Študije FDV

Letn. 4, št. 5 (2009)

The heritage of political violence among Slovenian elites and its mobilisation during the period of regime change (1988-1995)

Anton Kramberger

Revija Študije FDV objavlja predvsem interdisciplinarne študije. Svetovni splet omogoča večjo hitrost objave, obseg člankov ni omejen, poleg besedila lahko ti vsebujejo še različne nadbesedilne prvine. Članki so recenzirani. Stališča avtorjev ne izražajo uradnega stališča Fakultete za družbene vede.

The heritage of political violence among Slovenian elites and its mobilisation during the period of regime change (1988-1995)[1]

Anton Kramberger

Abstract: *The paper deals with bad memories on experienced political violence among members of Slovenian elites, who were active during the regime change in Slovenia (1988-1995), when this country transformed from an ex-Yugoslavia region to an independent state. Although elite members are definitely the persons who may exercise force and coercive power upon others and not the other way around, it is interesting to see, how the old and new elite members were utilizing possible past violent acts over themselves or their families, exercised by different regimes from the past. Data are based on a special survey among Slovenian elite members in 1995. Results show relatively high spread of unpleasant memories among elite members (4 out of 10 have such recollections), though concerning different events from the past. Significant differences concern mobility type of elite members during 1988-95 and their specific sector engagement. First, old elite members, who left positions after 1988, were significantly higher exposed to violent maltreatment than were the others; by their withdrawals, a lot of social and political tensions were relaxed, contributing to a peaceful regime change. Second, (old and new) members of cultural elite still carry with them a lot of bad memories on past maltreatments, much more than the members of political and business elites. This issue might still be a factor in a further political mobilisation.*

Key words: *Slovenia, elite studies, regime change, violent behaviour, collective memory*

1. Factors effecting a mild Slovenian regime change circa 1990

In spite of their infrequency, revolutionary times almost inevitably possess the quality of social experiment. The film of otherwise slow, nearly invisible social development in such periods of rapid social change seems to roll before our eyes at a faster than usual pace. That's why we are able to detect and put together more salient power actors and key factors and conditions they are surrounded by. The layers of *wild power* rapidly open and shut while engaged agents of change emerge from elite circles or from civil society. They appear quickly and in groups, usually flanked by their fellow travellers, opponents and heterogenous ideological imaginaries (Chastel 1994).

The independence of Slovenian lands from the former federal framework of Tito's Yugoslavia and the emergence of the new Slovenian state (1990/1991) is an example of this kind of rare and abrupt historical event. During this condensed period, ongoing agitation in civil society translated into at least three movements on the level of the state authorities: regime change, the emergence of an independent Slovenian state (i.e. international recognition) and the initiation of numerous systemic reforms of political, economic and social structures.

During this condensed period, the members of the Slovenian elite became a bit more democratized (first divided and then surprisingly united) and shook off a foreign (Serbo-Yugoslav) regime. At the same time, the members of the old elite engaged in skirmishes with their descendents and, above all, with the newly emerging elite. The success of the various elite groups who during this period were struggling to create a new regime and a new country while reforming the system depended on many factors. Among the most important factors were specific internal elite conflicts related to regime change and how they were

---

resolved, what, in turn depended also on the experience of individuals with the previous regime(s). The exploitation of such experience for political engagement was largely determined by the nature of the emerging elite coalitions and how capable they were of tackling actual (new) instead of old challenges: namely, the changing circumstances of Slovenian military, political, economic and social conditions.

1.1 Theoretical considerations on causes of conflicts

Among elite members, new challenges could have a clear priority over traditional elite disputes only in specific settings. A trade with past conflicts usually accompany every regime change, at least in its initial phase. Social sciences dealing with the character of social conflicts were always highly interested in revealing different factors or causes of conflict resolution (Maoz & Russett 1993), with an aim to get useful insights for a better conflict management. In this kind of research, authors may focus more on exogenous causes, like in trade-based conflicts in international political geography (see for example McMillan 1997, Gartzke, Lee & Boehmer 2001) or more on endogenous factors, like in causes of civil wars in post-colonial Africa, Asia and Middle-East (see Henderson & Singer 2000, de Soysa (2002).

Concerning possible sources of internal conflicts, on the other side the proposed theoretical factors are often contested. Jackson (2001) recently puts forward an interesting observation that permanent "internal conflict is a 'normal' aspect of weak state politics". Is this valid for post-communist countries as well? The answer probably depends on the length of statehood history of a particular country. For example, this conclusion resembles findings of those who claim, for example that "the historical lack of (non-communist) political elite" could be among key factors for the Slovakia's known hesitation in its building a wider and more vivid democracy (Stena 2001). On the other side, Benson & Kugler (1998) claim just the opposite, most likely having in mind more consolidate elite groups in older countries - that the relative parity of resources (or the power-parity) between the government and the opposition leads to a higher level of possible violence. Obviously in theory both reasons, either weak politics or strong political groups may lead to a similar end, namely, to an open and violent political conflict. Less clear is then, what specific combination of wider conditions is likely to yield a more democratic and peace perspective.

1.2 *Pros et contras* of the regime change in Slovenia around 1990

In Slovenia, the regime change during the period (1988 - 1992) happened to be not very violent, similarly to some other "velvet revolutions" in Eastern European countries. Such milder a character of the regime change left a number of old elite members on their power positions. This inherited and transmitted constellation of power in Slovenia was eagerly accused by the opposition elite groups and by unsatisfied political commentators during the 90's. Still now, after a decade of reforms an initial structural pattern of power relations, which enabled both, a significant elite continuation and a rapid economic recovery of the small economy, is not very well researched and reasonably commented. Winners and losers of transition have thus quite different stories, concerning the advantages and disadvantages of the country's recent development. From time to time, among opposition elites and especially in media, reflecting deep dissatisfaction within bottom parts of the population, the following explanation emerges. The relative success of the country was achieved at a too high social price. Namely, an authoritarian way of ruling used by the old-fashioned cadres was simply transformed into the currently most popular (neo)liberal commanding. So, nothing really changes. In such a way, old latent social and elite tensions, stemming from a violent behaviour of leaders were not yet socially relaxed by the new regime implementation. They only were articulated differently, more in line with modern times, what means that old tensions are in a new latent form only prolonged further.

Even such narrative lamentation are highly characteristic for every elite in opposition, it may hold some true in a sense that latent conflicts could be a source for a more open conflict in future. We might be then interested to see, what really happened with the heritage of the previous political violence during the initial stage of the regime change. Was it used fully and enough as to mobilise political life for the regime change? Or was it packed as not so important factor at the political stage and was passed to further times due to other, more urgent elite interests or even common opportunities? In continuation, data on some theoretically meaningful factors, surrounding experiences with political violence and its usage during the political crises (1988-1992) are selected and explored as to see, whether the specific Slovenian conflict cumulated that kind of experiences and how far they were used in peaceful resolution of the initial political conflict. But before we empirically explore this aspect of Slovenian regime change, few additional remarks on the level of possible conflict are worthwhile, yielding our basic hypothesis.

1.3 Hypothesis on the impact of experiences with political violence

First, we must recognize that political crises and regime changes are often bloody and that not all of the various elite groups can succeed in their primary goal of occupying the highest echelons of power and authority. The rise of one elite group usually spells the downfall of another elite group generally as a result

of limited resources and positions. Moreover, any success in the world of fast-changing democratic governments tends to be short-term. From the standpoint of political sociology, a field that in its effort to define general development patterns attempts to transcend mere historical description, the most interesting questions regarding the Slovenian regime change of 1991 address the complex set of special factors that influenced the establishment of specific elite dynamics during the greatest period of crisis.

Namely, Slovenia was until recently always a province within larger state-units, what inevitably invokes elite sub-ordination. Therefore, the principal theme of political-violent activities from the Slovenian past is linked to violence exacted by foreign regimes and this lends an aspect of vassalage to the internal lustration process (Zidar 1996) as well to the prevention and outright prohibition of the opposition's performance of public office. In what follows, I will first determine to what extent political violence emerged from the subordination of the Slovenian elite to foreign regimes and to what extent it is preserved in the members of the current political elite. In this paper, political violence is broadly defined to include different violent acts upon individuals ranging from mild maltreatment, coercion and confiscation of property to more serious maltreatment and abuse, like imprisonment and forced exile.

Second, I will explore the somewhat wider issues of the consequences of past violence and specifically to what extent the accumulated personal experience of political violence among members of the elite coincides with collective historical conflicts among the elite. I will also look at how much these experiences were segregated within main sectors of the principal elites during the period of regime change (1988-1995).

I would like to verify if the following hypothesis holds up: namely, that because of the weak segregation of potential conflicts emerging from the cleansing of past regimes, the current elites in the new political space were substantially uninterested significantly to enhance the renewal of the elite during the principal period of regime change from 1988 to 1995.

I put forth the following additional assumptions to be tested:

a) the historical subordination of Slovenian elites under foreign regimes is evident in the considerable general amount of political violence experienced by current members of the Slovenian elite during their lives (point 3);

b) greater personal experience with political violence raises the *self-image of the elite* and at the same time strengthens the tendency for *radical regime change* (point 4);

c) painful personal experience with political violence and the value orientations that emerge from it (self-image of the elite, will for radical regime change) have not been resulted from (associated with) historical differences among Slovenian elites: namely, differences in *ethnic origin, religious faith and party preference* of elite members (point 5);

d) painful personal experience with political violence and historical factors of elite division during regime change were not concentrated (segregated) in specific elite sectors or in the mobility of the elite among sectors (point 6);

e) equitable circumstances and unsegregated distribution of historical conflicts and the potential risk for the radicalization of new conflicts among members of the elite lead to lower personnel changes among the old and new elites as well as the general tendency toward cooptation as the nature of Slovenian regime change after 1988;

If the above assumptions hold, the regime change together with national independence and the substantial systemic reforms that followed were more the fruit of unique and favorable *external* circumstances (the collapse of the bipolar division of Europe and the planet) than the fruit of internal opposition or the inclination among Slovenian elites for radical regime change. Namely, if internal (and not external) tendencies for change prevailed, it would have to be recognized in the characteristic segregation of historical conflicts and in the memory of violent experiences among the basic elite sectors and in the higher degree of change in new elite as a whole.

2. Research, basic explanation of data, and variables

In order to confirm the above hypotheses, I will cite selected data from a field research study conducted among members of the Slovenian elite in 1995 (Kramberger & V. Rus 1995). The study was modeled after comparable international research studies of national elite groups in six countries from two years earlier (Szelenyi & Treiman 1993). In our study, the definition of Slovenian elites conformed to recognized methods – i.e. first identifying formal leadership positions, and then identifying those who held these positions. In adhering to such a literal definition, however, we fail to identify certain principal elites

according to Mosca, Michels, and Pareto as well as the elite's *distinctive social formation[2]* in comparison with other social groupings. The advantage of defining the elite through leadership positions, which is the most widely used method in empirical research studies of elites, is quite simply the accessibility of lists of various positions and the people who have been appointed or elected to those positions. However, we must recognize the fact that what we arrive at is not the »real« elite but an approximation of it.

The above-mentioned research defined members of the Slovenian elite as individuals who, either in 1988 (that is, prior to the principal changes) or during the research project, in 1995 (that is, following the principal changes), occupied key positions in the most important Slovenian organizations in the areas of politics, business and culture in the widest sense of these words. By the end of the initial phase of the project, we had identified a target population that totalled 1,401 individuals and occupying about 2000 key positions either in 1988 or in 1995.

These individuals were found in the combined lists of various associations and examined and finally defined independently by six external experts as the most important individuals in the given time points in our society. By the time the interviewing phase was completed, we received full responses from 1,041 of these individuals only. Of the omitted 360 who we were either unable to reach or who were unwilling to cooperate, approximately 100 had departed from the ranks of the elite shortly after 1988, approximately 150 had entered the ranks of the elite prior to 1995 and the remaining 100 has survived the first phase of the transition as a member of the elite class.[3]

The interviewing period began at the end of February 1995 and was concluded at the end of August during the same year. It was planned that the first wave of those interviewed would come mostly from the cultural elites and the political and business elites would follow (see Table 1).

Table 1: Interviews with members of Slovenian elites by month and by segment in 1988 (column %)

Interview month of elite members in 1995	Elite segments in 1988				
	Not member of elite in 1988	Political elite	Business elite	Cultural elite	**TOTAL**
March	19	3	8	**56**	20
April	16	6	20	21	16
May	21	25	**34**	8	23
June	**30**	**45**	22	8	26
July	13	20	15	7	14
August	1	1	1		1
TOTAL	**100 %**	**100 %**	**100 %**	**100 %**	**100 %**
Number	*208*	*266*	*306*	*261*	*1041*

Source: Field Study of Elites in Slovenia 88–95, target group = 1401, interview group = 1041 (Kramberger & V. Rus 1995)

During this period of the field work, the average interview lasted 80 minutes (the shortest being 15 minutes and the longest being 225 minutes; standard deviation of 15 minutes). The longest average interviews were with members of the cultural elite (87 minutes; standard deviation of 27 minutes); the sector average was somewhat shorter with members of the political elite (81; 23) and the shortest with members of the business elite (77; 23). In order to successfully complete the interview, an average of 4 conversations or contacts were needed (one contact at the least and 25 at the most; standard deviation of 3). The highest number of contacts was needed with members of the business elite (average 4.8; standard deviation of 3.5), somewhat less with members of the political elite (4.0; 3.2) and the least with members of the cultural elite (3.6; 2.9). Suspicion toward or caution vis-a-vis the research project (or more precisely, vis-a-vis the researchers and their management) among members of the old 1988 elite could be measured also by the number of contacts needed – a greater number with the old business elites and a lesser number with the old cultural elites. The responsiveness of those questioned, evaluated by the length of the interviews, could also be used as a measure of occasional trust toward the

---

[2] (1) The closed nature of the elite (because of the small number of members), (2) the realisation of their own power which they subsequently divide among themselves, (3) the interconnection of elites because of their shared risk and (4) a sort of loose cooperation among actors in elite sectors for the purpose of solving common challenges. (Higley & Pakulski 2000, 41).

[3] For details about the multi-stage compilation of the list, the completion of the sample and various limitations regarding the correctness of the final "sample", its generalisation on to the national level and for international comparisons of findings (especially of elite reproduction rates), see Kramberger & Vehovar (2000).

researchers since it generally was inversely proportional to their caution, as measured by total number of contacts needed.

2.1 Elite sectors and elite mobility among these sectors

Among the fundamental external methods of predefining elite members, we included the notion of elite sector. The sector characterizes the principal field of influence and activity. Sector affiliation of elite members can change over the course of time. Roughly speaking, this has to do with the endurance of an individual in an elite sector or with the withdrawal of an individual from an elite sector over a given period of time.

The big picture of elite dynamics during 7 years is the following. Among the 1,041 elite members interviewed, 833 had already belonged to elite circles in 1988 and 208 were newcomers. Of the 833 members of the old elite, 142 had left elite circles before 1995. The remainder had persisted as »elite« actors at least until 1995 either in their previous sector or in another sector. The following table provides a detailed view of intra-sector mobility during this period of time (Table 2):

Table 2: Cross-sector mobility of interviewed members of the Slovenian elite (1,041 individuals) during the period 1988 – 1995 (in absolute numbers)

Elite sectors in 1988	Elite sectors in 1995				
	No more member of elite in 1995	Politics	Business	Culture	**TOTAL**
Not yet elite member in 1988		89	57	62	**208**
Politics	78	120	53	15	**266**
Business	34	23	245	4	**306**
Culture	30	26	5	200	**261**
TOTAL	**142**	**258**	**360**	**281**	**1041**

Source: Field Study of Elites in Slovenia 88–95, target group = 1401, interview group = 1041 (Kramberger & V. Rus 1995)

Mobility between elite sectors requires a varying level of invested energy and resources. The least energy, of course, is needed to simply withdraw from elite circles. A somewhat higher level is needed to preserve one's position in the same sector and even more to move from one elite sector to another. The greatest amount of energy and resources is needed to break into elite circles for the first time.

The fundamental differentiation in elite-promotional efforts is most evident in the quantity of friendly relations and help which was passed among the most important circles of various sectors of the Slovenian elite from 1988 to 1995 (for details see Kramberger 1999, 281, Table 7.9). The importance of friendly relations could also be discerned in the responses of the interviewed elites who gave a substantial weighting to having friends in elite circles or friends who were well-known figures from 1988 to 1995.[4] Such relations were most crucial to newcomers to elite circles who generally needed the help or friendship of two to three well-placed figures to break in.[5]

2.2 Variables

The interview questions were for the most part of the factual and closed type. This means that a range of answers was given in advance. For the most part, the questions had to do with issues of family background and general career path. There were also a number of open-ended questions, mostly touching on the characteristics of social networks, the life style of elite members and details about political difficulties encountered during the course of an elite career. In order to prove the above hypotheses, I will restrict myself to data derived from the following questions and from a cluster of research variables. To both of the question descriptions, I add the frequency of various answers.

---

[4] The lowest figure was 30% and the highest around 80% of elite members depending on the sector. The proportion between friends and between those who needed material help was somewhere around 2:1 to 5:1. Put another way, 2 out of every 5 high-placed friends gave material aid to an elite member during the period of transition.

[5] It is interesting that assistance from media leaders in 1995 was requested mostly by members of the old elite who moved from sector to sector during the period from 1988 to 1995. It is also surprising that the most mobile members of the elite have generally been friendly with dissidents of the former regime. For details about the adaptation of elite social networks to new conditions, see Iglič & A. Rus (1996 and 2000).

Political difficulties experienced by elite members

E1 (Maltreatment): Were you ever demoted to a lower position, dismissed from work or psychologically or physically maltreated for political reasons or for reasons having to do with your ethnic/national affiliation, your religion (or religious practice) or gender? (Several answers were possible.) In what year did the maltreatment occur?

E2 (Imprisonment): Were you ever imprisoned, sent to labor camp, war or any other kind of camp, violently displaced or deported for political reasons or for reasons having to do with your ethnic/national affiliation or your religion (or religious practice)? In what year did this occur?

The answers to the above questions revealed that some 197 different persons (or 19% of the interviewed elite members) had underwent these two kinds of a violent experience for political reasons. Of these, 107 were maltreated according to the E1 definition and 63 according to E2 and 27 reported both types of violent treatment simultaneously.

Confiscation of family property during socialism

H3 (Confiscation): Was any portion of property owned by your parents in 1941 confiscated as a result of occupation, nationalization or collectivization?

I15 (Confiscation): Was any portion of property owned by your paternal grandfather in 1941 confiscated as a result of occupation, nationalization or collectivization?

K5 (Confiscation): Was any portion of property owned by your maternal grandfather in 1941 confiscated as a result of occupation, nationalization or collectivization?

The combined answers to the above three questions regarding indirect violence experienced by family members as a result of socialist confiscation of assets or property indicated that confiscation occurred in the families and/or is inherited in the personal memory of 262 of elite members interviewed (25% of respondents).

Self-image of elite members

N13: The concept of elite is not uniformly defined. Please tell us whether, according to your understanding of the term, you currently belong (or did belong) to the Slovenian elite?

This question was responded to by 969 of the 1,041 elite members interviewed and, surprisingly, only 364 respondents (38%) recognized themselves as belonging to the Slovenian elite.

Desire for radical (regime) change

R1: Our country has undergone many changes in the past years – systemic, legal and other. What kind of changes do you see as desirable in your field of expertise?

Three percent of those interviewed (33 individuals) did not respond to the above question. 14% of those interviewed (144 individuals) responded with the opinion: »Many things need to be started completely from scratch.« 9% of those interviewed (96 individuals) responded with the opinion: »Change could be modeled on past solutions which were not so bad.« 74% of those interviewed (768 individuals) responded with the opinion: »The best changes are gradual and pragmatic without drastic shifts of direction.« Three-quarters of those interviewed therefore supported gradual change, while only one-seventh were inclined toward radical change.

Party preferences of elite members

N21: Which party did you vote for in the last general election?

76% of those interviewed (787 individuals) responded to this question while 24% (254) did not. The following is a breakdown of responses6: LDS 32% of those interviewed (328); SKD 6% (65); ZLSD 23% (243); SLS 2% (20); SDSS 6% (66); SNS 1% (7); other parliamentary parties 4% (38); other non-parliamentary parties 2% (20); »I don't know«, »Decline to comment«, »I didn't vote.« 24% of those interviewed (254).

Looking at the combined answers of the 787 who responded and dividing them into three simplified categories (roughly following broadly defined left-right wing categories of the voting space, known in

---

[6] LDS - Liberal Democrat Party (joint party of several factions, consolidated in 1993 by inauguration of Mr. Drnovšek as the president); ZLSD - Joint Party of Social Democrats (consisting mainly of the reformed faction of ex-communists); SDSS - Social Democrat Party of Slovenia (consisting of rather hetergoenous members of new parties and very old parties, aspiring for more radical changes, at least by its marginal groups of population, and leaded by Mr Janša), SLS - Slovenian Folk's Party (a replication of a successful conservative party, on power in mid-war times, leaded by two brothers Podobnik), SNS - Slovenian National Party (a nationalist party with rather unexpressive members but with quite strong and popular leader, Mr. Jelinčič).

literature, see for example more on this in Nieuwbeerta 1997: xx), we get the following picture of the political space of the Slovenian elite in 1995: the "left-wing" block of continuity (LDS, ZLSD) contained 571 respondents (73%), the Slovenian "right-wing" spring block contained 158 respondents (20%) and the remainder block composed of other parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties contained 58 respondents (6%). The large number of elite members who chose not to respond to this question makes it impossible to decisively define the framework of elite political reference. In addition, traditional division on left-wing or right-wing parties in Slovenia follows more (dis)affiliation of individuals to church policy declarations rather than to the labour policy goals, what all makes the above political space division even more inaccurate.

Ethnic background of elite members

O3: Citizens of Slovenia today report in great numbers that they are of Slovenian ethnic origin. Given Slovenian history, it is clear that many families must contain other ethnic roots to a greater or lesser degree. Please answer the following question carefully, taking into account your own feelings on the subject – With which national/ethnic groups are you able to identify? Please enumerate all suitable categories.

Of all those interviewed only 5% of elite members (49 respondents) answered that they could identify with one of the following ethnic categories: Croatian, Serbian, Muslim, German, Austrian, Italian or other nationalities.[7]

Religious affiliation of elite members

O4: Religion is a very intimate area of human affairs, containing many different shades of belief and religious practice. We will ask only the following question about religion and hope that you will be able to answer.... What is your current religious affiliation? (Possible answers: Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Jewish, other: none; I don't know, decline to comment.)

Five percent of respondents (51 individuals) refused to answer the question, 1% (16) responded that they didn't know, 25% (264) responded that they were no longer observant, 36% (378) defined themselves as not having been raised religious (i.e. none) and 30% defined themselves as Catholic. A little less than 1% (4) said that they were Protestant and 2% (20) defined themselves as other. If we combined all those who responded that they were observant in some faith (33%) with those who declined to answer (5%) – following the assumption that those who declined to answer generally find the question to be unacceptably probing – we arrive at a share of 38% of elite members having some religious belief and the remaining 63% not.

3. The heritage of subordination and political difficulties among elite members

As already said, Slovenia, up until independence in 1991, was a republic within a federation of various nations. As a result of this, foreign (non-Slovenian) authorities have always administered the principal government functions of Slovenia i.e. taxation, budgets, military, police, secret service and other social services. With a few exceptions, non-Slovenian authorities have also controlled the spheres of business, finance and commerce; fragments on this could be found in very exhaustive material, collected by Borak, Lazarević, Prinčič (1997). In terms of the authority of the subordinated entity, the daily political system could be characterized as *vassalage on a perpetual ethnic basis*. Members of the local and marginal elites, because of their inclination toward independence and their lack of loyalty toward the dominant regime, were subject to two kinds of visible pressure: first, direct pressure from foreign repressive bodies, and second, pressure from vassals – i.e. local authorities. In many cases, the latter, because of their desire to prove loyalty to the master, was worse than the former.

The subordination of political elites led to unprocessed, partial and hence contradictory historical victories on the symbolic level. Such historical conflicts have been preserved in (collective) memory and therefore are still felt in the contemporary era. It is essential to include this aspect in any meaningful analysis of contemporary Slovenian politics because the elite class preserves both the trauma of collective memory

---

[7] When the same question was posed to non-Slovenians about Slovenian national belonging, we noted the interesting process of rapid assimilation of their families to Slovenian society. If we therefore judge by the ethnic roots of the parents, non-Slovenian integration would come close to 21% of those interviewed (216 individuals): of which 6% had two non-Slovenian parents and 15% had at least one parent of non-Slovenian origins. The drop in ethnic belonging from 21% to only 5% in the course of one generation could be explained in a variety of ways: it could be positively regarded as the disappearance of intra-cultural differences because of the assimilating power of the Slovenian environment particularly in the case of mixed ethnic marriages or it could be negatively regarded as a pathogenic form of pressure from society at large. For more about various assimilating processes and its outcomes in Slovenia in general, and in Slovenian Histria in particular, see Sedmak (2002).

and the sensitivity of individual memories of political maltreatment. These memories feed today's discernable distrust of authority.[8]

I will briefly develop this aspect of my analysis in two ways. First, I will demonstrate how the provisional periodization of various regimes presiding over Slovenian territory in recent history influenced several political changes. These various regimes brought a variety of (political) difficulties to a population already saddled with unreconciled feelings of loyalty. Second, I will make this general historical aspect more concrete by linking it to various personal experiences of political violence which were present in the lives of interviewed Slovenian elites (in 1995). The following is a provisional list of major regime changes in the last century, characterized by larger changes in political regulation, power relations, and level of coercion:[9]

1. period up until the beginning of World War I (-1914)
2. period of World War I (1914-1918)
3. period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1919-1940)
4. period of military violence during World War II (1941-1945)
5. period of communist lustration until informbureau (1946-1948)
6. period of larger nationalizations of assets until the geopolitical commission of Yugoslavia, when western borders were fixed (1949-1955)
7. period of intensified international relations (also attempts of the third world unification, i.e. the association of non-aligned countries) until the removal of the head of secret policy Ranković (1956-1965)
8. period of a weak liberalisation of economy and its break (until 1971), accompanied by monetary illiquidity, national tensions with brutal reckoning with leaders at the end (1972-1974), increasing independence of republics, finished by local ethnic elites' consolidation (1966-1976)
9. period of huge foreign borrowings until Tito's death (1977-1980)
10. period of hyperinflation until the split of Slovenian communist party, the reform faction won over the orthodox faction (1981-1986)
11. period of wild privatization, political renewment and struggle for state independence until the recognition of Slovenia (1987-1992)
12. period of building the state functions, of systemic reforms and consolidation of democracy in Slovenia, oriented towards the EU (1993-)

War regimes under (2) and (4) brought about a huge number of military and civil casualties. The most traumatic non-war regime period was that under (5), immediately after World War II (1945-46). In a very short time, thousands of soldiers (and their family members), collaborating with war enemies (i.e. occupation forces) or working against Tito's regime, were ruthlessly exterminated, with no judicial procedure, after being repatriated from Austrian refugee camps to Slovenia.

Subsequent communist regimes kept on basically with unscrupulous ideological pressure over a variety of malcontents, grumblers, non-invited climbers, and other threateners or opponents of regime(s). Open coercive power was used rarely, only selectively and occasionally (Čelik 1994). By natural attempts to enlarge a substitute instead of it, namely, ideological and political control over ever wider spectrum of public matters, the regime itself became less sharp, even pointless, powerless and feeble. So, after the regime period under (9), the previously quite isolated and dispersed opposition factions slowly but firmly became more organized, mediated and legitimate, exploiting deftly both major regime problems, Balkan national tensions and economic inefficiency, for bargaining their own goals (i.e. more autonomy) on their road to power.

The frequent regime changes created numerous new forms of subordination. The mirror image of subordination is political violence. Every regime exerts pressure on those who would hinder or limit it. We will focus on political disloyalty and other minor offenses and sins. The punishments for various transgressions systematically directed against members of subordinated groups were manifold. They ranged from daily – almost cultural-based – maltreatment and humiliation to more severe forms of

---

[8] For this aspect of the analysis, I am indebted to a conversation with Taja Kramberger and Drago B. Rotar. For more about collective memory and the important concept of historical-sociological analysis, see Halbwachs (2001) and especially the preface to the Slovenian translation.

[9] In this (and in other) periodization of regimes, the underlying concept was to order key political events gathered in the extensive materials about various aspects of Slovenian history, edited for example in Borak et al. (1997), Kresal (1998), and by a variety of others.

violence which would be used when the regime declared a state of crisis and at times martial law. Violence in the political background is a standard tool of unstable and threatened regimes.

Of the 1,041 respondents, 19% (see Table 3 below) reported that they had, at least once during their lives, been subject to political pressure or violence as a result of their political ethnic/national or religious identity. Such violence came either in the form of *maltreatment* or *imprisonment* or both simultaneously. This means that at least one-fifth of the members of the Slovenian elite, who were on position during the period from 1988 – 1995 had personally experienced some form – from mild to severe – of political violence or chicanery. A historical analysis of these types of incidents during various regimes (two before mentioned regime periods were merged into a single one, lasting together from 1946 till1955) reveals that more severe incidents of violence (maltreatment and imprisonment) were generally experienced by elites during the Second World War. After that, there were two subsequent waves of intensified political violence: namely from 1966-1975 (strong political crises, with raising ethnic nationalism and several attempts of a mild liberal movements) and during the key regime change from 1987-1992.

Table 3: Time chart of violent incidents in the lives of maltreated
and/or imprisoned elites (n=197 individuals)

Regime period	Maltreated	Imprisoned	Maltreated & imprisoned	Total
Unknown	2			2
(3) 1919–1940			2	2
(4) 1941–1945		55	14	69
(5) 1946–1955		1	2	3
(6) 1956–1965	13	5	4	22
(7) 1966–1975	38	1	2	39
(8) 1975–1980	9			9
(9) 1981–1986	8		2	10
(10) 1987–1992	28	1		29
(11) 1993–...	9			9
TOTAL	**107**	**63**	**27**	**197**

Source: Field Study of Elites in Slovenia 88–95, target group = 1401,
interview group = 1041 (Kramberger & V. Rus 1995)

It was also mentioned earlier that 25% of the respondents had parents or grandparents who had had property or other assets confiscated. In order to get a fuller picture of the impact of all types of political violence and pressure among members of the current Slovenian elite, the following table combines all mentioned forms of coercive political methods: violence, maltreatment, imprisonment and confiscation of assets (Table 4):

Table 4: Forms of political violence and confiscation during lives of
interviewed elites (in abs. numbers)

Form of violence	Confiscation of property	No confiscation of property	TOTAL
Maltreatment	38	69	**107**
Imprisonment	23	40	**63**
Both	9	18	**27**
No direct violence	**192**	652	844
TOTAL	**262**	**779**	**1041**

Source: Field Study of Elites in Slovenia 88–95, target group = 1401,
interview group = 1041 (Kramberger & V. Rus 1995)

The above table reveals that 37.3% (197 + 192 = 389 individual members) of the Slovenian elite, in position during the period from 1988-1995, have had direct or indirect experience of some form of political violence. The frequency (share) of various kinds of political violence is indicated below:

  (a) 6.6%   - experienced personal maltreatment,

  (b) 3.7%   - experienced personal maltreatment and family experienced confiscations,

  (c) 3.8%   - were imprisoned,

(d) 2.2%   - were imprisoned and family experienced confiscations,

(e) 1.7%   - were personally maltreated and imprisoned,

(f) 0.9%   - were personally maltreated and imprisoned and family experienced confiscations,
(g) 18.4%   - family experienced confiscations,

(h) 62.7%   - did not experience any violence personally or any family confiscations of property.

In short, the interviews and analysis indicate that 4 out of 10 members of the Slovenian elite have been deeply affronted at some time during their lives and, as a result, may have wanted and perhaps still want revenge upon the people (or their descendants) who were linked to the regimes that caused injury to them or their family. Under these circumstances (i.e. an atmosphere imbued with political violence), it is not difficult to find a fair amount of hidden resentment.

I do, however, feel compelled to add to this picture justifiable doubts about the reliability and impartiality of available data. In the first place, there are probably among the respondents a number who cited political violence without having actually experienced it. This is an indication of a kind of trading in violent experiences during political regime changes. All the same, it is unlikely that the total aggregate of violence is overestimated by more than 9% (that is assuming that all incidents of political maltreatment after 1966 are fabricated, an improbable assumption). Second, the interviewed elite members could be seen at least as temporary winners during the whole period under observation (1988-1995); those who dropped out between this period and were not interviewed, would probably report same or higher rates of violent political experiences, what somewhat stabilize the above dubious indication. Third, even more important, the data does not reveal how many respondents (both those who claimed to have experienced confiscation or political violence and those who did not) actually perpetrated violence or confiscations upon others. The quantity of political chicanery in the most recent period (after 1966) certainly allows for this possibility since a considerable portion of the interviewed elites were in power during the previous regime, either in the top or middle echelons of the elite. Namely, having a power at hand among other things means simply - using it over the others.

4. Self-image of elite members in mid 1990s

As a nation, Slovenians are not much inclined to discuss the elite and when they do it is with mixed feelings. They often doubt the good judgement and importance of the elites. When the people in power make mistakes and, because of their exposure, there are many possibilities for them to do so, ordinary people make sarcastic and stinging remarks. Members of the elite during the mid of 1990s show a strong reluctance to even call themselves elite. On average, only four out of ten (38%) recognize themselves as such[10]. This is especially true of members of the cultural elite because their accomplishments tend to be individual and personal (45-48%). It is least true of business elites (28-31%) because their accomplishments tend to be dependent on their surroundings and not on themselves alone (see Table 5). In the modal category of self-image, there is no significant difference between static and mobile members of the elite during regime change. There is, however, a much higher self-recognition of elite status among those who altered their elite sector engagement during regime change (48%).

Table 5: Answers to the Question: "In your opinion, are you a member of the elite?"
by mobility type and by elite sector in 1988 and 1995, respectively (in column %)?

	Slovenian elites according to sector mobility from 1988 – 1995 (no = 1041 individuals)					'88 elites by sector (no = 833 ind.)			'95 elites by sector (no = 899 ind.)		
	All elites 88–95	Exited after 88	Remained from 88 to 95	Shifted from 88 to 95	Entered before 95	C-88	B-88	P-88	C-95	B-95	P-95
Yes	38	39	37	48	32	48	31	39	45	28	42
No	62	61	63	52	68	52	69	61	55	72	58
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
(n)	*969*	*127*	*531*	*112*	*199*	*244*	*280*	*246*	*267*	*333*	*242*

Source: Field Study of Elites in Slovenia 88–95, target group = 1401, interview group = 1041 (Kramberger & V. Rus 1995)

---

[10] During a recent contact of the author with current elite members (a lecture and an open discussion in a private club of top managers, held in 2002, in Ljubljana) it was suggested that the situation concerning low-level self-image of elite members might have changed dramatically since 1995. Namely, contemporary elites feel much more legitimate and free to expose themselves as the "real elite", whatever this self-nomination might publicly mean.

The main reasons for reluctance and even refusal of respondents to equate themselves with the elite are (were?) false modesty, ignorance, a personal feeling of insecurity and a lack of independence in taking key positions. Insecurity usually arises from the unreliability of sources of authority (many in 1995 are/were still in relatively weak positions and are/were strategically unprotected) and their positions in the top circles which they only intermittently penetrate (see relatively low self-image, 32% among elite newcomers).

Despite the frequent disavowal of elite membership, many of those questioned were of the opinion that they had earned their leadership position as a result of their work, personality and knowledge. (The detailed significance of various factors promoting elite status, following Kietschelt list of factors, is provided in Kramberger 1999, 275-276, Table 7.6.) When asked how important were various factors to their (first) decision to penetrate leadership circles, *personal qualities* were most frequently named as the most important factor. This was followed by outside factors such as luck, knowing people in certain circles (and especially the right people), and the availability of space, equipment and other operational resources. Financial assets - what is commonly acknowledged factor of promotion - was cited as the least important factor for promotion into elite circles by almost all those asked.[11]

The self-image of the elites along with the other above-mentioned factors is only one part of the story of elite promotion. The methods by which members of the elite characterize themselves in public communications (research, public opinion polls, and media outlets) may of course differ from the way they characterize themselves in the private sphere. It may also differ from the way others characterize them, particularly in terms of how important the above-mentioned factors actually were in achieving their positions. The following chart provides a view of the connection (association) between elite self-image and personal experience with political violence (Table 6):

Table 6: Association between elite self-recognition and personal experience with political violence (in row %)

Elite self-image	Experience of political violence	No experience of political violence	TOTAL in %	TOTAL *n*
Recognition	**47**	53	100	*364*
Non-recognition	32	**68**	100	*605*
Don't know	39	61	100	*72*
TOTAL	*37*	*63*	*100*	
(n)	*389*	*652*		*1041*

Source: Field Study of Elites in Slovenia 88–95, target group = 1401, interview group = 1041
(Kramberger & V. Rus 1995)

Elite self-image is statistically significantly linked to personal experience of political violence (risk level p = 0.000) insofar as those who had such experience were more likely to recognize themselves as elite members. Experience with political violence can therefore be characterized as a kind of *initiation* into an active and open role in the area of political authority.

We are also interested in whether personal experience of political violence is linked to a more radical world view in terms of changing the social order (see Table 7):

---

[11] A more detailed analysis reveals that nearly everyone equally evaluates the meaning of often-stated factors: the retirement of elite members who shifted from one elite sector to another during the period from 1988-1995. These individuals, much more than others, emphasise their own organisational and planning skills as well as their determination, legal knowledge and acquaintance with the (right) people. On the other hand, a marked difference can be observed among elite members who work in various sectors – culture, business and politics – and changes can be traced regarding those who came to these sectors during the discussed period. Cultural elites diverge from the other two sectors in giving much greater significance to the importance of education. Business elites tend, in comparison to the other two sectors, to place a greater emphasis on organisational, entrepreneurial and planning skills, on determination, a sense of the client and – luck. Political elites, as opposed to business and cultural elites stress that legal knowledge is an especially important factor for their success. What is surprising is that the order of these factors did not considerably change with the departure of the old and the arrival of the new elites.

Table 7: Association between personal experience with political violence and desire for social change

Desire for social change	Experience of political violence		TOTAL in row %	TOTAL (N)	TOTAL (column %)
	Experience of political violence	No experience of political violence			
Radical change	51	49	**100**	*144*	*14*
Status quo	41	59	**100**	*96*	*10*
Moderate change	35	65	**100**	*768*	*74*
TOTAL (row %)	**38**	**62**	**100**		
TOTAL (N)	*379*	*629*		*1008*	*100%*

Source: Field Study of Elites in Slovenia 88–95, target group = 1401, interview group = 1041 (Kramberger & V. Rus 1995)

The primary conclusion, revealed from column percent (far right column in the table), is that 85% of those questioned opted for relatively moderate change while only 14% opted for radical change. Within this general conclusion is nested the following one: a comparison of the two groups reveals also a statistically significant link between those inclined toward radical change and those who had had personal experience with political violence (risk p = 0.001). In other words, there was a considerably higher number among those who leaned toward radical change who had experienced some type of political violence.

However, we must not overlook a general lesson that applies to Slovenian elites in 1995: namely, that personal experience of violence does not necessarily lead to an inclination toward radical change. Only a minority of those who had experienced some sort of political violence in their lives advocated radical change. A true issue on elite action inclination or just a fleeting survey issue?

5. Other possible factors causing divisions among Slovenian elites

In terms of the classic conflicts that have erupted in Slovenian elite circles during regime crises, most frequently they center around some kind of cultural battle that can be in part interpreted along lines of ethnicity, in part along religious lines, and in part on people's affiliation with various political parties. We are interested in whether personal experience with political violence among interviewed members of the elite systematically linked them to any of these three classic sources of traditional Slovenian divisions (Table 8):

Table 8: Association between personal experience with political violence and traditional divisions
(traditional culture combats)

Exp. with violence	ETHNICITY (foreign roots)			RELIGION			POLITICS			
	Yes	No	Total	Yes	No	Total	Cont.	Spring	Other	Total
Yes, violence	47	37	37	42	35	37	34	50	47	38
No, violence	53	63	63	58	65	63	66	50	53	62
Vertical %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (n)	*49*	*992*	*1041*	*383*	*658*	*1041*	*571*	*158*	*58*	*787*

Source: Field Study of Elites in Slovenia 88–95, target group = 1401, interview group = 1041 (Kramberger & V. Rus 1995)

Analysis of the data indicates that the heritage of past violence is not linked to the (foreign) ethnicity of Slovenian elites (risk p. = 0.156). In contrast, the characteristic obstacle of religion seems to be statistically significant (risk p. = 0.025) and political orientation even more so (risk p. = 0.000). From the above table, it is clear that the most incidents of political violence have been experienced by elites who are religious and especially among elites who lean toward the Slovenian spring political parties.[12] This

---

[12] In terms of the applicability of a relatively high share of political violence between the continuing elites (192 out of 298 individuals reported), I should clarify that 68% cite confiscation and other types of political violence while only 32% cite the personal experience of violence (maltreatment, imprisonment or expulsion). Most of the latter incidents occurred during three regime changes: namely the period following World War II (imprisonment and expulsion), the

indicates that the heritage of political violence has been transformed into political demands with the help of religious and political agents. In other words, during the regime change of 1990, a considerable part of the historical tendency toward conflict (religious, political) was enhanced by the heritage of personally experienced violence and the accumulated effect of this found expression in the spheres of religion and political party affiliation. Therefore, we cannot accept the above-mentioned Hypothesis C – that the heritage of political violence during regime change in Slovenia did not find expression during periods of historical conflict.

6. Distribution of political risk among elite sectors

With the last questions, we intended to confirm the final part of the assumptions: namely, whether the heritage of political violence resonated more with any of the basic elite sectors during regime change (Table 9).

We can see that the heritage of political violence is relatively evenly distributed among the mobile members of the elite (average 37%). The greatest incidence of political violence could be found among the old elites who retreated after 1988 and who carried it with them from the relatively open authorities of the new regime to the private sphere (47%). In the area of elite sectors, the distribution of the heritage of political violence is quite remarkable and is also statistically significant. There is a relatively high concentration of 1995 cultural elites who have a vivid recollection of political violence experienced either personally or by their family (44%) as compared to the political elite (36%) and the business elite (30%).

Table 9: Distributions of experience of political violence in various sectors of the Slovenian elites (in column %)

	Slovenian elites by sector mobility from 88–95 (n = 1041 individuals)					Elite 88 by sector (n = 833 individuals)			Elite 95 by sector (n = 899 individuals)		
	All elites 88–95	Left after 88	Remained from 88–95	Shift in 88–95	Entered before 95	C-88	B-88	P-88	C-95	B-95	P-95
Yes, violence	37	**47**	35	39	36	**47**	32	35	**44**	30	36
No, violence	63	53	65	61	64	53	68	65	56	70	64
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Ans.(n)	*1041*	*142*	*565*	*126*	*208*	*261*	*306*	*266*	*281*	*360*	*258*

Source: Field Study of Elites in Slovenia 88–95, target group = 1401, interview group = 1041 (Kramberger & V. Rus 1995)

7. Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to investigate, on the basis of data collected in empirical studies, the question of how the heritage of subordinated Slovenian elites – defined by the quantity of political violence dealt out by past regimes to members of the elites and their families – found expression during the regime changes of 1988-1995. Contrary to posited assumptions, I discovered that the effects of this heritage are discernable and most strongly articulated in the political sphere of the new regime even though the actual experience of violence appears to be fairly evenly distributed among main elite sectors. Specifically, the data led me to the following conclusions: (1) because political violence functions as a sort of initiation into positions of authority, it elevates the self-recognition of elites in high positions; (2) the desire for radical change to the social order, a tendency which is otherwise fairly weak among the traditionally non-belligerent Slovenian elites, is more keenly felt by those who have experienced some form of political violence; (3) the heritage of political violence, with the regime change of 1990, was politically articulated and gathered mass among the following agents: members of the cultural elite who had been the most exposed ideologically during the time of communism and socialism, religious elites and adherents of Slovenian spring political parties; (4) the concentration of this heritage continued even in 1995 to be most pronounced in the cultural elites. It is interesting to note that, during regime change, the cultural elites experienced the lowest level of changes in membership among all the elite sectors. This

---

period of increasing independence of the Yugoslav republics 1966-1976 (maltreatment) and the period of wild privatisation (maltreatment). See related observations in Part 3.

could mean two things: first, that old cultural elite was transformed from within and thus created a basis for the soft transition into the new regime; second, that the political ambitions for radical change in the regime have in fact not been entirely realized (yet!).

I put forward a number of assumptions in the first part of this paper and shaped them into the most likely scenario, a scenario that I ultimately cannot support given the analysis of the collected data. Although the heritage of political violence does not appear to be highly emphasized among any of the elite sectors (political, business or culture) or among mobile elites (old, new, those who retreated from elites), its mere presence in the above-mentioned sectors contributes to a *conscious elite signalization* (ex. Lee & Schlesinger 2001) of certain unresolved questions from the past in the Slovenian political context and in the mass media. This message is regularly disseminated by cultural elites (media: Nova Revija), religious elites (media: Družina and church pulpits) and the political elites connected to Slovenian Spring (media: Demokracija, Mag[13]). Even later, during the 1990s, the accumulated heritage of political violence in the above-mentioned sectors preserved a certain level of tension among competing elite movements in shaping the key questions of current politics.

That is why it is necessary to amend the somewhat overly optimistic story of the hypothetically small influence of the heritage of political violence during regime changes and of the nature of elite confrontation in Slovenia during the 1990s. One version of this continuing story which better suits the data goes something like this: political violence is part of the collective experience shared by members of current Slovenian elites; nevertheless, at the beginning of the 1990s those who had experienced political violence had not entirely capitalized on their experience vis-a-vis those who had not or those who had even perpetrated such acts on others. Here a general observation might be in order: namely that the regime change that took place during the period from 1988-1995 in Slovenia was at least in part the result of an extremely favorable international environment (Lebow & Stein 1995). It was, however, also the result of the accumulated inner dissatisfaction among the subordinated Slovenian elites from the past. Assumption D which posits that regime change in Slovenian is for the most part imported has a more complicated, multilayered background than indicated in this assumption. The process of overthrowing the regime was gradual, a series of external and internal mechanisms of political mobilization. An internal dynamic among the elites was thus triggered and some derived strength from it while others were crippled. We can even conclude that this process of transformation has not yet exhausted all of the internal potential for a possible larger elite mobility arising from the heritage of past political violence.[14] For this reason, it will be necessary to substantially enhance my original assumptions, a task I shall put aside until future opportunities present themselves.

Subordination, political violence and the difficult to dismiss memory of it are doubtless connected factors in political and elite dynamics and, at specific points in time, can play a role in the risk of political investment. In the longer historical process of the gradual maturation of autonomous authorities in Slovenia, the potency of these factors ebbs and flows. As with every story of subordination, a certain gloom accompanies the slow extinction of symbols of the past Slovenian vassalage and the political violence that emerged from that system. This spirit of gloom is not disturbed by the more general sense that, because of strong passions and tendencies toward cleansing, every political process is a harsh one. Up until 1990, it was with bent heads and a readiness for humiliation that individuals climbed into the top echelons of power. This situation was maintained by a considerable degree of both servility toward authorities and aggression toward underlings, the latter aggression being supported by foreign masters as well. Reconciliations, if necessary, are rarely done with open-minded people and they rarely mount above a useful, handy flattery. Is it really all the different today, now that Slovenia is an independent country?

An optimistic projection of a gradual reduction in the heritage of past political violence would go something like this: if the percentage of members of the Slovenian elites encumbered with the experience of political violence declined from 37.7% to 35.9% from 1988 to 1995 (that is to say by an insignificant 2% during seven full turbulent years of regime change), then we can hope that the wounds from Slovenia's era of vassalage will finally be healed over the next half century. Of course, this will only take place if members of current and future elites who personally experienced a form of political violence – the painful kind that is felt on one's own skin – will no longer insert their experience into the system.

---

[13] The situation with this media landscape changed a bit in the second half of the 2000s, during the period of right-wing parties' coalition in power (2004-2008). Mag split due to politically-led pressure into two editions, the renewed Mag and a new Reporter, where the latter continues the previous attitude while the former shifted more toward the centre.

[14] The unfinished latent mobilisation of past conflicts translated into a public polemic regarding the too infrequent circulation of elites during regime change after 1988. This polemic has somewhat died down in the professional press (Kramberger & Vehovar 2000, Adam & Tomšič 2002).

I conclude this paper with the observation that the conducted research and analysis on the heritage of political violence does not cover all the conditions and factors that conspire in the methods of governing Slovenia in the 1990s. This was not the purpose of the research study. I wanted to show that the most recent regime change in Slovenia was influenced by the heritage of old political resentments among elites, too. In the aspiration for public office, old elites who have been dismissed or ignored challenge the new elites with historically-grounded limitations, conditions and prohibitions from which past violence emerged during regime change as a bitter and contradictory investment in political capital.

In order to fill in both the background and the contents of this picture of Slovenian elite mobility during the 1990s, it would be necessary to provide a more detailed analysis of the many factors that served to promote or hinder them. What perhaps is lacking in this fleeting picture about factors of elite mobility, the presence of which would make it more cogent, is a high-quality professional judgement of the hidden but probably still decisive influence of foreign elites on the current Slovenian elites. Something similar was concluded at the end of the 1990s by Hungarian (Szeleny & Szeleny 1996) and Czech sociologists who observed the impotence of a divided civil society during key elections - to elect "more promising and obstinate" parties or their leaders. For example, despite the tendency of Czech civil society toward greater autonomy and modernization, the electoral body could not bring itself to reject any elites still in *the old tracks of foreign dependence* (Adamski *et al.* 2001, Machonin 2002). It seems that in former vassal countries the actual internal differences among elites is less important than their traditional similarity: that is, their historical subordination to foreign elites.

Bibliography

Adam, F., M. Tomšič (2002): Elite (Re)configuration and Politico-Economic Performance in Post-Socialist Countries. Eur.-Asia stud. May 2002, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 435-454.

Adamski, W. W., P. Machonin, W. Zapf (ed., 2001): Structural Change and Modernization in Post-Socialist Society. Sisyphus Social Studies, Vol. XV. Warsaw: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of Polish Academy of Science.

Benson & Kugler (1998) "Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence". Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(2): 196-209.

Borak, N., Ž. Lazarević, J. Prinčič (ed., 1997): Od kapitalizma do kapitalizma. Izbrane misli o razvoju slovenskega gospodarstva v XX. stoletju. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba.

Chastel, A. (1994, or. 1983): Il Sacco di Roma, 1527. Ljubljana: ŠKUC (Studia Humanitatis).

de Soysa, I. (2002): Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, & Governance in Civil War, 1989–99. Journal of Peace Research 39 (4): 395–416.

Gartzke, Erik, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer (2001): "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict", International Organization 55: 339-438.

Halbwachs, M. (2001): Kolektivni spomin (translated by D. B. Rotar, introduction by Taja Kramberger). Ljubljana: SH.

Henderson, E. A. and J.D. Singer (2000): Civil war in the postcolonial world, 1946–1992. Journal of Peace Research 37 (2000), pp. 275–299

Higley, J. , J. Pakulski (2000): Elite Theory and Research in Postcommunist Society. V: J. C. Zagorska and J. Wasilewski (ed.): The Second Generation of Democratic Elites in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 37–49. Warsaw: Polish Academy of Science.

Iglič, H., A. Rus (1996): Dinamika sprememb v egocentričnih omrežjih slovenskih elit v obdobju tranzicije 1988–95. V: A. Kramberger (ed.): Slovenska država, družba in javnost. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.

Iglič, H., A. Rus (2000): Elite Networks in Transition: The Dynamics of Change in Personal Networks of Slovenian Elites. V: J. C. Zagorska and J. Wasilewski (ed.): The Second Generation of Democratic Elites in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 175–195. Warsaw: Polish Academy of Science.

Jackson (2001) 'The State and Internal Conflict'. Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 55(1), 2001, pp. 65-81.

Kramberger, A. (1999): Poklici, trg dela in politika. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.

Kramberger, A., V. Rus (1995): Anketna raziskava Socialna stratifikacija na Slovenskem – Študija slovenske elite 1988–1995 (arhiv: CESTRA). Ljubljana: FDV.

Kramberger, A., V. Vehovar (2000): Regime Change and Elite Dynamics in Slovenia during the 1990s: What can the elite reproduction rates tell us?. V: A. Kramberger (ed.): Mechanisms of social differentiation in Slovenia: thematic issue, Družboslovne razprave, vol. 16, no. 32/33, July-October 2000, pp. 143–180.

Kresal, F. (1998): Zgodovina socialne in gospodarske politike v Sloveniji od liberalizma do konca druge svetovne vojne (ed. N. Borak and Ž. Lazarević). Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba.

Lebow, R., J. G. Stein (1995): We All Lost the Cold War. Princeton: Princeton Univeristy Press.

Lee, T., M. Schlesinger (2001): Signaling in Context: Elite Influence and the Dynamics of Public Support for Clinton's Health Securuty Act. Harvard University: Faculty Research Working Papers Series RWP01-029 (Version 2: May 2001).

Machonin, P. (2002): A Contribution to the Testing of Elite Theories on the Czech Postsocialist Historical Reality. Paper (draft) for the Trento workshop: Enlargement & Europeanisation: Elite Perspectives, June 7 and 8, 2002.

Maoz, Zeev, Russett, Bruce (1993): Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986, in: American Political Science Review 87:3, 624-638.

McMillan, S. M. (1997): "Interdependence and Conflict", Mershon International Studies Review, 41: 33-58.

Sedmak, M. (2002): Etnično mešane zakonske zveze kot oblika medkulturnega soočenja: primer Slovenske Istre. Družboslovne razprave, vol. 17 (April 2002), no. 39, pp. 35-57.

Szeleny, I., D. Treiman (1993): Social Stratification in Central and Eastern Europe – Elite Survey. Common Questionnaire for an International Comparative Survey (Columbia University & Consortium of National Teams).

Szeleny, S., I. Szelenyi (1996): Interests and Symbols in Post-Communist Political Culture: The Case of Hungary. American Sociological Review, vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 466-477.

Zidar, A. (1996): Lustracija. Izločitev nasprotnikov demokracije z javnih položajev. Ljubljana: Nova revija.