associated and the assimilation or equation with which he fiercely denounced on numerous occasions was that of a *(post)structuralist*: We can agree that structuralism has formed one of the most systematical attempts of removing the 'event' not only from ethnology but also from a whole series of other sciences and in the last instance even from history itself. In this sense, I cannot see who could be a bigger anti-structuralist than me (Foucault 1991, 60).

²⁸ We are referring here to Foucault's self-inscription into a philosophical stance that seeks to interpret its proper age. For such an example see Foucault's text "What is Enlightenment" (Foucault 1991, 145–58).

Accordingly with his request above, we believe that locating traces of similarities in Foucault's work that could, at the end of the day, be generalized and displayed as indications of 'essentially' structural axioms, is not a particularly fruitful endeavor. Nonetheless, we have chosen, for the sake of clarity, to briefly sketch out four conceptual aspects that might help elucidate Foucault's relation to structuralism.

Jean-Claude Milner urges us to reconsider the unity of what we call 'structuralism'. He states that

two essentially different entities are usually grouped under this name. On one side, there is the research program, developed by scientists from the end of the twenties to the end of the sixties [...] On the other hand we have the movement of doxa, that places side by side with agents of the research program, other, sometimes famous names, that do not originate from this program (Milner 2003, 7).²⁹

Saussure, Dumézil, Benveniste, Barthes, Jakobson and Lacan, is the chronological line Milner proposes as representing the principal moments of articulation in structuralism's 'research program'. While explaining the reason for his surprising exclusion of Claude Lévi-Strauss from his 'case studies', he astonishingly admits (which is rather rare in the academic circles to say the least), that it is due to the "limits of his competency" (ibid., 8). He seems to be equally harsh in his assessment of structuralism's doxa, since he differentiates it from the 'research program', "insofar this was a program and not the spreading of rumors" (ibid., 149). He does admit, rather ironically however, that Deleuze was right in depicting the names of doxa in terms of a 'figure': "Like stars, knowing nothing about each other and forming a constellation for a look that knows nothing anymore" (ibid.). It must be acknowledged, that Milner continues his description of doxa on a slightly less critical note, yet the main argument remains: the work of names like Sartre, Foucault, Deleuze, Althusser etc. cannot be legitimately inscribed into what he terms the 'scientific paradigm' of structuralism.

²⁹ Adding to this guideline for reconsideration he furthermore warns us that while classical structuralism and its doxa need to be clearly delineated, this does not imply that they should or even can be treated independently.

Even though Milner identifies his work with structuralism's doxa, we believe that there are at least two conceptualizations in its 'research program' from which Foucault drew and could be seen as 'conditions of possibility' for the existence of his own statements. In addition to his widely known categories of the 'signifier' and the 'signified' which he developed in order to propose an alternative conceptualization of the constitution of meaning in the relation between 'words' and 'objects', Ferdinand de Saussure also differentiated between what he called 'diachronic' and 'synchronic' linguistics. Diachronic linguistics is a method applied to the comparison of "linguistic states whose documents originate from different points in time" (Milner 2003, 20); synchronic linguistics on the other hand, is a comparative method for linguistic states whose documents are contemporaneous. It should also be noted, that diachronic linguistics differs from historical linguistics in that it deals with *relative* and not *absolute* attribution of dates, the question is therefore limited to determining only if a certain event precedes or succeeds another.

This aspect of 'classical' or linguistic structuralism can be likened to one of Foucault's essential methodological guidelines, namely that historical research, or the research of knowledge, should in its first instance deal with historically delimited formations:

Each periodisation is the demarcation in history of a certain level of events, and conversely each level of events demands its own specific periodisation, because according to the choice of level, different periodisations have to be marked out and, depending on the periodisation one adopts, different levels of events become accessible. This brings us to the complex methodology of discontinuity (Foucault 2005, 614).

Moving further down the chronology of structuralism's research program we encounter Georges Dumézil.³⁰ Amongst other characteristics of Dumézil's work, Milner underlines his comparative historical method which he traces back to Fustel de Coulanges whose historical analysis consist "not of a complete revival of the past, but of an insurmountable scissure between the past and the present" (Milner 2003, 53). This

³⁰ The paradox according to Milner is that although his work can clearly be "*interpreted in structural terms*", Dumézil himself did not consider structural linguistics as his referential point of departure for the research he conducted along the years: "This research program crosses paths with the structural program, yet they do not blend with each other" (Milner 2003, 42).

‘insurmountable scissure’, which Foucault would term *discontinuity*,³¹ has its own anti-pole: if it is possible to trace a kind of continuity between chosen epochs that one is researching, this continuity must be based on “concrete transfers” (ibid.). Dumézil’s tri-functionality, for example, a characteristic of the indo-european mythology he has covered in *L’idéologie tripartite des indo-européens*,³² does not persist in culture in terms of a structure, it ‘perseveres’ with the help of knowledges [*connaissances*] that are carried over. Since this transfer can be either fragmentary or even obscure, we are consequently faced with two necessary precondition for its research: “on one hand, it must be possible to locate this knowledge in an enormous stack of documents and monuments; on the other hand it must be possible to legitimately assume the pathways and bases for a possible transfer” (ibid).

Another name examining the question of structuralism’s characteristics is Gilles Deleuze in his essay *A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme*. Deleuze’s approach is different to Milner’s and so are his presuppositions and answers. Rather than distinguishing between its ‘research program’ and structuralism’s doxa, Deleuze (1995) discerns seven criteria for the recognition of structuralism.³³ Because of the complexity and depth of Deleuze’s text we will roughly delineate solely those aspects of structuralism where he directly refers to the work of Michel Foucault in order to elucidate his argument.

Deleuze states that since elements of the structure “do not have an external signification neither an internal meaning” (Deleuze 1995, 44), they are not real or imaginary, but symbolic. They cannot therefore be determined with preexisting realities nor can their meaning be ascribed via imaginary or conceptual content that they would possess. In order to resolve this paradox, Deleuze turns to Lévi-Strauss who stresses that the

³¹ Arnold I. Davidson offers the following two-fold warning: *firstly*, discontinuities between systems of knowledge are rather a consequence than an assumption of archeology and *secondly* that this method makes no presumption about “the predominance of discontinuity over continuity in the history of knowledge” (Davidson 1991, 224).

³² For the Slovenian translation of this book see Dumézil (1987).

³³ Deleuze’s criteria are the following: (1) the *symbolic*; (2) the *local* or the criterium of *position*; (3) the *differential* and the *singular*; (4) the *differentiating* and *differentiation*; (5) the *serial*; (6) the *empty field* and the last criteria that covers (7) the *transition from the subject to praxis*.

symbolic elements of the structure possess nothing else than ‘sens’,³⁴ a sense that is “necessarily and solely the sense of position” (Deleuze 1995, 45). Referring to Foucault’s characterizations of such determinations as death, work, play, desire etc. he warns us that these are not to be viewed as “empirical dimensions of human existence” but rather as qualifications of “places and positions, that make those who occupy them, into mortals, dying, desirable, workers, actors – even though they will, in reality, occupy them only secondarily, because they will take on their roles according to the order of their neighborhood, that is the order of the structure” (ibid.).

One of the main criticisms structuralism is most commonly faced with is a reductionist interpretation of passages similar to the one quoted above. Its main fallacy is that it (supposedly) does not or cannot (sufficiently) account for social action or social actors, whether collective or individual (e.g. Guzzini 1993; Lukes 2005, 2007; Wrong 1996). It is said to be a deterministic theory which does not allow for any sort of autonomous social action and even opposes the very possibility of attaining freedom.

Both Milner and Deleuze strongly disagree with this kind of interpretation. Milner attributes the following belief, at one point he even terms it a “philosophical decision” (Milner 2003, 151), to names belonging to structuralism’s research program as well as those of its doxa: “Revolutions are possible and legitimate, but the carnival procession does not end there” on the contrary “they are its constitutive part” (ibid.).

At the core of this philosophical stance is its attitude towards the problem raised in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. These names have, according to Milner, “realized that it is impossible to get out” (ibid., 150). Yet the result of this recognition is neither nihilism nor passivism. In various fashions and with differing emphasis they have articulated what Sartre viewed in political engagement as the “necessary and sufficient source of true light” (ibid.) and Michel Foucault researched in the last years of his life under the label of ‘subjectivation’ or ‘practices of the self’.³⁵

³⁴ The expression used by Lévi-Strauss in French is ‘sens’ which signifies both meaning and direction (this dual meaning was brought to our attention by Stojan Pelko, the author of the Slovenian translation of Deleuze’s text).

³⁵ For a selection of Foucault’s texts concerning this subject see Foucault (1997a).

Deleuze identifies this decision with his criterium of the ‘empty field’ – the only place or position within the structure that cannot be filled and does not even require to be filled. According to Deleuze, the empty space is symbolic and is at the same time itself its own symbol. His other half, which could otherwise be ‘filled’, must be eternally missing. Nevertheless, he warns us that this emptiness is not ‘non-being’, or at least this non-being is not negative. It is rather a ‘problematic positivity’ – “an objective being of the problem and the question” (Deleuze 1995, 62). It is in these terms that Deleuze understands Foucault’s following statement from *Les Mots et les Choses*: “It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void left by man’s disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled in. It is nothing more and nothing less than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think” (Foucault 2008a, 373).

The above examples, taken from structuralism’s research program, its doxa or simply just statements fitting one of Deleuze’s criteria for recognition, are not meant to serve as objective indicators for determining Foucault’s compatibility with structuralism. They were presented in order to show that if we are to “grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence” (Foucault 2008, 30), the background or even better, fertile ground, from which they originated, must be taken into consideration. Foucault’s anti-essentialist and anti-tautological approach to history; his consequent attempts of articulating the mechanisms of knowledge production and transfer via such concepts as the *épistémé*, discursive field or the dispositive; his insistence on the intertwinement of power over knowledge in their otherwise co-constitutive relation and ultimately his advocacy of ‘practices of the self’ as the ultimate form of freedom are surely not examples of ‘*creatio ex nihilo*’. If we are to stay true to his analytical and theoretical guidelines we should apply the same rigor when dealing with his work as he did while expressing his position on the work of other ‘great names’. In short, we are to spare him the irksome label of ‘an author’.

2.1 .. une Pipe

Foucault's work is in its first instance a negative one.³⁶ His own views concerning the problem under examination are almost always preceded by an extensive negation of what his work is not doing, as well as a differentiation with regards to the work already being done. When Foucault's account of his archeological approach to the examination of the rules of formation involved in the constitution of knowledge was articulated, it has entered in a complex relationship with various other philosophical domains and concrete theoretical paradigms: various epistemological approaches with their relative ontologies: phenomenology, nominalism, psychoanalysis, Marxism etc.³⁷ Most of his books are impregnated with such efforts of negation and differentiation and the numerous interviews he gave were in great part devoted to clarification of his relation with classical epistemology, his historical method or to specifying the main characteristics of his conceptualizations.

With the limits of this paper in mind we will restrict ourselves to a rough delineation of the following elements in Foucault's analysis of the constitution of knowledge: (1) *archeology* as a method for the study of (2) *discursive formations*³⁸ with (3) *the statement* as its 'basic unit' enabled by the (4) *historical a priori* revealing *visibilities* and attracting *articulabilities*. We will however, indicate references for further reading along the way that should help deepen and broaden our understanding of the roles his hypotheses take up in a broader theoretical context and elucidate the relations that his work enters into with regard to alternative already well established paradigms.

³⁶ In relation to his conceptualization of power, Mladen Dolar states that Foucault "spends almost most of his time explaining what is not [sic] power" (Dolar 1994, 168).

³⁷ Concise indications concerning these relations can be found in texts by Étienne Balibar (1989), Hubert L. Dreyfus (1989), Gérard Lebrun (1989), Roberto Machado (1989) and Jacques-Allain Miller (1989).

³⁸ Davidson proposes another candidate for the 'object' of archeology's examinations: truth "understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements" (Davidson 1991: 221). If truth is to be thus conceived, then Foucault can be thought of as writing histories of these 'ordered procedures' claiming the status of truth.

2.1.1 ARCHEOLOGY

It was only in 1966, the same year that Foucault published his *Les Mots et les Choses*, that Pope Paul VI abolished the Roman Catholic Church's *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*. A place on the list that once included such names as Simone de Beauvoir, René Descartes, Victor Hugo, Thomas Hobbes, John Stuart Mill, Jean-Paul Sartre, Baruch Spinoza and Emile Zola would in all likelihood not have escaped Michel Foucault, since it was laughter and the subsequent uneasiness that apparently triggered his archeological method.

The laughter emerged while reading Jorge Luis Borges' passage that quoted a 'certain Chinese encyclopedia' in which animals were apparently divided into: "(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies" (Foucault 2008a, xvi).

Still, what does this exotic taxonomy have to do with 'archeology' – a method which Foucault conceptualized in order to solve a "relatively simple problem: the division of discourse into great unities that were not those of oeuvres, authors, books or themes" (Foucault 2008, 151)? The laughter apparently soon gave way to uneasiness akin to being faced with a radically different system of thought and to a sobering realization of "the limitations of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that" (Foucault 2008a, xvi).

But what is in fact so 'impossible' in the above classification? The elements contained are neither a product of some untamed imagination, nor are we confronted with inventions in the style of 'inconceivable amphibious maidens' or 'creatures breathing fire' that would unsettle our classical idea of animals. Foucault lucidly recognizes that the impossibility of this categorization should not to be searched for in its objects, but rather in 'the narrowness of the distance' separating animals classified as 'fabulous' from those that have 'just broken the water pitcher' or 'stray dogs': "What transgresses the boundaries of all imagination, of all possible thought, is simply the alphabetical series (a, b, c, d) which links each of those categories to all the others" (Foucault 2008a,

xvii). Our own system of thought does not deny the existence of these categories, what it does *obstruct* however, is conceiving of a *common locus* where these creatures could meet, it prevents forming a roof under which they could coexist.

It is precisely this displacement of attention from the object itself to the “space [sic] in which various objects emerge and are continuously transformed” (Foucault 2008, 36) that presents one of the main characteristics of Foucault’s archeological method. The simple spatial delimitation is not enough however, for the unity of discursive formations should no longer be identified with the mere fact of reference of its elements to a single and uniform object. Instead, we are to identify and examine “the interplay of rules that make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time” (ibid.).

Another apparent twist in Foucault’s analytical method, which differentiates it from the already well established fields of epistemology,³⁹ linguistics or the history of ideas, is that it does not search its elements of analysis for traces of objectivity, evidence of rationality or progressive materialization. Archeology “no longer relates discourse to the primary ground of experience, nor to the a priori authority of knowledge” (Foucault 2008, 89), it does not categorize statements into relative or arbitrary; on the contrary, it takes upon itself the description of discourse in the exact specificity of its occurrence.

After articulating his views on the differences between archeology and epistemology in an article entitled: *Sur l’archéologie des sciences. Réponse au Cercle d’épistémologie* in 1968 (the article also served as the basis for his next book *The Archeology of Knowledge*), Foucault tackled what he conceived of as the last possible obstacle in the process of demarcating his own method: “the space that has long been known as the history of ideas” (Foucault 2008, 152).

According to Foucault, the three great themes that appear to be governing the history of ideas; *genesis*, *continuity* and *totalization*, seem also to determine its two principle roles. On the one hand, the history of ideas narrates the tales of those imperfect, rudimentary

³⁹ Roberto Machado however states, that at least methodologically, the ties of Foucault’s archeology with French epistemology, or the ‘philosophy of concepts’ as developed by Bachelard, Koyré or Canguilhem need to be stressed. ‘Bachelardian’ philosophy, as Machado terms it, can be credited for rejecting the idea of ‘general’ rationalism in favor of its ‘regional’ variant: “the absence of valid criteria for all sciences imposes a detailed study of many regions of scientificity” (Machado 1989, 16). Since Bachelard examined the rationality of ‘natural sciences’ and Canguilhem ‘sciences of life’, Machado sees in Foucault’s archeological history a variation studying ‘human sciences’.

experiences, which were doomed never to cross the thresholds of scientificity; it analyzes opinions rather than knowledge, errors rather than truth, types of mentality rather than forms of thought. On the other hand, by claiming its place outside the boundaries of existing (scientific) disciplines, it aims at putting them into perspective: “it describes the knowledge that has served as an empirical, unreflective basis for subsequent formalizations; it tries to rediscover the immediate experience that discourse transcribes; it follows the genesis, which, on the basis of received or acquired representation, gives birth to systems and oeuvres” (Foucault 2008, 153). The history of ideas can therefore be best described as a discipline of ‘beginnings and ends’, a discipline that describes ‘the obscure continuities and returns’; a discipline that reconstitutes developments in a ‘linear form of history’.

How is it then, that Foucault suggests we analyze discursive formations, what are the basic principles of his archeological method? He proposes the following four rationales that should be considered as guidelines for archeological research:

Firstly, archeology’s intention is not discerning “thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses: but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules. It does not treat discourse as document, as a sign of something else” (Foucault 2008, 155). This negative guideline can be associated with the characteristics of the basic element contained in discursive formations: ‘the statement’. Since we will elaborate these characteristics later on, let us for now simply turn to Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of this differentiation, that emphasizes Foucault’s refusal to search for a dual inscription of the statement’s signification, a pursuit which aims at isolating a “logical proposition which then operates its [the statement’s] manifest meaning” (Deleuze 2006, 15). By showing how ‘no statement can have a latent existence’ Foucault focuses his analysis on the ‘positivity of the dictum’. He does warn us however, that “the statement is neither visible nor hidden” and explains, that because it is “covered over by phrases and propositions” (ibid.) it might not be immediately perceptible.

Archeology is therefore concerned with the analysis of discourse in its own right and its own magnitude. It treats its elements not as *documents* but as *monuments*,⁴⁰ which it does not seek to interpret, aiming solely at describing the possibilities of their existence.

Secondly, archeology is not concerned with accounting for either the progressive objectivization or rationalization of the elements contained in discursive formations. It does not aim at identifying the moment when “on the basis of what they were not yet, they became what they are” (Foucault 2008, 155); or on the contrary, that moment when their solidity began to crumble away and they gradually began to lose their identity. Its objective is in fact quite the opposite, to “define discourses in their specificity; to show in what way the set of rules that they put into operation is irreducible to any other” (ibid.). It is in this sense that we are to understand Foucault’s question: “What has been done, that this statement has appeared, and no other in its place?” (Foucault 2005, 734).⁴¹

Thirdly, archeology is not arranged accordingly with the familiar conceptions of sovereignty of the oeuvres or that of their authors. This point has sparked quite some turmoil, since it was attributed a label which is usually reserved for the wider paradigm of structuralism – it was denounced as deterministic (e.g. Guzzini 1993; Lukes 2005, 2007; Wrong 1996). In response we would like to point to the following lines of Michel Foucault which can be thought of as an echo to charges of his prosecutors accusing him of ‘killing man’. Archeology “defines types of rules for discursive practices that run through individual oeuvres, sometimes govern them entirely [sic], and dominate them to such an extent that nothing eludes them; but which sometimes, too, govern only part of it [sic]. The authority of the creative subject as the *raison d’être* [sic] of an oeuvre and the principle of unity, is quite alien to it” (Foucault 2008, 156).

Lastly, archeology resists any interpretative aspirations. Its goal is not to search for and restore any possible thoughts, wishes, ambitions, desires or experience that sparked the statements expressed in a discursive formation; the ‘*origin*’ is not a relevant concept for

⁴⁰ In his essay from 1968, entitled *Sur l’archéologie des sciences. Réponse au Cercle d’épistémologie*, Foucault acknowledges his indebtedness for using the term *monument* in this sense to G. Canguilhem.

⁴¹ The original goes as follows: “comment se fait-il que tel énoncé soit apparu, et nul autre à sa place?” We have opted for a ‘clumsier’ translation to preserve Foucault’s ‘*jeu de mots*’ in which he alludes to a certain mechanism, system, an interplay of rules etc. which would have been lost if the sentence were translated “what happened...”

archeological research. Foucault perceives his task in terms of unglamorous ‘rewriting’: it is, “in a preserved form of exteriority, a regulated transformation of what has already been written. It is not a return to the innermost secret of the origin; it is the systematic description of a discourse object” (Foucault 2008, 156).

Archeology as an analytical method is therefore primarily concerned with a specific delimitation of a ‘discursive formation’ or what is most commonly referred to simply as ‘discourse’. “The concept of discourse is arguably Michel Foucault’s best-received contribution to the humanities and social sciences” claim Fabio Vighi and Heiko Feldner (2007, 141),⁴² and even though it is true, as Manfred Frank points out, that Foucault’s conceptualization cannot be radically differentiated from its classical structural utilization,⁴³ it is Foucault’s work that enables us to claim with Lukšič and Kurnik (2000, 152) that “discourse is not exterior to us, something on which we can act upon from the outside, from a safe distance. We must recognize that we are also its product, for we are living a discursive reality.”

It is true, that discursive formations and ‘reality’ are in a mutual and circularly productive relationship, but since we will examine this relationship later on, and keeping in mind that it has its own internal rules of formation, we will now proceed with a brief delineation of Foucault’s characterization of ‘discourse’ as an object of archeological analysis.

2.1.2 DISCURSIVE FORMATIONS

Discourse appears to be, at present, a well established⁴⁴ object of analysis in various scientific fields; from linguistics, literary critique, sociology, to cultural studies as well

⁴² Their text nonetheless aims at exposing Foucault’s theoretical failures and proposes to complement, upgrade and in the last instance replace them with ‘ideology critique’ of Slavoj Žižek.

⁴³ In his text *Sur le concept de discours chez Foucault*, Frank elaborates the role of Lévis-Strauss (as well as Roland Barthes) in the terminological transformation of the concept (Frank 1989, 126–32).

⁴⁴ Amongst many other examples, the ‘*Critical Discourse Studies*’ journal is published by Routledge; Barcelona, Ljubljana and Zhejiang University in China have their respective centers for Discourse studies; Lancaster University, Texas A&M University, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona and Amsterdam University even hold university programs intended strictly for the formation of ‘*Discourse studies*’ graduates. This arbitrary illustration is to be considered only as an indicator that discourse studies are in no way a peripheral or second-grade field of academic investigation.

as political science. Inter-disciplinary discourse analyses are also not rare, but since the internal rules of formation are peculiar to each individual discursive field and need to be, in the first instance, searched for within such a formation, we will now proceed with an extremely abridged portrayal of certain self-referential observations within the discursive field of International Relations.

According to Penguins' *Dictionary of International relations*, the term (international relations) is used to "identify all interactions between state-based actors across state boundaries" (Evans and Newnham 1998, 274). The French *Dictionnaire des relations internationales* goes further in its elucidation and emphasizes the 'reality' of this "singular and positive order" in which "the fundamental question of international anarchy's consequences and its implications for conflict, power and domination" remain in the centre of attention (Venesson in Smouts, Vennesson and Battistella 2003, 436). Dictionaries mostly hold a referential function for they are comprised in order to provide concise definitions and guidelines for further study. Since they therefore have a tendency to construct definitions that are as wide as possible in order to avoid any possible objections of theoretical bias, we will now shortly delineate postulates of three significant paradigms in the discursive field of International Relations and their respective conceptualizations of 'core elements' with which they equate 'the essence' of their field of study.

In the discursive field of International Relations, from the second world war onwards at least, realism appears to be its "dominant paradigm" (Battistella 2003, 111). Even though it is clear that as any other theoretical paradigm, it is not entirely homogenous, the core of the realist paradigm can perhaps be fairly accurately summed up with the following four-folded postulate:⁴⁵ in the *anarchical* field of international relations, with the *nation-state* as its primary agent which is endlessly preoccupied with rationally "maximizing its national interest defined in terms of power" (ibid., 112), the *balance of power* is the only viable fashion of assuring stability. Perhaps it was Hans Morgenthau that best summed up the principle guiding Realist theoreticians in the following characterization of his field of investigation: "Because the want for power is a

⁴⁵ We are grounding our 'realist' postulate primarily on an exposition found in the referential French handbook entitled *Théories des Relations Internationales* (Battistella 2003), although fairly similar accounts can be found throughout other interpretative literature on this subject, including Oxford's *The Globalization of World Politics* (Dunne and Schmidt 2005, 161–65), *Sociologija mednarodnih odnosov* (Benko 2000, 55–56) and *Znanost o mednarodnih odnosih* (Benko (1997, 63–86).

characteristic element of international, and any other politics, international politics is necessarily a politics of power” (Morgenthau 1995, 109).

Theoreticians pertaining to classical Liberalism, which is considered as Realism’s historical alternative and the “second general principal approach to international relations” (Battistella 2003, 143), seem to adhere to the characterization of their sphere of investigation as ‘anarchical’ as well as the identification of the ‘nation-state’ as its principal agent. They do, however, differ in their conclusions resulting from these presuppositions: “the absence of a legitimate global authority with the power to enforce law does not mean we are in a state of war” (Dunne 2005, 187). They believe that the causes for war, ranging from ‘imperialistic tendencies’ of nation-states, to the ‘failure of the balance of power’, can and should be “remedied through collective [sic] security” (ibid.). States are therefore not (necessarily) driven solely by primitive and egoistic interest of survival; ‘cooperation’ and a ‘harmony of interests’ is possible, even more, it should be pursued.⁴⁶

Since we have, rather arbitrarily, chosen to sketch out elements of only three ‘main’ theories of international relations, our choice of the third paradigm should also be considered as such (an equally legitimate choice might have been *Social Constructivism*, *Historical Sociology* or the *Feminist theory*). We have chosen however to shortly present a Marxist conceptualization, since it constitutes, as the authors of the abovementioned Oxford’s International Relations handbook entitled *The Globalization of World Politics* term it, “a rather unfamiliar view” (Hobden and Jones 2005, 227) of world politics. The complexity of Marxism as a theoretical paradigm is enormous to say the least (and here we are in no way implying that realism or liberalism are academic ‘simpletons’), hence the following sketch of its implications for understanding the field of international relations is bound to be partial and random.

Firstly, in stressing that the social world should be “analyzed as a totality” (Hobden and Jones 2005, 229), Marxism clearly rejects the division between a domestic and an international sphere which provides the basis for a subsequent delimitation of the

⁴⁶ Contrary to what the commonly employed normative label of an ‘idealistic’ theoretic stance might imply, Dario Battistella refers to the ‘English School of international relations’ as well as to the ‘liberal theory of international relations’ of Andrew Moravcsik, as examples aiming at a “hypothetico-deductive empirical theory, conforming to standards of a positivistic social science [...]” (Battistella 2003, 145).

‘nation-state’ as the principle actor in international relations. Immanuel Wallerstein, for instance, attributes our inability to predict and understand the collapse of the Soviet Union, or the more recent terrorist activities, to the fact that we have “studied these phenomena in separate boxes” (Wallerstein 2006, x) like ‘politics’, ‘economics’, ‘the social structure’, ‘culture’ etc. which are, in his view, more a construct of ‘our imagination’ than of ‘reality’. He believes, on the contrary, that these phenomena “are so closely intermeshed that each presumes the other, each affects the other, each is incomprehensible without taking into account the other boxes” (ibid.).

Secondly, *anarchy* as the inherent characteristic of world politics is replaced by a conceptualization of a “driving force” (Benko 2000, 112) of tensions between “the means of production and relations of production that together form the economic base of a given society” (Wallerstein 2006, x).⁴⁷ This displacement of the ‘origin’ of international relations’ conflicting nature, from states to social entities that care little for their national character, replaces the *locus* of the need for survival from states to that of social class.

Lastly, a hypothesis that can be attributed the Marxist label, yet is not strictly Marx’s, since the ‘author’ of its conceptual articulation was initially Antonio Gramsci, is that the contemporary international system is inherently *hegemonic*.⁴⁸ “successive dominant powers in the international system have shaped a world order that suits their interests, and have done so not only as a result of their coercive capabilities” (Hobden and Jones 2005, 237) but also, as Robert Cox puts it, by finding and protecting “a world order which was universal in conception, i.e., not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order which most other states (or at least those within reach of the hegemony) could find compatible with their interests” (Cox 1983, 136).

⁴⁷ Since we have exposed Immanuel Wallerstein as a ‘marxist’ theoretician, we believe that the following couplet of disambiguations is in order. Firstly “Wallerstein is to be inscribed within historically oriented Marxism that repudiates the a-historicism of structural Marxists [...]” which, “while accepting Marx’s conception of capitalism with the integrated idea of the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, follows Marx’s research of pre-capitalistic historical formations” (Benko 2000, 106–7). Consequently, the ‘efficiency primacy’ of economy in the constitution of dominance *vis-à-vis* politics is to be understood *dialectically*: “his understanding of the relation between economy and politics does not subordinate the latter, both social poles are rather connected in a dialectical relation” (ibid., 105).

⁴⁸ Milan Brglez rightfully warns that the role *hegemony* as a concept plays in the field of international relations needs to be differentiated. There are two ‘main’ conceptualizations of hegemony: *firstly* the neorealist and neoliberal conceptions that see hegemony solely in materialistic terms “as military and economic supremacy” and *secondly* a conception that adds to the aforementioned material aspect “a conceptual and/or ideological component” (Brglez 2008, 65, note 67).

We are not challenging any particular aspect of these hypotheses, we are merely emphasizing that Realism's and Liberalism's conceptualizations regarding their field of investigation gravitate around the 'nation-state'. They do differ in defining its characterization, but that is at this point of secondary importance. The third paradigm however, fully rejects the explanatory validity of the concept of the 'nation-state' and focuses on what it conceives of as a more basic social dynamic, the internal contradictions of "different forms of the social organizations of production and commerce" (Žižek 1995, 1).

Furthermore, we are well aware that the above accounts of Realism, Liberalism and Marxism are inevitably partial and to some extent biased or even arbitrary. Again, our aim was not their full presentation, a confirmation, or a rejection of their postulates. What we wanted to show is that they all construct their hypotheses around a single uniform object, be it the 'nation-state' or the 'economic basis' around which the internal dynamics of a given society evolve.

But how are we to legitimately abandon and substitute the 'object' as a principle of unity and coherence of a discursive formation? How does the archeological method suggest we approach the problem of unities in discursive formations, how are we to answer such questions as, to rephrase Foucault's interrogation from *Archeology of Knowledge*, 'What, in fact are medicine, grammar, politics, political economy or international relations?'

As we have shown above, in order to identify and expose the elements around which a discursive formation is formed, reference to a single invariable object is often put forward as proof of unity. Foucault's work from his early years, where he extensively covered the topic of the constitution of madness, might provide some useful guidelines for altering such an approach. While studying the history of the concept of 'madness', in terms of an object of analysis, Foucault came to a conclusion that the group of statements referring to 'madness' is "far from referring to a single object, formed once and for all" (Foucault 2008, 35). The search for mental illness' "secret content, its silent, self-enclosed truth" should be replaced by a recognition that it was rather "constituted [sic] by all that was said" and that "it is not the same illnesses that are at issue in each of

these cases” that, in short: “we are not dealing with the same madmen” (Foucault 2008, 35).

Foucault’s proposed alternative does not end, however, with an effortless quasi-structural or even de-constructivist assertion of a relational constitution of the *object-formerly-known-as-madness*;⁴⁹ he goes further, and suggests that the focus of our attention should be displaced from the object to the “space [sic] in which various objects emerge and are continuously transformed” (ibid., 36). Instead of chronicling the progressive grasping of an object’s essence, we should aim at individualizing a group of statements concerning madness by detecting and analyzing the rules of “simultaneous or successive emergence of the various objects that are named, described, analyzed, appreciated [...]” (ibid.). Briefly, the unity of a specific discursive field should be based on “the interplay of rules that make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time” (ibid.).

When we are proposing to accept or to recognize, that the object named ‘madness’, the ‘nation state’, or any other object of a particular discursive formation for that matter, has transformed through history and that this change was not due to a progressive human grasping of its essence, but that its constitution is rather the result of a complex process of various intertwining factors, we are not urging for a blind substitution of one credence with another. Extensive, thorough and informative accounts of concrete historical examples of such processes can be found throughout Foucault’s work, his lectures at Collège de France, for instance, include fine examples of archeological analysis.

In a similar academically rigorous fashion Foucault succeeds in formulating alternative pathways to possible unity, which again, instead of neglecting processes of constitution and uncritically examining what is ‘already there’, focus exactly on the mechanisms that render them possible in the first place. It is in this fashion that he replaces the delimitation of a group of statements *via* recognition of their unity, manifested in their

⁴⁹ Since we are primarily dealing with the argumentation put forward by Michel Foucault, we believe it necessary to clarify, that we are in no way implying that such a relational approach is absent from International Relations scholarship. One such example is Patrick T. Jackson’s and Daniel H. Nexon’s (2003) combination of theories of processes and relations, which via a “relational ontology questions all entities that are commonly understood as subjects of international relations” (Brglez 2008, 97).

‘common form’ and ‘type of connection’. Instead, he focuses on the group of rules, which render a certain type of enunciation under examination possible.

If unity of a discursive field cannot be concluded by presupposing the gravitation of a particular discourse around one unvarying object; or on the other hand, that its main characteristic is a certain form of statement-making, would it therefore be plausible to broaden the horizon and presume unity by determining the “system of permanent and coherent concepts involved” (Foucault 2008, 38)? Foucault again resists the comfort of presupposing ‘permanence’ and ‘coherence’ in the study of concepts and suggests that unity might be more productively sought in identifying, measuring and interpreting the “distance that separates them” and perhaps even in “their incompatibility” (ibid.).

Another hypothesis, that at first sight seems the hardest to ‘break’, since its aspirations are the farthest reaching of the four, is that unity of a discourse can be accounted for by the “identity and persistence of themes” (ibid., 39). In order to elucidate this presupposition we will turn to Foucault’s elaboration of such an example, ‘the evolutionist theme’, which seems to exhibit a certain unity enduring, if not even from Aristotle onwards, at least for a period of two hundred years, from Buffon to Darwin.

Focusing solely on these two authors he shows that even though a single ‘*theme*’ might be discerned in their works, its uniformity cannot be uncritically accepted since:

In the eighteenth century, the evolutionist idea is defined on the basis of a kinship of species forming a continuum [sic] laid down at the outset (interrupted only by natural catastrophes) or gradually built up by the passing of time [whereas i]n the nineteenth century the evolutionist theme concerns not so much the constitution of a continuous table of species, as the description of discontinuous [sic] groups and the analysis of the modes of interaction between an organism whose elements are interdependent and an environment that provides its real conditions of life (Foucault 2008, 40).

The conclusion is therefore clear, while there might be a single ‘theme’ under consideration it is apparently not uniform since it is “based on two types of discourse” (ibid.). Consequently Foucault proposes that the individualization of a discourse should be sought “in the dispersion of the points of choices that the discourse leaves free” and sees this dispersion in terms of “strategic possibilities that permit the activation of

incompatible themes, or, again, the establishment of the same theme in different groups of statements” (ibid., 41).

It is evident that the concept of the statement appears throughout Foucault’s elaboration on the intrinsic characteristics of the discursive field. The question, whether it is in fact *discourse* or the *statements* within a particular discursive formation, that are to be considered as the primary object of archeological analysis, can be solved by stating that these elements present differing levels of archeological research. Nonetheless, the statement [*l’énoncé*] is, as Mladen Dolar points out, “the minimal unit of knowledge” (Dolar 1991, XII) and it is through the complex interplay of various procedures regulating relations between statements, that ‘discursive practices’ are ultimately formed. These practices, with their internal restrictive as well as productive logic, regulate, as Foucault extensively elaborated in his Inaugural lesson at Collège de France, the differentiation between ‘speaking the truth’ and “being in the true” (Foucault 1991, 12). With this inherent link between knowledge, power and truth in mind, we will now proceed with a short examination of Foucault’s conceptualization of the statement.

2.1.3 THE STATEMENT

While developing his conceptualization of the discursive formation, Foucault announces that by doing so, he has undertaken “to describe the relations between statements” (Foucault 2008, 34). One might wonder, what are the main characteristics of archeology’s object of analysis that would succeed in distinguishing it from the already well established conceptualizations and legitimize its place amongst them?

The search for structural criteria that would define its unities is apparently bound to end up in failure, since the statement is “not in itself a unit, but a function [sic] that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space” (ibid., 98). This characterization of the statement as a (multivariable?) function can perhaps reduce our amazement, when it comes to Foucault’s assertion, that not only few things *are* said, but “few things [...] can [sic] be

said” (ibid., 135). It is unable, however, to tone down the paradox that arises from opposing this claim to archeology’s affirmation that “everything [sic] is always said in every age” (Deleuze 2006, 47).

‘Since only a few things can be said, only a few things are actually said, therefore everything that can be said, is always said in every age’ might therefore be a fairly faithful paraphrasing of Foucault, considering we also take into account his belief that the production of discourse is always “controlled, selected, organized and partitioned by a certain number of procedures, whose role is to deflect their powers and dangers, to control their accidental events and to evade their weighty, frightening materiality” (Foucault 1991, 4).

As this characterization of discourse is already implying an inherent intertwining of knowledge and power – a thesis that will be developed further in the conclusion of our essay – we will refrain from its further elaboration and somehow artificially focus solely on the following conditions that Foucault states as crucial for the recognition of statements in their ‘*special mode of existence*’:

“(G”) The *sense, validity, objectivity, rationality, value* etc. of an examined sentence or proposition are most commonly checked through the degree with which they faithfully correspond to an exterior object, concept or by their compliance with axioms governing their formation. The mere existence of statements however, is preconditioned with “a specific relation” (Foucault 2008, 100) that it entertains with itself, and “not its cause or its elements” (ibid.). This is one of the ways with which archeology moves away from being a formalizing or an interpretative method and reliably carries on its ‘task’ of systematically describing the discourse-object.

Logicians approach this problematic from a different perspective. As it is well known, in logics, a proposition like ‘The golden mountain is in California’ cannot be checked, since it does not have a referent. Archeology turns this rationale upside down and accords primacy to the correlate of the statement in order to determine, in a definitive way, whether it does or does not in fact have a referent: “we must know to what the statement refers, what is its space of correlations, if we are to say whether a proposition has or has not a referent” (Foucault 2008, 101). Therefore, a sentence such as: ‘The present king of France is bald’, should not be checked with an ‘exterior objective

reality', but should take into account the locus (as well as its correlate spaces) from which it was deployed and subsequently checked whether it is true or false. Perhaps the sentence was taken from a 1998 edition of *L'Equipe*, referring to Zinedine Zidane, and could therefore probably be considered as true; or perhaps it represents a coded message implying that France no longer possesses any nuclear arms, which would most likely make it false.

Another possible relation that the statement could entertain with itself is that with its 'meaning'. Grammarians say we are to consider the sentence 'Colorless green ideas sleep furiously' as 'nonsensical' despite its perfectly correct grammatical structure. This decision again excludes, beforehand, numerous possibilities; that this sentence is in fact a 'coded message', that it is a 'depiction of dreams', a 'poem', that it was uttered by a 'drug addict' or constructed by an extremely artful grammarian in order to show how in fact meaningless yet grammatically perfectly correct sentence can be constructed. Instead of assuming that a sentence must necessarily refer to 'some visible reality', archeology stresses that "the relation of a sentence with its meaning resides within a specific, well-stabilized enunciative relation" (Foucault 2008, 102).

The statement is therefore not confronted with an existence or absence of an exterior correlate or referent, nor is its coherence verified *via* an examination of meaning or compliance to deductive principles of its construction. It is linked instead to a 'referential' that is not composed of 'things', 'facts', 'realities' or 'beings', but of "laws of possibility and rules of existence for the objects that are named, designated or described within it, and for the relations that are affirmed or denied in it" (ibid., 103). The 'referential' is therefore a spatial potentiality since it forms "the place, the condition, the field of emergence, the authority to differentiate between individuals or objects, states of things and relations that are brought into play by the statement itself; it defines the possibilities of appearance and delimitation of that which gives meaning to the sentence, a value as truth to the proposition" (Foucault 2008, 103).

By differentiating the 'referential' from the 'correlative',⁵⁰ Foucault contrasts the 'enunciative level' of sentence formulation from its grammatical and logical levels. It is through its concrete relationship with 'various domains of possibility' that the statement

⁵⁰ Gilles Deleuze seems to keep the 'correlative' label while at the same time staying true to Foucault's differentiation (Deleuze 2006, 7–9).

transforms a syntagm, or a series of symbols, into a sentence that can or cannot be labeled meaningful, or into a proposition that can be considered true or false.

“M”) The statement further differentiates itself from other linguistic conceptualizations since it possesses a specific relation with ‘the subject’. This issue of assigning position to the subject is however neither solely grammatical nor strictly linguistic, for it can be inscribed in a broader problematization of the subject’s role in history itself. By conceiving the statement in terms of a function, Foucault’s archeology refuses to assign the subject a defining post in the construction of statements or even knowledge itself for that matter. The subject is neither the cause, origin, nor the starting point of “the phenomenon of the written or spoken articulation of a sentence” (ibid., 107). It is like all other elements of the statement-function, a variable or rather “a set of variables” (Deleuze 2006, 47).

Perhaps the most noted and frequently quoted account of Foucault’s position of the subject’s variable position inside the discursive field as well as in the statement itself, is his lecture from 1969 entitled *What is an author?* Elaborating his thoughts on this problem in the way he did, did not do him much good, since he was accused that after Nietzsche has proclaimed the death of God,⁵¹ he was now proclaiming the death of Man. While defending his case in relation to this ‘*attempted murder*’, Foucault was also accused of nihilism, and perhaps rightly so.

André Glücksman defines three meanings of nihilism: ‘a relativism of values’ – there is no supreme good; a ‘refusal of creating supreme values’ – God, deceased, is not to be replaced; the ‘reign of absolute subjectivity’, a loss of the world and a-cosmic existence. There is ‘no doubt’ for Glücksman, that when considering the first couple of nihilistic positions Foucault is definitely a nihilist. Even in the third case, he offers a partial confirmation: “Foucault is an a-cosmic thinker, who does not however, defend any absolute subjectivity” (Glücksman 1989, 395). In this aspect, it is not Foucault’s originality that stands out, it is more his rigor that does not cease to upset us.

⁵¹ In consideration we offer the following disambiguation of the event in question: “To announce the death of God [...] is nothing. What counts is *how*. Nietzsche showed already that God dies in several ways; and that gods die, but from laughter [sic], upon hearing one god say that he is the Only One” (Deleuze 1995, 62).

On the other hand, Paul Veyne distinguishes between ‘passive’ and ‘reactionary’ nihilism. Veyne identifies ‘reactionary nihilism’ with ‘auto-irony’ and its passive variation with a mental blockade which arises from recognizing that there is no ‘infinite truth’, a blockade that prevents what the current president of the United States termed ‘The audacity of hope’.⁵² Following Veyne and Deleuze, we believe that with regards to both ‘faces of nihilism’, Foucault’s political engagement and the innumerable pages he wrote under what is most commonly labeled as his third folding – ‘practices of the self’, speak for themselves and require no further exculpation.

In order not to lose ourselves in an elaboration of Foucault’s views on the ‘processes of subjectivation’ and the ‘practices of the self’ which would definitely require, as well as deserve, an essay of its own, we will now continue with the description of his conceptualization of the subject’s relation with the discursive field in general and the statement in particular.

Foucault states that the subject’s topographical location within the statement is a “particular vacant place” (Foucault 2008, 107) which can, as a matter of fact, be occupied by various individuals. Yet instead of being fixed once and for all, it is ‘variable enough’ to either remain the same throughout a number of sentences or indeed change with each one: “If a proposition, a sentence, a group of signs can be called ‘statement’, it is not therefore because, one day someone happened to speak them or put them into some concrete form of writing; it is because the position of the subject can be assigned” (ibid.). An analysis of the relation between the author and what he says, does not meet the requirements of describing the statement; its description consists in “determining what position can and must [sic] be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it” (ibid.).

“(Ć”) Sentences or propositions are presupposed by their respective ‘systems of axioms’ to which it matters little, if they are followed or not by another sentence or proposition, in order to determine their validity. They are therefore ‘self-sufficient’ and can exist in full autonomy. The ‘enunciative function’ however, cannot operate on a sentence or a proposition in isolation; “it must be related to a whole adjacent field” (Foucault 2008, 109).

⁵² Veyne used the French expression '*oser vouloir*' (Veyne 1989, 400).

Deleuze points out, that this ‘adjacent domain’ should not be reduced to what is usually referred to as ‘context’,⁵³ and Foucault specifies its distinction from “all the situational and linguistic elements, taken together, that motivate a formulation and determine its meaning” (Foucault 2008, 110), by stressing that it is precisely this ‘collateral space’ that makes them possible in the first place. It is indeed this spatial distribution which is determined, to a certain extent, by the enunciative function itself, and in ‘cooperation’ with which ‘position’, ‘status’ and ‘role’ are jointly accorded to an enunciated formulation.

Foucault distinguishes between the following four aspects of the associated field. Its first feature can be likened to a ‘chain’, composed of all the other formulations, within which the enunciation materializes itself and forms ‘only one element’. By sustaining rigorously his views on ‘originality’, Foucault adds that “there can be no statement that in one way or another does not reactualize others” (ibid., 111), thus connecting the enunciative function to all the other statements to which it, implicitly or openly, refers. This connection is not only retroactive, since each statement subsequently opens up a field of possibility for the formulation of others, that might draw from it, confirm it, negate it, modify it, or even decide to ignore it. Lastly, the statement is also a part of all the other enunciations with which it shares its status, “among which it takes its place without regard to linear order” (ibid.).

The collateral space is apparently an extremely vast, yet necessarily limited domain. It implies that the statement is neither a ‘manipulation’ by the speaking, writing or performing subject of a series of elements or linguistic rules, nor is it a simple and straightforward projection of a certain perceived reality onto ‘the plane of language’. Foucault is not denying that manipulation or projection take place in the construction of a statement. He is stressing however, that rather than being a result of genuine manipulation or pure transcription, a statement is from its very outset guided – both limited and le(f)t free by the fact of its insertion into an enunciative field in which it has ‘a place and a status’, a field which sets up its “possible relations with the past and which opens up for it a possible future” (Foucault 2008, 111).

⁵³ For a more extensive elaboration see Deleuze (2006, 6–7).

“S”) The last ‘special mode of existence’ concerns the materiality of the statement, for a series of linguistic elements, in order to be recognized and considered as a statement, must be expressed, as Foucault puts it, in “a sense perceptible element” (ibid., 112). Yet the statement does not precede this sense perceptible element, materiality is not an additional characteristic and should not be considered as its *‘mehrwert’*. Materiality forms a constitutive part of the enunciative function, yet it should not be considered in terms of a ‘pure form’, for even if a sentence is composed of the same linguistic elements, carries the same meaning, and upholds an identical syntactical and semantic identity, it is not the same statement if it sprayed on a wall or uttered in a lecture. *Substance, support, place* and *date* represent intrinsic characteristic of the statement and can be understood in terms of its ‘coordinates’. A statement however cannot be entirely defined by or reduced to the characteristics constituting its ‘spatiotemporal individuality’. It is rather the statement’s ‘status [sic] as a thing or object’ or what Foucault terms ‘the order of the institution’ which defines its “possibilities of reinscription and transcription (but also thresholds and limits)” (Foucault 2008, 116).

As we have shown above, the statement cannot be analyzed in isolation nor does it exist *en soi*. Its identity or institutional status necessarily enters into a complex relation with its ‘adjacent domain’ in which it has a certain role and function to perform. Configurations in which it plays a part, schemata that govern its usage, and the regulation of a statements application, all represent its ‘strategic potentialities’ and delimit its ‘field of stabilization’. It is precisely this field, that enables, despite all the possible differences in the enunciations themselves, to repeat statements in their identity; even more, simultaneously with delimiting the space for possible repetitions, the ‘field of stabilization’ defines thresholds beyond which no further functional parity is possible and the apparition of a new statement should be acknowledged.

Archeology is therefore not preoccupied at establishing criteria for individualizing a statement. It rather aims at describing the principles of its variation:

Too repeatable to be entirely identifiable with the spatiotemporal coordinates of its birth (it is more than the place and date of its appearance), too bound up with that which surrounds it and supports it to be as free as a pure form (it is more than a law of construction governing a group of elements), it is endowed with a certain modifiable heaviness, a weight relative to the field in which it is placed, a constancy that allows of

various uses, a temporal permanence that does not have the inertia of a mere trace or mark, and which does not sleep on its own past (Foucault 2008, 117–18).

In conclusion and response to interpretations of Foucault's work, which impose clear distinctions between his writings on knowledge,⁵⁴ power and 'ethics' and thus enable, amongst other conclusions, as Widder points out, to dismiss his *Archeology of Knowledge* as representing "a semi-structuralist and linguistic-centered phase that Foucault rejected as he moved to an analysis of institutions and practices" (Widder 2004, 414) we would like to point to the following passage from this 'linguistic-centered' book that perceives discourse in terms of "an asset – finite, limited, desirable, useful – that has its own rules of appearance, but also its own conditions of appropriation and operation; an asset that consequently, from the moment of its existence (and not only in its 'practical implications'), poses the question of power; an asset that is, by nature, the object of struggle, a political struggle" (Foucault 2008, 136).

2.1.4 THE VISIBLE AND THE ARTICULABLE

Deleuze rightfully points out, that Foucault's elaboration of his archeological method does not entail a direct elucidation of the nature of 'peculiar features' "presupposed by the statement" – the "Archeology of Knowledge stops at this point and does not attempt to deal with a problem that surpasses [*qui déborde*] the limits of 'knowledge' (Deleuze 2006, 12). Considering that archeology is a descriptive method and not a formalizing or an interpretative one, this absence should be seen as a sign of rigor rather than its deficiency; for instead of examining 'the conditions of validity', archeology deals with conditions of the 'reality' of statements.

⁵⁴ While we agree with the necessity of distinguishing between the different axes of Foucault's research which do not, as Garry Gutting (1991, 3) warns us, ultimately form "a single historic-philosophical method"; we do believe that much of Foucault-inspired-research tends to neglect the interconnectedness of his work which does nonetheless address extremely specific issues. For instance, while attempting to present the limits of Foucauldian IR via an engagement with Foucault's "oeuvre as a whole", Jan Selby still cannot escape defining *The Archeology of Knowledge*, *The Order of Things* and *This is Not a Pipe*, as examples of Foucault's works where his "concerns are primarily philosophical" while other texts have "a strongly materialistic edge" (Selby 2007, 327).

It must be stressed that these preconditions do not enable a determination of truth, authority, legitimacy, soundness or credibility (these characterizations are due to knowledge's inherent intertwinement with another, different and exterior dimension); they are rather gateways for "freeing the conditions of emergence of statements, the law of their coexistence with others, the specific form of their mode of being, the principles according to which they survive, become transformed, and disappear" (Foucault 2008, 143).

Since archeology deals with discourse in its 'positivity', these preconditions and rules of coexistence are those of things 'actually said'; they are not superposed on the elements they link together, nor are they to be considered as 'pure unmodifiable forms', for they are "caught up in the very things they connect; and if they are not modified with the least of them, they modify them, and are transformed with them into certain decisive thresholds" (Foucault 2008, 144). It is this 'system of temporal dispersion', which is itself a 'transformable group', that Foucault defines as the 'historic a priori' of statements.

On the contrary to what this 'rather barbarous' term might imply, Foucault does not go so far as to negate the existence of 'formal a prioris'. He states that their nature, role and tasks are quite different: "The formal a priori and the historical a priori neither belong to the same level nor share the same nature: if they intersect, it is because they occupy two different dimensions" (ibid.). Since the *historic* a priori must be capable of explaining *why* and *how*, at a given point in time, a particular discursive formation accepts, enables, rejects, neglects or ignores a given 'formal structure'; it is unable to take account of the *formal* a prioris. It does however enable us to understand "how the formal a prioris may have in history points of contact, places of insertion, irruption, or emergence, domains or occasions of operation, and to understand how this history may be not an absolutely extrinsic contingency, not a necessity of form deploying its own dialectic, but a specific regularity" (ibid.).

Even though Foucault never went so far as to explicitly conceptualize the underlying elements 'put into play' by a particular historical a priori, their presence can be felt in his archeological analysis, commentaries or interpretations of works of art. His analysis of oeuvres written by *Raymond Roussel* and *Maurice Blanchot* or painted by *Diego*

Velázquez and *René Magritte* are amongst his most noted texts on artistic production. It is already in this selection of forms of art, that one can detect Foucault's interest in modes of seeing and saying; modes to which Deleuze assigns expressions that are tentative and broad enough not to prejudicate their nature – places of 'visibilities' and fields of 'articulabilites'. Every single historical formation therefore implies its own specific distribution of the visible and the articulable. These are neither superposed onto things and words, nor are they singular or self sufficient; they rather 'act upon themselves' and from one historical formation to the next vary in their distribution, since "the visibility itself changes in style, while the statements themselves change in their system" (Deleuze 2006, 42).

In accordance with what Milner termed a 'philosophical decision' of staying in the cave; or better yet, considering the search for its exit immaterial, the light offering potential visibilities is to be considered more as a (group of) shooting star(s) than the Sun.⁵⁵ The shooting star, or a group of those, is 'all-encompassing', since it is not only the objects that it sheds its light on; in *The Order of Things* Foucault offers the following interpretation of Velázquez's *Las Meninas*:

as it passes through the room from right to left, this vast flood of golden light carries both the spectator towards the painter and the model towards the canvas; it is this light too, which washing over the painter, makes him visible to the spectator and turns into golden lines, in the model's eyes, the frame of that enigmatic canvas on which his image, once transported there is to be imprisoned (Foucault 2008a, 6).

It is this 'flood of golden light' that represents a common locus for the painter, the model and the spectator: "we are observing ourselves being observed by the painter, and made visible to his eyes by the same light that enables us to see him" (ibid., 7).

By stressing that both the subject and the object are mutually constituted by the same flashes of light, Foucault underlines that the examination of their relation is subject to epistemology, rather than phenomenology. The object is neither immediately visible nor hidden; it is not constructed *via* some raw or savage experience. Drawing from a

⁵⁵ We owe the idea for this metaphor to Alain Badiou (2007-08). He presented his alternative translation of Plato's 'sun' during his lectures at *École Normale Supérieure* in 2007-2008 entitled *Pour aujourd'hui: Platon!* Badiou suggested that 'the sun' be translated as '*éclair*' or rather in plural '*les éclairs*' – the broadest English equivalent of this term might be 'flash(es) of light'.

passage in *Raymond Roussel*,⁵⁶ Deleuze states that “visibilities are not forms or objects, nor even forms that would show up under light, but rather forms of luminosity which are created by the light itself and allow a thing or object to exist only as a flash, sparkle or shimmer” (Deleuze 2006, 45), nor is its existence due to the particular degree of a subject’s ability to grasp its essence: “the conditions pertaining to visibility are not the way in which a subject sees: the subject who sees is himself a place within visibility, a function derived from visibility” (Deleuze 2006, 49). Nothing is prior to knowledge.

If shooting stars are a metaphor for the visible aspect of Foucault’s historical a priori; its articulable counterpart has a slightly less glittery yet still sufficiently grand denomination – “the great murmur” (Deleuze 2006, 48). It is within this great murmur that Foucault wished his discourse be placed:

Rather than beginning it myself, I would prefer being enveloped by speech and carried away well beyond all possible beginnings. I would prefer noticing, a nameless voice, already there, speaking well before me: thus it would suffice to merely join in, continue the sentence, and inconspicuously lodge myself in its interstices, as if it had signaled to me by pausing, for an instance, in suspense. Thus, there would be no beginning, and instead of being the one from whom discourse proceeded, I would be a slender gap in its venturous unfolding, the point of its possible disappearance (Foucault 1991, 3).

Since “the being of language appears by/for/in [*pour lui-meme*] itself only with the disappearance of the subject” (Foucault 2005, 549), we will now turn our attention to Foucault’s elaboration of the ‘language-being’ as presented in articles regarding the works of Maurice Blanchot and Raymond Roussel.

Rather than ascribing modern literature the capability of extreme auto-referential interiorization of the language-being, Foucault perceives ‘literature’ in terms of a ‘passage to the outside’, a passage through which language evades the special discursive modes of existence: “Literature is not language approaching itself to the point of its blazing manifestation, it is language putting itself as far away from itself as possible; and if, in this exteriorization [*se mettre hors de soi*], it unveils its proper being, this sudden clarity reveals a gap [*un écart*] rather than a withdrawal [*un repli*], a dispersion, rather than a return of signs upon themselves” (Foucault 2005, 548).

⁵⁶ The passage in question can be found in Foucault (1963, 140–1).

As there is more than one shooting star, so is fiction not the only possible passage for attaining ‘the outside’ of language. The great murmur or the language-being has numerous yet a nevertheless finite number of voids constituting possible points for insertion, dispersal and dissemination of statements; deployed from various topological locations, their rhythm and loudness (frequencies?) differ accordingly.

Foucault likens the pure and bare experience of ‘the outside’ with Blanchot’s ‘attraction’. He warns us however, that ‘attraction’ is not due to the murmur’s charm; it does not constitute a break with solitude, nor is it the base of any positive communication. Like Odysseus’s Sirens, whose voice, forever elusive and forbidden, fascinates not so much by its current chant, but by that which it promises to be: “Their seductiveness is not due so much to what they make us hear but to the distant shine of what they are about to say” (Foucault 2005, 560). Their chant misleads, since it offers nothing but itself, which is ‘nothing-in-itself’, a tentative void, a pure potentiality and eventuality; and it tells the truth, for it is only through its demise, that it is capable to endlessly describe the adventure of heroes.

The Sirens’ promising chant functionally corresponds to Roussel’s (1995) ‘key’ from his own book entitled *Comment j’ai écrit certains de mes livres*. Pledging to decipher the secret workings operating behind his stupendous writing style, it succeeds, on the contrary, to prolong our uneasiness in affirming it for what it is. However, rather than revealing what it really is, it elucidates that which is making it opaque: “a language that wants to say nothing more than what it does” (Foucault 2005, 238).

The radical uncertainty, caused by the realization that the enchantment of Roussel’s words is not due to their sparkling nature, but to the invisible hand enabling them to exist and arranging them from the outside; is soon replaced with an unquiet assurance that even if “each element of his language is taken from an uncountable series of eventual configurations” (ibid., 239) the ‘interior space of language’ is still precisely designated – yet the access to its essence nevertheless obstructed by an apparently arbitrary ellipse hiding its inevitable nature.

Thus the scenery we face when Roussel’s key opens the window to ‘the outside’, unlocks the door causing our (in)security, might be similar to that depicted in Magritte’s painting entitled *La lunette d’approche* where “in the window’s transparency, we stare

at moving clouds and the blue sea's reflection. Yet the black space behind the window's opening reveals, that it is in fact, a reflection of nothing" (Foucault 2007, 39).

Visibilities and articulabilities are therefore two forms of exteriority, they constitute different dimensions, and even though they exist and establish each other only through their relation, it is neither causal nor symbolizing; 'words' and 'things' are irreducible to one another: "what we see never lies in what we say" (Foucault 2008a, 10). It is precisely this 'irreducibility' that we believe lies at the heart of Foucault's theory of knowledge, the conceptualization of which he elaborated in his commentaries on paintings by René Magritte in his book entitled *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*.⁵⁷

Even though René Magritte might not have agreed completely with Foucault's interpretations of his work, and the content of his book might have been different if Magritte was still alive when it was first published,⁵⁸ let us nevertheless examine the radicalization of this famous negation⁵⁹ as proposed by Michel Foucault. There are two aspects of this commentary that must be clarified before we go into greater detail: Foucault analyzes Magritte's painting as if it was *a calligraph* and consequently suggests that there are *not two statements* to be examined but *only one*.


By its double, repetitive and tautological inscription, the calligraph's aim is to cancel out "the oldest contradictions of our alphabetical civilization: to show and to name; to depict and to express; to reproduce and to articulate; to imitate and communicate; to see and to read" (Foucault 2007, 15). It threatens the abovementioned irreducibility of words and things, of visibilities and articulabilities, for it is designated to fill that minuscule narrow strip, as Deleuze (2006, 53) once put it, "colourless and neutral", that separates text from figure. It is through thus conceptualizing the calligraph, that Foucault can radicalize Magritte's negation beyond the obvious "I (this group of words that you are just reading) am not a pipe" (Foucault 2007, 18) and suggest that there exists instead, between the wording and the painting, an inherent intertwining, a whole series of complex relations.

⁵⁷ For the Slovenian translation of this book see Foucault (2007).

⁵⁸ René Magritte passed away on 15th of August 1967 and Foucault's article, on the basis of which he published his subsequent book, appeared in *Les Cahiers du chemin* on 15th of January 1968 (Foucault 2005: 663–78).

⁵⁹ In a private letter to Michel Foucault from May 23rd 1966, Magritte denies that statement it is in fact a 'negation'. He states that "It confirms in a different way" (Foucault 2007, 48, note 19).


Image 2.1: THIS IS NOT A PIPE 1



Source: Foucault (2005, 669).

Firstly, the pronoun 'this' from Magritte's calligraphic pipe can indicate that the very depiction under consideration, whose imagery is nonetheless extremely easy to recognize is not a pipe. This is not a fact that would trigger some serious 'cognitive dissonance' since it seems obvious to us that the materiality in question is not the same, that the 'connection' between two 'pipes' is not basic or fundamental, neither can we say that one constitutes the other or *vice versa*.

Image 2.2: THIS IS NOT A PIPE 2



Source: Foucault (2005, 669).

Simultaneously with the abovementioned negation, the words can be interpreted as stating something completely different: 'this' – *the words*, or the statement, cannot be equated with the pipe itself nor can it be considered as its substitute or an adequate representation. This too is not uncommon, due to the fact that 'representation' or the names given to tangible objects, phenomena etc. are a result of (relatively) broad social conventions, the pipe itself is replaceable, the image faceless. It is irrelevant what the

image above might wish to represent, the wording below would still pronounce its incapability to name it in a satisfactory manner.

Image 2.3: THIS IS NOT A PIPE 3



Source: Foucault (2005, 669).

The last negation is due to the painting's calligraphic nature. The 'thin colorless line', dividing text from image is thus overpowered, enabling us to see that it offers a third possible interpretation. Suddenly, the pronoun no longer serves to separate the image and its text, by tying them together it shows how 'this' – the alleged cohesion constituted by the depiction of the pipe and the letters (themselves drawn) under it – is irreconcilable with this equally discursive and perceptible element which is 'the pipe'. It is thus that "the image and the wording fall apart, accordingly to their respective gravitations. They no longer have a common space, nor a place where they could interfere, where words would be able to attain a certain figure and figures could enter into the order of vocabulary" (Foucault 2007, 20).

In *The Order of Things* Foucault admitted his amazement when faced with systems 'impossible' to conceive of. Our civilization has apparently eradicated or is at least seriously obstructing the construction of certain common loci for words and things. Now, he goes even further in suggesting that the construction of such loci is in fact impossible – the place where words and things could meet and 'faithfully' represent each other, it is in fact a void. Visibilities and articulabilities are radically irreducible to each other; constituting respective dimensions, their tangibility is extremely improbable: *what we see never [sic] lies in what we say* – unless...

2.2 .. une Souveraine

Le pouvoir ça n'existe pas.

Michel Foucault

“Aren't you ashamed to fall for such cheap rhetoric?” Slavoj Žižek⁶⁰ recently shouted out at a crowd enthusiastically approving his denouncement of humanitarianism as propagated by Bill Gates and George Soros. More likely than exposing the shallowness of his interpretation, he was stating that behind these appealing and sometimes even borderline populist statements, there are comprehensive conceptualizations worth examining in greater detail.

Foucault's ‘*provocation*’ resulted from a question challenging him to specify his view on the ‘*nature*’ of power. Uttered during one of his many interviews, it is so ambiguous that it prompted, as Mladen Dolar points out,⁶¹ the English translator to interpret it: “*Power in the substantive sense, ‘le’ pouvoir, doesn't exist*” (Foucault 1980, 198). Another of Michel Foucault's well known controversial statements calls, in a revolutionary fashion, for the “*decapitation of the King*” (Foucault 1991, 66) which, unlike in ‘actual’ history, has not yet occurred in political theory.

Clarification of assertions, that power does not exist yet it is “*co-extensive with the social body*” (Foucault 1980, 142); that resistance is inherent to relations of power, yet “*there are no spaces of primal liberty between the meshes of its network*” (ibid.); that the sovereign we must dispose of is, as Deleuze (2006, 63) interprets, neither the ‘*source*’ nor the ‘*essence*’ (of power), but merely a part of an ‘*operating mechanism*’; calls for a thorough examination, rather than a noncritical appraisal (or dismissal) of statements such as those quoted above. Since Foucault's conceptualizations and analysis are extremely extensive and detailed, we will proceed with a brief delineation of merely

⁶⁰ The quotation is taken from a debate between Slavoj Žižek and Steven Lukes, that took place on September 3rd 2008 at the *Barnes & Noble* Union Square bookstore, where they discussed their respective new books: *Violence and Moral Relativism*. The video of the second part of this debate (from which the quote is taken) is accessible through Barnes and Noble (2008).

⁶¹ For a comprehensive and informative account of Foucault's conceptualization of power see Dolar (1994).

some of the elements which are most commonly considered crucial for understanding his approach to the *'analytics of power'*.

2.2.1 NON-EXISTANCE

The first issue calling for clarification is perhaps Foucault's nominalism with regards to the object of his investigation; since even though he stated, on numerous occasions, that his research is in no way aiming at 'a general theory of power' (neither can it be considered as constituting 'only a part' nor even merely 'a beginning' of such a theory) one can still stumble upon remarks of the following sort: "Given the major role that the concept plays in Foucault's genealogies, it is unfortunate [sic] that he offers no definition of 'power' as such" (Flynn 1994, 34).⁶²

In order to disambiguate: rather than providing a transcendental definition, Foucault's genealogical analysis of power's (micro)mechanisms should aim at answering questions of the following sort: "where does it [power] pass, how does it take place, between who and who, between which point and which point, according to which techniques⁶³ and with which effects" (Foucault 2004b, 3). Insistence on analytics (rather than a theory), thus displaces the pivotal question from what power is, to how it operates. It is furthermore directed at showing how, even though power is not a substance, an analysis of power is still sensible; for "non-existence is not simply nothing", quite on the contrary – "it has tangible, omnipresent [sic] and positive effects" (Dolar 1994, 167).

Gilles Deleuze somewhat tunes down (even if only momentarily) this complexity when he states that Foucault does in fact provide for a definition of power; even more, it seems to be a very simple one: "power is a relation between forces or rather every relation between forces is a power relation" (Deleuze 2006, 59).⁶⁴ There are two

⁶² Another example of a similar sort is Guzzini's assertion that an inter-subjective conceptualization of power which "stresses the link between knowledge and power" is inadequate because it tends "to overload and thus render incoherent a single concept of power" (Guzzini 1993, 462).

⁶³ Foucault uses the French expression *'procédé'* which carries a triple meaning: *a mechanism, technique* and *a device*.

⁶⁴ We did not turn to Deleuze for a 'foucauldian' definition of power because Foucault himself would fail to provide one, quite on the contrary: immediately after 'negating' the existence of power he added the following explanation: "What I mean is this. The idea that there is either located at, or emanating from, a given point some-thing which is a 'power' seems to me to be based on a misguided analysis, one which at

elements in this definition that need to be stressed, he adds, firstly that “power is not a form”, and furthermore, that force is “never singular” and has “no other object or subject than force” (Deleuze 2006, 59).

The elaboration from which Deleuze is most probably drawing from in this instance can be found in Foucault’s essay entitled *The Subject and Power*, which states that “in effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future” (Foucault 1983, 220).

The assertion that power ‘has no other existence than that of relation with other forces’ implies that its ‘being’ can be delineated solely within a particular field of actions: “power exists only when it is put into action” (ibid., 219). When Foucault states that we should displace the question from what to how, he simultaneously warns us that such an analysis should not be limited to a simple description of its affects “without ever relating those affects either to causes or to a basic nature” (ibid., 216). Answering the ‘how’ Foucault has in mind, is therefore not limited to an unproblematic account of power’s manifestations; the examination of the ‘means’ through which it is exercised, is essential for a genealogical analysis. Nevertheless, before we address the interconnectedness between relations of power, and the means it ‘puts into play’ the following clarification is in order.

Primarily (and somehow arbitrarily or at least temporarily), the forces in a particular relation can be characterized or defined by their ability ‘to affect’ and [sic] ‘be affected’ by other forces in this relation. The un-derived definition is therefore ‘binary’ yet it offers countless possible enactments: “it is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier and more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely” (ibid., 220). It should be noted that the interplay of ‘actions upon actions’ does not take place within a ‘zero-sum game’; as Gilles Deleuze points out, ‘the affected force’ - the *induced, enabled, constrained, seduced* etc. is not simply ‘the passive side’ in relation to ‘the affecting

all events fails to account for a considerable number of phenomena. In reality power means relations; a more-or-less organized, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations” (Foucault 1980, 198).

force', it is "rather 'the irreducible encounter' between the two, especially if we believe that the force affected has a certain capacity for resistance" (Deleuze 2006, 60).

Furthermore, even though Foucault's position is extremely clear: "the relations, the set of relations, or perhaps better yet; this set of procedures, whose role is to establish, maintain and transform the mechanisms of power, these relations are not autogenetic, they are not auto-subsistent, they are not founded on themselves. Power is not founded on itself and it is not generated by itself" (Foucault 2004b, 4); it seems that it is nevertheless possible to discern specificities and regularities in the workings of historically, spatially and, in want of a better term, spherically delimited power mechanisms.

Foucault's detailed account, as presented in *Discipline and Punish*, of Bentham's *Panopticon*, can perhaps be considered as such an attempt of discerning specificities and regularities in a historically (end of XVIII and beginning of XIX century), spatially, (Western Europe) and spherically, (the penal system as its first manifestation which nonetheless 'spilled over',⁶⁵ as we will see, into other spheres of the social body) delimited power apparatus.

Bentham's design of the Panopticon can perhaps be viewed as a prolongation and an attempt of perfecting another mechanism of 'social control' that proved its efficacy in combating the wide-spread disease of that time: the plague. The practice Foucault refers to is the "rigorous spatial quadrillage" (Foucault 2004, 215) which, in co-ordination with numerous local, yet nonetheless hierarchically organized, 'instances of power' succeeded, *firstly* in spatially delimiting and quarantining the disease in question; and *secondly* in continuously differentiating and individualizing specific cases within this phenomena, thus enabling its informed and efficacious administration.

Foucault claims that "Bentham's Panopticon is the architectural figure of this composition" (ibid., 219) and sees its main effect in inducing "in the inmate a state of permanent and conscious visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power" (ibid., 221). Furthermore, this 'machine' is devised in a manner that:

⁶⁵ Jef Huysmans (2006, 85–104) offers a Foucauldian perspective on the 'spill over' phenomenon in the European Union. In his analysis he aims at constructing a conceptual framework elucidating "how the development and application of technological devices [...], professional knowledge and skills, and technocratic routines structure the relation between freedom and security" (Huysmans 2006, 86).

It succeeds in attaining that the effects of surveillance are permanent, even though its activity is discontinuous; it causes that the perfection of power tends to render its actual practice unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus is a machine which creates and sustains power relations independently from the person who exercises it; in short, it causes that the prisoners are caught up in a power relations, of which they are themselves its carriers (Foucault 2004, 221).

Rather than re-stating Foucault's description of Panopticon's effects, we will proceed with a short and consequently necessarily limited disambiguation of two common misapprehensions in considerations regarding this conceptualization.

Firstly, (and it is necessary to stress that this conception is perhaps diametrically opposed to what Foucault wanted to articulate) the example Foucault used to portray a certain mechanism of power that “can and must be detached from any particular use” (Foucault 2004, 225), is all too often reduced or equated with ‘the Panopticon’ in terms of the punitive institution from which it got the name. This view completely neglects Foucault insistence that the focus should be with the effects produced by this mechanism, namely the individualization and (the possibility of) constant visibility of the subjects in question; it is an apparatus which “automates and de-individualizes power. Its principle is not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes [...] (ibid., 222). So instead of conceiving the ‘Panopticon’ as just another manifestation of classical unidirectional sovereign power, or even ‘a dream building’, it should rather be viewed as a “generalizable model of functioning” – a “diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology” (ibid., 225).

Secondly, the consequence of constant visibility (the possibility of continuous and detailed social control) is frequently seen as the ultimate aim of the exercise of power. Foucault shows that, quite on the contrary, it is rather one of the means within a larger schema of (interconnected) power mechanisms, through which the exercise of power aimed at and succeeded in becoming more effective. It needs to be stressed however, that efficiency is not power's ‘raison d'être’ – a conception that implies incessant evolution in perfecting its techniques. This process should rather be viewed as inherent

and co-constitutive with wider social developments of that time, which required and produced an apparatus capable of “individualizing observation”, “characterization and classification” and “the analytical arrangement of space” (Foucault 2004, 223). In the substantives Foucault employed to describe the causes of its emergence, and effects the Panopticon produced, it is possible to detect a developing intertwinement of mechanism of power with ‘fields of visibilities’, since it is through “the ability to penetrate into men’s behaviour” that “knowledge follows the advances of power, discovering new objects over all the surfaces on which power is exercised” (ibid., 224). Rather than ‘control’, in the carceral sense of the word, circular causes and effects of the panoptical mechanism are (the need for and the providing of) ‘information’ and the ‘conduct’ [*conduite*] of individuals, as well as larger social entities.

As we have seen it is in fact possible, even if only temporarily and somewhat artificially, to distinguish the ‘pure function’ of power from its inherent intertwinement with knowledge. Deleuze borrows the term ‘diagram’ from Foucault when he describes the Panopticon as power’s (contemporary) function “of imposing a particular⁶⁶ taste or conduct on a multiplicity of particular individuals, provided simply that the multiplicity is small in number and the space limited and confined” (Deleuze 2006, 60–1).

The diagram can therefore be defined, with the following four ‘interlocking’ characteristics: it is “the presentation of the relations between forces unique to a particular formation; [...] the distribution of the power to affect and the power to be affected; [...] the mixing of non-formalized pure functions and unformed pure matter”; finally (and accordingly with the archeological logic of dispersion and regularity) “it is a transmission or distribution of particular features” (ibid., 61–2).

Foucault’s nominalist stance therefore amounts to, in its first instance, to a negation of the following postulates which are most commonly employed in ‘juridico-discursive’ conceptualizations of power:⁶⁷ *firstly* that power is something that is possessed,

⁶⁶ The English translation we are using for this quotation is slightly ambiguous, since it equates the French expression ‘*quelconque*’ with ‘particular’ (behavior and a group of individuals); perhaps a more accurate translation would be ‘any’ which would transform the characterization of this particular diagram into: “imposing any [sic] taste or conduct on any group of individuals [...]”

⁶⁷ During a lecture he gave in Brazil in 1976, Foucault gathers Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf and Jean-Jacques Rousseau under the following postulate: “At first there was no society; then it came about in the moment when a central locus of sovereignty was created, organizing the social body and subsequently enabling a whole series of local and regional practices of power” (Foucault 2007a, 186).

deployed and ultimately embodied in a Sovereign (or particular subsequent points of sovereignty to which power was delegated by a central authority), and *secondly* that power is essentially formulated (deployed by a certain point of sovereignty) in a negative way - in the form of Law, preventing, restricting, prohibiting, obstructing etc.

Foucault's genealogical approach on the other hand suggests that 'Panoptical power' is a complex mechanism, a "physics of relational and multiple power" (Foucault 2004, 228–9); it cannot therefore be equated "neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality of its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a 'physics' or an 'anatomy' of power, a technology" (ibid., 236).

2.2.2 OMNI-PRESENCE

As we have seen above, Foucault proposed that instead of uncritically ascribing power unidirectional and primarily negative characteristics, it should rather be viewed in terms of a plurality of coordinated mechanisms; 'diffuse', 'multidirectional', and 'polyvalent' mechanisms that operate "throughout the entire social body" (Foucault 2004, 229). However, before we go any further in delineating what is most commonly understood under the label 'micro-physics' of power, we believe that the following couple of disambiguation is in order.

Firstly, it is indeed plausible to group Foucault's entire corpus of conceptualizations on power under the label of 'micro-physics'.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, one is still faced with the need of discerning its key characteristics; Wendy Brown's (2006, 67) claim for instance, that this conceptualization amounts to a negation of three prevalent models of power, namely the 'sovereignty model', the 'the commodity model' and the 'repressive model', corresponds to Deleuze's assertion that Foucault's "great theses on power [...] develop under three headings: power is not essentially repressive [...]; it is practiced before it is

⁶⁸ For Foucault's delineation of guidelines directing his analysis under this '*umbrella term*' see: Foucault (2004, 34–5); and Foucault's lecture originally entitled *Nas malhas do poder* the Slovenian translation of which is published in Foucault (2007a, 182–99).

possessed [...]; it passes through the hands of the mastered no less than through the hands of the masters [...]" (Deleuze 2006, 60).

This type of a 'three-folded' approach is certainly not the only one possible. However, since it is one of the most common pathways of approaching Foucault's conceptualization of power, the delineation below can be considered as combining some of its possible variations. It must be stressed however that the 'headings' referred to above are in fact constructed from complementing and overlapping negations of several hypotheses⁶⁹ normally guiding predominant theories and particular analyses of power. It is precisely because of their complementing and overlapping nature that an exact differentiation and a subsequent coherent presentation can be somewhat problematical. Since their differentiation is not of key relevance to our paper we will not attempt to present them independently, but will repeatedly return to them throughout the following parts in order to elucidate and contrast Foucault's claims.

Secondly, Foucault's displacement of analytical attention from 'the Sovereign' (or particular points of sovereignty) to dispersed yet nonetheless coordinated mechanisms of power⁷⁰ is too often viewed as an outright attribution of fallacy to the juridical conceptualization of power. We believe that Foucault's emphasis lies elsewhere: rather than labeling the abovementioned conception as erroneous in-itself,⁷¹ Foucault warned against imprudent attributions of transcendental value; attributions which neglect both the limits of its contemporary implication as well as the forms of power in our modern-day societies. Foucault's 'micro-physics' should therefore not be viewed as a 'true

⁶⁹ Gilles Deleuze suggests that Foucault's conceptualization of power amounts to a negation of the following hypotheses: (1) the postulate of 'property', a view to which Foucault counterposes a conceptualization of power as 'a strategy'; (2) the postulate of 'localization', the negation of which we have delineated in the previous section; (3) the postulate of 'subordination' according to which the functioning of power is dependent on a 'system of production' and 'infrastructure'; (4) the postulate of 'essence' which makes power an 'attribute' and implies a 'zero-sum' logic thus distinguishing 'dominators' from the 'dominated', a conception which Foucault contests by showing how power is strictly 'operational'; (5) the postulate of 'modality' which characterizes power strictly negatively in terms of violence, ideology, repression etc. – Foucault's case against this conception will be presented in the following section and finally (6) the postulate of 'legality' which claims that power is primarily manifested in form of (State) law whose primary effects are positive impositions of peace and legality (Deleuze 2006, 21–6).

⁷⁰ It should be noted that the role of these mechanisms is not primarily repressive but that they aim, *via* traversing the social body, at 'amplifying' its (the social body's) forces: their purpose is "to increase production, to develop the economy, raise the level of public morality; to increase and multiply" (Foucault 2004, 228).

⁷¹ For an informative account of the archeological distinction between '*vrai en soi*' and '*vrai pour nous*' see a text by Gérard Lebrun (1989, 49–51).

definition' of power, it is more an account of the current modalities of its exercise; and as we have indicated above, the processes leading to these transformations were not due to some inherent characteristic of power's nature – they were “circularly the effect and cause” (Foucault 2004b, 4) of wider changes in economy, judicial and penal systems, medicine, psychology, sociology, pedagogy etc. – the new micro-physical modality of power emerged as a reaction to and in coordination with particular displacements in these discursive formations.

What is therefore characteristic of this new diagram of power? Which are its modalities and what are the particular alterations in mechanisms, practices and technologies of power that arose within and constitute a wider web of its exercise? One should begin answering this question with first discerning the novel and 'abstract' forms or surfaces of power's application; to be clear, they were not creations '*ex nihilo*' as it is sometimes suggested, their entrance into the specter of visibility was enabled by the historical *a priori* of that time; the entities we are referring to are 'the population' and 'the body'.⁷² Emergence of these entities required and produced new modalities of power's exercise, modalities which Foucault termed 'anatomo-politics' and 'bio-politics'; complex mechanisms that began, in coordination with the abovementioned discourses, to individualize, analyze and administer particular populations and bodies:

[...] there may be a knowledge of the body that is not exactly the science of its functioning, and a mastery of its forces that is more than the ability to conquer them: this knowledge and this mastery constitute what might be called the political technology of the body. Of course this technology is diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous, systematic discourses; it is often made up of bits and pieces; it implements a disparate set of tools or methods. In spite of the coherence of its results, it is generally no more than a multiform instrumentation (Foucault 2004, 34).

The abovementioned 'entrance into the specter of visibility' can be thought constitutive of a wider process in the workings of disciplinary mechanisms. It was roughly in the course of XVII and XVIII centuries that 'disciplines' gradually expanded and were

⁷² Foucault's most referenced accounts of a political economy of the body can be found in his books *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 2004) and *History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1998); for his portrayal of 'bio-politics' and the constitution of the 'population' as an object of 'governance', see Foucault (2004b) and (2004a) respectively.

diffused ‘throughout the social body’. This diffusion unrolled *via* three complementing modalities.

Firstly, this diffusion was due to what Foucault terms the ‘functional inversion of disciplines’. During this period ‘disciplines’ reversed their mode of functioning as well as their aim. Where they previously operated grandiosely, sporadically and unidirectionally, they now became “lighter, more rapid, more effective” (Foucault 2004, 229); where beforehand they aimed at fixating, neutralizing and restricting, they were now required to develop techniques for “for making useful individuals” (ibid., 231). It is precisely because their social function was inversed from restriction to ‘mobilization’, that this modality of power could be inserted into, was able to attach itself to, and provided support for other social spheres such as education, medicine, economy etc.

Simultaneously with the abovementioned functional alteration and consequential multiplication of ‘disciplinary establishments’, the mechanisms employed started to show a certain ‘tendency of de-institutionalization’: they began “to emerge from the closed fortress in which they once functioned and to circulate in a ‘free’ state; the massive, compact disciplines are broken down into flexible methods of control, which may be transferred and adapted” (ibid.). This transformation did not imply a diminished social role of institutions, perhaps quite on the contrary: since the techniques employed became more flexible and easily transferrable their logic could be taken up by smaller and smaller social entities – in the last instance by, supposedly the smallest social matrix, the family and within it, particular individuals. Alongside this new vertically penetrating ability of power mechanisms, it was the ‘institutions’ themselves that started to horizontally broaden the scope of techniques they employed, a process which amounted to what is in juridical terms referred to as ‘implied powers’:

The practice of placing individuals under ‘observation’ is a natural extension of a justice imbued with disciplinary methods and examination procedures. Is it surprising that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labor, its authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in normality, who continue and multiply the function of the judge, should have become the modern instrument of penalty? Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons? (Foucault 2004, 248).

Ultimately, the inverted disciplinary mechanisms were in a way duplicated by state-controlled organizations and the principal medium through which this process took place was the police apparatus. It was perhaps precisely this state-controlled patterning, that in a sense ‘completed’ the process of permeation, thus spreading supervising techniques indiscriminately throughout the entire social body. Reconfiguring our classical conception of a state-controlled, centralized, hierarchical and repressive police apparatus into anything else than a pure vehicle of classical sovereign power is indeed challenging; Foucault however claims, that its functioning was quite different and specific. Unlike previously, when its primary role was the neutralization of deviant, extreme and marginal components of society, the police apparatus was now meant to be “coextensive with the entire social body” (Foucault 2004, 234), it should examine every detail with meticulous care: “Police must bear ‘over everything’ [...] the dust of events, actions, behaviors, opinions [...]” (ibid.).

It should be stressed that this incessant examination of individuals which finally culminated in a series of reports and registries was not solely unidirectional, as Foucault puts it “it was in fact a double-entry system [...] also capable of responding to solicitations from below” (ibid.); neither did the police-apparatus gain primacy amongst other panopticed mechanisms; it rather acted in an interrelating and complementary fashion. The police was simultaneously an intermediary mechanism binding various institutions and an ‘additive’ since it acted “where they could not intervene, disciplining the non-disciplinary spaces” (ibid., 235). François Ewald claims that this process in its last instance produced a modality of power ‘without an outside’; an entirely ‘disciplined society’⁷³ where, as Foucault puts it, “there are no spaces of primal liberty amongst the meshes of its network” (Foucault 1980, 142).

Before we proceed with delineating a negation of the ‘repressive hypothesis’, we believe that the following couplet of anti-reductionist cautions should be highlighted:

Firstly, even though it is true that Foucault did in fact advocate ‘an ascending analysis of power’, one that should begin with “infinitesimal mechanisms [...] and then see how these mechanisms of power have been – and continue to be – invested, colonized,

⁷³ Ewald warns that the emphasis in this conceptualization should not be uncritically placed with the notion of ‘discipline’: “What is important in the idea of a disciplinary society is the concept of society: disciplines make society; they create a type of common language for all types of institutions; they make them translatable [sic] into one another” (Ewald 1989, 197).

utilized, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc. by ever more general mechanisms” (Foucault 1980, 99), this guideline should not blur the relation between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of power’s modalities. Neither primacy nor reduction can be assigned to power’s ‘micro-level’ (a view that clearly neglects Foucault’s conception of the panoptical modality of power in terms of a ‘double-entry system’); Nathan Widder illuminated this problem rather clearly: “The microscopic and macroscopic levels are neither simply external to one another nor internal and identical. They are immanent to one another while being reciprocally determining” (Widder 2004, 422).

Moreover, as Wendy Brown (2006, 67) claims, the omnipresence of power is all too often reduced to a claim that “power equally and indiscriminately touches all elements of the social fabric” and “that power belongs equally to everyone.” Interestingly this two-folded simplification can lead to diametrically opposed implications: it can turn Foucault’s conception either into radical determinism or total relativism and voluntarism. Since we will provide respective and slightly more detailed clarifications of this simplification in the following parts of our paper, we will for now merely point to the following disambiguation: “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault 1998, 93).

2.2.3 POLYMORPHISM

The idea that, as Wendy Brown puts it, “power is productive rather than simply repressive” (2006, 70) is one of those Foucault’s theses that, since it was largely embraced and built upon, as well as greeted with fierce criticism,⁷⁴ merits a distinct delineation.

Contrary to what it is commonly reduced, Foucault’s account of contemporary modalities, mechanisms, techniques and devices of power goes well beyond mere assertions of their productive character; nor does it stop at proposing an alternative theoretical conceptualization which amounts to claiming that power is ‘a pure function

⁷⁴ Since we will indicate directions for further reading affirming and building on Foucault’s thesis on specific occasions throughout the following section, we will at this point merely point to what is most commonly conceived the most influential couplet of Foucault’s critics focusing largely on precisely the abovementioned thesis: Jean Baudrillard (2005) and Jürgen Habermas (1988, 226–77).

of actions upon actions' which, upon logical examination, inevitably leads to conclusions of its polymorphous character. Rather than theoretical 'one-upmanship', Foucault provides thorough historical accounts of transformations in modalities of power, their interplay and inherent intertwinement with the constitution of various discursive formations.

Foucault primarily engages a 'juridico-discursive' conceptualization of power which, even though it is in fact a complex combination of various interlocking hypotheses, can nonetheless be reduced to the following postulate: power is principally exercised through *juridical* media (the most prominent medium is the Law), its deployment and effects being essentially *repressive* in character. Power, according to Foucault, is thus

defined in a strangely restrictive way [...] this power is poor in resources, sparing on its methods, monotonous in the tactics it utilizes, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed always to repeat itself. Further, it is a power that only has the force of the negative on its side, a power to say no; in no condition to produce, capable only of posting limits, it is basically anti-energy. This is the paradox of its effectiveness: it is incapable of doing anything, except to render what it dominates incapable of doing anything either, except for what this power allows it to do (Foucault 1998, 85).

As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, 131) claim, Foucault's stake against this conceptualization is two-fold: in its first instance it aims at a "genealogy of how the repressive hypothesis came to be and what functions it has played in our society"; furthermore, and in extension of the presumption that such a conception still plays a role in our contemporary societies, it aims at revealing the modalities of power currently in place, their mechanisms, techniques and devices.

The abovementioned postulate, so claims Foucault, is in fact a 'relic' persisting from a 'monarchic' conception of power.⁷⁵ Its endurance can primarily be accounted for by examining the argumentation used against the monarchic institution itself at the point when it was gradually replaced and integrated into new forms of government. Critique

⁷⁵ Foucault identifies the monarchy as the basic medieval institution of power, embodied in "the state with its apparatus" (Foucault 1998, 86) that functioned primarily as a regulative agency. It succeeded in imposing order to a multiplicity of competing powers by forming a unitary regime, "identifying its will with the law, and [...] acting through mechanisms of interdiction and sanction" (ibid., 87). There was doubtlessly "more to this development of great monarchic institutions", Foucault recognizes, "than a pure and simple juridical edifice. But such was the language of power [...] it was the monarchic system's mode of manifestation and the form of its acceptability" (ibid.).

directed against ‘the monarchy’ was then articulated “on behalf of a pure and rigorous juridical system to which all the mechanisms of power could conform, with no excesses or irregularities” (Foucault 1998, 88); and even in our present day, criticism against institutions or modes of governance, rarely strays away from exposing a ‘manipulation of lawfulness’ as the primary distortion to be remedied: “the discourse of law as legitimation found a form which is still in use” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 131).

There are two further reasons for the successful persistence of the juridico-discursive conception of power: firstly there is what Foucault terms “the speaker’s benefit” (Foucault 1998, 6). Building upon a presumption of radical exteriority in relation between power and truth, the speaker, unmasking power’s workings, verbalizing truths and promising freedom, places himself “outside of power and within the truth” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 130); an inviting position from which even Foucault cannot be excluded, with an important exception however, for “as a genealogist he is certainly not claiming to be outside of power, nor to promise us a path to utopia or bliss” (ibid.). If power and truth were indeed opposed to one another, than the benefit of the speaker would be only one amongst many elements through which the reality of this relationship would be revealed, one amongst many pathways to truth and liberation. Since Foucault is contesting this view, he sees it as a crucial tactical element within a wider schema of the current modality of power, which can successfully operate “only on the condition that it masks a substantial part of itself” (Foucault 1998, 86). In the possibility of attaining truths unstained and beyond the reach of power’s effects – the possibility of objective knowledge, and in the idea that power is a “pure limit set on freedom”, Foucault sees, for our societies at least, “the general form of its acceptability” (ibid.).

As we have indicated above, Foucault does not stop at claiming that power is indeed ‘masking’ a substantial part of itself, that it deserves a richer conceptualization since its effectiveness cannot be accounted for solely *via* ‘anti-energy’ but rather by energy *tout court*. Through an archeologico-genealogical examination of discursive formations and social practices, he offers a “far-reaching interpretation of modernity” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 126), which draws from his analysis of the passage in conceptualizations of power viewed essentially as ‘the right of death’, to its contemporary modalities and technologies operating in accordance with the notion of ‘power over life’.

One of the main features of classical political theory, *the right to decide life and death* is, according to Foucault, marked with radical dissymmetry. The sovereign power touches life only indirectly, through the exercise of his right to kill or restraining himself from such action: “The right which was formulated as the ‘power of life and death’ was in reality the right to ‘take’ life or ‘let’ live” (Foucault 1998, 136). Paradoxical already at its theoretical level, it ultimately implies a non-existent subject, since “from the view-point of life and death the subject is neutral, endowed with the right to be alive or the right to be eventually dead, simply through the sovereign” (Foucault 1997, 214). The exercise of power is therefore analogous to a ‘subtraction device’ capable of seizing property, time, bodies and eventually even “life itself” (Foucault 1998, 136).

If such a conceptualization corresponded to the way power operated in the classical age, Foucault claims that its mechanisms have since profoundly altered. Instead of being their main characteristic, deduction has become only one amongst many elements within a larger diagram of power “bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit or destroying them” (ibid.). The central factor in this transition is the way *life, the body, sexuality* and *truth* were aligned with requirements of these mechanisms that ultimately sought to *administer life*. It needs to be stressed that Foucault’s historical account should not be viewed as describing a *substitution* of the former modality of power,⁷⁶ this process should rather be read as one of “complementation of this old sovereign right [...] with another, new right, that will not efface the first one, but will penetrate it, traverse it, modify it, and that will be a right that is completely inverse: the right to ‘make’ life and ‘let’ live” (Foucault 1997, 214).

This complementation however was neither uniform nor instantaneous; the ‘power over life’ coalesced around two historically as well as mechanically distinct techniques that were, each in its own way, inherently intertwined with new rationales then emerging

⁷⁶ Andrej Kurnik warns against hurried conclusions on the ‘humanization’ of punishment: “We are dealing with a profound transformation which nonetheless leaves no place for illusions. The death penalty is not abolished because we have reached a higher level of humaneness but because bio-power demands its reintegration into a new economy of power” (Kurnik 2005, 137).

within various discursive formations of social sciences. Ultimately coming together, they formed what is now known under the label of ‘bio-power’ or ‘bio-politics’.⁷⁷

Historically, the ‘*disciplinary*’ diagram of power was the first that took form. As Dreyfus and Rabinow claim, it was through the “*interplay of a disciplinary technology and a normative social science*” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 143), centered on the individual body, “*not so much as the means for human reproduction, but as an object to be manipulated*” (ibid., 134) that this first aspect of bio-power was developed. Through a multiplicity of various disciplinary mechanisms, power was exercised in a way that ultimately sought to produce useful and ‘*docile bodies*’ – a true ‘*technology of the body*’.

Unquestionably, the abovementioned technology is not the first to preoccupy itself with the body; in *Discipline and Punish* for instance Foucault distinguishes the following three forms of punishment. If *torture*, a public and pompous manifestation of the sovereign’s power, whose main effect was in a “body effaced, reduced to dust and thrown to the winds” (Foucault 2004, 59–60), has little to do with the disciplining operation of *normalizing detention*, the latter can be thought as incorporating a *humanist critique* of the aforementioned ritual of atrocity. Building upon contractualist ideas and thus displacing the signification of criminal acts, seen beforehand as attacks on the sovereign, to transgressions of the social contract; the humanist critique placed the right and duty of addressing crime in the hands of the society as a whole. Numerous concrete alterations in the modes of punishment were envisaged, but perhaps most importantly an idea of ‘reintegration’ emerged: the transgressor should no longer be ‘effaced’ because of crimes he committed; punishment should rather bring him “back to his rightful and useful place in society” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 148).

There are perhaps two aspects to a successful social reintegration: in order to avoid recurrence of the criminal act itself, individual psychological features and broader societal preconditions need to be thoroughly examined, as well as appropriate punishment applications “adjusted to the supposed motivating root” (ibid., 149). For this purpose a whole array of specialized discursive fields were formed; precise

⁷⁷ For widely influential work drawing on Foucault’s conceptualization of bio-power see Hardt and Negri (2000 and 2004) and Agamben (1998, 2003 and 2005).

knowledge that individualized, examined, classified and ultimately objectified criminals as well as criminal acts: “The appropriate application of correct punishment required an object who was fixed as an individual and known in greater detail” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 149). However, it is not the detailed knowledge of individuals that presents the innovative element in this technique; it is rather the incorporation of an individual’s *soul* in the punitive calculation: “the ‘mind’ as a surface of inscription for power [...]; the submission of bodies through the control of ideas” (Foucault 2004, 115–16). To put it in Foucauldian terms: it is precisely this ‘moral’ imperative of punishment which sought to redress the criminal’s soul, not by offering punishment in a form of exemplary warning, but *via* its correction and useful reintegration – “a kind of public morality lesson” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 150); that simultaneously presents, an element of *discontinuity vis-à-vis* the sovereign modality of power and forms a part of the *historical a priori* in the formation of disciplinary technology.

Gilles Deleuze claims that discipline, a diagram of power where the abovementioned moral imperative was combined with the necessity of economic efficiency, succeeded in ‘imposing conduct’ through “distribution in space (which took concrete form in enclosing, controlling, arranging, placing in series), ordering in time (subdividing time, programming an action, decomposing a gesture...), composition in space-time (the various ways of ‘constituting a productive force whose effect had to be superior to the sum of elementary forces that composed it’)” (Deleuze 2006, 60). In order to strengthen this account of constitutive elements in techniques of power which ultimately form “an apparatus of total, continuous and efficient surveillance” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 152), we offer a short extraction from a whole series of meticulous behavior-regulating directions for the imprisoned, one that Foucault used in *Discipline and Punish* in order to illuminate his argument: “ [...] Art. 18. Rising. At the first drum-roll, the prisoners must rise and dress in silence [sic], as the supervisor opens the cell door. At the second drum-roll, they must be dressed and make their beds. At the third drum-roll, they must line up and proceed to the chapel for a morning prayer [sic]. There is a five minute [sic] interval between each drum-roll [...] ” (Foucault 2004, 12).

Accordingly with François Ewald’s claim that “economy of visibility” (1989, 198) provides the basic support for a broader ‘normative schema’ sparked with the panoptical modality of power, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, 156) distinguish “hierarchical

observation” and “normalizing judgment” as the main procedures of disciplinary power which combine into its central technique: the examination. Since we have already delineated the basic features in the workings of an omnipresent modality of power, and we will return to its normalizing aspect at the end of this section; let us at this point only reiterate that it is through the following four-fold circular process of: (i) *enabling visibility*, (ii) *examination and classification*, (iii) *documentation* and (iv) *normalization* that, in coordination with the then evolving social and human sciences, disciplinary techniques succeed in ‘producing individuals’. It is true that there is a radical shift in an operation of power which views “individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (Foucault 2004, 189), yet it is precisely at this point as well, that it reveals the limits of its capabilities: this diagram of power stops at dealing with ‘individuals as objects’.

Foucault claims it was in the second part of the 18th century that a different technology of power, that can no longer be considered ‘disciplinary’, appears. However, it should again not be considered as a replacement; firstly because it owes a substantive part of its success to the existence of the latter, whose mechanisms it partly incorporated and partly modified; but above all because it operates and constitutes a completely different level: “it concerns itself with the life of people, or if you prefer, it does not deal with the human-body, but with the living-human, a human as a living being; in its last instance it deals with the human-species” (Foucault 1997, 216). It is true that both techniques are exercised on a *multiplicity* of people, yet with a slight but important difference; if disciplinary power aimed at ordering a multiplicity of *individualized* people; the new techniques refer their exercise to a multiplicity of people conceived in terms of a “global mass affected by general processes that are proper to life, processes as birth, death, procreation, sickness, etc” (ibid.). It is with this dual displacement of *attention* and *surface* in the exercise of power that Foucault identifies a technology of power that is no longer the “anatomy-politics of the human body, but [...] a ‘biopolitics’ of the human species” (Foucault 1997, 216).

In coordination with the abovementioned alteration in power’s exercise, the “epistemological de-blockage of sciences on man” (Lukšič and Kurnik 2000, 181) underwent its own. Birth- and death-rates, diseases, environmental and social settings effecting human-beings, began to be examined in terms of *collective temporal*

phenomena – as processes continuously affecting the entire population. It is in precisely these phenomena that Foucault sees ‘points of departure’ for the constitution of a bio-political power/knowledge nexus: “it is through natality, mortality, various biological incapacities, from surrounding effects [...] that biopolitics will get hold of its knowledge and define the field of intervention of its power” (Foucault 1997, 218). Accordingly, its techniques differ in function from previous disciplinary mechanisms: “previsions, statistical estimates, global measurements” (ibid., 219) are tools through which power, perhaps not so much ‘intervenes’ in the lives of those subjected to its exercise, but rather ‘intermediates’ in various (biological) processes with a view of ‘optimizing life’. Ultimately we are witnessing an advent of “regulatory mechanisms” (Foucault 1997, 219) of power.

Even though disciplinary and regulatory modalities of power, exercise their functions *via* differing mechanisms and techniques, ultimately aiming at disciplining the body and regulating the population, they do not exclude, ignore, nor cancel each other out. It is precisely through operation on different levels of reality that their cooperation and connectedness is enabled. Foucault distinguishes *the norm* as the constitutive element of bio-politics able to ‘circulate’ between the disciplinary and the regulatory, thus forming a “normalizing society [...] where the disciplinary and regulatory norms intersect according to a perpendicular articulation” (ibid., 225); and *sexuality* as the privileged element to be ‘normalized’, since it can be found at the intersection of “the organism and population”, of individual “bodies and global phenomena” (ibid., 224).

The specificity of modern (bio-politicized?) societies cannot be sufficiently accounted for, according to François Ewald, if the advent and predominance of the norm, which gradually incorporated and substituted the law as the main matrix in the exercise of power, is not taken into consideration. The technology of the norm is perhaps nothing more than an assemblage of instruments “aiming to resolve traditional problems of power: ordering multiplicities, articulating the whole [*le tout*] and its parts, putting them in relation with one another” (Ewald 1989, 198) constituting a normative schema that functions according to the principle of production (rather than repression) and the logic of individualization. It is important to stress that the logic of individualization does not entail segregation or exclusion, for it never ceases to individualize, relating only to the things it makes visible: “Whereas law prohibits from a position of exteriority certain

individual behavior [*comportements*], the norm regulates them from the interior; in the sense that it is the individuals that assess themselves according to a norm [...] If the norm controls the individuals, it is because it produces these beings that live themselves as such” (Benasayag and del Rey 2007, 185).

If the norm is in fact the instrument through which individuals are produced as well as continuously produce themselves; if it is simultaneously the element enabling governance of multiplicities in their globality, how can one characterize this omnipotent phenomenon? Ewald’s sees it as a “principle of comparison, of comparability, a common measure” (Ewald 1989, 200) and exactly that “by which and through which society [...] communicates with itself” (ibid., 198).

Foucault’s concept of bio-power, a power/knowledge nexus where mechanisms, techniques and instruments of sovereign, disciplinary and regulatory power “coexist and complement each other” (Kolšek 2003, 139) in a ‘triangular diagram’ of power is perhaps one of his most influential thesis. However, contrary to what it is most commonly reduced to, an ‘all-encompassing-reality-producing power mechanism’⁷⁸ subjugating individual bodies and controlling entire populations, it needs to be stressed that Foucault conceived it in terms of an assemblage of “polymorphous techniques of power” with a wide specter of possible effects which may be those of “refusal, blockage, and invalidation” but also those of “incitement and intensification” (Foucault 1998, 11). Power thus conceived consist in “guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome” (Foucault 1983, 221), its effects perhaps best characterized as structuring “the possible field of actions of others” (Foucault 1983, 221).⁷⁹

One of the most important wagers in Foucault’s enterprise of disengaging his analysis from the ‘juridico-discursive’ conceptualization of power is overcoming the following contradictory couplet of conclusion resulting from such a conception. If power is

⁷⁸ Leaning on Bruno Latour’s statement that “bio-politics [...] is one of those expressions that, even though they awake the critical mind, paralyze it at the same moment”, Peter Klepec suggests that in an age where “everything seems to be biopolitics” (Klepec 2003, 112) this expression is “in some sense” indeed “simply too powerful” (ibid., 126).

⁷⁹ A similar account can perhaps be found in Hay (2002, 185–186) where he proposes a “definition” of power which combines both the classical “direct” – power as conduct shaping – definition of Dahl, with an “indirect form of power” which entails “the ability of actors (whether individual or collective) to ‘have an affect’ upon context which defines the range of possibilities of others”.

primarily *repressive and exterior* to knowledge, truth or desire, it can and must be overcome, an assumption calling for radical emancipation and leading to what Foucault terms “the promise of a liberation” (Foucault 1998, 83). On the other hand, if power is a *constitutive part* of knowledge, desire or truth; enters nihilism: “you are always-already trapped” (Foucault 1998, 83).

It seems that Foucault’s polymorphous conceptualization of the contemporary biomodality of power is not immune to such binary conclusions. Keeping in mind his insistence on the immanent constitution of power and knowledge, perhaps the nihilistic position is especially tempting. It seems that power which in addition to producing and meticulously disciplining the individual body to infinitesimal details at its micro-level, regulates it through time at the point of its insertion into the macro-level of population, does not offer much hope nor reason for maneuvering (resistance?): seemingly “The right disposition of things is [...] maintained through the standardization of populations within certain defined parameters, the self-disciplining of their own behaviour by individuals conforming to these parameters and the disciplining function of surveillance [...] that seeks to prevent any straying outside of those parameters” (Lipschutz 2007, 229). Again, things are perhaps not as simple as they might seem.

At this particular point, silence in relation to Foucault’s work on the concept of *resistance* (as well as to the entailing problems) which ultimately lead to a conceptualization of various forms of “the self’s relationship to itself” (Davidson 1991, 221) or ‘ethics’, could and should be considered either as insincerity or ignorance. In an analytics of power where “there is no diagram that does not also include, besides the points which it connects up, certain relatively free or unbound points, points of creativity, change and resistance” (Deleuze 2006, 37), or which presupposes, as Michel Foucault put it: “that there are no relations of power without resistances” (Foucault 1980, 142); dodging this aspect would be imprudent at least. Given the complexity and extensiveness of Foucault’s own sayings and writings concerning this subject, as well as the wide specter of interpretations, we have chosen self-restraint as our guiding principle; a faithful and accurate delineation would definitely require and deserve a more extensive elaboration than the one presently feasible.

With this clarification in mind, we will now proceed with shortly delineating Foucault's genealogical 'method' which aims at deciphering particular power/knowledge nexuses thus connecting "the anonymous rules governing discursive practices" with "the network of power relations of which these rules are a part" (Shiner 1982, 388).

2.2.4 GENEALOGY

During an interview from 1976, the same year as his widely known lectures at Collège de France entitled *Il faut défendre la société* took place, Foucault acknowledged that what was missing in his work "was this problem of the 'discursive regime', of the effects of power peculiar to the play of statements" (Foucault 1991, 60). Although not entirely absent thus far, the analyses to follow, will pay greater attention to "the network of power relations" constituting an essential part in the formation of "anonymous rules governing discursive practices" (Shiner 1982, 388).

In his defense, Foucault distinguishes three factors contributing to a relative silence when he first broadened the question concerning 'the political status of science' to what Ian Hacking termed the 'immature sciences'.⁸⁰ The *first* threshold this topic failed to pass was constructed by France's Marxist intellectuals who at the time sought to gain recognition amidst the established university circles and consequently aimed at resolving the same problems. According to Foucault, "medicine and psychiatry didn't seem to them to be very noble or serious matters, nor to stand on the same level as the great forms of classical rationalism" (Foucault 1991, 58). *Secondly*, there was the reactionary stance of 'post-Stalinist Stalinism' which excluded from discourse everything that was not a timid restatement of the already known. The *last* factor might have been that intellectual circles gravitating around the French Communist Party were in some way refusing to talk about "the problem of internment" or "the political use of psychiatry, and, in a more general sense of the disciplinary grid of society" (ibid.), the reason being contemporary developments in the Soviet Union.

⁸⁰ For the entire article where Hacking primarily examines basic hypotheses put forward by Foucault in *The Order of Things* see Hacking (1979).

If the described historical circumstances obstructed both a coherent articulation of the problematic as well as its resonance in the established intellectual field, the events in and around May 1968 apparently contributed to a shift of “Foucault’s interest [...] away from discourse” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 104), a displacement which ultimately lead to a reformulation and re-conceptualization of his analyses under the umbrella term of genealogy. The main area of focus thus became “the mutual relations between systems of truth and modalities of power”, or perhaps even more accurately: “the way in which there is a ‘political regime’ of the production of truth” (Davidson 1991, 224).

Undoubtedly the emergence of genealogy cannot be ascribed solely to the events of May 1968. At the beginning of the abovementioned lectures at the Collège de France Foucault delineated the following two-sided process that contributed to an “insurrection of subjugated knowledges [*savoirs assujétis*]” (Foucault 1997, 8).

The homogenizing feature within this set of subjugated knowledges is *the local character of their critique*, apparently free from preconditions of validation or endorsement by a unitary regime of knowledge. The insurrection however, is marked by a double return. *Firstly*, by an excavation of “historical contents which were buried, masked within functional coherences or formal systematizations” (ibid.) and *secondly*, with the restoration of particular knowledges, once deemed hierarchically subordinate and thus failing to pass the thresholds of coherency and scientificity. It was therefore through a combined (re)emergence of both functionally and hierarchically subordinate knowledges that a “historical knowledge of struggles” (ibid., 9) could become discernable.

However, before we go any further into the intricacies of Foucault’s “opposition to unitary bodies of theory or globalizing discourses which seek to integrate diverse ‘local’ events within a totalizing frame in order to prescribe practices and thereby realize specified effects” (Smart 1991, 166), it seems necessary to examine a text that Foucault wrote explicitly on the thematic of genealogy: *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*. Perhaps even more so since Arnold Davidson (1991, 224) claims that it was through following Nietzsche that Foucault came to be “concerned with the origin of specific claims to truth” and Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, 106) add that “it would be hard to overestimate

the importance of the essay” since “all of the seeds of Foucault’s work of the 1970s can be found in this discussion on Nietzsche.”

“Genealogy is gray, meticulous and patiently documentary” (Foucault 2005, 1004) is the opening statement of the abovementioned essay. *Nothing excitingly new* is a possible response to this characterization and perhaps rightfully so. Firstly, Foucault’s *genealogy* is certainly not *new*; it can legitimately be viewed as a complementation or a continuation of his archeological method, for it is without a doubt underscored by the same ‘theoretical stance’.⁸¹ On the other hand, the adjective ‘exciting’, should not be so hurriedly dismissed; according to a random dictionary, the primary meaning of *excite* is to “arouse or stir up emotions or feelings” and one of its further disambiguations is to “stir to action; provoke or stir up” (Random House 1987, 675). While genealogy is in no way an offspring of phenomenology, it does however tend to privilege the examination of various inherently unstable relationships of force that, through their interaction, light up eventual *locations of combat* and open up gates for “possible interpretations” of “events on the stage of historical process” (Foucault 2005, 1014).

Correspondingly with the ‘methodological’ elaborations on archeology, Foucault again proposes an alternative approach to history, one that does not “attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities” and reproaches this type of analysis of assuming “the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession” (ibid., 1006). In the same way as an archeologist aims at capturing the statement in ‘the exact specificity of its occurrence’, a genealogist situates ‘the singularity’ of events in locations we usually consider marginal or even ‘without history’. Avoiding the quest for depth he rather examines the surfaces of events, obscure details and marginal shifts: history is therefore “the study of petty malice, of violently imposed interpretations, of vicious intentions, of high-sounding stories masking the lowest of motives” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 108). Consequently, and again accordingly with archeology’s stance regarding the common premise of history’s progressive evolution, the genealogical “story of history is

⁸¹ We agree with Nathan Widder (2004, 414) who suggests that “even in this move from an archeology of discursive formations to a genealogy of power, and beyond that to a genealogy of ethics, the logic of dispersion [sic] remains crucial to Foucault.”

one of accidents, dispersion, chance events, lies – not the lofty development of Truth or the concrete embodiment of Freedom” (ibid.).

The main object of genealogical analysis is therefore slightly prolonged or broadened for it examines such concepts as ‘reason’, ‘truth’, ‘morality’, ‘freedom’ etc. However, rather than focusing on their temporal aspect, it studies them in their spatiality, thus accentuating the inherent intertwinement of the potential myriad of forms of knowledge and power’s possible localities. Leaning on previous elaborations by Nietzsche, Foucault states that expressions ‘descent’ and ‘emergence’ are best suited for accounting the “true objectives of genealogy” (Foucault 2005, 1008) and thus differentiates them from history’s familiar search for *Ursprung* or ‘the pursuit of the origin’.

Herkunft or ‘descent’, as understood by Foucault, represents an alternative way of approaching the thematic of “the ancient affiliation to a group, sustained by the bonds of blood, tradition, or social class” (ibid., 1008). Genealogy perceives of ‘descent’ in terms of a complex and largely accidental intercrossing of ‘numberless beginnings’ “through which, thanks to which, against which” (ibid., 1009) these features or concepts (race, people, tradition, social class etc.) were formed in the first place. Rather than narrating the ‘evolution of a people’ or the ‘destiny of a social class’, a genealogist aims at pinpointing the deviations, accidents, errors and miscalculations within the process of the constitution of a cultural legacy; a process which is not progressively solidifying, but “an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures and heterogeneous layers” (ibid.).

Entstehung or ‘emergence’ is a term Foucault adopts from Nietzsche in order to articulate the very moment of the eruption of forces, the event of their coming into play and forming a delineated principle, a “singular law of an apparition” (ibid., 1012). Here again Foucault opposes the common inclination under which we think of ‘emergence’ as the ultimate manifestation of continuous and progressive development. Through the concept of ‘emergence’, genealogy aims at delineating *the space* within which particular forces enter into relation. In the analysis of ‘emergence’, genealogy is therefore not particularly interested in the ‘physics’ of power relations in question, but rather focuses on the ‘scenery’ in which the struggles are being fought. It should be noted that, again

in continuation of Foucault's archeological method, the scenery where forces encounter is likewise a "non-place, a pure distance indicating that the adversaries do not belong to a common place" (Foucault 2005, 1012). Constituted only through a specific confrontation, it is nothing more than an empty space, a void filled with potentiality, a medium in which 'meanings' rise from battle. Leaning on Nietzsche, Foucault claims that such a deconstruction inevitably leads to a recognition that the rise of a particular conception of freedom, duty, morality or truth, is "like that of any other major event, profoundly and extensively saturated in blood" (Nietzsche 1988, 252).

Conceiving history in terms of "struggles and conflicts around the question of truth" (Smart 1991, 166), combined with the previously delineated principal features in Foucault's conceptualization of power, triggered the following question: "if indeed power is in itself the bringing into play [*mise en jeu*] and deployment of relations of forces [...] should it not then primarily be analyzed in terms of combat, confrontation or war" (Foucault 1997, 16)? The answer consists in Foucault's renowned reversal of Clausewitz's postulate into a claim that "politics is war continued by other means" (ibid.).⁸²

Assuming that politics can indeed be thought of as a war-like struggle between various competing schemata of truth, if there is in fact "for every society, for every historical age [...] a regime of truth, unplanned but functional, generated somehow out of the network of power relations, out of the multiple forms of constraint, and enforced along with them" (Walzer 1991, 64); and furthermore, if genealogy is to be acknowledged as a qualified deciphering mechanism for such a societal configuration, how would its analyses characterize the settings in our own society, what does our contemporary 'political economy of truth' consist of?

⁸² For an overview of this 'reversal', focusing explicitly on the implication it has on the concept of *strategy*, which otherwise "still tends to be defined within the domain of strategic studies as a form of instrumental rationality by which the relationship between means and ends is calculated to advance the interest of states and other actors" (Reid 2003a, 1) see Julian's Reid's paper *Foucault on Clausewitz: Conceptualizing the Relationship between War and Power* (2003a). For a comparison of "Deleuze's argument upon the nature of the relation between war and the state" and "Foucault's concept of power" (Reid 2003, 57), see *Deleuze's War Machine: Nomadism Against the State* (Reid 2003).

In response Foucault provides the following principal features: in our Western societies, the production and transmission of truth is *chiefly* commanded by a handful of dominant power apparatuses, such as the university, the media, the military etc. and is *primarily* considered as such (as Truth) if it is presented in an appropriate form, originating from within a scientific discourse and the competent institutions producing such discourses. Truth is *consequently* subjected to incessant mechanisms of political and economical incitement, diffusion, consumption, political debates and social confrontation: “[...] truth isn’t outside power or lacking of power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions repay further study, truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world [...]” (Foucault 1991, 72–3).

Perhaps a final clarification considering Foucault’s understanding of truth is appropriate. In combining archeological and genealogical approaches into an analysis of history conceived in terms of various struggles, battles and strategies gravitating around truth; one should above all persist in avoiding the comfortable viewpoint which perceives of confrontations and strategies involved as *centered on* incompatible truths discovered, arrived at, accepted, neglected etc. and therefore a conception of battles fought ‘*in the name of truth*’. Foucault suggests that truth should rather be understood as “the set of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects attached to the true”, displacing the focus of battles to “the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays” (Foucault 1991, 74).

Every truth-claim bears the scars of battle and “all knowledge rests upon injustice” (Foucault 2005, 1023) might be one of the strongest and simultaneously most disconcerting claims put forward by Michel Foucault.

3 Concluding remarks and open questions

After each academic year at College de France every lecturer is obliged to provide a resume of his course to be published in their *Annuaire*. Ewald and Fontana (2004, XI) tell us, that Michel Foucault normally wrote his summaries in June, quite some time after the end of his courses that took place from beginning of January until the end of March: “this was for him the best occasion to state, retrospectively, the intentions and objectives” of his course(s). The hazardous throw of dice wanted that these concluding remarks are similarly separated as well as detached from the main part of our own work.

Before going any further we would like to state the guiding principle of this conclusion. The first is foucauldian, this time coming from Balibar (1989, 54): “It is tempting – maybe even necessary for a non-pious reading – to apply to Foucault’s texts (and I am referring here above all to his books) his own principles of analysis of rules of formation and individualization of statements: to search for the correlations they have with others, which “people their borders”, with which they “participate in challenge and struggle”, in order to “rediscover their occurrence as event””.⁸³ To reiterate a bit more concisely, it is necessary to treat statements in the *positivity of their occurrence*.

“This year’s course has been entirely dedicated to what ought to have been only its introduction” writes Foucault (2004a, 323) in the beginning of his resume on *The Birth of Biopolitics*. During our work we likewise realized, that what ought to have been only one of its components, setting the undertone or constituting its “unsaid”; namely Foucault’s sayings and writings on the relations between knowledge, power and truth, turned out to be its main object of investigation.

We choose not to state (nor restate) our main “conclusions” at this point, for several reasons. Firstly, all that could be written (and understood for that matter) on the topic of “Strategies of Truths” is already present in the main text itself as well as in the Slovenian abstract. Secondly, without being at all conscious of it, we have undergone a process that Foucault describes in the following way:

⁸³ Quotation marks signal the passages from *L’Archéologie du savoir*, its French original, from which Balibar is quoting. The passages are taken from pages 128, 138 and 159; respectively and correspond to pages 110, 118, and 137 in the English language edition we have consulted.

What I think is never quite the same, because for me my books are experiences in a sense that I would like to be as full as possible. An experience is something that one comes out of transformed. If I had to write a book to communicate what I'm already thinking before I begin to write, I would never have the courage to begin. [...] I'm an experimenter in the sense that I write in order to change myself and in order not to think the same thing as before (Foucault 2002, 239).

Inevitably on an incomparable scale, something like a transformation occurred in our own line of thought, a slight rupture if you will, which makes it impossible to write a defense, negation or a confirmation of the content above; nonetheless because "experience is neither true or false. An experience is always a fiction: it's something that one fabricates oneself, that doesn't exist before and will exist afterward" (ibid., 243). These are roughly the main reasons why this conclusion will be more an account of 'lessons learned' than 'points (un)successfully made'.

In the introduction of our paper, we pointed at uncritical universalistic presumptions as well as somewhat hurried totalizing conclusions in some of the most influential contemporary literature in the discursive field of International Relations. Without a doubt it is necessary to recognize "the always already political character of theoretical discourse" (Balibar 1989, 55); we never claimed that our, or a foucauldian standpoint was in any way outside or above the theoretical battlefield. We nevertheless believe it is necessary to distinguish at this point the following couplet of possible strategies: discussion and polemics.

According to Foucault (1997a, 111–13), there is a fundamental difference between "the work of reciprocal elucidation" and the "task of determining the intangible point of dogma". The former obeys certain established rules of dialogue and discussion in which interlocutors do not claim rights transcending the topic in question: "The person asking the questions is merely exercising his right [...] to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning and so on;" while on the other hand the person questioned is "by the logic of his own discourse [...] tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of dialogue [...] to the questioning of the other." The latter on the other hand is "not in the order of shared investigation": an individual involved in polemics "possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just

undertaking”, the polemicist therefore “tells the truth in the form of his judgment and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself”.

Partly aware of this distinction when writing our essay, (which would also roughly correspond to the first lesson learned) we did try to avoid polemics throughout our work; and while we surely did not succeed in dodging it entirely, we have hopefully kept its aspects to a tolerable minimum.

There seems to be a two-folded condition for successfully operating within the strategic field of discussion. Firstly, one needs to avoid as far as possible the sirens of generalization and engage in an archeological as well as genealogical reading of theoretical statements.⁸⁴ This entails a comprehensive account of sayings and writings in their positivity, as well as discernment of their strategic status, role and aim. In concert with such a reading, the historical a priori need to be searched for and exposed; a task that necessarily involves a complex historically diachronic analysis of what Foucault terms “problematizations”.⁸⁵

It is therefore because of our awareness of the quantity, comprehensiveness and complexity of Michel Foucault’s work, as well as of those names whose statements are usually associated with his positions, that we have restrained ourselves from wandering too far into other theoretical positions, as well as from generalizing on Foucault’s. Our essay can therefore be thought of as a schematic delineation as well as a tentative listing of possible starting points for potential further investigation.

Since our paper also swung from “abstract” to “concrete”, from “theoretical” to “practical”, from “generalizations” to “singularities”, it is perhaps best that we finish with the following lesson, which is more a lesson that still needs to be (continuously) learned (and practiced) than one that was already truly apprehended.

Despite the continuous redrafting of our paper’s internal schema, we have nonetheless made one important decision, to omit from it an account of “the third axis of his [Foucault’s] analyses ‘ethics’” (Davidson 1991, 227). This exclusion was in part due to

⁸⁴ Foucault himself was not prone to hurried judgments on other authors (cf. Veyne 2008, 10 and 56); however a good example of refusing to interpret an aspect of Freud’s work, he does not know enough to comment upon, can be found in his interview for *Ornicar?* (Foucault 1991, 96–7).

⁸⁵ For Foucault’s account of the distinction between a history of »problematizations«, history of »ideas« and history of »mentalities« see Foucault (1997a, 117–19).

our own understanding of the problematic in hand, as we then understood it, partly because of the limitations of time, space etc. Since Foucault (1992, 6) stated that “after studying the games of truth (*jeux de vérité*) in their interplay with one another [...], and then studying their interaction with power relations, [...] I felt obliged to study the games of truth in the relationship of self with self in the forming of oneself as a subject [...]”, it is necessary to acknowledge that this omission does in fact represent a certain lacuna in the understanding of his statements and is definitely a field that need to be thoroughly studied.

The brief acquaintance with Foucault’s texts from the period when he researched the construction of the thematic of *the hermeneutics of the self* and did so also in relation to practices which the Greeks termed *epimeleia heautou*, or were in latin called *cura sui*; there if however the following point we find extremely interesting.

In his texts on this subject, Foucault reemphasizes the historical distinction between two “imperatives” pertinent to the formation of the self: *gnothi seauton* and *epimeleia heautou*. Even though the latter was also “a philosophical principle”, it remained a form of activity [sic]” and referred not only to “an attitude of awareness or a form of attention focused on oneself” it designated “a regular occupation, a work with its methods and objectives” (Foucault 2005a, 493).

One possible conception of the care of the self, required “practice that must be undertaken throughout one’s life”, one of its key occupation being what Foucault terms *the critical function*: “to rid oneself of all one’s bad habits and all the false opinions one may get from the crowd or from bad teachers, as well as from parents and associates. To “unlearn” (*de-discere*) is an important task of the culture of the self” (ibid., 495).

During a conference speech subsequently entitled *What is critique?* Foucault (1997b, 45) defined the term as “the art of not being governed quite so much”. If one looks retrospectively at Foucault’s work, it can therefore perhaps be seen as a three-fold critical exercise of disposing himself of general ideas implicitly governing conceptions, activities and in the last instance modes of one’s being; for “critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth” (Foucault 1997b, 47).

However, for a “critical” care of the self to be truly successful, one needs to acknowledge the necessity of combining the “need for theoretical knowledge” (Foucault 2005a, 498) with the recognition that caring for oneself requires *a regular occupation, a work with its methods and objectives*. That the theoretical knowledge gained needs to be practiced and tested through concrete analyses of one’s own, is therefore the last lesson we are taking with ourselves.

Since the beginning of our paper was “internationally” colored, we believe that such should also be its ending. In a text entitled *Engaging Foucault; Discourse, Governance and the Limits of Foucauldian IR*, Jan Selby (2007, 324) states that appropriations of Foucault’s statements by post-structural theoreticians of International Relations can be gathered into three groupings.⁸⁶ One possible usage of his statements supports “deconstructions of realist international theory”, the second analyzes “modern discourses and practices of international politics” and the third aims at developing “novel accounts of the contemporary global liberal order”.

While only the second appropriation, where foucauldian analytics is “usefully employed [...] in analyzing and bringing to the fore, the diverse liberal discourses, practices and techniques of international politics”, suits Selby’s understanding of Foucault’s statements; deconstructions of realist theory and novel accounts of global liberal order are apparently examples where “his major insights, emphases and concepts” are often “ignored or misrepresented” (ibid., 330). We believe that the way Selby dismisses these appropriations is closer to “polemics” than “discussion”. This primacy is even more evident in his assertion that the difficulty of translating Foucault into International Relations arises from the fact that he was “above all an interrogator of modern liberal capitalist societies” (ibid., 326), and a “theorist whose focus was primarily on the ‘domestic’ social arena” (ibid., 327). Furthermore, foucauldian analytics can apparently be well “used to theorize the ‘how of power’ [...] but they cannot help us in understanding the ‘when’, the ‘where’ or (most significantly) the ‘why’ of power” (Selby 2007, 337).

⁸⁶ We are not using Selby’s text neither to criticize his understanding of Foucault’s statements, nor to expose it as a representative example of their understanding. Our aim is to show how the problems (»lessons«) exposed above are to be taken seriously indeed.

Some possible clarifications to similar objections Selby's were already offered in the main part of our essay, we therefore wish only to briefly restate the following. *Firstly*, considering the specificity of Foucault's statements, it is perhaps best to avoid determinations of what Foucault "really" or "above all" was. *Secondly*, his analytical premises and starting points were not aimed at reaching general theoretical conclusion; not fulfilling such goals cannot therefore be viewed as a failure of foucauldian analytics, neither can reaching them – via "foucauldian tools" – be viewed as "foucauldian". *Lastly*, we reject Selby's thesis that genealogical analysis is incapable of answering the "when", "where" and "why" of power; Foucault's genealogical analyses are bursting with concrete historical (where and when) facts on the intertwined emergences of power mechanisms via actual local and slightly less local interests (why).

It is true that Foucault's statements cannot be uncritically appropriated; they should be studied in detail before application within separate analyses. We find confirmation of our premise in Selby's (ibid., 332) approval of the second possible appropriation, where Foucault was used "for much more empirical purposes, to investigate local sites, strategies and technologies of power pertaining to the international" – apparently these "writers on the borderlands between IR and postcolonial studies" (ibid.) were stricter translators of Foucault's statements.⁸⁷

Thus we have gone full circle with our paper. When realizing that understanding Foucault's statements was itself a sufficient endeavor, we focused our attention on his analytical clarifications, in place of wandering into unfruitful fields of polemics or necessarily flawed independent analysis. However, we are well aware that the game is by no means over – certain aspects of foucauldian analytics need to be complemented as well as tested on real case studies – if they are to be fruitful remain so be seen for: *Un coup de dés jamais n'abolira le hasard*.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ This fact does not in any way undermine the validity of the other two branches of "foucauldian" IR critique – it is just that they "owe" slightly less to Foucault than some of the authors apparently claim (Selby 2007, 330).

⁸⁸ *A roll of the dice will never abolish chance* is the title of a poem by Stéphane Mallarmé.

4 Povzetek v slovenskem jeziku

Zdi se, da svetovi obstojijo v dvojicah: so beli in ostalih barv, Dobri in Zli, pravilni in napačni. V tem oziru se je danes tematiki Krize nemogoče izogniti; pa naj bo ta politična, kulturna, okoljska ali ekonomska – v slednji naj bi odzvanjala nezmožnost Zahodne Civilizacije, da prek Uma razreši notranja družbena protislovja, odpravi sosedska trenja, reši naš Planet pred propadom in tako ponovno požene kolesja Zgodovine.

Pričujoča diplomska naloga je kot primer zgoraj opisanega stanja v uvodnem delu na kratko orisala naslednji par vplivnih teoretskih pozicij, za kateri menimo, da se nahajata na presečišču 'splošno družbenega/političnega' ter polja mednarodnega dogajanja, katerega se dotika tudi naš sestavek: sodbo o *koncu Zgodovine* (Fukuyama) in perspektivo *spopada civilizacij* (Huntington). Nadalje smo nekatere njune splošne predpostavke poskusili zgodovinsko umestiti s pomočjo shematičnega orisa dvoumnosti zapuščine 'Konfucijanske Civilizacije' ter njenega ambivalentnega odnosa do okolja.

Uvodni orisi niso odkrivali »napačnih hipotez« ali izpodbijali njihovih »zmotnih zaključkov«, želeli smo zgolj nakazati večplastnost obravnavanih tematik, pri katerih se zaradi določenih teoretskih ali filozofskih premis, prepogosto in prehitro zaide v poenostavljene binarne zaključke. Menimo, da lahko iz uvodnih primerov izluščimo sledeče, sorazmerno problematične predpostavke:

- a) da je '**resnica**' **univerzalnost** in se jo potemtakem lahko obravnava, preuči, preizkusi ter končno tudi spozna njeno bistvo, neodvisno od kakršnih koli družbeno-zgodovinskih, političnih, ideoloških, ekonomskih, estetskih ali drugih relevantnih kontekstualnih dejavnikov;
- b) da '**vednost**', ki izhaja iz spoznavanja resnice in posledično vodi do novih in stopnjujoče 'višjih' oblik resnic ter zavedanja, **lahko je in mora biti objektivna**;
- c) pojmovanje '**moči**', ki le-to vidi kot **prevladujoče vertikalen, enosmeren** in v svojem bistvu **represiven fenomen** – moč kot ovirajoča silnica, katere spon se

moramo osvoboditi, zato da bi lahko dosegli najvišji in najplemenitejši cilj človeštva – svobodo.

Cilj diplomskega dela torej ni bilo izpodbijanje vsakršne veljavnosti orisanih predpostavk, ne odslavljam jih s karakterizacijo »neprofesionalnosti«. Prav tako ne namigujemo, da imamo za preučevanje podobnih družbenih pojavov pripravljeno rešitev, odgovor ali smernice, ki bi peljale k objektivnejšim in boljšim rezultatom. Namen naloge ni nadomestitev že obstoječih raziskovalnih metod ali konceptov; je prej pregled zmožnosti določene premestitve, zamika ali morda zgolj dopolnitve.

Izvirov našega predloga je mnogo in nesmiselno bi jih bilo pripisati enemu mislecu ali eni sami teoretski šoli. Vseeno smo se, zavoljo jasnosti in koherentnosti, omejili na izjave Michela Foucaulta ter na kratko razdelali kombinacijo dveh različnih, vendar tesno prepletenih analitičnih pristopov: *arheologijo vednosti* in *genealogijo moči*.

ARHEOLOGIJA VEDNOSTI

Kot vsaka izjava je tudi Foucaultova artikulacija arheološkega pristopa k analizi vednosti ob svojem vzniku vstopila v kompleksno mrežo relacij, tako s konkretnimi teoretskimi paradigmi kot s celotnimi filozofskimi področji. Ker ob tej priložnosti primerna izdelava razmerij ni bila mogoča, smo se omejili na kratek oris sledečih elementov Foucaultove analize delovanja in konstituiranja vednosti: (1) *arheologije* kot metode za preučevanje (2) *diskurzivnih formacij*, z (3) *izjavo* kot temeljno enoto, ki jo omogoča (4) *historični a priori*, osvetljuječ vidljivosti in privabljuječ izrekljivosti.

Foucault (2001, 145) pravi, da je arheologijo zasnoval za razrešitev »relativno preprostega problema: skanzije diskurza skladno z velikimi enotnostmi, ki niso bile enotnosti del, avtorjev, knjig ali tém«. Kako naj bi se arheolog lotil svojega dela? Prva sprememba, ki jo arheološka metoda predpostavlja, je pravzaprav zamik pozornosti od samega objekta preučevanja, na »prostor [sic], v katerem se profilirajo različni objekti in se kontinuirano predrugačijo« (ibid., 36). Preprosta prostorska zamejitev pa vseeno ni zadosti, saj naj enotnosti diskurza ne bi več iskali na podlagi sklicevanja izjav na

določen enoten objekt; arheolog naj bi namesto tega identificiral in preučil igro pravil »ki v času danega obdobja omogoči pojavitev objektov« (ibid.). Naslednje vodilo, ki arheologijo razlikuje od že uveljavljenih pristopov je, da v elementih, ki jih preučuje, ne išče znakov objektivnosti, dokazov racionalnosti ali progresivne materializacije. Arheologija diskurza ne veže več »niti na prva tla izkustva niti na *apriorno* instanco spoznanja« (ibid., 85), izjav ne deli na ustrezne ali arbitrarne (oziroma bolje rečeno, navkljub navidezni »arbitrarnosti« predpostavlja možnost njihove relevantnosti). Njena naloga je popis diskurza v singularnosti njegovega nastopa.

Tako smo prišli do prvega izmed štirih načel, ki jih Foucault izpostavi kot vodila arheološke analize:

1. **Pozitivnost dikcije:** arheologija v diskurzu ne išče skritih pomenov in še manj razkriva prave; popisuje »diskurze kot prakse, ki se pokoravajo pravilom« (Foucault 2001, 149). Pri tem jih (diskurzov) »ne obravnava kot *dokumente*, kot znaka za nekaj drugega« (ibid.), ampak kot *monumente* in tako svojo nalogo omejuje na popisovanje pogojev njihovega obstoja.
2. **Specifičnost (singularnost) diskurza:** iskanje progresivne objektivacije, materializacije ali racionalizacije elementov diskurzivnih formacij za arheologijo ni relevantna naloga. Diskurze analizira v njihovi singularnosti in pri tem želi pokazati, »v čem je igra pravil, ki jih diskurzi uporabljajo, nezvedljiva na vsako drugo« (ibid., 150).
3. **Anonimnost izjave:** arheološki odnos do predpostavke suverenosti avtorja ali homogenosti dela je najverjetneje najbolj znano analitično vodilo izmed tu naštetih, a hkrati tudi eno izmed največkrat poenostavljenih in pogosto slabo razumljenih. V odgovor interpretom, ki v njej vidijo nastavke za determinizem, nihilizem in pogubo subjekta (prim. Guzzini 1993; Lukes 2005, 2007; Wrong 1996), ponujamo naslednjo Foucaultovo izjavo: arheologija definira

tipe in pravila diskurzivnih praks, ki prečijo individualna dela, ki jih včasih v celoti obvladujejo in jim vladajo, ne da bi jim karkoli ušlo [sic]; ki pa včasih vladajo zgolj

enemu delu teh del [sic]. Instanca kreativnega subjekta je kot razlog obstoja [sic] nekega dela in kot načelo njegove enotnosti arheologiji tuja (Foucault 2001, 150).

4. **Robnost analitične pozicije:** namesto deskripcije, ki zaradi predpostavke o opoziciji zunanosti in notranosti rečenega, išče in rekonstruira želje, misli, ambicije, izkustva ipd., ki naj bi v diskurzivni formaciji sprožile nastop izjave; namesto 'skorajda zabrisane svetlobe izvora' želi arheologija osvetliti tisto zunanost (robnost), s katere se izjavljalni dogodki (izjave) razvrščajo v diskurzivno prakso, ter prek tega ponuditi »sistematično deskripcijo nekega diskurza – objekta« (ibid.).

Zadnje vodilo, ki arheologu predpisuje pozicijo zunanosti (robnosti), predpostavlja odmik od iskanja globljih ali skritih pomenov ter slednje nadomešča s sistematičnim opisom diskurzivnega objekta. Ta premik nadalje pomeni tudi, da se enotnost diskurzivnega polja ne išče več v *skupni formi* ali *tipu povezave* med njegovimi objekti.

Arheološka metoda nadalje postavi pod vprašaj enotnost diskurza na podlagi razločitve sistema »permanentnih in koherentnih pojmov« (Foucault 2001, 38) ter tudi »identičnosti in vztrajnosti tém« (ibid., 39).

Namesto predpostavk o univerzalnosti pojmov ali pa vsaj obravnavanih tematik, arheologija individualizacijo diskurza išče v »disperziji točk izbire« (ibid., 41), ki jih diskurz tako odpira kot pušča odprte. Uporaba pojma *disperzija* na tem mestu nakazuje določeno regularnost v konstelaciji polja strateških možnosti; konstelaciji, ki omogoča »aktiviranje nezdružljivih tem«, pretres »nasprotujočih si strategij« ali investiranje neke iste teme v različne skupke izjav (Foucault 2001, 40-41).

V arheološki analizi naj bi izjava [l'enonce] torej predstavljala eno izmed ključnih notranjih značilnosti diskurzivne formacije. Vprašanje, ki se ob podrobnejšem pregledu arheološke metode neizogibno pojavi, ali je primarnejša in primernejša enota analize izjava ali diskurz, se hitro razreši prek ugotovitve, da oba elementa predstavljata objekt arheološke analize, vendar operirata na različnih ravneh. Vseeno pa velja na tem mestu upoštevati zapis Mladena Dolarja, ki pravi, da je izjava [l'énoncé] »minimalna enota

vednosti« (Dolar 1991, XII) ter da se diskurzivne prakse vendarle vzpostavljajo preko kompleksnega medsebojnega delovanja raznih procesov, ki regulirajo odnose med izjavami.

Kako torej prepoznati, določiti in analizirati delovanje izjave? Foucault ponuja sledečo »definicijo«, ki klasično iskanje strukturnih kriterijev enotnosti izjave v arheološki analizi napravi za popolnoma nebitveno: izjava »sama na sebi sploh ni enotnost, temveč funkcija [sic], ki preči področje možnih struktur in enotnosti ter jih skupaj s konkretnimi vsebinami razkriva v času in prostoru« (Foucault 2001, 94). Arheološki kriteriji obstoja izjave se tako pomembno razlikujejo od klasičnih predpostavk logike ali gramatike.

Smisel, veljavnost, objektivnost, racionalnost, vrednost sentenc ali trditve se najpogosteje določa preko stopnje ujemanja in ustrezanja z zunanjim objektom, konceptom ali skladnosti z aksiomi, ki določajo njihovo stvaritev. Arheološka analitika se od zgoraj naštetih formalnih in interpretativnih kriterijev radikalno razlikuje že v tem, da razmerja med izjavo in njenih referentom (konceptom, objektom, aksiomi etc.) ne pojmuje kot odnosa zunanosti. Tako namesto logične zavrnitve veljavnosti trditve »Zlata gora je v Kaliforniji« (ta naj ne bi imela realnega referenta, preko katerega bi bilo mogoče preveriti njeno veljavnost), arheolog pri določanju obstoja referenta podeli primat korelatu izjave: »vedeti je treba, na kaj se izjava navezuje, kateri je njen prostor korelacij, da bi lahko rekli, ali propozicija ima ali nima referenta« (Foucault 2001, 97).

Izjava tako ni soočena z vprašanjem obstoja ali odsotnosti zunanjega korelata ali referenta, tako kot tudi njena koherentnost ni podvržena preučitvi pomena ali preizkusu skladnosti z deduktivnimi pravili konstrukcije. Namesto tega je izjava povezana z *referenčnim* poljem, ki pa ni sestavljen iz stvari, dejstev, realnosti ipd., ampak iz »zakonov možnosti, pravil obstoja za objekte, ki so tu poimenovani, označeni ali opisani, za relacije, ki so tu potrjene ali zanikane« (ibid., 99).

Tako je torej jasno, da izjave niso samozadostne ter da njihov obstoj v izolaciji ni mogoč. Izjave se nujno vežejo na celotno *sosedsko* polje, ki pa ga, kot to opozori Deleuze (2006, 6–7) ne smemo prehitro zamenjati za *kontekst*. Namesto *situacijskih* elementov, ki bi določali motivacijo neke formulacije in *lingvističnih*, ki bi isto storili za

njen pomen, se arheološka analiza osredotoči na *pozicijo*, *status* in *vlogo* kot ključne elemente izjavne funkcije.

Čeprav je *sosedsko* polje izjave neznansko veliko, je potrebno poudariti njegovo neizogibno zamejenost. Foucault poudarja, da nastop izjave ne gre enačiti z manipulacijo določene serije elementov ali lingvističnih pravil nekega govorečega, pišočega ali izvršujočega subjekta, niti ne s projekcijo zaznane realnosti na polje jezika. Arheologija pri konstrukciji izjav tako ne zanika obstoja in vloge manipulacije ali projekcije, vendar pa izjavo vseeno prej kot rezultat avtentične manipulacije ali čiste transkripcije vidi kot vodeno entiteto z določeno lokacijo in statusom, pridobljenima prek umestitve v izjavljalno polje, ki ji (izjavi) »ponuja možna razmerja s preteklostjo in ji odpira morebitno prihodnost« (Foucault 2001, 108).

Zadnja karakteristika izjave, ki bi jo veljalo na tem mestu izpostaviti, je njena specifična materialnost. Da bi določena skupina elementov veljala za izjavo, mora biti izražena tako, da je dostopna čutilom. Materialnost izjave pa vseeno ni nekakšna *dodatna vrednost*, saj predstavlja njen konstitutivni del, niti ni *čista forma* – stavka, sestavljena iz enakih lingvističnih elementov, ki nosita enak pomen in zadržujeta identično sintaktično in semantično identiteto, nista ista izjava, če je prvi napisan na steno stranišča drugi pa izrečen na predavanju. *Substanca*, *podlaga*, *kraj* in *časovna umestitev* so torej notranje značilnosti izjave, ki skupaj s *pozicijo*, *statusom* in *vlogo*, predstavljajo njene *strateške potencialnosti*. Poleg tega pa določajo tudi polje njene stabilizacije, ki istočasno omogoča tako ponovitev kot določanje meja, preko katerih funkcionalna enakost ni več mogoča in je potrebno pripoznati nastop nove izjave.

Po kratkih orisih arheološke analitike ter konceptov diskurzivnega polja in izjave se zdi, kot da je tisto ključno za teorijo vednosti še vedno nerazjasnjeno ali pa ostaja vsaj neizrečeno. Kaj so torej ti elementi, ki naj bi jih izjava predpostavljala?

Deleuze pravilno izpostavi, da Foucaultova izdelava arheološke metode ne vsebuje direktne razjasnitve značilnosti oblik vsebovanih v izjavi, saj se arheologija »tu ustavi in še ne obravnava tega problema, ki preči meje vednosti« (Deleuze 2006, 12). Čeprav Foucault nikoli ni eksplicitno definiral elementov, ki jih določena zgodovinska

konstelacija ali zgodovinsko a priori⁸⁹ spravlja v pogon, pa lahko morda neke vrste splošne indikatorje njegove pozicije najdemo v arheoloških analizah umetnostnih del Roussela, Blanchota, Velásqueza in Magritta. Že v izbiri umetniških področij je mogoče zaznati Foucaultov interes za moduse videnja in govora; modusi, katerim je Deleuze dodelil izraze, dovolj nedoločne in široke, da ne prejudicirajo njihove narave: kraji vidnosti in polja izrekljivosti.

Vsaki zgodovinski formaciji je določena distribucija vidnega in izrekljivega lastna. Vidnost in izrekljivost pa nista vsiljeni na besede in reči, nista niti singularni ne samozadostni; prej bi lahko dejali, da *delujeta sami na sebi* ter da iz ene zgodovinske formacije v drugo njuni distribuciji variirata, saj se »same vidnosti spreminjajo v stilu in izrekljivosti v svojem sistemu« (Deleuze 2006, 42).

Lep primer vseobsegajoče robnosti in mnogoterosti distribucije vidnosti Foucault poda v naslednjem odstavku iz *Les Mots et les Choses*, kjer opisuje Velasquezovo *Las Meninas*: »Prehajajoč sobo z desne proti levi, obsežna reka zlate svetlobe ponese tako gledalca proti slikarju, kot model k platnu. In prav ta preplavljajoča svetloba je tista, ki gledalcu omogoči videti slikarja ter v očeh modela, spremeni okvir enigmatičnega platna, na katerem bo nekoč njegova podoba zaprta, v zlate linije« (Foucault 2008a, 6).

S postavitvijo tako subjekta kot objekta v polje vidnosti, kjer ju konstituirata isto polje svetlob, pridemo do zaključka, da »vidljivosti niso oblike, ne objekti, niti forme, ki bi se pod svetlobo pojavile; ampak prej oblike svetlosti, ki so ustvarjene preko svetlobe same in določeni reči dovolijo, da obstoji zgolj kot [pre]blisk, iskra ali blesk« (Deleuze 2006, 45).

Foucault svojega razumevanja izrekljivosti ni skrival zgolj v svojih spisih o pesnikih in pisateljih, ubesedil ga je tudi ob svojem nastopnem govoru na Collège de France:

⁸⁹ Glede tega skorajda barbarskega termina je potrebno, skupaj s Foucaultom, poudariti, da ne gre za negacijo obstoja formalnih a priori. Raje kot nasprotujoča si koncepta je v njima potrebno prepoznati dopolnjujoča elementa, katerih narava, vloge in naloge pa so vendarle različne: »Formalno a priori in historično a priori nista niti iste ravni niti iste narave: če se križata, potem se križata zato, ker zasedata dve različni dimenziji« (Foucault 2001, 144). Ker mora zgodovinsko a priori znati pojasniti, *kako* in *zakaj*, v neki določeni točki v času, neka diskurzivna formacija sprejme, omogoči, zavrne, spregleda ali ignorira določeno formalno strukturo, ni zmožna razložiti formalnih a priori.

V govor, ki naj bi ga imel danes, in v govore, ki jih bom moral imeti tu morda vrsto let, bi želel smukniti na skrivaj. Bolj kot to, da si vzamem besedo, bi želel, da me ona objame in ponese onstran vsakega možnega začetka. Opazil bi rad, da bi bil v trenutku, ko naj bi govoril, tam že dolgo pred mano neki brezimni glas: tako bi zadoščalo, da navežem, da nadaljujem stavek, da se neopazno naselim v njegovih vrzelih, kot da bi mi sam pomignil in za trenutek zastal v zraku. Začetka torej ne bi bilo in namesto da se nekdo, od koder prihaja govor, bi bil neznatna vrzel v njegovem naključnem odvijanju, možna točka njegovega izginotja (Foucault 1991, 3).

Sklepali bi lahko, da se obstoj jezika »pojavi za-sebe [pour lui-même] zgolj z izginotjem subjekta« (Foucault 2005, 549). S tem v mislih nadaljujemo s Foucaultovo obrazložitvijo *biti-jezika* [language-being] v njegovih spisih o delih Blanchota in Roussella.

Prej kot da bi v literaturi videl zmožnost radikalnega avto-referenčnega ponotranjenja *biti-jezika*, Foucault v njej zaznava možnost prehoda k njegovim najbolj zunanjim instancam, možnost prehoda k robu. V literaturi naj bi bilo namreč mogoče, morda bolj kot pri katerem koli drugem preučevanju jezika, zavzeti robno analitično pozicijo. Preko omenjenega prehoda k svoji zunanosti se jezik izogiba posebnim diskurzivnim oblikam svojega obstoja: »Literatura ni jezik, ki bi se približeval samemu sebi do točke sijoče manifestacije, to je jezik ki se od sebe oddaljuje kolikor je to le mogoče; in če v tem pozunanjenju [se mettre hors de soi] razkrije svojo pravo bit, ta nenadna čistost razodene prej razpoko [un écart] kot umik [un repli], prej disperzijo, kot pa povratek znakov [signes] k samim sebi« (Foucault 2005, 548).

Funkcionalnost prehoda k robu jezika, bi lahko enačili z vlogo *ključa* iz knjige Raymonda Roussella *Comment j'ai écrit certains de mes livres*.⁹⁰ Čeprav naj bi tako naslov kot namen knjige namigovala in obljubljala razvozlanje mehanizma stoječega za Rousselovim izrednim pisateljskim stilom, pa knjigi uspe ravno nasprotno – podaljšati naše neugodje tako, da ga potrdi v tem, kar je. Vseeno pa tu ne gre za nekakšno razodetje njegove prave narave; Roussell raje razkrije to, kar ga napravlja nejasnega in nerazumljivega: to je preprosto »jezik, ki noče povedati nič več kot to, kar pove« (Foucault 2005, 238).

⁹⁰ Približni prevod naslova Rousselove knjige bi bil »Kako sem napisal nekatere svoje knjige«. Ker delo še ni prevedeno v slovenščino, napolujemo na francosko izdajo Roussell (1995).

Negotovost ob ugotovitvi, da čar Rousselovih besed ne leži v njihovi bleščeči naravi, ampak v nevidni roki, ki jim omogoča obstoj in jih od zunaj razmešča, kmalu zamenja zaskrbljujoča zagotovitev, da četudi je »vsak element njegovega jezika vzet iz neskončne serije možnih konfiguracij« (ibid., 239), notranjost njegovega jezika vendarle ostaja natančno določena, dostop do nje pa vseeno preprečen z navidezno arbitrarno elipso, ki skriva njegovo neizogibno naravo.

Vidnosti in izrekljivosti sta si torej zunanji formi, utemeljujeta različni dimenziji in čeprav se vzajemno vzpostavljata in obstajata zgolj zavoljo medsebojne relacije, slednja ni ne vzročna ne simbolizirajoča; besede in reči niso zvedljive ene na druge: »to kar vidimo, nikoli ne leži v tem, kar izrečemo« (Foucault 2008a, 10).

V uvodu *Les Mots et les Choses* smo priča Foucaultovem začudenju ob trčenju miselnih sistemov in klasifikacij, ki bi si jih bilo, v racionalnosti naše družbe, nemogoče zamisliti. Očitno je, da na »zahodu« uspešno brišemo, ali pa vztrajno onemogočamo izgradnjo nekaterih skupnih krajev za besede in reči. Ne samo to, po Foucaultu izgradnja takih krajev pravzaprav ni mogoča; kraj, kjer bi se besede in reči lahko srečale in se verodostojno medsebojno predstavljale, je v resnici nič drugega kot praznina. Vidnosti in izrekljivosti so med seboj radikalno nezvedljive, saj konstituirajo različni dimenziji: to kar vidimo, nikoli ne leži v tem, kar izrečemo – *razen če ...*

GENEALOGIJA MOČI

»Oblast ne obstaja« (Foucault 1991, 80). Najverjetneje ena izmed najbolj znanih Foucaultovih izjav je tako dvoumna, da je, kot to lucidno izpostavi Mladen Dolar, angleškega prevajalca napeljala k interpretaciji: »Power in the substantive sense, 'le' pouvoir, doesn't exist« (Foucault 1980, 198). Nadalje je Foucault poznan tudi po revolucionarnem napeljevanju k »obglavljenju Kralja« (Foucault 1991, 66); nečesa kar se, v nasprotju z dejansko zgodovino, v politični teoriji še ni pripetilo.

Namesto branja, ki bi zgornje izjave nekritično povelečevalo ali pa jih odslovilo kot gole provokacije, smo v našem sestavku poskusili z orisom treh pomembnih

elementov Foucaultove analitike moči ter v zadnjem razdelku na kratko povzeli še genealoške predpostavke.

Prvi element, ki kliče po razjasnitvi, je najverjetneje Foucaultov **nominalizem**, saj lahko navkljub mnogim izjavam, da njegovo delo nikakor ne cilja na splošno teorijo moči, še vedno naletimo na veliko podobnih izjav: »Glede na pomembno vlogo, ki jo koncept igra v Foucaultovih genealogijah, nam na žalost [sic] ne ponudi nikakršne definicije 'moči' kot take« (Flynn 1994, 34).

Namesto transcendentalne definicije želi genealogija odgovoriti na sledeča vprašanja: »preko česa [moč/oblast] prehaja, kako se dogodi, med kom in kom, med katerimi točkami, v skladu s katerimi tehnikami in s kakšnimi posledicami« (Foucault 2004b, 3). Tako je skladno z zamikom pozornosti z vprašanja esence moči na analizo njenega delovanja mogoče trditi, da je navkljub ne-substancialnosti, njena analiza še kako smiselna, saj »ne-eksistenca ni enostavno nič«, ravno nasprotno, oblast »ima otipljive, vseprisotne in 'pozitivne' učinke« (Dolar 1994, 167).

V enem od svojih poznejših tekstov Foucault vendarle poda naslednjo razjasnitev svojega pojmovanja: »Dejansko oblastno povezavo definira to, da je način delovanja, ki ne deluje direktno in neposredno na druge. Oblast ne deluje na druge, temveč na njihova delovanja: delovanje na delovanja, na obstoječa in na tista, ki se lahko pojavijo v sedanjosti in prihodnosti« (Foucault 1991, 113). Najverjetneje je to ena izmed podlag za sledečo Deleuzovo (2006, 59) interpretacijo: »moč je razmerje med silami, oziroma vsako razmerje med silami, je razmerje moči«. Slednje »ni forma«, sila »nikoli ni singularna« in nima »drugega objekta ali subjekta kot sile«.

Hkratno s predlogom analitičnega premika nas Foucault opozarja, da analizo razmerij moči ne smemo omejiti na preprosto opisovanje njihovih učinkov »ne da bi te učinke povezali z vzroki ali s kako temeljno naravo« (Foucault 1991, 110). Odgovor na zgornja vprašanja se ne sme ustaviti pri golem popisu učinkov razmerij moči; kritična preučitev *sredstev* preko katerih se le-ta izvajajo je še kako pomembna za genealoško analizo.

Tako bi morda bilo mogoče Foucaultovo nominalistično pozicijo povzeti na sledeč način: čeprav »moč ni samo-utemeljena in se ne samo-proizvaja« (Foucault 2004b, 4),

je razločitev *specifičnosti* in *regularnosti* v delovanju *zgodovinsko, prostorsko* in (v pomanjkanju prikladnejšega termina) *sferično* zamejenih mehanizmov moči vendarle mogoča. Poseben značaj in določena rednost v delovanju analitično zamejenih razmerij moči se po Deleuzu (2006, 61–2) kaže v sledečih prepletenih značilnostih *diagrama*, pojmovanega kot »uprizoritev razmerij moči, lastnih določeni formaciji; [...] distribucija zmožnosti aktivnega [to affect] in pasivnega [to be affected] učinkovanja; [...] mešanje ne-formaliziranih golih funkcij in neformirane gole materije«; in nazadnje (ter skladno z arheološko logiko disperzije in regularnosti) kot »prenos ali distribucija določenih lastnosti«.

V Foucaultovem nominalizmu je vseeno potrebno prepoznati določeno oporekanje sledečim predpostavkam *juridično-diskurzivnega* pojmovanja moči.⁹¹ Tu je slednja opredeljena kot nekaj, kar je mogoče posedovati, posledično razmestiti in razporediti; vse to je utelešeno v Suverenu (ali določenih naknadnih točkah suverenosti, ki jim moč podeli centralna avtoriteta) ter je v prvi vrsti formulirano negativno – v obliki Zakona, ki preprečuje, omejuje, prepoveduje, onemogoča ipd. Genealoški pristop pa nasprotno poskuša pokazati, kako so oblastna razmerja vpeta v kompleksne relacijske mehanizme, ki jih ne gre enačiti »ne z institucijo ne z aparatom; je tip oblasti, način, kako se izvršuje, ki vsebuje cel skupek instrumentov, tehnik, postopkov, aplikacijskih ravni, tarč [...]« (Foucault 2004, 236); ali če postrežemo s klasičnim foucaultizmom: *C'est pas si simple que ça*.

Predpostavko o enosmernem in primarno represivnem delovanju moči naj bi genealoška analiza torej zamenjala z zgodovinskimi popisi množstva koordiniranih, razpršenih, večsmernih in polivalentnih mehanizmov, ki delujejo »v vsem družbenem telesu« (Foucault 2004, 229).

Premik analitične pozornosti s Suverena na razpršene, a vseeno koordinirane mehanizme moči, je (pre)pogosto razumljen kot enoznačna in nepreklicna diskreditacija *juridično-diskurzivnega* pojmovanja moči. Skladno z arheološko

⁹¹ Med predavanjem v Braziliji leta 1976 Foucault »zbere« Grotiusa, von Pufendorfa in Rousseaua pod naslednjim postulatoma: »Na začetku ni bilo nobene družbe, potem pa je nastala družba, in sicer v trenutku, ko je nastala centralna točka suverenosti, ki je organizirala družbeno telo in nato omogočila cel niz lokalnih in regionalnih praks« (Foucault 2007, 186).

razločitvijo med »resničnim na sebi [en-soi]« in »resničnim za nas [pour nous]«⁹² menimo, da je v genealoškem premiku produktivnejše prepoznati svarilo pred prehitrim zaključkom o transcendentalnosti juridičnega pojmovanja. Slednje je namreč, tako kot vsako, zgodovinsko pogojeno ter potemtakem avtomatično ni zmožno zadostno razložiti singularnosti delovanja sodobnih mehanizmov moči. Posledično tudi v Foucaultovi analitiki ne gre iskati popolnoma dovršenih nastavkov za reinterpretacijo esence moči kot take, saj gre v prvi vrsti za popis zgodovinsko zamejenih transformacij modalnosti njenega udejanjanja.

Pri genealoških analitičnih izsledkih, povzetih po Deleuze-u (2006, 60) v naslednje tri tematske sklope, ki zatrjujejo da (1) »oblast ni primarno represivna« - je (2) »prakticirana preden se jo poseduje«; ter da (3) »nič manj« ne preči rok vladanih kot tistih, ki vladajo; najverjetneje velja opozoriti še pred naslednjih parom redukcionističnih zaključkov.

Čeprav je Foucault zagovarjal **vzpenjajočo analizo moči**, ki bi začela »z neskončno majhnimi mehanizmi [...] in bi potem videla, kako so ti mehanizmi moči bili – in še vedno so – investirani, kolonizirani, uporabljeni, spremenjeni, premeščeni, razširjeni, itd. s strani še splošnejših mehanizmov« (Foucault 1980, 99), njegov analitični napotek ne bi smel zabrisati odnosa med *mikro* in *makro* nivoji modalnosti moči. Widder (2004, 422) takole povzame njuno relacijo: »Mikroskopski in makroskopski nivo si nista ne preprosto zunanja, ne notranja in identična. Drug drugemu sta imanentna in vzajemno določujoča«.

Kot to izpostavi Wendy Brown (2006, 67), **postulat vse-prisotnosti razmerij moči**, pogosto pripelje do sledečega poenostavljenega sklepa; namreč da »moč v enaki meri in brez razlike dosega vse elemente družbene zgradbe [fabric]« in potemtakem »enako pripada vsem«. Zanimivo je, da lahko tak zaključek pelje do diametralno nasprotnih teoretskih drž: radikalnega determinizma (moči ni mogoče uiti) ali pa popolnega relativizma in voluntarizma (ker je moč povsod in jo imajo vsi enako je mogoče vse). V razjasnitev ponujamo sledečo Foucaultovo izjavo: »Oblast je povsod; to ne pomeni, da vse zaobjema, pač pa, da prihaja od povsod« (Foucault 2000, 97).

⁹² Za poučen opis arheološkega razlikovanja med 'vrai en soi' in 'vrai pour nous' glej Lebrun (1989, 49-51).

Ni presenetljivo, da se genealogu juridično-diskurzivno pojmovanje moči zdi nenavadno omejeno:

Najprej zato, ker bi to bila oblast z bornimi sredstvi, varčna v postopkih, enolična v taktikah, ki jih uporablja, nesposobna izumljati in kot obsojena, da se kar naprej ponavlja. Nato zato, ker je to oblast, ki ne bi imela ničesar drugega kot moč za 'ne'; nezmožna karkoli proizvesti, sposobna zgolj postavljati meje, bi bila predvsem anti-energija; tak bi bil paradoks njene učinkovitosti: ne more ničesar, razen doseči, da tisto, kar je podvrgla, ne more ničesar narediti, razen tistega, kar mu ona pusti (Foucault 2000, 89).

Dreyfus in Rabinow (1983, 131) trdita, da je Foucaultov zastavek zoper tako pojmovanje dvojen: v prvi vrsti cilja na »genealogijo nastanka in funkcij, ki jih represivna hipoteza izvaja v naši družbi« ter si nadalje prizadeva (pod predpostavko aktualnosti vpliva te koncepcije) osvetliti sodobne modalnosti razmerij moči, njihove mehanizme, tehnike in aparate.

Ključ do sprememb v modalnostih razmerij moči naj bi bilo mogoče najti v postopnem prehodu iz pojmovanja, ki moč primarno enači s *pravico do smrti*, v modalnosti in tehnologije, ki delujejo skladno s koncepcijo *moči nad življenjem*.

Eden izmed pomembnejših elementov klasične politične teorije, *pravica odločanja o življenju in smrti*, je tako po Foucaultu zaznamovana z radikalno asimetrijo. Moč suverena se dotika življenja zgolj posredno, preko izvajanja ali samo-omejevanja izvajanja pravice do (u)smrti(tve): »Pravica, ki se oblikuje kot 'pravica nad življenjem in smrtjo', je v resnici pravica *povzročiti* umreti in *pustiti* živeti« (Foucault 2000, 140).

Odločanje o življenju in smrti kot ključna značilnost odnosa moči, naj bi bistveno bolj ustrezala specifičnosti mehanizmov zgodovinskega obdobja, v katerem je bilo tako pojmovanje formulirano. Foucaultove analize namreč kažejo, da se je delovanje mehanizmov od takrat temeljito spremenilo. *Dedukcija*, nekoč poglavitna značilnost, je postala zgolj eden izmed elementov obsežnejšega diagrama moči, katerega cilj ni preprečevanje, podreditve ali uničevanje. Sodobni diagram je namreč nasprotno »usmerjenem h generiranju sil, njihovi rasti in ureditvi« (ibid.). Osrednji dejavnik opisanega prehoda naj bi bil način usklajevanja pojmovanj *življenja, telesa,*

seksualnosti in resnice z zahtevami mehanizmov, ki so v svoji osnovi skušali **upravljati življenje**.

Nove modalnosti razmerij moči prejšnjih seveda niso preprosto nadomestile;⁹³ proces predružačenja je prej dopolnitev »te stare pravice suverenosti [...] z neko drugo, novo pravico, ki pa prve ne bo izbrisala, temveč jo bo prežela, prečila, spremenila, in ki bo ravno nasprotna pravica, ali raje moč: moč »omogočati« življenje [»faire vivre] in »pustiti« umreti [»laisser« mourir] (Foucault 2007a, 89).⁹⁴

Dopolnitev predhodnih mehanizmov moči tako ni bila ne enoznačna (uniformna) ne enkratna; *moč nad življenjem* se je vezala na in zraščala z dvema tako zgodovinsko kot mehansko različnima tehnikama izvajanja moči, ki sta se na koncu združili v obliko, ki jo danes poznamo pod Foucaultovo formulacijo *bio-moč* [bio-oblast] ali *bio-politika*.

Disciplinarni diagram naj bi se razvil preko »prepleta disciplinarne tehnologije in normativnih družbenih ved« (Dreyfus in Rabinow 1983, 143); prepleta, ki je posamezno telo obravnaval »ne toliko kot sredstvo za človeško reprodukcijo, temveč bolj kot objekt za manipulacijo« (ibid., 134). Razmerja moči so preko množstva različnih disciplinarnih mehanizmov tako ciljale na proizvodnjo krotkih in uporabljivih teles in so vsebovala prave *tehnologije telesa*.

Skladno z Ewald-om (1989, 198), ki v »ekonomiji vidnosti« vidi temeljno podporo širši normativni shemi panoptične modalnost moči, Dreyfus in Rabinow razločita »hierarhično opazovanje« in »normalizirajoče ocenjevanje« kot pglavitni proceduri disciplinarne moči, združeni v njeno osrednjo tehniko: izpit [examination]. Delovanje disciplinarnega diagrama moči, zaznamovano z naslednjim štiristopenjskim krožnim procesom: (i) *omogočanjem vidnosti*, (ii) *preiskavo in klasifikacijo*, (iii) *dokumentacijo* in (iv) *normalizacijo*, ter povezano s takrat nastajajočimi družbenimi vedami, je tako omogočalo *produkcijo* (krotkih in uporabljivih) posameznikov. Čeprav je v operacijah moči, kjer je posameznik »hkrati [...] predmet in [...] orodje« (Foucault 2004, 189) njihovega izvajanja, viden radikalni prelom tako v pojmovanju kot delovanju moči, je

⁹³ Kurnik (2005, 137) ob tem mestu pravi, da gre za »globoko transformacijo, ki pa vendarle ne pušča nobenih iluzij. Smrtne kazni se ne opušča zato, ker bi dosegli višjo stopnjo humanosti, ampak zato, ker biooblast zahteva njeno reintegracijo v novo ekonomijo oblasti«.

⁹⁴ Poudarki v oglatih oklepajih so tokrat delo slovenskega prevajalca tega predavanja.

prav na tej točki mogoče zaznati meje disciplinarnega diagrama: ta vlogo posameznika omejuje zgolj na funkcijo objekta.

Diagram razmerij moči, ki se pojavi v drugi polovici osemnajstega stoletja pa zaradi značilnosti svojega delovanja ne zdrži več oznake *disciplinarni*. Od prejšnjega se temeljito razlikuje že v tem, da deluje na popolnoma drugi ravni: »nanaša se na življenje ljudi, ali če že hočete, ne naslavlja se na človeka-telo, temveč na živega človeka, na človeka kot živo bitje; v zadnji instanci se naslavlja na človeka-vrsto« (Foucault 2007a, 91).

Res je, da se disciplinarni diagram moči prav tako ukvarja z množtvom ljudi, vendar se ta ustavi pri množtvu *posameznikov*; na drugi strani pa se »nove« tehnike osredotočijo na množstvo ljudi kot »globalno maso [masse], ki jo zadevajo skupni procesi, značilni za življenje: rojstvo, smrt, razmnoževanje, bolezen itd. (ibid.).⁹⁵ Tako se s tem dvojnimi premikom, *pozornosti* (človek kot živeče bitje) in *površine* (mnoštvo posameznikov v svoji globalnosti) izvajanja moči vzpostavi tehnologija, ki ni več »anatomska politika človeškega telesa, ampak [...] »biopolitika« človeške vrste« (ibid.). V nasprotju z disciplinarno tehnologijo moči, ki se v prvi vrsti *vmešava* v delovanje posameznikov, bio-moč *posreduje* v razne biološke procese s *ciljem optimizacije življenja*; Foucault (2007, 94) pravi, da smo priča vzniku »regulacijskih mehanizmov« moči.

Koncept bio-moči, prepleta vednosti in odnosov moči, kjer mehanizmi, tehnike in instrumenti suverene, disciplinarne in urejajoče moči »sobivajo in se dopolnjujejo« (Kolšek 2003, 139) v trikotnem diagramu, je najverjetneje ena izmed Foucaultovih najvplivnejših tez. Veljalo bi opozoriti, da se *bio-moč* ali *bio-politiko* vse prevečkrat zreducira na vseobsegajoč mehanizem proizvodnje realnosti, ki si podreja posamezna telesa in kontrolira celotne populacije; Foucault (1998, 11) jo je namreč nasprotno videl kot »mnogolične tehnike oblasti«, s širokim spektrom možnih učinkov, ki so lahko tako »zavrnitve, blokade in razveljavitve« kot tudi »spodbude in okrepitve«. Ključ tako pojmovane moči je torej v »upravljanju možnosti ravnanja in urejanju možnih izidov« (Foucault 1983, 221) tega ravnanja, njene učinke pa se morda najbolje opiše kot strukturiranje »polja možnega delovanja drugih« (ibid.).

⁹⁵ Tudi tu je referenca na francoski original delo uradnega prevajalca.

Tako končujemo s shematičnimi orisi ključnih lastnosti Foucaultovega pojmovanja delovanja sodobnih razmerij moči. Preostane nam torej zgolj še kratka skica genealoške analitike kot »metode« za preučevanje teh konstelacij.

Čeprav vednosti, diskurza in izjav tudi do tedaj ni pojmoval kot nekaj zunanjega razmerjem moči, je Foucault med pogovorom leta 1976 potrdil, da je v njegovem dotedanjem delu posvetil premalo pozornosti in prešibko osvetlil »problem diskurzivnega režima, problem učinkov oblasti, ki so značilni za igro izjav« (Foucault 1991, 60).⁹⁶ Osrednje področje njegove analitike naj bi tako sedaj zasedala »razmerja med sistemi resnic in modalnostmi moči« ali morda celo bolj natančno: »načini obstoja nekega političnega režima resnice« (Davidson 1991, 224).

Krajših programskih opredelitev in razjasnitev elementov genealogije, analitike, ki nasprotuje »unitarnim skupkom teorije ali globalizirajočim diskurzom, ki hočejo integrirati razne lokalne dogodke znotraj totalizirajočega ogrodja z namenom predpisovanja praks in posledične realizacije določenih učinkov« (Smart 1991, 166) pri Foucaultu zagotovo ne manjka. V našem sestavku smo se navkljub temu (ali pa ravno zavrlo tega) osredotočili na tekst *Nietzsche, Genealogija, Zgodovina*; ne nazadnje zato, ker Davidson (1991, 224) trdi, da je Foucault do analitike izvorov »specifičnih sklicevanj na resnico« prišel preko svojega branja Nietzscheja, ter ker naj bi bilo očitno »težko preceniti pomembnost tega sestavka«, kjer naj bi lahko našli »vsa semena Foucaultovega dela v sedemdesetih« (Dreyfus in Rabinow 1983, 106).

»Genealogija je siva, vestna je in potrpežljivo dokumentarna« (Foucault 2008b, 87). *Nič kaj vznemirljivo novega* bi lahko upravičeno dejali. Foucaultova genealogija seveda nikakor ni klasična novost, je odkrita dolžnica tako Nietzschejevemu delu kot arheološki metodi.⁹⁷ Označbe *vznemirljivo* pa morda ne gre tako hitro zavreči, saj

⁹⁶ Foucault (1991, 57–58) navaja tri dejavnike, ki naj bi prispevali k relativni tišini v času njegovega načnjanja tematike političnega statusa nezrelih znanosti. V prvi vrsti so bili marksistični izobraženci preveč zaposleni z umeščanjem v širše francosko intelektualno polje in so si posledično tako zastavljali, kot odgovarjali, na enaka vprašanja. Nadalje je post-stalinistični stalinizem v Franciji predstavljal diskurzivni prag, prek katerega ni prišla nobena izjava, ki ni predstavljala zgolj plahe ponovitve že znanega. Nazadnje pa bi k neodzivnosti morda lahko pripomogla tudi odklonitev tematiziranja »zapiranja« ali »politične rabe psihiatrije« zaradi tedanjega stanja v Sovjetski zvezi. K čistejši resonanci problematiziranja vstaje podvrženih znanj pa naj bi poleg odmevnih dogodkov leta 1968 pripomogel tudi lokalni značaj njihove kritike, očitno prost predpogojev uveljavljanja ali podpore unitarnih režimov vednosti.

⁹⁷ Z Widderjem menimo, da tudi v »premiku iz arheologije diskurzivnih formacij v genealogijo moči in nadalje v genealogijo etike, logika disperzije [sic] za Foucaulta ostaja bistvena« (Widder 2004, 414).

genealogija daje prednost preučevanju notranje nestabilnih razmerij moči, ki preko interakcije osvetljujejo morebitna bojišča in odpirajo vrata možnim interpretacijam, ki pa jih je potrebno »pokazati kot dogodke v gledališču procedur« (Foucault 2008b, 98).

Skladno z arheološkimi metodološkimi napotki, Foucault (ibid., 1006) tudi tokrat predlaga drugačen pristop k zgodovinopisju; pristop, ki ne zagovarja iskanje izvora, saj naj bi se tam skušalo »najti sólo bistvo stvari, njena najbolj čista možnost, njena skrbno vase zapotegnjena identiteta«, ampak preučuje singularnost dogodkov na krajih, ki jih navadno prezremo ali pa celo mislimo, da so brez zgodovine. Tako genealogija namesto viteških pohodov v globino zgodovine raje preučuje površje dogodkov, obskurnih podrobnosti in marginalnih premikov; zgodovinopisje je torej »preučevanje neznatnih zlobnosti, vsiljenih interpretacij, pokvarjenih namenov, visoko-zvenečih zgodb, ki prikrivajo najnižje motive« (Dreyfus in Rabinow 1983, 108). Posledično je zgodovina zgodba »slučajev, disperzije, naključnih dogodkov, laži« in ne »veličastnega razvoja Resnice ali konkretnega utelešenja svobode« (ibid.).

Naslanjajoč se na Nietzscheja, Foucault (2008b, 92) pravi, da izraza »kot sta *Entstehung* ali *Herkunft*, bolje kot *Ursprung* zaznamujeta predmet, ki je lasten genealogiji« in ju tako razloči od že vsakdanjega iskanja Izvora (*Ursprung*).

Herkunft ali **sloj** tako predstavlja alternativni pristop k zgodovinski zvezi, saj je pojmovana kot kompleksen in v veliki meri naključni preplet nešteti začetkov, »preko katerih (zaradi katerih, navkljub katerim)« (ibid., 92–93) so se posebnosti ali koncepti kot *rasa*, *ljudstvo*, *tradicija*, *družbeni razred* ipd. sploh osnovali. Prej kot progresivno evolucijo naroda ali zgodovinsko usodo družbenega razreda, genealog izpostavlja odklone, naključja, zmote in napačne presoje znotraj samega procesa formacije kulturne zapuščine; procesa, ki ni progresivno konsolidirajoč, ampak »skupek razpok, prelomov, heterogenih slojev« (ibid., 93).

Entstehung ali **vznik** pa na drugi strani nakazuje trenutek izbruha silnic; dogodek, ko silnice stopijo v igro in oblikujejo zamejen princip - »posebni zakon pojavljanja« (ibid., 94). Genealogija posledično cilja na zamejitev *prostora* znotraj katerega posamezne silnice stopajo v razmerja in ne posveča veliko pozornosti »fiziki« le-teh; osredotoča se namreč na *pokrajino*, kjer se boji odvijajo. Velja poudariti še, da gre pri pokrajini, kjer se sile srečujejo za »ne-prostor, za čisto razdaljo, za dejstvo, da

nasprotniki ne pripadajo istemu prostoru« (ibid., 96); osnovana je izključno preko specifične konfrontacije in ni nič več kot prazen prostor, vrzel potencialnosti, okolje znotraj katerega se prek boja vzpostavljajo pomeni. Sledeč Nietzscheju tako pridemo do pripoznanja, da je vzpon določene predstave o svobodi, dolžnosti, morali ali resnici, »tako kot vsak drug dogodek, globoko in znatno obarvan s krvjo« (Nietzsche 1988, 252).

V povezavi z zgoraj orisanimi poglobljenimi lastnostmi sodobnega delovanja relacij moči je pojmovanje zgodovine kot »bojev in konfliktov okoli vprašanja resnice« (Smart 1991, 166) sprožilo sledeče vprašanje: »če je oblast sama po sebi res igra razmerja sil in njegovo razodevanje, mar je tedaj ne bi morali analizirati predvsem z vidika boja, spopada ali vojne« (Foucault 2007a, 84)? Odgovor sestoji iz znanega Foucaultovega obrata Clausewitzevega postulata v trditev: »politika je nenehna vojna z drugimi sredstvi« (ibid., 85).

V vsaki družbi in v vsakem zgodovinskem obdobju naj bi torej obstajal »režim resnice, nenačrtovan ampak delujoč/funkcionalen, nekako proizveden iz omrežja razmerij moči, iz mnogoterih oblik pritiska in vsiljen skupaj z njimi« (Walzer 1991, 64). Resnica je posledično podvržena nenehnim mehanizmom politične in ekonomske spodbude, razširjanja, porabe, političnega debatiranja in družbenih konfrontacij: » [...] resnica ni zunaj oblasti ali odsotnosti oblasti, resnica ni nagrada svobodnim duhovom, plod dolgotrajne umaknjenosti niti privilegij tistih, ki se jim je uspelo osvoboditi. Resnica je nekaj tuzemskega [...] « (Foucault 1991, 72-3).

Tu je najverjetneje na mestu še sledeča razjasnitev Foucaultovega razumevanja resnice. Kombinacija arheološkega in genealoškega pristopa k preučevanju zgodovine, pojmovane kot skupek raznih borb, bojev in strategij, vpletenih v vprašanja resnice, v prvi vrsti zahteva izvitje iz lagodnosti stališča, ki razloge in smisel bojevanja ter strategij, postavlja v »ime« različnih nekompatibilnih resnic. Foucault predlaga, da resnico raje razumemo kot »skupek pravil, v skladu s katerimi se razločuje resnično in neresnično ter so resničnemu pripojeni specifični učinki oblasti«, kar premešča žarišče bojev okoli »statusa resnice ter ekonomskih in političnih vlog, ki jih igra« (Foucault 1991, 74).

Vsako sklicevanje na resnico nosi brazgotine boja: Foucaultovo (2007a, 107) trditev, da »ni spoznanja, ki ne bi temeljilo na nepravilnosti«, pa bi morda lahko označili za njegovo najdaljnosežnejšo in najvznemirljivejšo izjavo.

V skladu z zaključki povzetimi v razdelku *Concluding remarks and open questions* se želimo na tem mestu zgolj na kratko dotakniti povezave med izjavami Michela Foucaulta ter možnimi implikacijami slednjih na polje mednarodnih odnosov.

V tekstu naslovljenem *Engaging Foucault; Discourse, Governance and the Limits of Foucauldian IR*, Jan Selby (2007, 324) trdi, da je prilaščanja Foucaultovih izjav pri post-strukturalističnih teoretikih in analitikih mednarodnih odnosov mogoče strniti v tri kategorije. Ena izmed možnih uporab je v funkciji »podpore dekonstrukcijam realistične teorije mednarodnih odnosov«, druga »analizira moderne diskurze in prakse mednarodnih politik«, zadnja pa služi »razvijanju novih razlag sodobnega liberalnega svetovnega reda«.

Medtem ko zgolj druga različica, kjer se je Foucaulta »koristno uporabilo za [...] analiziranje in osvetljevanje raznih liberalnih diskurzov, praks in tehnik mednarodnih odnosov« (ibid., 332), zadovolji Selbyevo razumevanje »foucaultovske« pozicije, pa naj bi tako dekonstrukcije realistične teorije, kot »foucaultovske« razlage sodobnega liberalnega svetovnega redu, bili primeri »ignoriranja« (ibid., 330) poglobitnih Foucaultovih poudarkov; slabega razumevanja njegovih glavnih »uvidov« (ibid.); »napačnega prikaza« njegovih konceptov in celo »inherentne težavnosti internacionalizacije Foucaulta« (ibid., 331).

Naj razjasnimo, da Selbyevega teksta ne izpostavljam kot reprezentativni primer dobre uporabe ali zlorabe Foucaulta v teorijah mednarodnih odnosov, pač pa zato, ker menimo, da dobro kaže na resnost problematik, izpostavljenih v našem zaključku.

Prvič zato, ker tako razlogi za nezadostnost dveh možnih uporab Foucaulta v diskurzivnem polju mednarodnih odnosov, kot način njihovega podajanja, veliko bolj spominjajo na zasledovanje »naloge določanja nedotakljive točke dogme«, kot na »recipročno osvetljevanje« neke problematike (Foucault 1997a, 111–112).⁹⁸ Da ima

⁹⁸ Želeli bi poudariti, da se naš komentar nanaša izključno na točko, kjer se Selby dotika Foucaultovih izjav (ali pa podaja svoje razumevanje le-teh) in nikakor ne odpira vprašanja veljavnosti njegovih analitičnih zaključkov glede »mednarodnih foucaultovskih izpeljav«.

»polemika« v Selbyevem tekstu primat nad »diskusijo«, se morebiti najbolj kaže pri zatrjevanju o težavnosti prevajanja Foucaulta na polje mednarodnih odnosov, saj naj bi bil slednji »predvsem prespraševalec modernih liberalnih kapitalističnih družb« (Selby 2007, 326) in »teoretik, katerega analize so bile osredotočene predvsem na »domačo« družbeno področje« (ibid., 325). Poleg tega naj bi foucaultovska analitika sicer zmogla »teoretizirati »kako« oblasti [...] ne more pa nam pomagati razumeti »kdaj«, »kje« ter (najpomembnejše) »zakaj« oblasti« (ibid., 327).

Ker smo nekaj možnih razjasnitev podobnih pomislekov že nakazali, bi tu zgolj ponovno na kratko poudarili sledeče. *Prvič*, da je vredno upoštevati dejanski značaj njegovih izjav in se zavoljo tega izogniti zapletanju v oznake, kaj naj bi Foucault »zares«, ali pa v prvi vrsti »bil«. *Nadalje*, premise in izhodiščne točke njegovih analiz (pa naj bodo označene za nominalistične, skeptične ali kritične) ne merijo na splošne teoretske zaključke in niso zasnovane za njihovo zavračanje ali potrjevanje; so prej »poskusi« pisati zgodovino drugače, videti drugače, misliti drugače.⁹⁹ *Nazadnje* bi želeli zavrniti Selbyevo tezo, da Foucaultovska analiza ni zmožna odgovoriti na »kdaj«, »kje« in »zakaj« odnosov oblasti; Foucaultovi genealoški popisi so polni konkretnih zgodovinskih (kje in kdaj) dejstev o vzpostavitvah oblastnih mehanizmov, preko prepleta množstva dejanskih lokalnih in manj lokalnih interesov (zakaj).

Res je, da Foucaultova analitična metoda ni zlahka »prevedljiva« in se je njenemu razumevanju potrebno resno posvetiti, preden jo je mogoče uporabiti v kaki samostojni raziskavi. Vse to smo izkusili tudi sami. Potrditev zapisanega pa najdemo tudi v Selbyevem (2007, 332) odobravanju druge možne prilastitve, kjer se je Foucaulta uporabilo za »mnogo bolj empirične namene, za preučevanje lokalnih okolij, strategij in tehnologij moči, ki se dotikajo mednarodnega«. Najverjetneje so se prav v tej teoretični smeri, »na mejah med mednarodnimi odnosi in post-kolonialnimi študijami« (ibid.), strožje držali Foucaultovih izjav kot v drugih dveh primerih.¹⁰⁰

Na hitro smo ponovno prehodili pot pisanja diplomske naloge. Zaradi ugotovitve, da je zadovoljivo razumevanje Foucaultovih izjav že samo na sebi zadosten zalogaj, smo se

⁹⁹ Glede te točke lahko poučnejše razjasnitve kot je naša najdemo v uvodih Foucaultovih predavanj (2004a in 2004b) ter nenazadnje tudi skozi celotno Veynovo (2008) knjigo.

¹⁰⁰ Skupaj s Selbyem (2007, 330) velja poudariti, da to dejstvo nikakor ne zanika veljavnosti kritik drugih dveh vej »foucaultovske« analize mednarodnih odnosov, le da ne »dolgujejo« toliko Foucaultu, kot to trdijo nekateri izmed avtorjev.

namesto možnim polemikam ter nujno površnim samostojnim analizam posvetili izključno njim. Zavedamo se, da pot ni zaključena – določene aspekte »foucaultovske« analitike je potrebno dopolniti ter jih dodatno preizkusiti na konkretnih primerih – na sodbe o uspehu pa bo potrebno še počakati, saj: *Un coup de dés jamais n'abolira le hasard..*¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Sposodili smo si naslov pesmi Stéphana Mallarméja, ki bi ga lahko prevedli nekako takole: *Met kocke ne bo nikoli odpravil naključja.*

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